PY4617: The Philosophy of Saul Kripke
Spring 2015
Module coordinator and lecturer: Dr. Ephraim Glick
Email: [email protected]
Office: Edgecliffe Room 201
Office Hour: Th 14:00-17:00
GENERAL INFORMATION
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Lectures: Th 11am-1pm
Seminars: Tu 1-2pm
◦ Seminars begin in Week 2
MMS page: https://mms.st-andrews.ac.uk/mms/module/2014_5/S2/PY4617/
Moodle: https://moody.st-andrews.ac.uk/moodle/course/view.php?id=3782
Library list: http://resourcelists.st-andrews.ac.uk/lists/156149F5-A735-05C92445-89D8A02D697D.html
Course content and learning outcomes: In this module we will examine many
of the most important works of Saul Kripke, together with some of the
secondary literature inspired by Kripke. (We won’t look at Lectures 1 and 2 of
Naming and Necessity, as these were covered in PY3701.) Topics will include the
referential / attributive distinction, propositional attitude reports, empty names,
rule-following, the mind-body problem, and more. By the end of the module,
you will be familiar with Kripke's work on those issues, as well as some of the
other important related pieces of literature. You will be able to understand and
critically examine contemporary literature about the issues.
ASSESSMENT
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Workload: This module is worth 30 credits; hence it should typically occupy
half of your working week. The standard university working week is 37.5 hours,
so this module should occupy about 18 hours per week, of which only three
are spent in class. You will neither achieve the grade of which you are capable,
nor gain much satisfaction from the course, unless you plan your study
accordingly.
Weighting: 100% coursework (no exam). The coursework has four components:
short weekly blog posts (15%), one 750-word argument analysis (15%), one
1750-word essay (25%), and one 3500-word essay (45%). Detailed instructions
are provided below. Full details of marking criteria for essays can be found in
the Philosophy Handbook for Undergraduates.
Coursework details:
◦ Blog posts: For each week Dr. Glick will provide a selection of prompts
about that week’s topic. Each of you must post at least one comment on the
module’s Moodle blog for that week by Monday at 16:00. Your comment
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can reply to one of the provided prompts, to another student’s comments,
or start a new thread. (Though let’s try to continue the conversation rather
than proliferating new threads.) You will earn two points for a thoughtful
comment of a short paragraph in length (or more), one point for only
posting a less substantive comment, and zero points if you fail to post
anything by the deadline. (So over ten weeks, you have the potential to earn
20 points, each point worth .75% of your overall module grade.)
o Argument Analysis: Write 750 words in response to the prompt below. No
need to set up all the background, write a formal introduction, etc. – just
focus on explaining and evaluating the central idea. Due Friday, February 6th
at 16:00.
 What is Kripke’s most compelling reason for thinking that definite
descriptions are not semantically ambiguous between referential and
attributive uses? Critically evaluate Kripke's reasoning.
o Short Essay: Write 1750 words in response to one of the two prompts
below. Due Friday, March 6th at 16:00.
 Critically evaluate Kripke's modal argument against descriptivism.
 What is Kripke’s puzzle about belief, and what lessons should we
draw from it? How does the puzzle affect the debate between
Millians and Fregeans about the semantics of names?
o Long Essay: Write 3500 words in response to one of the two prompts below.
Due Friday, April 17th at 16:00.
 What is the puzzle about meaning that Kripkenstein is posing, and
how should we respond to it?
 What is Kripke’s argument against the identification of physical
states with mental states? Is there any adequate response for the
physicalist, or can Kripke fend off the most powerful objections?
Please note these requirements for essays and other written work:
o Essays must be submitted via MMS.
o Essays must be word-processed and double-spaced. Formatting in .doc or
.docx is preferred, but .rtf or .pdf is acceptable.
o Essays will be marked anonymously, so do not include your name anywhere
in the document.
o On the first page of your essay, write your matriculation number, the
module name and number, your tutor’s name, the essay question you’ve
answered, and the following statement: ‘I hereby declare that the attached
piece of written work is my own work and that I have not reproduced,
without acknowledgement, the work of another’.
o Essays must not exceed the word limit; you must provide a word count at
the end of your essay. If you essay is too long, I might not read all of it.
