1
Slovenes and their Identity after the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
Lecture Held at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague, April
11, 2012, 17:00
After the era of the Protestant, Primož Trubar, who was the first to write the word
Slovenes in 1550, Slovene common national identity developed slowly. It was only in
1843 that the term Slovenia was created and in 1848 the first national program,
written by the rare Slovene intellectuals of the time. Slovenes lived in Austrian
historical lands, of which a strong regional identity and national heterogeneity was
characteristic; the eastern part of Slovene territory developed separately in the
Hungarian part of the monarchy, with the local Slovenes (Prekmurian Slovenes) even
developing their own literary language. With schooling at lower levels the Hapsburg
Monarchy made it possible for Slovenes to be preserved as a nation, yet at the same
time prevented them from achieving political autonomy. With the disintegration of the
monarchy the majority of the Slovene nation came under the Yugoslav state, the
entire western part, i.e. one-third of the population, under Italy, the northern part
(Carinthia) under Austria, while the eastern part was divided between the Yugoslav
and Hungarian states, with Yugoslavia receiving the larger part (Prekmurje) and
Hungary the smaller part (the Raba Region). All minorities were quickly subjected to
assimilation, with Slovenes of the Littoral experiencing it the first and the worst under
Fascism. Under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Slovenes became stronger economically
and culturally, gaining a university as well; however, they failed to achieve their main
goal: political autonomy. With resistance against the German, Italian and Hungarian
occupiers during World War II they succeeded in preserving themselves as a nation,
achieving a modification of the western border and the status of a republic in the
Yugoslav Socialist Federation. They had their own assembly (parliament) and
government (executive council); after the constitution of 1974 they were also given
collective presidency of the republic, and in all national and republican constitutions
after 1946 also the right to self-determination, including the right to secession.
Thus throughout history Slovenes had different identities. The strongest one was,
and to a great extent still is, the regional one, derived from the former Austrian lands,
yet with even older roots. On a national level Slovenes were strongly devoted to the
Austrian or Austro-Hungarian identity, and later to the Yugoslav identity in two
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versions: the royal and the socialist one. National identity was being built slowly,
mostly through language and culture. On several occasions history witnessed the
emergence of temptations, dictated by unpleasant circumstances or ideology, or
often both, to renounce national identity and language in favor of Germanness or
unitarian Yugoslavism.
Thus transnational identity was most often connected with national ideology; at the
time of Austria-Hungary it was also connected with religion and individual leaders,
particularly with Franz Joseph and Josip Broz-Tito.1
The final period of Yugoslavia, the 1980s, was welcomed by Slovenes with a hollow
Yugoslav socialist patriotism; rituals and celebrations appeared in abundance: the
two most important ones were the Day of Youth with its Relay of Youth, and 29th
November, Republic Day, in memory of the day when a new, socialist Yugoslavia
was formed in 1943. Generations growing up in the eighties did not know Yugoslavia.
All that was left of a common identity was Yugoslav rock and sport, everything else
was obscured by international conflicts.2 Theses began to appear that Slovenes did
not belong to the Balkan sphere of civilization. Yet since the state still existed and its
existence had strong international support, with bipolarity remaining a reality until
1989, different quests for a new identity began to emerge. Some of these reached
into the past with the so-called autochthonous theories, according to which Slovenes
were natives (Etruscans, Veneti etc.) and not Slavic settlers. Of the different theses
on Etruscan, Illyrian or Venetic origin, the public clung most of all to the so-called
Venetic theory. The theory appeared in the middle of the 1980s; its main authors
were “venetologists” Matej Bor, Joško Šavli and Ivan Tomažič, who in their book
Veneti, naši davni predniki [Veneti, Our Ancient Ancestors] proclaimed Slovenes to
be descendants of the Veneti, the latter being “the first nation created from an IndoEuropean people in Central Europe”, which afterwards endured all subsequent
occupations, including the Roman one. The authors try to prove their theory with
language interpretation, particularly with the explanation of the origin of names and
with archeological finds. The interpretation (“translation”) of various place, lake and
1
More on the topic: ROZMAN, Franc, MELIK Vasilij, REPE, Božo 1999: Zastave vihrajo. Spominski
dnevi in praznovanja na Slovenskem od sredine 19. stoletja do danes [Flags Flutter. Commemorative
th
Days and Celebrations in Slovenia from the Middle of the 19 Century to the Present Day]. Ljubljana:
Modrijan.
2
REPE, BOŽO 2002: Jutri je nov dan. Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije [Tomorrow is a New Day.
Slovenes and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia]. Ljubljana: Modrijan.
