\..
'110".
.....
' · . . ","'
• •• tCA~
.:_t ,..
'.
THE
VIET-CONG
STRATEGY
OF
TERROR
DOUGLAS PIKE
INDOCHIN
A
,.
Tbis monograpb was prepared by Douglas Pike
for the United States Mission, Viet-Nam
The Viet Cong Strategy of Terror
By Douglas Pike
Saigon,
Viet- NaIll
February 1970
Tables of Contents
I _ Overview .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
5
II _ Doctrine and Programs • • . • • • • • . ,
15
III _ Hue: A Case History • • • • . . • . . . ,
41
IV _ Technology of Terror • • • • • • . • • . ,
69
Appendix: The Record . • • • • • . • . . ,
87
Glossary of Vietnamese Terms • • • . . •
119
Map of Hue Major Body Finds: Inside Back Cover.
* * * *
This monograph was written privately as a contribution
to understanding the present-day situation in Viet-Nam.
It
does not necessarily reflect the views of the United States
Government.
5
Chapter I: Overview
7
Chapter 1: Overview
As this is being written, early in 1970, the so-called
Vietnamization process is well under way in South Viet-Nam.
What is going on is the assumption of responsibility by the
South Vietnamese for all aspects of the war, accompanied by
the orderly -- but not precipitous -- disengagement of U. S.
military forces. Only as this process reaches its conclusion
(and no man now knows, exactly, when that will be) will one be
able to assess the degree to which the coherence of the social
structure in South Viet-Nam, including both civil and military
elements, has been retained and strengthened in the face of
the communists' persistent efforts to reduce it to chaos.
The communists have indicated 1 that they are picking up
the "Vietnamization" gauntlet thrown down by the governments
of Viet-Nam and the United States. They appear, at least in
terms of public pronouncements, to be confident they can spoil
this effort to transler the burden and frustrate the endeavors
of the South Vietnamese to establish, after the Americans have
departed, a system that can stand alone. From the documents
and pronouncements noted above 2 , it is apparent that the communist leadership has mapped out for its forces four tasks
which, if successful, will yield communist victory. In order
of priority they are:
1.
To prove by demonstration (possibly with divisionsized operations) that the Republic of Viet-Nam Armed Forces
(RVNAF) cannot successfully fight alone.
2. To prove that the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) in
Saigon is a mere facade propped up by the Americans and will
collapse when American disengagement reaches a certain point.
3. To destroy the various political, social, economic
and militia-type programs the GVN has under way in the
country's 2, 500 villages - - collectively known as the Pacification Program -- thus destroying or minimizing any faith and
trust villagers m.ight have in the Saigon government.
4. To increase American casualties so as to turn the
disengagement into a rout.
8
s
tiv es, pa rti cu lar ly obj ect ive
In pu rsu ing the se fou r ob jec
act ivi ty) ,
r bei ng ess ent ial ly mi lita ry
two and thr ee (on e and fou
rea sed
com mu niS ts wi ll ma ke inc
it is qui te pro bab le tha t the
str ug gle ,
the y var iou sly cal l arm ed
and int ens ifie d use of wh at
er sid e
oth
sap pe r wo rk, or wh at the
arm ed rec on nai ssa nce or
cal ls ter ror .
gu ish
mi gh t fir st app ear to dis tin
It is mo re dif fic ult tha n
Te rro r,
or bet we en ter ror and~.
bet we en ter ror and vio len ce
s
use to
wo rd, one wh ich eac h sid e
of co urs e, is a pej ora tiv e
wn too
the oth er. Wi tho ut bei ng dra
de pre cat e the act ivi tie s of
rap h,
nog
mo
r, for pu rpo ses of thi s
far afi eld , it wo uld see m fai
rfa re,
vio len ce, ass um ing tha t wa
to def ine ter ror as ille ga l
tex t of
con
l ter ms , is leg al in the
alt ho ug h im mo ral in eth ica
s are
eve n in wa rfa re cer tai n act
int ern ati on al law , bu t tha t
poi nt
ter me d ter ror . Th is lat ter
ille ga l and ma y pro pe rly be
a
and
,
all thi ngs the re are lim its
res ts on the bel ief tha t in
c use of
d at the poi nt of sys tem ati
che
rea
is
re
rfa
wa
in
it
lim
the r
y am ong the pop ula tio n (ei
dea th, pai n, fea r and anx iet
ng ,
del ibe rat e pu rpo se of coe rci
civ ilia n and mi lita ry) for the
g int o
ish ing or sim ply frig hte nin
pun
g,
tin
ida
im
int
g,
tin
ma nip ula
ond the
in act s eve n in wa r are bey
hel ple ss sub mi ssi on . Ce rta
d ter ror .
pal e and can onl y be lab ele
ey
wo uld sub s·c rib eto thi s. Th
Pro bab ly the me n of Ha noi
my 's
ent ly in des cri bin g the ir ene
use the wo rd ter ror fre qu
ter ror
y dra win g a leg al dis tin cti on:
all
usu
th,
Sou
the
in
s
ion
act
vio len ce
ce, alt hou gh oth er act s of
is a cri mi na l act of vio len
ore tibe ma de cle ar tha t Ha noi the
are no t cri mi na l. It sho uld
equ ate
m of pac ifis m, wh ich wo uld
cia ns do not end ors e any for
ly the
ent
the y rej ect fla tly and veh em
wa r wit h ter ror . In fac t,
y ter m
iol enc e in fav or of wh at the
n-v
no
ve
ssi
pa
of
e
typ
ian
Ga ndh
Vie tent . To get a com mu nis t in
the arm ed str ug gle mo vem
sar yo ur def ini tio n) is not ne ces
(by
act
ror
ter
a
to
it
adm
Na m to
thi ng in his ow n mi nd.
ily to sho w him gui lty of any
t is,
a sem ant ic qu est ion - - tha
In pa rt, of co urs e, thi s is
to
re
mo
ror and for ce. . Wh at see ms
the dif fer enc e bet we en ter
w, ph it tho ugh t pa tte rn, wo rld vie
the poi nt is not lan gua ge bu
the
e
ver you wa nt to ch ara cte riz
los op hy of po liti cs or ho we
ntu ry:
mo st sha rpl y in the 20t h Ce
qu est ion wh ich div ide s us
, in
ror
ter
irr ati on al vio len ce,
wh at are the lim its to for ce,
9
that ascending order, in bringing about social change? All of
us fall somewhere along this force-violence-terror continuum.
Toward one end are those who believe that less rather than
more is justified; toward the other are those who advocate more
On grounds of imperative need or as principle. As one looks
about at various world societies in various conditions of social
pathology, one cannot help but conclude sadly that the drift
toward the extreme end, terror, is anything but a diminishing
phenomenon. Thus the question of force /terror is not one of
concern only to the Vietnamese, but one that concerns us all.
III
The communists in Viet-Nam, as we shall see, are far
down the continuum. Terror is an essential ingredient of nearly all their programs. Current intelligence in Viet-Nam points
to a continuation of this. Indicators, such as information on
communist training programs, weaponry shipments, personnel
assignment, public statements on doctrine and strategy, all
suggest that the communists are in the process of reverting to
the so-called protracted conflict thesis, perhaps in some new
form. Much of the intelligence indicates that this neW form
will involve what in part might be termed a strategy of terror.
An exan-,ple is the conversion of communist military and paramilitary elements into wide- ranging, well-trained sappers or
city commandoes assigned to full-time terrorism. This does
not necessarily mean a substantial increase in terror incidentb
- - already the incident rate is at a high level - - but that terror
will become even more central to communist strategy than in
the recent past.
Therefore, it seems worth-while that a monograph on
this new strategy, and especially the aspects dealing with
terror, be written at this time. It would not be worthwhile
nor is it the purpose of this monograph, to produce a word
picture of Vietnamese communist as fiendish fanatics with
blood dripping from their hands. Most of the world that pays
any attention to the war in Viet-Nam learned years ago the communists engage systematically in what we here define as terror
(indeed, as we shall see, the communists assert they have a
right to do so). If there still be at this late date any who regard
10
them as friendly agrarian reformers, nothing here could
possibly change that view. Hopefully this monograph will be
of some aid in understanding communist doctrine and strategy
as they unfold during the crucial next year or two. If it also
is an indictment of communist behavior, it is because the
behavior is indictable.
D. P.
Saigon, Viet-Nam
February 1, 1970
II
Chapter I _ Footnotes
13
Chapter I . F
0 0
t not e s
1 - See especially Resolution Nine, which contains a
detailed communist assessment of the current military situation and represents an accurate portrayal of the collective
judgment of the men of the DRV politburo; The Party's Military
Line, by General Vo Nguyen Giap; and Under the Party Banner
by Colonel General Van Tien Dung. All three have been published recently in the Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes
series by the U. S. Mission, Viet-Nam. Earlier indications
of changed communist strategy are found in the author's War,
Peace and the Viet Cong (MIT Press 1969).
2 - Ibid.
15
Chapter II: Doctrine and Programs.
17
Chapter II:
Doct.rine and Programs
The goal of the communists in Viet-Nam is unification
of North and South Viet-Nam under the communist banner.
Their leaders have reiterated this goal in virtually every
speech since 1954. It is implicit in their every act, in VietNam or in Paris. To most South Vietnamese, this is what
the war in Viet-Nam is all about. The issue is not peace,
the issue is forced unification.
In seeking their objective over the years the communists have employed various grand strategies:
* Unification by
relying on French diplomacy (1954-58).
'" Unification by fostering anarchy, chaos and social
pathology in South Viet-Nam (1959-64).
*
Unification by big-unit war, i. e., 130 battalions of
North Vietnamese soldiers in South Viet-Nam, doing 80
percent of the day-to-day combat (1965-present).
Through the years the struggle in Viet-Nam has had a
dual character, in effect it has been two war.'3.0ne war, in
communist terminology the armed struggle, pitted the Liberation Army and later the North Vietnamese Army against
the South Vietnamese Army and later the Allied armies.
This kind of combat is as old as war itself -- contending
armies each trying to destroy the other. It is an adjunct to
the more central war, the political struggle l waged on the
communist side by various specially-created organizations
collectively (and inaccurately) termed by the world the VietCong. The individual fighting this other war is the man in
the black pajama of the Vietnamese peasant. His mission
is to steal people away from the government. His concern
is almost exclusively control of the people, as distinguished
from the big-unit war, where the concern is "control" of
the enemy's army. He seeks to achieve this through programs designed to control the people, programs augmented
18
and made possible by as much (and as little) military effort
as is required.
Population Control
Control of the people, and here we are chiefly concerned with the two-thirds or so of the population living in
the nation's villages, is sought through a number of specific
methods. One means is enmeshing the villager in a network
of social movements and organizations which develop social
pressures to keep the dissenter in line, probably the most
powerful force in any society. Another is through intensive
communication efforts: education, "thought reform", agitation, propaganda. A third means is coercion, force and
terror. All, and others besides, are essential to the system.
