International Journal of Korean History (Vol.17 No.1, Feb.2012)
29
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of
Suzerain-Vassal as Viewed from the Standpoint of
Chosŏn*
1
Mori Mayuko**
Introduction
The Sino-Japanese War was a watershed incident in the history of
modern East Asia.1 Two different orders coexisted in East Asia prior to
the Sino-Japanese War. One was the Sinocentric order centering on the
Qing dynasty and the other was the treaty-based order rooted in
international law. However, the former collapsed after the Sino-Japanese
War and was in effect amalgamated into the latter. In this regard,
attention should be focused on how the suzerain-vassal relationship
between Chosŏn (Joseon) and Qing, which collapsed as a result of the
Sino-Japanese War, was discussed during the outbreak of the SinoJapanese War.
* This article is a modified version of an essay that was presented during a
colloquium <A Reinterpretation of History of Korea and East Asia in 1894; The
Kabo Reforms, the Sino-Japanese War, the Tonghak Peasant Uprising> held by the
Center for Korean History, Korea University and Research Institute for Korean
Studies(RIKS), Korea University on July 9(Saturday), 2011.
This work is supported by the Konosuke Matsushita Memorial Foundation.
** Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Department of Area Studies, The University
of Tokyo(Department of Korean History, Seoul National University)
30
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
The positions of Qing and Japan began to clash in 1882. While Qing
regarded Chosŏn as its tributary state based on the suzerain-vassal
relationship, Japan regarded Chosŏn as a state whose independence had
been made evident by the signing of the Kanghwa (Ganghwa) Treaty of
1876. Having been deprived of some of its other vassal states by the
Western powers, the Qing dynasty recommended that Chosŏn conclude a
treaty with the United States in 1882, a move which Qing perceived as a
means, through the use of the balance of power, to preserve the tributary
relationship. Once the treaty was established, Qing dutifully informed the
United States in a diplomatic note that Chosŏn was its vassal state.2 In
addition, Qing responded to the Imo Mutiny of 1882 by dispatching its
troops to Chosŏn to suppress the military revolt in its capacity as the
suzerain state. Thereafter, in October 1882, it concluded the Regulations
for Maritime and Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing (Ch., Chao
Qing shangmin shuiliu maoyi zhangcheng; 朝淸商民水陸貿易章程), an
agreement that effectively clarified the suzerain-vassal relationship
between the two. The relationship between Chosŏn and Qing started to
change from this point, moving more towards the traditional suzerainvassal relationship 3 than the ruling of a tributary state based on
international law. 4 In this regard, ever mindful of Russia’s southward
expansion, Japan, which did not accept the notion of a tributary
relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, nevertheless pursued a basic
policy of cooperation toward Qing that avoided any mention of the issue
of tributary relations. At the same time, Japan perceived Qing as a
potential rival, and proceeded to engage in a military buildup in
preparation for a future confrontation with Qing over Chosŏn.5 Japan also
raised the notion of a neutral Chosŏn under which a number of countries,
including Qing and Japan, would be responsible for the protection of
Chosŏn, with the intention placing Japan on an equal standing with Qing.
However, this was not implemented amidst the passive attitude of Chosŏn
and the outright refusal by Qing.6
While the international status of Qing in East Asia was greatly
enhanced in the aftermath of the Convention of Tianjin of 1885,
Mori Mayuko
31
established as a response to the Kapsin (Gapsin) Coup of 1884, Japan’s
was degraded. The Convention of Tianjin was based on the equality of
Qing and Japan, and stated that each side should notify the other in
writing whenever an important incident emerged or either Qing or Japan
decided to dispatch its army to Chosŏn. However, the Convention of
Tianjin was followed shortly thereafter by the reaching of a secret
agreement between Chosŏn and Russia (Cho Ro milyak; Jo Ro milyak)
and Great Britain’s occupation of Kŏmun (Geomun) Island. Although the
Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Inoue Kaoru suggested a proposal
for the joint protection of Chosŏn to Li Hongzhang,7 his proposal was
refused by Qing and the status of Japan regressed. In addition, Li
Hongzhang’s successful implementation of negotiations with Russia left
Japan with no other choice but to cede responsibility for the security of
Chosŏn to Qing. Thus, although the Qing-Japan relationship on the
surface appeared to be one between equals in the aftermath of the
Convention of Tianjin of 1885, in actuality Qing occupied a position of
absolute superiority over Japan. In accordance with these international
events, Qing proceeded to increase its degree of interference in Chosŏn.
Qing’s strengthened policy toward Chosŏn after 1885 can be explained
from two standpoints. One is that Qing’s Korean policy exhibited the
characteristics of modern colonial rule. 8 The other is that rather than
subjugation in accordance with international law, Qing’s Korean policy
was rooted in the notion of suzerain-vassal relations. 9 Meanwhile,
Chosŏn’s policy toward Qing can be regarded as an ‘anti-Qing policy’ in
which under the former scenario modernity was the goal, while under the
latter independence, even if this meant independence as a tributary state,
was pursued. Various measures taken by Chosŏn after 1885 illustrate the
anti-Qing course that was undertaken.10 However, Chosŏn never refused
the suzerain rights of Qing. On the other hand, although Japan did not
accept the tributary relationship between Chosŏn and Qing, it temporarily
delayed the holding of discussions on the independence of Chosŏn
because it did not regard the suzerain-vassal issue, which carried the
possibility of starting a war with Qing, as a diplomatic matter. Therefore,
32
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
the balance in international relations in East Asia after 1885 was
maintained up until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War through a
mixture of elements, namely Chosŏn-Qing relations based on the concept
of the independence of a tributary state, the presence of superficially
equal Qing-Japanese relations based on the Convention of Tianjin, and
Chosŏn-Japanese relations that were based on an intentional delay on the
part of the former of the raising of the matter of the former’s
independence. In other words, Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan were able to
preserve the peace by not raising any issues that might upset the delicate
balance between suzerain-tributary relations and the treaty-based system.
The commencement of the collapse of this balance during the process
that led up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War resulted in the notion
of the suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Chosŏn being
outrightly refused in the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. However, Japan
identified the internal reform of Chosŏn rather than the suzerain-vassal
relationship as the justification for the Sino-Japanese War. Given the
importance of the suzerain-vassal relationship to Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan,
why did the Japanese government not identify the suzerain-vassal
relationship as one of the causes of the war? More to the point, how was
the matter of the suzerain-vassal relationship discussed during the process
that led to the outbreak of the war?
The majority of studies that have dealt with the process leading up to
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War have been carried out in Japan.
However, few studies have in fact analyzed the significance of the
suzerain-vassal relationship. Seizaburo Shinobu 11 explained the
relationship between the suzerain-vassal issue and the process leading to
war as follows. He argued that Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu
perceived a conflict with Qing as running the risk of causing frictions
with Great Britain, which accepted the notion of the suzerain-vassal
relationship, at a time when Japan was seeking to modify its treaty with
Great Britain. While Kiyoshi Tabohashi identified the assassination of
Kim Okkyun as the root cause of the Sino-Japanese War, he also made
mention, albeit in a vague manner, of the relationship between the
Mori Mayuko
33
suzerain-vassal issue and the Sino-Japanese War. 12 Although Akira
Nakatsuka perceived the Sino-Japanese War as part of the historic flow
that could be traced back to the first year of the Meiji Era,13 his study
failed to explain how the suzerain-vassal issue influenced the onset of the
Sino-Japanese War. Such an oversight should be seen as the result of the
fact that he explained the war from the sole standpoint of Japan’s national
history of a country. More recent studies have focused on the theory of
unintended war, a notion that runs contrary to that of intentional war.
These studies, which have focused on the actions of politicians such as Itō
Hirobumi and Mutsu Munemitsu, have concluded that the dispatch of the
Japanese army to Chosŏn made in inevitable for Japan to engage in a war
with Qing.14 However, the unintended war theory focused on revealing
the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War in a detailed manner,
thereby exposing the limits of perceiving the relationship between the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the suzerain-vassal issue from a
historical context.
Based on the above mentioned problem, awareness, and existing studies,
the present study examines, with the main focus being on Chosŏn, how
the suzerain-vassal issue was discussed during the process that led up to
the Sino-Japanese War, which resulted in the collapse of the existing
balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan after 1885. The present study
focuses only on events within Chosŏn, and more specifically, the
Japanese Legation in Chosŏn and the Chosŏn government. First, the study
analyzes the responses of the Japanese Legation in order to identify what
position Japan assumed regarding the suzerain-vassal issue during the
process that led to the Sino-Japanese War. Such an approach, namely
separating the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn from the Japanese
government, is intended to facilitate discussion of the differences between
the positions adopted by the two entities.15 Thereafter, given the fact that
one of the causes of the Sino-Japanese War was the Chosŏn government’s
request that, in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship, Qing
dispatch troops to help quell the Tonghak (Donghak) Peasant Uprising,
the study also delves into how the Chosŏn government treated the
34
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
suzerain-vassal relationship during the process that led up to the SinoJapanese War.
