Child Development, xxxx 2014, Volume 00, Number 0, Pages 1–15
The Origin of Representational Drawing: A Comparison of Human
Children and Chimpanzees
Aya Saito
Misato Hayashi
Chubu Gakuin University
Kyoto University
Hideko Takeshita
Tetsuro Matsuzawa
The University of Shiga Prefecture
Kyoto University
To examine the evolutional origin of representational drawing, two experiments directly compared the drawing behavior of human children and chimpanzees. The first experiment observed free drawing after model
presentation, using imitation task. From longitudinal observation of humans (N = 32, 11–31 months), the
developmental process of drawing until the emergence of shape imitation was clarified. Adult chimpanzees
showed the ability to trace a model, which was difficult for humans who had just started imitation. The second experiment, free drawing on incomplete facial stimuli, revealed the remarkable difference between two
species. Humans (N = 57, 6–38 months) tend to complete the missing parts even with immature motor control, whereas chimpanzees never completed the missing parts and instead marked the existing parts or traced
the outlines. Cognitive characteristics may affect the emergence of representational drawings.
The oldest representational drawings in existence are
the upper Paleolithic cave drawings of Homo sapiens,
who drew animals with a variety of materials and
refined techniques (Beltr
an, 2000; Chauvet, Deschamps, & Hillaire, 1996). A recent study using
uranium-thorium dating methods estimated that
some of these drawings are more than 40,000 years
old (Pike et al., 2012). Since that time, humans have
created art by drawing or painting in every period in
every culture. Archeological findings, such as
engraved pieces of ochre and shell beads, indicate that
our use of symbols emerged at least 100,000 years ago
(Henshilwood, d’Errico, & Watts, 2009; Henshilwood
et al., 2011). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that
humans had the cognitive capacity for producing
representational drawing when Homo sapiens emerged
in Africa about 200,000 years ago. At the very least,
it is likely that they had this capacity when they
spread out of Africa approximately 100,000 years ago.
However, the underlying cognitive mechanisms for
drawing behavior are yet unknown.
Drawing Behavior in Chimpanzees
The present study aimed to assess the cognitive
capacity that led humans to begin drawing by
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Aya Saito, Faculty of Child Studies, Chubu Gakuin University,
30-1 Nakaoida-cho, Kakamigahara, Gifu, 504-0837, Japan. Electronic mail may be sent to [email protected].
examining the drawing behavior of chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes), humans’ closest living relatives.
Chimpanzees and humans share about 98.8% of the
genome (Chimpanzee Sequencing and Analysis
Consortium, 2005) and share a common ancestor
that existed until about 6 Ma. Chimpanzees show
marked similarities with humans in some aspect of
tool using and social behavior. By comparing
behavior between the two species, we can infer
older cognitive traits shared with our common
ancestor, and differences, the divergent newer
traits, achieved separately by humans and chimpanzees following evolutionary separation. Although
there are no reports of drawing behavior in wild
chimpanzees, it is common for captive chimpanzees
to learn to draw or paint by manipulating a pen or
a brush on paper. In the early attempts at studying
chimpanzee drawing, Kellogg and Kellogg (1933)
and Ladygina-Kohts (1935/2002) individually cared
for chimpanzees along with their human children
and compared the two species’ development of
many behaviors, including drawing. Kellogg and
Kellogg reported that a chimpanzee scribbled after
observing a model drawing, but she did not imitate
the human’s drawing. In contrast, human children
© 2014 The Authors
Child Development © 2014 Society for Research in Child Development, Inc.
All rights reserved. 0009-3920/2014/xxxx-xxxx
DOI: 10.1111/cdev.12319
2
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
preferred imitation. Ladygina-Kohts described stages
of scribbling in a chimpanzee, but not representational drawings.
The first systematic study on chimpanzee representational drawing was conducted by Schiller
(1951), who presented geometric figures to a chimpanzee, Alpha. Alpha changed her scribbling pattern depending on the stimuli. For example, she
marked on the relatively large figures drawn in the
center of the sheet and scribbled in blank space
when presented with relatively small figures drawn
in the periphery. She scribbled on the fractured
piece of a Pacman-like figure or arranged circles.
Schiller discussed those responses as balancing the
composition, ascertaining that Alpha was capable
of intuiting a human-like sense of order. Schiller’s
studies were followed by Morris (1962), Smith
(1973), and later, Boysen, Berntson, and Prentice
(1987). Like Schiller, these researchers reported that
their chimpanzees marked on the figures or scribbled on blank space; however, they did not observe
the balancing behavior observed by Schiller, and
thus it appears problematic to claim that chimpanzees possess a sense of order akin to what is likely
the origin of human aesthetic sense (Lenain, 1995,
1997).