To understand fully their use by communists, one must
understand the political and social instruments through which
the communists work. This apparatus includes the Party,
the various military elements, the popular front- organization
and mutual interest groups2. All are engaged in various
types of programs. All of these programs contain elements
of terror, not as a capricious addition, but as an integral
part. In short, the communists operate a population control
system re sting in part on terror.
This does not mean a system in which terror is dominant, all pervasive and always at the forefront. Quite the
contrary. What is vital to the system is not terror which
has been employed. Terror employed, at that point and in
that particular case, must be put down as a program failure.
What is vital is the underpinning of terror, the ominous
spectre always hovering in the background; ideally, threatening but never emerging. Of course credibility demands
periodic demonstrations that one still is able and willing to
use terror o
Too often communist terror is portrayed in simplistic
terms: viciousness for its own sake, terror simply to terrorize. the communists presented as sub-human sadists
19
indifferent to the blood on their hands. Those who paint it
thus do a disservice to truth and ~ greater one to understanding. The average communist in Viet-Nam thinks of his system not in moral but in utilitarian terms. He finds terror to
be the single greatest advantage he has over the government,
one which he credits for making possible most of his successes, This being the case, he can intellectualize and semanticize its use and easily corne to regard himself as a finer
person than those whom he terrorizes.
It has become an axiom for the communists that their
successes are a direct function of the degree of people's
sense of insecurity: the greater the insecurity, the better
their prospects. This is well known and fully understood at
all communist levels. Insecurity is not exactly the same as
terror, but is closely allied to it. Conversely, for the
government, the more security the brighter its prospects.
To the government, security is not exactly the same as organization, but it is its heart.
Thus, in effect, the tool of the communists in establishing control consists of those programs which terrorize, just
as the indispensable device of the government, also seeking
to establish control, is organization. This is not to suggest
that terror is the only concern of the communists any more
than that the only concern of the government is organization.
In each case it is the respective essence. All communist
programs therefore have development of insecurity/terror
as their center.
A frank word is required here about "terror" on the
other side, by the government and the Allied forces fighting
in Viet-Nam. No one with any experience in Viet-Nam denie s
that troops, police and others commanding physical power,
have committed excesses that are, by our working definition,
acts of terror. No one can justify these, no one can condone
them. They are wrong and beyond atonement. The heat of
battle is no excuse. Neither is the argument that every army,
now or in history, has been similarly guilty.
20
But there is an essential difference in such acts between
the two sides, one of outcome or result. To the communist,
terror has utility and is beneficial to his cause, while to the
other side the identical act is self-defeating. This is not
because one side is made up of heroes and the other of
villains. It is because, as noted above, terror is integral
in all the communist tactics and programs and the communists
could not rid themselves of it if they wanted to. Meanwhile,
the other side firmly believes, even though its members do
not always behave accordingly, that there is a vested interest
in abstaining from such acts.
One might remark that terror from passion is the same
as terror from policy, but in fact there is a world of difference: the difference of one side seeking to maximize its use
and the other seeking to eliminate it from its ranks.
Rationale
Two devices are employed constantly and intensively
by the communists in verbalizing their use of terror: semantics and legalisms.
The communists choose their words most carefully
when writing or talking about what we here define as terror,
and it is virtually impossible to condemn them out of their
own mouths by quoting them. A whole range of terms and
words are studiously avoided. In print especially the subject of communist violence is treated delicately, alluded to,
or circumnavigated.
Communist writer s are masters of
the technique of writing around a subject, leaving the desired
impression without ever dealing directly with it. Something
of the nature and flavor of this exercise in semantics is contained in the following examples taken from communist
announcements and reports.
*
Blowing Up Saigon Police Headquarters. '!At 0830
hours on August 16 a commando unit of the Liberation Army,
Saigon-Gia Dinh area, attacked valiantly the Saigon puppet
administration's Directorate General of National Police at
21
the intersection of Vo Tanh street and Cong Hoa Boulevard •••
The hooH gan police faced with the violent attack dared not
resist and their losses were very heavy. •• This was an
appropriate blow directed at these lackeys of the Am.ericans,
notorious for their dishonesty, wickedness and cruelty. ,,3
The
* Execution of Two Arn.erican Prisoners of War.
punishrn.ent of Septem.ber 26 of u. S. Captain Hurn.bert R.
Versace and Sgt. Kenneth M. Roarback is a fully justified
act, severe and well deserved ••• a proper protest against
the fascist sentence and execution by the lackey governm.ent
of three patriots (convicted by the GVN of terror acts - Ed. ).
To prevent further such crim.es on the part of the U.S. aggressors and their henchm.en the NLF has carried out its severe
verdict against the aggressors. ,,4
* Killing of Civilians. "We never did it without reason.
We advised people who worked with the governm.ent to stop.
Som.e of them. were very stubborn. We would warn them. three
tim.es, but still som.e refused to leave the governm.ent side.
Since they stayed with the governrn.ent, it m.eant they supported
the governrn.ent's fascist suppression efforts. So they deserved
to be punished. ,,5
*Killing Governm.ent Social Welfare Workers. "The
(enem.y) is concentrating its greate st efforts against the
countryside. It is trurn.peting about the vanguard role of the
so-called Revolutionary Developm.ent groups. These are
people who are given a quick training course to turn them.
into hunting dogs to operate under the cover of cultural,
educational and social welfare work, using intim.idation and
dem.agogy... We are attacking and punishing these cadres
right in their dens or when they crawl out to spray their
.
pOlson
.... ,,6
* Killing Governrn.ent Civil Servants.
Sm.ash the
enem.y pacification schem.e. •• The U. S. - puppet vile terrorist m.ethods have given (our) self-defense arm.ed com.batants
new urgent tasks, which are to heighten vigilance ••• , wipe
out enem.y spy organizations, m.aintain security for com.pa-
22
d the ir
e rel en tle ssl y dem on str ate
tri ots ••. (Ou r peo ple ) hav
tio n
res ou rce ful ne ss, det erm ina
gal lan try , ste adf ast nes s,
and bol dne s s. 117
rds tha t im ply ter ror . In
No te the abs enc e of any wo
al
s is gen era lly tru e of int ern
com mu nis t out put (an d thi
we ll
as
ers
am ong Pa rty me mb
do cum ent s cir cu lat ed onl y
ed;
is sel do m sho t or dec api tat
as pu bli she d sta tem ent s) one
Th e
has ex erc ise d its pow er.
he is pu nis hed or the Fro nt
or a
r,
va nt but a pup pet rep res so
vic tim is nev er a civ il ser
or a
lic em an bu t a sec ret age nt
cru el ele me nt; nev er a po
Th ai,
or
n
not an Am eri can , Ko rea
lac key hen chm an. On e is
r lac key .
r or im pe ria lis t ag gre sso
sso
gre
ag
t
lis
ria
pe
im
an
t
bu
opp osi ng
po liti cal or rel igi ou s gro up
On e is no t a me mb er of a
t ele me nts
rea cti on ary or rec alc itr an
the com mu nis ts bu t a key
Alw ays
op pre ssi ve org ani zat ion .
(wh en mo re tha n one ) in an
aga ins t
to jus tic e or cri mi na l act s
cru el fas cis ts are bro ug ht
ere
nt has ca rri ed out its sev
pa tri ots ave ng ed or the Fro
s hav e
ant
rs, no t tha t no n-c om bat
ve rdi ct aga ins t the ag gre sso
ali ze
the lan gua ge tha t can rat ion
bee n sla ug hte red . Su ch is
use of ter ror .
is the fac ade of leg ali sm .
Th e sec on d dev ice em plo yed
. Or
hea d of the NL F is a law yer
It is no acc ide nt tha t the
nic ati on
on ext ens ive pub lic com mu
tha t the NL F ha s ca rri ed
mo cra De
ern ati on al As soc iat ion of
ov er the ye ars wit h the Int
din g
t-f ron t gro up, inc lud ing sen
tic La wy ers , a com mu nis
Ce ntr al
its me eti ng s, eve n tho se in
rep res en tat ive s to eac h of
in ter ms
ort s in the Sou th are cas t
Af ric a. All com mu nis t eff
is int iA cod ifie d sys tem alw ays
of hav ing a jud ici al ba se.
ca rri ed
ex ist s. As sas sin ati on s are
ma ted , eve n tho ugh non e
ct" is
op le's cou rt" . Th e "ve rdi
out aft er a "tr ial " in a "pe
le of thi s
ple me nte d". Fo r an exa mp
han ded dow n and the n "im
er the
of cod e-b ase d law , con sid
eff ort to cre ate an im age
fir st
the
s,
lic pro no un cem ent
ton e and lan gua ge of two pub
ers
of the two Am eri can pri son
dea lin g wi th the exe cut ion
cit ed ear lie r:
(GV N exe cut ion of com mu
"F ace d wit h thi s sit uat ion
sso rs
cou ld not let the U. S. ag gre
nis t ter ror ist s), the NL F
23
and their lackeys go unpunished. Logically, the U. S. aggressors captured-by us should have been brought before people's
courts for trial long before, because they illegally invaded
our country and conunitted many crimes against our people •••
To punish the U.S. aggressors and their lackeys for having
massacred our compatriots indiscriminately, the Liberation
Armed Forces conunand ordered the punishment of the two
aforementioned U. S. aggressors. "8
The second:
"In order to severely punish the reactionary agents and
spies, defend the revolutionary power and safeguard the
people's lives and property, the people's courts of Ca Mau
and Can Tho provinces recently held public trials of the
reactionary agents and spies who had created disturbances
and undermined public safety in the liberated area" 119
This is the language of law, seeking to convey the aura
of the courtroom, the judicial process at work. It is a constantly-employed screen with which the conununists hope to
avoid the stigma of illegality for their terror-based programs.
In the Conununist- Controlled Villages
Some 400 villages of the 2,500 total in the country,
chiefly in the more remote parts of the country (and incorporating about 10 percent of the population) are under communist control and it is the programs in these villages that we
seek to examine briefly here.
Some of these villages have been under more or less
continual conununist control for a generation and have corne
to be something of an enclave conununist society. Not a
great deal is known about life in these villages but it is
known that certain social institutions have changed considerably - - production and marke ting of rice, the parent- child
relationship, the nature of social organization, for example.
In this sub- society the aims are: internal order,
24
external security, expansion of geographic size, revolutionary justice and mutual welfare, in that order. Its economic s are semi- collectivist with considerable socialist competition. Its political tools are custom and terror. Its cloak
of authority, Party ceremony and symbolism. Politicalobedience exists in these villages because of villager self-interest
and habit resting on fear and force with outward manifestation
of inertia, deference, sympathy or numbed resignation.
A host of social organizations at the Village level enmesh the villager in a web of social control. Strong social
sanctions - - physical, psychological and economic - - are
used to force conformity. There is no escape except to flee
the village for the government area. This villagers have
done_by the tens of thousands. Most of the so-calledrefugees
in Viet-Nam are not refugees from battle but are Jelfdisplaced war victims, having as much attempted to escape the
repressive hand of the communists in their villages as to
escape dangers of war. "Refugees" do not come from secure
government- controlled areas.
