TELCON The President/Mr. Kissinger 11:30 -

TELCON
The P r e s i d e n t / M r . Kissinger
11:30 -- A p r i l 15, 1972
K:
. .. about 50 % of
P:
So certainly, Henry, they m u s t be hitting something.
K:
Well, Mr. P r e s i d e n t , they claimed t o have counted 10,000 bodies
up t o now and if you cut it i n half, t h e r e must be another 5,000
that they have killed that we don't find.
o u r s s o they a r e getting it.
Sure, s u r e .
In B-52 attacks.
Well, I ' l l t e l l you they a r e being punished and they a r e taking heavy
casualties. The b a s t a r d s a r e
--
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , if they don't m a k e it this time, they a r e not going
t o come back f o r two y e a r s .
If they don't make it this t i m e , w e ' r e out of the woods but the point
i s that we have t o r e a l i z e though that our hold c a r d is the blockade.
However, t h a t ' s why you've got t o get it settled with the Russians
now. I don't want a meeting -- you s e e , when you m e e t with t h e m
it's e i t h e r got t o be on the way t o settlement o r we blockade. You
s e e t h a t ' s the one thing I'm concerned about, these b a s t a r d s , that
they will filibuster us.
They c a n ' t filibuster you beyond the 25th of April.
Right.
And on the other hand, Mr. P r e s i d e n t , the m a j o r thing now is t o
beat down t h e s e North Vietnamese. I told t h e m that you could not
have a reasonable summit meeting if t h e r e w e r e m a j o r action
going on i n Vietnam.
Right.
He understands that, doesn't h e ?
Oh, yes.
Good, God, we can't go t h e r e with Russian tanks and Russian
Hell, no, w e ' r e
guns killing South Vietnamese and Americans.,
not going t o go! We won't go. It i s n ' t just a reasonable summit;
it means t h e r e a i n ' t going t o be no meeting, that's what h e ' s got t o
understand.
TELCON
The P r e s i d e n t / M r . Kis singer
April 15, 1972 - - 11:30
K:
Right.
P:
And you can
trip.
K:
Well, I think when I s a y i f we keep our nerves, I don't mean you.
I m e a n if a s a country we keep our nerves, we a r e going to make it.
Assuming the South Vietnamese don't collapse on us but t h e r e i s no
sign of this.
P:
They m a y be s t r o n g e r than we think.
K:
,
--
s o you've got a few c a r d s t o play yourself on your
Well, s o f a r , Mr. President
--
P:
I t ' s been t h r e e weeks now.
K:
Actions have been going on t h r e e weeks; they have not achieved one
m a j o r objective. When it started, we said t o ourselves if they take
3 o r 4 provincial towns, we a r e not doing badly. They've not yet
taken one.
Yeah; p r e t t y good, i s n ' t i t ?
T h a t ' s right.
Well, i n any event, you would be going under p r e s e n t plans Wednesday
night.
Yes. I suggested moving it a day but he said t h e r e i s a meeting of
the Politburo on Sunday and s o it would be v e r y inconvenient if they
had t o change.
Move it back a day, which way?
T o Thursday night.
Hell, no, go Wednesday.
Right.
The sooner, the better f o r us.
Well, w e ' r e going Wednesday night now.
Yeah, yeah; get it over with.
Right.
In the meantime though, you mean our hands a r e tied now for a week?
TELCON
The P r e s i d e n t l ~ r .Kis singer
A p r i l 15, 1972 -- 11:30
K:
Well, no, we can bomb the bejesus out of t h e m all over North
Vietnam except i n the Hanoi and Haiphong a r e a .
P:
You would not - - because you in effect had said we would not
bomb t h e r e , i s that what you told them?
K:
T h a t fs right.
P:
What about naval action?
K:
We can go up and down the coast but not beyond the 20th p a r a l l e l
i n effect.
P:
T h a t ' s a l l right too.
K:
But, M r . President, that gets every port of North Vietnam except
Haiphong
P:
Yeah. But on the other hand, that allows A b r a m s t o do what he
wants t o do and concentrate his a i r power i n the battle a r e a and
we've given t h e m quite a shock up i n that a r e a f o r a while.
