Contemporary China Center, Australian National University
The Last Hurrah? Political Protest in Inner Mongolia
Author(s): William R. Jankowiak
Source: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 19/20 (Jan. - Jul., 1988), pp. 269-288
Published by: Contemporary China Center, Australian National University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2158548 .
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THE LAST HURRAH?
POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA*
WilliamR. Jankowiak
Over 6,000 Mongoliancollege students,
on threeseparateoccasions,
poured into the streetsof Huhhot,capital of the Inner Mongolia
Autonomous
Region(IMAR) of thePeople's Republicof China,in the
autumnof 1981,shoutingslogans,singingsongs,petitioning
thepublic
and disruptingall manner of commerce and traffic.To many
of the lingering
Huhhotians,it was anotherpublic demonstration
a periodof socialturbulence
thatthe
woundsof theCulturalRevolution,
Chinesegovemment
nowrefersto as 'a nationaldisaster'.The Mongols
referto theperiodas the GreatSorrow(da ku), forit was
poignantly
numberof Mongols were
duringthis period that an extraordinary
arrested,
imprisoned,
tortured
andkilled.The repercussions
oftheseacts
continueto reverberatethroughout
much of the IMAR and have
contributed
to a generalizedyetsharpsenseof moralambiguity,
outrage
andethnicassertiveness.
*
This articleis based on fieldresearchconductedduringvarioustripsto northern
Chinaand theIMAR throughout
muchof the1980s.DuringthattimeI was able
to informally
interview
186 Mongols.The information
containedin thispaperis
derivedfromobservation
and conversations
withMongolianscholars,officials,
and ordinarypeople. This researchwas supported,
in part,by a grantfromthe
NationalScience Foundation(C.S.C.P.R.C.), Sigma Xi, and the University
of
California
PatentFund.The authorthanksthefollowing
scholarsforcommenting
on a previousversionofthisarticle:JimBell, MunroeEdmonson,BarryHewett,
Don McMillen,TomPaladino,Jonathan
Ungerandtwoanonymous
reviewers.
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS,ISSUE 19/20,1988
270
THEAUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL
OFCHINESEAFFAIRS
In thispaperI intendto analysethestudent
unrestandproteststrike
of 1981-82as a meansto identify
thehistorical
and sociologicalfactors
responsiblefor periodicallymobilizingMongols and, in some cases,
restrainingthem from taking their grievancesto the street and
demandingjustice fromthe state. In addition,an analysis of the
students'grievancesprovidesan opportunity
to assess the difficulties,
inherentin federalism,
of implementing
a viable autonomousregion
policywhilesimultaneously
fornationalintegration.
striving
HistoricalBackground:1911-58
The modemhistory
of InnerMongoliais a taleof invasion,landfraud,
economicdebt,politicalintrigueand nation-building.'
Fletcherfound
thatafterthe collapse of the Qing dynastyin 1911, Han colonization
showeda markedincreasethatresultedin limitation
of the nomads'
pastoralmovementand a reductionof theirpasture.2This provoked
someMongolianprincesto engagein highlychargeddebatesoverwhat
should be done about the problemand what theirpolicy should be
towardsthe newlyformedRepublicof China. Some InnerMongolian
princesarguedthattheirlong-term
interestlay in joiningwithOuter
Mongolianprincesin forming
a new independent
nation.Otherprinces
urgedMongoliansto forma nationindependent
of bothOuterMongolia
and China. In orderto promotethisidea, the lattergroupformeda
political party called, appropriately
enough, the Inner Mongolian
Revolutionary
Party(Nei ren dang) which was foundedin October
1925,3The majority
of theprinceslivingin InnerMongolia,however,
foundthe idea of independenceand nation-building
unattractive
and
economically
unfeasible.The issue becamemootafter1911 whenYuan
Shikai, recentlyappointedpresidentof the Republic of China and
commanderof China's northernarmy,defeatedan invadingOuter
Mongolianarmy,therebysecuringInnerMongoliafortheRepublicof
China. The pacificationof the InnerMongolianRevolutionary
Party
membership,
however,was farfromcomplete.A numberof Mongolian
princes,particularly
Demchugdungrub
(De Wang),remainedadamantin
1
Thissectionis basedon readings
andconversations
withHan andMongolian
scholars
livinginShanghai,
Beijing,InnerMongoliaandtheUnitedStates.For
I cannot
obviousreasons,
directly
citetheir
contributions.
2 JosephFletcher,'HistoricalText' in Alonso (ed.), China's InnerAsianFrontier
(M.E.PeabodyMuseum,
Boston,1979),p.45.
3 S. Jagchidand P. Hyer,Mongolia's Cultureand Society(WestviewPress,
Boulder,
Colorado,
1979).
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
271
totheidea of independence,
butunsureofhowbestto
theircommitment
realize that ambition.In an attemptto compel the Guomindang
in Nanjingto grantgreater
toInnerMongolia,De
government
autonomy
Wang and his followersconveneda conferencein 1933 to forma
thatwould be separatefrom
westernInner Mongolian government
Manchukuo(Manchuria)andXing'an,a Japanesepuppetadministration
China. De Wang's
and autonomousMongolianprovincein north-east
was notsuccessfuland in 1936 withsecret
appealforgreaterautonomy
Japaneseaid he formedan InnerMongoliangovernment.
This,Fletcher
notes, 'created a split withinthe Mongolian leadership.A Chinaorientedcoalitionwithdrew
fromDe Wang's nationalist
but
movement,
De Wang held his groundand joined Manchuriain an unsuccessful
toinvadeSuiyuan'.4
attempt
The collapse of the Manchurianpuppetadministration
in 1945
rekindled many Mongols' hopes for obtaining greater political
autonomy.
thelate 1940sInnerMongoliaservedas a
Indeed,throughout
cauldronforcompetingpoliticalpartiesrepresenting
a wide rangeof
interests
andideals.Rangingin size fromtinycliquesof twoor
different
threemembersto large associationsof over 3,000 members,these
Inner
politicalpartiesofferedcompetingvisions of what constituted
Mongolians' best interests.Some political parties wanted only to
overthrow
theGuomindanggovernment;
othersdesiredto linkup with
OuterMongolia; and stillothersurgeda mergerwiththe Communist
Partyin a unitedfront
againsttheGuomingdang.