3
river names across Europe goes something like this: Drava (Dravus) means to gush,
a river with a fast current. The word is derived from Sanskrit; Drava is not only found
in Slovenia, but also in Poland and Switzerland (Derotchia), which testifies to the
expansion of the Veneti and at the same time to the direct connection between them
and the Slovenes. According to this logic (which among other things does not even
consider language development), a Slovene origin can also be found in the words
Celeia (selo = hamlet), Logatec - Longaticus (log = grove; Locarno and Lugano are
supposedly of the same origin), Trst - Tergeste (trg = market), Oterg-Oderzo (otržje =
a place with a market) etc.
3
Such argumentation is very similar to the one by the
Americanized father of Greek descent Gus Portokalos, in the comedy by Joel Zwick
My Big Fat Greek Wedding, who was convinced that he can etymologically prove that
every word is of Greek origin. Thus he – in addition to a number of other funny ideas
– established that a kimono (“ki” means 'to wear' in Japanese, and “mono” means
'object, thing') comes from the Greek “kimona” (“cheimonas” is Greek for winter) and
concluded: “What do you wear in the winter? A robe! So there you go!”)
To the time of the separation from southern Slavism in the 1980s, in addition to the
rise of venetology, also belongs the renewed quest for a common Central European
identity, mostly connected with the area of the former Austria-Hungary. Similarly as
between the wars it came to life at a level of cultural connecting. In Slovenia it came
to life with the establishment of a literary festival in the underground cave of Vilenica.
A more susceptible observer could have perhaps detected a few political illusions. In
certain Austrian political circles, e.g., an aspiration could be detected towards Austria
reclaiming its former “imperial/royal” role, were the circumstances to change. The
quest for a Central European identity had triggered quite a few polemics, especially
among writers; in Slovenia primarily due to the statement by the Austrian writer
(though of Slovene descent) Peter Handke that Central Europe is nothing more than
a “meteorological notion”. This identity was also rejected by certain politicians from
other Central European countries: a few years ago, while visiting Slovenia, the Czech
President Vaclav Klaus ironically labeled the modern quest for a Central European
identity and the act of connecting on that basis as “rhetoric”); such an act of
3
BOR, Matej, ŠAVLI, Joško,TOMAŽIČ Ivan,1989: Veneti, naši davni predniki [Veneti, Our Ancient
Ancestors], Ljubljana, Spodnje Škofije, Wien, Maribor : Večer.
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connecting was favored neither by the long-term Slovene Prime Minister and later
President of the State, the now late Dr Janez Drnovšek.
An important role in the search for a new identity in the eighties was held by the myth
of a continuous national ascent and longing for a state of their own. The main theme
of the story is that the Slavs (or in the mythic version Slovenes themselves) settled in
today's territory as Avar serfs at the end of the 6th century, managed to become
independent and create their own state, and were later enslaved by the Germans,
remaining under German slavery until World War I (Carinthia, “the cradle of
Slovenism” remaining there forever). According to this interpretation Slovenes had
their own state in the Middle Ages, that of Carantania, centered in today’s territory of
Austria (Carinthia); this is a way of “pushing” a national identity to a time when it had
not even existed. 4 One part of searching for this connection to a medieval state also
lay in symbols: there were suggestions for including the Carantanian panther in the
Slovene coat-of-arms. Connected with the idea of Carantania was also a thesis on
the alleged early democratic tradition of the Slovenes, which was afterwards lost until
1990. It is connected with the enthronement of dukes – a special feudal ritual, which
had its roots in the older enthronement of Carantanian princes, and was preserved in
a modified form until 1414 (the last to be merely symbolically enthroned by Slovene
peasants was Ernest Železni). At first, authority was granted to the prince by a tribal
or people's convention, and later on this function was taken over by “kosezi” or
freemen (a sort of higher, free peasant class). In the end this was merely a ritual
without content, since the prince was actually enthroned by the Franconian
(Germanic) ruler. The ritual was carried out at the Prince's Stone, a part of a Roman
column, which had originally probably stood at Krn Castle (Austrian Carinthia). The
national/romantic image made the Prince's Stone one of Slovene cult objects, which
also appeared upon the attainment of independence on money vouchers,
predecessors of the Slovene currency after independence, i.e. the tolar, which
caused protests by the nationalistic Carinthian politicians lead by the late Jörg
Haider. When Slovenia introduced the Euro, it imprinted the Prince's Stone on the
coin for two cents and the protests took place once again. In 2005 Haider had the
4
ŠTIH, Peter, 2006: Miti in stereotipi v podobi starejše slovenske nacionalne zgodovine [Myths and
Stereotypes in the Image of Older Slovene National History]. In: Mitja Ferenc, Branka Petkovšek (ed.):
Mitsko in stereotipno v slovenskem pogledu na zgodovino [The Mythical and Stereotypical in the
Slovene View on History]. Ljubljana:Zveza zgodovinskih društev Slovenije. 25-47.