The com.m.unists portray the "liberated village" as a
sort of peaceful, tranquil Shangri La where not only hostility
but even animosity has vanished and the only worry is the
intrusion of the government. Those who come from such
villages, however, depict them as
places of never-ending
"urgent tasks of revolution." Cadres constantly harangue
villagers to raise more food for PAVNtroops in the vicinity;
to engage in corvee labor such as transporting supplies for
the military; to join local "self- defense" units; to buy more
"war bonds" or pay more "national defense taxes"; to root
out spies. These are merely some of the tasks in a neverending li st.
Authority in the village is essentially negative, denying
the government access to the villagers. Adjudication of nonpolitical internal disputes is handled casually by local committees. All else, especially anything involving security,
is handled by district level cadres virtually as they please.
Such a cadre is judge, jury and executioner rolled into one.
25
Freed priso ners from comm unist "jails " have told bonechilli ng stori es of comm unist justic e in actio n. The
most
griev ous crim e is "spyi ng" which can be any act the
comm unists decid e is hosti le. Cadr es, as well as the appar
at as a
whole , have devel oped a paran oic preoc cupat ion with
spies
in recen t years .
Any suspe ct may be arres ted by any cadre . He is then
hande d over to the distr ict level politi cal office r along
with his
dossi er and a bill of indic tmen t. He goes befor e a "Peo
ple's
Cour t" which tries and sente nces him - - to death or
impr isonment . Usua lly the death penal ty must be appro ved by
provi ncial offici als. Distr ict cadre s may sente nce perso ns
to
priso n or deten tion up to one mont h. Long er sente nces
must
be appro ved by provi ncial offici als. An excep tion is
"anyo ne
who uses force to preve nt the peop le's will ••• , he may
be
execu ted on the spot by the distr ict cadre ••• ,,10
To handl e a rathe r large volum e of villag ers who are
suspe cted of harbo ring anti-c omm unist thoug hts and
are
there fore not to be truste d, but who have comm itted
no know n
act of "spyi ng, " a "sent ence of surve illanc e", which
is in
effec t house arres t, has been devis ed. A captu red direc
tive
descr ibed its opera tion:
"The follow ing perso ns shoul d imme diate ly be put
under the sente nce of surve illanc e: Thos e enem ies
of socie ty
whos e arres t and execu tion or impri sonm ent would not
be
benef icial to the Revo lution ; those guilty of being enem
ies
of socie ty who have not repen ted but whos e cases are
not so
serio us as to warr ant impri sonm ent; form er inma tes
of
(com muni st) priso ns who have not repen ted. Name s
of all
perso ns under surve illanc e sente nce must be sent imme
diate ly to distr ict cadre s. Perso ns in this categ ory must
make a
publi c confe ssion and denou nce their accom plice s.
They must
prese nt them selve s every 15 days to the villag e secur
ity cadre
and make a publi c repor t on their re-ed ucati on prog
ress.
They must perfo rm force d labor to redee m them selve
s.
The surve illanc e sente nce can last up to two years at
the end
of which time the perso n, if still unred eeme d, will be
tried
by a Peop le's Cour t."
26
Thou ght refor m sessi ons were intro duced by North ern
ution
cadre s in 19(,6 and since have becom e a stand ard instit
The magin the areas tightl y contr olled by the comm unist s.
ent
docum
red
captu
nitud e of the effor t is indic ated by one
ng
from the zonal level (roug hly 10 provi nces) in the Meko
three Delta in which it was repor ted that 2,700 peopl e in a
m
refor
ght
mont h perio d had taken the distr ict-le vel "thou
as
cours e". The syste m emplo yed with such peopl e is
a
to
tarily
volun
follow s: He (or she) is persu aded to go
se of
distr ict level camp estab lishe d for the speci fic purpo
.
thoug ht refor m. If he refus es he is taken under guard
h,
mont
a
The "clas ses" in the camp run from two week s to
to
after which the indiv idual , if refor med, is allow ed
is
he
"
rmed
retur n home . If he indic ates he is not "refo
cirun throu gh the cours e again . If he still rema ins recal
along
go
ly
overt
not
trant (and one wond ers why he would
ncial
with his capto rs) he is sente nced to jail at the provi
that
level . A perso n who is allow ed to retur n home finds
that
al
arriv
his relati ves have been notifi ed ahead of his
is the
they will be held accou ntabl e for his behav ior. This
milithe
in
oyed
so-ca ll,ed doub le-ho stage syste m, also empl
ts,
tary ranks (if a SOn servi ng the comm unist force s deser
cause ,
his paren ts will be punis hed; if they do not suppo rt the
the son will suffe: !:).
Captu red recor ds descr ibe indiv idual villag ers who
al
have been sent throu gh the thoug ht refor m cours e sever
s:
word
these
times . One repor t descr ibed a villag er in
for the
"He rema ined totall y unrep entan t, conti nued to work
t
(abou
doubt
and
e
enem y by creat ing confu sion in the villag
comm unist s). "
One canno t help but wond er about such a perso n, his
al even
motiv ation , his sourc e of coura ge, his stubb orn refus
on
hold
eath
life-d
a
to prete nd to bow befor e those who have
firing
him. How many of these have gone defia ntly to the
do not
we
fight
to
in
squad we do not know . How many rema
Nam
know . But in such is the great untol d story of this Viethero of
war. Such a perso n is by any stand ard an authe ntic
with no
odds,
that war. Alone , in silen ce, facing incre dible
1
27
ins t
shi ng mu ch, he fig hts on aga
ver y gre at hop e of acc om pli
na
t in the mo st dan ger ou s are
the dea dly con un un ist app ara
oll ed vil lag e.
of all , the con un un ist -co ntr
In the Co nte ste d Vil lag e
"ot her wa r" is the soTh e tru e bat tle gro un d in the
we en
h its str ug gle for pow er bet
cal led con tes ted vil lag e, wit
con
ver nm ent , bet we en the two
the con un un ist s and the go
two sep ara te ba ses .
ten din g pro gra ms res tin g on
now are chi efl y def ens ive .
Th e com mu nis t pro gra ms
wn
the go ver nm ent eff ort s kno
Th ey see k to blu nt and nul lify
m.
gra
nt or as the pac ific ati on pro
as Re vol uti ona ry De vel op me
ch a
or pac ific ati on is not so mu
Re vol uti ona ry dev elo pm ent
ng a
eri
ati ve gen eri c ter ms cov
pro gra m as a con cep t, alt ern
ent ire
ms , wh ich ran ge ov er the
gra
pro
ic
cif
spe
of
st
ho
ole
wh
mi c spe ctr um in Vi et- Na m.
soc ial , po liti cal and eco no
gra m;
(Op en Ar ms ) or am nes ty pro
Inc lud ed are the Ch ieu Ho i
to hig her
or nat ion al rec on cil iat ion
spe cif ic off ers of do an ket
lud ing
com mu nis t sid e (of fer s inc
ran kin g cad res wh o qui t the
po sts , bu t ma de
mo ney to spe cif ic po liti cal
~ eve ryt hin g fro m
org aas me mb ers of the NL F);
to cad res as ind ivi du als , not
is a new
lf- De fen se Fo rce , 11 wh ich
niz ati on of the Pe op le' s Se
efl y
chi
sed
tic in con cep t, com po
vil iag e def ens e gro up, sta
gu ard ;
of old me n- -an arm ed ho me
of you th un der dra ft age and
cho ose
un der wh ich the vil lag ers
the loc al ele cti on pro gra m
cou nci l;
a
in the ir vil lag es thr ou gh
the peo ple wh o run aff air s
rur al are as, chi efl y thr ou gh
eco nom ic dev elo pm ent in the
ll as
cre dit and ma rke tin g as we
im pro ved me tho ds of rur al
and
in ag ric ult ura l tec hno log y;
int rod uct ion of inn ova tio ns
be tte r
on
us
ica tio n eff ort s wi th foc
fin all y, inc rea sed con un un
en
we en lea de rs and led , bet we
two -w ay com mu nic ati on bet
lut ion is is wh at is me ant by Re vo
the vil lag e and Sai gon . Th
thr ow n
ati on . Th is is the gau ntl et
ary De vel opm ent or pac ific
ich
org ani zat ion al off ens ive wh
dow n by the go ver nm ent , an
tro y.
the com mu nis ts see k to des
mu nis ts to thi s cha lle nge
Th e att ent ion pai d by the com
beg an,
ars aft er the big -un it wa r
is rel ati vel y new . In the ye
28
in 1965, the communists allocated few resources to disrupt
the various government programs in the countryside. Their
focus was military. Part of the trauma of the Tet offensive
in February 1968 was the high communist casualty total,
which caused the leadership to reassess its doctrine of victory
through big-unit war. And part of the trauma, a reflection of
those personnel losses, was a resounding improvement (from
the government view) in the security condition of the countryside, especially in late 1968 and early 1969. The Pacification
Program, which previously had not been taken seriously,
gradually assumed major significance for the communists.
A full scale attack on it is now under way, and in fact, one
could approach all present communist programs in the contested villages in these terms. For example, hoi chanh12
(especially officers) are sought by large numbers of "defectorhunting teams" wh" would otherwise be engaged in combat.
Whereas the communists previously made little effort
to prevent villagers from becoming "refugees" (and may in
some instances have encouraged it, to add a further burden
on the government), now considerable effort is made to prevent them from leaving their horne area; in fact this is the
primary duty of many main force companies in the Mekong
Delta. Resettlement camps are harassed, or worse (see
examples in Appendix).
The People's Self-Defense Force is a primary target,
as might be expected. It is an impediment to communist tax
collectors and recruiters, but equally important, since it is
from and of the village it defends, it serves there as a stabilizing and unifying force. 13
Village elections, also ignored at first by the communists, now are physically disrupted, as indicated by several
examples contained in the Appendix. The government's
social welfare projects occupy the attention of several thousand communist cadres whose only duty is to disrupt them,
sometimes employing terror that is beyond explanation;
consider, for example, what could have been the policy
decision behind an act such as this:
29
"The y (the cOIllI llunis ts) are parti cular ly inter ested in
For exaIll ple, last Illont h an
~~llosling schoo ls (in this area) .
a side
;Calm1.ed propa ganda teaIll stopp ed a local schoo l bus on
not
were
ren
child
drive r the
'I'D...., one Illorn ing and tllid the
age
atten d schoo l any Illore . The drive r conve yed this Illess
. to the paren ts who could not belie ve the COIll Illunis ts were
when
serio us. The bussi ng conti nued until a few days later
girl and
the saIlle teaIll stopp ed the saIlle bus, took off a little
. ,,14
cut off her finge rs, The schoo l has been close d since
its
Revo lution ary Deve lopIll ent is attack ed chief ly throu gh
Vung
at
l
perso nnel -- the cadre s speci ally train ed at a IIchoo
aIlls
Tau or the indiv idual s who are part of the vario us progr
and
s
cadre
ent
at the villag e level . Revo lution ary Deve lopIll
e are
other gover nIllen tal offici als work ing in the coun trysid
ing
follow
or
tly
first targe ts for assas sinat ion, eithe r direc
kidna ping.
a
The secon d Illost iIllpo rtant targe t - - and certa inly not
offici als,
new one - - is key indiv idual s in the villag es - - not just
no
hold
who
s
.but the natur al villag e leade rs, those indiv idual
of chara cter,
office but who, becau se of age, sagac ity or stren gth
to for
look
and
e
are the ones to WhOIll peopl e turn for advic
ers
leade rship . They Illay be religi ous figur es, schoo l teach
are
they
use
Beca
or SiIllp ly peopl e of integ rity and hono r.
deadl y
super ior indiv idual s they are the COIll Illuni sts' IllOSt
essne ss,
eneIll Y. Stead ily, quiet ly and with a syste Illatic ruthl
whole
a
ally
the COIll Illunis ts in 10 years have wiped out "Virtu
are
class of Vietn aIlles e villag ers, and Illany villag es today
the
ps
perha
are
devoi d of natur al leade rs. Natu ral leade rs
ng
single Illost iIllpo rtant eleIll ent in any socie ty, repre senti
NaIll
Vietto
loss
This
.
a hUIlla n resou rce of incal culab le value
.