The retreatof theJapanesearmycombinedwiththeslow advance
of the Communistarmycreateda powervacuumin north-east
Inner
MongoliathatenabledNei rendangleadersto consolidatetheirposition
and in 1946 to assistin forming
an independent
government,
withits
in
capitallocated thecityof Ulanhote.This newlycreatedgovernment
was short-lived.
Withina year,at the 1947 Chengdemeetings,the
CommunistPartydelegates,appealingto revolutionary
consciousness
and anti-Japanese
sentiment,
successfullypersuadedthe majorityof
InnerMongoliandelegatesto disbandtheirgovernment
at Ulanhoteand
to incorporateit into the People's Republic of China. Though the
delegatesremaineddeeplysuspiciousoftheParty'strueintentions,
they
were ultimatelymoved by ideological appeals for national unity.
Guaranteeswere made by the Partyto implementa viable minority
policy thatwould protectMongolianeconomicinterestsand cultural
heritage.Not lost on theInnerMongoliandelegateswas theominous
4
Fletcher,
p.46.
272
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
factthat,without
theSovietUnion'ssupport,
theyhad no chancein any
thepowerful
Red Army.
eventofdefeating
over one-thirdof the delegates
In spite of these considerations,
some fledto thesafetyof the
votedagainstthemerger.Subsequently,
to hide in Hailar and
MongolianPeoples' Republic.Othersattempted
down and either
to
be
hunted
the
Russian
border
villages along
only
imprisoned
or executed.Of thosedelegateswho did voteto mergewith
membersof theNei rendang who had become
thePRC (manyformer
severalwererewarded
important
officialsin theUlanhotegovernment),
bureaucratic
for theirsupportthroughappointment
to high-ranking
positionswithinthe newly formedInner Mongolian Autonomous
Region.Thus,by 1950,80 percentof theregionalgovernment
officials
wereMongols.
In 1953,however,BeijingorderedtheIMAR, establishedin 1947,
to be expandedto includethenorth-west
provinceof Suiyuan.Publicly,
thePartyclaimedit was restoring
theoriginalQingboundariesdistorted
by the Guomindangduringthe 1930s. In fact,Beijing had become
increasingly
uncertainover the loyaltyof Mongols livingalong the
borderof theMongolianPeoples' Republic5and the Soviet Union.In
addition,it was suspiciousof itsown high-ranking
Mongolianofficials.
Because theHan overwhelmingly
outnumbered
theMongolsin Suiyuan,
in the ethniccompositionof
Beijingwas able to legitimizealterations
the IMAR bureaucracyby invokingthe widely held principleof
majority
representation.
It was notuntiltheGreatLeap Forwardanditsdisastrousaftermath
had rippledthrough
theIMAR, affecting
herderand peasantalike,that
Mongolian cadres publiclyexhibitedsigns of disillusionment
with
Beijing's minority
policy. High-ranking
Mongol leaders vehemently
protestedagainst the national government'sreversal of 'putting
livestockfirst'in favourof 'puttinggrainfirst'in the IMAR. The
Mongols arguedthattheecologyof the grasslandswould not support
intensive
graincultivation
and thatit was inappropriate
to de-emphasize
herding(a traditionalMongolian subsistenceactivity)in favourof
farming(the traditionalHan subsistenceactivity).The government
respondedswiftlyto dissent by arrestingand/ordemotingevery
Mongolianofficialwho had voiced oppositionto the government's
directives.Beijing's actionswere not lost on the Mongolianofficials
residingin Huhhot.Privately,
accordingto interviews,
manywondered
iftheyhadnotmadea seriousmistakeinjoiningthePRC. The majority
5
ThoughtheMongolianPeople's Republicwas foundedin 1924,Huhhotians
still
referto itas OuterMongolia.
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
273
of thecity'sMongolianpopulationadopteda pragmatic
view,however,
would
and hopedthatthepoliticalunrest
pass soon,sparingthemselves
This hopewas notrealized.Halfa
andtheirfamiliesneedlesssuffering.
dozen years afterthe GreatLeap Forward,the issue of Mongolian
loyaltywas again raised by Han leaders. This time, however,the
consequencesweredevastating.
The CulturalRevolution- The Rise ofa MythicalNei rendang
Huhhotin thesummerof 1966.6
The CulturalRevolutionsweptthrough
Red Guardunits,sentfromlargercoastal cities,believedthatChina's
traditionalcustoms were barbaric,backward,and responsiblefor
of theiranger
holdingback China's development.
The demonstration
in
ofall but
towardstheartifacts
of China'sheritage
resulted thegutting
one of thecity'stenTibetan-Buddhist
temples,theclosureof thecity's
onlyCatholicchurchand thepartialclosureof Qing da si, thelargest
ChineseMoslemmosquein Huhhot.
Besidestargeting
a varietyofminorcadresforcriticism,
Red Guard
units also attackedhigh-ranking
Mongol leaders and, in particular,
of theIMAR, foralleged sympathies
with
Ulanfu,thePartysecretary
local Mongoliannationalistic
interests.
Aftera numberof skirmishes
betweenBeijingMaoistsand loyal Ulanfuforces,thePLA 21st army
underthecommandof Deng Haiqingwas orderedtorestoreorderin the
IMAR.7By 1967,theviolentperiodhadwaned.However,in early1968,
Deng Haiqing,nowthePartysecretary
oftheIMAR,reported
toBeijing
thatnot everyonehad abandonedtheirpreviouspoliticalties. Some
remainedcommitted
to theNei ren dang movementwhich,now that
China was in dangerousferment,
was benton realizingits historic
ambitionof reunitingInnerMongolia with the MongolianPeoples'
Republic.
The reactionof the centralgovernment
was swift.Deng was
orderedto use whatevermethodswerenecessaryto findtheleadersof
Nei rendangandcrushtheirsecretorganization.
WithBeijing'ssupport,
Deng Haiqing orderedeveryworkunitin Huhhotto appointa Han
officialto oversee the organizationand routineinterrogation
of all
6
My purposeis notto tellthehistory
oftheCulturalRevolutionin theIMAR. That
stillneeds to be written.
Rather,I wishto showtheconsequencesof theNei ren
dangcampaignon present-day
Han-MongolrelationsinHuhhotandtheIMAR.
7 P. Hyer and W. Heaton,'The CulturalRevolutionin InnerMongolia', China
Quarterly,
no.36,1968,pp.114-28.