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monument moved from the Provincial Museum in Klagenfurt to the Carinthian
Provincial Parliament to emphasize that the tradition of enthronement is connected
with Carinthia and not with the Slovenes and their recently formed state. The ritual of
the symbolic passing of authority to the Carantanian Prince and the Duke of Carinthia
by the peasants is said to have directly influenced the American statesman Thomas
Jefferson and the creation of the American Declaration of Independence, although
there is no historical evidence of this. In 1990, after the first multi-party elections,
there was also an aspiration towards the inauguration of the Slovene Presidency and
the President at Vače, the geometrical center of Slovenia, following the model of the
enthronement at Gosposvetsko polje, which the four members of the Presidency and
its President, Milan Kučan, refused.
The thesis on the Slovenes always wanting a state of their own is developed further
with the statement that they had already recorded this demand in the United Slovenia
program of 1848 and later on tried to realize that program in various historical
situations, finally succeeding in 1991.
5
The last generation of Slovene politicians is
therefore believed to have realized a “thousand-year-old dream”, thus bestowing the
highest political credo on the (real or alleged) “merits for independence”, and a sort of
“blank check” for ruling to the “emancipators”.
In reality at the time only rare intellectuals supported the United Slovenia program of
1848 and it had not demanded an independent state but the unification of Slovenes
in a self-governing unit with its own national assembly within Austria. Likewise, the
trialistic program from the turn of the century had not demanded an independent
Slovene state, as was, e.g., demanded by the Czechs, but a division of the monarchy
into three parts, with a southern Slavic part, in addition to the Hungarian and Austrian
ones, composed of Austro-Hungarian Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and, after the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary in 1908, also Bosniaks.
Thought to be an expression of Slovene statehood, for some historians containing
even elements of international recognition, is the transitional one-month formation of
Austro-Hungarian southern Slavs, called the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs. It
was created after the disintegration of Austria-Hungary at the end of October 1918
5
PRUNK, Janko,1992: Slovenski narodni vzpon [Slovene National Ascent]. Ljubljana: DZS. See also:
GRANDA, Stane, 1999: Prva odločitev Slovencev za Slovenijo:dokumenti z uvodno študijo in
osnovnimi pojasnili [The First Decision of Slovenes for Slovenia: Documents with a Preliminary Study
and Basic Explanations]. Ljubljana: Nova revija.
6
with a seat in Zagreb, and later united with Serbia into a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes. In the State of SCS Slovenes for a brief time had a local government
but had not managed to establish a parliament.6
Between both wars political programs did not extend beyond demands for autonomy;
during World War II United Slovenia (in a federal Yugoslavia) was the program
guideline for both the partisan as well as the anti-partisan side, with only the partisan
one effectively fighting for it and achieving a modification of the western border.
Programs in the socialist Yugoslavia until the second half of the eighties as well did
not go beyond a federal or confederal status, with Yugoslavia appearing a safe
refuge from the worst national enemies. The decision on a completely independent
state thus matured in the second half of the eighties as a result of the crisis situation
in Yugoslavia and, following the first multi-party elections after World War II in the
spring of 1990, was confirmed at a plebiscite in December of that year. The reason
behind this decision was the inability of Yugoslavia to democratize itself, to overcome
the severe economic crisis to which an ineffective economic and political socialist
system had led it, and its inability to join the European Economic Community of the
time, the later European Community or European Union, even though Western
politicians offered it this chance under the condition that it reforms itself. At the same
time the historical fear of Germans and Italians as felt by Slovenes slowly began to
fade away. Slovene independence was only attained after lengthy political conflicts
with the federation and in the end also by a successful armed revolt in the ten-day
war against the Yugoslav Army. The great powers and the European Community did
not favor the disintegration of Yugoslavia and Slovenia’s gaining of independence;
hence the struggle for international recognition was difficult and at first highly
uncertain, dependent on numerous international circumstances upon the end of the
Cold War.7
In Slovenia the decision on independence is contributed above all to individual
intellectual circles, particularly those surrounding the magazine Nova revija. In reality
it was a complex process, in which a very important role was held by alternative
6
PEROVŠEK, Jurij, 1998: Slovenska osamosvojitev v letu 1918 : študija o slovenski državnosti v
Državi Slovencev, Hrvatov in Srbov [Slovene Attainment of Independence in 1918: a Study on
Slovene Statehood in the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs]. Ljubljana: Modrijan.
7
REPE, Božo, 2001: Historical Consequences of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia for Slovene Society.
In: Österreichische. Osthefte.Wien, hf. ½.5-26.