Illore
or
ation
is inesti Illabl e; its repla ceIlle nt will take a gener
e
Speci ficall y there are fiftee n types of South Vietn aIlles
aIll.
who COIlle withi n the scope of the assas sinat ion progr
found
ently
frequ
been
This "Fifte en Categ ories " list has
tly,
aIllon g captu red docUI llents ; the langu age varie s sligh
30
but thi sis typical:
"I. EnelTlY personnel in fields of espionage, police,
public security, special forces psywar, including covert
organizations.
"2. MelTlbers of reactionary political parties and organizations, and parties working behind a religious front (i. e. ,
Dai Viets, VNQDD, Cao Dai, Hca Hao).
"3. MelTlbers of enelTlY lTlilitary and para-lTlilitary
or ganizations.
"4. Puppet governlTlent officials, frolTl inter-faITLily
level upwards.
"5. Leading and key popular organization leaders (i. e. ,
village organizations such as farlTl cooperatives, wOlTlen's
and youth organizations; trade unions).
"6. MelTlbers of the enelTlY's cultural, art, propaganda
and press establishlTlent.
"7. Leading and key lTlelTlbers of religious organizations still deeply superstitious (i. e., Catholics).
"8. Thieves, assassins, gangsters, prostitutes, speculator s and fortune teller s.
"9. Defectors who have given inforlTlation to the enelTlY,
who have taken with thelTl autolTlatic weapons or ilTlportant
docUlTlents, or who are suspected of having done salTle; or
who were cadres or officers.
"10. MelTlbers of the exploiter class and their spouses
who have not specifically sided with the workers. (The COlTllTlunists in Viet-NalTl as elsewhere divide soCiety into exploiter and exploited. )
"11.
Individuals with backward political tendencies
31
including those who do dishonest and corrupt deeds, yet try
to justify them.
"12. Relatives of persons engaged in enemy espionage,
security, special forces or psywar organizations; relatives
of important members or leaders of reactionary political
parties or religious groups still deeply superstitious; families
of military above the rank of private; members of families
of government officials from village level upwards.
"13. Relatives of per sons who have been punished by
the Revolution (i. e., in earlier years) and who subsequently
have grumbled about the Revolution; relatives of those jailed
by the Revolution for spying.
"14. Deserters or AWOL's who have returned to the
Revolution. but without clear explanation (i. e., who may be
government penetration agents. )
"15. Individuals with suspicious background or record
of past activity. "
It has been estimated that this list, if strictly applied to
all of South Viet-Nam, would total at least three million.
This probably is what Col. Tran Van Dac, the highest ranking
hoi chanh, meant when he said, "There are three million
South Vietnamese on the (communist) blood debt list. ,,15
In the Urban Areas
The communist calculation (basic Maoism) has always
been that assault on individuals, as individuals and as key
members of organizations, should begin in the villages and
work its way up through district and provincial levels until
finally a direct attack is made on the establishment in Saigon.
For this reason there never has been as concerted an assassination effort as might be expected in the more secure areas,
which include most cities. As far as can be determined only
recently did the communists begin a concerted effort to
assassinate cabinet-level government officials. Prior to
.2
32
thi s suc h att em pts we re reg
ard ed as "ad ven tur ism ",
wa ste ful
of res ou rce s eve n if suc ces
sfu l. No w the re are ind ica
tio ns
thi s is cha ngi ng. At tem pts
in 196 9 we re ma de on the
liv es of
two cab ine t-le vel off ici als
, one of the m suc ces sfu l.
Fro
m
rep ort s of com mu nis t tra ini
ng cam p act ivi tie s cu rre ntl
y un der
wa y, we can exp ect a ste
p-u p in urb an ter ror , esp
eci all y
kid nap ing and ass ass ina tio
ns. Th ere is fur the r dis cus
sio n
of urb an are a ter ror in Ch
apt er IV .
Do ctr ine
Th e pub lic rat ion ale for use
of ter ror em plo yed by the
com mu nis ts is tha t the ene
my has pe rm itte d no alt ern
ati ve.
Su ch jus tifi cat ion , or any
oth er for tha t ma tte r, nev
er
has
bee n an eas y ma tte r am on
g the ran k and file . Th e
na tur al
abh orr enc e of Vi etn am ese
for sys tem ati c ass ass ina tio
n wa s
and is a ma jor and con tin
uou s do ctr ina l pro ble m to
the cad res .
To the loc all y rec rui ted esp
eci all y, eve n the use of for
ce
see ms bot h rep ug nan t and
un nec ess ary . Am ong the
mo
re
sop his tic ate d cad res , esp
eci all y tho se fro m the So uth
, the re
wa s wi des pre ad bel ief tha
t vic tor y cou ld be obt ain ed
by pol itica l str ug gle alo ne and wo
uld not req uir e ter ror . Th
e respo nse by the lea de rsh ip to
thi s vie w wa s to mi x tho rou
ghl y
the vio len ce pro gra m and
the po liti cal str ug gle and
to
cal l
the res ult po liti cal . It als
o inv olv ed adm ini ste rin g
ma
ssi ve
do ses of ind oct rin ati on to
cad res to con vin ce the m
tha
t
vic tor y cou ld be ach iev ed
onl y thr ou gh for ce and vio
len ce.
Th e do ctr ina l un der pin nin
gs for use of ter ror hav e
ten ded to shi ft ov er the ye
ars . Th e pre sen t do ctr ine
see ms
to be tha t ter ror is req uir
ed to ach iev e thr ee ma jor
pro
xim ate
ob jec tiv es:
1. Te rro r to dim ini sh the
opp osi ng for ce, bot h in the
sen se of eli mi nat ing key ind
ivi dua ls and in red uci ng the
tot ali ty of pow er wh ich the
oth er sid e has acc um ula ted
.
Te rro r we ake ns gre atl y and
tha t is the sin gle mo st im
po rta nt
gai n the com mu nis ts ach iev
e in its use . Th is is a ha
rd
ob jec tiv e wit h litt le of the
fuz zy psy cho log ica l con sid
era tio ns
of oth er ob jec tiv es. A pe
rso n is kid nap ed and kil led
or is
33
ass ass ina ted : gon e not onl
y is an ind ivi dua l, but a ser
vic e,
a res ou rce , an ass et wh ich
the ene my had and now is
wit
hou t.
Fr om a do ctr ina l sta ndp oin
t an yo ne in any of the fift een
cat ego rie s is som eon e tha t the
cou ntr y wo uld be we ll rid
of and
tha t is exc use eno ugh for his
rem ov al. Bu t the re are lim
itin g
fac tor s. On e is exp edi enc
y: one doe s not kil l a pro mi
nen t
"ne utr ali st" bec aus e the Pa
rty cu rre ntl y is wo oin g ne
utr ali sts .
No r is it as eas y to kid nap
, say , a pro vin ce chi ef, as
an ou tsid er mi gh t ass um e, and the
mo rta lity rat e on wo uld -be
ass ass ins (as we ll as the fai
lur e rat e on as sas sin ati on s)
has
bee n exc eed ing ly hig h thi s
ye ar, Th ere for e cos t is a
fac tor ;
the pri ce mu st be wo rth it.
A kin d of pri ori ty ex ist s.
Th e
cri ter ion fol low ed is: Ho w
mu ch pow er is sub tra cte d
fro
m
the oth er sid e. Fr om thi s,
for exa mp le, fol low s the pol
icy
tha t it is be tte r to kil l a Vi
etn am ese off ici al tha n his
Am eri can
-ad vis or sin ce: "If we des
tro y the Am eri can s, the y
are cap abl e
of bri ng ing in rep lac em ent
s. Bu t (it is) dif fic ult to fin
d rep lac eme nts for the exp eri enc ed
old fox es (i. e., GV N off ici
als ) wh o
are fam ilia r wit h the loc al
situ ati on. ,,1 6 Th e me asu re
of thi s
obj ect ive : it con trib ute s to
the cau se to the deg ree tha
t it
dim ini she s the for ce op po site
.
2. Te rro r to sus tai n com
mu nis t mo ral e. Th is ma y
not
be con sid ere d by ou tsi de rs
as a ser iou s ob jec tiv e. Bu
t
a
gu err illa lea de r kno ws tha
t the mo ral e of his fol low ers
is far
mo re eph em era l and sub jec
t to gre ate r sw ing s fro m eup
ho ria
to dy sph ori a tha n is the mo
ral e of reg ula r sol die rs.
An
d he
kno ws tha t a sen se of im po
ten cy is the mo st deb ilit ati
ng
tho ugh t tha t can inf ect his
me n and dri ve mo ral e dow
n to the
poi nt wh ere he da re not com
mi t the m to act ion . Alw ays
the
gu err illa see s him sel f alo ne,
bel eag uer ed, sur rou nd ed,
out num ber ed. Ini tia lly ter ror
bui lds con fid enc e; lat er it
sus tai ns
mo ral e. No thi ng so sen ds gu
err illa mo ral e soa rin g,a nd
wip es
out pas t fee lin gs of des pon
den cy and dou bt, as a sha tte
rin
g
blo w del ive red the ene my in
his lai r, one exp ert ly pla nne
d,
fau ltle ssl y exe cut ed and cul
mi nat ing in un sca the d esc ape
.
In a mo me nt the en em y's gre
at fir e pow er, his ove rw hel
mi ng
nu mb ers , his hug e log ist ic
bas e, shr ink int o un im po rta
nce
.
Wh eth er the blo w the ter ror
ist str uc k wa s litt le mo re tha
n inc on ven ien ce to the ene my doe s no
t ma tte r. Pro we ss is dem on
str ate d;
34
invulnerability again proven. The caution, of course, and
the worry to the leader in serving this objective, is that the
act rrlUst be perfect. If it is botched, he is far worse off
than if he had never attempted it.
3. Terror to disorient and psychologically isolate the
individual. Terror is a rot in the social fabric. Hue was a
classic example. Terror to disorient and isolate relates
directly to our earlier discussion of the communist subliminal
goal: raising the level of the people's sense of insecurity.