274
THE AUSTRALIAN
OF CHINESEAFFAIRS
JOURNAL
Mongolsassignedto thatworkunit.High-ranking
Mongolianofficials
untiltheynamedat leastfouror
weredetained,questionedand tortured
fiveothermembers
of thesecretRevolutionary
Party.In time,thesweep
expandedto includeany Han who 'associatedwithMongolians'.In the
waningmonthsof the purge,even Han urbanitesand local peasants
began to vent theirlongstanding
animositytowardneighboursand
associatesby aggressively
accusingone anotherof beinga memberof
Nei rendang.
It was not until 1970-71 thatorderwas restoredin the IMAR.
Homes had been vandalized,lives ruined;parentsand childrenwere
missing,imprisonedor dead. In reaction,between 1971 and 1975
Huhhotservedas the focalpointfora numberof ad hoc Mongolian
demonstrations,
protestingagainsteithergovernment
policies or the
actionsofspecificHan officials.
In 1976,thefallof the'Gang of Four' brought
an intensecathartic
reactionthroughout
China. In Huhhot,the yearsof frustration,
anger,
bitterness
and grieferuptedin a spontaneousoutpouringof personal
anguish,whichwas dramatizedin character
postersput up throughout
thecity.Forthefirsttime,thegeneralpubliclearnedfirst-hand
aboutthe
horrors
oftheCulturalRevolution.
Below are a samplingof accountsrecountedto me by Mongol
informants:
The Han devilsbrokeintomyhouse and startedslappingmymotherand
father,
accusingthemofbeingmembers
oftheNei rendang.Theythentook
myfatheraway,sayingtheywouldcomeback formymother...My father
was beatenforseveralweeks... One nighttheytied him to a chairand
slowlypouredboilingwateroverhishead.By morning
he was dead.
Anotherremembered:
We didn'tsee myfather
forovera year.We worriedconstantly.
One dayhe
reappearedat ourhome.He was hungry
and in pain.He was stillsuffering
fromrepeatedbeatingsandthehumiliation
of havinghisearscutoff.
A thirdrecalled:
One nightwe heardthedogs barkingand a screamfrommyaunt.My father
hadreturned
home.We hadn'tseen himforsix months.My poorfather,
he
couldn'ttellus whathadhappened.Theyhadcutouthistongueandgouged
outhiseyes.He diedsix weekslater.
A fourth
related:
Because my fatherwas highin thegovernment,
he was arrestedearlyin
1969.We lostall contactwithhim.We didn'tsee himforfiveyears.When
THELAST HURRAH?POLITICALPROTESTIN INNERMONGOLIA
275
myfather
didreturn,
hehada noticeable
thefirst
limp.Itseemsthatduring
yearofarrest,
theyhadslowlybumedtheskinoffthesolesofhisfeet.
A fifth
reported:
Myfather
He wouldnevernamefiveleadersoftheso-called
was strong.
Nei ren dang.Evenafter
theybrokehislowerspine,he refused
tofalsely
accusehisfriends.
Theycameto ouryurt[a Mongolian
tent]andshotmy
uncleandmyaunt.I waselevenyearsoldat thetimeandthey
justleftme
there.
Another
Mongolrelatedthefollowingstoryabouta friend:
His mother,
a high-ranking
official,
was arrested
and interrogated
for
severalweeks.Onenight
hergaolersdecidedtorapeherwitha pole.When
theystopped,
shemanaged
tobreakawayandleaptoherdeath.
Another
related:
My unclewas killedafterhisguardsplaceda largecauldron
filledwith
onhischest.
water
boiling
Another
recalledtheethnicepithets
usedwhen:
Theytookmeintoa roomandstarted
toslapme,anddemanded
toknowifI
lovedGenghis
KhanmorethanMao. Suddenly
oneofthemthrew
a potof
boilingwateron myback.Theylaughingly
calledme a Mongolwithno
back.
Another
informant
noted:
Myfather
wasmorefortunate.
After
questioning
himall day,theylethim
alone.He didn'twanttofalsely
accusehisfriends.
He tiedhisshoelacesto
thebedpostso hecouldcommit
suicidebypushing
himself
offthesideof
thebed.
As thesearchformembersof Nei rendang continued,
it expanded
to include Han who had close ties with Mongolians.Below is a
remembrance
ofthatbitter
time:
Myfather,
a Han,worked
ina Mongolian
work-unit.
himand
Theyarrested
accusedhimofhidingMongolian
secrets.
Whatsecrets?
Whilehe was in
prison,
we werestillallowedtogo tomiddleschool.Atschoolthestudents
knewmyfather
hadbeenarrested,
andeveryday
theywouldteasemyolder
brother.
He foughtto defendour familyhonour.That'show he died,
fighting
theother
students.
In theaftermath
of intenseoutpourings
of personalgrief,a teamof
Mongolscholarswas organizedto investigate
and quantify
thenumber
of people imprisoned
andkilledin theIMAR. At JiangQing's trial,the
stateaccusedherof contributing
to thedeathof over 16,222people in
276
THE AUSTRALIAN
JOURNAL
OF CHINESEAFFAIRS
InnerMongolia.8This was probablyan understatement.
Relyingupon
eyewitnessaccounts,confessions,and individualstatements,
Mongol
thatthefigurewas morethan100,000.9In 1976,the
scholarsdetermined
local government
privatelyagreedthatover 50,000 people had died
the
during
upheaval.The government,
however,refusedto include
whodiedtwoorthreeyearsafter
'delayeddeaths'(i.e.,thoseindividuals
thepurge
theywereallowedto return
home).The scholarsinvestigating
disagreed with the government'saccounting. Today, informed
Mongolianinformants
willciteboththeofficialand unofficial
statistics.
In additionto the 100,000who died eitherdirectlyor indirectly
from
woundsinflictedduringthe CulturalRevolution,therewere between
350,000 and 500,000 people arrested.10
It is difficult
to obtainexact
figureson the ethniccompositionof those killed and imprisoned.
Mongolianintellectuals
fervently
believeand adamantlyinsistthatthe
vast majorityarrestedand killedwere Mongols.One informant
noted:
'Therewas not a singleMongol who did not lose a close relativeor
friendduringtheCulturalRevolution'.His observation
in
was supported
my own surveyof 186 Mongolianpastoraland urbanhouseholdsin
whichI foundthat56 households(30 per cent)had at least one person
and 11 households(17 percent)had lostat leastone immediate
arrested
relative during the Nei ren dang upheaval. If this sample is
representative
it wouldmean thatmorethanone out of fourMongols
was arrestedat different
periodsduringtheCulturalRevolution.It also
lends supportto the argument
thatduringthe CulturalRevolutionthe
vastmajority
ofthe500,000peoplearrested
andthe100,000killedwere
Mongols.