In most cases, drawing occurs spontaneously,
that is, without food rewards or special training,
and apes will draw or paint as self-gratifying play
(Boysen et al., 1987; Lenain, 1997; Matsuzawa, 1995;
Morris, 1962; Schiller, 1951; Smith, 1973; Tanaka,
Tomonaga, & Matsuzawa, 2003). For this reason,
drawing opportunities are sometimes proposed as
environmental enrichment for great apes in captivity. Despite decades of such experiences, however,
chimpanzees’ drawings have consistently been
regarded as scribbles, without clear evidence for
representational figures. Gardner and Gardner
(1978) reported that chimpanzee Moja, who learned
American Sign Language (ASL), signed on her
drawings “bird” when they asked what it was. This
kind of labeling was also observed in other ASLtrained chimpanzees or gorillas (Patterson, 1986).
Nevertheless, to human eyes their works appeared
to be no more than scribbles and it is difficult to
recognize what, if anything, was represented on the
page.
Why is it that chimpanzees do not draw representational figures? Certain mechanisms must
underlie the human capacity for representational
drawing. For example, we must have motor skills
to control the lines, some cognitive function to
translate perception into action, as well as the motivation to pick up a writing utensil and draw.
Premack (1975) verified a likely cognitive factor. In
a composition task with fractured facial photo stimuli that reduced motor demands, only a 12-year-old
chimpanzee named Sarah succeeded in completing
an accurate configuration of the face; 3 other participants did not succeed.
The ability to manipulate tools by relating one
object to another develops in chimpanzees just as it
does in human children (Hayashi & Matsuzawa,
2003; Takeshita, 2001). Generally, as chimpanzees
gain experience drawing, they become better at
controlling their pens and are able to produce a
variety of smooth lines (Gardner & Gardner, 1978;
Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933; Ladygina-Kohts, 1935/
2002; Morris, 1962; Tanaka et al., 2003). However,
most previous reports concern only infant or juvenile chimpanzees as participants, as it is difficult to
control adult chimpanzees safely in face-to-face
situations in order to conduct standardized experiments. In this study, we conducted experiments
with two juveniles and four adult chimpanzees, all
of whom had considerable experience participating
in face-to-face experiments due to their long-term
relationships with a human tester (Matsuzawa,
2009).
In order to test our hypotheses with chimpanzee
participants who had considerable drawing experience, we devised two experiments: free drawing
after presentation of a model (Experiment 1) and
free drawing on illustrations of a chimpanzee face
(Experiment 2). In general, after human children
begin scribbling at around 1 year of age, their scribbling develops from accidental markings to controlled lines, and it gains variation as their motor
skills develop. They finally begin to draw representational figures when they are around 3 years of
age (Cox, 1992; Saito, Hayashi, Ueno, & Takeshita,
2011). Although many studies have been conducted
on child drawing, the majority of systematic studies
focused on representational drawing of children
older than 3 or 4 years of age (e.g., Arnheim, 1954;
Freeman, 1972; Golomb, 1973; Goodnow, 1977). The
studies conducted on scribbling stages have been
limited to longitudinal observation studies of one
or a few children (Eng, 1954; Luquet, 1927) or a
cross-sectional study by collecting the drawn figures of a large number of children (Kellog, 1969).
We carried out the same experiments in chimpanzees and human children to establish a comparative
scale of development. Based on the results of the
two experiments, we discussed potential explanations for the scale of development and to thus
explore the cognitive basis of representational
drawing.
The Origin of Representational Drawing
Experiment 1
In order to evaluate the motor skills necessary for
figure drawing, a prerequisite for the emergence of
representational drawing, we used imitationof-model drawing. Although the imitation task is a
commonly used developmental assessment tool,
there is a lack of research on the developmental
processes underlying the change from simple scribbling to successful imitation. Previous studies of
drawing on premarked stimuli indicated that many
chimpanzees change their scribbling position to
mark the stimuli or blank space (Boysen et al.,
1987; Morris, 1962; Schiller, 1951; Smith, 1973).
Matsuzawa (1990, 2000) reported that an adult
chimpanzee named Chloe spontaneously traced a
drawn circle. In this study, we modeled the drawing of simple figures and observed the drawing
behavior of participants on the same sheets. The
materials and procedures were kept the same for
chimpanzees and humans in order to directly compare their motor-control ability. The longitudinal
observation of human children permitted analysis
of not only when children succeeded in imitating,
but also how their scribbles developed until successful imitation emerged.
Method
Participants
Human participants were 32 Japanese children
(13 boys and 19 girls) who ranged in age from
11 months to 31 months at the time of the first testing session. They were members of the Umikaze
Infant Laboratory at the University of Shiga Prefecture, Japan, recruited from the surrounding area.
We tested each participant once every 2–3 months
from September 2005 to April 2009, although the
entry date and the duration varied for each child.
All experiments complied with the laws of Japan
and were approved by the Human Ethics Committees of the Primate Research Institute of Kyoto University and the University of Shiga Prefecture.
Informed consent was obtained from the parents of
all participants.
