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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response
Framework and National Contingency Plan during a
Major Oil Spill Incident
Analysis and Recommendations for Improvement
Contents
1
Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................1
2
Introduction and Purpose ....................................................................................................4
3
Overview of the National Contingency Plan .......................................................................5
3.1
Implementing Laws and Regulation ............................................................................................... 5
3.2
National Response System ............................................................................................................. 6
3.3
Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................................................................. 7
3.3.1 Preparedness Planning and Coordination ................................................................................... 7
3.3.2 Notification and Communications .............................................................................................. 11
3.3.3 Response Operations ................................................................................................................ 11
4
Overview of the National Response Framework ..............................................................12
4.1
History of Implementing Laws and Regulation ........................................................................... 12
4.2
Structure of the NRF ...................................................................................................................... 13
4.3
Agencies Involved .......................................................................................................................... 14
4.4
Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................................................................... 15
4.4.1 Joint Field Office (JFO) .............................................................................................................. 16
4.5
Response Actions .......................................................................................................................... 17
4.6
Response Organization ................................................................................................................. 19
5
Comparison of the NCP and NRF in Response to Maritime Oil Spills ............................21
6
NRF and NCP during the DWH Event ................................................................................23
6.1
How the NCP Was Applied and Implemented during the DWH Event ...................................... 24
6.1.1 Preparedness Planning and Coordination ................................................................................. 24
6.1.2 Notification and Preliminary Assessment .................................................................................. 30
6.1.3 Response Operations ................................................................................................................ 31
7
Recommendations for Improved Oil Spill Response .......................................................36
7.1
Organization Strategies ................................................................................................................. 37
7.2
Planning Strategies ........................................................................................................................ 38
7.3
Response Strategies ...................................................................................................................... 39
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7.4
Communication Strategies ............................................................................................................40
Appendix A: The National Response System .........................................................................42
Appendix B: Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................................................43
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Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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1 Executive Summary
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) incident triggered the largest oil spill response in U.S. history
and was the first to be classified as a Spill of National Significance (SONS) under federal law.
The resulting response represented an unprecedented opportunity for the public and private
sectors to test the U.S. regulatory and procedural framework for extraordinary oil spills, which cut
across every level of governance, from national to local, and involved a wide range of regulators,
elected officials, businesses, and private citizens.
Section 496 of Chapter 2011-142 of the Laws of Florida created the Commission on Oil Spill
Response Coordination. The commission was charged with preparing a final report that identifies
potential changes to state and federal laws and regulations, which will improve response
capabilities and processes, and protect Florida’s people and resources. This report is one of
several reports that will help form the basis for the final report. The purpose of this report is to
compare and contrast the two organizing federal authorities for oil spill response, the National
Response Framework (NRF) and National Contingency Plan (NCP), and make
recommendations to better align the processes. While the response activities of the DWH
incident were dictated by federal law and statutory authorities, several lessons were learned from
the DWH incident that could strengthen Florida’s ability to respond to future spills.
The NCP was developed specifically to promote coordinated government response to
discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants in
accordance with the authorities of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA). The purpose of the NRF is to
provide a coordinated approach across the federal government for any emergency or major
disaster, to rapidly assist state and local government. The NRF includes an annex to address oil
and hazardous materials response, Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10, which discusses
the relationship between the NRF and NCP.
The NCP served as the official federal response framework for the DWH event. Although ESF
#10 was not activated in response to the DWH spill, significant confusion existed between the
NCP and NRF at all levels of government, which adversely affected initial oil spill response
efforts. Overall, this report found that the NCP is a sound framework and that additional
congressional legislative action is not required at the federal or state level. However,
several areas require improvement in implementation under the NCP to ensure our nation
and state’s readiness for another oil spill.
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This report recommends the following organization, planning, response, and communication
strategies for improved response capabilities in future:
Organization Strategies
•
Additional technical guidance should be developed for the NRF and ESF #10 that clearly
details how oil spill response should be conducted if ESF #10 is activated and for a SONS
event.
•
USCG district lines should be redrawn to include Florida in one district to improve
communication during response activities or the USCG should develop a process for a single
coordinating mechanism for Florida that is consistently detailed in the Regional Contingency
Plans (RCPs) for the Seventh and Eighth USCG Districts and in the five sector Area
Contingency Plans (ACPs).
•
The NCP should be updated to create a larger and clearer role for state and local officials in
oil spill response.
•
State and local officials should receive mandatory training on the NCP in relation to oil spill
response.
•
The National Response Team (NRT) should carefully consider the roles and responsibilities
of the Responsible Party (RP) in the NCP on the basis of lessons learned from the DWH
event and provide further technical guidance on how the RP should coordinate with state and
local officials.
•
The NRT and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should reconsider the role of the
NRT and Regional Response Team (RRT) during an incident and develop technical
guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities.
•
The NRT and RRTs should develop criteria and protocols related to public and
environmental health and the use of dispersants, beach and fisheries closures, and a
process to regularly update the resultant guidelines.
Planning Strategies
•
The RCPs and ACPs should be rewritten or supplemented to address any identified
deficiencies including: worst-case discharge scenarios, use of dispersants, local boom plans,
environmentally sensitive areas, response personnel qualifications, and decision-making
criteria for use of resources under competing stakeholder interests.
•
State and local plans should be more directly integrated and coordinated with RCPs and
ACPs. Local county officials could advise the State On-Scene Coordinator (SOSC) on local
coordination strategies.
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•
The NRT should develop standardized guidelines for RCPs.
•
The NRT and RRTs should promote best practices and lessons learned across RRTs and
Area Committees (ACs).
•
ACPs should be updated every two or three years.
•
The One Gulf Plan should be clearly aligned with the RCP for the USCG Seventh District to
cover those gulf counties not included in the One Gulf Plan.
•
State and local officials (or their appointed representatives) should be included in RRT and
ACs, and the SOSC and State Emergency Response Team (SERT) should ensure
collaboration and participation.
•
An annual module or course on the NCP and its components should be available for newly
elected and interested officials.
•
NCP training activities should occur regularly and periodically include a SONS event.
•
The SOSC and SERT should ensure that all appropriate state and local representatives are
invited and that participation is appropriately high.
•
State and local officials could advise the SOSC and SERT on invitations and response rates,
including how to increase low participation rates.
Response Strategies
•
The use of local liaisons and their chain of command should be explicitly included in NCP
technical guidance, RCPs and ACPs.
•
Criteria for the speedy establishment of local branches should be detailed in RCPs and
ACPs.
•
The role of the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) and RP in approving and expediting
requests under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund should be clarified through technical
guidance (e.g., consistency in form and applications, whether or under what conditions can
permits be waived).
•
The ability of governors to direct resources provided by the RP or after a state of emergency
is declared should be clarified through technical guidance.
•
ACs should develop protocols for pre-event oil spill response contracts (e.g., cooperative
agreements or memorandums of understanding), similar to those established for Stafford Act
events, to be included in ACPs.
•
State and local officials should establish pre-event oil spill response contracts as outlined
through ACP protocol.
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Communication Strategies
•
RRTs and ACs should include a public outreach component in their activities. At a minimum,
committee meeting minutes and materials should be publicly available and maintained
online.
•
RRTs and ACs should include a communications strategy that identifies plans for informing
and updating the news media, including pre-packaged technical information on the properties
of spilled oil, how it moves, how it ages in the sea, how it reacts to booms, approaches for
protecting sensitive areas and deflecting oil to beaches for easier cleanup, challenges of
skimming oil, shore cleanup techniques, etc.
•
The SOSC, Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), and SERT should work
with the RRTs and ACs to develop a process for integrated messaging across Florida (that
could be included as a component of the communications strategy above or a separate state
specific strategy).
•
RRTs and ACs should pre-develop public outreach messages and materials such as
factsheets and pamphlets that are readily available for county, state, and federal agency use.
•
The messaging should be incorporated into a ready-to-use campaign that localities can
immediately use/tailor to hit the ground running before public concern grows to an
unmanageable level.
•
The information could be included as appendices to the ACPs or available on the appropriate
web-sites.
2 Introduction and Purpose
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) incident triggered the largest oil spill response in U.S. history
and was the first to be classified as a Spill of National Significance (SONS) under federal law.
The resulting response represented an unprecedented opportunity for the public and private
sectors to test the U.S. regulatory and procedural framework for extraordinary oil spills, which cut
across every level of governance, from national to local, and involved a wide range of regulators,
elected officials, businesses, and private citizens. The purpose of this report is to compare and
contrast the two organizing federal authorities for oil spill response, the National Response
Framework (NRF) and National Contingency Plan (NCP), and make recommendations to better
align the processes. While the response activities of the DWH incident were dictated by federal
law and statutory authorities, several lessons were learned from the DWH incident that could
strengthen Florida’s ability to respond to future spills. These lessons are discussed in the final
section of this report and include improvements in organization, planning, response, and
communication.
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3 Overview of the National Contingency Plan
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan was developed in
response to a large oil spill that occurred in 1967 off the coast of England, from the oil tanker
Torrey Canyon. The incident highlighted the difficulties of responding to oil spills in coastal
waters, and prompted U.S. federal agencies to assess their own oil spill response capabilities.
The NCP was published in 1968 as a multiagency plan and blueprint for all federal government
activities in response to oil spills. Since 1968 the NCP has undergone several revisions in
response to the enactment of congressional legislation. The legal authorities and primary
components of the NCP are described in this section.