In addition, the author of this study in fact majored in modern Korean
history, and in particular that of Chosŏn, and can be regarded as being a
relative outsider in terms of the study of modern Japanese history. To this
end, it is hoped that researchers in the field of Japanese history can
provide me with additional insight regarding the response of Japan.
Japan’s Perception of the Suzerain-vassal Relationship16
The Position of the Japanese Government
On February 14, 1894, Ōtori Keisuke of the Japanese Legation reported
to his superiors that the Qing government intended to dispatch a minister
to attempt to help oversee a political reform process in a Chosŏn where
the fervor for such reform had reached new heights. He went on to add
that the continuation of peace in East Asia would best be ensured by
having Japan cooperate with Qing in implementing internal reforms in
Chosŏn.17 This report, which revolved around Minister Ōtori Keisuke’s
request for Qing-Japan cooperation, saliently exhibits the international
status of Japan in East Asia after 1885. The recipient of this report,
Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu also promoted a policy of
cooperation with Qing. Mutsu Munemitsu avoided implementing any
policy related to the suzerain-vassal issue on the grounds that this could
put Japan at odds with Great Britain at a time when Japan was trying to
bring about the long-cherished national desire since the onset of the Meiji
Era of amending its treaty with Great Britain.18
However, the assassination in China of Kim Okkyun, who had sought
exile in Japan, on March 28 and the subsequent handling of his body
based on the tenets of the suzerain-vassal relationship had the effect of
exacerbating the conflict between Japan and Chosŏn-Qing.19 It was from
this point onwards that Mutsu Munemitsu began to be cognizant of the
Mori Mayuko
35
growing possibility of war with Qing. 20 In addition, using the
assassination of Kim Okkyun as cover, the Japanese media began to
inflame public sentiment as part of its hawkish attitude toward Chosŏn
and Qing.21 As such, the suzerain-vassal issue, which had not been raised
as a problematic diplomatic issue between the three countries since 1885,
was suddenly brought to the forefront.
On June 1, Sugimura Hukashi of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn sent
a telegram to Mutsu Munemitsu in which he informed the latter that the
Tonghak Peasant Army had occupied Chŏnju (Jeonju) and that the
Chosŏn government would petition Qing to dispatch its troops to help
suppress the uprising. 22 Upon reception of this telegram, Mutsu
Munemitsu immediately asked and received permission from the
Japanese Cabinet to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. The dispatch of Japanese
troops to Chosŏn had as its primary goal the protection of the Japanese
Legation and Japanese residents in Chosŏn. However, Prime Minister Itō
Hirobumi was of a different mindset with regards to this matter. Having
been informed in late May that the Chosŏn government was unable to
suppress the Tonghak Peasant Revolt by itself, Itō had in fact decided
before May 31st, that is prior to Qing, to dispatch Japanese troops to
Chosŏn. However, upon hearing the news that the Chosŏn government
would petition Qing to dispatch troops to Chosŏn, Itō determined that
even though it had decided to dispatch its troops before Qing, Japan
should purposefully take a back seat to Qing and allow the former to
proceed first. Eventually, the Japanese government followed Itō’s line of
reasoning.
The Japanese government’s ability to become a secondary actor in this
event was predicated on its reception, as agreed to in the Tianjin
Convention of 1885, of a written document from Qing in which it
informed Japan of its desire to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. However, as
Qing had dispatched its troops in response to a request submitted by the
Chosŏn king, the Japanese government also considered the possibility that
no such written document would be forthcoming. 23 Japan subsequently
received information that the Qing government would in fact send such a
36
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
written document by June 6, thereby removing any doubts which Japan
may have had with regards to Qing’s intentions, but nevertheless
proceeded to dispatch its own troops to Chosŏn. 24 However, attention
should be drawn to the fact that the Japanese government’s course of
action was heavily dependent on Qing’s response. The Japanese
government fully expected that Chosŏn would turn to suzerain Qing when
it failed to suppress the revolt. It also regarded Qing troops’ protection of
foreign residents in Hansŏng (Hanseong; Seoul) as suzerain Qing’s
natural responsibility. 25 On the other hand, the Japanese government
worried that the suzerain-vassal relationship would be used to infringe on
the tenets of the Tianjin Convention. In this case, Japan would have to
interfere in the suzerain-vassal relationship and risk starting a war
between Qing and Japan that would lead to a collapse of the balance
between Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan. The fact that the Japanese government
worried about such things should be seen as a clear sign that Japan had no
intention to start a war with Qing.
Lastly, this study examines the logic behind the Qing government’s
decision to dispatch its troops to Chosŏn and to send Japan written
notification of its intentions. Above all, once it became clear that the
Chosŏn government would request that Qing dispatch troops,
Yuan Shikai determined that Qing, given its status as suzerain within the
suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between Qing and Chosŏn, would
have to oblige by helping its vassal state to quell an internal matter it had
been unable to put down by itself in order to save its own face. 26
Although Qing wielded great influence in East Asia at the time, the three
countries had routinely handled all diplomatic issues in a manner that
avoided the suzerain-vassal relationship, which was perceived as a grey
matter. To this end, Yuan Shikai perceived this matter as an opportunity
to clarify the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between Qing and
Chosŏn once and for all.27 In addition, the combination of the relatively
lower status of Japan at the time and Sugimura
Hukashi’s statement that, “I hope Qing can immediately suppress the
revolt,” left Yuan Shikai feeling rather optimistic that the dispatch of
Mori Mayuko
37
troops to Chosŏn would not negatively impact Qing. 28 Trusting Yuan
Shikai’s assessment of the political situation and the report containing
similar contents submitted by Qing ambassador to Japan, Wang Fengzao,
Li Hongzhang decided to dispatch troops to Chosŏn. The dispatch of
Qing troops to Chosŏn would inevitably have the effect of bringing the
issue of the Tianjin Convention to the surface. However, because it
perceived the dispatch of Qing troops to Chosŏn as being based on the
suzerain-vassal relationship, Qing realistically believed, as it mulled over
the format and method through which it should convey its written
confirmation of its intentions to Japan, that such an action would not run
contrary to the Tianjin Convention.
The written confirmation of Qing’s intentions prepared in accordance
with the tenets of the Tianjin Convention by Li Hongzhang was conveyed
to the Japanese Government on June 6. In this diplomatic note, Qing
essentially informed Japan that its dispatch of troops to Chosŏn was being
undertaken in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship that
existed between the two. 29 Although the Japanese government initially
requested that Qing modify the contents of this diplomatic note, it did not
push this matter again in order to avoid making an issue of the suzerainvassal relationship.30 However, the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn, which
opposed the position of the Japanese government, intended to use the
matter of this diplomatic note of intentions to induce war with China.
The Position of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn
A comparison of the attitudes of the Japanese government and the
Japanese Legation in Chosŏn regarding the suzerain-vassal issue reveals
that while the Japanese government attempted to perceive the issue based
on the standpoint of global history, the Japanese Legation viewed the
matter solely from the standpoint of Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan. Thus, the
emergence of differences of opinions between the two parties over the
suzerain-vassal issue was in many ways inevitable. Nevertheless, the
38
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
Japanese Legation was a subordinate of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,
which could not act independently of the decisions of Foreign Minister
Mutsu Munemitsu and Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi. However, the
emergence of problems pertaining to the conveying of information
occasioned by the disruption of the telegram system and the discretionary
power granted to Minister Ōtori Keisuke of the Japanese Legation during
the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War allowed the Japanese
Legation to implement an independent policy.31
Rumors that Qing would dispatch troops to Chosŏn began to spread at a
time when Minister Ōtori Keisuke was on his way back to Chosŏn from
vacation and Sugimura Hukashi served as the acting Minister of the
Japanese Legation. Sugimura Hukashi was a diplomat who was so well
versed in the internal affairs of Chosŏn that Mutsu Munemitsu once said
about him, “As he worked in Chosŏn for several years and had thorough
knowledge about the national affairs of Chosŏn, the government fully
trusted his report.”32 Thus, the Japanese government trusted Sugimura Hukashi
inherently.33
The second son of the lower samurai clan Morioka, Sugimura Hukashi34
was born on February 16, 1848. Having worked for the Yokohama
mainichi shinbun (Yokohama Daily Newspaper) as a reporter responsible
for Chosŏn related issues, he arrived in Chosŏn in April 1880 after having
been recommended by the Minister of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn,
Hanabusa Yoshimoto. At first, he worked in Pusan (Busan) as a
goyōgakari (officer in charge of special tasks). Thereafter, he worked in
the Foreign Ministry’s Bureau of Commerce and Industry before being
relocated to Seoul in April 1882. After working in posts such as that of
Vice Consul (October 1882), he was appointed to posts in Inch΄ŏn
(Incheon; December 1882) and Pusan (June 1883) before being placed in
charge of the handling of the aftermath of the Kapsin Coup in Hansŏng at
the end of March 1885. He was then appointed as the Secretary to the
Legation in March 1886 before being dispatched to Vancouver, Canada
(late 1889-early 1890) as Consul. In the autumn of 1891, he was
appointed to the post of First Secretary in Hansŏng. It was while he
Mori Mayuko
39
served as the acting Minister of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn that the
first shots of the Sino-Japanese War were fired.35 Sugimura Hukashi was
a man from a humble family who had been a reporter with an interest in
Chosŏn and became to be deeply involved in intricate matters related to
the country after he met Hanabusa Yoshimoto. The following can be
regarded as the key points of his career that should be highlighted. First,
he worked in Chosŏn from the very initial moments of the Japanese
Legation there. Second, he worked not only in Hansŏng, but also in local
areas such as Inch΄ŏn and Pusan. Third, he witnessed firsthand important
historical incidents such as the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup.