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youth culture, various civil society movements, and reformist processes within
governing structures, particularly within the leading League of Communists. National
homogenization was also strongly influenced by two campaigns that had nothing to
do with politics. The first one was the campaign “Podarim – dobim” [I give – I receive]
(held for the first time in 1984), which began raising funds for the national Alpine
team through a special lottery system. This campaign lasted until 1997. As many as
18 million cards were sold in 13 seasons; the start of the campaign was made
possible by the success of coach Tone Vogrinec, who stirred the enthusiasm of
Slovenes, first with Bojan Križaj and later on with a number of other excellent skiers.
At that time they competed under a Yugoslav flag, yet all the national team selections
included only Slovene athletes, who began wearing helmets with Slovene flags on
them. In the most talked-about years just before the attainment of independence
more money was collected than the national Alpine teams receive today from all their
sponsors and the state. The shows and spots featured male and female skiers, their
coaches and managers. The central figure of the campaign became the actor Janez
Hočevar – Rifle with his great charm and famous colorful scarf. The mass campaign
strengthened the confidence of Slovenes and co-shaped the emerging new national
identity of the eighties. For this reason Bojan Križaj swore on behalf of all athletes at
the Winter Olympics in Sarajevo in the Slovene language, which triggered many
polemics all over Yugoslavia. The second campaign distinctly concerned tourism and
was carried out by Studio marketing from Ljubljana, at the time the most modern
advertising agency in Yugoslavia. In order to promote Slovene tourism in 1984 a goal
was set for Slovenes to welcome foreign tourists among them in a homely and kind
manner, who would then actively enjoy the undiscovered diversity of the clean and
genuine Slovene land. Emphasis was to be placed on natural beauty and the
kindness of the people, as that was the only solution under the crisis circumstances
and amidst the general apathy and grayness of everyday life. The group suggested
the slogan “Slovenija, moja dežela” [Slovenia, My Country] and wrote a song that is
still considered a cult one in Slovenia: “Moja dežela/to je njena lepota/moja dežela/mi
smo njeni ljudje/lepota dežele je sloves njen/ njeni ljudje/smo njeno ime ponosno ime
[My country/this is its beauty/my country/we are its people/the beauty of the land is its
reputation/its people/we are its proud name].” On the basis of a survey the linden leaf
was chosen as the artistic symbol that would symbolize Slovenia and be connected
with nature. Among the selected and suggested symbols: carnation, ear, sunflower,
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and linden leaf, as many as 75% of the respondents recognized the linden leaf as
“the only truly Slovene symbol” (the carnation was primarily recognized as an
Austrian symbol and only afterwards as a Slovene one, the sunflower as an Italian
one, and the ear as a Hungarian one). In order to draw attention at the start of the
campaign they decided on a proclamation, following the example of wartime
proclamations by partisan authorities. After an overall image was adopted with a
logotype and linden leaf, the production of badges, t-shirts, umbrellas, and other
souvenirs began, as well as the making of posters, pamphlets, and films. Due to a
lack of money, the majority of these concepts began to be used as late as in the
second half of 1985. The most talked-about part of the campaign, the film Slovenija,
moja dežela [Slovenia, My Country], today still a cult one, began showing in 1986.
The campaign triggered severe polemics across Yugoslavia, claiming that it
expresses Slovene separatism, while the Slovenes somehow internalized it. It was
particularly successful in the countryside, while certain critical Slovene intellectuals
also felt that it conceals a nationalistic note, which was not the intention of its
creators.8 This campaign was recently given a heated epilogue, since Studio
marketing sold it to the Spar international retail chain, which is now using it to market
Slovene products in its shops; this is being severely criticized by some of the cocreators of Slovenia, My Country, saying that it has sold “a national symbol” to
foreigners. 9
After the attainment of independence, and partially already in the eighties, a similar
attitude was formed towards Yugoslav identity and state as the one towards former
national formations in which Slovenes had been included. In the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia the once glorified Catholic Austria with its cult Emperor Franz Joseph
became known as a “prison of nations”, despite the fact that it enabled Slovenes their
existence, economic development (albeit a slow one) and the preservation of national
identity, and taught them modern political manners, including parliamentarianism.
The same designation was given to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after its
8
BOŽO REPE, 2011:Vloga akcije »Slovenija, moja dežela«, pri oblikovanju nacionalne zavesti [Role
of the Campaign “Slovenia, My Country” in Shaping National Consciousness]. In: Mitja Ferenc, Jurij
Hadalin, Blaž Babič (ed.): Osamosvojitev 1991:država in demokracija na Slovenskem v zgodovinskih
razsežnostih [Attainment of Independence 1991: State and Democracy in Slovenia in Historical
Proportions]. Ljubljana: Znanstvena založba Filozofske fakultete v Ljubljani 225-240.