Chimpanzee participants were 4 adult and 2
juvenile chimpanzees (Table 1), living in a group of
14 chimpanzees at the Primate Research Institute of
Kyoto University, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. All had
previously participated in cognitive experiments
using a touch-screen computer. The chimpanzees
were familiar with the experimental setting and
with face-to-face situations with human testers since
3
Table 1
Chimpanzee Participants in Experiments 1 and 2
Name
Age in years
Akira
Ai
Popo
Pan
Ayumu
Pal
29 Adult
28 Adult
23 Adult
21 Adult
5 Juvenile
5 Juvenile
Sex
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
childhood (Hayashi & Matsuzawa, 2003; Hayashi
et al., 2009; Matsuzawa, 2009), and all had some
degree of drawing experience before this study
(Hayashi & Matsuzawa, 2003; Tanaka et al., 2003).
Two mother–infant pairs (Ai and Ayumu, Pan and
Pal) had also participated in a free-drawing task
using a touch-screen computer (Tanaka et al., 2003).
Prior to the study, all chimpanzee participants practiced free drawing on blank paper to allow observation of their freestyle drawing and to familiarize
them with the materials and the experiment face-toface situation.
Procedure
We used an imitation-of-model drawing, which
was standardized as a developmental scale for
human children (Kyoto Scale of Psychological
Development; Ikuzawa, Matsushita, & Nakase,
1985) with a simplified procedure. The experiments
were carried out individually and face-to-face for
both human and chimpanzee participants. Children
were also tested in other object-manipulation tasks
on the same day (Hayashi, 2007; Hayashi & Takeshita, 2009; Hayashi et al., 2009). Our experiments
with chimpanzees were conducted directly after the
computer experiments at the same experimental
booth. Human children sat beside their parent or on
their lap while a tester sat across from them at a
low table in a quiet room at the laboratory. Chimpanzee participants sat on a wooden board on the
floor in front of a human tester in the booth. The
procedure was nearly identical for human and
chimpanzee participants and used the same materials, namely, B4-sized paper (257 mm 9 364 mm)
and water paint markers. A session started with a
free drawing trial, which allowed the participant to
draw freely on a blank paper. The tester said, “Let’s
draw on this,” and observed the participant’s drawing behavior for at least 1 min. We used the first
five figures from the Kyoto Scale of Psychological
Development (Ikuzawa et al., 1985) for a session: (1)
4
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
horizontal lines, (2) vertical lines, (3) a circle, (4) a
cross, and (5) a square. In each trial, the tester drew
a model figure with a pale orange marker in front of
the participants while saying, “Can you draw like
this?” Then, the participant drew on the same paper
with a marker of a different color so as to identify
the lines in later analysis. If the participant did not
succeed in imitating within 30 s, the tester demonstrated the model drawing again by tracing the
model figure and then observed for another 30 s or
more. The drawing behavior of the participants was
recorded using two digital video cameras set at different angles.
In a given experimental day, human children
participated in one session consisting of a free
drawing trial and two to five model figure trials,
depending on their concentration and their previous success in imitation. For very young children
who could not imitate the first figures and had difficulty in keeping concentration for many trials, we
randomly chose two figures, one from line figures
(1) or (2), and one from geometric figures (3) or (5)
in order to counterbalance comparisons of their
scribbling patterns with chimpanzees.
Chimpanzees participated in three sessions at
intervals of 1½ months. We used fruit to maintain
their motivation but not to reward any specific
drawing behavior.
Data Analysis
We analyzed data from 679 trials from 286
sessions with human infants, and 87 trials from 19
sessions with chimpanzees. The mean number of
sessions for a child was 9.0 (SD = 4.7) during 31.7
(SD = 13.6) months of observation period with 3.2(SD = 0.8) month intervals. The age of the first successful imitation was defined as the age at which a
child first imitated a figure that he or she had not
previously imitated in longitudinal observations.
This analysis did not include cases in which children succeeded on the very first trial. The success
of an imitation was evaluated by using the criteria
of the Kyoto Scale of Psychological Development
(Ikuzawa et al., 1985; see Appendix S1 in the online
Supporting Information).
Next, we used the failure trials before the first
successful imitation of the figure for humans and
compared the drawing patterns with those of the
chimpanzees. Typical behavior patterns were identified by focusing on changes in position and scribbling touches compared to the first free drawing
trial: (a) scribbled randomly: scribbled without clear
change in position and touch; (b) marked the
figure: moved scribbles to mark the model figure;
(c) similar lines: change in scribbling touches
depending on the model figure (e.g., horizontal up
and down strokes increased after the presentation
of horizontal lines or spiral scribbles increased after
a circle presentation); (d) imperfect imitation:
attempted to draw the model figure but the criteria
for success were not met; and (e) traced the model
lines: traced a part of the model lines. From the
video recordings, a main rater (A. S.) checked
whether each categorized behavior was observed in
a trial. To assess interrater reliability, an additional
rater watched video recordings of 214 of 355 trials
in humans and 87 of 87 trials in chimpanzees and
checked the participants’ behavior. The main rater
and the second rater agreed on each categorized
behavior on 97.8% of the trials. From the longitudinal data of individual children, we considered the
first occurrence of each of the four categorized
behaviors and the first success of imitation and
compared the occurrence ages by a one-way
repeated measures of analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The frequencies of the categorized behaviors were
calculated in each of five age ranges in humans
(11 months to 1 year 5 months: 65 trials analyzed;
1 year 6 months to 1 year 11 months: 96 trials;
2 years to 2 years 5 months: 72 trials; 2 years
6 months to 2 years 11 months: 57 trials; 3 years:
65 trials) and two groups of chimpanzees (juveniles:
27 trials; adults: 60 trials).