The communists need only a single index to measure their
progress (assuming it can be measured objectively) -- a
people's anxiety-level graph. If it goes up and stays high
long enough, the communists will have won; if it goes down
and stays there, they will have lost. Obviously, and even by
definition, nothing serves to increase a sense of individual
insecurity as does terror.
But here we are also concerned with the social context,
what terror does to the relationship of the individual to his
society. An assassination in a village not only frightens a
villager but it destroys part of the structure which previously
was a source of security. Terror of any sort shifts the ground
strangely, as an earthquake. It removes the underpinnings of
the olderly system leaving confusion as much as fear. A
civilian expects safety and order in his society and when it
vanishes he becomes disoriented. Terror isolates. An individual can no longer draw strength from customary social
support. He can rely only on himself. Physically he may be
untouched by a terror act, but because of it he is suddenly
terribly alone and in anguish. A terrorized village, said an
American psychiatrist in Viet-Nam, is a case of collective
anxiety neurosis, the victim seeking only relief. The victim,
in this case the village, stops behaving as a normal social
unit; each individual is fragmented within, searching desperately to fix his own personal security. When this happens, the
third communist proximate objective has been served.
These programs and doctrine are the face of communism which the Vietnamese people in the past decade have
35
corne to know well. Much water and blood have flowed beneath
the bridge. The Vietnamese people are wiser, and sadder,
even if the world is not. How outsiders can assume they
would prefer communism to an extension of the security being
brought them by the government is a universal and neverending puzzlement to all in Viet-Nam, Vietnamese and
foreigners alike.
The impression with which one is left, following a survey
of communist terror uses, is that its effectiveness as a political and psychological weapon has been overrated by the communist leadership. Despite intensive efforts, the villagers'
sense of insecurity is not driven upwards or, if it is, refuses
to stay there. The villagers' anxiety is converted into hatred
and increasingly they have taken calculated risks to strike
back; the nominally indifferent Buddhist leader is incensed
and angered by communist rockets dropping into a school
yard; the average man's reaction is no longer fear, but anger.
Yet the communist leaders are prisoners of their own
policy. If they were to eliminate terror as a base they might
win worldwide commendation but would commit suicide; and
theirs is a power struggle, not a popularity contest. We can
expect them to continue increased efforts to terrorize but
with diminished effect.
One also concludes that to end the military defense in
Viet-Nam, to halt opposition to these communist programs,
would not, as has often been suggested, bring an end to the
long suffering that has been the plight of the Vietnamese
people. Considering the integral part terror plays in communist social change, it does not follow that the quick and sure
route to peace, to a moratorium on death, is to permit the
cOrn.n1unists to assume powero
Chapter I I -
Footnotes
39
Cha pter II:
1.
Foo tnot es
Polit ical strug gle as defin ed by the comm unist s does
not
precl ude the shedd ing of blood ; it would be more accur
ate
to use, in Engli sh, the term non-m ilitar y viole nce
progr am.
2.
See listin g of force s on the comm unist side, in gloss
ary.
3.
Radio Liber ation , Augu st 21, 1965 .
. 4.
5.
Nhan Dan, as quote d by Radio Hano i, Septe mber 28,
1965.
Rema rks to the autho r by hoi chanh , chief of assas
sination uni1; My Tho provi nce, Nove mber 1969.
6.
Radio Liber ation , April 5, 1969.
7.
Radio Liber ation , Dece mber 5, 1968.
8.
Ibid, note 4.
9.
Radio Liber ation , Febru ary 24, 1969.
10.
Nume rous descr iption s exist in captu red docum ents;
this
one carne from the Meko ng Delta , circa 1965.
11.
The milit ary and para- milit ary force s of the GVN
are
organ ized to corre spon d to the enem y struc ture, i.
e" the
Repu blic of Viet- Nam Arme d Forc es (RVN AF) or
regul ar
milit ary, made up of Army of Viet- Nam (ARV N),
the Air
Force , the Navy , the Mari nes and sever al elite units
of
parat roope rs, Speci al Force s, etc., is match ed again
st
the PAVN and the Main Force elem ents of the PLAF
; the
GVN 's Regio nal Force , opera ting chief ly at the provi
ncial
level , is matc hed again st the comm unist para- milit
ary
Regio nal or Terri toria l guerr illa force ; the GVN 's
Popu lar
Force , opera ting chief ly at the distri ct level , is match
ed
again st the comm unist para- milit ary Loca l Force ;
the
GVN' s Self- Defen se Force as noted above is a static
village guard . In addit ion there is opera ting in the count
ry-
40
side the GVN 's Natio nal Polic e Field Force , a lightl
yarme d para- milit ary force with polic e dutie s.
12. See gloss ary.
13. The terro r incid ent level invol ving Peop le's SelfDefen se
Force mem bers was about 200 cases per mont h in
mid1969 (the assas sinat ion rate being 65 per month ; the
kidnapin g rate, 140 per mont h). The Revo lution ary Deve
lopment cadre s, nume ricall y far fewer , were being killed
at the rate of about 20 per mont h and the villag e offici
al
assas sinat ion rate at about 33 per mont h.
14. IV Corp s Advi sor's Offic ial Repo rt, Febru ary
1969.
15. Col. Tran Van Dac, press confe rence in Saigo n,
Febru ary
6, 1969.
16. III Corp s captu red docum ent
dated Marc h 1967.
41
Chapte rIll: Hue
43
Chapter III:
Hue
The city of Hue is one of the saddest cities of our earth,
not simply because of what happened the,re in February, 1968,
unthinkable as that w;'s. It is a silent rebuke to all of us, inheritors of 40 centuries of civilization, who in our century have
allowed collectivist politics- -abstractions all- -to corrupt us into
the worst of the modern sins, indifference to inhumanity. What
happened in Hue should give pause to every remaining civilized
person on this planet. It should be inscribed, so as not to be
forgotten, along with the record of other terrible visitations of
man's inhumanity to man which stud the history of the human
race. Hue is another demonstration of what man can bring himself to do when he fixes no Ihnits on political action and pursues
uncautiously the dream of social perfectibility.
What happened in Hue, physically, can be described with
a few quick statistics. A communist force which eventually
reached 12,000 invaded the city the night of the new moon marking the new lunar year, January 30, 1968. It stayed for 26 days
and then was driven out by military action. In the wake of this
Tet offensive, 5,800 Hue civilians were dead or mis sing. It is
nOw known that most of them are dead. The bodies of most have
been found in the past 20 months, in single and mass graves
throughout Thua Thien province which surrounds this cultural
capital of Viet- Nam.
Such are the skeletal facts, the important statistics. Such
is what the incurious world knows, if it knows anything at all
about Hue, for this is what was written, modestly, by the world's
press. Apparently it made no impact on the world's mind or
conscience. For there was no agonized outcry. No demonstrations at North Vietnamese embas sies around the world. Lord
Russell did not send his "war crimes tribunal" to Hue to take
evidence and indict. In a tone beyond bitterness, the people
there will tell you that the world does not know what happened in
Hue or, if. it does, does not care.
The City
Considered by Asian standards, Hue is not old, less than
two centuries. The ancient imperial capital was Hanoi. A dynas-
44
tic break up in the early 1800's affor ded a powe rful
court noble
the chanc e to seize the mant le of powe r, which he
did. He proclaim ed hims elf Empe ror Gia Long and went on to
becom e one
of Viet- Nam' s most famo us ruler s. One of Gia Long
's first acts
was to move the capit al far to the south , to the banks
of the
mean derin g Perfu me River half way betwe en Hano
i and Saigo n.
There he settle d his court behin d the newly -built walle
d fortif ication now calle d the Citad el. Insid e his artisa ns erect
ed build ings,
work ing with sketc hes of the palac es of Pekin g. The
city of Hue
grew up aroun d the Citad el.
As the years passe d Hue becam e the cente r of religi
ous
and intell ectua l leade rship , while Hano i assum ed the
politi cal
and Saigo n the comm ercia l leade rship . Throu ghout
the days of
Fren ch rule, Hue main taine d what neith er Viet- Naml
s two other majo r
cities could mana ge, and that was digni ty. In Hue the
Frenc h hand was
behin d a facad e, the Cour t. But a facad e is bette r
than nothin g
and in Hue pride could grow . Conf ucian ism and Budd
hism ming led harm oniou sly, first in the temp les and later in
the unive rsity,
each reinf orced stead ily by the grow ing powe r of natio
nalism .
Tradi ti,ma lism becam e a mean s of affron ting the Fren
ch, and
Hue speci alize d in tradit ion. So the old class ics were
read and
rever ed, the ancie nt musi cal instru ment s taugh t and
playe d and
each new build ing went up accor ding to time- hono red
archi tectu ral prece pts. Hue came to regar d itself as the repos
itory of a
great esthe tic and cultu ral inher itanc e with the speci
al task of
defen ding and trans mitti ng this to the futur e. Hue
as guara ntor
of cultu re was a conce pt held even by the illite rate
cyclo drive r
in the stree t. Grad ually Hue assum ed a perso nality
, then characte r, then ambi ance.
Each empe ror befor e joinin g his ances tors caref ully
construc ted his own tomb , fine garde ned areas which now
grace the
river valle y behin d the city. The tomb s of Tu Duc,
Minh Mang ,
Khai Dinh and Dong Khan h are treas ured natio nal landm
arks
know n to every Vietn ames e schoo l child .
Now Hue has a new tomb , Nui Ba Vanh (Thre e Hills
Ringe d).
It is destin ed to becom e a hallo wed natio nal shrin
e, for here are
burie d the unide ntifie d victim s of the Hue Mass acre
(othe rs
havin g been reint erred in their own ance stral plots)
, all civilians. It is appro priate some how that in this kind
of war the tomb
of the unkno wn shoul d conta in a civili an.
45
The Battl e
The Battl e of Hue was part of the comm unist Wint er-Sp
ring
camp aign of 1967- 68. The entir e camp aign was divid
ed into three
phase s:
Phas e I carne in Octob er, Nove mber , and Dece mber
of
1967 and entai led "coor dinat ed fighti ng meth ods, " that
is, fairly
large , set-p iece battle s again st impo rtant fixed instal
lation s or
allied conce ntrati ons. The battle s of Loc Ninh in Binh
Long Province , Dak To in Kontu m Provi nce, and Con Tien in
Quan g Tri
Provi nce, all three in the moun taino us inter ior of South
VietNam near the Camb odian and Lao bord ers, were typic
al and, in
fact, majo r elem ents in Phas e I. Phas e II carne in
Janua ry,
Febru ary, and Marc h of 1968 and invol ved great use
of "inde pendent fighti ng meth ods, " that is, large nolmb ers of attac
ks by fairly smal l units , simul taneo usly, over a vast geogr aphic
area and
using the most refine d and advan ced techn iques of guerr
illa war.
Wher eas Phas e I was f')ugh t chief ly with North Vietn
ames e
Regu lar (PAV N) troop s (at that time some 55,00 0 were
in the
South ), Phas e II was fough t main ly with South ern Comm
unist
(PLA F) troop s. The cresc endo of Phas e II was the
Tet offen sive
in which 70,00 0 troop s attack ed 32 of South Viet- Nam'
s large st
popul ation cente rs, inclu ding the city of Hue.
