THE MEANING OF HISTORY
GIORGIO
F ACCHI
What is the meaning of history? There is an intrinsical finality in the
-events, that are flowing along with the flight of time? Are the doings of single
individuals positively detennining,
or are human persons no more than drops in
.an ocean, the sport of the winds and waves?
It is well knowm that in our
20th century for philosophy of history it is meant a body of doctrines coneerning
the problem oí the meaning of history, and giving to it various solutions.
Since
Hegel's "Geschichtsphilosophie"
(published in 1831) though the term itselí was
struck out by Voltaire ("philosophie
de l'histoire")it is possible to outline
ahree main tenc1encies among these theories:
e)
a)
History is a sequence
link of interconnection
;
b)
History
of events,
is expre sion of
111which is concealec1 an immanent
the intentional
design
of a
transcendent
Power;
c) History is but a casual and meaningless succession of events, to which
an order is given only by their concurrence or succession in the course of time.
Against each of these leading theories there are some capital objections.
The first is maintainec1 typically by the idealistic school: it postulates a reality
-as expression of an absolute Mind or Spirit, unfolding itself dialectically, i. e.
.according to a logical process , History is, then, only the chronological
seeming
of this Mind, the succession of its "avatars", whose meaning is naturally bestowed
by its inner rationality , 1'0 suit to this pattern, nevertheless,
it is 1110st often
necessary to stretch events to a kind of bed oí Procustes, particularly
with 3D
-exclusion of those in opposition unpleasantly to a preconceived scheme.
The same objection can be directed against the second theory: as a matter
-of fact it is difficult to deal with a bulk of events as if they were, all of thern,
consistent with each other. Only a very generic consideration
can allow such
-a conception to be maintained:
it rather accommodates
facts to a preconceived
scheme of history, than gets out a significant view of history from facts. Both
theories, on the whole, are liable to a capricious and arbitrary
choice of the
il1troductory scheme, entirely cornmitted to a personal taste or unconscious indu-cements.
It is better, therefore. to agree to the third solution,
-in it some difficultie . Incleed this theory is methodologically
(1)
although there are
without any doubt
"Think in this batter'd Caravanserai-whose
Portal s are alternate Night and
Day,- How Sultan after Sultán with his Pomp-Abode
his destined Hour, and
went his way". (Rubáiyát oí Ornar Khayyám, XVII, transl. by Edward Fitzgerald).
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the best, ami in best accordance with the general coursc of modern science. It
ís obviously the result of a train of r easoning well known by every scientist : the
same with that of the experimental
methocl, so frequently and successíully ernployed in physical science. Also in history the matter is about a network oí
order1y arranged notions, and every historical science is a business 01 structural
and significant interpretations.
There is, oí course, a distinctiou to do, between
history as amere succession of casually packed together events, anc1 history as a
systematic selection ..anc1 arrangement
of those events.
Surprisingly
enough, C0111111011 opinion, which never rnixed up nature and
science of nature, so lightly intermingles
with one another both acceptation of
the term "history".
By the way, that is another argument against any theory
both of the first and second type: very often, indeed, a meaning is found in
history just because the matter in hand is actually an already complete set of
selected events. We may say that the first two theories are standing only on
this intermingling
of both meanings of the term "history",
i. e. history as a
bulk of events and history as historiography,
a selected and digested set oí events.
Anyhow, it isn't a question only of two conflicting stand-points,
respectively a-priori and a-posteriori.
The question is here very different, for it is
possible that the a-posteriori
stand-point leads to the very same concJusions as
the a-priori theories, i. e. there is a rational meaning in history. As a questicn
oí method, any a-priori method seems absolutely unqualifiecl to be a serious
foundation for any scientific theory. But our main problem is always unanswered ;
there is or not a meaning in history?
In point of fact, it isn't easy to believe there is no meaning in history :
our tradition ancl education are inducing us to ascribe to history some indwelling
meaning. We must consider, however, that al so in physical nature it is not unusual even now-a days-and
it was unanimously agreed in ancient times-to
see
an intrinsic rationality and indwelling purpose . Not long ago Kant, though he
rejectecl any metaphysics, only reluctantly gave up the teleological argument of
real existence of Goe!, because he adrnitted an undeniable order in our world :
still more recently, the whole idealistic "Weltanschauung"
stood upon a supposition of an ore!erly ancl well-framecl texture oí the cosmical course of events.
By the way, it is quite disputable whether they c1eclucecl a worldly order Irom
their belief in an intelligent ruling principle, or rather írom their belief in an
orclerly course of the world they deduced the existence of such a principIe;
anyway, that is a palpable case oí vicious circle .
What a wonder, then, that such a conception is he1d in respect of history?