3.1 Implementing Laws and Regulation
Authority for the NCP is in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (known as the Clean Water
Act [CWA]) 1 and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, 2 which serve as the primary federal
statutes governing the federal response to oil spills. 3 The CWA of 1972 is the principal federal
statute protecting navigable waters and adjoining shorelines from pollution. CWA section 311
authorizes the President to develop an NCP to specify the federal response actions and
authorities related to an oil spill, including creating a fund for federal responses to oil spills.
The OPA of 1990 was passed as a response to growing public concern surrounding the Exxon
Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. OPA strengthens and clarifies the federal
government’s role in oil spill response, solidifies responsible party (RP) liability, and provides
new requirements for contingency planning by both government and the oil industry. OPA
section 4201 amends CWA section 311(c) to provide the President with authority to perform
cleanup activities immediately after a spill using federal resources, monitor the RP response
efforts, or direct that party’s cleanup activities. 4 OPA also amends the NCP by requiring the
President to establish procedures and standards for responding to worst-case oil spill scenarios. 5
The President delegated to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the new
responsibilities for implementing the NCP amendments. 6
1
33 U.S.C. 1251, et seq.
OPA, Public Law 101-380
3
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) is also
considered a legal authority for the NCP; however, CERCLA establishes the Superfund for federal responses for releases of
hazardous substances, an issue which is outside the scope of this report.
4
Hagerty, C. and J.L. Ramseur. 2010. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress, 7-5700, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C.
5
40 CFR 300(D)
6
Executive Order 12777, Implementation of Section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of October 18, 1972, as
Amended, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, George Bush, October 18, 1991.
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The NCP was finalized in 1994 to reflect the OPA provisions and serves as the operative federal
response framework for an oil spill. Per the enforcement authorities of the OPA and the CWA, oil
spill response actions required under the regulations of the NCP are binding and
enforceable.
3.2 National Response System
The NCP provides a federally controlled approach to oil spill response, but with opportunities for
participation and input by the states, RP, and other key stakeholders. Hence, the NCP is often
referred to as having a top-down approach. 7
The NCP established national response capability and overall coordination among the
responders and contingency plans for oil spills through the National Response System (NRS).
The NRS consists of three organizational levels: national, regional, and onsite. Key components
of the NRS, as applied to an oil spill, are the following:
•
The National Response Team (NRT) is an organization composed of 16 federal
departments and agencies. 8 An EPA representative serves as the chair, while a U.S. Coast
Guard (USCG) representative serves as the vice-chair.
•
Regional Response Teams (RRTs) are composed of regional representatives of each NRT
member agency, state governments, and local governments. Each RRT has two principal
components: (1) a standing team, which consists of designated representatives from each
participating federal agency, state governments, 9 and local governments (as agreed to by the
states); and (2) incident-specific teams formed from the standing team when the RRT is
activated for a response. Representatives of the USCG and EPA act as co-chairs of the
RRTs, except when an incident occurs. The USCG chairs the RRTs during responses to oil
spills in coastal waters, while EPA chairs RRTs for inland oil spills.
•
The Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) are the federal officials predesignated by
EPA and USCG to coordinate response resources. 10
7
USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG,
Washington, D.C.
8
The NRT includes the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Environment Protection Agency (EPA), the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of the Interior, the Department of Justice, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), and other agencies [40 CFR 300.175(b)].
9
Each state governor is requested to “to assign an office or agency to represent the state on the appropriate RRT; to
designate representatives to work with the RRT in developing RCPs; to plan for, make available, and coordinate state
resources; and to serve as the contact point for coordination of response with local government agencies, whether or not
represented on the RRT” [40 CFR 300.115(h)].
10
EPA provides FOSCs in inland waters/zones and has approximately 200 FOSCs at 17 nationwide locations. The USCG
provides FOSCs for the coastal waters/zones. The USCG has 35 sectors, spread among the nine USCG districts, each of
which is headed by a Captain of the Port (COTP) who acts as an FOSC. Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater
Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010. Response to Current Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of
Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
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•
Area Committees (AC) include qualified personnel from federal, state, and local agencies.
FOSCs direct the ACs.
3.3 Roles and Responsibilities
The guiding concept of the NCP is a unified command (UC) system that “brings together the
functions of the federal government, the state government, and the [RP] to achieve an effective
and efficient response.” 11 Three fundamental activities are performed pursuant to the NCP:
(1) preparedness planning and coordination, (2) notification and communications, and
(3) response operations. 12 This section identifies the primary roles and responsibilities relevant
to the three organizational levels for these activities.
3.3.1 Preparedness Planning and Coordination
The NRT oversees national planning and coordination and can recommend changes to the NCP.
The NRT is charged with maintaining national preparedness to respond to a major oil spill,
publishing guidance documents, monitoring response-related research and development, and
developing recommendations for response training.
RRTs develop and update Regional Contingency Plans (RCPs), which follow the format of the
NCP and outline effective regional response to discharges of oil or releases of hazardous
substances, pollutants, or contaminants. RCPs also include information on all useful facilities
and resources in the region. The boundaries that define the RRTs are based on the EPA and
USCG regional boundaries, with EPA boundaries implemented relevant to inland oil spills and
USCG boundaries implemented relevant to oil spills occurring in coastal waters. Florida is in
EPA Region 4. Florida is divided between two USCG districts, with northwestern Florida in the
Eighth District, headquartered in Mobile, Alabama, and the remainder of the state in the Seventh
District, headquartered in Miami, Florida.
RRTs are charged with maintaining regional preparedness to respond to a major oil spill,
conducting advanced planning for use of dispersants, evaluation of FOSC actions, and
conducting or participating in training. The NCP recommends that RRTs meet at least
semiannually to review response actions carried out during the preceding period, consider
changes in RCPs, and recommend changes in Area Contingency Plans (ACPs).
The FOSC directs response efforts and coordinates all activities at the scene of the discharge or
release. The FOSC is responsible for conducting periodic area response drills and overseeing
the development of the ACP (required by CWA section 311j).
11
12
40 CFR 300.105
40 CFR 300.105(b)
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The NCP requests that state governors identify an office or agency to represent the state on the
RRT, a State On-Scene Coordinator (SOSC), and representatives to serve on the State
Emergency Response Commission (SERC). Refer to the highlight box for more detail on state
and local roles in preparedness planning and coordination.
State Role in Preparedness Planning and Coordination, as designated in the NCP
1.
State governors are requested to assign an office or agency to represent the state on the
RRT.
2.
The state’s RRT representative, the SOSC, should coordinate with the SERC, which is
appointed by the state governor.
3.
The SERC of each state is to
a.
Designate emergency planning districts
b.
Appoint Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs), supervise and
coordinate their activities, and review local emergency response plans
c.
Establish procedures for receiving and processing requests from the public and
to designate an official to serve as coordinator for information
Local Role in Preparedness Planning and Coordination, as designated in the NCP
8
1.
Local governments are invited to participate on the RRT as provided by state law or as
arranged by the state’s representative.
2.
The LEPC of each emergency planning district is to
a.
Prepare a local emergency response plan for their district
b.
Establish procedures for receiving and processing requests from the public
c.
Appoint a chair and establish rules for the LEPC
d.
Designate an official to serve as coordinator for information and designate in its
plan a community emergency coordinator
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Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the NRT, RRT, and AC.
Figure 1. Relationship between the NRT, RRT, and AC.
ACPs are developed by ACs, in coordination with RRTs. The plan should be capable of
removing a worst-case discharge under the regulations at Title 40 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) 300.324, and mitigating or preventing a substantial threat of such a discharge
from a vessel, offshore facility, or onshore facility operating in or near the area. ACPs should
include the following information: 13
•
13
Description of the area covered by the plan
40 CFR 300.210(c)
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•
Detailed description of the responsibilities of an owner or operator and of federal, state, and
local agencies in removing a discharge and in mitigating or preventing a substantial threat of
a discharge
•
List of equipment, dispersants, or other mitigating substances and devices, and personnel
available to an
•
owner or operator and federal, state, and local agencies, to ensure an effective and
immediate removal of a discharge, and to ensure mitigation or prevention of a substantial
threat of a discharge
•
Description of procedures to be followed for obtaining an expedited decision regarding the
use of dispersants
•
Description of how the plan is integrated into other ACPs and tank vessel, offshore facility,
and onshore facility response plans approved by the President
•
A detailed annex containing a Fish and Wildlife and Sensitive Environments Plan that is
consistent with the RCP and NCP
Under the OPA, owners and operators of vessels and offshore facilities are also required to
prepare contingency plans. Facility contingency plans are reviewed by the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (previously called the United States Minerals
Management Service), while Vessel Contingency Plans are reviewed by the USCG. Taken
together, the planning documents inherent in the NCP include the RCPs, ACPs, and potential
RP plans (vessel and facility contingency plans), as illustrated in Figure 2.
National
National Contingency Plan
Regional
Regional Contingency Plan
Local
Area Contingency Plan
Vessel Contingency Plan
Facility Contingency Plan
Figure 2. Preparedness components of the NCP.
