Taking Sides and Constructing Identities: Reflections on Conflict Theory
Author(s): Günther Schlee
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp.
135-156
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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TAKING
SIDES
AND
IDENTITIES:
CONSTRUCTING
REFLECTIONS
CONFLICT
ON
THEORY
GtJNTHER SCHLEE
Max
Planck Institute for Social Anthropology,
Halle/Saale
Conflicts are often explained in terms of the interests of the groups involved, especially
their competition for resources or gains. There is much merit in this approach. Theories
of this type appear more realistic than those which take the legitimizing accounts of participants at face value. What people are fighting about is a fundamental question in conflict analysis, but there is another equally fundamental question that remains poorly
understood, namely, who is fighting whom and why? How and why do people draw the
distinction between friend and foe precisely where they do?
Many social scientists offer theories of conflict which focus on that which is
in other words the resources that contending
contested,
parties fight about.
Without
the
of
these
resource-orientated,
economically
denying
importance
from
the
or ecologically
focus
I
the
wish
to
shift
theories,
objects to
inspired
the subjects of violent conflict. My concern is 'who fights whom?'This
ques?
tion may sound very basic, even too simple to be of much scholarly interest.
conflicts in which it is
But as anthropologists
we come across many violent
not at all easy to describe
the criteria by which friend and foe are distinabout who they
offer different explanations
guished and in which participants
them from their enemies.
So,
are, what unites them, and what distinguishes
we lack
empirically, this is not at all an easy question to answer. Furthermore,
the theoretical
tools to address this issue. Despite the extensive work of anthro?
of alliance, faction, and
both recently and in the past on questions
pologists
in our under?
there are still critical deficiencies
political boundary-making,
standing of the ways in which people in specific conflict situations may make
To put
and break alliances and which patterns of identification
they follow
trouble
the matter more simply, in the contemporary
world's innumerable
about who is likely to gang up with whom
spots any observer s predictions
of
So the question
and against whom
can be highly inexact or inaccurate.
how such identifications
work and what the reasons behind them might be
is far from trivial.
One
issues are so rarely addressed.
ask why
these
might
important
at hand for those who are
There seem to be only two possible approaches
in conflict situations: either
concerned
with the issue of group identification
? Royal Anthropological Institute 2004.
J. Roy. anthrop.Inst. (N.S.) 10, 135-156
136
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
or an approach
a form of cost-benefit
by economists,
analysis as favoured
Those
on social
and their cognitive
structures
representations.
focusing
involved
are generally very different kinds of thinkers. What I seek to show
these two
in this article is that much clarity can be gained by combining
perspectives
systematically.
When one asks how and why people take sides in violent conflicts one can
and categories.
expect two types of reason. The first has to do with concepts
and others tends to be systeThe way in which people
classify themselves
structure will prevail. Wishing
matic in nature; a certain logic and plausibility
to be or not to be something
is not enough; one also needs a plausible claim
to an identity or a plausible reason for rejecting it. If plausible alternatives are
of others
lacking, one might be forced by ones own logic and the expectations
to join the fight on a given side. The other type of reason concerns the advanand such deci?
that may arise from such identifications
tages and disadvantages
sions to take sides, in other words, from the costs and benefits of taking sides.
It is to be expected
that the two types of reason will overlap and interpenetrate. Where there is room for identity work ? that is, room for people rea?
can be expected
them ? categories
soning about their identities and changing
to be replaced or stretched to fit the needs of actors. These needs often have
to do with the size of a group or alliance: one either seeks a wider alliance
or tries to keep others out, in order to exclude them from sharing in certain
benefits.
rather than reasons. Decisions
one may look at consequences
Alternatively,
as well as
to take sides have consequences
for those who make the decision
those who do not. In the case of the latter, others make the decision for them
or the decisions
of others affect them. Unintended
may, of
consequences
course, affect later decisions.
or inclusionist
In exploring
the issue of how group size relates to exclusivist
of my basic theory of group
identification
strategies, I begin with an overview
of
in the recruitment
size. I then consider the rhetorical
strategies deployed
allies in a perspective
which is inspired by action theory. Next, I turn to the
I then return to
and inclusion.
tool kit of discourses on exclusion
conceptual
cause of identity politics,
economic
reasoning, often taken as the underlying
and of politics in general. A theory which attributes primacy to free decisions
is
in a somewhat
extreme
fashion, Elwert s analysis of 'markets of violence',
the
steer
deci?
critically discussed, and the extent to which social structures
is emphasized.
sions of even the apparently most arbitrary power-holders
My
and sociologiof
economic
central concern
then is to show a new synthesis
to be dealt
cal perspectives,
rather than leaving the two types of reasoning
with little
and
little
with by two different types of thinkers who communicate
success.
A
size
theory
of
identification
in
For the sake of clarity, I present
these
questions
schematic
three
interconnected
of
which
consists
framework,
B, and C.
the
form
components:
of
a
A,
GUNTHER
A.
Social
structures
the semantic fields
and their cognitive
of identity
SCHLEE
137
representations:
concepts
Like an object in space, the location
of which is identified
by giving certain
values in three different dimensions,
takes place by ascribsocial identification
Such dimensions
ing certain values to different dimensions.
may be language
Farsi, Finnish, and so on), religion
(with the values
and
so
of
identification
or
various
Baptist, Buddhist,
on),
appealtypes
of descent. The identity concepts found in these
ing to descent or metaphors
different domains, for example
or religious
names of languages
ethnonyms,
are
are
not
fields.
isolated
semantic
words
but
form
communities,
They
of
taxonomies
and
with
each
defmed
contrasts
and
parts
by
equivalences
other.