The horror
oftheseeventsjoltedethnicconsciousnessandopeneda
far-reaching
dialogue amongherders,farmersand urbanitesover the
meaningand significance
of regionalautonomy
andMongolianunity.In
Huhhot,Mongol-Hanfriendship
tieswereredrawnalongethniclines.A
numberof informants
noted thatprior to the CulturalRevolution,
Mongolsand Hans livingin Huhhotattempted
tointeract
andmaintaina
hospitabledemeanour,buttherenow emergeda segmentof theurban
8
A GreatTrialinChinese
History
(NewWorldPress,Beijing,1981),p.21.
9 This figureof 100,000 probablyincludesanyonewho was killed duringthe
CulturalRevolutionin theIMAR. I could notfindanyonewhocould give me a
preciseethnicbreakdown.
It is important
tonote,however,thattheMongolswho
did suffer
thelion's shareoftheterror
insistthatthisfigurereflects
onlyMongols
whowerekilledduringtheCulturalRevolution.This figureis citedso oftenthat
mostMongolsbelieveittobe true.
10 ibid.
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
277
Mongolcommunity
that'refusedtotouchHan' (i.e.,wouldnotassociate
with anyone who was ethnicHan Chinese). Othersreaffirmed
their
ethnicheritageby discardingtheirHan surnamein favourof their
of
Mongolone. It now becamea badgeof honour,a publicaffirmation
Mongolianethnicity.
Beijing attempted
to softenthe CulturalRevolution'sexcesses in
InnerMongoliaby renewingits pledge to supporttheprincipleof an
In addition,Beijingdecidedin 1977,
autonomous
regionalgovernment.
of thefoundingof the IMAR, to reuniteall the
the 30th anniversary
leagues(meng)thathad beenseparatedduringtheCulturalRevolution.
Exceptfora small forestry
regionin Xing'an league,all leagueswere
administratively
transferred
back to the IMAR. The government
also
expandedits affirmative
actionpolicy to includean ethnicquota for
admissionto college.The innercircleof the government
believedthis
gesturewould softenMongolian outrageand, in the words of a
official:'reuniteand 'close thewoundsbetweentheHan
governmental
and Mongolianpeoples'. Mongolsfeltotherwise.
Theyused thestate's
offerof reconciliation
as an opportunity
toformally
thenational
petition
thestoryof a
government,
first,to arrestDeng Haiqingforfabricating
all lostterritory
Nei rendangmovement;
to theIMAR,
second,to return
includingtheforestry
area annexedduringtheCulturalRevolution;and
to haltthetransportation
ofmineralwealthoutoftheIMAR.
third,
For Mongols, especiallythose living in Huhhot,this three-part
petitionbecame the symbolof ethnicrenewaland an assertionof
minority
rights.The petition,
signedby morethan50,000Mongols,was
acceptedand thenquietlyforgotten.
The underlying
issueswouldnotgo
away,however.The firesof minority
nationalism,
stokedby personal
sufferings
duringtheCulturalRevolution,
continued
to smoulder.
The state soughtto win over Mongol sentiment
by grantingto
Mongols a specificnumberof university
and government
positions.
Moreover,thenationalgovernment
interpreted
its minority
birthcontrol
policy in such a way, until 1986, as to allow Mongols to have an
unrestricted
numberof children(as of 1986, urbanMongolscan have
twochildren).llThe state'sattempt
to heal thewoundsof theCultural
11
Some workunitsdid,in fact,allow unlimited
births;and someworkunitsinsisted
thatthe regulationdid not apply to mixed marriages.Hence, Han-Mongolian
coupleswereclassifiedas Han and subjectto thesame regulations
thatpertained
to the Han. On theotherhand,otherworkunitsclassifiedmixedmarriagesas
Mongolianand allowedunrestricted
births.For manyMongols,theneteffectof
theselectiveinterpretation
of Partydirectiveswas to heightenanxietyover the
278
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Revolutionthroughsymbolicreparationsand a recommitment
to the
principleof minority
rightsdid not immediatelylessen Mongolian
itdid,however,lead to a backlashagainstMongolsby
anger.Ironically,
thoseHan who feltthestatepolicygave unfairpreferential
treatment
to
Mongols. Both ruraland urbanHan believedthatthe government's
affirmative
actionpolicywas unfair,
and abusive.Privately
demeaning,
and at timespubliclytheirangerled to arguments
withotherMongols,
thoughforthemostpartHan citizenskepttheirfeelingsto themselves,
fearfulof government
criticism.Thus, in spite of the government's
attemptto forgea new sense of nationalunityand greaterethnic
Huhhotremained,
toleration,
thelate 1970s and the1980s,a
throughout
troubled
city.
ChronologyofEvents:The 1981-82MongolianStudentStrike
The state's minority
policy has been inherently
inconsistent.
On one
hand, it promotesHan immigration
into the autonomousregions,
therebythreatening
the Mongols' abilityto establishan effective
culturalbarrieragainstthe settlers;whileon theotherhand,the state
reaffirmsits commitmentto upholdingthe principleof cultural
autonomy.
By demographically
'fillingup InnerMongolia'- thatis, populat- thestatehopedto accomplishtwo things:
ingit through
immigration
one, ease some of the overcrowding
in the Chinesecountryside
and
coastal cities; and, two, ensurethe region'scontinuedloyaltyto the
nation,by makingMongols a minority
withintheirown region.The
impactof this long-standing
in
policy
the IMAR can be seen by
comparing
the1962 censuswiththe1982census.In 1962 therewere22
countieswhereMongols formedthe majoritypopulation.Moreover,
censusdatarevealthatin 1962 therewere6,000,000peoplelivingin the
IMAR, 15 per centof whomwereMongols.By 1982, however,Hans
were outnumbered
by Mongols in only one countyin the IMAR.
Additionally,
theregion'spopulationhad expandedto 19,850,000,with
Mongols(2,681,000)and Daur (60,000) forming
just 10.5 per centof
thetotalpopulation.12
In spiteof thisdemographic
trendof 'fillingup
12
regionalgovernment's
policy; therebyreafflrming
the militants'argumentthat
Chinawas a country
of 'directives'(guiding)andnotlaw (fala).
Migrationto InnerMongoliaduringtheQing dynastyand therepublicanperiod
was aroundtheborderoftheregionand alongrailways.Butwithbettertransport
and communications
thePRC government
could assignChinesesettlers
to other
partsof InnerMongolia accordingto politicaland economicconsiderations.