K.
T h a t ' s right, M r . President.
P:
Why do you think though they will i n t e r p r e t , Henry - - what do you
think they will i n t e r p r e t our stopping hitting the North, protests
o r something? You see, t h a t ' s what w o r r i e s me.
.
They know what the situation is.
No, no, no; they know we a r e talking t o the Russians. And a f t e r all,
we a r e only stopping something that we have only done one day.
We a r e continuing everything else.
They might expect we might come back another day.
Exactly.
Has it been c a r r i e d i n the news yet?
Yeah.
Heavily.
[ ~ a u g h t e r ]What a r e they saying about i t ?
--
Squealing?
Well, they a r e just reporting it
i t ' s just t h e f i r s t wave there.
I t ' s wave a f t e r wave of planes. You s e e , they can't s e e the B-52
and they dropped a million pounds of bombs.
TELCON
The P r e s i d e n t I M r . Kis singer
April
What?
A million pounds of bombs.
A million pounds of bombs.
In the Haiphong a r e a ?
In t h e Haiphong a r e a .
Did they have t h e i r c a l i b r a t o r s fit?
Yeah, they a r e fixed now.
You think they r e a l l y hit something this time, don't you?
Well, actually, we now have t h e photographs; they hit something
l a s t t i m e too.
Yeah. But this t i m e they probably hit a hell of a lot though, don't
you think?
Oh, God, yes.
And this t i m e they did it visually
, Mr. President.
Oh, the weather was good enough?
Yes, they did it with r a d a r visually.
Goddamn, that m u s t have been a good s t r i k e !
Yeah.
Of c o u r s e , you want t o r e m e m b e r Johnson bombed t h e m f o r y e a r s
and it didn't do any good.
But, Mr. P r e s i d e n t , Johnson n e v e r had a strategy; he was s o r t of
picking away a t them. He would go i n with 50 planes, 20 planes;
I bet you we will have had m o r e planes over t h e r e i n one day than
Johnson had i n a month.
Really?
Yeah.
Well, that has m o r e i m p a c t too.
T h a t ' s right.
TELCON
The ~ r e s i d e n t / M r . Kissinger
A p r i l 15, 1972
11:30
--
P:
That s h o c k t r e a t m e n t of cracking them.
The only thing I r e g r e t
i s that when we made this plan, we didn't take out the power plants.
The power plants, that can really demoralize a person.
Well, they have a power plant that they can hit south of the 20th
parallel.
I meant the ones i n Hanoi; put out the lights.
Well, it m a y be on there.
Really?
I have t o check that list. What they gave t h e m was 10 t a r g e t s
of which they w e r e supposed t o hit 6.
I see.
Well, it's probably a pretty good strike, Henry, i s n ' t i t ?
Well, 196 airplanes, Mr. President, t h a t ' s pretty serious.
Well, i n World War I
plane raid.
- - I1 though, w e
used t o have a thousand
Yeah, but t h e s e planes can c a r r y -- each plane can c a r r y about
10 t i m e s the load of World War II plane could c a r r y .
Yeah.
Well, anyway, we will hold on and s e e what happens.
Well, we've got a few hold cards.
I think we've got Bill on salvo; h e ' l l take a hard line.
knows it.
I think he
I mean, Mr. President, even if some protests s t a r t next week,
we've got a big hol& card.
Well, the fact t h a t you've been t o Russia.
Exactly.
When we blow that one, that's going t o really - - of course, if we
blow that one, you realize we will s a y then that we a r e not going
t o the summit. But t h a t ' s - -
TELCON
The P r e s i d e n t / M r . Kis singer
A p r i l 15, 1972 - - 11:30
--
K.
Well, no, but t h e r e m a y be conditions which we may blow it
P:
And s t i l l go, huh?
K:
And s t i l l go t o the summit. F o r example, supposing we get a
settlement which the Russians guarantee.
P:
Oh, that!
K:
My a s s e s s m e n t i s that the chances a r e 50-50 that we may want t o
blow it a t some point. But a t any r a t e , it i s a good hold c a r e t o
have.
P:
Well, we s h a l l see. Oh, y e s , that's the r e a s o n why you a r e going.