Social identities
cannot be made up at will, because they have to be plausible to others. The range within which identities
can be changed or manipulated is limited both by the systemic logic of these semantic
domains
and
social
convention.
by
(with
B.
the values
The politics
French,
Baha'i,
of size:
inclusion
and exclusion
Within
to the
the range of options of identification,
has to be paid
special attention
size of the groups or categories
con?
defmed by alternative
identity
within the same dimencepts. One can opt for wider or narrower identities
sion (for instance, within the linguistic
one can put the emphasis
dimension
on Pan-Slavism
the religious
or, more narrowly, on being a Croat; within
dimension
one can identify with Christianity
or with just one
as a whole
small elect sect, and so on) or one can change from one dimension
to another
based ethno-nationalism
to a religious identifica?
(that is, from a linguistically
tion, if the latter offers the wider alliance, or excludes
people one wants to
keep out).1
On the level of larger groups and their interactions,
only some members
of these groups actively engage in identity discourses.
Fewer still are virtuosi
in identity manipulation,
of group
who succeed in the widening
or narrowing
or
has
to disalliances intentionally.
One therefore
memberships
inter-group
between
and those who are affected
tinguish
people who change identities
by these changes.
C.
The economics
of group
size
Narrower
and wider identifications
have to be analysed in terms of costs and
benefits for those who make decisions
about them and for those who are
affected by such decisions. A wide alliance may be useful in obtaining
certain
benefits, but narrower definitions
might be preferred when it comes to sharing
these same benefits.2 Costs and benefits may be unintended
of
consequences
identifications
or they might be the reasons for them (in other words, the
between
C and B needs to be examined).
relationship
138
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
A to B to C, but
In this article I do not proceed
in this order sequence
develop my discussion with reference to texts and case histories which might
and which also
require that more than one level be addressed simultaneously
raise additional
One of these might well be how to assess gains
questions.
and losses if the units of reference
are groups of people whose composition
thrust of the latter part of the article is to argue against overemchanges.3The
for forms
as an explanation
phasizing the freedom of rational decision-making
of recruitment.
(which stress level C), it will be argued
Against such positions
within
that one has to take into account
the place of the decision-makers
fields within which
(level B) and the logic of the semantic
given identities
they operate (level A). These might restrict their options.
The
necessity
for
strategies
of
inclusion
and
exclusion
to Machiavelli
1975, 2: para. 8), there are two types
(Discourses
According
new
of the ruler to dominate
of war. The one is fired by the ambitions
total
other
areas, the other is fought by entire populations
populations
against
when
a whole people, with all its families, leaves a place, driven thence either by famine or
by war, and sets out to look for a new home and a new country in which to live.
In this case it does not, as in the previous case, merely govern these, but it takes posses?
sion of every single thing, and expels or kills the old inhabitants (Machiavelli [1975,
1:378]).
as being
described
brutal; in
particularly
by Machiavelli
In
history, they are formodern-day
parlance we would call them genocidal.
have
as
at least one of their
and
tunately rare. Most wars are of the first type
of their
reduction
with
the
aims
the
of an adversary, possibly
key
subjugation
and
annihilation
of
total
but
not the goal
numbers,
straightforward
definitely
seizure of their material resources. The second
war, is,
type, the genocidal
however, easier to model in terms of costs and benefits, and that is why I take
deliberations.
it as the starting-point
for my theoretical
In the case of a clear imbalance
of power, if group A is much stronger than
Such
wars
are
and approprigroup B, A can annihilate B with minimal losses to themselves
ate all of B's resources. All benefits belong to the living, and, of the two, it is
is not so clear and A
A who continues
to exist. But what if the imbalance
would be to mainan
A
attack
on
B
as
rather
perceives
risky?
good suggestion
tain peace, but sadly history has often taken a different course. An alternative
to peace would be to look for allies. A can reactivate ancestral links to other
or religion,
as well as the
groups or appeal to shared customs,
language,
and
A'". But for
with
of
shared
alliance
and
form
an
A', A",
loot,
prospect
of B, A would have to share B s
that there is a price: after the annihilation
resources with three other groups. This division can be achieved on an equal
if there is an
basis if the alliance was of an egalitarian
nature, or unequally
hierarchical arrangement.
In either case the effect is basically the same: a larger
returns
and diminishing
alliance means higher security in achieving
victory
after victory.
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
139
is just as many
Clearly in such a model the optimal number of conquerors
as are necessary to make the conquest.4 In optimizing
their numbers the con?
wish for a certain margin of safety vis-a-vis the
querors would presumably
minimal
of war
force, in order to avoid a change in the fortunes
necessary
and a retaliatory tide of genocide
Beyond this, further allies
against themselves.
are superfluous,
the
and expensive.
If one wants to optimize
bothersome,
number of ones own comrades-in-arms,
one must therefore be in a position
to reduce or increase their number according to need, which means that social
and ideological
mechanisms
of exclusion
are required.
as well as inclusion
So far we have looked solely at the attackers' side. We may, however, find
calculations
of the same type on the part of the defenders. When threatened
from outside, they are surely more likely to be ready to adopt strangers into
their ranks; however, if they include too many, this can result in overly strong
pressure on their resources. They might escape military defeat and immediate
but they would have to deal with their economic
decline and
extermination,
decline of the original core group. Their friends
perhaps even the demographic
rather than their enemies would be consuming
their resources, but consumed
as well as limit
they would be in any case. Thus, being able to encourage
of allies
for groups and configurations
growth in numbers is equally beneficial
which are intent on defending
themselves.