9
http://www.siol.net/novice/slovenija/2012/03/turisticni_slogan_obujen_za_tujo_blagovno_znamko.aspx
9
disintegration; already during its existence the idealized notion of a common
coexistence of “three tribes of one nation” crumbled. In the kingdom Slovenes did in
fact gain a university, a chance for economic development and an informal cultural
autonomy, but not a political one. The self-governing socialism of socialist Yugoslavia
changed from “the best system in the world” to “totalitarianism”, the beloved comrade
Tito became a dictator, the myth of brotherhood, unity and socialist patriotism turned
to dust. The new mythical, uncritically idealized goal became the so-called Europe.
At the time of Austria-Hungary those in Slovenia took it for granted that it belonged to
the Central European cultural identity and state – even though Austria-Hungary was
to a large extent also a Balkan state. At the time of both Yugoslavias it was also
taken for granted that Slovenia was a Balkan state.
After the attainment of independence, in the nineties, the issue of placement within a
“European” or “Balkan” area became one of the most topical issues. The position of
Slovenia within the emerging new Europe was placed in the forefront. It was a
question of whether Slovenia was “able to legitimately leave the Periphery, bind itself
to the countries of Central Europe and defend itself against Balkanism” as the
Foreign Minister of the time, Dimitrij Rupel, defined it. According to him this was also
a foundation for long-term polarization in the Slovene political space: “In the near
future Slovene parties will be divided with regard to the border between the ‘North'
and 'South', between the developed and the undeveloped, between Europeanism
and Balkanism”.10 In principle it can be said for that time that such opinions were an
expression of the belief that Slovenia had not quite shaken its Yugoslav heritage and
its unstable foreign policy situation, as its entry into the EU was still uncertain and
distant, and that it was a result of the fact that due to its geographical position it
bordered on a conflictive and restless zone. Similar reactions were even then an
expression of the smallness of Slovene politicians and provoked irony in larger
countries. Slovene politicians of that time received a true shock in the beginning of
1994 when Madeleine Korbel Albright, a special envoy of the American President Bill
Clinton, who came to Europe to explain the Partnership for Peace initiative, ranked
Slovenia among “Balkan democracies”, alongside Romania, Bulgaria and even
10
RUPEL DIMITRIJ, 1993. Nedokončano osamosvajanje Slovenije ali meditacija o razočaranju;
Slovenci in prihodnost [The Unfinished Attainment of Independence for Slovenia or a Meditation on
Disappointment; Slovenes and the Future]. In: Ljubljana, Nova revija.
10
Albania! The US Ambassador to the United Nations (later the United States
Secretary of State and a firm supporter of the thesis that the international recognition
of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992 was “premature”) afterwards corrected herself that
the adjective “Balkan” had not been meant in a cultural, historical or spiritual sense,
but in a geographical one.11 In her opinion the matter of whether Slovenia belongs to
the Balkans or not should be debated by geographers. Slovenes were not and are
not the only ones that do not wish to be placed in the Balkans. As early as 1915 the
war correspondent John Reed wrote that the easiest way to anger a Romanian (who
is, of course, Latin and not a “wild” Greek or Slav) is by telling him or her that
Romania is a Balkan state.12
Between the cult caricature by Hinko Smrekar of 1921, in which a Slovene girl
wearing a national costume ecstatically welcomes a strong Serbian soldier as her
liberator, and the likewise cult caricature by Franco Juri of the plebiscite December of
1990, in which the girl replies to the drunken and neglected soldier’s demand “Let’s
go home” with “Don’t be ridiculous”, less than seventy years have passed; in
Slovenia today these years are judged in politics and the media with extreme
negativism.
Newborn Slovenia shut the door behind it in 1991; its commentary afterwards was
merely: “Oh, those Balkans!” It did not want anything to do with the former
Yugoslavia, neither in a national nor political sense. This can be seen as a historical
reality. What was and still is controversial is that it had shut the door in a moral sense
as well. We have always stuck to the historical standpoint that the first and the
second Yugoslavia was co-created by us, that no one had “annexed” us. Yet when
we left it not a word was uttered as to how we were also responsible for its
disintegration.
Slovenia maintained a highly rigid policy towards the countries of the former
Yugoslavia and did not take into consideration the difficulties of the local people that
resulted from the disintegration of the common state. The bank Ljubljanska banka,
e.g., did not pay out savings deposits to people in the former republics (in Croatia
11
Clintonova odposlanka Albrightova v Sloveniji [Clinton's Envoy Albright in Slovenia]. In: Delo,
January 15, 1994.
12
REPE, Božo, 1999: Slovenci, Balkan in Srednja Evropa [Slovenes, the Balkans and Central
Europe].In: Anthropos 31.4/6. 301-312. See also: REPE, Božo. 2003: Zapozneli zamah zgodovine
[The Belated Swing of History]. In: Delo, April 26, 2003. 55/96.