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
279
InnerMongolia', thePartycontinuedto insistthatChinawas a multiethnic nation committedto maintainingthe culturalintegrityand
of all ethnicgroups.Mongolianmilitants,
economicadvancement
still
at theParty'srefusalto acknowledgethattheNei rendang
smouldering
killingsstemmedfromunderlying
ethnicantagonismand not factional
politics,feltotherwise.
Hu Yaobang,thegeneralsecretary
of theParty,in 1980 requested
thatthe regionalPartycommitteepreparea long-rangeplan for the
of InnerMongolia(called article28). By 22 August1981
development
everyleague,banner,andmunicipality
in theIMAR hadreceiveda copy
of the report.Its release to the generalpublic broughtan immediate
responseby bothHan and Mongols.In general,theHan agreedthatit
was a properand fairreport.Mongols,by and large,weredisappointed
and feltthatthePartyhad no intention
of haltingHan migration
into
Inner Mongolia. Withinthe universities,Mongolian studentswere
especiallyoutraged,urgently
demandingthattheregionalgovernment
reconsiderits long-range
plan. A strikewas threatened
unless student
demandswere met. Withintwenty-four
hours,a large contingent
of
studentswas marchingon Partyheadquarters,
demandingto see the
Partysecretary
of theIMAR, Zhou Hui. Because he was absent,other
government
officialssteppedforwardand attemptedto defuse the
protesters'
anger.Thiswas onlynarrowly
accomplishedby havingthem
agreeto waituntilZhouHui returned.
The nextnighta smallcontingent
of studentsstood vigil outsidehis house. When the Partysecretary
arrived,they requestedthat he attenda special meetingat Inner
MongoliaUniversity
in orderto discussthelong-range
plan forInner
Mongolia.He agreed,butfailedto attend.Mongolianstudents,
who had
as youthseitherobservedor had takenpart in numerousCultural
Revolutionprotestsagainstlocal officials,werequick to react.Student
leaders utilized campus studentorganizationsto co-ordinaterelated
activitieswiththeotherurbancampuses.This co-ordination
provedto
be criticalas thestrikeexpandedbeyondtheuniversities
and intoother
citiesandtownsin InnerMongolia.
Four days later,the strikereacheda new phase of intensity
and
publicopennesswhen,on 13 September1981,morethan3,000 students
Massive resettlement
in the north-west
and InnerMongoliagot underway in
1956 (Henry Schwartz,'Chinese Migrationto North-West
China and Inner
Mongolia,1949-59', China Quarterly,
no.26, 1963, pp.62-74).The population
ratioof Chineseto Mongolswas approximately
4:1 in 1947,increasedto 9:1 by
1960,andby 1968reachedan estimated12:1 (Hyerand Heaton,pp.114-28).
280
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
marchedto New Chinasquarein downtown
Huhhotdistributing
leaflets
thatcriticized
article28. In addition,
thestudents
issuedeightdemands:
(1) Save ourmotherland.
(2) Stoptheimmigration
ofHan.
(3) Promotetheminority
populationinterest
by increasingthequota
ofminority
students
from25 percentto90 percent.
(4) Increasetheproportion
ofMongolianofficials.
(5) In the futureonly Han experts(e.g., engineersand scientists)
should be allowed, for a shorttime, into Inner Mongolia;
afterwards
theyshouldleave.
(6) The Party secretaryand the regional commandermust be
Mongolian.
(7) ReturntoUlanfu'spolicyofpromoting
livestockfirst.
(8) (Note:Noneofmyinformants
couldremember
theeighthpoint).
Thesedemandsand theclearsentiments
embodiedin themrepresented
what the Mongols had come to regardas theirbirthright.On 26
September,the government
receivedthe 'Declarationof Mongolian
Youth' submitted
by a smallercontingent
of students
who livedon the
grasslands.
This declaration
expressedthefearsoftheherdersandasked
thegovernment
to recognizetheirconcernsand offerredress.It further
assertedthattheherderswerepreparedto defend'ourlands... We want
you to cut the darkhands thathave extendedinto the territory
and
demandthattheyreturn
totheirnaturalhome'.
The generaltoneof thedeclaration
was conciliatory
and reformist
in that the studentsneverquestionedthe legitimacyof the central
nor did theiranalysisdeviatefromconventional
government,
Marxist
interpretations
of history.For the Mongols, the issue was one of
protecting
and maintaining
culturalintegrity;
forthe government,
the
issue remainedone of nationalunityand economicdevelopment.
Thus
thegovernment
feltjustifiedin insisting
thatimmigration
was necessary
because it helped to alleviatepopulationpressuresin otherareas in
China and because it stimulated
morerapideconomicdevelopment
of
theIMAR. The students
leftbothdissatisfied
and unclearas tohow best
to respond. But withina week, the governmenthad an answer:
Mongolianstudentsat everyuniversity
and collegein thecityvotedto
go on strike.Over3,000 Mongolianstudents
walkedoutof theirclasses
in formalprotest.
The government
was caughtoff-guard.
No one had suspectedthat
thestudents
wouldpresstheirdemandstothepointof opendefiance.In
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
281
A numberof highturn,the students'demandssplitthe government.
rankingMongol officials,sympathetic
to the students'demands,were
slow to act againstthem.While some Mongolianand Han leaders
wantedto arrestthe studentsimmediately,
otherMongolianleaders
arguedthattherewas no legal basis forsuchan act. It was also pointed
out by some that the studentsdid not question the rightof the
government
to make policy; theyonly questionedthe contentof the
policy,and thuswere withintheirlegal rights.As the debate raged
withintheinnercouncilsof theregionalgovernment,
a similardebate
was conductedamongthestrikers.
Amongthefirst-generation
Huhhot-born
Mongols,a majority
could
notspeaktheMongolianlanguage(whichmayhave cutthemoffto an
extentfromthefullintensity
of thestrike)and weremoremoderatein
theirpoliticalgoals. The studentsfromthe grasslands,however,were
vociferous,
and pushedhardfora moreambitiouspoliticalagenda.The
grasslandMongol students
reportedly
shamedtheurbanMongolsinto
a moreradicalsolutionto Han migration
supporting
intothe IMAR.13
Not all urbanMongolianstudents
agreedwiththedemandthat'every
Han shouldbe made to leave the region',but because everyonewas
caughtup in theexcitement
of theevent,fewobjectedto theproposal
14
whenit was firstintroduced.A fewgrasslandMongolianstudents,
in a
Thispattern
was notabsolute,
however.