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3.3.2 Notification and Communications
Depending on the size or complexity of the discharge or release, the NRS will expand or contract
to accommodate the response effort. When an incident occurs, the FOSC provides an initial
assessment as to whether federal assistance is required, or whether a state or local level
response effort is more appropriate. The RRT could be notified to respond to a request from the
FOSC or when a release occurs across state boundaries, exceeds the area response
capabilities, or poses a substantial public health threat. The NRT will be notified and will function
as an emergency response team if requested by any NRT member or when an oil spill transects
regional boundaries, exceeds the regional response capabilities, or poses a significant public
health threat. Additional communications responsibilities established for the NRT, RRT, and
FOSC are identified at 40 CFR Part 300 Subpart B.
The NRS organizational response concept is included as Appendix A.
3.3.3 Response Operations
The response operations outlined in the NCP correspond to various types of incidents that can
occur in and around the United States. Generally, the NCP provides the basic framework of a
response management structure, which is a system (e.g., a UC system) that brings together the
functions of the federal government, the state government, and the RP to achieve an effective
and efficient response under the direction of the FOSC. 14 This UC system brings together the
Incident Commanders of all major agencies involved in an incident to coordinate an effective
response. 15 The UC links the agencies responding to an oil spill (or any incident of national
significance) and provides a forum for them to direct, through a consensus process, necessary
response actions.
NCP section 300.135(a) authorizes the FOSC to direct all federal, state, and private response
activities at the discharge site. Additionally, NCP section 300.320 establishes a set response
pattern for the FOSC including determination of threat, classification of the size and type of the
release, notification of the RRT and the NRC, and supervision of removal actions. Subpart J of
the NCP establishes the NCP Product Schedule, which details the types of dispersants and
other chemical or biological products that may be used in carrying out response operations. At
the time this report was written, the NCP Product Schedule was undergoing revision by EPA to
integrate recent effectiveness and toxicology test results. 16
14
40 CFR 300.105(d)
For more information on the Unified Command System, please see Report 2: Analysis of the effectiveness of the use of the
Incident Command System in the DWH incident.
16
Further information is on EPA’s website at http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/ncp/index.htm
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4 Overview of the National Response Framework
The NRF was released in January of 2008 and was developed to unify federal emergency
response for all types of hazards. Today, this document is the federal government’s
administrative mechanism to integrate effective practices in emergency preparedness and
response into a national framework for incident management. This section of the report
discusses national emergency planning leading up to the NRF’s development and the current
responsibilities and actions detailed in its text.
4.1 History of Implementing Laws and Regulation
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)
established in 1988 outlined the programs and processes by which the federal government
provides emergency and major disaster assistance to states and localities, individuals, and
qualified private nonprofit organizations. Section 611 of the Stafford Act authorizes the Director
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to prepare federal response plans and
programs and to coordinate these plans with state efforts. 17 Consistent with this authorization,
FEMA released the Federal Response Plan in April 1992. However, many federal emergency
response plans and strategies were still housed in other statutes and under various agency
jurisdictions.
The need to develop the NRF was recognized during the federal response to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, when the structure for responding to emergencies and disasters resided
in at least five separate plans. 18 In December 2004, through the primary guidance and
authorization of the Stafford Act, the Homeland Security Act, 19 and Homeland Security
Presidential Declaration 5, 20 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the successor
to the Federal Response Plan, which is titled the National Response Plan (NRP). The NRP was
tested when Hurricane Katrina impacted the Gulf coast in August 2005. Because of various
criticisms of and difficulties with the NRP and a mandate in the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006, 21 DHS revised the document and released the NRF in
January 2008.
17
42 U.S.C. 5196(b)
Lindsay, B. 2008. The National Response Framework: Overview and Possible Issues for Congress, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C.
19
Public Law 107-296
20
Homeland Security Presidential Declaration 5 (HSPD-5) called on the Department of Homeland Security to establish a
single, comprehensive national incident management system.
21
Public Law 109-295
18
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Today, the NRF is the federal government’s administrative mechanism to integrate effective
practices in emergency preparedness and response into a national framework for incident
management. The NRF is not a binding and enforceable regulation like the NCP. Also unlike the
NCP, the NRF is not an operational plan that dictates a step-by-step process for responding to a
specific type of disaster. Instead, the NRF identifies the programs and processes by which the
federal government provides emergency and major disaster assistance to states and localities,
among others. 22 Because of its focus on local or site-level initial response to incidents, the
NRF is often referred to as a having a bottom-up approach. Gulf states and counties are
familiar with the NRF through Stafford Act emergency declarations and funding support for
responding to hurricanes and floods.
4.2 Structure of the NRF
The NRF document is organized into five chapters, as outlined in Figure 3.
Introduction
Chapter 1
Roles and
Responsibilities
Chapter 2
Response Actions
Chapter 3
Response Organization
Chapter 4
Planning
Chapter 5
Additional Resources
• Overview of entire document
• Explains the evolution of the NRF
• Identifies the various actors involved in emergency and
disaster response
• Outlines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and
local governments, the nonprofit and private sectors, and
individuals and households.
• Describes and outlines key tasks as they pertain to what DHS
calls the “three phases of effective response.”
• These phases are prepare, respond, and recover.
• Discussion of the organizational structure and staffing used to
implement response actions under the NRF.
• Describes the process of planning for national preparedness
• Summarizes planning structures relative to the NRF
• Describes the 15 Emergency Support Functions
Figure 3. Chapter titles and topics of the NRF.
22
The Stafford Act is cited by DHS as one of the “principal emergency authorities” of the NRF.
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Chapter 5 of the NRF contains 15 emergency support functions (ESFs). ESF #10 pertains to Oil
and Hazardous Materials Response actions and responsibilities. Appropriate general actions can
include the following efforts to
1. Prevent, minimize, or mitigate a release
2. Detect and assess the extent of contamination (including sampling and analysis and
environmental monitoring)
3. Stabilize the release and prevent the spread of contamination
4. Analyze options for environmental cleanup and waste disposition
5. Implement environmental cleanup
6. Store, treat, and dispose of oil and hazardous materials 23
In some instances, the ESFs point to existing authorities for guidance during an incident. ESF
#10 identifies the NCP as the operative structure for oil spill response. 24 The NCP applies to and
is in effect when the Federal Response Plan and some or all of its ESFs are activated.
4.3 Agencies Involved
Under the NRF, the President leads the federal government response effort to ensure that the
necessary coordinating structures, leadership, and resources are applied quickly and efficiently
to large-scale and catastrophic incidents. The President’s Homeland Security Council and
National Security Council, which bring together Cabinet officers and other department or agency
heads as necessary, provide national strategic and policy advice to the President during largescale incidents that affect the nation. The Department of Defense is a full partner in the federal
response to domestic incidents, and its response is fully coordinated through the mechanisms of
the NRF.
State agencies play a primary role in emergency preparedness and response in the NRF;
specifically, they provide direct and routine assistance to their local jurisdictions through
emergency management program development and by routinely coordinating these efforts with
federal officials. Under the Stafford Act, states are also responsible for requesting federal
emergency assistance for communities and tribal governments in their jurisdiction. In response
23
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
24
Hagerty, C. and J.L. Ramseur. 2010. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress, 7-5700, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C.
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to an incident, the affected state helps coordinate and integrate resources and applies them to
local needs. 25
4.4 Roles and Responsibilities
The NRF describes roles and responsibilities for
federal, state, and local governments; the
nonprofit and private sectors; and individuals and
households.
Within the NRF, the responsibility for responding
to incidents—both natural and man-made—
begins at the local level, with individuals and
public officials in the county, city, or town affected
by the incident. The responsibility for ensuring
public safety and welfare during an incident is
vested with a mayor, town or city manager, or
county manager. The local emergency manager
has the day-to-day authority and responsibility for
overseeing emergency management programs
and activities. He or she works with elected and
appointed officials to ensure that there are unified
objectives with regard to the jurisdiction’s
emergency plans and activities. This role entails
coordinating all aspects of a jurisdiction’s
capabilities. 26
Duties of the Local Emergency Manager
1. Coordinating the planning process and
working cooperatively with other local
agencies and private sector organizations
2. Developing mutual aid and assistance
agreements
3. Coordinating damage assessments during
an incident
4. Advising and informing local officials
about emergency management activities
during an incident
5. Developing and executing public
awareness and education programs
6. Conducting exercises to test plans and
systems and obtain lessons learned
7. Involving the private sector and
nongovernmental organizations in
planning, training, and exercises
In response to an incident, the state helps coordinate and integrate resources and applies them
to local needs. The state’s governor is responsible for coordinating state resources and providing
the strategic guidance needed to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
incidents of all types. In accordance with state law, the governor might be able to make, amend,
or suspend certain orders or regulations associated with response. He or she is also responsible
for communicating to the public and helping people, businesses, and organizations cope with the
consequences of any type of incident. The governor also commands the state military forces
(National Guard personnel not in federal service and state militias). Any requests for federal
assistance, including a Stafford Act Presidential declaration of an emergency or major disaster,
25
All information from: Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework. January, 2008.
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf
26
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
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is also the governor’s responsibility. The State Homeland Security Advisor serves as counsel to
the governor on homeland security issues and may serve as a liaison among the governor’s
office, the state homeland security structure, DHS, and other organizations both inside and
outside the state.
