General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
1
WEEK 1: WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?
Required reading:
Edmund Gettier (1963), ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, Analysis 23: 121–123.
Linda Zagzebski (1994), ‘The Inescapability of Gettier Problems’, Philosophical Quarterly 44: 65–73.
Alvin Goldman (1967), ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, The Journal of Philosophy 64: 357–372.
Essay question: ‘It’s not possible to provide an analysis of knowledge’. Evaluate this claim with
reference to one such attempt.
Further reading:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
Laurence BonJour (1980), ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
5: 53–73. Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology
(OUP 2000).
D. M. Armstrong, ‘The Thermometer Model of Knowledge’, in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary
Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000): 72–85.
Ernest Sosa (1999), ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141–153
Robert Nozick (1981), ‘Knowledge and Skepticism’, in his Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press): 167–185. Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Sosa and
Kim (2000); or 2nd edition, ed. Sosa, Kim, Fantl, and McGrath (2008); and also in Knowledge: Readings
in Contemporary Epistemology, ed. Bernecker and Dretske (2000); and in ed. DeRose and Warfield,
Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (1999): 156–164.
Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, Ch. 1.
Michael Blome-Tillmann (2007), ‘The Folly of Trying to Define Knowledge’, Analysis 67: 214–9.
Stephen Kearns (2007), ‘In Praise of Folly: A Reply to Blome-Tillmann’, Analysis 67: 219–22.
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General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
2
WEEK 2: SCEPTICISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE
Required reading:
René Descartes: Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditation 1).
David Hume: An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Section XII).
G. E. Moore (1939), Proceedings of the British Academy 25: 273–300; reprinted as ‘Proof of an External
World’, in Huemer (ed.) Epistemology: Contemporary Readings (Routledge, 2002), Ch. 9: 602–605. Also in
Moore, Philosophical Papers, (Allen & Unwin, 1959), Ch. 7: 127–150.
Robert Nozick (1981), ‘Knowledge and Skepticism’, in his Philosophical Explanations, pp. 167–185.
Reprinted in Epistemology: An Anthology, 1st edition, ed. Sosa and Kim (2000); or 2nd edition, ed. Sosa,
Kim, Fantl, and McGrath (2008); and also in Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology, ed.
Bernecker and Dretske (2000); and in ed. DeRose and Warfield, Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader
(1999): 156–164.
Essay question: Does Descartes’ evil demon thought experiment show that we do not have
knowledge of the external world?
Further reading:
Laurence BonJour (1980), ‘Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
5, pp. 53–73. Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology
(Oxford: OUP, 2000).
David Lewis (1996), ‘Elusive Knowledge,’ Australian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 549–67.
Barry Stroud (1984), The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
J. Vogel (2014), ‘The Refutation of Skepticism,’ in Sosa, Steup, and Turri (eds.) Contemporary Debates in
Epistemology, (West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons): 108–120.
Timothy Williamson (2000), Knowledge and its Limits, Ch. 8.
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General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
3
WEEK 3: THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
Required reading:
David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sections
IV–V.
Bertrand Russell (1912), The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 6: 93–108.
James van Cleve (1984), ‘Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction’, Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, 9(1), 555–567.
Essay question: Are any of our inductive beliefs justified?
Further reading:
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1, Part III, Section 6.
Wesley Salmon (2008), ‘An Encounter with David Hume’, in Joel Feinberg et al. (eds.), Reason and
Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy, 13th edition (Wadsworth): 245–63. Also in
earlier editions of this volume.
Nelson Goodman (1983), Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 4th edition (Harvard University Press), Chs. 3–4.
Reprinted in Bernecker and Dretske (eds.) Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology (OUP 2000).
Laurence BonJour (1998), In Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge: CUP), Ch. 7.
Sydney Shoemaker (1980), ‘Properties, Causation and Projectibility’, in Cohen and Hesse (eds.),
Applications of Inductive Logic (OUP): 291–312.
P. F. Strawson (1952), Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen), Ch. 9, pp. 233–263.
Karl Popper (1979), Objective Knowledge, revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press), Ch. 1.