Little is known about Hanabusa Yoshimoto’s perception of Chosŏn.
However, given that he was a member of the Japanese Foreign Ministry,
we can thus surmise that his perception of Chosŏn was not very different
from that of the Japanese government’s when it comes to Chosŏn policy.
Although Japan sought to maintain a balance between Chosŏn, Qing, and
Japan for a time, it eventually wanted to use the theory of Chosŏn’s
independence to secure Japanese hegemony in Chosŏn. This is evidenced
by the document sent to Mutsu Munemitsu on May 22 in which he asked
Mutsu’s opinion regarding the dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn. He
described the reasons for the dispatch of Japanese troops as being, “to
protect the Japanese people living in Chosŏn and to maintain the balance
between Japan and Qing in Chosŏn.”36 In addition, while he did not think
about the possibility of war with Qing over this matter, he nevertheless
desired that Japan restore its status in Chosŏn and acquire equal status
with Qing.
Realizing that the situation of Chosŏn was a complex one, I set out
to use this situation to achieve all our ends in Chosŏn. . . . My goals
at the time were to restore the status of Japan in Chosŏn, to achieve
an equal status with Qing, and to reform the internal affairs of
Chosŏn. I never anticipated that this would lead to the waging of the
decisive battle for hegemony in Chosŏn in the form of the onset of
the Sino-Japanese War.37
40
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
The use of expressions such as restore and equal status with Qing can
be explained by the fact that the influence of Japan had been on the
decline since 1885. As the Japanese government regarded this situation as
being a temporary one and fully intended to confront Qing over Chosŏn
in the future, his three goals can be seen as having inevitably involved a
confrontation with Qing. To this end, we can conclude that his goals in
fact extended to the onset of a war with Qing through the raising of the
suzerain-vassal issue.
Upon his return to Chosŏn on June 10, Minister Ōtori Keisuke received
a directive from the Japanese government ordering him to search for a
peaceful resolution to the crisis. He thereafter initiated and successfully
concluded negotiations with Yuan Shikai over the simultaneous
withdrawal of troops from Chosŏn. However, the Japanese Legation,
including Hanabusa Yoshimoto, opposed this decision. Senior Legation
officials such as Motono Ichirō and Matsui Keishiro held a secret
conference during which they decided, “We need to find a way to rupture
the negotiations over the simultaneous withdrawal of Japanese and Qing
troops. Japan should use the present opportunity to determine the matter
of the independence of Chosŏn, even if this means having to go to a war
with Qing.” This line of reasoning was subsequently conveyed to Minister
Ōtori Keisuke. 38 Here, attention should be paid to the fact that the
suzerain-vassal issue was raised. While Ōtori Keisuke responded to these
entreaties by asserting the need to resolve the political situation in a
peaceful manner, Hanabusa Yoshimoto asserted that Japan should force a
conclusion to the matter that was based on military power and the theory
of Chosŏn independence if Qing refused the simultaneous withdrawal of
troops. Hanabusa Yoshimoto’s efforts eventually resulted in Minister
Ōtori Keisuke leaning toward war.39 Here again, special note should be
taken of the fact that Hanabusa Yoshimoto openly referred to the
suzerain-vassal issue.
Having accepted the opinions of the officials from the Japanese
Legation, Minister Ōtori Keisuke suggested that the Japanese government
use the suzerain-vassal issue as an excuse to initiate a war with Qing on
Mori Mayuko
41
June 17. 40 As this official letter only arrived in Japan on June 26, the
Japanese Legation naturally had not received any instructions from the
Japanese government as of this point in time. However, Minister Ōtori
Keisuke nevertheless discussed the suzerain-vassal issue with Yuan
Shikai on that very day.41 In addition, on June 26, Consul Uchida also
submitted an opinion piece to the Japanese government in which he
argued that Japan should support Chosŏn’s independence and criticized
the notion of Qing’s suzerain rights over Chosŏn.42 On June 27, Minister
Ōtori Keisuke sent a plan which called for the raising of the suzerainvassal issue and the urging of internal reform to the Chosŏn government
to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. 43 In short, by adopting a basic
policy that revolved around the raising of the suzerain-vassal issue, the
Japanese Legation in effect advocated the advent of war with Qing.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government adopted a different position. The
Japanese government sought to avoid the suzerain-vassal issue
developing into a political matter for the following reasons. Raising the
suzerain-vassal issue as the foundation for a diplomatic dispute could be
regarded as the stirring up of long-accepted facts. In addition, Japan’s
starting of a war over this issue could potentially provide the Western
powers with an opportunity to blame Japan for having sought to reopen
an old wound in order to start a dispute. 44 Thus, on June 27 the
government responded to the official letter sent by Minister Ōtori Keisuke
by instructing its people to only raise the issue of the internal reform of
Chosŏn and forego any mention of the suzerain-vassal issue.45 Here we
can see that while the Japanese government had in fact decided to start a
war, its justification for doing so was the pursuit of the internal reform of
Chosŏn. However, Russian involvement in the attempts to regulate the
conflict caused the Japanese government to abandon the plan to start a
war altogether on June 30. The Japanese Legation, which had received a
directive to cease moving ahead with the plan, openly disregarded the
instructions it had been given. The Japanese Legation dispatched one of
its officials Motono Ichirō along with Lieutenant Colonel Yasumasa
Fukushima to Tokyo to garner support for war with Qing. The opinions of
42
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
the Japanese Legation, as conveyed by Motono Ichirō, revolved around
the fact that the suzerain-vassal issue lay at the very heart of any effort to
implement internal reform in Chosŏn.46 Thus, we can once again see that
the Japanese Legation intended to bring about war by raising the suzerainvassal issue.
Having ruled out the possibility of Russian or British interference, the
Japanese government finally reached a decision on going to war on July
12. The Japanese government instructed the Japanese Legation of its
intention to start a war with Qing. However, it rejected the position
advocated by Minister Ōtori Keisuke and made no directives regarding
Chosŏn policy. The Japanese Legation received contrasting directives in
the form of a secret order sent by Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu on
July 19, which stated, “The most pressing task of our time is the
incitement of a clash between Japan and Qing. Take any actions
necessary to see this task through.”47 The following day it also received
an order proscribing any occupation of the royal palace.48 Desiring to start
a war with Qing, the Japanese Legation decided to adhere solely to the
secret order of July 19 and proceeded with the occupation of
Kyŏngbokkung (Gyeongbokgung). Upon being informed about the
occupation of Kyŏngbokkung, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu sent a
telegram to Ōtori Keisuke in which he listed the reasons that should be
given for the taking of such action and the plan for the future.49 Hidenao
Takahashi has pointed out that this series of events resulted from the
Japanese government’s loss of control over the Japanese Legation and the
latter’s taking of independent measures based on its discretionary
power.50 What is in fact being inferred when we discuss the independence
of the Japanese Legation? The occupation of Kyŏngbokkung was carried
out on the grounds that the Chosŏn government had failed to adequately
respond to two inquiries sent by the Japanese Legation. One of these two
inquiries was related to the suzerain-vassal relationship.51 In other words,
the Japanese Legation had proceeded to initiate war by raising the
suzerain-vassal issue, something that the Japanese government had
steadfastly been opposed to doing.
Mori Mayuko
43
On July 23, a battle erupted in Chosŏn over Japan’s occupation of
Kyŏngbokkung. Then, on July 25, 1894, the Japanese and Qing navies
clashed in the Battle of P’ungdo (Pungdo; Ch., Fengtao). On July 31, the
Japanese government informed the Western powers about the onset of
war with Qing. It officially proclaimed war with Qing on August 2, 1894.
Perceptions of the Chosŏn Government
Although the Sino-Japanese War emerged in Chosŏn and was about
Chosŏn, existing studies have focused on the conflict between Qing and
Japan, while by and large ignoring the position of Chosŏn.52 The Chosŏn
government’s request that Qing suppress the Tonghak Peasant Uprising
based on the suzerain-vassal relationship provided the spark that ignited
the Sino-Japanese War. The attitude that the Chosŏn government adopted
toward the suzerain-vassal relationship thereafter remains by and large
unclear. Let us now examine how the Chosŏn government implemented
its foreign policy during the period spanning from the stationing of Qing
and Japanese military troops in Chosŏn to the occupation of
Kyŏngbokkung.