Forexample,
theleaderofthestudent
strike
wasa second-generation
urbanMongolwhodidnotspeakMongolian,
yet
was completely
committed
to pursuinga policythatfavouredMongolian
nationalism.
14 Priorto theCultural
Revolution
thereweretwopostures
towardHan-Mongol
interaction:
cultural
pluralism
and assimilation.
After1970,a morepolitically
militant
posturearose.In Huhhot,
mostof thecity'sMongolianpopulation
embracescultural
pluralism
withits emphasison preserving,
in some form,
Mongolian
cultural
heritage.
The moretraditional
cultural
pluralists
typically
speakMongolianand are oriented
towardthegrassland
socialnetworks
and
culture.
Butthemajority
oftheHuhhot
Mongolians,
whohaveadopted
a cultural
pluralistic
outlook
andmayormaynotspeakMongolian,
areoriented
toward
the
modemization
andurbanization
ofChina.Theassimilationists
makeup a small
shareof Huhhot'sMongolianpopulation
and are indifferent
to Mongolian
cultural
heritage.
The militants
makeup a largershareof thecity'sethnic
population
thantheassimilationists
buta muchsmallersharethanthecultural
pluralists.
Theyinsist,first,
thatthestateshouldgrantmorebenefits
to the
Mongols;and second,thatMongoliansshouldassociateonly withother
Mongolians
whileremaining
civilwiththeHan.The militants
differ
fromthe
in thattheyactively
traditionalists
attempt
to influence
government
policiesby
persuasion,
whereasthetraditionalists
tendto ignoresuchthings.
Duringthe
13
282
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
separatepaperthatwas highlycriticalof theParty,concludedthatthe
Partyshouldbe abolished(a treasonable
offence).
The regionalgovernment
showed notablepatienceand unusual
restraint.
It publiclyconcludedthatsincethestudents
didnotunderstand
all thefacts,theyweresimplymisguided.To educatethestudents,
the
orderedbothHan and Mongol studentsto attenda public
government
meetingheld at Huhhot'sConcertHall, thelargestindoorarenain the
city.The Mongolianstudents
arrivedsuspiciousand hostile,fillingthe
entiresouthside of the arena; the Han studentssat listless,looking
somewhatbored,in thenorthern
sectionof thestadium.A high-ranking
Mongolofficialbeganby firsthonouring
thosefamousMongolleaders
- Ulanfu,Jieyutie,Qubei - who had helped in the moderndevelopment
of InnerMongolia.Afterwards,
in Inner
he reviewedtheParty'shistory
Mongolia,notingthatMongols hatedthe Guomindangbecause of its
unresponsiveness
to Mongolianproblems,and stressingthe Party's
long-term
commitment
and supportfor minority
rights.Blamingthe
Cultural Revolution and the so-called 'Gang of Four' for the
in Han-Mongolrelations,
deterioration
he reminded
thestudents
thatthe
Partyis not'thePartyforHans,northePartyforMongols,butrather
the
Partyof proletarians'.
The call was as alwaysforunity.Insisting
thatthe
Partyhad theMongols' bestinterests
at heart,he reviewedtheParty's
in promotingMongolian culturaland educational
accomplishments
The officialthenbegan to reviewArticle28 point by
development.
point. Afterhe had read only two points,the Mongolian students
demandedthathe stop readingand answertheirquestions.When he
refused,they stormedout into the night shouting:'Answer our
questions', 'Take back Article 28', 'Defend our motherlandand
autonomy','Let Zhou Hui go to anotherplace', 'Charge the Party
and 'ChinaoccupiesMongoliaforprofit'.Laterin theweek,
secretary',
some students'tookover' thecity'sradio station,apparently
withthe
tacitapprovalofitsmanagers,
andbroadcastthereasonsforthestrike.
Some students
volunteered
to return
to theirhometownsto discuss
thestrikewithotherMongols.A numberof students
did indeedreturn
home but were disappointedto findless thanfull supportfor their
actions.However,a smalltown,Alxa,in Ala Shanleaguein westInner
Mongoliabecamethesiteofunexpected
violencebetweenMongolsand
student
strikethemilitants
wereable toeffectively
neutralize
and,in manycases,
momentarily
radicalizethoseMongolswho favouredculturalpluralism.For a
briefperiod,theHuhhotianMongols,eitherbyremaining
silentor enthusiastically voicing theirsupport,helped legitimitizethe militants'claim that all
Mongolswerein support
ofthestudents'demands.
THE LAST HURRAH?POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
283
Hans whichresultedin thedeathof six Mongolswhiledemonstrating
strike.
Whenthestudents
learnedof
theirsupportfortheHuhhotstudent
this,it sparkedanotherseries of protestsand rallies. In addition,it
oftheAla Shansix'.
a newdemand:'Arrestthemurderers
generated
in the city,
Hopingto cool down an alreadyvolatileatmosphere
one of
decided to re-broadcast
leadersat InnerMongolianUniversity
Zhou Enlai's 1950s speeches calling for betterminority-majority
Threedayslater,a Han studentread a preparedspeech,
understanding.
which argued thatthe
writtenby a seniorleader at the university,
in
IMAR
to
what
Leninhad in mind
not
similar
were
the
circumstances
minorities
can break
whenhe wrotethat'undertherightcircumstances
endedherspeechbycallinguponthe
awayfromthenation'.The student
strikersto understandtheirerrorsand returnto theirstudies.The
Mongolian students were not persuaded. One student angrily
summarized
thefeelingsofhiscohortsbynoting:
InnerMongoliawas givena lot of promisesby theHan. We weretoldwe
would have power and rightsover naturalresources.We have never
therewerea lot ofMongolleadersin Inner
receivedthem.Beforeliberation
Mongolia.Now thereare onlya few.Most leadersin Huhhotare Han; all
theleadersofeverycountyareHan; Mongolssimplyhaveno power.
Anotherstudentargued that the Han did not understandthe true
meaningof an autonomousregion.He pointedout that:
This is the Inner Mongolian autonomousregion. This is Mongolian
If thiswereOuterMongoliaeverystudentwouldbe Mongolian.If
territory.
official
theneveryhigh-ranking
thiswas a trueautonomousgovernment
yearswe would have developedour own
wouldbe Mongol.Withinthirty
economy.It would be just as developedtodayas now. Maybe moreso.