Matters become
more complicated
if we leave the genocidal
model, in
which only winners survive, and turn instead to continuing
relations between
winners
and losers after the war or series of raids. For this, I use material
from southern
and northern
Ethiopia
Kenya. Here ethnic
groups can be
considered
to be political
and military units of relatively recent formation,
which consist of clans and clan fragments
earlier
dating from a considerably
period.
the same clan can be found in more than one ethnic group
Frequently
its history, part of this area, the
(Schlee 1994 [1989]) (see Figure). Throughout
lower valley of the Omo River, has been characterized
by its great distance
from any form of governmental
of
control as well as by a high frequency
wars and the relatively small size of groups which were internally
peaceful,
though hostile towards the outside world. For the lower Omo valley it has
been shown that the 'ethnic' or 'political' groups often consist of clans and
families who hold traditions indicating
that their origins lie with other ethnic
that no longer
ethnic
exist. Fragments
of extinct
configurations
groups
reassemble
to form new ethnic groups comprising
several thousand
people
(Turton
1994).5
members
of these groups offer many different explanations
for
Although
their wars, including
ritual requirements
or cattle raiding, some of these confrontations
do seem to originate
as conflicts
over natural resources. This is a
where
famine
is
as
familiar as abundance.
resources, such
region
just
Disputed
as access to a certain well and its nearby pasture lands, may be of little significance
essential to survival when
during times of plenty but can become
the energy expenditure
rises to a criti?
necessary to reach pasture elsewhere
cal level. Thus, these groups correspond
of people
to Machiavelli's
description
who fight for the same resources at the level of survival. Machiavelli
would
have
assume
assumed
that
would
wars
between
these
undoubtedly
groups
dimensions.
genocidal
140
GUNTHER
clan classification
ethnic (political)
classification
ethnic
sub-groups
groups
(phratries,
SCHLEE
sub-clans
clans
moieties)
ethnic
group
clanA
I
clanB
ethnic
group
II
clanC
ethnic
group
III
Figure. Double taxonomy: schema to show inter-ethnic clan relations.
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
141
this assumption
in northern
is not confirmed
However,
Kenya and southern Ethiopia. No total genocides
are docof entire populations
or expulsions
in
umented.
of
seems
to
be
that
Instead, the predominant
regrouping
pattern
alliances and the integration
In other parts of Africa and
of the vanquished.
the rest of the world, there certainly are conflicts which can plausibly be classified as genocidal
wars.6 The factors that lead to this level of escalation need
to be examined
further. It seems that agriculture and the concomitantly
higher
are significant
terms of violence
factors in generating
population
density
which involve the annihilation
of whole populations.
of whether
the destruction
of the enemy goes as far as wholeRegardless
sale genocide,
it is possible to fmd radically different strategies of both inclu- even
sion and exclusion
to the typologies
presented above
corresponding
within
a single pastoral-nomadic
form of production
and involving
people
who live under the same ecological
and
For example, the Rendille
conditions.
who both herd camels in neighbouring,
even overlapping
areas, have
are conwhich
of production
and organization,
quite different techniques
nected to mutually incompatible
and have much to do with growth
ideologies
and with inclusion
or exclusion,
respectively
The Rendille
camels that are only
keep a breed of small, undemanding
Somali,
watered at long intervals, for they believe that
animals weak. They do little to cure sick camels.
to endure much hardship. Herders in the camel
and blood, a rather heavy diet, yet they do not
fact that they must be in a constant
state of
milk for
brought to them, they will exchange
makes the
frequent watering
Likewise, people are expected
on milk
camps live exclusively
of thirst, despite the
complain
If water is
slight dehydration.
water on a ratio of 1 :1. The
Rendille
delay the marriage of daughters in one of their age grades: this and
other practices have been interpreted
as demographic
braking-mechanisms.7
They discriminate
against strangers and against one another. When they occaare often stigmatized
sionally do integrate strangers, they or their descendants
as outsiders even after 200 years. Their society is characterized
by a permanent tendency
to fission. It is hard to gain admission
to Rendille
society and
which
quite easy to leave it. All this can be seen as a form of self-limitation
has positive effects on environmental
are a small
sustainability. The Rendille
society that stays small and adapts to limited resources.
In contrast, the Somali keep what are probably some of the biggest camels
in the world. Rendille
These
camels to elephants.
these Somali
compare
camels, too, endure long intervals between
watering, but when this is not necessary the Somali allow their camels to drink as often as they want to. Their
medicine
is highly developed.
veterinary
They marry young and have many
children. They are prepared to integrate strangers, and, as long as these convert
to Islam, they are fully assimilated. This can be seen as a strategy of expansion. They use natural resources without
constraints
and move to new pastures when the old ones are exhausted. Their numerical
and military strength
allows them to do this (Schlee 1988).
The fact that these two differing forms of adaptation
to identical ecologi?
cal conditions
exist side by side clearly invalidates
any form of ecological
seems to
determinism.
Rather
than determining
social practices,
ecology
a
wide
framework
for quite distinct patterns of adaptation.
provide
142
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
In the case of the Rendille
and Somali, the balance of energy expenditure
seems to be roughly equal for both systems. The low energy intake and low
and the high intake and output of the Somali
energy output of the Rendille
result in roughly the same net return. Were it otherwise,
one of these systems
of production
would have ceased to exist long ago. The problem
becomes
rather more complex
of interaction
to that of
when we add the question
A conservative
coexistence.
form of resource
usage can only exist next to
another conservative
form of production.