11
and Bosnia and Herzegovina), claiming that it was a matter of an agreement on the
succession of the former Yugoslavia. It is true that when Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina were at war, it aided both with weapons and equipment, and even by
secretly training the units on Slovene territory; yet the fundamental decision of the
leadership of the state on such policy led to shameful military profiteering under the
auspices of the Ministry of Defense, which still remains to be clarified.
Diplomatic relations with the former republics were established shortly after the
gaining of independence, with an exception until the fall of Milošević's regime or until
the end of 2000, when the normalization of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia took
place (it later on broke off into Serbia and Montenegro). Slovenia also recognized
Kosovo shortly after it proclaimed its independence, in March 2008, which for a short
time again worsened the Slovene-Serbian relations. Economic and cultural, as well
as political and other contacts were being renewed much slower. The same at first
held true for the flow of people due to the rigid visa policy, and later on due to
Slovenia's entry into the EU. Relations with the neighboring Croatia, who was at least
a verbal Slovene ally during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, although much less so
in practice, have been burdened over the past two decades by a number of issues,
primarily by the border issue, most of all by the issue of the border at the Gulf of
Piran. In Yugoslavia, the borders between the republics were merely administrative
and never confirmed by the Yugoslav Assembly, while the sea border was never
even mapped out, since it concerned a common Yugoslav sea; thus, a conflict
occurred particularly over the small Gulf of Piran, through which, in times of
Yugoslavia, Slovenia had access to the high seas. It was only in November 2009 that
the two countries agreed to solve the problem by an arbitration agreement; in March
2011, despite the harsh propaganda by the right, this decision was confirmed by
Slovenes at a referendum.
In the past few years, Slovenia's policy towards the Western Balkans has changed.
Nevertheless, the trust that it has squandered away with its unprincipled politics in
the years after the disintegration will be hard to make up for at once; in addition, other
countries have successfully entered this area in an economic, political, and expert
sense.
The attainment of independence also created difficulties for Slovenes, which were
complex and multi-layered. It was a double process, in addition to the attainment of
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independence there was also the establishment of a multi-party democracy and a
market system. The Slovene state was created at a time when the functions of a
classical national state had already been surpassed and, at least in Europe, lost
many of its functions (defense, economic and financial system, national currencies,
legal system and human rights…). Due to its smallness, its elites were also weak,
which soon became clear in all areas. A show of understanding for a young state and
its historical traumas was far from what politicians and the people were expecting,
which is why the various blockades - also by neighboring countries, primarily by Italy
and somewhat less by Austria - of joining the European Union and entry into NATO
caused frustrations. And a sort of offended conviction that we can be self-sufficient.
Uncritical imitation of Western countries and the acceptance of anything that had
been ordered from abroad (or that the Slovene political elites thought it had been)
and that was to result in EU membership on the one hand and the distancing from
anything connected with the former Yugoslavia on the other, were the main
characteristics of the first decade after gaining independence. It is still strongly
evident today that in the historical need of catching the right moment to form a state,
democracy was placed after national goals. Despite the fact that upon the plebiscite
decision for independence in December 1990, Slovenia guaranteed all the rights to
the citizens of other republics of the former Yugoslavia who had a permanent
residence in Slovenia, it only partially fulfilled it. It did grant citizenship to a majority,
yet over 24,000 people, who did not apply for it or were denied for various reasons,
were simply “erased” from the Permanent Population Register, their documents
destroyed, all rights stripped from them and their children, making them homeless.13
The true extent of this administrative ethnic cleansing has begun to reveal itself only
in recent years, by becoming the object of (an otherwise inadequate) righting of
wrongs, limited merely to the regulation of status, and of hearings before the
European Court of Human Rights. So far, no nation from the territory of the former
Yugoslavia has gained minority status. They are allowed to form cultural societies,
yet even here only the new act on national radio television, which was rejected at a
referendum, would have finally given them the possibility of cultural shows. Transition
“in the Slovene way”, which for a long time appeared to be a “success story”, today
13
Neža Kogovšek ... [et al.] ; [editors Neža Kogovšek, Brankica Petković ; translation Olga Vuković],
2010: The Scars of the Erasure : a Contribution to the Critical Understanding of the Erasure of People
from the Register of Permanent Residents of the Republic of Slovenia / Ljubljana: Peace Institute.
13
shows a rather dark side with a small political elite with quickly acquired wealth; the
bankruptcy of numerous, once successful companies due to unsuccessful attempts
at privatization by managers; a (too) high percentage of people living at the poverty
threshold or below it; a fast reduction of the middle classes. Regional divisions have
been replaced by fragmentation into small municipalities, of which only rare ones
possess a development impetus. The once excessive egalitarianism has been
replaced by radical individualism; the main criteria of success are political power and
wealth; the means to an end are not important.