The Use of the Suzerain-vassal Relationship
One such policy approach was to make active use of the suzerain-vassal
relationship. As mentioned above, the Chosŏn government intended to
use its suzerain-vassal relationship with Qing to suppress the Tonghak
Peasant Uprising. However, the Chosŏn government continued to try to
make use of this relationship even during the period that led up to the
actual onset of the Sino-Japanese War in order to resist Japan. This was
carried out by submitting a request for Qing to dispatch additional troops
made through Chu Jin tongni (駐津督理; Ju Jin tongni; Ambassador to
Qing)53 in Tianjin.54
44
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
Chu Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang,55 left for Tianjin on July 6.56 Upon his
arrival, Yi received three telegrams from the Governor of P΄yŏngan
(Pyeongan) province, Min Pyŏngsŏk, on July 29.57 The first was related to
the Japanese army’s desire to learn more about Qing intentions, the
dispatch of 2000 Qing troops to Chosŏn, and questions about when Yuan
Shikai, who had left Chosŏn on July 19, would return to Chosŏn. The
second telegram was related to the protection of P΄yŏngyang from a
Japanese attack. The last message reported on the arrival of the first of the
2000 Qing troops and the shortage of food in P΄yŏngyang. On the same
day he received this telegram, Yi Myŏnsang sent a message to Sheng
Xuanhuai requesting the dispatch of Qing troops to Ŭiju (Euiju). 58 Yi
exchanged written conversations with Sheng Xuanhuai regarding the
additional dispatch of Qing troops on July 30th.59 Here, it should be noted
that Yi emphasized the suzerain-vassal relationship as the basis for his
request for the dispatch of Qing troops in his written conversations with
Sheng Xuanhuai.60
As no materials remain, the answers Sheng Xuanhuai gave to Yi
Myŏnsang during these written conversations are unknown. However,
looking at the telegram that Yi Myŏnsang sent to Min Pyŏngsŏk on July
29 or 30,61 one can see that an attempt was made to convey the political
situation in Qing. “I (Yi Myŏnsang) have heard that Li Hongzhang
ordered Qing troops to advance to Chosŏn and the latter should soon
arrive in P΄yŏngyang,” and “although the exact period has yet to be
determined, Yuan Shikai will promptly leave for Chosŏn.” To this end,
we can surmise that such information had been passed on to Yi Myŏnsang
by Sheng Xuanhuai.
Next, although there are no exact dates, Min Pyŏngsŏk sent a telegram
to Yi Myŏnsang at the end of July62 in which he notified the latter that
Japanese troops had advanced from Inch΄ŏn to Hansŏng and occupied
Kyŏngbokkung, and requested an immediate dispatch of Qing troops. Yi
Myŏnsang responded by urging Sheng Xuanhuai to dispatch Qing troops
to P΄yŏngyang. They also engaged in conversations about other matters.63
In addition, during this same period, Yi Myŏnsang also included a request
Mori Mayuko
45
that Sheng Xuanhuai dispatch Qing troops in the diplomatic box64 that he
sent, which included the news that a secret envoy acting as a
representative of the king had come to visit.65 Although doubts can be
raised as to the reliability of this information, the possibility that the king
of Chosŏn dispatched a secret envoy to Tianjin in order to request the
support of Qing after the Japanese occupation of Kyŏngbokkung cannot
be overlooked. However, contrary to Japan, which was on the rise, the
situation in Qing was an increasingly difficult one. Growing increasingly
nervous, Yi Myŏnsang once again engaged in an exchange of written
notes with Sheng Xuanhuai on August 1 in which he requested the
dispatch of additional troops. Yi also used expressions that emphasized
the suzerain-vassal relationship.66
As such, a closer look at the documents of the Chu Jin tongni reveals
that while the Governor of P΄yŏngan Province, Min Pyŏngsŏk, conveyed
the political situation in Chosŏn to Chu Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang, the
latter discussed these matters with Sheng Xuanhuai of the Tianjin
Customs Office. In other words, during the initial stages of the SinoJapanese War, an information conveyance structure based on the
suzerain-vassal relationship and which ran from the Governor of
P΄yŏngan province to Chu Jin tongni and the Tianjin Customs Office (and
Li Hongzhang), was firmly in place. The Chosŏn government’s operation
of this line of communication was designed to obtain the support of Qing.
This fact is also evidenced by a look at the records of the Japanese
Legation in Chosŏn: “The Chosŏn government intends to dispatch Chu
Jin tongni, Yi Myŏnsang, to Tianjin in order to secure the dispatch of
troops through negotiations with the Qing government.”67
The Use of the Treaty System
The other foreign policy approach employed by the Chosŏn
government was the active use of the treaty system. Shortly after the
arrival of the two countries militaries in Chosŏn, the Chosŏn government
began to call for their withdrawal68 and requested the mediation of the
46
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
Western powers based on its treaty relationships. In other words, the
Chosŏn government sought to ensure the withdrawal of Qing and
Japanese troops and to avoid conflict through the mediation of the
Western powers.
On June 18, the Office for General Control of Diplomatic and
Commercial Affairs (T’ongni kyosŏp t’ongsang samu amun; T’ongni
gyoseop t’ongsang samu amun) let it be known to the ministers and
consuls of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Russia, and France
that the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had been suppressed.69 In a note sent
to the representatives of the Western powers on June 24, Chosŏn
criticized the fact that both countries’ troops remained in Chosŏn despite
the fact that the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had been suppressed and
requested mediation to bring about the withdrawal of both militaries.70
Here attention should be drawn to the fact that Chosŏn requested the
mediation of the Western powers based on the notion of ‘good offices’71
that had been included in its treaties with the Western powers. In short,
the Chosŏn government sought to use the treaty system to forge ahead
with the withdrawal of the militaries of Qing and Japan from Chosŏn. In
addition, attention should also be paid to the fact that Chosŏn criticized
the Japanese troops stationed in Chosŏn on the grounds that it violated
international law. In other words, while Chosŏn implored Qing to
dispatch its troops by emphasizing the suzerain-vassal relationship, its
requests for mediation by the Western powers was based on treaties and
international law as an independent state. Here, we can see that the
Chosŏn government’s foreign policy during the process that led up to the
Sino-Japanese War was not very different from what it had previously
been.
The representatives of the United States, Russia, France, and Great
Britain sent a jointly signed note to convey the Chosŏn government’s
opinions to Yuan Shikai and Ōtori Keisuke.72 However, Yuan Shikai and
Ōtori Keisuke replied that the current situation rendered the withdrawal of
their respective military troops difficult. 73 The king requested the
mediation of the representatives of the Western powers in Hansŏng. As
Mori Mayuko
47
the Minister of the French Legation reported to his government, the
representatives of the Western powers did not possess the necessary
qualifications to successfully see through such mediation. Such mediation
should be conducted by governments.74 In reality, as the governments of
the Western powers had already started to mediate between the Qing and
Japanese governments, it became futile for ministers and consuls in
Hansŏng to try and mediate between them.75
However, the Chosŏn government treated the United States differently.
While it sent out the note to all the Western powers, Chosŏn sent a
separate request for mediation to the United States. Previous studies have
explained the Chosŏn government’s decision to single out the United
States for assistance as having been based on the close relationship that
existed between the Chosŏn government and the American Legation.76 On
July 5, the Chosŏn government sent a directive to the Ambassador to the
United States, Yi Sŭngsu, to directly request the U.S. President’s
mediation of the issue of Japanese troops.77 This directive included two
documents.78 One was a telegram sent to Yi Sŭngsu titled, “The Palace,”
on June 28, which contents were similar to those found in the note sent
out on June 24. The other implored the ambassador to request that the U.S.
government instruct the Qing, Japanese, and American Legations in
Chosŏn to make efforts to bring about the withdrawal of the Qing and
Japanese troops. However, as the U.S. government had adopted a
favorable attitude toward Japan, it did not actively consider this request
for mediation.79
Li Hongzhang received Yuan Shikai’s report regarding the request for
mediation submitted by the Chosŏn government to the Western powers
and conveyed it to the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen (總理各國事務衙門,
Office in Charge of Affairs of All Nations). Having received no specific
instructions from the Zongli Geguo Shiwu Yamen, Li Hongzhang decided
to accept Yuan Shikai’s conclusions regarding matters related to
mediation.80 Thus, the issue of mediation did not impact Qing’s policy.
Meanwhile, no historical materials pertaining to the matter of whether the
Japanese Legation reported the issue of mediation to the Japanese
48
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
government have been uncovered yet. However, there are records
showing that the American and Russian Legations in Japan conveyed this
matter to the Japanese government.81 In addition, the Russian Legation in
Japan also conveyed the Chosŏn government’s request for mediation to
Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. 82 However, as the Japanese
government had already subjected itself to mediation attempts by Great
Britain and Russia, there was no further reason for Japan to consider
changing its policy because of mediation. The matter of the possible
interference by Western powers having been settled, the Japanese
government subsequently proceeded to occupy Kyŏngbokkung, with the
Japanese Legation at the forefront of this movement, and wage war on
Qing.
The occupation of Kyŏngbokkung came at a time when the Chosŏn
government was still seeking to use the treaty system to avoid the
outbreak of war between Qing and Japan. The Chosŏn government
criticized Japan’s actions right after the Japan’s occupation of
Kyŏngbokkung and, based on the treaties it had signed with Western
powers, petitioned the ministers and consuls of the United States, Russia,
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to initiate mediation so as to
avoid war.83 This note, which was essentially the same as the note of June
24, was also prepared based on the mediation (good offices) clause found
in the treaties with the Western powers. However, because Western
powers had already attempted to mediate the conflict, this particular
request for mediation failed to achieve any results.