Where resources saved up for the
future by one group of users are immediately
consumed
by their neighbours
whose
is some?
strategies are less long term, a field of problems is opened.This
thing that has been explored in the context of Hardin's (1968) concept of the
of game theory and
and also from the perspective
'tragedy of the commons',
the notion
of the 'prisoner's
involve
cases
since such situations
dilemma',
where there are apparent gains to be made by initially agreeing to co-operate
and then by being the first to break the agreement.
such convenTherefore
tions require strong contractual
and institutional
safeguards and are consea preferred topic of new institutional
economics
&
quently
(e.g. Anderson
Simmons
1993).
These brief remarks should serve to indicate that strategies of inclusion
and
exclusion
are not carried out by groups in isolation but rather in interaction
with the corresponding
Thus, the appropriate
strategies of their neighbours.
unit of reference for the anthropological
is not the ethnic group
monograph
or tribe, but rather the region.
The Rendille
I asked some
themselves
are well aware of this. When
Rendille
certain rules of their age-grade
why they have discontinued
system,
which have been interpreted
I received
as demographic
braking mechanisms,
the answer that the neighbouring
for better or for
Turkana are multiplying
worse and that they do not wish to be pushed out by them. Thus demo?
graphic pressure is counteracted
pressure, strategies of optiby demographic
mization are relinquished
in favour of strategies of maximization,
and children
are raised for future wars: a procedure
with which
we are familiar from
nation-states
and which has been referred to in these contexts
as
European
'natalism'.8
The implication
of this is that manipulating
the size of ones own group
or alliance of groups is of great strategic importance.
on the par?
Depending
ticular conditions,
the strategic option of keeping group size small or reduc? that is, the
ing its size may appear to actors as preferable to the alternatives
?
increase of group size or the strengthening
of alliances
observers
though
might naively expect that people would normally prefer to belong to a strong
terms. In pursuit of
alliance, as well as one which was superior in numerical
these aims, such groups do not confine
to biological
themselves
strategies
either the production
of cattle or that of human offspring; on the
involving
of inclusion
and exclusion
contrary, they may also practise various techniques
with regard to human adults.
For those who do not conduct
research on East African pastoral nomads
but rather on modern industrial societies, it may be of interest to seek analoSuccessful identification
gies in areas of non-biotic
systems of production.
pol?
itics among East African pastoralists seem to be directly translated into animal
biomass and demographic
and postindustrial
contexts,
growth. In industrial
GUNTHER
143
SCHLEE
but one might fmd it
are similar strategies of exclusion
and inclusion
to primidifficult to define the aim of the game. Without
returning
does
that
sometimes
tivism, one might
simpler
provide
say
anthropology
model cases.
there
more
The
instruments
conceptual
social
and
categories
of
their
exclusion
overlapping
and
inclusion:
relations
This section focuses on the categories
in strategies of
that may be employed
char?
inclusion
and
and exclusion,
their
situational
manipulable
emphasizing
and taxonomies
of social categories
acter, as well as the logic and plausibility
which set limits to arbitrariness and manipulation.
In the work of identifica?
of
and contestation
tion, in other words, in the appropriation,
elaboration,
social identities,
structure and action clash with one another. The fluid prinstructure, or breaks on it.
ciple, action, bends the rigid principle,
It has been assumed up to this point that groups identify collective
aims,
and act collectively
On
to achieve them. In fact, this is an oversimplification.
closer inspection,
with indi?
the action-theoretical
side is always concerned
vidual actors, or possibly the vector sum of actions of individual
actors, and
cannot have the collective
need to
as its point of departure. We therefore
return to questions that have thus far been dealt with in a somewhat
schematic
fashion in order to maintain the models' simplicity. Among these are the ques?
tions
of the
subject
of decisions
and the frame
of reference
of cost-benefit
analyses.
I turn
used for the
first to the conceptual
and categorical
instruments
are always
of inclusion
and exclusion.
Social groups and categories
purposes
fictional features
named in connection
with more-or-less
real or more-or-less
of groups. For example,
we can distinguish
local groups, linguistic
groups,
descent
by certain
groups, and so on, and each of these types, identified
dimensions
of characteristics
has numerous
Thus,
(see above),
sub-types.
we can follow
descent
various forms of linearity
within
systems, such as
the
double
descent
uni-linear
of transmission
through
(the coexistence
the other can
patri- and matriline). When one form of filiation predominates,
be understood
as a complementary
filiation. We can further consider uterine
to the patrilineage
of the mother) and affinal relation-sets.
(that is, belonging
Much the same could be said of local, linguistic, and other forms of classifi?
of
cation. In short, each type of identification
opens up a broad repertoire
which can overlap with one another in a multitude
possible categorizations
of ways.
In social anthropology,
the
that are created through
the configurations
have been discussed under the term 'cross-cutting
overlap of such categories
as factors
ties'.To date, cross-cutting
ties have been discussed almost exclusively
of social cohesion.
Gluckman
(1966: 11), who adopts a fairly Hobbesian
peras constantly
argues that
spective and sees humanity
caught up in conflicts,
such ties make possible
a certain measure
of internal
peace in a society.
In this theory, then, cross-cutting
ties are the very basis of society. Because
we use multiple criteria for the establishment
of social groups and categories
and since these can overlap, we must always be prepared for the possibility
144
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
but an ally in
in one context
that another person might be an opponent
conflicts to escalate
another. Consciousness
of this prevents us from allowing
of any form of
to a level at which
lead to the destruction
they would
and
of social cohesion
ascribes the establishment
Gluckman
society. Therefore
ties. This does not seem to
the de-escalation
of conflicts
to cross-cutting
me to be always and necessarily
the case. Let us return once more to the
notion
that it is advantageous
for actors and groups of actors to have both
means of inclusion
and exclusion
at their disposal. I wish to clarify this using
clan relations in northern
the previously
mentioned
of inter-ethnic
example
Kenya.