Phas e III, in April , May, and June of 1968, origi nally
waS
to have comb ined the indep enden t and coord inate d fighti
ng meth ods,
culmi natin g in a great fixed battle some wher e. This
was what
captu red docum ents guard edly refer red to as the "seco
nd wave ".
Possi bly it was to have been Khe Sanh, the U. S. Marin
e base in
the far north ern corne r of South Viet- Nam. Or perha
ps it was to
t.(
~,' have been Hue.
There was no secon d wave chief ly becau se event s
f, in Phas es I and II did not devel op has expect thed. Sdtill , thehw ar d
;; reach ed its blood iest temp o in eig t years
en, uring t e perio
from the Battl e of Hue in Febr uary until the liftin g of
the siege
of Khe Sanh in late summ er.
Ame rican losse s durin g those three mont hs avera ged
near,.ly 500 killed per week ; the GVN losse s were doubl e
that rate;
;.and the PAVN -PLA F losse s were nearl y eight times
the Amer ican
~ loss rate.
In the Wint er-Sp ring Camp aign, the comm unist s began
with
46
about 195,000 PLAF main force and PAVN troops. During the
nine months they lost (killed or permanently disabled) about
85,000 men.
The Winter-Spring Campaign was an all-out communist
bid to break the back of the South Vietnamese armed forces and
drive the government, along with the Allied forces, into defensive
city enclaves. Strictly speaking, the Battle of Hue was part
of Phase I rather than Phase II since it employed "coordinated
fighting methods" and involved North Vietnamese troops rather
than southern guerrillas. It was fought, on the communist side,
largely by two veteran North Vietnamese army divisions: The
Fifth and 324-B, augmented by main forces battalions and some
guerrilla units along with some 150 local civilian commissars
and cadres.
Briefly the Battle of Hue consisted of these major developments: The initial communist assault, chiefly by the 800th and
802nd battalions, had the force and momentum to carry it across
Hue. By dawn of the first day the communists controlled all the
city except the headquarters of the First ARVN Division and the
compound housing American military advisors. The Vietnamese
and Americans moved up reinforcements with orders to reach
the two holdouts and strengthen them. The communists moved
up another battalion, the 804th , with orders to intercept the
reinforcement forces. This failed, the two points were reinforced and never again seriously threatened.
The battle then took on the aspects of a seige. The communists were in the Citadel and on the western edge of the city.
The Vietnamese and Americans on the other three sides, including that portion of Hue south of the river, determined to drive
them out, hoping initially to do so with artillery fire and air
strikes. But the Citadel was well built and soon it became
apparent that if the communists r orders were to hold, they could
be expelled only by city warfare, fighting house by house and
block by block, a slow and costly form of combat. The order
was given. By the third week of February the encirclement of
the Citadel was well under way and Vietnamese troops and
American Marines were advancing yard by yard through the
Citadel. On the morning of February 24th, Vietnamese First
Division soldieTs tore down the communist flag that had flown
for 24 days ove'r the outer wall and hoisted their own. The
47
b at tl e w as w on
, al th ou gh sp
o ra d ic fi gh ti ng
ci ty . S om e 2
w ou ld co nt in ue
,5 0 0 co m m u n
o u ts id e th e
is
ts di ed d u ri n g
2, 50 0 w ou ld di
th e b at tl e an d
e as co m m u n
an
o th er
is ts el em en ts
A ll ie d de ad w
w er e p u rs u ed
er e se t a t 35 7.
be yo nd H ue .
T he F in d s
In ,h e ch ao s th
at ex is te d fo ll
ow in g th e b at
ci v il ia n b u si n
tl e, th e fi rs t
es s w as em er
o rd er of
g
en
cy re li ef , in
p re v en ti o n of
th e fo rm of fo
ep id em ic s, em
od
sh ip m en ts ,
er g en cy m ed ic
th e ho rn e re b u
al ca re , et c.
il d in g ef fo rt .
T
he
O
n ca m e
nl
ca su al ti es . N
y la te r di d H ue
o tr u e p o st -a
b eg in to ta b u la
tt
ac k ce n su s h as
te it s
lo ca l o ff ic ia ls
y et b ee n ta ke
re p o rt ed th at
n. In M ar ch
1 ,9 0 0 ci v il ia n
w ar w ou nd s an
s w er e h o sp it
d th ey es ti m at
al iz ed w it h
ed th at so m e
ac co u n te d fo r.
5 ,8 0 0 p er so n
s w er e u n ' /..
T he fi rs t d is co
v er y of co m m
H ig h S ch oo l y
u n is t v ic ti m s
ar d , on F eb ru
ca rn e in th e G
ar y 26 ; ev en tu
ia H oi
ed . In th e ne
al ly 17 0 b o d ie
xt fe w m o n th s
s
w
er
18
e re co v er ad d it io n al g ra
la rg es t of w h
v e si te s w er e
ic h w er e T an g
fo un d, th e
Q ua ng T u P ag
(7 7) , C ho T ho
o d a (6 7 v ic ti m
ng a re a (a n es
s) , B ai D au
ti m at ed 10 0) ,
(2 01 ), T h ie n
th e im p er ia l
H am (a p p ro x
to m b s a re a
im at el y 20 0) ,
10 0) . In a ll al
an d D on g G i (a
m o st 1 ,2 0 0 b
p
p ro x im at el y
o d ie s w er e fo
co n ce al ed g ra
un d in h as ti ly
v es . A t le as
du g, p o o rl y
t h al f of th es e
at ro ci ty k il li n
sh ow ed cl ea r
g s: h an d s w ir
ev
id en ce of
ed
be hi nd b ac k s,
b o d ie s co n to rt
ra g s st uf fe d in
ed b u t w it ho ut
m o u th s,
w ou nd s (i nd ic
o th er n ea rl y
at in g b u ri al al
60 0 b o re w ou
iv
nd
e)
.
m
T he
ar k s bu t th er
in g w h et h er th
e w as no w ay
ey d ie d b y fi ri
of d et er m in n g sq u ad o r in
A m on g th es e
ci d en ta l to th
v ic ti m s w er e
e b at tl e.
th re e W es t G
te ch n ic ia n w ho
er
m an d o ct o rs ,
w as th e w if e
L C at h o li
a m ed ic al
of
on e of th e d o ct
c p ri e st s, on
o rs , an d tw o
e of w ho m w as
F re n ch
b u ri ed al iv e.
T he se co n d m
aj o r g ro u p of
fi nd s w as d is
m o n th s of 19 69
co v er ed in th
in P h u T hu d is
e fi rs t se v en
tr ic t - - th e S
T ay -- an d H
an d D un e F in d
uo ng T hu y d is
s
tr ic t -- X ua n
an d L e X a
M a rc h an d A p
H o a- V an D u o
ri l. A d d it io n
n
g
-in
al
la te
g
ra
d is tr ic t in M ay
v e si te s w er e
fo un d in V in h
an d in N am H
L oc
oa d is tr ic t in
Ju ly .
T he la rg es t of
th is g ro u p w er
si te s of V in h
e th e S an d D un
L uu , L e X a D
e F in d s in th e
on g an d X ua n
th re e
tu ft ed sa n d du
0 lo ca te d in
ne co u n tr y n ea
ro
ll
in
g
,
r
th
g
ra ss e S ou th C hi na
sa lt -m ar sh v
al le y s, th es e
S ea . S ep ar at
du ne s w er e id
ed b y
ea l fo r g ra v es
.
O n th e d is co v
er y of th e S an
d D un e F in d s
lo ca l fa rm er ,
a st o ry is to ld
w al ki ng o v er
th at a
th e du ne s on e
p ie ce of w ir e
m
o rn in g , tr ip p
st ic k in g ou t of
ed
o
th
v er a
e sa n d . In ir
ou t of th e sa nd
e h e je rk ed at
, at th e o th er en
th e w ir e an d
d of h is w ir e,
ca rn e a bo ny h
an d an d ar m .
48
The find was Inade. Exc.avation work was ordered, and 809
bodies began to be uncovered.
A fixed procedure then developed, now used in all the
excavations. Four-person teaIns, usually young people,
operate as a unit, They wear surgical gloves well-doused
in alcohol, their faces Inasked to avoid odor. They dig
systeInatically, using sound archeological principles. The
area is Inarked off into a grid. Digging is done with flat
shovels used in a peculiar sideward Inotion that slices away
layer after layer of sand until a strike is Inade. Then, with
the aid of a sInall garden trowel, the body is uncovered. It
is reInoved and placed on a sheet of plastic. Then COInes
registration: a nUInber painted on the skull and a description
(dental iInpression, color of hair, identifying papers, clothing,
jewelry, religious artifacts, etc.) listed in a record book.
The body is then carted away to a central clearing station
where the inforInation gathered is posted before waiting
relatives. It is slow work, averaging six Inan-hours per
body.
The teaInS are now experienced and even specialized.
SOIne are assigned the task of probing the sand with long iron
rods and have developed an alInost sixth sense as to where
the bodies are. Others specialize in reInoving bodies intact,
iInportant in terInS of later identification. One old Inan has
gained faIne for his ability to identify persons he has known by
the shape and feel of skulls.
Vegetation is one indicator, the presence of bright green
grass is an alInost certain sign that a body is beneath. Young
children are another source of inforInation. A fourteen-yearold buffalo boy with a sharp eye and a good IneInory pinpointed
the location of Inore than a dozen bodies, which he had watched
the COInInunists bury a year and a half ago.
In the Sand Dune Find, the pattern had been
to tie victiIns together in groups of 10 or 20, line theIn up in
front of a trench dug by local corvee labor and cut theIn down
with subInachine gun (a favorite local souvenir is a spent
49
Russian machlne gun shell taken from a grave). Frequently
the dead were buried in layers of three and four, which makes
identification particularly difficult.
In Nam Hoa district carne the third, or Da Mai Creek Find,
which also has been called the Phu Cam death march, made
on September 19, 1969. Three communist defectors told
intelligence officers of the lOlst Airborne Brigade that they
had witnessed the killing of several hundred people at Da Mai
Creek, about 10 miles south of Hue, in February of 1968. The
area is wild, unpopulated, virtually inaccessible. The Brigade sent in a search party, which reported that the stream
contained a large number of human bones.
By piecing together bits of information, it was determined
that this is what happened at Da Mai Creek: On the fifth day
of Tet in the Phu Cam section of Hue, where some threefourths of the City's 40,000 Roman Catholics lived, a large
number of people had taken sanctuary from the battle in a
local church, a common method in Viet-Nam of escaping war.
Many in the building were not in fact Catholic. A communist
political commissar arrived at the church and ordered out
about 400 people, some by name and SOme apparently because
of their appearance (prosperous looking and middle-aged
businessmen, for example). He said they were going to the
"liberated area" for three days of indoctrination, after which
each could return home. They were marched nine kilometers
south to a pagoda where the communists had established a
headquarter s. There 20 were called out from the group,
assembled before a drumhead court, tried, found guilty,
executed and buried in the pagoda yard. The remainder were
taken across the river and turned over to a local communist
unit in an exchange that even involved handing the political
commissar a receipt. It is probable that the commissar
intended that their prisoners should be re-educated and
returned, but with the turnover, matters passed from his
control. During the next several days, exactly how many is
not known, both captive and captor wandered the countryside.