Thus, during the process that led up to the Sino-Japanese War, the
Chosŏn government sought to avoid war in Chosŏn by using both the
suzerain-vassal relationship as well as the treaty-based system. In other
words, rather than using either the suzerain-vassal relationship or treatybased system, the Chosŏn government set out to maintain a balance
between these two different orders. Here, one cannot overlook the fact
that the Chosŏn government’s use of the treaty-based system was
motivated by the mediation clauses that were included in its treaties with
the Western powers. While the Chosŏn government had great
Mori Mayuko
49
expectations regarding this clause, mediation was regarded by the
Western powers as nothing more than an empty provision. 84 The
measures taken by the Chosŏn government during the period that
immediately preceded the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War were
exactly the same as those it undertook during the Kapsin Coup that
occurred ten years before. At that time, it also did not receive any
effective mediation from the Western powers. 85 In short, the Chosŏn
government developed an identical foreign policy that revolved around
misplaced importance on this clause even though over ten years had
passed since it had first been incorporated into the treaty system. As far as
the Chosŏn government’s use of the treaty system is concerned, it is
necessary to further analyze this matter from the standpoint of Chosŏn. In
other words, rather than an evaluation based solely on the modernization
of diplomacy, consideration should also be given to the fact that it also
made active use of the suzerain-vassal relationship.
Conclusion
Chosŏn, Qing, and Japan’s hesitance to discuss the suzerain-vassal
issue in the aftermath of the Tianjin Convention of 1885 helped to
maintain the balance of power in East Asia. The process that led up to the
Sino-Japanese War can be perceived as one in which this balance of
power collapsed. Although the suzerain-vassal issue was in fact raised in
Japan after the assassination of Kim Okkyun, the Japanese government
actually used the matter of the internal reform of Chosŏn as its excuse to
wage war, not the suzerain-vassal issue. The Japanese government
determined that the suzerain-vassal issue was not only an ancient matter,
but also a weak reason to go to war. The fact that the suzerain-vassal issue
was not used as the excuse for the Japanese government to start the war
with Qing shows that Japan’s priority was to secure hegemony in East
Asia, with the intention of resolving the suzerain-vassal issue later. 86
However, the Japanese Legation desired to start a war with Qing by
50
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
raising the suzerain-vassal issue. The disruption of communication
networks made it such that the Japanese government and Japanese
Legation could not iron out their differences of opinions. Consequently,
the Japanese government could not submit any clear instructions
regarding its Chosŏn policy at a time when war with Qing was looming.
Using the discretionary power vested in the Minister of the Japanese
Legation, the Japanese Legation proceeded to raise the suzerain-vassal
issue as a cover for its occupation of Kyŏngbokkung.
During the process that led to the Sino-Japanese War, the Chosŏn
government sought to maintain the existing order based on the suzerainvassal relationship and the treaty-based system. After the arrival of Qing
and Japanese troops in Chosŏn, the Chosŏn government used the line of
communication that ran from the Governor of P΄yŏngan Province to Chu
Jin tongni and the Tianjin Customs Office (and Li Hongzhang) to petition
Qing for help. Here, the fact that Chu Jin tongni emphasized the suzerainvassal relationship in his request to Qing for the dispatch of additional
troops cannot be ignored. On the other hand, the Chosŏn government also
tried to use the mediation clause found in its treaties with Western powers
to get their representatives in Hansŏng to mediate the withdrawal of
foreign troops from Chosŏn. Two separate requests for mediation were
made, namely immediately after the stationing of Qing and Japanese
troops in Chosŏn and Japan’s occupation of Kyŏngbokkung. However, as
the governments of the Western powers had already started mediation
between Qing and Japan, mediation through the representatives of the
Western powers in Chosŏn failed to have an impact on the main parties’
decisions. Nevertheless, the Chosŏn government’s intention to maintain
the suzerain-vassal relationship and treaty-based system prior to the actual
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War can be construed to mean that
Chosŏn’s foreign policy cannot solely be seen as having been based on
the modern construct called the modernization of diplomacy.
Mori Mayuko
51
Notes :
1 Takashi Okamoto, Zokukuni to jishu no aida (Between tributary and
independence) (Nagoya Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2004).
2 Song Pyŏnggi, Kŭndae Han Chung kwan΄gyesa yŏn΄gu (Modern History of
Korea-China Relations) (Seoul: Tandae Ch’ulp’anbu, 1985); Kwŏn Sŏkbong,
Ch΄ŏngmal tae Chosŏn chŏngch΄aeksa yŏn΄gu (The history of Qing policies
towards Chosŏn during the final period of Qing) (Seoul: Ilchogak,1986).
3 Kim Chongwŏn, “Cho Ch΄ŏng sangmin suryuk muyŏk changjŏng ŭi ch΄egyŏl
kwa kŭ yŏnghyang (The conclusion of the Regulations for Maritime and
Overland Trade Between Chosŏn and Qing) in Chosŏn hugi taeoe kwan΄gye
yŏn΄gu (The foreign relations of late Chosŏn), eds. Kim Chongwŏn and Yi
Yangja (Seoul: Hanul, 2009).
4 Toshio Motegi, “Li Hongzhang no zokukuni shihaikan”(Li Hongzhang’s
perceptions of ruling vassal states), Chūgoku-Shakai to bunkai (June 1987).
5 Moriyama Shigenori, “Ni Shin sensōteki no Nihon gunbu no tsui Chō seisaku”
(The Korean policy of the Japanese military at the time of the Sino-Japanese
War), Doku kyō hōgaku 43 (March 1996).
6 Naoko Hasegawa, “Jingo gun ran ato no Nihon no Chōsen chūritsuka kōsō
(Japan’s concept of Chosŏn neutrality after the Imo Munity of 1882,” in
Senshi kenkyūkai ronbun syū 32 (October 1994); Hiroaki Osawa, “Chōsen
eisei chūritsuka kōsō to kindai Nihon gaikō” (The concept of the permanent
neutrality of Chosŏn and modern Japanese foreign policy), Shin kyū
gakushutsu ronshū 12 (March 1998); Takashi Okamoto, “Chōsen chūritsuka
kōsō no ichikōsatsu” (A study on the concept of Korean neutrality), Rakuhoku
shigaku 8 (June 2006).
7 Moriyama Shigenori, Kindai Ni Chō kankeishi kenkyū (Modern History of
Japan-Korea Relations) (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1987), 13;
Hiroaki Osawa, 217.
8 Ku Sŏnhŭi, Han΄guk kŭndae tae Ch΄ŏng chŏngch΄aeksa yŏn΄gu (The history
of Qing policy in modern Korea) (Seoul: Hyean, 1999); Kirk W. Larsen,
Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 18501910 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).
9 Takashi Okamoto..
52
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
10 Yŏn Kapsu, Kojong dae chŏngch΄i pyŏndong yŏn΄gu (Political change during
the reign of King Kojong) (Seoul: Ilchisa, 2008); Han Ch΄ŏlho, Han ΄ guk
kŭndae Kaehwap΄a wa t΄ongch΄i kigu yŏn΄gu (The Enlightenment Party and
governmental organizations in modern Korea). Sŏnin, 2009).
11 Seizaburo Shinobu, Ni Shin sensō (The Sino-Japanese War) (Fukuda Shobō,
1934).
12 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, Ni Shin sen ato gaikōshi no kenkyū (A diplomatic history
of the Sino-Japanese War) (Toyo Bunko, 1951). On page 563 of this source, it
states that the first edition of this book was released in March 1940. An
enlarged and augmented edition was released in October 1944.
13 Akira Nakatsuka, Ni Shin sensō no kenkyū (A study on the Sino-Japanese
War) (Aoki Shoten, 1968).
14 Hiyama Yukio, “Itō naigaku no Chōsen shuppai jiken ni tsuite, I II” (The Itō
cabinet’s dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn, 1 and 2), Chū Kyō Hogaku
18, #1-3 (1984); “Chōsen shuppai jiken to kagai hahei hei taisei no keisei”
(The dispatch of Japanese troops to Chosŏn and the structure of the dispatch
of Japanese troops abroad) Chū Kyō Hogaku 18, #4 (1984); “Dai ichiji Chōsen
hahei jiken ni tsuite 1” (The first dispatch of troops to Korea 1), Chū Kyō
Hogaku 20, #3-4 and 21, #1-2 (1986-1987); Hidenao Takahashi, Ni Shin sensō
he no dō (The road to the Sino-Japanese War) (Sōgensha, 1995).
15 Ku Sŏnhŭi dealt with the issue of the vassal state during the process that led
up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In this regard, Ku identified
Minister Ōtori Keisuke as the main actor for Japan. See Ku Sŏnhŭi, “Ch΄ŏng Il
chŏnjaeng ŭi ŭimi” (The implications of the Sino-Japanese War), Han΄guk kŭn
hyŏndaesa yŏn΄gu 37 (Summer 2006). However, the Japanese government and
the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn were of a different mindset regarding the
suzerain-vassal issue at the time. The two parties were unable to iron out their
differences over this issue because their lines of communication were in fact
temporarily severed. Thus, the suzerain-vassal issue should be discussed in a
manner that involves a clear separation of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn
from the Japanese government.