Results
From longitudinal human observations, the average age of the first successful imitation is shown in
Table 2. On average, human children succeeded in
imitating horizontal lines at 2 years 4 months, vertical lines at 2 years 6 months, a circle at 2 years
11 months, a cross at 3 years 5 months, and a
square at 4 years. A one-way repeated measures
ANOVA showed main effects of figure, F(4, 80) =
36.2, p < .001, g2p ¼ :64. Post hoc Tukey–Kramer’s
honestly significant difference (HSD) comparisons
between the factors revealed a significant difference
between all figures except for horizontal and vertical lines. Table 2 also shows the average age of the
first occurrence of each categorized behavior before
their first success in imitation. They marked the
model figure at 1 year 5 months, drew similar lines
at 1 year 10 months, drew imperfect imitations at
2 years 5 months, and traced the model lines at
2 years 8 months, on average. A one-way repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for
categorized behaviors, F(3, 71) = 22.8, p < .001,
4
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
horizontal lines, (2) vertical lines, (3) a circle, (4) a
cross, and (5) a square. In each trial, the tester drew
a model figure with a pale orange marker in front of
the participants while saying, “Can you draw like
this?” Then, the participant drew on the same paper
with a marker of a different color so as to identify
the lines in later analysis. If the participant did not
succeed in imitating within 30 s, the tester demonstrated the model drawing again by tracing the
model figure and then observed for another 30 s or
more. The drawing behavior of the participants was
recorded using two digital video cameras set at different angles.
In a given experimental day, human children
participated in one session consisting of a free
drawing trial and two to five model figure trials,
depending on their concentration and their previous success in imitation. For very young children
who could not imitate the first figures and had difficulty in keeping concentration for many trials, we
randomly chose two figures, one from line figures
(1) or (2), and one from geometric figures (3) or (5)
in order to counterbalance comparisons of their
scribbling patterns with chimpanzees.
Chimpanzees participated in three sessions at
intervals of 1½ months. We used fruit to maintain
their motivation but not to reward any specific
drawing behavior.
Data Analysis
We analyzed data from 679 trials from 286
sessions with human infants, and 87 trials from 19
sessions with chimpanzees. The mean number of
sessions for a child was 9.0 (SD = 4.7) during 31.7
(SD = 13.6) months of observation period with 3.2(SD = 0.8) month intervals. The age of the first successful imitation was defined as the age at which a
child first imitated a figure that he or she had not
previously imitated in longitudinal observations.
This analysis did not include cases in which children succeeded on the very first trial. The success
of an imitation was evaluated by using the criteria
of the Kyoto Scale of Psychological Development
(Ikuzawa et al., 1985; see Appendix S1 in the online
Supporting Information).
Next, we used the failure trials before the first
successful imitation of the figure for humans and
compared the drawing patterns with those of the
chimpanzees. Typical behavior patterns were identified by focusing on changes in position and scribbling touches compared to the first free drawing
trial: (a) scribbled randomly: scribbled without clear
change in position and touch; (b) marked the
figure: moved scribbles to mark the model figure;
(c) similar lines: change in scribbling touches
depending on the model figure (e.g., horizontal up
and down strokes increased after the presentation
of horizontal lines or spiral scribbles increased after
a circle presentation); (d) imperfect imitation:
attempted to draw the model figure but the criteria
for success were not met; and (e) traced the model
lines: traced a part of the model lines. From the
video recordings, a main rater (A. S.) checked
whether each categorized behavior was observed in
a trial. To assess interrater reliability, an additional
rater watched video recordings of 214 of 355 trials
in humans and 87 of 87 trials in chimpanzees and
checked the participants’ behavior. The main rater
and the second rater agreed on each categorized
behavior on 97.8% of the trials. From the longitudinal data of individual children, we considered the
first occurrence of each of the four categorized
behaviors and the first success of imitation and
compared the occurrence ages by a one-way
repeated measures of analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The frequencies of the categorized behaviors were
calculated in each of five age ranges in humans
(11 months to 1 year 5 months: 65 trials analyzed;
1 year 6 months to 1 year 11 months: 96 trials;
2 years to 2 years 5 months: 72 trials; 2 years
6 months to 2 years 11 months: 57 trials; 3 years:
65 trials) and two groups of chimpanzees (juveniles:
27 trials; adults: 60 trials).