EveryoneknowsOuterMongoliais moreadvancedthanInnerMongolia.
People missthispoint.Thisis ourland.We shouldhavetherighttodevelop
itas we want.
Anotherinformant
noted:
For
has beensteadilylesseningin importance.
Mongolianpoliticalinfluence
Mongolofficialsto Han offlcials
example,in 1962theratioof high-ranking
was 7 to 3; however,at themiddlelevel,theratiowas 6 to 4 in favourof
Han offlcials;and at thejuniorlevel theratiowas 8 to 2 in favourof Han
and only50 per
officials.Today [1983] thepercentagehas shrunkfurther
cent of the high-ranking
officialsare Mongol; but at the
governmental
middlelevel 80 percentare Han; and at thejuniorlevel 90 percentof all
positionsare fllledbyHans.
governmental
Given their interpretation
of these facts, the studentsrefused to
believe that theirdemands were excessive. Believing theircause just,
284
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
andconvincedthattheywouldneverbe able to obtainsatisfaction
from
the regionalgovernment,
the studentsdecided to go to Beijing to
formnally
petitionthePartyCentralCommittee
to amendArticle28. On
28 October1981 morethanthreethousandcollege and middle-school
students
marchedin loose formation
to theHuhhotrailwaystationto see
theirrepresentatives
off.Once there,theleaderof thestrike,
on
standing
a home-madewooden platform,
remindedthe studentsthatonce the
Central Committeewas informedof their situationthe regional
government
would be orderedto amendArticle28. Followinga brief
speech,anotherstudentboundedup ontotheplatform
and handedthe
leadera bowlof whiteliquor(baijiu, thefavourite
Mongolianalcoholic
beverage),and a Mongolianceremonialscarf(hada) - bothsymbolicof
Mongolianethnicity.
The student
leadersippedthebeverageand looked
outintothecrowd,whichrespondedwitha deafeningroarof approval
as thestudent
leaderwithfiveotherstudents
boardedthetrainboundfor
Beijing.
At home,student
excitement
and optimismranhigh.Takingto the
Huhhotstreetstwomoretimes,thestudent
marcheswerewell organized
and internally
policed.Some historically
mindedstudents
joked among
themselvesthattheirstrikewas akin to the famed1858 Du quyilung
protestmovement.15
However,the students'optimismwas short-lived.
At the same time thatthe studentsmarchedthroughthe streetsof
Huhhot,their representatives
were being reprimandedby a vicesecretaryin the centralgovernment,
who reportedly
explainedto the
students:
Thisis a political
matter.
Article
28 is animportant
andproper
document.
If
youdon'tlikeit,youshoulddisagree
according
to properorganizational
procedures.
Cultural
Revolution-style
protests
area thing
ofthepastandare
nolonger
tolerated.
He thenadvisedthem'to go homeand studyhard'. Not lost on them
was theunstated
possibility
thatrefusaltoterminate
thestrikeultimately
15
Du quyilungmeanscircle.Local Mongolshad opposedtheMongolianprinces'
sale of land to Han peasants,who were deprivinglocal Mongolianherdersof
neededgrazingland.The protesters
hadwritten
theirnamesin a largecircleso no
one would knowwho was the leader. There were a numberof different
Du
quyilung
protests,
thoughthemajority
wereconfinedto theYikejiaoregion.
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
285
mightresultin thearmybeingcalledout.Back homein Huhhot,afteran
intensediscussionoverstrategies,
itwas agreedto sendanother
groupto
Beijingto againplead theircase. Thatnightthreemorestudents
setoff
for Beijing only to have the same message repeatedby the vicesecretary;
thenextday,theytooreturned
to Huhhot.
Once Beijing's responsebecame known,the Han studentswere
delighted.The Mongolianstudentswere beaten.One Han informant
noted:'They didn'tget anything.
We thinkthe government
has been
very kind to them'. He elaborated:'You must rememberthey are
backwardand willall haveto changein thefaceof progressive
forces.I
don't feel bad forthem.Progressis moreimportant'.
A Han official
observedthat'theMongolianstudents
similarly
hadfailedtounderstand
thatChina was foundedon theprincipleof equal opportunity
and that
theirinsistenceon special statusundermined
thatprinciple'.Events
movedrapidly.The students,
lostas to how bestto respondto Beijing's
rejectionand demandthatthestrikequicklyend, adopteda pragmatic
position and soughtreconciliation.They requestedthat the Party
exoneratethemand notpunishthemforanyof theiractions.The Party
agreed.November19 saw theMongolianstudentsreturnen masse to
theirclasses.
In February1982thePartysecretary
oftheIMAR, Zhou Hui,called
all the Han and Mongol studentstogetheronce again to meet at
Huhhot'sindoorstadiumto listento theParty'sexplanationof events.
Those studentsand concernedcitizenswho were not able to attend
listenedto Zhou Hui's speechbroadcastsimultaneously
overtheradio.
Zhou Hui stressedreconciliation
and the importance
of Han-Mongol
unity.Emphasizingthatthe strikewas an unfortunate
occurrence,a
mistakein judgementthat the regional government
had not been
preparedfor,he sternlytoldthe studentsthat'thistimeall is forgiven
butif thereis a nexttimeit'll be severelydealtwith'.Zhou Hui then
addressedthe 'wild rumours'currentin Huhhotthat ten thousand
Sichuan Han were migratinginto Inner Mongolia and that the
Mongolianstudentswere going to lose theiracademic benefits.He
blamedthe strikeon 'the actionsof outsiders'(i.e., non-students)
who
had incitedthemto strikeand disruptthecity'sdailylife.He urgedthe
Han and Mongolstudents
to uniteand servetheinterest
of thecountry
and not theirown 'selfishdesires'. Several non-militant
Mongolian
studentstold me that 'manyof the Mongolianstudentswere deeply
movedby Zhou Hui's speech'. The moreradicalMongolsrefusedto
comment.
286
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Aftermath
Zhou Hui was trueto his word.No studentwas arrestedand,just as
seniorwas assignedto a workunit.The
importantly,
everygraduating
followingautumnsemester,a Mongolianstudentagain attempted
to
arousethe students
to protestagainstgovernment
policyin theIMAR.
Thistimethegovernment
was ready;he was arrested
withintwenty-four
hours.No further
effort
toorganizethestudents
was attempted.
High-ranking
government
officialsdid notfareas well. In spiteof
thegovernment's
publicdisplayof powerand unity,itsconfidence
had
been shaken. As soon as the strikeended, the presidentof every
and college in the city was disciplinedby being laterally
university
transferred
to a non-educational
workunit.The new presidentswere
instructed
to police theirworkunitsmorerigorously.