Whether we mean for history the whole sequence oí hurnan events, or on1y :\
sequence of salient and memorable events, it isn't easy-as
we already remarkedto believe there is no meaning in history. We must clistrust, however, of nv
immediate evidence: our experience give copious evidence of stubborn a-id often
mischievous errors, caused by a too conficling reliance upon the common sense .
Our choice is between a preconception, to which historical events are made subservient, no matter if intentionally pervertec1, or chosen on1y for the sake 01 conformity, and a theory drawn from facts, always improvable in case of Iurther
information.
Like in the smoky ancl ra velled skein of nature, it is impossible to outline
-in
the equally confused ancl tumultuous
kein of history-an
exhaustive system
oí principIes and laws. This notwithstancling, human rnind is everlastingly ende-
22 - 26 JULI.O
1961 -
SAN JOSE - COSTA RICA
251
avouring to outline such a system. There is an instinctive impulsion for thi
sisyphean exertion, and it is doubtful whether it is a glorious privilege or a di sgraced curse; but certainly no man, who' s worthy of this name, would give it up.
As a rnatter of fact, know ledge was in all times a powerful instrurnent of defenceand a hey to rule over nature. Any demand oí the M ystic and Sceptic for an
abstinence from any attempt to attain to knowledge is destined to be unsuccessíul
and alluring only either to the lazy or life-weary.
There is no insurrnountable
heterogeneity in this cliscrepancy between the
human thirst for knowledge and the indifferent turmoil of the course of events.
Human reason could be only an element of that turmoil, or a weak counteragent
with an inconsiderable influence upon the whole. As for history (in its acceptation
as a collection oí human doings), its aggregate is made up of single intentional
action, which are resolving thernselves into historical facts, their very unlike
offsprings.
Vico distinguished
this phenornenon as "eterogenesi
dei fini" (¡. e.
heteroqenesis af euds ), what may be assumed either as an eviclence of an indwelling logical staple in history ("storia ideale eterna", i. e. eiernal ideal liistor y},
or vice versa as eviclence of an irremediable
desorder in historical events: a
disarray could outcorne from a sequence of intentional actions as well as fW1l1
a fortuitous concourse of randorn atoms.
It seerns that the latter way oí thinking is worthy of winning the palm.
There is no meaning in history, any particular purpose carries little or no weight
on the whole, any "hero" is no more than a "rnouche clu coche", pushed together
with al! mankind by powers that are exceedingly stronger than any Tamerlane Df
Napoleon.
In this lump we can, nevertheless, and better than in the IUl11p of
physical events, outline some constancy of cour e, derivable from the peculiar
homogeneity of the atOl11S in action within, i. e. hurnan and wilful beings. A
single man is only a paltry grain of sand, the shaclow of a shacle, a drop in the
ocean of physical events; a single volition is only a fleeting delusion, an inappreciable leap in the clark, a trifling fancy . History, however, is a business of
masses, a wholesale subject of reflection, ancl it is, therefore, particularly worthy
of notice any endeavour to fathom the course oí events in a period of time, to
ascertain in its clarkness some sparkling, ancl to cliscern in its turbulent strearn
some feature for a ¿ruclent behavior in the future. It is possible that irom this
senseless congerics of events issues only, as in the poet's worcls, "a tale told by
an icliot, full of sonnd ancl Iury, signifying nothing"; but it is possible, also, that
some warning flows out, a precious lightning on the future . It is only a hope,
but mankincl is too interestecl in such a perscrutation
to withclraw frorn it. Our
past experience isn't too encouraging about this matter. Foolishness, rule of rhumb,
narrow-rnindedness
and fanatical conternptuousness
are apparently up to this day
the leit-motiu of history, both with regard to indivicluals ancl to human species at
large. History as a mernory of the past for a better understanding
of the present
ancl a wiser provision of the future - i. e. as a science, ancl this in its most legitimate acceptation, in spite of the Idealist, who so much concurred to its perversion
and misunderstanding
- doesn't keep faith too much with its current c1efinition as
maqistra vitae.
It would be very expedient, however, that history in this sense, though
cleceitful ancl only approxirnately
akin to the true course of events, were actually
a right and aclvantageous guicle to human behavior. Whereas science, anciently
conceivecl as a theoretical otium, has turnecl into the present subserviency of our
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modern technology, history met with an almost opposite experience: from "magistra" to an inactive and powerless bystander of the overwhelming flow of human
events. Must we give up all hope? Perhaps it is not yet too late to bring history
back to its fonner authority, so that it shall play again as a protagonist, and not
merely as a silent character in the human tragicomedy. As a true knowleclgeoí the
past, history has absolutely no meaning, but its highway is tracecl as an endeavour
to find in the past some light to c1ear and render easier our uncertain walking
.towards the future.