Results
From longitudinal human observations, the average age of the first successful imitation is shown in
Table 2. On average, human children succeeded in
imitating horizontal lines at 2 years 4 months, vertical lines at 2 years 6 months, a circle at 2 years
11 months, a cross at 3 years 5 months, and a
square at 4 years. A one-way repeated measures
ANOVA showed main effects of figure, F(4, 80) =
36.2, p < .001, g2p ¼ :64. Post hoc Tukey–Kramer’s
honestly significant difference (HSD) comparisons
between the factors revealed a significant difference
between all figures except for horizontal and vertical lines. Table 2 also shows the average age of the
first occurrence of each categorized behavior before
their first success in imitation. They marked the
model figure at 1 year 5 months, drew similar lines
at 1 year 10 months, drew imperfect imitations at
2 years 5 months, and traced the model lines at
2 years 8 months, on average. A one-way repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for
categorized behaviors, F(3, 71) = 22.8, p < .001,
6
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
Figure 1. Examples of the products of the main categorized behaviors and their frequency in each age period for humans and chimpanzees in Experiment 1.
The Origin of Representational Drawing
7
Figure 2. A tester drew a circle as a model presentation (left), and chimpanzee Pan traced the circle (right).
drawing after model presentation. Despite receiving the same ambiguous verbal instructions, it is
possible that the two species differed in the degree
of understanding for the task objective to imitate
the figure. Therefore, we could not conclude that
chimpanzees are unable to imitate the shape of a
model. In fact, some of the adult chimpanzees
spontaneously changed their scribbling pattern to
shape similar lines seemingly in an effort to imitate the model’s movement. For instance, chimpanzee Pan, who ordinarily drew short vertical lines,
suddenly drew a long horizontal line during a trial
of horizontal lines, and she successfully traced
long vertical lines. Iversen and Matsuzawa (1997)
taught chimpanzees to draw a straight line parallel
to a presented line using their finger on a monitor.
Success occurred only when a starting point was
provided as a guide on the monitor, and it
required a great deal of trial and error. It is noteworthy that chimpanzees were not proficient at
imitating a human’s behavior, particularly when
the actions were not directed toward another
object or their own body (Myowa-Yamakoshi &
Matsuzawa, 1999). It is likely that imitating a
model figure constitutes an advanced level of imitation that requires not only simply directing a
pen toward the paper but also adequately controlled manual movements on the paper. In this
case, chimpanzees must perceive the relation
between their own manual movements and the
manifest results on the drawing.
Experiment 2
Results from Experiment 1 showed that adult chimpanzees had sufficient motor skills to control their
lines as required to trace a model line. Thus, the
absence of representational drawing in chimpanzees
was not caused by a lack of motor control. Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the underlying
cognitive mechanism, another prerequisite for the
emergence of representational drawing. Human
children in the early stages of representational
drawing will often draw faces of humans or
animals, and it is easy for others to objectively perceive what is represented. To assess the representational ability of children in scribbling stage, some
studies have used a design in which an incomplete
figure is presented, and the child is asked to complete it. It has been demonstrated that children who
cannot yet draw representational figures by themselves fill in some missing parts inside the contours
of illustrated figures (Freeman, 1977; Yamagata,
2001). A study in which children were allowed to
scribble on picture books showed that even 1- or 2year-olds who were still in the scribbling stage
often marked on human or animal figures, particularly on their faces (Yamagata, 1991). It was also
reported that adult chimpanzee Ai marked human
and animal figures that appeared in picture books
(Matsuzawa, 1995). We used incomplete figures to
directly compare representation ability of two
species.
In order to determine whether the chimpanzees
would fill in the missing parts, we prepared an
illustrated figure of a chimpanzee’s face and deleted
facial parts to make an incomplete-face stimulus.
As the marking behavior on picture books indicated
(Matsuzawa, 1995), chimpanzees did seem to recognize illustrated figures. Chimpanzee Ai even recognized familiar chimpanzees and humans portrayed
in line drawings and matched them with the letter
of the alphabet that corresponded to the individual’s name (Itakura, 1994). In the present experiment, chimpanzees’ spontaneous drawing behavior
on the incomplete-face stimulus was observed and
subsequently compared with that of human chil-
6
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
Figure 1. Examples of the products of the main categorized behaviors and their frequency in each age period for humans and chimpanzees in Experiment 1.