Include in the word count everything except your bibliography; that is to say,
the word count must include footnotes, quotations, etc.
o Your bibliography must give full details of all sources consulted. If you quote
from or paraphrase any of those sources in your essay, you must give clear
references that allow the sources to be identified in the bibliography.
Further information about academic integrity can be found in the
Philosophy Handbook for Undergraduates.
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Tutorials: Attendance at tutorials is a compulsory part of the module, just like
submission of written work for assessment. If you are absent from three or more
tutorials without authorisation, you will receive a level 10 academic alert,
meaning that you will not receive credit for the module.
READINGS
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Core texts: Many readings will be taken from the books below, available from
Blackwell’s. They will also be on short loan in the main library. Other required
readings will be available electronically through the MMS page.
o Kripke, S. (2011) Philosophical Troubles (OUP).
o Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Harvard)
o Berger, A., ed. (2011) Saul Kripke (Cambridge).
… And if you haven’t already, you should buy Kripke’s Naming and Necessity.
Further readings: Further readings related to each topic will be suggested in the
schedule below and in lectures. You will need to read some of these in order to
write a good essay. A number of books will be on short loan in the main library.
Among those you might consult most frequently are the four below, the first
three of which will be available in Blackwell:
o Hughes, C. (2006) Kripke: Names, Necessity and Identity (OUP)
o Fitch, G.W. (2004) Saul Kripke (McGill-Queen’s)
o Burgess, J. (2012) Kripke (Polity).
o Hale, B. and Wright, C. (1997) A Companion to the Philosophy of Language
(Blackwell).
RESOURCES
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Libraries: Besides the Main Library, be aware of the Philosophy Department
Library (Edgecliffe Room 107).
Online texts: Many useful texts are available online. To find electronic journals
and books, follow the link to electronic resources on the library’s main page.
Research tools: PhilPapers and GoogleScholar can point you in the direction of
books, articles (they link to JSTOR, etc., if you’re on the university network),
authors, authors who’ve cited those authors, and so on. It’s a good way to find
out if a publication has generated discussion in the philosophical literature
(click on the relevant ‘Cited By’ link). There are several useful online
encyclopedias that can provide you with introductions to topics as well as some
technical details: the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and Philosophy Compass.
Guidance on writing philosophy essays: You can find helpful guidance in the
online Philosophy Handbook for Undergraduates. Paper copies are also available
from the department. (The handbook also has important information about
school policies, resources, and issues like academic misconduct.) More useful
writing advice is available on the website of Jim Pryor (NYU):
http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html
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SCHEDULE
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Week 1: The Referential / Attributive Distinction
o Required reading:
 Donnellan (1966), “Reference and Definite Descriptions”,
Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
 Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference”, in
Philosophical Troubles
o Extra reading:
 Fitch, Ch. 3.0-3.3
 Burgess, “Reference vs. Attribution” (in Ch. 1 of Kripke)
 Soames, S. (1994). “Donnellan's Referential/Attributive
Distinction”, Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):149-168.
 Bach, K. (1981). “Referential/Attributive”, Synthese 49 (2):219-244.
 Reimer, M. (1998). “Donnellan's Distinction / Kripke's Test”,
Analysis 58 (2):89-100.
 Schoubye, A. (Forthcoming). “Against the Argument from
Convention”, Linguistics and Philosophy.
 Reimer, M. and Bezuidenhout, A. (2004) Descriptions and Beyond
(OUP). (A collection including several relevant papers.)
 Neale, S. (1990) Descriptions (MIT).
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Week 2: Propositional Attitudes and the De Re / De Dicto Distinction
o Argument analysis due Friday at 16:00
o Required reading:
 Quine, W.V. “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of
Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
 Kripke, “Unrestricted Exportation”, in Philosophical Troubles
o Extra reading:
 McKay, T. & Nelson, M. (2010) “The De Re / De Dicto
Distinction”, supplement to “Propositional Attitude Reports”, in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 Kaplan, D. (1968) “Quantifying In”, Synthese 19 (1-2):178-214.