In addition,the
government
beganto purgethoseofficialswho had eithersupported
the
studentsor were sympatheticto their acts or intentions.More
conservative
officialswere assignedin theirplace. The nextyear the
Mongol students were criticized in three separate government
distributed
publications
to everyuniversity
and collegein thecity.The
students
and theirteacherswereinstructed
toreadthepapersanddiscuss
the errorsof the Mongol strikers.The government
wantedto focus
collectivecriticism
on thestrikers.
In effect,
it wantedtopubliclyshame
them.Many Han studentsleaped at the opportunity,
pointingout how
theMongolstudents
were 'ungrateful
and elitist'.The Mongolattitude
was moredirect:'Theysimplybrokeus'.
The dissatisfaction
withtheregionalgovernment's
handlingof the
Nei ren dang killingspersistedat a personallevel. Some Mongols
believedthe government
shouldpunishthoseHan who had persecuted
Mongols. Some seniorofflcialswrotedirectlyto Ulanfu,the highest
rankingMongolianin the Party,for satisfaction;
an old Mongolian
officialinsistedto me at the timethatthe studentprotestshad been
aboutthreethings:land,rights,
andjustice.OtherMongolstooka more
directapproachand literallytookjusticeintotheirown hands.In 1983,
in a numberof different
workunits,youngmaskedMongolssoughtout,
attackedand in a numberof cases severelyinjuredHan Chinesewho
had either directly or indirectlycontributedto the suffering,
imprisonment,
ordeathofMongolsduringtheCulturalRevolution.
It became obviousto thegovernment
thatits attempt
to promote
economicdevelopment
by allowingHan migration
intotheIMAR had
underminedMongolian confidencein the regional government's
willingnessto protecttheirinterests.In spite of this sentiment,
the
governmentrefused to reconsiderits long-rangeplan for Inner
THE LAST HURRAH? POLITICAL PROTEST IN INNER MONGOLIA
287
Mongoliandevelopment.
Butin 1984,theplan was severelyquestioned
butwidelycirculatedscientific
by a confidential
reportpreparedby the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, documentingthe negative
unrestricted
to theIMAR.
ecologicalimpactof long-term
immigration
The reportconcludedthatif thesepatterns
the
of migration
continued,
grasslandswouldbe turnedintoa hugedesert,notfitforeitherherding
or farming.
Mongolofficialsseizeduponthisreportandre-emphasized
Ulanfu'searlier'livestockfirst'policy,and successfully
persuadedtheir
Han colleaguesto issue a new directiveorderingany farmers
residing
beyondthe 30thlatitude(thepointwhererainfallwill not supportdry
to theirnativevillage.
farming)
eitherto becomeherders
ortoreturn
The government
hadrespondedto theMongols'concernsonlyafter
it becameobviousthattheregion'secologicalbalancewas in a critical
conditionand in needof drasticadjustment.
It is ironicthattheMongol
herders' desire for greatereconomic and culturalautonomywas
realized,in large part,not because the staterespectedthatright,but
because the state feared the long-termconsequences of the
desertification
of InnerMongolia forbothsettlerand herderalike; a
secondary,and by no meansminorconcern,was the state'sdesireto
increaseproduction
of animalsforurbanconsumption.
In thesummer
of 1983,Buhe,thegovernor
oftheIMAR, and Zhou
Hui, thePartysecretary,
issueda jointdirectivedeclaringthatBeijing's
in theIMAR, and thus
de-collectivization
policywouldbe implemented
forthe immediatefuturecommunalherdsand land wereto be divided
amongtheherders.This proposalwas joyfullygreetedby bothherders
and many urban Mongols. One herderremainedsceptical of the
government's
trueintentions
butfeltthat:
It wouldguarantee
thattheHanswouldnotbe ableto settleon ourland.
Nowthecommune
leaderswillnothavethepowertoapprove
their
right
to
stay;only the individualherderwho owns the land will have thatright.
Previously,
we hadindividual
ownership
oflivestock,
butnottheland.We
nowhaveboth.16
In the end, the regionalgovernment's
endorsement
of the state's
nationwide
de-collectivization
program,
coupledwithits insistencethat
all immigrants
northof the30thlatitudehad to becomeherders,
settling
had the unintended
consequenceof providingpastoralMongols the
toprotecttheirculturalboundaries.
opportunity
16
In fact,theherdersdo notown theland but,as elsewherein China,have longtermcontracts
toindividually
use theland.
288
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALOF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Conclusion
Formorethana decade a seriesof Mongolianprotestshad erupted.The
studentstrikeand itsaftermath
constituted
just one incidentin a history
of incidentsover the meaning,interpretation,
and applicationof the
state'sminority
policyin theIMAR. Thoughthemotivesof thestrikers
varied,therewas agreementamongthemthatthe statehad failedto
address the Mongols' three primaryconcerns: (1) to continue
affirmative
actionpoliciesin theIMAR; (2) to punishthosepeoplewho
had persecutedMongolsduringtheCulturalRevolution;(3) to restrict
Han peasantmigration
ontothegrasslands.
It has takenthe statemorethanten yearsto directlyaddressthe
underlying
anxietiesoftheMongols.It is an insecurity
in
thatstemmed,
large part, fromthe Mongolian perceptionthat their status as a
privilegedminority
was decliningand thattheirculturalheritagewas
endangered.Every Mongol knew thatsince 1947 therehad been a
steadyreductionin the numberof 'slots' allottedto Mongols in the
regionalgovernment.
In addition,thecontinuing
migration
of Han into
InnerMongolia was threatening
to engulfthemculturally,and lent
supportto thebeliefthatthestatedid notreallycare aboutitsminority
citizens.Finally,because the statedid notappreciatethemagnitude
of
the Mongols' outrageover the Nei ren dang killings,its political
was severelyundermined.
credibility
It was notuntilthestudentstrike
burstintothepublic arenathatthestatemade anyconcreteattempt
to
investigate
thesourceof Mongoliandissatisfaction.
To thestate'scredit,
it has showncommendablepatienceand continuedits commitment
to
theprincipleof ethnicprivilege.But in notresolvingthecontradictions
inherent
in attempting
to implement
two opposingprinciples- national
integration
and regionalautonomy- ethnicrelationswithintheIMAR
remainin fluxtothisday.
New Orleans
March1988