? the
When a herdsman meets a stranger at a watering-hole
typical trigger?
situation for violent conflicts
and if he finds out who the stranger is, then
to the
the existence
of cross-cutting
ties opens up the following
possibilities
their difference
('We belong to dif?
pastoral warrior. He can either emphasize
or he can refer to a
ferent tribes, go away before our young men come!'),
shared identity ('Though
we belong to different tribes, we belong to the same
to my wife's clan', 'to my mother's clan', or whatever
clan', or 'You belong
the case may be).The
optional character of such references to identity or dif?
ference implies that cross-cutting
ties can be situationally
ignored. They are
and difference
force. Identity
not always present as a binding
should,
as resulting from certain criteria, namely the pres?
therefore, not be considered
ence or absence of certain markers, as factors on their own, which can generate hostility
or cohesion.
These markers should rather be seen as the raw
to pursue goals
material for political rhetoric, which can be used selectively
of inclusion
or exclusion.
that
to create the impression
it is by no means my intention
However,
and limitless
we are dealing with unbounded
manipulability
opportunism
It is precisely those cases where one
calculations.
following
purely economic
a prisoner
becomes
of ones
own logic that are sociologically
interesting.
descent in an exogamic
common
If, for example, based on real or fictional
towards a group with
clan system, I opt for a rhetoric
of brotherhood
of marriage
I come into contact,
which
then I foreclose
any possibilities
with that group, however
attractive such a possibility
may appear to be. All
I declare fraternal relations
the female members
of a group with whom
thus
Furthermore,
my sisters and are thus subject to incest prohibitions.9
Brothers of brothers are brothers. Thus,
fraternity is a transitive relationship.
I am potentially
into many more ties than I can oversee myself. In
entering
less unfortunate
overstretched;
cases, this may lead to my hospitality becoming
of alliances
in more serious
cases, this can mean that my entire system
find myself on the wrong side in
and security is overturned
and I suddenly
a conflict.
is concerned,
In so far as Gluckman's
and de-escalation
theory of cohesion
that the
indications
the case of northern
any
Kenya does not provide
or
avoidance
to
the
numerous
inter-ethnic
clan relations have contributed
crossbetween
of violent
the connection
de-escalation
conflicts.
Regarding
of violence, we must thus concutting ties and the escalation or de-escalation
between
is no relationship
sider a kind of zero-hypothesis,
that
there
namely,
of conflicts
the existence
or intensity
of cross-cutting
ties and the frequency
become
between
groups
who
have such
ties.
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
145
the Tauade of the
(1977) would take this a step further. Among
Hallpike
New Guinea highlands, he found that descent groups distributed
themselves
between
descent groups,
widely across local groups. When killings occurred
the Tauade frequently
who were
turned against those of their neighbours
members
of the clan with whom
and who
hostilities
had been exchanged
lived as a minority
in their midst. Such people were killed out of vengeance.
These neighbours
were within easy reach and could be killed with the least
risk. Of course, revenge
and it is easy to imagcounter-revenge,
provokes
ine the resulting escalation. Therefore,
the reverse of
we must also consider
ties
Gluckman's
that under certain conditions
cross-cutting
theory, namely
can contribute
to the escalation
of conflicts.
In another
New
of the Sepik
Guinean
case, the Manambu
region,
Harrison
ties do not reduce the overall
(1993) has shown that cross-cutting
of violence
in any way. Affiliation
to the same totemic clan, mar?
riage ties, or trade partnerships
might prevent certain people of one village
from attacking certain people of another village, but such ties can make them
an even likelier target of other people. Rivalries
of one
inhabitants
between
to hit out at the partners or relatives of internal rivals
village lead participants
living in another village. In an indirect way, that is, through their denial, crossto one
cutting ties can even be said to be the root cause of war. According
of several systems of norms, namely those postulating
the solidarity of the men
of one village who are united by one cult, outside links need to be periodiof social
the ubiquity
raids, because otherwise
cally severed by headhunting
ties would blur the boundaries
of local groups.10
In a case that I have examined
ties were
in some depth, cross-cutting
occurrence
unable to prevent a violent conflict between
manifestly
groups. On the other
to its escalation
either. However,
hand, they did not contribute
they seem
to have fulfilled a significant
of
in coping with the consequences
function
war.
Two hundred years ago, the ancestors of the Rendille
sub-clan Elemo were
with their camels, by Rendille
warriors. Originally
they
captured, together
had been Gabra. Rendille,
raiding Gabra, took both a herd of camels and their
owners. Some clan members
them voluntarily;
later followed
they had no
choice about this, since they could not have survived without
camels. In 1992,
Gabra people
of their
raided the Rendille
and captured a large proportion
camels. Paradoxical though this may sound, some members
of the Elemo subclan sought refuge from the Gabra among the Gabra and attached themselves
once again to their Gabra clan-brothers.
camels ? albeit
They also received
different camels, not the ones that had been seized from them ? so that they
could continue
their pastoral-nomadic
existence. Twice in their history they
had thus followed
their camels and joined those who had raided them. Their
clan-brothers
them from attacks by other Gabra.
among the Gabra protected
For this they were heavily criticized
by these same other Gabra and many
others who identified
more closely with the latter than with the recent new
arrivals from the Rendille.