In contrast to this, a completely different, idealized image was established by
propaganda particularly between the years 2004 - 2008, during a right-wing
government. Slovenia was said to be experiencing “a peak of history” and Slovenes
were said to be doing better than ever in history. They were said to have become one
of the “lighthouses of the world”, as was said by the then (and current) conservative
Prime Minister, Janez Janša, in his speech at the 15th anniversary of Slovene
independence, on June 24, 2006. His thought from the speech “We can never be the
biggest. We can never be the mightiest. But we can be the best”, was awarded with
“Bob leta”, an award given by the Slovene daily newspaper, Večer, for the best
sentence of the previous year. This sentence (and the main part of the speech) was
about as real as Slovene “success”. Janša namely copied it from Tony Blair’s speech
at the annual Labour Party Conference in Brighton of 1997.14
Naturally the question arises whether the dark side of the transition can obscure all
the positive things brought on by the attainment of independence and the twenty
years of development in an independent state? It must be added that Slovenes (too)
often feel unhappy, even though judging by objective indicators they should not, and
that they have an overly developed sense of true and alleged wrongs that are
supposedly happening to them, which is in part conditioned by history and in part by
character. There are less than two hundred countries in the world and Slovenes are
one of a few thousand nations that have managed to establish their own; since 1992
Slovenia has also been a member of the UN. There are more powerful nations even
in Europe that have failed to do so. After all, with their numbers Slovenes could
14
http://www.mladina.si/43871/jansa_govor_prepisal_od_blaira/?utm_source=tednik%2F200825%2Fjan
sa%5Fgovor%5Fprepisal%5Fod%5Fblaira&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=oldLink
14
barely fill a substantial suburb of a larger European city. In 2004 Slovenia became a
member of the European Union and in the first half-year of 2008 presided over it as
the first country from the group of new members to do so. The status of an
independent state gives it a substantially different position than it would have held
had Yugoslavia, under an optimistic development of events, been reformed,
preserved and had entered the European Union as a single state. In that case
Slovenia would have been only one of its regions. For now Europe shows a desire to
jointly solve crises and preserve the attained level of integration, and one can only
hope that it passes the test; yet at the same time nation-states still present a powerful
protection factor. Until the beginning of the crisis Slovenia somehow managed to
reach the European average gross domestic product and only just maintained the
concept of a social state, which is now quickly being torn down. In principle it can be
said that it is a modern state, with a diversified school system, developed information
technologies that are accessible to the majority of the population, and a road
network, yet at the same time with a dreadfully out-of-date railway system. It is
among the ecologically more developed countries; it has a low crime rate; life in it is
comfortable and of quality. Of course one must also be self-critical: one can never
clearly distinguish between what is a consequence of a community’s success and
what a consequence of general development in the world and of the achievements of
modern technologies. Slovenes have a few peculiarities that must be taken into
account when evaluating: obsession with property results in the majority of family
investments placed in houses and privately-owned apartments. Since the early
motorization in the sixties, the car has been a status symbol. At that time Janez
Menart, one of the most talented poets of the second half of the 20th century, wrote:
“A gentlemen drives in an elegant Zastava 750, while his stomach chews on
sauerkraut”. Since then the number of vehicles has increased tenfold and
modernized, yet the mentality has remained the same. An aerial image shows
Slovenia to be an idyllic little country with churches on all larger hills, illuminated at
night, which simultaneously points to its conservative mediocrity and its distrust of
anything different and foreign. Slovenes have a weak sense of humor and an even
worse sense of self-irony. They are quite conservative on average, yet at the same
time have no problems with globalization; they can be found in all corners of the
Earth; for the most part, contemporary artistic and other trends also have no difficulty
15
in finding their way to Slovenia. Sporting achievements surpass the number of people
in the nation, with extreme exploits a special passion of many.
Another Slovene characteristic is that due to the difficulty of finding accessible
apartments and due to economic reasons children have a hard time becoming
independent, with “prolonged adolescence” dragging on into their thirties. This
immaturity is a characteristic that could be symbolically transferred to the state itself.
Despite its full twenty years the latter is also unable to become properly independent.