The Origin of Representational Drawing
9
Table 3
Age Groups in Humans and Chimpanzees, Experiment 2
Age groups
Humans
1 year 6 month to 1 year 9 month
1 year 10 month to 2 year 1 month
2 year 2 month to 2 year 5 month
2 year 6 month to 2 year 9 month
2 year 10 month to 3 year 2 month
Chimpanzees
Juveniles
Adults
Number of
subjects
Number of
sessions
Number
of trials
10
8
17
10
8
10
8
17
10
8
55
45
90
50
45
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
4
8
20
40
6 year (0 year)
27 year (3 year)
imperfect completion, for example, drawing too
many eyes or indistinct eyes; (c) marking parts; and
(d) marking face. Then, we compared the mean age
and the frequency of spontaneous verbalization of
children among the four behavioral categories of trials. Statistical significance was evaluated by an
ANOVA for age followed by Tukey–Kramer HSD
analysis and by Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel test followed by residual analysis for the frequency of each
type of verbalization.
Results and Discussion
The frequency of each categorized behavior on
missing parts stimuli is presented by age group and
species in Figure 3. The most frequently observed
behavior in younger human groups was “mark the
whole face.” The frequency of “mark the present
parts” increased with age in humans (v2 = 12.9,
p < .01 by 1-df Cochran–Armitage trend test). “Complete the missing parts” increased with age
(v2 = 48.8, p < .001) and was the most frequently
observed behavior in the two groups of humans
aged 2 years 6 months or older. On the contrary,
none of the chimpanzees completed the missing
parts; instead, they marked the whole face (90.0% of
the trials in juveniles, and 27.5% of the trials in
adults), scribbled on blank space (0% in juveniles,
and 42.5% in adults), or marked the existing part
(25.0% in juveniles, and 30.0% in adults). Moreover,
adult chimpanzees traced the outlines of the face in
22.5% of trials, a behavior that increased with the
age in humans, particularly after 2 years 6 months
(v2 = 19.9, p < .001). Chimpanzees’ motor skills were
more refined in their marking of existing parts and
marking the existing outline but not, however, in
completing the missing parts. Conversely, human
children demonstrated an ability to fill in missing
Mage (SD)
year
year
year
year
year
8
0
4
8
0
month
month
month
month
month
(1
(1
(1
(1
(1
month)
month)
month)
month)
month)
parts of faces. In most human cases, tracing occurred
not independently (except for three cases by a child),
but simultaneously with other categorized behaviors, namely, completion (30.6% of trials), marking
parts (58.3%), and marking whole face (55.6%).
Therefore, we identified four main phases of
development in human children. First, marking
within the facial outline; second, marking on existing parts; third, filling in the missing parts but
imperfect; and fourth, completing the missing parts.
Stated otherwise, the marking of existing parts
gradually converges on distinct facial parts from
the whole face before the emergence of missing part
completion. We selected trials that contained these
types of behavior and recategorized them into the
four phases independently based on the best performance in each trial. That is, if a trial was categorized in one phase, the trial could not be placed in
another phase. The mean age and the frequency of
children’s spontaneous speech in four behavioral
categories of trials with the data for “tracing
outlines” as a reference are shown in Table 4. A
one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a
significant difference in ages among four categorized groups, F(3, 166) = 21.2, p < .0001, g2p ¼ :08.
Post hoc Tukey–Kramer’s HSD comparisons
showed the significant age difference between
“completion” versus “marking parts” or “marking
face,” “failure completion” versus “marking face.”
A Cochran–Mantel–Haenszel test revealed that the
frequency of verbalization before drawing differed
by categorized group of trials, v2(3) = 23.4,
p < .0001, Cramer’s V = 0.35, and verbalization
during or after drawing by categorized group,
v2(6) = 6.4, p = .039, Cramer’s V = 0.17. Residual
analysis showed that reference to missing parts was
more frequent in “completion” and “failure completion” groups and less frequent in “marking parts”
10
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
Figure 3. Examples of the products of main categorized behaviors and their percentage by different human and chimpanzee age groups
(the number of trials with the behavior/total trials).
The Origin of Representational Drawing
11
Table 4
Percentages of Spontaneous Referral to Missing Parts Before Drawing and Comments on Drawn Parts or Drawn face During or After Drawing on
Stimuli 2 Through 5
Spontaneous verbalization
Age
Type of behavior
N
M (SD)
Range
(a) Complete the missing
parts
(b) Fill in the missing parts
but imperfect
(c) Mark the existing parts
69
26
(d) Mark the whole face
64
Trace the outlinesa
20
2 year 8 month
(4 month)
2 year 7 month
(4 month)
2 year 4 month
(5 month)
2 year 2 month
(4 month)
2 year 8 month
(4 month)
2 year 0 month to
3 year 2 month
1 year 7 month to
3 year 0 month
1 year 6 month to
3 year 1 month
1 year 7 month to
3 year 2 month
2 year 0 month to
3 year 1 month
34
During or after drawing
Before drawing
Missing parts (%)
Drawn parts (%)
Drawn face (%)
55.1**
29.0**
10.1
55.9**
23.5
5.9
11.5*
15.4
0.0
3.1**
50.0
1.6**
30.0
10.9
10.0
Note. N indicates the number of trials categorized into the four types of behavior independently.
a
We excluded this category of data from the statistical analysis as it contains overlapping data with other categories.