In this case, the existence
to the
of cross-cutting
ties contributed
nothing
effect can
or limitation
no general cohesive
of war. Furthermore,
prevention
be attributed to them. Instead, they led to a fission among the Rendille
when
ties also
some Elemo remained whilst others rejoined the Gabra. Cross-cutting
146
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
led to a division among the Gabra among whom a pro- and an anti-Elemo
faction were formed.What
ties did do was to offer several
these cross-cutting
actors options that helped them to deal with the consequences
of war (Schlee
1997).
In terms of what has been said above about categories
situabecoming
tionally relevant and being situationally
ignored, one can say that in this case
at the inter-ethnic
level (here meaning
the interaction
of ethnic groups as
entire units, Rendille
of inter-ethnic
clan relation?
vs. Gabra), the existence
did not prevent one ethnic
clan relationships
ships was ignored. Inter-ethnic
On the clan-to-clan
group, the Gabra, from raiding another, the Rendille.
of the raids had to
level, they became relevant again when the consequences
be coped with.
This example suggests that a more finely grained analysis would enable us
to see more of the real effects of cross-cutting
ties. When we descend from
the level of groups to that of individual
differences
actors, we may perceive
in the cost-benefit
calculations
carried out by leaders and their followers. A
switch in alliance may have varying advantages and disadvantages
for leaders
and followers or, rather, for potential leaders and their followers; for it is possible that it is only with a switch in alliance that a leader becomes
a follower
or a follower a leader.
It has long been reported that the Pukhtuns
(Pathans) of Swat (Barth 1981)
have a segmentary
lineage system similar to that of the Somali. Unlike Somali,
to unite more closely related lineages
however, they do not have a tendency
over land, is far too great
against more distant ones. The rivalry, particularly
between
form
and closely related segments.
Instead, Pukhtuns
neighbouring
alliances with opponents
relations and immediate
of their immediate
neigh?
'the enemy
of my enemy
is my
the principle
bours, and by generalizing
for a moment
that social groups
friend', divide into two factions. Assuming
one can imagine that one distinguishes
may be arranged in a linear sequence,
oneself from ones immediately
while belonging
to the
adjacent neighbours
same faction as the subsequent
of
ones. Thus, we find an alternating
sequence
a b a b a b.ln reality and over space, relations are of course not quite as simple
as along this imaginary
for
line and thus there are numerous
possibilities
alliances. In every given
other, since the liminal
context
one group is necessarily
stronger
case where
both are equally
strong is
Pukhtuns
tend to call the two groups
extremely
unlikely. Correspondingly,
and
Such
a
situation
can of course be considmajority
minority
respectively.
ered from the point of view of cross-cutting
ties: the division into majority
and minority
ties ceroverlaps with lineage structure. But these cross-cutting
do
not
kind
of'cohesion'
at
least
at
the
level
of
the
total
tainly
produce any
switching
than the
society.11
It is good to belong
to the majority. In juridical
disputes the majority
resources
from
the
The
therefore
tries to persuade
acquires
minority
minority.
members
of the majority to join it in order to turn the minority
into the
An
incentive
to
current
in
leave
the
consist
majority.
group may
being offered
a leading position in the new configuration.
Leaders have privileges
and ben?
efits not enjoyed by their followers.
For current or potential
leaders who are
a switch in alliance and for their followers
whom
considering
they would
have to bring with them, as they would otherwise
be numerically
insignifi-
GUNTHER
cant, the cost-benefit
analysis of such a switch
such a betrayal, presents itself in quite different
On
the
sociologization
economization
of
of
147
SCHLEE
or, to put it more
terms.
economics
and
bluntly,
of
the
sociology
In all of the examples discussed thus far, both cost-benefit
as they
calculations,
are carried out by economists,
and social structures and their cognitive
repthe latter form the
of identification:
resentations,
play a role in processes
are made. Of
about identification
matrix, so to speak, within which decisions
clan relations are not timeless and
course, social structures such as inter-ethnic
immutable. They are the objects of ideological
work and are subject to change.
on an ad hoc
inter-ethnic
clan relationships
are also invented
Occasionally,
in the clan names. Such
this is just a matter of similarities
basis; sometimes
ties are not very resilient, however, and even the most ingenious
imaginings
of this kind are rarely if ever rewarded with camels. In any given situation of
we can thus see social categories
and groups as largely given,
decision-making
and only manipulable
to a limited degree. This, then, is the sociological
aspect
of the matter.
to Duesenberry
deals with the ways in
According
(1960: 233), economics
which people make decisions, while it is the domain of sociology
to explain
why they have no decisions to make. Indeed, homo oeconomicus, the admittedly
model of humanity
used by economists,
simplified
appears to be freer in his
and is thus rather more appealing than the some?
capacity to make decisions
what foolish
fits into
homo sociologicus who, in the process of socialization,
units and ultimately
meets given role-expectations
supra-individual
perfectly.
Our analysis of empirical
of
reality should not be guided by such feelings
and socio?
what we must ask instead is how economic
empathy, however;
of explanation
in order to model
elements
can best be combined
logical
reality.
As the north Kenyan example
of economic
and
suggests, the interlocking
factors may result in actors, in part pushed by pressures of sursociological
within a social space which offers some
vival, doing the work of identification
scope for variation but which is also limited by pre-determined
options. This
to one type of actor, those who are intelligent,
and with
applies particularly
of the historical materials from which identity constructs are made
knowledge
and who take liberties in handling them.
The ethnic groups of northern
Kenya are ethnic groups in the full, apparsense.12 Each maintains
differences
and linguistic
ently self-evident
religious
vis-a-vis the others, and they are clearly distinguished
and
by their clothing
habitus. Nevertheless,
a network
of
they are linked to one another through
inter-ethnic
clan relations, which are based in part on splits occurring
at the
time of the genesis of the present-day
ethnic groups, and in part on more
recent migrations
and reaffiliations.