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General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
4
WEEK 4: THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Required reading:
David Chalmers (2010), ‘Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness’, in The Character of Consciousness,
(Oxford: OUP), pp. 3–34. Read sections 1–6 only.
Frank Jackson (1982), ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, The Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136.
David Lewis, (1999), ‘What Experience Teaches’, in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), pp. 262-290. Reprinted in ed. Ludlow et al., There’s Something about Mary:
Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
Terence Horgan (1984), ‘Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 34: 147–
52.
Essay question: Is it true that someone could know all physical facts without knowing what it is like to
see red? If so, would physicalism be refuted?
Further reading:
Brie Gertler (2005), ‘The Knowledge Argument’, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, (London: MacMillan).
The paper can also be found online: http://people.virginia.edu/~bg8y/KdgeArgt.doc
‘Qualia: The Knowledge Argument’, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
Brian Loar (1990), ‘Phenomenal States’, Philosophical Perspectives 4: 81–108.
Michael Tye, (1986), ‘The Subjective Qualities of Experience’, Mind 95: 1–17.
Michael Tye (2000), ‘Knowing What It Is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge
Argument’, in his Consciousness, Color, and Content (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Torin Alter (1998), ‘A Limited Defence of the Knowledge Argument’, Philosophical Studies 90: 35–56.
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General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
5
WEEK 5: PERSONAL IDENTITY
Required reading:
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Book II, Chapter XXVII).
Derek Parfit (1984), Reasons and Persons (Oxford: OUP), Ch. 12: 245–80. Reprinted as ‘Why our
identity is not what matters’, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003).
Eric Olson (2003), ‘An Argument for Animalism’, in Martin and Barresi (eds.), Personal Identity,
(Oxford: Blackwell). Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2011).
Essay question: What, if anything, does the possibility of fission tell us about personal identity?
Further reading:
Eric Olson, ‘Personal Identity’, The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Bernard Williams (1970), ‘The Self and the Future’, Philosophical Review 79: pp. 161–180. Reprinted in
Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).
David Lewis (1976), ‘Survival and Identity’, in Rorty, The Identities of Persons, (University of California
Press): 17–40. Reprinted in his Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1 (OUP, 1983): 55–77.
Theodore Sider (2001), Four Dimensionalism (Oxford: OUP): 188–208.
Bernard Williams (1956-7), ‘Personal Identity and Individuation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:
229–252. Reprinted in B. Williams, Problems of the Self (Cambridge: CUP, 1973).
Paul Snowdon (1990), ‘Persons, Animals, and Ourselves’, in Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind
(Oxford: OUP), Ch. 4: 83–107. Reprinted in Crane and Farkas (eds.) Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology
(Oxford: OUP, 2004): 578–596.
Sydney Shoemaker (1970), ‘Persons and their Pasts’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 7(4): 269–85.
Reprinted in Kim, Sosa, and Korman (eds.), Metaphysics: an Anthology, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2011).
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General Philosophy
Tutor: James Openshaw
6
WEEK 6: FREE WILL
Required reading:
David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII.
A. J. Ayer (1954), ‘Freedom and Necessity’, in his Philosophical Essays (London: Macmillan): 271–84.
Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will, 1st edition, (Oxford: OUP, 1982).
Peter van Inwagen (1975), ‘The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism’, Philosophical Studies,
27: pp. 185–99. Reprinted in Watson (ed.), Free Will, 1st edition, (OUP, 1982); and also in Robert
Kane (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002).
Essay question: ‘Every event in the physical world is determined by the laws of nature. Since we
cannot act in a different way than we actually do, free will is an illusion’. Do you agree?
Further reading:
Harry Frankfurt (1969), ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–
839. Reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.) Free Will, 2nd edition (Oxford: OUP, 2002): 167–176.
Roderick Chisholm (1964), ‘Human Freedom and the Self’, reprinted in Gary Watson (ed.), Free Will,
1st and 2nd editions (Oxford: OUP, 2003); and in Robert Kane (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell,
2002).
Jonathan Bennett (1980), ‘Accountability’, in Zak van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects (Oxford:
OUP).