At some point in Phase III (see below) the local communists
decided to eliminate witnesses. Their captives were led
50
th ro u g h s ix
k il o m e te rs
of some of
in C e n tr a l
th e m o s t ru
V ie t- N a m ,
g g e d te rr a in
to
s h o t o r b ra
D a M a i C re
in e d a n d th
e k . T h e re
e ir b o d ie s
th e y w e re
s tr e a m .
le ft to w a s
h in th e r\ U
ln in g
T h e 1 0 Is t
A ir b o rn e B
s ib le to re a
ri g a d e b u ri
c h th e c re e
a l d e ta il fo
k o v e rl a n d
u n d it im p o
o r im p a s s a
, ro a d s b e
sb le . T h e c
in
g
n
re
o n -e x is te n t
e k 's fo li a g
c a ll e d d o u b
e is w h a t in
le -c a n o p y ,
V ie t- N a m
th a t is , tw o
b ru s h a n d
is
la y e rs , o n
tr e e s c lo s e
e
c
to
o n s is ti n g o
th e g ro u n d
tr e e s w h o s
f
, a n d th e se
e b ra n c h e s
o n d o f ta ll
s p re a d o u t
p e rm a n e n t
h
ig
h above. B
tw il ig h t. B
e n e a th is
ri g a d e e n g
in g a h o le
in e e rs s p e n
th ro u g h th e
t
tw
d o u b le -c a n
o d a y s b la s
d a n g le d o n
opy by exp
tlo n g w ir e s
lo d in g d y n a
b e n e a th th e
T h is c le a re
m
it
e
ir
h o v e ri n g h
d a la n d in g
e li c o p te rs .
p a d fo r b e li
c le a rl y th is
c o p te r h e a
was a spot
rs
e s . Q u it e
w h e re d e a th
e v e n w it h o
c o u ld b e e a
u t b u ri a l.
s il y h id d e n
The Da Ma
i C re e k b e d
th e ra v in e ,
, fo r n e a rl
y ie ld e d s k u
y a h u n d re
d y a rd s u p
ll s , s k e le to
bones. Th
n s a n d p ie c
e dead had
es of huma
b e e n le ft a
a m o n g th e m
n
b o v e g ro u n
, th is m e a
d (f o r th e a
n t th e ir s o
e a rt h fo re v
n
im
is ts
u ls w o u ld w
e r, s in c e s
a n d e r th e lo
u c h is th e
and 20 mon
n
e
fa
ly
te
th s in th e ru
o f th e u n b u
ri e d d e a d ),
n n in g s tr e a
w h it e .
m h a d le ft
b o n e s c le a
n and
L o c a l a u th
o ri ti e s la te
p e rs o n s w h
r re le a s e d
o m th e y s a
a li s t o f 4 2
id h a d b e e n
8 names of
c re e k b e d
p o s ti v e ly id
re m a in s .
e n ti fi e d fr o
The comm
exceSses w
m th e
u n is ts ' ra ti
a s e li m in a ti
o n a le fo r th
o n o f " tr a it
li s t o f 4 2 8
e
ir
o rs to th e
v ic ti m s b re
re v o lu ti o n
aks down a
tw o o ff ic e rs
."
s
The
fo
ll o w s: 2 5 p
, th e r e s t
e rc e n t m il it
N C O 's a n d
s tu d e n ts ; 5
e n li s te d m e
a ry :
0 p e rc e n t c
n ; 2 5 p e rc e
iv il s e rv a n
se rv i: :e p e rs
nt
ts , v il la g e
onnel of va
a n d h a m le t
ri o u s c a te g
o ff ic ia ls ,
o ri e s ,a n d o
rd in a ry w o
T h e fo u rt h
rk e rs .
or Phu Thu
1969, near
S
a lt F la t F in
th e fi sh in g
d s c a m e in
v il la g e o f L
east of Hue
November
u o n g V ie n
, a n o th e r d
s o m e te n m
e s o la te re g
e a rl y in th
il e s
io n . G o v e
e m o n th b e
rn m e n t tr o o
g a n a n in te
re m n a n ts o
ps
n s iv e e ff o rt
f th e lo c a l
to c le a r th
c o m m u n is t
V ie n , p o p u
e
a re a o f
o
rg a n iz a ti o n
la ti o n 7 0 0 ,
. P e o p le o
w h o h a d re
f 'L u o n g
m a in e d s il
e n t in th e p
re s e n c e o f
51
tro op s for 20 mo nth s app are
ntl y fel t sec ure eno ugh fro
m com mu nis t rev eng e to bre ak sil
enc e and lea d off ici als to the
fin d. At
thi s wr itin g, exc ava tio n wo
rk is un der wa y. Ba sed on
de
scr iptio ns fro m vil lag ers wh ose
me mo rie s are not alw ays
cle ar, loc al
off ici als est im ate the nu mb
er of bo die s at Ph u Th u to
be at lea st
300 and po ssi bly 1,0 00 .
Th e sto ry rem ain s un com ple
ted . If the est im ate s by Hu
e
off ici als are eve n app rox im
ate ly co rre ct, ne arl y 2,0 00
peo ple
are sti ll mi ssi ng . Re cap itu
lat ion of the dea d and mi ssi
ng :
Af ter the bat tle , the GV N'
s tot al est im ate d
civ ilia n cas ua ltie s res ult ing
fro m Ba ttle of
Hu e . . . . . . . . .
760 0
Wo und ed (ho spi tal ize d or ou
tpa tie nts ) wi th
inj ure s att rib uta ble to wa rfa
re . • . .
-19 00
sub tot al
570 0
Es tim ate d civ ilia n dea ths
due to acc ide nt
of bat tle • . • . . . . •
• • • . . . •
-94 4
475
6
Fi rst Fin ds- Bo die s dis cov
ere d im me dia tel y
po st- ba ttle , 196 8 . . . .
• • . •
-11 73
sub tot al
358 3
Sec ond Fin ds, inc lud ing San
d Du ne Fin ds,
Ma rch - Jul y, 196 9 (es t.)
.•.•
-80 9
sub tot al
277
4
Th ird Fin d, Da Ma i Cr eek
Fin d (N am Ho a
dis tri ct) Se pte mb er, 196 9
• • • • . •
-42 8
sub
tot
al
234 6
Fo urt h Fin ds- Ph u Th u Sa lt
Fla t Fin d,
No vem ber , 196 9, (es t.) •
...•.
-30 0
sub tot al
204 6
Mi sce lla neo us fin ds du rin g
196 9 (ap pro xim ate )
-10 0'
TO TA L YE T UN AC CO UN TE
D FO R • • . • • •
194 6
(A ma p of the Hu e are a sho
win g loc ati on s of m.a jor bod
y fin ds
is ins ide the bac k co ve r of
thi s m.o nog rap h. )
0
•
•
0
•
•
•
•
52
Communist Rationale
The killing in Hue that added up to the Hue Massacre far
exceeded in numbers any atrocity by the communists previously in South Viet-Nam. The difference was not only one in
degree but one in kind. The character of the terror that
emerges from an examination of Hue is quite distinct from
communist terror acts elsewhere, frequent or brutal as they
may have been. The previously noted objectives for communist
terror (see page 21 ) scarcely fit for Hue. The terror in Hue
was not a morale building act- -the quick blow deep into the
enemy's lair which proves enemy vulnerability and the guerrilla's omnipotence and which is quite different from gunning down
civilians in areas under guerrilla control. Nor was it terror
to advertise the cause. Nor to disorient and psychologically
isolate the individual, since the vast majority of the killings
were done secretly. Nor, beyond the blacklist killings, was it
terror to eliminate opposing forces. Hue did not follow the
pattern of terror to provoke governmental over- response since
it resulted in only what might have been anticipated--government assistance. There were elements of each objective, true,
but none serves to explain the widespread and diverse pattern
of death meted out by the communists.
What is offered here is a hypothesis which will suggest
logic and system behind what appears to be simple, random
slaughter. Before dealing with it, let us consider three facts
which constantly reassert themselves to a HUE? visitor seeking
to discover what exactly happened there and, more importantly, exactly why it happened. All three fly in the face of common sense and contradict to a degree what has been written.
Yet, in talking to all sources--province chief, police chief,
American advisor, eye witness, captured prisoner, hoi chanh
(defector) or those few who miraculously escaped a death scene
- -the three facts emerge again and again.
The first fact, and perhaps the most important, is that
despite contrary appearances virtually nO communist killing
was due to rage, frustration, or panic during the communist
withdrawal at the end. Such explanations are frequently heard,
but they fail to hold up under scrutiny. Quite the contrary, to
trace back any single killing is to discover that almost without
exception it was the result of a decision rational and justifiable
53
in the comrrlUnist mind. In fact, most killings were, from the
communist calculation, imperative.
The second fact is that, as far as can be determined,
virtually all killings were done by local communist caOres and
not by the PAVN troops or Northerners or other outside communists. Some 12, 000 PAVN troops fought the battle of Hue and
killed civilians in the process but this was incidental to their
military effort. Most of the 150 communist civilian cadres
operating within the city were local, that is from the Thua Thien
province area. They were the ones who issued the death orders.
Whether they acted on instructions from higher headquarters
(and the communist organizational system is such that one must
assume they did), and, if so, what exactly those orders were,
no One yet knows for sure.
The third fact is that beyond "example" executions of
prominent "tyrants IT, most of the killings were done secretly
with extraordinary effort made to hide the bodies. Most outsiders have a mental picture of Hue as a place of public executions and prominent mass burial mounds of fresh-turned earth.
Only in the early days were there well-publicized executions
and these were relatively few. The burial sites in the city were
easily discovered because it is difficult to create a graveyard
in a densely populated area without someOne noticing it. All
the other finds were well hidden, all in terrain lending itself
to concealment, probably the reason the sites were chosen in
the first place. A body in the sand dunes is as difficult to find
as a Sea shell pushed deep into a sandy beach over which a wave
has washed. Da Mai Creek is in the remotest part of the province and must have required great exertion by the communists
to lead their victims there. Had not the three hoi chanh led
searchers to the wild uninhabited spot the bodies might well
remain undiscovered to this day. A visit to all sites leaves
one with the impression that the communists made a major
effort to hide their deeds.