16 The Sino-Japanese War was the first modern international war that Japan
experienced. During the war, Japan was able to establish a nation-state by
mobilizing its people around the emperor. Hiyama Yukio, Ni Shin sensō to
Nihon (The Sino-Japanese War and Japan); Tō Ajia kindaishi kagukai, ed., Ni
Mori Mayuko
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
53
Shin sensō to Tō Ajia sekai no henyō I (The Sino-Japanese War and changes in
East Asia, I) (Yumani Shobō, 1997).
As various factors are involved in the outbreak of a war, any discussion of this
issue that is limited to the actions of the main actors runs the risk of
simplifying what is in essence in a complex process. However, as this study
seeks to analyze the discussions over the suzerain-vassal issue during the
process that led to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, it does in fact limit
itself to the role of the main diplomatic actors.
Michio Fujimura, Ni Shin sensō (The Sino-Japanese War) (Iwanami Shoten,
1973), 44.
Seizaburo Shinobu, 98.
Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 98.
Kawamura Kazuo, Ni Shin sensō to Mutsu gaikō (The Sino-Japanese War and
Mutsu Diplomacy), Gunji shigaku 112 (December1992).
Mizuno Kobayashi, “Ni Shin sensō kaisen zenya shisō jōkyō” (The logic
behind a justification of the Sino-Japanese War), Aoyama Gakuin Joshi Tanki
Daigaku Kiyō 64 (December 2010).
For a more vivid description of the process leading up to the Sino-Japanese
War, please refer to Hidenao Takahashi, section II, chapters one and two.
Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku (騫騫錄) (Iwanami Shoten, 1894), 32-36.
For more on the process through which Japan decided to dispatch its troops to
Chosŏn, please refer to Hidenao Takahashi, 320-328.
Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 87.
Tae Tongyang, “Kabo Chung Il chŏnjaeng kigan Ch΄ŏng chŏngbu ŭi tae Il
chŏngch΄aek (The Qing government’s Japan policy during the Sino-Japanese
War), in Ch ΄ ŏngil chŏnjaeng ki Han · Chung · Il samguk ŭi sangho chŏllyak
(Seoul: Tongbuka Yŏksa Chaedan, 2009), 258.
Sugimura Hukashi, Meiji niju shichi hachinen zaikan kushinroku (Yukisha,
1932), 4.
Ibid. See also, Tae Tongyang, 260.
Gaimushō, ed., Nihon Gaikō Bunsho: Meiji 27 nen 2 (Japanese Foreign Policy
Documents: Meiji year 27, vol. 2) (Tōkyō: Gennandō, 1953), Document 518.
Tae Tongyang, 267-268.
Hidenao Takahashi, 315-316. 378. 386.
Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 23. The first edition of Foreign Ministry
described Sugimura Hukashi’s personality as one that was profound and
54
33
34
35
36
37
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
accurate. (Ibid., 376) While there are no materials related to any direct
relationship between Mutsu Munemitsu and Sugimura Hukashi, the fact that
Okamoto Ryunosuke, who was from the same hometown as Mutsu
Munemitsu and was a personal representative of the latter (Kiyoshi Tabohashi,
182), frequently visited the Japanese Legation at the time raises the possibility
that the two of them had in fact established a relationship through Okamoto
Ryunosuke. For more on Okamoto Ryunosuke, please refer to Seizaburo
Shinobu, 124-126, 138, 448-449, 466-467.
Kiyoshi Tabohashi also pointed out that the opinions of Sugimura Hukashi,
who had thorough knowledge of the situation of Chosŏn, wielded great
influence not only within the Japanese Legation but also the Japanese Foreign
Ministry. Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 95-96.
Materials related to Sugimura Hukashi include his own Niju shichi hachinen
zaikan kushinroku (明治廿七八年在韓苦心錄) and Sugimura nikki (Sugimura’s
diary) found in Sunaga Bunko (須永元文庫), a work housed in the Sano Folk
Museum in Tochigi Prefecture. Sugimura’s diary consists of memos regarding
the assassination of Queen Min and diary entries dated from April 1882 to
September 1885. Each diary entry generally consisted of approximately one
line pertaining to his health, the weather, the entry of ships and vessels, and
banquets. His grandson, Fukushima Shingo retyped these diary entries and
added explanations. The incidents of 1882 and 1884 as well as the
assassination of Queen Min are in Sugimura’s diary in “Jingo kōsin Min hi
jiken kanren no Sugimura nikken,” (The incidents of 1882 and 1884 as well as
the assassination of Queen Min in Sugimura’s Diary), Senshu Shigaku 22
(April 1990).
Upon his return to Japan on October 30, 1895, Sugimura Hukashi was
confined in Hiroshima Prison for his role in the assassination of Queen Min.
He was subsequently released and appointed to the post of administrative
official within the Government-General of Taiwan (April 1896), Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry within the Foreign Ministry (June
1899), and the Minister for Brazil (April 1905). He died in Brazil on May 19,
1906. “Jingo kōsin Min hi jiken kanren no Sugimura nikken,” (The incidents
of 1882 and 1884 as well as the assassination of Queen Min in Sugimura’s
Diary), Senshu Shigaku 22 (March 1989), 53-54.
Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 497.
Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 12-13.
Mori Mayuko
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
55
Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 14.
Hanabusa Yoshimoto, 13-16.; Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 130-131.
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 559.
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 378.
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 379.
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Document 384.
Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 129-133; Hidenao Takahashi, 404.
Nihon Gaikō Bunsho, Documents 382 and 385.
Hidenao Takahashi, 423.
Akira Nakatsuka, Kenkenroku, 136. Hidenao Takahashi pointed out that this
secret order was an arbitrary action on the part of Foreign Minister Mutsu
Munemitsu that ignored the general opinions of the Japanese government.
Hidenao Takahashi, 472-475.
Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu wanted to occupy the palace but the
Cabinet was opposed to this move. Hidenao Takahashi, 427-431.
Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 420.
Hidenao Takahashi, 439-440.
Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Document 422.
Attention should be drawn to the fact that Pak Chonggŭn dealt with the
occupation of Kyŏngbokkung and the assassination of Queen Min in a manner
that focused on the relationship between the Sino-Japanese War and Chosŏn.
However, the concept of the independence of Chosŏn advocated by Pak was
one that encompassed only the anti-Japanese or anti-imperialist movements.
Pak did not accept the independence of the enlightenment forces that
implemented reforms of the existing Chosŏn government as well as the Kabo
Reforms. Pak Chonggŭn, Ni Shin sensō to Chōsen (The Sino-Japanese War
and Chosŏn) (Aoki Shoten, 1982).
In this regard, Ŏm Ch΄anho identified the response of the Chosŏn government
during the process that led up to the onset of the Sino-Japanese War as one
that involved measures such as the Chosŏn government’s request to Qing for
the dispatch of troops and the request to both Qing and Japan that they
withdraw their troops. He also identified Japan’s response as one that revolved
around the pushing through of internal reforms and the reaching of a
consensus on the waging of war. However, Ŏm did not make any mention of
either the suzerain-vassal relationship or the treaty-based system dealt with in
this study. Ŏm Ch΄anho, “Ch΄ŏng Il chŏnjaeng e taehan Chosŏn ŭi taeŭng”
56
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
(The Chosŏn government’s response to the Sino-Japanese War), Han Il kwan΄
gyesa yŏn΄gu 25 (2006).
In accordance with the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade Between
Chosŏn and Qing (朝淸商民水陸貿易章程) reached in 1882, the position of
Chu Jin tonggni (駐津督理) was changed to that of Chu Jin taewŏn (駐津大員).
For more on the Chu Jin taewŏn and Chu Jin tonggni, please refer to Han Ch΄
ŏlho, “Han΄guk kŭndae Chu Jin taewŏn ŭi p΄agyŏn kwa unyŏng (1883-1894)”
(The dispatch and management of Chujin taewŏn in modern Korea: 18831894), Tonghak yŏn΄gu 23 (2007); Kwŏn Hyŏksu, Kŭndae Han Chung kwan΄
gyesa ŭi chaejomyŏng (Revisiting the history of China-Korean relations in the
modern era) (Seoul: Hyean, 2007). However, the author of the present study is
now in the process of preparing a study that involves a standpoint different to
the one employed in these studies.
This is evidenced by various records included in the Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An
(Records of Sheng Xuanhuai) written by a member of the Tianjin Customs
Office named Sheng Xuanhuai, which is currently housed in the Shanghai
Library. The Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An included the documents exchanged
with the Korean Legation in Tianjin called the Chosŏn sangsŏham
chŏllokchon (朝鮮商署函電錄存). As such, one can find the letters and notes
exchanged between the Chu Jin tongni, acting Chu Jin tongni, Sheng
Xuanhuai, and the Governor of P ΄ yŏngan Province. However, in many
instances, the spoken instructions of Sheng Xuanhuai were not included in the
notes and letters that were exchanged. This study referred to the Jiawu Zhong
Ri zhanzheng II (The Sino-Japanese War of 1894), which is a printed version
of the Sheng Xuanhuai Dang An.