*p < .05. **p < 0.01 (residual analysis).
and “marking face” groups. More than half of the
children mentioned missing parts before completing
the task, even if the end result was imperfect, indicating that they spontaneously tried to complete
the missing parts, in spite of their lack of motor
skill. Verbal behavior during or after drawing was
observed more frequently in “completion” and less
in “marking face.” Further, 15.4% of the children
(n = 4) who marked the existing parts mentioned
drawn parts, while none of them mentioned the
face or object during or after drawing, suggesting
that they recognized the drawn parts and perhaps
intended to draw but did not notice the parts missing. On the other hand, in “marking face,” only
1.6% of the children (n = 1) mentioned drawn parts,
while 10.9% (n = 7) mentioned the drawn face later,
indicating that they recognized the face but had not
noticed the drawn or missing parts.
Although chimpanzees were likely to recognize
the illustrated face, as former studies indicated, it is
unclear whether they failed to recognize the incomplete figure as a face, recognized it but did not
notice the absence of the parts, or noticed the
absence of the parts but had no motivation to
complete them. Further investigation is needed
to address this issue, especially with respect to
chimpanzee’s symbolic capacity when processing
the incompletely drawn figures.
However, chimpanzees might direct their attention toward the outline rather than the target facial
features, since the frequency of the behavior “trace
the outlines” by the adult chimpanzees was higher
than it was for humans under 2 years 9 months. In
contrast, the frequency of the behavior “mark the
present parts” was lower for adult chimpanzees
than for humans older than 2 years 6 months.
General Discussion
Cognitive Foundation for Representational Drawing
This study approached the emergent representational drawing ability of young children and illustrated their similarities and differences with
chimpanzees by directly comparing the two species
in two experiments. The longitudinal study of
Experiment 1 investigated and shed light on the
developmental trajectory of human drawing from
scribbling to successful copying of a shape. Chimpanzees not only marked the figures, which is a
common response to these stimuli, but also traced
the lines in a similar manner to the human
children in the early stages of imitation ability,
showing adequate motor-control skills. Adult chimpanzees exhibited a greater array of drawing patterns on stimuli than did juvenile chimpanzees,
indicating more mature motor-control skills in the
former. Experiment 2 demonstrated a remarkable
difference between the two species. Humans drew
missing parts despite more limited motor control,
whereas adult chimpanzees marked only existing
figures. These results indicated that the lack of representational drawing in chimpanzees was not due
to a motor deficit but derived from a cognitive
12
Saito, Hayashi, Takeshita, and Matsuzawa
process necessary for drawing missing parts to
complete an image. Although Premack (1975)
reported that a chimpanzee named Sarah correctly
configured facial parts, three other chimpanzees
failed. The task used here, namely completing a
face by filling in missing parts without assistance,
appears more complex than simply organizing
existing parts.
Figures on a paper may trigger imagination in
humans that is not possible in chimpanzees. Perhaps this is the faculty that assists humans in drawing representational figures. In Experiment 2, some
mothers whose children completed the missing
parts explained that it was the first time their children had drawn a representational figure. In addition, many children over 2.5 years old drew the
representational figures inspired by the models
observed in Experiment 1 (Figure 4). They may
have conceived an imaginary shape of objects from
a composition of lines and completed it by adding
the missing parts. During longitudinal observations
of drawing, about 48% first-time representational
figures (by 11 of 23 children) were observed in
model drawing trials following the absence of any
clear representation in earlier free-drawing trials
during the same session (Saito et al., 2011). Some
stimuli, including even simple abstract figures, can
trigger imaginative representations in young children, especially those in the transition period from
scribbling to representational drawing.
Ancient cave art indicated that Paleolithic
humans also imagined animals and drew missing
2 y 5 m Girl “Railroad”
2 y 7 m Boy “Train”
2 y 8 m Girl “Anpanman”
3 y 1 m Boy “Bus, Starts!”
Figure 4. Human children sometimes drew spontaneous representations inspired by the models in Experiment 1. The indicated
age, gender, and verbal explanation by the child. They used their
imaginations with the presented lines and completed their
images by adding some “missing” parts.
parts to complete their images although the situations were obviously not the same with our experimental settings. For example, the famous bison of
Altamira were drawn on swells of the dome, and
the contours of the bodies were sometimes confluent with natural cracks on the rock. There is also a
“mask” with eyes filled in on the hanging parts of
rock that resembles a face silhouette. Humans have
a strong tendency to imagine novel configurations,
even in ambiguous images such as a spot on the
wall or clouds in the sky (Gombrich, 1972; Guthrie,
1993). This cognitive trait may be a defining feature
distinguishing Homo sapiens from other ancestors
who did not develop representational drawing.
Why Do We Have the Cognitive Trait of Imagination?