The hypothesis offered here connects and fixes in time
the communist assessment of their prospects for staying in Hue
with the kind of death order issued. It seems clear from sifting
evidence that they had no single unchanging assessment with
regard to themselves and their future in Hue, but rather that
changing situations during the course of the battle altered ,their
54
p ro sp ec ts an d
th ei r in te n ti o
n s. It al so se
fr o m th e ev id
em s eq u al ly cl
en ce th at th er
ea r
e w as no si n g
d ea th o rd er s;
le
co m m u n is t po
in st ea d th e ki
li cy on
nd of d ea th o
d u ri n g th e co
rd er is su ed ch
u rs e of th e b at
an
ge
tl e. T he co rr
d
tw o is hi gh an
el at io n b et w ee
d di vi de s in to
n
th
es e
th
re
e
th er ef o re is th
p h as es . T he
at as co m m u n
h y p o th es is
is t p la n s d u ri
ch an ge d so di
n g th e B at tl e
d th e n at u re of
of H ue
th e d ea th o rd
co nc lu si on is
er s is su ed . T
b as ed on o v er
hi s
t co m m u n is t
b y p ri so n er s
st at em en ts , te
la n d h o i ch an
st im o n y
h, ac co u n ts of
d o cu m en ts an
ey e w it n es se s,
d th e in te rn al
ca p tu re d
lo g ic of th e co
m m u n is t si tu at
io n .
H ue : P h as e I
W he n th e co m
m u n is ts w er e
th ei r ca d re s
p re p ar in g th ei
a t th e sa n d ta
r at ta ck on H ue
b le ex er ci se s
,
o ff ic er s th ey
d ee p in th e ju
w ou ld b e in th
ng le to ld
e ci ty se v en da
m es sa g e w as
ys :>nd no m o
p as se d on to
re . A
m o st of th e at
th e b at tl e. It
ta
ck er s on th e
w as st at ed m
eV e of
o
re o r le ss op
n o u n ce m en ts .
en ly in pu bl ic
R ad io H an oi ,
p
ro on F eb ru ar y
sc ri b ed th e at
1 fo r ex am p le
ta ck as an ef fo
,
d ert
"t o re m o v e S
ce rt ai n le v el s,
ai go n p o w er at
ac ce le ra ti n g
th e p ro ce ss of
th e S ai go n ad
d ec o m p o si ti o n
m in is tr at io n .
of
"
{
I,
T hi nk in g in P
h as e I w as w el
ti o n is su ed to
l ex p re ss ed in
ca d re s on th e
a P R P re so lu
ev e of th e of fe
ns iv e:
"B e su re th at
th e li b er at ed
co n so li d at ed .
.• • ci ti es a re
Q ui ck ly ac ti v
su cc es sf u ll y
at e ar m ed an
es ta b li sh ad m
d p o li ti ca l u n
in is tr at iv e o rg
it s,
an s a t al l ec h
(c iv il ia n) d ef en
el o n s, p ro m o
se an d co m b at
te
su p p o rt ac ti v
to es ta b li sh an
it ie s, g et th e
a ir d ef en se sy
pe op le
st em an d g en
to b e re ad y to
er al ly m o ti v at
ac t ag ai n st th
e th em
e en em y w he n
h e co u n te ra tt
ac k s •• . "
T h is w as th e
li m it ed vi ew
S u b se q u en t d ev
at th e st a rt - -h
el d m o m en ta ri
el o p m en ts in
H ue w er e re p
ly .
R ad io H an oi on
o
rt
ed
in d if fe re n t te
F eb ru ar y 4 sa
rm s.
id :
"A ft er on e h o
u r' s fi gh ti ng th
o cc u p ie d th e
e R ev o lu ti o n ar
re si d en ce of
y A rm ed F o rc
th
e
pu
es
H ue ), th e p ri
pp et p ro v in ci
so n an d th e of
al g o v er n o r (i
n
fi
ce s of th e pu pp
T he R ev o lu ti o
et ad m in is tr at
n ar y A rm ed F
io n .. :
o rc es p u n is h ed
th e en em y an
m o st cr u el ag
d se iz ed co n tr
en ts of
o
l
of th e st re e ts
p u n is h ed do ze
•• • ro un de d up
n of cr u el ag en
an d
ts an d ca u se d
th e en em y o rg
an s
55
of control and oppression to crmnble ... "
During the brief stay in Hue, the civilian cadres, accompanied by execution squads, were to round up and execute key
individuals whose elimination would greatly weaken the government's administrative apparatus following communist withdrawal. This was the blacklist period, the time of the drumhead
court. Cadres with lists of names and addresses on clipboards
appeared and called into kangaroo court various "enemies of
the Revolution." Their trials were public, usually in the courtyard of a temporary communist headquarters. The trials lasted
about ten minutes each and there are no known not-guilty verdicts. Punishment, invariably execution, was meted out immediately. Bodies were either hastily buried or turned over to
relatives. Singled out for this treatment were civil servants,
especially those involved in security or police affairs, military
officers and some non-commissioned officers, plus selected
non-official but natural leaders of the community, chiefly
educators and religionists.
With the exception of a particularly venomous attack on
Hue intellectuals, the Phase I pattern was standard operating
procedure for communists in Viet-Nam. It was the sort of
thing that had been going on systematically in the villages for
ten years. Permanent blacklists, prepared by zonal or interzone Party headquarters have long existed for use throughout
the country, whenever an opportunity presents itself. Quite
obviously not all the people named in the lists used in Hue were
liquidated. One meets today a surprisingly large nutnber of people who obviously were listed, who stayed in the city throughout
the battle, but escaped. Throughout the 24-day period the communist cadres were busy hunting down persons on their blacklists, but after a few days their major efforts were turned into
a new channel.
Hue:
Phase II
In the first few days, the Tet offensive affairs progressed
so well for the communists in Hue (although not to the south,
where Party chiefs received
some rather grim evaluations
from cadres in the midst of the offensive in the Mekong Delta)
that for a brief euphoric moment they believed they could hold
the city. Probably the assessment that the communist were, in
56
Hu e to sta y wa s not sha red
at the hig her ech elo ns, but
it wa s
wi des pre ad in Hu e and at
the Th ua Th ien pro vin cia
l lev el. On e
int erc ept ed con un un ist me
ssa ge , app are ntl y wr itte n
Fe bru ary
2, exh ort ed cad res in Hu
e to hol d fas t, dec lar ing :
"A new era ,
a rea l rev olu tio nar y per iod
has beg un (be cau se of ou r
Hu e vic tor ies ) and we nee d onl y
to ma ke sw ift ass au lt (in
Hu
e)
to
sec ure ou r tar ge t and gai
n tot al vic tor y. "
Th e Ha noi off ici al Pa rty pap
er Nh an Da n ech oed the the
me :
"L ike a thu nd erb olt , a gen
era l off ens ive has bee n hu
rle
d
aga
ins
t
the U. S. and the pup pet s •..
Th e U. S. -pu pp et ma chi ne
has bee n
dul y pu nis hed •.• Th e pup pet
adm ini str ati ve org ans ...
ha ve sud den ly col lap sed . Th e Th ieu -K
y adm ini str ati on can not esc
ape fro m
com ple te col lap se. Th e
pup pet tro op s hav e bec om
e ext rem ely
we ak and can no t avo id bei
ng com ple tel y ext erm ina ted
. ,,2
Of co urs e, som e of thi s ver
bia ge is sim ply exh ort ati on
to
the fai thf ul, and , as is alw
ays the cas e in rea din g com
mu
nis
t
out put , it is mo st dif fh ult
to dis tin gu ish bet we en bel
ief and wi sh.
Bu t tes tim on y fro m pri son
ers and hoi cha nh, as we ll
as int ercep ted bat tle me ssa ge s,
ind ica te tha t bot h ran k and
file
and
cad res bel iev ed for a few
day s the y we re per ma nen
tly
in
Hu e,
and the y act ed acc ord ing ly.
Am ong the ir act s wa s to
ext end the dea th ord er and
lau nch
wh at in eff ect wa s a per iod
of soc ial rec on str uct ion ,
com mu nis t
sty le. Or de rs we nt out ,
app are ntl y fro m the pro vin
cia l lev el
of the Pa rty , to rou nd up
wh at On e pri son er ter me d
"so cia l
neg ati ves ," tha t is, tho se
ind ivi dua ls or me mb ers of
gro ups wh o
rep res en ted po ten tia l dan
ger or lia bil ity in the new
soc
ial ord er.
Th is wa s qui te im per son al,
not a bla ck lis t of nam es but
a bla cklis t of titl es and po sit ion s
hel d in the old soc iet y, dir
ect
ed no t
ag ain st peo ple as suc h bu
t ag ain st "so cia l un its . "
As see n ea rli er in No rth
Vi et- Na m and in Co mm un
ist
Ch ina , the com mu nis ts we
re see kin g to bre ak up the
loc
al
soc ial ord er by eli mi nat ing
lea de rs and key fig ure s in
rel igi ou s
org ani zat ion s (Bu ddh ist bo
nze s, Ca tho lic pri est s), po
liti cal
pa rti es (fo ur me mb ers of
the Ce ntr al Co mm itte e of
Vi et- Na m) ,
soc ial mo vem ent s suc h as
wo me n's org ani zat ion s and
you th
gro up s, inc lud ing , wh at oth
erw ise wo uld be tot all y ine
xp
lic abl e,
the exe cut ion of pro - com
mu nis t stu den t lea de rs frO
In
mi
dd le'
and up per cla ss fam ili es.
57
In consonance with this, killing in some instances was
done by family unit. In one well- docUITlented case during this
period a squad with a death order entered the horne of a prominent comITlunity leader and shot hinl, his wife, his married
son and daughter-in-law, his young unITlarried daughter, a
ITlale and feITlale servant and their baby. The faITlily cat was
strangled; the family dog was clubbed to death; the goldfish
scooped out of the fishbowl and tossed on the floor. When the
cOITlrnunists left, no life remained in the house. A "social
unit" had been eliminated. (Appalling though it was, one
stands in that farrlily's living room and, as a parent, thinks
perhaps this was the kindest way, for in Hue one is haunted
by the feeling that bereavement' is worse than death).
Phase II also saw an intensive effort to eliminate
intellectuals, who are perhaps more nUITlerous in Hue than
elsewhere in Viet-Nam. Surviving Hue intellectuals explain
this in terrrlS of a long- standing comrrlUnist hatred of Hue
intellectuals, who were anti-comrrlUnist in the worst or ITlost
insulting ITlanner: they refused to take communism seriously.
Hue intellectuals have always been contemptuous of communist
ideology, brushing it aside as a latecomer to the history of
ideas and not a very significant one at that. Hue, being a
bastion of traditionali sm, with its intellectuals steeped in
Confucian learning intertwined with Buddhisrrl, did not, even
in the fermenting years of the 1920's and 1930's, debate the
merits of corrlmunism. Hue ignored it. The intellectuals in
the university, for example, in a year's course in political
thought dispense with Marxism- Leninism in a half hour
lecture, painting it as a set of shallow barbarian political
slogans with none of the depth and time-tested reality of
Confucian learning, nor any of the splendor and soaring
hUITlanism of Buddhist thought. Since the <;oITlrnunist, especially the communist from Hue, takes his dogma seriously, he
can become demoniac when dismissed by a Confucian as a
philosophic ignoraITlus, or by a Buddhist as a trivial materialist. Or, worse than being dismissed, ignored through the
years. So with the righteousness of a true believer, he sought
to strike back and eliminate this challenge of indifference.
Hue intellectuals now say the hunt-down in their ranks has
taught them a hard lesson, to take communism seriously,
if not as an idea, at least as a force loose in their world.