Yi Myŏngsang served as Chu Jin tongni from March 7 to August 28, 1893 and
June 13, 1894 to May 3, 1895.
Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso, ed., T΄ongsŏ ilgi ( 統署日記 ) III
(Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1972-), June 3 of the 31st year of
King Kojong; Koryŏ Taehakkyo Asea Munje Yŏn’guso, ed., Ku Han ΄ guk
oegyo kwan ΄ gye pusok munsŏ 5 (Documents related to the international
relations of old Korea, vol. 5) (Seoul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch’ulp’anbu, 1972).
hen Xulu, Jiawu Zhong Ri Zhanzheng II (The Sino-Japanese War of 1894)
(Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1892), 484-489.
Ibid., 92.
Ibid., 92-94.
Mori Mayuko
57
60 天朝之体恤敞邦, 視同內服, 深仁厚澤, 淪洽東土, 今三百有年矣. 且小邦服
事之城, 亦可以昭日星而貫金石矣. 今若倭夷敢抗大邦, 先自藩籬而入, 其
宅心傾詐, 至凶絶潜, 此天下臣民之所共憤, 非獨朝鮮一國之憤恨也. 幷此
諒燭. Ibid., 93-94.
61 Ibid., 485.
62 Ibid., 485.
63 Ibid., 485-486.
64 Ibid., 487-490. The date is recorded as the “end of July.”
65 今有敝邦近密臣奉寡君命, 變服隨英人搭輪到津 (ibid. 489 (10)).
66 閣下俯怜也, 且保東即保上國也, 如無朝鮮, 殆同撤藩籬離而缺唇齒, 開門
塀而防賊人也, 幷此諒燭. Ibid., 486.
67 Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed., Chu Han Ilbon kongsagwan kirok I
(Records of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn, vol. 1) (Seoul: Kuksa
P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 1987), 108, 410.
68 Ŏm Ch΄anho, 298-305.
69 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (May 15 of the 31st year of King Kojong); Ku Han΄guk oegyo
munsŏ: Mi an 2 (June 18, 1894; no. 1255); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng
an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 1029); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1 (June 18,
1894; no. 1409); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Ŏ an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 589);
and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an (June 18, 1894; no. 577).
70 T΄ongsŏ ilgi (May 21 of the 31st year of King Kojong); The notes sent out to
the Western powers were changed from “寔與万國公法違背” to “實與万國
公法違背” and from “請按條約, 從中設法善爲調處” to “應請從中設法, 善
爲調處.”
Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 2 (June 18, 1894; no. 1257); Ku Han΄guk
oegyo munsŏ: Yŏng an 1 (June 18, 1894; no. 1031); Ku Han ΄ guk oegyo
munsŏ: Tok an (June 18, 1894; no. 1411); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Ŏ an 1
(June 18, 1894; no. 590); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an 1 (June 18, 1894;
no. 558); and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: I an (June 18, 1894; no. 48).
71 若他國有何不公輕藐之事, 一經照知, 必修相助, 從中善爲調處, 以示友誼
關切. While the actual expressions are somewhat different for each country,
the U.S.-Chosŏn Treaty was referred to in this study because the main
contents are similar. Ch ΄ oe Tŏksu, Choyak ŭro pon Han ΄ guk kŭndaesa
(Modern Korean history as viewed through treaties) (Seoul: Yŏllin Ch’aek Tŭl,
2010), 779.
58
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
72 See appendix one, inclosure one in number 16 from Foreign Relations of the
United States (1895; reprint, NY: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1968). See also,
Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, ed. P’ŭrangsŭ oemubu munsŏ: Chosŏn, 18931894, 6 (French foreign affairs documents, 1893-1894, vol. 6) (Seoul: Kuksa
P’yŏnch’an Wiwŏnhoe, 2007), 77. The king requested that the representatives
of the Western powers mediate the withdrawal of the military troops of Qing
and Japan.
Annex 2, 167-168. In terms of the representatives of the Western powers in
Hansŏng, attention should be drawn to the fact that they held meetings to
determine whether the Japanese Legation’s request regarding military action at
Inch΄ŏn Port was acceptable. During these meetings, which were held on July
7, 10, and 16, the Consul General of Great Britain called for the neutralization
of Inch΄ŏn port, a denouement which was disadvantageous to Japan. However,
as Russia was opposed to this proposal, the neutralization of Inch΄ŏn Port was
consequently not accepted. T΄ongsŏ ilgi (June 3-5, 8, 14 of the 31st year of
King Kojong); Kikuchi Kenzo, Chōsen Ōkoku (Chosŏn dynasty) (Minyusha,
1896), 425-426.
73 Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, No.18; Kenneth Bourne
and D. Cameron Watt, ed., British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Series E,
Asia, Vol. 4 (University Publications of America, 1989), Doc. 308-Doc. 313;
French Documents on Foreign Affairs 6, Annex 3 and Annex 4, 168-170.
74 French Documents on Foreign Affairs 6, 165-166.
75 For more on the mediation of the Western powers, please refer to Kiyoshi
Tabohashi, 189-265;
Guan Jie, “Kōgo Chū Ni sensōki no Tō Ajia no kokusai kankei” (The SinoJapanese War of 1894 and East Asian relations), in Ni Shin sensō to Tō Ajia
sekai no henyō I, ed. Tō Ajia kindaishi kagukai (Yumani Shobō, 1997).
76 Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 245. Kiyoshi Tabohashi claimed that the Chosŏn
government’s action of sending a note to the Western powers on June 24 was
undertaken based on the recommendation of American Minister to Chosŏn,
John M. B. Sill, to ensure that no one would complain when they discovered
that the United States would mediate between Qing and Japan. However, he
did not suggest any grounds for this assertion (Kiyoshi Tabohashi, 247). John
M. B. Sill actually responded to the request of the Chosŏn government and
attempted to mediate the withdrawal of Qing and Japanese troops. (Ku Han΄
guk oegyo munsŏ: Mi an 2 (July 3, 1894; no. 1259.) The close relationship
Mori Mayuko
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
59
between the United States and Chosŏn can be explained by the fact that the
United States supported the independence of Chosŏn from the beginning of
the establishment of its legation and that the United States occupied the
presidency of the foreign representatives in Hansŏng. Son Chŏngsuk, “Han΄
guk kŭndae chu Han Miguk kongsa yŏn ΄ gu: 1883-1905” (The American
Legation in modern Korea: 1883-1905), Han΄guk sahak (2005).
Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, No. 20.
Foreign Relations of the United States, Appendix 1, Inclosure 1 in No. 20.
Guan Jie, 116.
Li Hongzhang quanzhi (Collected writings of Li Hongzhang) (Shanghai:
Shanghai Remin Chubanshe, 1986), 726-727.
Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, Documents 628 and 633.
Kuksa P’yŏnch’an Wiwonhoe, ed., Chu Han Ilbon gongsagwan kirok 4 (The
Records of the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn 4 (Seoul: Kuksa P’yŏnch’an
Wiwonhoe, 1987) 559-560.
T΄ongsŏ ilgi (June 21 of the 31st year of King Kojong). Among the notes sent
to the Western powers, the following can be identified: Ku Han΄guk oegyo
munsŏ: Ŏ an 1 (July 23, 1894; no. 596); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Pŏp an 1
(July 23, 1894; no. 562); and Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1 (July 23,
1894; no. 1413).
Katsumi Watanabe, Sen Bi Shūkō Tsūshō Jōyaku Kōshōshi (History of the
Korea-U.S. Treaty of 1882 Negotiations) (Tokodo Shoten. 1941);
Nagata Akihumi, Seodoa Rūzuberuto to Chōgoku (Theodore Roosevelt and
Korea) (Miraisha1992).
T΄ongsŏ ilgi (October 19 of the 21st year of King Kojong); Ku Han΄guk oegyo
munsŏ: Mi an 1 (December 6, 1884; no. 123); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ:
Yŏng an 1 (December 6, 1884; no. 136); Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ: Tok an 1
(December 6, 1884; no. 51).
Although no distinct responses of the Western powers regarding this request
have been uncovered, a note written by the British consul to the Chosŏn
government stating that the mediation should be conducted by the government
rather than ministers or consuls has been found. (Ku Han΄guk oegyo munsŏ:
Yŏng an 1 (December 25, 1884; no. 147.) The Chosŏn government’s direct
request to the U.S. government for mediation may be based on this reply.
The Japanese government did not accept the suzerain-vassal relationship.
However, the signing of the Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade
60
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
Between Chosŏn and Qing (朝淸商民水陸貿易章程) in 1882 based on the
suzerain-vassal relationship had the effect of bringing about a balance of
power between Chosŏn and Japan. See Han Sŭnghun, Ilbon e taehan kwanse
chajugwŏn hoebok ŭl sido hada (Attempt to recover customs independence
from Japan), and Ch΄oe Tŏksu, 135. Here, we can see that while the Japanese
government refused the suzerain-vassal relationship, it nevertheless used this
unique relationship to its own advantage. During the process that led to the
Sino-Japanese War, Japan regarded its hegemony in East Asia as being more
important than the abandonment of the suzerain-vassal relationship. However,
this position should be regarded as one that is entirely rooted in Chosŏn
history. It is hoped that researchers in the field of Japanese history will be able
to shed some light on how Japan actually perceived the securing of hegemony
in East Asia and the abandonment of the suzerain-vassal relationship.