 Kaplan, D. (1986) "Opacity," in L. Hahn, ed., W.V. Quine (Open
Court). (Available on MMS. Note: Very difficult!)
 Sosa, E. (1970) “Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re”, Journal
of Philosophy 67:883-96.
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Week 2: Naming and Necessity
o Argument analysis due Friday at 16:00
o Required reading:
 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lectures I and II.
o Extra reading:
 Noonan, H. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and Naming and
Necessity. London: Routledge.
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Fitch, Chs. 1-2.
Burgess, Chs. 1-3.
Stanley, J. “Names and Rigid Designation”, in A Companion to the
Philosopy of Language, eds. Hale and Wright. Preprint here.
Stanley, J. “Rigidity and Content”, in Language, Thought, and Logic,
ed. Heck. Preprint here.
Stanley, J. “Modality and What is Said”, Philosophical Perspectives
16:321-344.
Soames, S. “The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified
Descriptions”, Noûs 32(1):1-22.
Salmon, N. “How to Measure the Standard Metre”, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 88: 193-217.
Jeshion, R. “Ways of Taking a Meter”, Philosophical Studies 99(3):297318.
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Week 3: Millianism and Belief Attributions
o Required reading:
 Kripke, “A Puzzle about Belief”, in Philosophical Troubles
o Extra reading:
 Fitch, Ch. 3.4-3.5
 Hughes, Ch. 1, pp. 27-36
 Burgess, “Direct Reference”, “Puzzling Pierre”, and “Poles Apart”, (in
Ch. 4 of Kripke)
 Richard, “Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief”, in Berger
 Salmon, “A Note on Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief”, in Berger
 Salmon, N. (1991) Frege’s Puzzle (Ridgeview).
 Salmon, N. and Soames, S. (1988) Propositions and Attitudes (OUP).
(A collection including several relevant papers.)
 Soames, S. (2002) Beyond Rigidity: the Unfinished Semantic Agenda of
Naming and Necessity (OUP)
 Taschek, W. (1988) “Would a Fregean be Puzzled by Pierre?”, Mind
97 (385):99-104.
 Sosa, D. (1996) “The Import of the Puzzle about Belief”, The
Philosophical Review 105 (3):373-402.
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Week 4: Empty Names
o Required reading:
 Kripke, “Vacuous Names and Fictional Entities”, in Philosophical
Troubles
 Salmon, “Fiction, Myth, and Reality”, in Berger
o Extra reading:
 Burgess, “Empty Names” (in Ch. 4 of Kripke)
 Braun, D. (1993) “Empty Names”, Noûs 27 (4):449-469.
 Braun, D. (2005) “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical
Names”, Noûs 39 (4):596-631.
 Salmon, N. (1998) “Nonexistence”, Noûs 32 (3):277-319.
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Reimer, M. (2007). “Empty Names: Communicative Value Without
Semantic Value”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):738747.
Everett, A. and Hofweber, T. (2000) Empty Names, Fiction, and the
Puzzles of Nonexistence (Cambridge). (A collection including several
relevant papers.)
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Weeks 5-6: Wittgenstein, Rule-Following, and Private Language
o Essay due Friday at 16:00
o Required reading:
 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language
o Extra reading:
 Burgess, Ch. 5
 Fitch, Ch. 7
 Wilson, “On the Skepticism about Rule-Following in Kripke’s
Version of Wittgenstein”, in Berger
 Steiner, pages 170-73 of “Kripke on Logicism, Wittgenstein, and De
Re Beliefs about Numbers”, in Berger
 Beuchner, “Not Even Computing Machines Can Follow Rules”, in
Berger
 McGinn, C. (1984) “Kripke on Wittgenstein's Sceptical Problem”,
Ratio 26:19-32
 Boghossian, P. (1989) “The Rule-Following Considerations”, Mind
98 (392):507-549.
 Millikan, R.G. (1990) “Truth Rules, Hoverflies, and the KripkeWittgenstein Paradox”, The Philosophical Review 99 (3):323-353
 Byrne, A. (1996) “On Misinterpreting Kripke’s Wittgenstein”,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
 Ginet, C. (1992) “The Dispositionalist Solution to Wittgenstein’s
Problem about Understanding a Rule: Answering Kripke’s
Objection”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1):53-73. (Available on
MMS.)