When the overall coordination of federal response activities is required, it is implemented through
the Secretary of Homeland Security consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive
5. 27 The role of the Secretary of Homeland Security is to provide the President with an overall
architecture for domestic incident management and to coordinate the federal response, when
required, while relying on the support of other federal partners. Depending on the incident, the
Secretary also contributes elements of the response consistent with DHS’s mission, capabilities,
and authorities. While the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for
domestic incident management, the FEMA Administrator is the principal advisor to the President,
the Secretary, and the Homeland Security Council on all matters regarding emergency
management.
4.4.1 Joint Field Office (JFO)
The JFO is the primary federal incident management field structure (see Figure 4). This office
provides a temporary facility to coordinate federal, state, tribal, and local governments and
nongovernmental and private sector organizations’ response actions. The JFO is operated by
the Unified Coordination Group, whose structure varies, depending on the scope and nature of
the incident and the assets deployed in support of the affected jurisdiction. 28
Additionally, private sector organizations play a key role before, during, and after an incident.
During an incident, key private sector partners should be involved in the local crisis decisionmaking process or at least have a direct link to key local emergency managers. Communities
cannot effectively respond to, or recover from, incidents without strong cooperative relations with
the private sector.
27
The White House, Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5. Washington, DC,
February 28, 2003.
28
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
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Source: DHS, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of the National
Response Framework. January, 2008. Pg. 63.
Figure 4. Joint Field Office.
4.5 Response Actions
Four key actions typically occur in support of a response: (1) gain and maintain situational
awareness; (2) activate and deploy key resources and capabilities; (3) effectively coordinate
response actions; (4) then, as the situation permits, demobilize. These response actions are
illustrated in Figure 5 below.
Gain and
Maintain
Situational
Awareness
Activate and
Deploy Key
Resources
and
Capabilities
Effectively
Coordinate
Response
Actions
Demobilize
Figure 5. Key response actions.
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In terms of developing situational awareness, key priorities must include gathering timely and
accurate information, integrating reporting efforts, linking operation centers, and tapping subjectmatter experts. 29 For national events, the National Operations Center (NOC) serves as the
national fusion center. A fusion center manages the flow of information and intelligence across
all levels and sectors of government and private industry, and through analysis the center
provides meaningful intelligence products and situational awareness for the federal government
and for state, local, and tribal governments.
When activating and deploying resources and capabilities, the NRF suggests developing incident
objectives on the basis of incident priorities, developing an Incident Action Plan by the Incident
Command (IC), and developing support plans by any combination of the appropriate local, tribal,
state, or federal government entities. State governments are instructed to identify staff for
deployment to the emergency operations center (EOC) and activate Incident Management
Teams (IMTs). IMTs are IC organizations, composed of the command and general staff
members and appropriate functional units of an IC System (ICS) organization. 30
Coordination of response actions should increase the efficiency and effectiveness of response
operations and enhance the full application of the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). 31 Key aspects of this step are managing emergency functions, coordinating initial
actions and requests for additional support, identifying resource needs, and coordinating
information across agencies. State agencies provide the majority of the external assistance to
communities responding to events. States are also the gateway to several government programs
that help communities prepare: when an incident grows beyond the capability of a local
jurisdiction and responders cannot meet the needs with mutual aid and assistance resources,
the local emergency manager contacts the state. 32
After the event is over and response activities end, the demobilization step ensures an orderly,
safe, and efficient return of resources to their original location and status. At the local, tribal, and
state level, this should include a process for tracking resources and ensuring applicable
reimbursement, validating the safe return of resources to their original locations, and an
accounting of compliance with aid and assistance provisions.
29
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
30
For more information on the Incident Command System, see Report 2: Analysis of the effectiveness of the use of the
Incident Command System in the DWH incident.
31
NIMS is a comprehensive, nationwide systematic approach to incident management with a core set of doctrine, concepts,
principles, terminology and organizational processes for all hazards. Further details are in Report 2: Analysis of the
effectiveness of the use of the Incident Command System in the DWH incident.
32
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
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4.6 Response Organization
The NRF describes in detail the organization and staffing structure of every entity responsible for
preparedness and response. Organizing to execute response activities includes developing an
overall organizational structure, strengthening leadership at each level, and assembling wellqualified teams of paid and volunteer staff for essential response and recovery tasks. NIMS
provides standard command and management structures that apply to response. Integrating
these NIMS principles into all phases of an incident and throughout all levels of government
ensures that all stakeholders have a common set of principles from which to operate during an
incident. Additionally, this common system enables responders from different jurisdictions and
disciplines to work together to respond to incidents.
NIMS provides a core set of common concepts, principles, terminology, and techniques under
the following functional areas:
•
An ICS that is structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas
•
A Multi-Agency Coordination System to coordinate activities above the field level and
prioritize the incident demands for critical or competing resources
•
For larger events, a UC, 33 which provides guidelines to enable agencies with different legal,
geographical, and functional responsibilities to coordinate, plan, and interact effectively
•
Training for managers and responders
•
Identification and management of resources to ensure an effective response
•
Mutual aid and assistance, which is executed before an incident with appropriate entities at
the local, tribal, state, and federal levels
•
Situational awareness, derived from monitoring relevant sources of information regarding
actual incidents and developing hazards
•
Qualifications and certifications for personnel to ensure that competent staff are available
•
Collection, tracking, and reporting of Incident Information to document the full range of
personnel, resource, and activity details
•
Crisis action planning during non-incident periods to enable quick transition to crisis action
planning when an incident occurs
•
Exercises consistent with the National Exercise Program
33
The Unified Command is also an organizing framework of the NCP.
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Government agencies at all levels are encouraged to conduct a thorough, systematic inventory
of their response resources and to conform to NIMS organizational and management principles
as noted above. Government agencies should also ensure that they have a cadre of personnel
(which can include full-time employees, temporary or surge personnel, and contractors) who are
trained in incident management and response principles and organized into teams. Personnel
and equipment can be organized to provide a certain function or mission capability. 34
The field-level organization (Figure 6) is based
on the ICS and used by all levels of
government—federal, state, tribal, and local—
and by many private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations. 35 Typically, the
IC is structured to facilitate activities in five
major functional areas: command, operations,
planning, logistics, and finance/administration. If
necessary, a federal Area Command can be set
up at the field level to oversee management of a
complex incident dispersed over a larger area
and broker critical resources. Local EOCs are
physical locations where multiagency
coordination occurs. EOCs help form a common
operating picture of the incident, relieve onscene command of the burden of external
coordination, and secure additional resources.
State Officials
& Emergency
Operations
Center
Incident
Command
Post
Local Officials
& Emergency
Operations
Center
Figure 6. State and Emergency Operations Center
Interactions with Incident Command.
State EOCs are physical locations where multiagency coordination occurs on a broader level.
Every state maintains an EOC configured to expand as necessary to manage events requiring
State-level assistance. Therefore, the state EOC is the central location from which off-scene
activities supported by the state are coordinated. State and tribal officials typically take the lead
to communicate public information regarding incidents occurring in their jurisdictions.
The Secretary of DHS is the principal federal official responsible for domestic incident
management. This includes coordinating federal operations and resource deployments in the
United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or
other emergencies. The NOC is the primary national hub for situational awareness and
operations coordination across the federal government for incident management. It provides the
Secretary of DHS and other principals with information necessary to make critical national-level
34
Department of Homeland Security, Overview: ESF and Support Annexes Coordinating Federal Assistance in Support of
the National Response Framework. January, 2008. http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-overview.pdf
35
The ICS and ICP are also organizing frameworks of the NCP.
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incident management decisions. The following components of the NOC provide integrated
mission support:
•
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC): The NRCC is FEMA’s primary
operations management center and the focal point for national resource coordination. As a
24/7 operations center, the NRCC monitors potential or developing incidents and supports
the efforts of regional and field components.
•
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC): The NICC monitors the nation’s
critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis. During an incident, the NICC
provides a coordinating forum to share information across infrastructure and key resources
sectors through appropriate information-sharing entities such as the Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers and the Sector Coordinating Councils. 36
5 Comparison of the NCP and NRF in Response to
Maritime Oil Spills
The NCP was developed specifically to promote coordinated government response to
discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants in
accordance with the authorities of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the CWA. The purpose of the NRF is to provide a coordinated
approach across the federal government for any emergency or major disaster, to rapidly assist
state and local government. The NRF includes an annex to address oil and hazardous materials
response, ESF #10, which discusses the relationship between the NRF and NCP. 37 As identified
in NRF ESF #10 and noted previously in this report, the federal response to oil spills is carried
out in accordance with the NCP, with the NCP containing more detailed response information
than that of the ESF.
The NCP can either serve as the sole federal response authority in response to a maritime
oil spill, or it can be supplemented by the NRF. NRF ESF #10 can be activated as a
supplement to the NCP for incidents requiring a more robust coordinated federal response, such
as any of the following:
•
A major disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act
•
A federal-to-federal support request
36
Ibid.
Emergency Support Function #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex is at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-10.pdf.
37
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•
An actual or potential oil discharge or hazardous materials release, to which EPA or
DHS/USCG (or both) respond under CERCLA or Federal Water Pollution Control Act
authorities (or both) and funding, and for which DHS determines it should lead the federal
response
NRF ESF #10 can also be activated “to respond to actual or threatened releases of materials not
typically responded to under the NCP but that pose a threat to public health or welfare or to
the environment.” Appropriate ESF #10 response activities to such incidents include water
quality monitoring and protection, air quality sampling and monitoring, and protection of natural
resources.