2
Submission Date: 2011.12.12
Accepted: 2012.1.20
Completion Date of Review: 2012.1.19
61
Mori Mayuko
<Abstract>
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue
of Suzerain-Vassal as Viewed from the Standpoint of
Chosŏn
Mori Mayuko
The Sino-Japanese War was a watershed incident in the history of modern East
Asia. Two different orders coexisted in East Asia prior to the Sino-Japanese War.
One was the Sinocentric order centering on the Qing dynasty and the other was
the treaty-based order rooted in international law. However, the former collapsed
after the Sino-Japanese War and was in effect amalgamated into the latter. In this
regard, attention should be focused on how the suzerain-vassal relationship
between Chosŏn (Joseon) and Qing, which collapsed as a result of the SinoJapanese War, was discussed during the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This
study analyzes this issue from the standpoint of Chosŏn. The present study
focuses only on events within Chosŏn. To be more specific, the present study
focuses on the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn and the Chosŏn government.
Although the Convention of Tianjin reached in 1885 outwardly expressed the
equality of Qing and Japan, Japan experienced a slight lowering of its status.
Meanwhile Qing saw its international status within East Asia heightened after
1885. Buoyed by its enhanced standing, Qing proceeded to strengthen its
interference in the internal affairs of Chosŏn. Chosŏn responded to this by
implementing a foreign policy that was based on the notion of its independence in
its capacity as an independent vassal state. For its part, Japan refused to accept the
suzerain-vassal relationship between Qing and Chosŏn. However, as its priority
was to amend the unequal treaty with Great Britain, it did not want to create a
conflict with Qing by openly questioning the suzerain-vassal relationship. As such,
62
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
Japan could not overtly put an end to the talk about independence that was taking
place within Chosŏn. The international order in East Asia after 1885 was one in
which a balance was maintained through the interaction of factors such as QingChosŏn relations that were based on the independence of the vassal state, the
superficially equal Qing-Japan relations stipulated by the Convention of Tianjin of
1885, and Chosŏn-Japan relations that resulted in the delaying of the
independence of Chosŏn, prior to the Sino-Japanese War.
However, the assassination of Kim Okkyun and the dispatch of the Qing army
to Chosŏn to suppress the Tonghak (Donghak) Peasant Uprising in 1894 had the
effect of spurring the Japanese government to lean toward war. Weary of the
Western powers, the Japanese government avoided mentioning the suzerainvassal issue during the process that led up to the outbreak of the war, and instead
highlighted the fact that its focus was on internal reform within Chosŏn.
Meanwhile, the Japanese Legation in Chosŏn sought to induce war by raising the
suzerain-vassal issue and highlighting the independence of Chosŏn. However, the
disruption of their communication networks ensured that the Japanese government
and Japanese Legation could not air out the differences in their respective
positions. Eventually, the Japanese Legation fired the proverbial shot that led to
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War by proceeding to use the discretionary
rights it had been granted by the Japanese government as its cover to occupy the
royal palace.
This study also analyzes the Chosŏn government’s responses during the same
period. The Sino-Japanese War was set off by the Chosŏn government’s request
that, in accordance with the suzerain-vassal relationship that existed between the
two, Qing dispatch troops in order to quell the Tonghak Peasant Uprising. In
accordance with the tenets of the Convention of Tianjin, Japan responded to
Qing’s dispatch of troops to Chosŏn by sending in its own troops. The two armies
continued to be stationed in Chosŏn even after the Tonghak Peasant Uprising had
been suppressed. Desiring to induce the support of Qing based on the suzerainvassal relationship, the Chosŏn government opened a line of communication that
ran from the Governor of P　yŏngan (Pyeongyang) province to the Ambassador
to Qing and the Tianjin Customs (and Li Hongzhang). At the same time, based on
the articles pertaining to intervention found in the treaties it had signed with the
Mori Mayuko
63
Western powers, the Chosŏn government implored the representatives of both
countries to withdraw their troops from Chosŏn. But, the Chosŏn government’s
attempts failed to prevent the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. However, the
Chosŏn government’s desire to maintain the dual international order composed of
suzerain-vassal relations and the treaty-based system right shortly before the
outbreak of the war implies that Chosŏn’s foreign policy cannot be understood
solely from the standpoint of the modernization of diplomacy.
Keywords: Sino-Japanese War, suzerain-vassal relations, treaty-based system, Chosŏn
government, Japanese government, Japanese Legation in Chosŏn
64
The Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Issue of Suzerain-Vassal as ~
<국문초록>
조선에서 바라본 청일전쟁 개전 과정과 종속문제
모리 마유코 (도쿄대학 총합문화연구과 지역문화연구전공 박사과정·
서울대학교 인문대학 국사학과 박사수료)
청일전쟁은 동아시아 근대사의 분수령이 된 사건이다. 청일전쟁 이전의 동아시아
에는 청조를 중심으로 한 중화질서와 국제법을 기반으로 한 조약체제의 두 가지 질서
가 공존했는데, 전쟁 이후에는 전자가 붕괴되고 후자로 일원화되었던 것이다. 따라서
청일전쟁의 결과 무너진 朝鮮과 淸朝의 宗屬關係가 개전 과정에서 어떻게 논의되었
는지를 밝히는 것은 중요하다. 본고는 이 문제를 조선에 주목하여 분석한 논문이다.
여기서 조선이라 함은 지리적인 관점을 의미하여 구체적으로는 駐朝鮮 日本公使館과
조선정부에 초점을 맞추었다.
1885년의 天津條約에서는 표면적으로는 청과 일본의 평등성이 표명되었지만,
1885년 이후의 동아시아 정세에서 청조가 국제적인 지위를 높여갔던 반면에 일본의
지위는 상대적으로 낮아졌다. 청조는 이러한 국제관계를 배경으로 조선에 대한 간섭
을 강화하였는데, 이에 대해 조선은 ‘屬國自主’의 ‘自主’를 바탕으로 대외정책을 전개
하였다. 일본은 朝淸의 종속관계를 인정하지 않았지만 영국과의 불평등조약 개정을
우선하였기 때문에 종속문제를 거론함으로써 유발되는 청조와의 대립을 원하지 않았
고, 따라서 조선독립에 대한 논의도 끝낼 수 없었다. 이에 1885년 이후의 동아시아 국
제질서는 ‘屬國自主’가 拮抗하는 朝淸關係와 天津條約에 의해 표면상 대등한 淸日關
係, 그리고 독립론을 보류한 朝日關係가 뒤섞여 균형을 이룬 채 청일전쟁 전까지 유
지되었다.
그러나 1894년에 김옥균 암살과 동학농민운동에 대한 청조의 출병이 이어지면서
일본정부는 점차 청일개전으로 기울어졌다. 다만 일본정부는 구미열강의 눈을 의식
하여 개전 과정에서 종속문제를 거론하는 것을 기피하고, 대신에 조선내정개혁을 그
명분으로 삼았다. 한편 駐朝鮮 日本公使館은 조선의 독립을 명확하게 하기 위해 종속
문제를 거론함으로써 개전으로 유도해가고자 하였다. 그러나 일본정부와 공사관은
통신망의 불통으로 이러한 입장 차이에 대해 충분히 상의할 수 없었다. 결국 공사관
Mori Mayuko
65
이 정부에서 부여된 재량권을 바탕으로 왕궁점거를 단행하여 청일 개전의 단서를 열
었다.
다음으로 같은 시기의 조선정부의 대응을 살펴보았다. 청일전쟁의 원인은 조선정
부가 동학농민운동에 대해 종속관계에 기탁하여 청조에 원병을 요청한 데에 있다. 청
병의 출병으로 인해 天津조약에 따라 일본군도 조선에 출병하였고, 동학농민운동이
수습된 후에도 청일 양군은 그대로 조선에 주둔하였다. 이에 대해 조선정부는 일본군
을 철병시키고자 종속관계에 의거하여 ‘平安道監司―駐津督理―天津海關道(-李鴻
章)’라는 정보 전달 라인을 가동하고 청조의 원조를 이끌어내고자 하였다. 동시에 조
선정부는 구미열강과 체결한 조약 중의 居中調整 조문을 활용하여 駐朝鮮 각국 대표
에게 청일 양군의 철병을 조정해줄 것을 요청하였다. 조선정부의 이러한 시도는 청일
개전을 막는 데에 큰 영향을 미치지 못했다. 하지만 개전 직전에 조선정부가 종속관
계와 조약체제의 두 가지 질서를 유지하고자 한 것은 조선의 대외정책을 외교의 근대
화라는 근대성만으로는 이해할 수 없을 것임을 시사한다.
키워드: 청일전쟁, 종속관계, 조약체제, 조선정부, 일본정부, 駐朝鮮 日本公使館