It is important
for the heads of pastoralist groups to have knowledge
of these relations at their disposal. They can thus
find refuge with clan brothers
of
in other ethnic
groups during periods
since
ethnic reaffiliation,
drought or war. This does not imply an immediate
they are initially taken in just as clan brothers and may be thought of as guests
148
SCHLEE
GUNTHER
rather than as members
of the host ethnic group. An actual ethnic reaffiliation may take place at a particular point in time, which is marked by a ritual,
or it may drag out over generations
and never be fully accomplished.
For immediate
it is unimportant
in the first instance
survival, however,
halfone receives
whether
one finds full cultural acceptance
or whether
in finding
hearted hospitality. What can be a matter of survival is virtuosity
out and manipulating
to them in order to genand appealing
relationships
memerate acts of solidarity. This only works when the sense of common
the appeal is being
for those to whom
bership is also valid and binding
made.
The actor
in a position
is
and social intelligence,
who, by means of social knowledge
not to integrate
but, rather, to
passively into such categories
them to his own benefit, profits from the fact that others possess
manipulate
with their
this ability to a lesser degree. Were the virtuosi
of relationships,
appeals to solidarity, always to meet with minds that are equally skilled in
finding reasons for rejecting these appeals, the entire game would not work.
are to a certain extent preThus we are dealing with relationships
which
ordained
and immutable
and, indeed, are to some degree subject to being
instrumentalized
and manipulated,
and with a measure of virtuosity.
same extent.
albeit
They
with
cannot
only the requisite knowledge
to the
be used by everyone
ethnic
such social categories,
So, despite their constructedness,
including
groups and nations, are in no way arbitrary. They have a certain reality about
them, at least in the sense of having real effects.
This is due in part to the fact that they are not free inventions,
no matter
how popular the expression
of Hobsbawm
since the publication
has become
and Ranger's
The invention of tradition. One has only to think of the
(1983)
numerous
book-titles
such as The invention of India (used twice), The invention
of Africa, The invention of Ethiopia, The invention of primitive society and so forth.
in its literal sense and speak of'conInstead, one should take constructivism
structions' rather than 'inventions'.
As in the building trade, which is the source
of the metaphor, constructions
are not arbitrary: they follow the laws of statics;
they consist of elements which support each other, and
materials. Sometimes
old foundations
are used, or old
reused. Even very recent social constructs
may be
same processes, thus achieving
familiarity, plausibility,
they make use of local
materials are
building
out of the
generated
and often a degree of
pseudo-naturalness.
But even where the creation of ethnic groups and nations appears to be
artificial and occurs with a visible romanticizing
effort, there will
ideological
still be very real consequences
in terms of behaviour.
It may well be possible
to dream up ethnic groups and nations, but when these turn out to be nightmares it is very difficult to dream them away again.
Markets
of
violence
and
the
freedom
of
choice
To focus on what is at stake in a conflict,
on the contested
resources, is a
usual perspective
and a useful one. One recent example is Klare's Resource wars,
and many comparable
studies could be cited (2001). Down-to-earth
analysts
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
149
inclined towards materialist approaches tend to look first at contested resources
and the economic
interests they engender, when they try to understand a con?
flict. My aim is not to supplant this perspective
but to complement
it. Iden?
tification in conflict situations is in no way determined
resources.
by contested
The logic of identification
the con?
may be the same, regardless of whether
tested resource is oil, water, cattle, or land. Explanations
which focus excluand economic
interests may therefore
fall short of the
sively on resources
target. My critique could be directed at many authors, but I will focus my
discussion
on one of the most sophisticated
contributors
to this field, Georg
Elwert.
In 1997, Elwert published
an analysis of 'Markets of violence'
with the
sub-title 'Observations
on the instrumental
rationality of violence'. As the title
and sub-title both imply, the emphasis lies on economic
calculation
and thus
on freedom of choice. In my view, the shortcomings
of his approach lie in the
neglect of the limitations
imposed
by social structures and the conventional
which limit even the rationally acting radically egoistic
logic of identification,
warlords postulated
by Elwert in their freedom of choice.
Markets of violence
which are beyond
appear in 'spaces open to violence'
the reach of state monopolies
on violence,
and they appear when the market
market
economy
expands into these spaces. They are 'a totally deregulated
a radically free market economy'.
Extortion
and suchlike play an
economy,
role.
important
It emerges
from Elwert's own exposition
that the 'radically free market
is not a further development
of the 'free market economy'.
On the
economy'
at its roots. Portes (1994: 432)
contrary, it smothers
capitalist development
makes it even clearer that the origin of the 'free' market economy
lies prerather than deregulation:
cisely in regulation
This 'triumph of the invisible hand' [here, he is referring to Mobutu's Zaire where everything, even the renunciation of state rules and laws, has become buyable] does not lead
to capitalist development, as would be anticipated from public choice theory ... ; the
opposite is actually the case. In the absence of a stable legal framework and credible
enforcement of contracts, long-term productive investment becomes a near impossibility.
Markets are not formed out of some natural inclination,
nor as a product of
what Adam Smith saw as an innate human propensity
to 'truck, barter and
The creation of a market economy
exchange'.
requires there to be someone
outside
the realm of competition,
rules
standing
'making sure that property
are enforced
and contracts
In this context,
observed'.
to
Portes, appealing
character of markets (this
Polanyi and Everrit, refers to the highly regulated
was also the case in terms of market-place
in Europe in the early
activities)
There were even bread-tasters
and beer-tasters.
stages of capitalist development.