When ESF #10 is activated, the UC structure of the NCP provides the primary structure and
response mechanisms. Activation of ESF #10 allows for a build-out of the NCP structure
within the NRF mechanisms. While ESF #10 attempts to outline how coordination between the
NCP and NRF structures would occur, specific guidance on exactly how to coordinate this larger
government-wide response is lacking, particularly during a SONS. For example,
•
ESF #10 states “When ESF #10 is activated, the NCP typically serves as the basis for
actions taken in support of the NRF.” The document does not elaborate on instances when
the NCP is not the basis of oil spill response actions.
•
ESF #10 states “During Stafford Act responses, some procedures in the NCP may be
streamlined or may not apply.” The document does not specify which procedures in the NCP
should be streamlined or would not apply.
•
The RP is not named in the hierarchy or organization of ESF #10; thus, ESF #10 is silent on
the role that the RP should play when it is activated.
•
The primary federal responsibility of the EPA and USCG for oil spill response is reaffirmed in
ESF #10; however, if a spill is classified as a SONS, DHS has the ability to decide whether it
should coordinate the overall federal response. The document does not specify what the
criteria or decision-making processes are regarding whether DHS should take primary
leadership of oil spill response.
•
Figure 7 highlights the additional NRF inputs to the NCP if ESF #10 is activated. However,
ESF #10 does not clarify lines of communication, hierarchy, nor address potential duplicity of
activities (e.g., should the Joint Field Office play the same role as the IC Post or Unified Area
Command [UAC]?)
Although ESF #10 was not formally activated for the DWH incident, the incident exposed many
of the issues that should be further explored regarding how to harmonize the two frameworks in
responding to a SONS. The next section identifies lessons learned from the DWH response to
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(1) identify those areas under the NCP or NRF that require additional clarification; (2) illustrate
overlapping responsibilities and synergies; and (3) explore gaps between the NCP and NRF.
Figure 7. Illustrative build-out of the NCP per ESF #10.
6 NRF and NCP during the DWH Event
The DWH event began on April 20, 2010, when the DWH offshore oil drilling platform
experienced a major explosion and fire above a Mississippi Canyon Block 252 well site in the
Gulf of Mexico. The explosion caused loss of life, injuries, and a significant oil release. Oil
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
continued to be released into the Gulf of Mexico until the well was capped on July 15, 2010;
however, response operations to mitigate the resultant oil spill continue today. 38
The DWH incident was declared a SONS on April 29, 2010, which was the first time in history
that the federal government had used that declaration. 39 The emergency response effort to the
event was unprecedented and grew significantly more complex as the response continued.
6.1 How the NCP Was Applied and Implemented during the DWH
Event
The NCP served as the official federal response framework for the DWH event. ESF #10 was not
activated in response to the DWH spill. 40 It has not been documented as to why or how this
decision was made, but considering the nature of the initial set of challenges—rescuing drilling
personnel, recovering bodies, and capping the leaking well—establishing the management of
offshore response operations under NCP can be viewed as understandable. Anticipating the
threat posed by the leaking oil and underscoring the confusion that existed between the NCP
and NRF constructs, the governors of Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama declared
states of emergency pursuant to the Stafford Act. As described in section 4.1, the Stafford Act is
administered by DHS and serves as one of the primary authorities of the NRF. Significant
confusion existed between the NCP and NRF at all levels of government, which adversely
affected initial oil spill response efforts. 41 The following sections illustrate how the NCP was
applied and implemented during the DWH event and highlight those activities that occurred
outside the framework.
6.1.1 Preparedness Planning and Coordination
6.1.1.1 Regional Contingency Plan
State-Specific Overview
The RRT coordinated the One Gulf Plan to serve as the RCP for the Eighth Coast Guard
District. 42 USCG Marine Safety Unit (MSU) Port Arthur, Texas, wrote the base plan, which was
published in 2003. The Gulf states, including Florida, concurred that this would serve as
the guiding regional document for oil spill response. The following USCG districts recognize
38
USCG Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team. 2011. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, USCG, Washington, D.C.
Ibid.
40
Hagerty, C. and J.L. Ramseur. 2010. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for Congress, 7-5700, Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C.
41
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
42
The One Gulf Plan at http://ocean.floridamarine.org/acp/mobacp/ACP_PDF/MobileOnePlanUpdates_05.pdf.
39
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the One Gulf Plan: Corpus Christi, Houston-Galveston, Port Arthur, Morgan City, New Orleans,
and Mobile. Northwest Florida is in the Eighth District, under FOSC Mobile.
The remainder of Florida is in the USCG Seventh District. An extensive Internet search for the
RCP for the Seventh District was conducted for this report; however, a copy of the RCP was not
identified. The URLs for the RCP are not functional. 43 In interviews conducted for the
Commission, USCG representatives stated that the RCP for the Seventh District is currently
being updated.
Florida’s Pollutant Discharge Act originally named representatives to the RRTs from Department
of Natural Resources, Department of Environmental Regulation, and Department of Community
Affairs (note: state agencies in Florida were reorganized significantly before the DWH incident,
and DCA was merged into other agencies in 2011). During the activation of the RRT, the
designated lead state agency was to assume Florida's primary representation on the RRT. 44
DWH Event and Lessons Learned
The One Gulf Plan was identified in post-event reports as the relevant RCP for the spill; 45
references to the RCP for the USCG Seventh District were not included in post-event reports.
According to USCG representatives interviewed for this report, the RCP for the Seventh District
was not activated during the DWH event. The cited reasons ranged from the chaos and
confusion following the event, to waiting for oil to cross into Seventh District boundaries.
Several lessons were learned regarding RCPs and regional planning efforts that the DWH
incident exposed:
•
Many county and local level officials interviewed through the course of this research were not
aware of the existence of the RCP before the DWH event and had not contributed to its
development. The One Gulf Plan had no reference to the role of local officials or local
communities in general at the time of the spill. 46
•
The One Gulf Plan was identified as the primary response plan in the Incident Specific
Preparedness Review conducted by the USCG following the DWH event. However, many
other planning frameworks were used during the DWH event, including ACPs and state and
local contingency plans. There was confusion among government officials regarding which
43
The URL that is included in the ACPs for the Seventh USCG District RCP is not functional:
http://www.nrt.org/production/NRT/RRTHome.nsf/AllPages/rrt_iv.htm?OpenDocument.
44
Florida Pollutant Discharge Prevention and Control Act, as amended in 2005.
45
USCG National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report. 2011. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, at
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf, and USCG Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team. 2011. BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, USCG, Washington, D.C.
46
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
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plan should be applied and a lack of familiarity with the plans. 47 Exacerbating the issue,
minimal to no coordination occurred among the various plans. 48
•
While the One Gulf Plan was determined sufficient in meeting traditional, localized spills, the
DWH event exposed significant flaws in the RCP, such as how to prioritize SONS response
efforts on the basis of conflicting stakeholder priorities.
•
No standardized guidelines are in the NCP or issued by the NRT for content requirements of
the RCPs.
6.1.1.2 Area Contingency Plans
State-Specific Overview
ACs generally meet annually to develop, review, and update the ACPs for each of the five USCG
regions in Florida. 49 The USCG Commandant is in charge of appointing AC members for the
coastal zone and the EPA Administrator is in charge of appointing AC members for the inland
zone. 50 The USCG Seventh District regions include St. Petersburg, Key West, Miami, and
Jacksonville. The USCG Eighth District region is in Mobile, Alabama, and includes northwest
Florida. The Florida sectors for the two USCG districts are shown in Figure 8.
Sector Mobile provides an illustrative example of AC membership. The Captain of the Port for
Coast Guard Sector Mobile chairs the Sector Mobile AC, which meets annually. As listed in the
ACP, the membership of the Sector Mobile AC consists of the following Florida representatives:
•
Northwest Florida SOSC, Vice Chairman of the Executive Steering Committee
•
Representatives from the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), AC
members
•
Representatives from county Emergency Management Agencies (Escambia, Santa Rosa,
Okaloosa, Walton, Bay, Gulf, Franklin, Wakulla, Jefferson, and Taylor counties), AC
members
47
Ibid.
USCG Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team. 2011. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, USCG, Washington, D.C.
49
Note that the NCP recommends that ACs meet “at least semi-annually.”
50
USCG, One Gulf Plan, updated on August 2009. http://www.glo.texas.gov/what-we-do/caring-for-the-coast/_documents/oilspill/compliance/onegulfplan.pdf
48
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Figure 8. Florida’s USCG regions.
DWH Event and Lessons Learned
Overall, a review of ACPs conducted by the USCG following the DWH incident determined that,
“ACPs were inadequate for this incident and possibly for smaller more localized
incidents.” 51 The lack of review and technical guidance by the RRTs was cited as a contributing
factor. In addition to this overall finding, the following issues were identified:
•
Although Emergency Management Agency representatives are listed as AC members,
research conducted for the commission indicated that local representatives were not aware
of or did not participate in AC meetings (or both).
•
While Florida’s state-level Pollutant Spill Contingency Plan is referenced in the ACPs, it is not
clear how that plan was incorporated into the ACPs. The ACP did not clarify when the statelevel plan versus the relevant ACP should be followed.