 Soames, S. (1998) “Skepticism about Meaning: Indeterminacy,
Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox”, in Meaning and
Reference, A. Kazmi (ed.), 211-49 (University of Calgary Press).
 Goldfarb, W. (1985) “Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules”, Journal of
Philosophy 82 (9):471-488.
 Miller, A. and Wright, C. (2002) Rule-Following and Meaning (McGillQueen’s / Acumen). (A collection including several relevant
papers.)
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Weeks 7-8:
Mind and Body
o Required reading:
 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Lecture 3
o Extra reading:
 Fitch, Ch. 5.5
 Hughes, Ch. 4
 Burgess, Ch. 6
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Shoemaker, “Kripke and Cartesianism”, in Berger
Yablo, S. (2010) Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality
(OUP).
• (1993) “Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?”
• (2000) “Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of
Concepts”
• (2006) “No Fool’s Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility”
Noonan, H. (2012) Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kripke and
Naming and Necessity (Routledge).
Chalmers, D. (1996) The Conscious Mind (OUP).
Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. (1999) “There are Fewer Things in
Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers’ Philosophy”, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 59 (2):445-454. (A review of Chalmers’
1996 book.)
Hill, C. (1997) “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the
Mind-Body Problem”, Philosophical Studies 87 (1):61-85
Garcia-Carpintero, M. and Macia, J. (2006) Two-Dimensional
Semantics (OUP). (A collection including several relevant papers.)
• Chalmers, D. “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional
Semantics”.
• Byrne, A. and Pryor, J. “Bad Intensions”.
• Stalnaker, R. “Assertion Revisited”.
Soames, S. (2005) Reference and Description: The Case Against TwoDimensionalism (Princeton).
Papineau, D. “Kripke’s Proof is Ad Hominem not Two Dimensional”,
ms.
Levine, J. (2001) Purple Haze (OUP).
Buechner, “Not Even Computing Machines Can Follow Rules”, in
Berger
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Week 9: Metaphysics of modality
o Required reading:
 Kripke’s comments on possible worlds in the Preface to Naming and
Necessity
 Stalnaker, R. “Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical
Foundations”, in Berger
o Extra reading:
 Stalnaker, R. (1976) “Possible Worlds”, Noûs 10 (1):65-75.
 Fitch, Ch. 1.3
 Hughes, Ch. 3.1-3.2, pp. 119-153
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Week 10: Identity over time
o Essay due Friday at 16:00
o Required reading:
 Hughes Ch. 3.3 pp. 153-169
 Sider, T. (2001) Selections from Ch. 6 of Four-Dimensionalism (OUP).
o Extra reading:
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Hawley, K. (1999) “Persistence and Non-Supervenient Relations”,
Mind 108:53-67
Zimmerman, D. (1998) “Temporal Parts and Supervenient
Causation”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):265-288.
Lewis, D. (1999) “Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere”,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):209-212.
Zimmerman, D. (1999) “One Really Big Liquid Sphere: Reply to
Lewis”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):213-215.
Week 11: TBD
o We can choose a topic for the final week based on student interest. Possible
topics include knowledge and modal logic.
 Knowledge:
• Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, Ch. 3. Focus on pp. 167178, 197-211. (Available on MMS.)
• Kripke, “Nozick on Knowledge”, in Philosophical Troubles.
• Luper-Foy, S. (1987) The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and his
Critics (Rowman and Littlefield).
• Briggs, R. and Nolan, D. (2012) “Mad, Bad, and Dangerous
to Know”, Analysis 72 (4):314-316.
 Modal logic:
• Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, in
Acta Philosophica Fennica 16, pp. 83-94. (Available on MMS.)
• Burgess, “Modal Logic and Its Archenemy” (in Ch. 2 of
Kripke) and Appendix A, “Models”
• Burgess, “Kripke Models”, in Berger
• Fitch, Ch. 1.0-1.2
• Hughes, Ch. 2.1, pp. 70-84
 Propositional attitudes and the de re / de dicto distinction:
• See previous plan for Week 2 above.
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