I t ' s a good thing t o do. As I said, a f t e r r e v e r s i n g e a r l i e r the
decision, I think i t ' s right; you've just got t o go. Whether they come
o r not, the Vietnamese - -
Oh, any settlement.
You could even make a c a s e if they come a week l a t e r , it gives
t h e m a better chance t o work t h e m over.
Well, also, we've got a chance t o work them over
Yeah, yeah.
I mean, after you m e e t
too. You understand i f they don't show
the Russians
--
--
Oh, we go right back to him.
Don't you a g r e e ?
Oh, yeah.
6;: Russians have got t o damn well understand that.
And, also,
they've got t o understand - - Well, I don't know, I just have a feeling,
Henry, that the strategy,which you and I both a g r e e on, i s the right
one.
No question.
Everybody thinks i t ' s too Hawkish; too unreasonable and s o f o r t h
but what the h e l l e l s e can you do?
M r . P r e s i d e n t , if we had pursued the L a i r d strategy, we might have
won i n the South but the w a r would have dragged on and on and on and
doesn't bring the Russians in.
winning i n the South i s no
I mean, we wouldn't have won i n the
What brings the Russians i n
--
--
TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
A p r i l 15, 1972
11:30
--
K:
(con'td) South, we could have held i n the South and what brings
the Russians i n i s the fact that the situation may get out of hand.
Pouring that F l e e t i n t h e r e h a s made m o r e of a n impact on
the Rus sians than the defense of An Loc which they don't understand.
Yeah.
The F l e e t shakes t h e m because they think i t ' s a blockade.
Of course.
And t h e y ' r e right. This t i m e we a r e n ' t fooling; we've got enough
t o do it with, haven't we? We have M o r r i s and Bill Cumin ( ? )
out t h e r e
--
Two c a r r i e r s on the way. One of t h e m i s going t o be t h e r e on
Monday and operational on Wednesday. That immediately gives us
96 s o r t i e s more.
I t e l l you the thing t o do i s t o pour it i n t h e r e every place we can;
just pour it down wherever the weather i s and just bomb the h e l l
out of them. I would think they'd be tearing the hell out of the
I Corps now, shouldn't they? The w e a t h e r ' s pretty good.
Oh, God
--
A r e they hitting some things ?
Oh, yes. And they a r e tearing up the Panhandle. I don't even r e p o r t
this stuff t o you; 26 secondaries, warehouses,destroyed and stuff
like that.
In the Panhandle ?
Yeah.
And the cumulative effect of that i s going t o be quite a lot.
Oh, Abrams has got the h o r s e s now.
but himself.
He can't blame it on anybody
Exactly.
Okay. Well, we finished one P a n American one again.
t h e r e i s s u r e not a damn thing t o s a y t o these folks.
T h a t ' s the truth.
I t e l l you
TELCON
The ~ r e s i d e n t / M r .Kis s i n g e r
11:30, A p r i l 15, 1972
P:
They've been a t it a week and - - God, I love t h e m but J e s u s C h r i s t
i t ' s -- the Organization, I mean they a r e just lovely people but they
just haven't got it, have they?
No.
Well, t h e r e ' s something missing.
Except f o r Brazil.
Yeah.
T h e r e ' s something missing.
Well, anyway, w e ' l l see.
In the morning you will gi v e m e
--
I'm going over t o the Pentagon t o get a full wrap-up on today's
operations and then I will give you a call.
Yeah. On t h e R o g e r s ' thing, I told h i m t o give m e a call if he
had any thoughts o r anything he wanted t o a s k about. But h e ' s all
s e t f o r the h a r d line. I s t h e r e anything m o r e you think we want
t o feed him, why, l e t ' s give i t to him.
Right, Mr. P r e s i d e n t s
You know, l e t ' s let h i m go
--
Well, I don't think we should overdo it now; I think we a r e i n good
shape.
He won't overdo it, you know that. What I meant i s , whatever he
s a y s won't sound n e a r a s hard a s if Laird s a y s it. That's the
r e a s o n his saying it i s good.
Oh, yes; i t ' s a g r e a t asset.
Yeah.
Okay, thank you.
Right, M r à President.