•
The Jacksonville, St. Petersburg, and Key West ACPs included a planning scenario for a
worst-case discharge, but the Mobile and Miami ACPs did not include such a planning
scenario.
51
USCG Incident Specific Preparedness Review Team. 2011. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, USCG, Washington, D.C.
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•
Public records, including meeting minutes, agendas, and records of attendance were not
readily available for several of the Florida ACs, which would assist in understanding
membership, activity, and the awareness level of state and local stakeholders. 52
•
The USCG determined that the information on environmentally sensitive areas was not
identified in many ACPs, and the information that was included was deficient. 53 Digital ACP
supplements had been developed for each of Florida’s ACPs at the time of the DWH
incident, but there was some question about their accuracy or adequacy or both.
•
Significant delays in incorporating/approving supplemental boom plans developed by the
counties were reported. 54
•
Each AC is required to conduct training exercises for its ACP under the guidance of the
USCG once every three years. 55 However, state and county representatives stated that they
had not been invited to participate in ACP oil spill training.
•
USCG District Seven conducted an ACP review/update every three to four years. State
officials interviewed through research for the commission recommended that ACPs be
reviewed every two years.
6.1.1.3 State Preparedness Planning
Florida enacted legislation supporting the NCP that identified the lead agency and State
Emergency Response Team (SERT) for oil spill response, along with supporting agencies and
roles. FDEP was named as the lead agency in responding to all discharges of pollutants that
occur in coastal waters, estuaries, tidal flats, beaches, and lands adjoining the seacoast of
Florida. 56 Personnel from FDEP’s Bureau of Emergency Response serve as SOSCs for oil and
hazardous material incidents occurring anywhere in Florida, including coastal waters that extend
nine miles from the coast in the Gulf of Mexico.
The Florida Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) operates and leads SERT. FDEM
operates out of the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) in Tallahassee, Florida. The
SEOC would be activated for a major coastal spill event and would serve to coordinate the
52
Note that the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission maintain Florida specific ACPs at
http://myfwc.com/research/gis/projects/oil-spill/acp/. USCG district websites maintain their respective ACPs and some
include information regarding ACP updates and recent meetings. For example, Sector Miami includes ACP updates and
meeting presentations at: https://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/portDirectory.do?tabId=1&cotpId=35. However, meeting
minutes, agendas, and records of attendance are generally not available for the other sectors.
53
Ibid.
54
This issue was also identified in interviews conducted by the Deepwater Horizon Workgroup established by the Florida
House of Representatives. (Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010. Response to Current
Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.)
55
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making Within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
56
Section 376.031(12), F.S.
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deployment of all needed state resources in support of the response. Other state agencies that
have been identified for a state response effort are the following:
•
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
•
Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
•
Florida Division of Emergency Management
•
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
•
Florida Department of Health
•
Florida Attorney General
•
Florida Department of Financial Services
Florida has developed a state-level contingency plan jointly with USCG that incorporates the
ACPs. 57 In addition, Florida has worked with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, USCG, and
other agencies, to develop statewide Sensitivity of Coastal Environments and Wildlife to Spilled
Oil Atlases and a Florida Tidal Inlet Protection Strategies for Oil Spill Response. 58 This
information was incorporated into the digital ACP maps referenced above in Section 6.1.1.2 and
was available before the DWH event. Overall, Florida met the planning obligations of the NCP
under the CWA before the DWH event. It should be noted, however, that even these
considerations did not anticipate—and could not in themselves address—the size and scope of
the response necessary to deal with an event like the DWH.
6.1.1.4 Local Preparedness Planning
Categorically, one of the overarching findings of this report is that local-level participation and
planning efforts had not been integrated under the NCP framework. County and municipal
representatives were generally unfamiliar with their respective ACPs and had not participated in
their development. County and municipal representatives also had not participated in ACP
training and preparedness activities. 59
However, as part of the NRF, counties in Florida had developed Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plans in coordination with FDEM. These plans typically focus on hurricane and
flooding response. While many acknowledge an oil spill as a potential hazard and cite the NCP,
research conducted for the commission did not identify any of these plans that addressed oil spill
response as a likely event. Several local government representatives interviewed for this report
57
Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010. Response to Current Disaster and Preparation
for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
58
This information is at http://myfwc.com/research/gis/projects/oil-spill/acp/.
59
The interview process did not identify any participants in NCP training activities; however, it is recognized that some local
participation in Florida might have occurred but was not identified in this research.
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
stated that they have been, and still are, regularly involved in the annual hurricane drills
conducted as part of the NRF.
6.1.2 Notification and Preliminary Assessment
State-Specific Overview
Florida identifies the processes for notification of pollutant discharge in the Coastal Pollutant Spill
Response Plan and the Pollutant Discharge Act, 60 which are compliant with the NCP. Each of
the ACPs also details the required steps for notification and preliminary assessment if an oil spill
occurs.
Initial reports of an oil spill are required to be made by the RP to the National Response Center,
and to the FOSC and SOSC. Each oil spill incident must be evaluated by the FOSC to determine
the level of response, and it is Florida’s the policy to fully assist the FOSC in response to
pollutant spills. If the SOSC is the first response official on scene, he or she will institute an ICS;
if not, the SOSC will immediately report to the ICS to establish contact with the FOSC or the
Incident Commander. It is the SOSC’s responsibility to provide technical assistance to the RP or
FOSC or both, assess the incident, and determine what actions should be taken. The SOSC is to
coordinate all FDEP activities or requests for state resources by the FOSC. If a determination of
an RP is made, the principle role of the state is to observe, monitor, and provide advice and
counsel.
DWH Event and Lessons Learned
Notification of an explosion and fire aboard the DWH was received at the USCG District Eight
command center on April 20, 2010. On April 21, following the emergency search and rescue
mission, the Commanding Officer of MSU Morgan City, Louisiana, became the first FOSC to
direct the oil spill response. SERT began monitoring the incident and established communication
with the USCG on that date.
The preliminary assessment of the incident by the FOSC (and others in the NCP structure) has
been criticized by post-spill reports for failure to quickly recognize the severity of the
incident.61 The FOSC remained at the top of the NCP command structure for nine days. A
SONS was not declared and a National Incident Commander was not appointed until April 29,
nine days after the initial explosion. Interviews with USCG officials conducted by the staff of the
National Commission on the DWH event found that many responders thought a sense of over-
60
62N-16.022 Notification of Pollutant Discharge; Specific Authority 370.021, F.S. Law Implemented 376.12, F.S.
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
61
30
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optimism affected responders (e.g., the spill was not severe) and that the initial approach was
too slow and unfocused. 62
6.1.3 Response Operations
6.1.3.1 Command and Control
State-Specific Overview
The NCP, supported by the ACPs, has an established response structure governing oil spills as
outlined in Section 3.3.3. The SOSC is in the UAC and is responsible for coordinating all state
actions. In Florida, DER is responsible for providing the majority of the personnel that will
participate in the UAC. SERT supports the SOSC and coordinates state agency response
activities. SERT is grouped into 18 ESFs that are under direction of agency-appointed
Emergency Coordination Officers. 63 Florida has also designated that the State Scientific
Coordinator work with the SOSC and FOSC for all resource-related issues.
DWH Response
The emergency response operations for the DWH event evolved from an initial UAC established
in Robert, Louisiana, on April 23, to an elaborate IC structure that included a National IC
(Houston, Texas), a UAC (New Orleans, Louisiana), three IC posts (Houma, Louisiana; Mobile,
Alabama; and Miami, Florida), and numerous branches and staging areas by the time the well
was capped on July 15. Figure 9 illustrates the build-out of response operations as they affected
Florida.
The IC in Houma directed the response effort in Louisiana. The Mobile IC was responsible for
the response effort in Mississippi, Alabama, and northwest Florida (15 counties). The IC in Miami
was responsible for directing response efforts for the remainder of Florida (52 counties).
In response to the DWH event, the FDEM Director was designated as the Florida SOSC. The
SOSC and SERT staff reported to IC Mobile on April 28, which constituted the Florida Branch at
UC Mobile.
62
Ibid.
Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010. Response to Current Disaster and Preparation
for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
63
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
National Incident Commander
Washington, DC
National Response Team
Federal On-Scene Coordinator
National Incident Command,
Houston, TX
Regional Response Team
Deputy Unified Area Commander
Unified Area Command, New Orleans, LA
FOSCR
Incident Command Post Houma, LA
Federal On-Scene Representative
(FOSCR)
Incident Command Post Mobile, AL
FOSCR
Incident Command Post Miami, FL
Florida SOSC, State
Management Team
USCG Deputy
USCG Deputy
Branch Destin
Branch Pensacola
USCG Deputy
USCG Deputy
Branch Port St. Joe
Branch Panama City
Figure 9. Command and control structure for the DWH event.
SERT deployed a forward command to IC Miami and also sent liaisons to the UAC New Orleans.
In addition, SERT collected an extensive amount of data through air, land, and sea
reconnaissance efforts, which were integrated into FDEM’s Geospatial Assessment Tool for
Operations and Response (GATOR). This information was relayed to all command elements. 64
64
Florida Division of Emergency Management, State Emergency Response Team. 2010. Deepwater Horizon Response:
After Action Report/Improvement Plan, FDEM, Tallahassee, Florida.