Efforts, present after the attainment of independence and entry into the EU, to reach
the so-called third national consensus on future directions have so far not been
realized and the impression remains that Slovenes do not in fact know what to do
with their country. The idealized national self-image has been eaten away by the
crisis; the frustrations and fears of a hundred years have been suppressed by
integration into the EU, yet it could not have simply washed them away. So far
Slovene political elites have been unable to demonstrate anything other than a sort of
contradictory combination of uncritical nationalism with simultaneous blind following
of bureaucrats from Brussels. Illusions of lighthouses, the end of history, which was
to be reached by the attainment of independence and the transition from a people to
a nation, and any other similar myths, are gone. It is clear that after twenty years of
an independent state Slovenia is, as it has been many times in contemporary history,
stuck halfway between a village and a city, to use a metaphor. It could only weakly
use the state as a tool for the good of its citizens, yet it used it much more effectively
to “divide the spoils” among the politicians and their parties, and to settle mutual
scores. Indeed Slovenes cause the majority of their problems to themselves. This
has often been the case throughout their history, however, this might be the first time
that they are not existentially threatened by others and that they are mostly
dependent on themselves and their abilities. As for an identity with which they would
be able to respond to the challenges of the present and future as a national, and
above all as a state community – well, it is still being searched for. And will be for a
long time.
16
Slovenes and their Identity after the Disintegration of Yugoslavia
(summary of a lecture held at the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague,
April 11, 2012, 17:00)
Throughout history Slovenes had different identities. The strongest one was and to a
large extent still is the regional one, while on a transnational level, historically
speaking, there were the Austrian and Yugoslav ones. The final period of Yugoslavia,
the 1980s, was welcomed by Slovenes with a hollow Yugoslav socialist patriotism;
rituals and celebrations appeared in abundance. What disappeared as well was the
fear of the eternal enemies, the Germans and Italians, while fear of the Serbs,
otherwise allies throughout history, grew. Yet since the state still existed and its
existence had strong international support, with bipolarity remaining a reality until
1989, different quests for a new identity began to emerge. These extended to the
revival of Central Europe, to autochthonous theories, to mass campaigns which
raised self-confidence in times of crisis ( Podarim-dobim ,
Slovenija, moja
dežela ), and to national programs. After attaining independence Slovenia was
frustrated for thirteen years and resorted to self-sufficiency, before receiving a new
transnational identity by entering the EU. But did it in reality also accept and assume
it? After twenty years of an independent state it is, as it has been many times in
contemporary history, stuck halfway between a village and a city. It could only weakly
use the state as a tool for the good of its citizens, yet it used it much more effectively
to settle mutual scores. Indeed Slovenes cause the majority of their problems to
themselves. This has often been the case throughout their history, however, this
might be the first time that they are not existentially threatened by others and that
they are mostly dependent on themselves and their abilities. An identity for modern
times with which they would be able to respond to the challenges of the present and
future as a national and state community is still being searched for.
CV
Božo Repe was born in 1956 in Spodnje Gorje near Bled. He is a full professor of
contemporary Slovene history at the Faculty of Arts in Ljubljana. His research area is
contemporary Slovene, Southern Slavic and Central European history. He is also occupied
with issues regarding history lessons in schools. He is the author or co-author of numerous
books and textbooks, among others Obračun s Perspektivami [Confronting Perspectives]
(Ljubljana 1990); »Liberalizem« v Sloveniji [“Liberalism” in Slovenia] (Ljubljana 1992); The
Repluralization of Slovenia in the 1980s (co-author, University of Washington, Seattle 2000);
Slovenci v osemdesetih letih [Slovenes in the Eighties] (Ljubljana 2001); Jutri je nov dan.
Slovenci in razpad Jugoslavije [Tomorrow is a New Day. Slovenes and the Disintegration of
Yugoslavia] (Modrijan, Ljubljana 2002); Viri o demokratizaciji in osamosvojitvi Slovenije
[Sources on the Democratization and Attainment of Independence of Slovenia] (three
17
volumes, Ljubljana 2002-2004); Oris sodobne obče in slovenske zgodovine [Outline of
Contemporary General and Slovene History] (co-author, Ljubljana 2003); Rdeča Slovenija.
Tokovi in obrazi socializma [Red Slovenia. The Currents and Faces of Socialism] (Ljubljana
2003), Sodobna zgodovina [Contemporary History] (textbook, Ljubljana 2005), Prelom.Svet
in Slovenci 1914-1918 [A Break. The World and the Slovenes 1914-1918] (co-author,
Ljubljana 2005, Russian edition 2011), Kriza. Svet in Slovenci od konca prve svetovne vojne
do srede tridesetih let [A Crisis. The World and the Slovenes from the End of World War I to
the Middle of the Thirties] (co-author, Ljubljana 2008); Resistance, Suffering, Hope. The
Slovene Partisan Movement 1941-1945 (co-author and co-editor, Ljubljana, Trieste 2008);
Pred časom. Portret Staneta Kavčiča [Ahead of His Time. A Portrait of Stane Kavčič] (coauthor, 2009), O feldmaršalu Svetozarju Boroeviću de Bojni [On Field Marshal Svetozar
Boroević de Bojna] (co-author, 2010).
E-mail: bozo. [email protected]
Website: http://www2.arnes.si/~surbrepe/