In our study, motorically capable chimpanzees
marked strictly on the small parts or lines, that is, a
localized area. This tendency might be related to
chimpanzees’ lack of global processing in comparison to humans, who have strong global processing
abilities (Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999). Humans also
exhibit greater temporal integration accuracy than
do chimpanzees in the task of dynamic shape
perception under a slit-viewing condition (Imura &
Tomonaga, 2013). Global processing may be related
to imaginative recreations of abstract figures, as it
leads to Gestalt perception and object recognition.
Imagination can be described as perceiving a
percept as “something” and categorizing lower
level visual information into the concept of “something” by associating it with a symbol otherwise
represented in the mind. This symbolic cognitive
system is further evident in the case of human language, and is indeed the premise behind human
language, and humans tend to imagine something
even in response to ambiguous figures (Humphrey,
1998). Many studies have indicated that chimpanzees have the ability to learn some symbols, such as
characters and numerals, and even to understand
some sign language (e.g., Matsuzawa, 1985a,
1985b). Therefore, we could not conclude that chimpanzees never have imaginative capability only
from the result of the present study. Some chimpanzees especially who experienced symbol training may have some primitive capability of
imagination based on the primitive symbolical
capability, as one of the chimpanzees who engaged
in language training correctly configured facial
parts in the simple task of organizing existing parts
in Premack’s (1975) study.
On the other hand, symbolic systems in humans
are much prevalent and also reflected in representa-
The Origin of Representational Drawing
tional drawings of children as the former studies
indicated. For example, Arnheim (1954) disputes
the assumption that problems of form in young
children’s drawing can simply be decoded into
problems of content, by discussing the meaning of
well-known phenomenons such as “transparency”
and “tadpole man.” As children’s representational
drawings are very symbolic, as opposed to a copy
of the real object (Luquet, 1927), they might directly
reflect the development of knowledge while the
children are expanding their conceptions of objects
as a symbol. A phenomenon known as orientation
indifferent representation arises in the early representational period, where children draw a figure in
an inverted or horizontal orientation. This phenomenon can be induced by presenting stimulus figures
such as illustrations of ears of a cat in different
orientations. Some younger children draw facial
parts in a rotated orientation on rotated stimuli and
in an upright orientation on upright stimuli. It
seems that the younger children are indifferent to
the orientation of the face on the plane to draw.
Since they may know the relative order of the facial
parts in the whole face, they do not show difficulty
drawing the rotated face in a given orientation. On
the other hand, older children always intended to
draw facial parts in an upright orientation: They
reorient the sheet into the upright position before
they start drawing. These age differences in reaction
to inverted stimulus figures indicate a relation
between the production and development of the
facial symbol (Saito et al., 2011).
In Experiment 2, human children marked on
the presented figures, similar to chimpanzees,
before they started to complete the missing parts.
However, when they noticed the absence of certain features, they embraced the challenge to complete them, despite their lack of motor skills in
comparison to chimpanzees. It is noteworthy that
the tester only instructed participants to “draw
freely” and did not acknowledge “completion” as
a correct reaction. In addition, some children drew
independent representational figures on blank
space. In contrast, chimpanzees never completed
the missing features whereas more than half of
the humans aged over 2.5 years did so spontaneously. As Freeman (1977), Matthews (1984), and
Yamagata (2001) pointed out, even young children
in the scribbling stage have the intention of representation.
It must be noted that human participants likely
practice drawing outside of the experimental context far more often than chimpanzees. Such behavior might be encouraged by social motivation, as
13
early representational drawing evokes a great deal
of vocal communication between children and their
parents and others given the joint attention drawn
to their figures. Besides, humans, unlike chimpanzees, are socialized starting in infancy to use paper
for drawings, to view pictures, and other twodimensional imagery. Drawing enables the sharing
of an inspired image in one’s mind, and it is likely
that this is a strong motivation for making representational drawing in human children.
Human infants are brought up to socialize in
upright positions and are encouraged to engage in
face-to-face communication with other people
(Takeshita, Myowa-Yamakoshi, & Hirata, 2009). We
speculate that this abundance of social interaction
since birth would enhance human children’s ability
to internalize others’ varied viewpoints, strongly
motivate them to share with others, and play an
important role in the development of imagination.
This development of imagination should manifest
in the completion of missing parts in images. It is
believed that humans have evolved a great deal of
their characteristic complex behavior through cultural learning (Tomasello, 1999). Chimpanzees also
have primitive social-learning ability in the acquisition of tool-using skill, such as “education by master-apprenticeship” (Matsuzawa et al., 2001) or
bonding- and identification-based observational
learning (De Waal, 2001). However, enhanced cultural learning in humans may have played an
important role in more than 30,000 years of art history among Homo sapiens and, further, seems to be
one of the primary drivers of the emergence of
representational drawing.
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Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found in
the online version of this article at the publisher’s
website:
Appendix S1. The Criteria for Imitation in
Humans, Modification of Ikuzawa et al. (1985)