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In June 2010, more than one month after the DWH explosion, USCG Deputies under the
command of IC Mobile were forward deployed to Florida to better coordinate with state and local
officials. Each Deputy directed a small IMT. SERT, USCG, and BP established four operational
branches in Pensacola, Destin, Panama City, and Port St. Joe to direct local tactical
operations. 65
Lessons Learned
An overarching criticism of the DWH response is that state and local concerns were ignored.
Several issues contributed to that sentiment, which are further explored below:
•
Lines of authority were not clear. This sentiment has been expressed at all levels of
government, including by NIC, Thad Allen. 66 The DWH event represented the first time that a
SONS was declared and that an NIC was designated; thus, the DWH event was the first time
that the command and control structure for a SONS was tested. In addition, there was a lack
of familiarity with the NCP, from the federal agency leads to state and government officials.
Specifically, the DWH event exposed the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the
following under the NCP:
• National Incident Commander: The NCP designates an NIC for a SONS event; however,
ESF #10 and Homeland Security Directive-5 names the Secretary of Homeland Security
as the Principal Federal Official. Although the Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary
Napolitano, ceded that authority to the NIC, these two roles need to be clarified. 67
• Responsible Party: BP, the company directing the drilling operation, was identified as the
RP for the DWH event. As the designated RP, BP led the effort to cap the well, had a lead
role in the response, and was responsible for funding the response and clean-up. As
stated by NIC, Thad Allen, “the statutorily defined role of the RP in an oil spill response
was generally not understood or accepted by the public and all levels of government.” 68
The DWH event exposed significant issues with the roles and responsibilities, 69 of the
RP—especially with coast line protection and cleanup—which should be further explored
and clarified.
• NRT: As envisioned in the NCP, the NRT provides high-level technical guidance and
interagency decision-making support if an oil spill occurs. It was reported that during the
65
For more information on the operational branches, please see Report 2: Analysis of the effectiveness of the use of the
Incident Command System in the DWH incident
66
USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG,
Washington, D.C.
67
A more thorough discussion on this issue is presented in USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident
Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG, Washington, D.C.
68
Ibid.
69
This issue is discussed in more detail in the other white papers in this series, including: Report 1: Analysis of Current State
and Federal Laws Addressing Oil Spill Planning and Response. and Report 4: Financing, Planning & Response Statutes, &
Implementing Agency Representatives.
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
first NRT call, the members were replaced by agency principals, and Secretary Napolitano
chaired the call, as opposed to the NIC. 70 Furthermore, the role of the NRT was
essentially replaced by a new organization, the Interagency Solutions Group, within the
NIC. The NRT became a “report-to body rather than a decision-making body.” 71
• RRTs: Under the NCP, the RRT duties include decision making on the use of dispersants
and providing interagency expertise to assist in decisions such as fishery and beach
closures. Directives on the use of dispersants were first made by the FOSC and then
taken over by EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, 72 completely circumventing the RRT. This
generated confusion for government officials and the public regarding how these important
decisions were being made.
• State and local officials: Under the NCP, the state’s role is to provide a SOSC and
personnel to the UAC and to implement FOSC decisions. However, there are no further
requirements under the NCP for state or local participation in the planning or response
processes. This lack of explicit guidance from the NCP on the involvement of state and
local officials contributed to their lack of awareness of the NCP structure and decisionmaking processes.
•
Florida was divided between two USCG jurisdictional boundaries. Florida is unique in
this aspect, as it is split between the USCG’s Seventh and Eighth Districts. This division
caused confusion for Florida government officials and the public regarding the command
structure of the response. Under this division,
northwest Florida was under IC Mobile, Alabama.
“A lot of the decisions about Florida
That important decisions affecting Florida were
are being made in Mobile”
being made in another state contributed to the
— Mike Sole, FDEP Secretary
perception that the concerns of Florida were not
being appropriately considered.
•
Build out of the command structure did not occur quickly enough. Branch locations
incorporating local agencies were not established in Florida until more than a month after the
blowout occurred. Communications and tactical operations were greatly hindered in the first
month of the response without local, on-the-ground insight. State and local representatives
interviewed for the Commission described numerous instances where IC Mobile did not have
up-to-date information on local issues and resources and also where IC Mobile failed to
communicate with local officials on status and planned activities.
•
State and local officials were unfamiliar with the NCP structure and with their respective
ACPs. Florida does not have oil and gas exploration/production in state waters; thus, state
70
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
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Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
and local officials are not as familiar with oil and gas emergency response and preparation
as their Gulf state counterparts. Lack of participation in the ACP development and training
process exacerbated this lack of familiarity.
•
Lack of data and information on extent of impacts. Several state and county officials
interviewed for this report stated that up-to-date information on the spill and impacts was not
provided by the USCG or RP or both. The information that was provided was often
insufficient; with issues in resolution (e.g., not provided at appropriate scale) or timing (e.g.,
already out of date). Florida established a GIS database, GATOR, for impacts and spill
response using SERT reconnaissance efforts. However, it is outside the scope of this report
to determine whether that information was an accurate supplement.
6.1.3.2 State and Local Actions outside the NCP Structure
During DWH response operations, state and local officials across the Gulf region expressed
frustration with what they felt was the top-down control structure of the NCP. The sentiment that
local concerns were not adequately addressed in the response, especially in the first month, was
widely acknowledged in post-spill reports and expressed in interviews. 73
The situation was compounded when the governors of Florida, Louisiana, Alabama, and
Mississippi declared states of emergency on April 29, which triggered the Stafford Act provisions.
The Stafford Act describes how the federal government should provide aid to a state during an
emergency and is a primary authority of the NRF. The Stafford Act is used in response to
hurricanes and flooding, and is a familiar legislative and response tool for the Gulf states.
However, instead of a Principal Federal Responder being appointed to provide federal aid
directly to the states to use as they see fit as detailed under the NRF, under the NCP, the FOSC
and UC direct the response and resources provided by the RP.
During the DWH event, state and local officials had to obtain authorization from the FOSC
and the RP before spending funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Once the Stafford
Act provisions were triggered, there was significant confusion regarding whether Gulf states
should legitimately have more control over resource allocation as occurs under the NRF. This
issue was never formally clarified.
The lack of ability to direct resources spurred many state and local officials to act outside
the NCP structure. The boom wars became the manifestation of the state and federal decisionmaking struggle. Each Gulf state and potentially affected county wanted to ensure that their
shorelines were protected from oil. Given the magnitude of the spill, there were not enough
73
USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG,
Washington, D.C. and USCG National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report. 2011. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill,
at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf.
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35
Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
booms and skimmers to protect the entire region. As described in several post-spill reports, the
degree that booms were deployed in their respective areas became a symbol of whether, and to
what degree, local concerns were being addressed. 74 State and local officials across the Gulf
often worked to mobilize resources to protect their local areas even if the direction had not been
provided by the FOSC. For example, county officials indicated that they had purchased booms
and other supplies independently of IC Mobile direction because of both the perception that local
concerns were not appropriately being addressed by the UC and from difficulties in the approval
process.
In addition, BP as the RP provided grants directly to the states. Florida received $25 million
to “accelerate implementation of the ACPs” and $15 million to “promote tourism.” 75 This money
was under direct control of Florida’s governor—not the FOSC or ICs. In fact, there was no
requirement that the funds be used in a manner consistent with the NCP. The response
operations funded by these grants were, thus, outside the control of the FOSC and the NCP
response structure. Provision of the grants directly to the states without federal approval also
contributed to the perception that the RP was in control of the terms of the response. 76
7 Recommendations for Improved Oil Spill Response
Admiral Thad Allen states in his NIC personal report, “we experienced both the political and
social nullification of the NCP during the Deepwater Horizon response.” 77 One of the
primary reasons that the NCP did not work effectively is that responders at all levels of
government lacked familiarity with its structure and that state and local officials were not
successfully integrated into the NCP. Ultimately, state and local officials expressed preference
for the NRF/Stafford Act response model.
Overall, the research conducted for the Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
found that the NCP is a sound framework and that additional congressional legislative
action is not required at the federal or state level. However, several areas require
improvement in implementation under the NCP to ensure our nation and state’s readiness
for another oil spill. The recommendations identified through research and interviews
74
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the Unified
Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
75
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the
Unified Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
76
USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG,
Washington, D.C.
77
Ibid.
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conducted for this report are included below and grouped as organization, planning, response, or
communication strategies.
7.1 Organization Strategies
1. While NRF ESF #10 outlines the build-out of the NCP within the NRF framework, specific
guidance regarding roles, responsibilities, and lines of communication is lacking.
Recommendation: Additional technical guidance should be developed for the NRF and
ESF #10 that clearly details how oil spill response should be conducted if ESF #10 is
activated and for a SONS event. 78 It is further recommended that the role of the RP be
specified in ESF#10, that a common lexicon be used for both frameworks, and that the
potential duplicity of activities be addressed.
2. Under the NCP, Florida is divided between two USCG districts (the Seventh and Eighth).
Under the NRF, a federal coordinating officer is appointed for each state to work directly
with the state coordinator, which provides a single coordinating mechanism for each
state. Recommendation: USCG district lines should be redrawn to include Florida in one
district to improve communication during response activities or the USCG should develop
a process for a single coordinating mechanism for Florida that is consistently detailed in
the RCPs for the Seventh and Eighth USCG Districts and in the five sector ACPs. 79
3. There was a significant lack of state and local understanding of the NCP and significant
confusion regarding roles in response efforts. Recommendations:
a. The NCP should be updated to create a larger and clearer role for state and local
officials in oil spill response. 80
b. State and local officials should receive mandatory training on the NCP in relation
to oil spill response.
4. The conduct of the RP, including direct provision of resources to states and counties
outside the UC structure, failure to share data related to oil flow and spill impacts, and
compliance issues regarding the resource approval process, have been cited as
adversely affecting the oil spill response. Recommendation: The NRT should carefully
consider the roles and responsibilities of the RP in the NCP on the basis of lessons
learned from the DWH event and provide further technical guidance on how the RP
78
Recommendations to clarify the NCP and NRF frameworks have been identified in numerous post-spill reports, including in
USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG,
Washington, D.C.
79
A similar recommendation is also included in Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010.
Response to Current Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
80
Recommendations to more clearly involve state and local officials have been identified in numerous post-spill reports,
including in USCG National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report. 2011. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, at
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf.
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
should coordinate with state and local officials. 81 Specifically, while it is appropriate for
the RP to be involved in command decisions regarding offshore response, spill control, oil
containment, salvage operations, and well capping, there is little justification for involving
the RP in directing activities related to spill monitoring in the open sea, mobilizing coastal
resources, protection of sensitive coastal areas, and shoreline/beach cleanup.
5. The NRT and RRT were circumvented during the DWH event and important decisions
regarding use of dispersants, beach and fisheries closures were made in an ad hoc
organizational construct. Recommendations:
a. The NRT and DHS should reconsider the role of the NRT and RRT during an
incident and develop technical guidance to clarify roles and responsibilities. 82
b. The NRT and RRTs should develop criteria and protocols related to public and
environmental health and the use of dispersants, beach and fisheries closures,
and a process to regularly update the resultant guidelines. 83
7.2 Planning Strategies
1. The USCG determined that both RCPs and ACPs were inadequate for a SONS event,
and potentially smaller events. Recommendations: 84
a. The RCPs and ACPs should be rewritten or supplemented to address any
identified deficiencies including: worst-case discharge scenarios, use of
dispersants, local boom plans, environmentally sensitive areas, response
personnel qualifications, and decision-making criteria for use of resources under
competing stakeholder interests.
b. State and local plans should be more directly integrated and coordinated with
RCPs and ACPs. Local county officials could advise the SOSC on local
coordination strategies.
c. The NRT should develop standardized guidelines for RCPs.
d. The NRT and RRTs should promote best practices and lessons learned across
RRTs and ACs.
81
Recommendations to clarify the role of the RP have been identified in numerous post-spill reports, including in National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. 2011. Decision-making within the Unified
Command. Staff Working Paper 2, at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Updated%20Unified%20Command%20Working%20Paper.pdf.
82
A similar recommendation is also included in USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s
Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG, Washington, D.C.
83
A similar recommendation is also included in Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010.
Response to Current Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
84
Recommendations on strengthening RCPs and ACPs have been identified in numerous post-spill reports, including in
USCG National Response Team, On Scene Coordinator Report. 2011. Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, at
http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf.
38
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e. ACPs should be updated every two or three years.
2. The One Gulf Plan was developed to address the shared threat of oil spills facing Gulf
states. However, Florida is divided between two USCG districts and thus governed by
two separate RCPs. It is not clear whether or how these two plans are integrated.
Recommendation: The One Gulf Plan should be clearly aligned with the RCP for the
USCG Seventh District to cover those gulf counties not included in the One Gulf Plan.
3. State and local officials were not adequately included in developing, and were generally
unfamiliar with, the RCPs and ACPs. Recommendation:
a. State and local officials (or their appointed representatives) should be included in
RRTs and ACs, and the SOSC and SERT should ensure collaboration and
participation.
b. An annual module or course on the NCP and its components should be available
for newly elected and interested officials.
4. State and local officials did not generally participate in NCP training activities.
Recommendation:
a. NCP training activities should occur regularly and periodically include a SONS
event. 85
b. The SOSC and SERT should ensure that all appropriate state and local
representatives are invited and that participation is appropriately high.
c. State and local officials could advise the SOSC and SERT on invitations and
response rates, including how to increase low participation rates.
7.3 Response Strategies
1. State and local officials felt that they were not adequately consulted or included in
response efforts. Recommendations:
a. The use of local liaisons and their chain of command should be explicitly included
in NCP technical guidance, RCPs and ACPs.
b. Criteria for the speedy establishment of local branches should be detailed in
RCPs and ACPs. 86
85
A similar recommendation is also included in USCG National Incident Command. 2010. National Incident Commander’s
Report: MC252 Deepwater Horizon, USCG, Washington, D.C.
86
A similar recommendation is also included in Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010.
Response to Current Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
2. The lack of ability to direct resources spurred many state and local officials to act outside
the NCP structure. Recommendations:
a. The role of the FOSC and RP in approving and expediting requests under the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund should be clarified through technical guidance (e.g.,
consistency in form and applications, whether or under what conditions can
permits be waived). 87
b. The ability of governors to direct resources provided by the RP or after a state of
emergency is declared should be clarified through technical guidance.
c. ACs should develop protocols for pre-event oil spill response contracts (e.g.,
cooperative agreements or memorandums of understanding), similar to those
established for Stafford Act events, to be included in ACPs.
d. State and local officials should establish pre-event oil spill response contracts as
outlined through ACP protocol.
7.4 Communication Strategies
Note that communication is considered a cross-cutting issue and is addressed in many of the
other recommendations included in this section.
1. Public confusion regarding lines of authority and the decision-making process in oil spill
response. Recommendations:
a. RRTs and ACs should include a communications strategy that identifies plans for
informing and updating the news media, including pre-packaged technical
information on the properties of spilled oil, how it moves, how it ages in the sea,
how it reacts to booms, approaches for protecting sensitive areas and deflecting
oil to beaches for easier cleanup, challenges of skimming oil, shore cleanup
techniques, etc.
b. The SOSC, FDEM, and SERT should work with the RRTs and ACs to develop a
process for integrated messaging across Florida (that could be included as a
component of the communications strategy above or a separate state specific
strategy). The process should detail how to integrate messaging to and through
state and local governments, so they have accurate information that can be
transmitted to their local media, and overall media messages are consistent.
Local officials can play a unique role in assisting with public outreach and
communications in Florida.
87
A similar recommendation is also included in Florida House of Representatives, Deepwater Horizon Workgroup 1. 2010.
Response to Current Disaster and Preparation for Future Disasters. Florida House of Representatives, Tallahassee, Florida.
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Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
2. Public confusion regarding public health and safety (e.g., beach and fisheries closures).
Recommendations:
a. RRTs and ACs should develop public outreach messages and materials on:
(1) what dispersants are, when they are needed, and any environmental tradeoffs
associated with them, (2) what the public should do when/if they encounter
tarballs on the beach or an oil sheen in the water during a spill crisis, (3) issues
association with the safety of seafood consumption during a spill, (4) precautions
that response/cleanup workers should take when conducting clean-up activities,
and (4) any additional health and safety issues identified by the RRTs and ACs.
The development of factsheets and pamphlets on these topics will assist with
providing standard, consistent messages and materials that are readily available
for county, state, and federal agency use and will help ensure less confusion
among the public and in the media.
b. The messaging should be incorporated into a ready-to-use campaign that
localities can immediately use/tailor to hit the ground running before public
concern grows to an unmanageable level.
c. The information could be included as appendices to the ACPs or available on the
appropriate web-sites.
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
Appendix A: The National Response System
Incident Occurs
National Response Center
OSC
Initial
Assessment/First
Response,
Federal/State/Local
PRP Notification, and
Response Measures
Natural Resource Trustees
Federal Assistance Required?
No:
State/Local/PRP
Yes:
OSC
State/Local/PRP
Regional Response Team
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National Response Team
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
Appendix B: Abbreviations and Acronyms
AC
Area Committees
ACP
Area Contingency Plan
CERCLA
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
CFR
Code of Federal Regulations
CWA
Clean Water Act
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DWH
Deepwater Horizon
EOC
Emergency Operations Center
EPA
U.S. environmental Protection Agency
ESF
Emergency Support Functions
FDEM
Florida Department of Emergency Management
FDEP
Florida Department of Environmental Protection
FEMA
Federal Emergency Response Agency
FOSC
Federal On-Scene Coordinator
GATOR
Geospatial Assessment Tool for Operations and Response
IC
Incident Command
ICS
Incident Command System
IMT
Incident Management Team
JFO
Joint Field Office
MSU
Marine Safety Unit
NCP
National Contingency Plan
NICC
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center
NIMS
National Incident Management System
NOC
National Operations Center
NRCC
National Response Coordination Center
NRF
National Response Framework
NRP
National Response Plan
NRS
National Response System
NRT
National Response Team
OPA
Oil Pollution Act of 1990
RCP
Regional Contingency Plan
RP
Responsible Party
Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident
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Florida Commission on Oil Spill Response Coordination
RRT
Regional Response Team
SEOC
State Emergency Operations Center
SERT
State Emergency Response Team
SONS
Spills of National Significance
SOSC
State On-Scene Coordinator
UAC
Unified Area Command
UC
Unified Command
U.S.C.
United States Code
USCG
U.S. Coast Guard
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Report 3: A Comparison of the National Response Framework and National Contingency Plan during a Major Oil Spill Incident