Durkheim
made a similar point, though in more general terms, with refer?
ence to freedom, not just to the free market: 'Liberty itself is the product of
who can be exploited
regulation' (1984 [1893]: 320). Someone
simply because
he or she is weaker cannot be called free.
Elwert (1997) does not repeat observations
from a previous
paper (1995)
with an almost identical title. Here, Elwert (1995) considered
markets of vio?
lence to be 'a form of modernization'
based on an 'admittedly
rather uncon-
150
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
of commodity
as the 'interaction
of modernization'
understanding
the attribuand large-scale
Given this definition,
communication'.
economy
tion is plausible. Commonly,
however, one might prefer a notion of modern?
to the enduring
ization which stands for those processes that have contributed
It then
of industrial modernity
in processes of globalization.
preponderance
rather contrary
effects:
becomes
obvious
that markets of violence
develop
to
and education
they destroy bureaucracies
systems and allow infrastructures
ventional
decay.
With his focus on 'markets of violence',
Elwert expands the analysis of
violent conflicts to include those cases in which the state - at least in imme?
diate terms - does not play (or no longer plays) a part. Current theories, on
the other hand, assume the state to be the framework
of disputes or the prize
state
for the winner (for instance, ethnicization
as a strategy for appropriating
tree) provides
resources). Wimmer
(1995, particularly 486, his decision-making
a good overview
of these theories.13
of crumbling
Of course, it is precisely
statehood
in such a surrounding
and severed bonds and,
that we would expect fragmented
social structures
arbitrariness
for decision-making
thus, a broad scope
or, more precisely,
Elwert intesupported
by violence
among the more powerful. Unfortunately,
of markets of
in his definition
of the economic
grates the preponderance
I
violence
in a rather circular fashion. He writes: 'By markets of violence
understand
conflicts
called civil wars, warlord systems or thievery, where the
economic
beneath
the surface of ideomotive of material profit dominates
defined battle duties' (1997:
logical and political aims or reputedly traditionally
of the economic
I do not include the dominance
87-8).14 In the following,
motive in a definition
of the markets of violence.
Rather, I want to pose the
that is,
of how far economic
or sociological
empirical
question
explanations,
and
those focusing
on actors and decisions
versus those stressing structures
and in which
in markets of violence
ways they
givens, are of significance
interpenetrate.
to Elwert (1997), 'Not ethnic groups and clans, but economic
According
interests ... are poised against one another in these civil wars'. Here, he is
interests not held by
making
things too simple for himself. Are economic
to
Are they not dependent
on existing or nascent' "we"-groups',
somebody?
use Elwert's own term (1989)? Are they thereby not subject to pre-formed
in other words to precisely those ethnic groups and clans to
categorizations,
which
to them is
Elwert here denies any significance?
reference
Making
said to be 'culturalist'. That presumably
as
an indemeans that with culture
In 'cul?
are to be explained.
variable, other things, such as violence,
pendent
turalist' explanations,
a culture, thought of as being supra-personal,
appears as
a means of explanation
(explanans) and it is this that those who use the
term criticize. The term 'culturalist' implies a negative evaluation, as is the case
with the terms 'biologizing',
and so on. Calling
'essentialist',
'reductionist',
those who refer to clans and ethnic groups 'culturalists' implies that these 'culturalists' always consider
variables
and clanship to be independent
ethnicity
and assume that clans and ethnic groups simply are the way they are. In the
more recent theories
of ethnicity
and the more recent literature on clans,
Elwert's
own
in
could be further from the
work
this
area, nothing
including
GUNTHER
151
SCHLEE
truth. It is therefore unclear which hypothetical
of ignorance.15
Later in the same work he writes:
authors
are here being
accused
The warlords also need trade partners, supporters, and neutral forces. In order for them
to feel secure, it is helpful to let violence follow clear, symbolically pre-drawn lines. Signs
of religion, regional dress and accent, and similar things serve this purpose and create the
impression of ethnic or religious confrontation (1997: 94).
This makes it sound as though the warlords were largely free in their definitions of identity ? as though they could include in their following
precisely
those whom
they
they wanted 'in' and could exclude precisely those whom
'To
wanted 'out'. Apparently, warlords do not have to tolerate the unwanted.
tolerate the unwanted'
means becoming
a prisoner of one's own logic. One
to include individuals
and groups in the group defined as
may be compelled
'us' whom one would really prefer not to include, and be forced to do so by
or
the demands of consistency
in sticking to the system of social categories
one conventionally
accepted mode of identification.
it was
For Somalia, one of the most-often
cited settings of 'warlordism',
and
to show
that groups are not fractured
1996; 2002)
possible
(Schlee
alliances are not formed by the sheer arbitrary will of warlords but, rather,
in prethat these processes
follow
can already be found
which
patterns
colonial times.
The total genealogy
the entire Somali nation
(Lewis 1982) encompassing
true or it may be fictional. In any case, it is a common
may be historically
property accepted in many respects and laden with the weight of convention
so that no single individual
can change anything at will and certainly not on
an ad hoc basis.Thus
if an opponent
of the Darood clan family makes recourse
other than that
to Irrir, a clan ancestor of whom we know virtually nothing
most non-Darood
descend from him, this implies that he must include clans
of the 'we'and sub-clans
that claim to descend from Irrir in the defmition
his appeal to pangroup, even those whom he does not like, since otherwise
Irrir solidarity would become implausible. This means that he must grudgingly
the case during the processes
accept the unwanted. Were he, as was increasingly
to far
of fission of political
the 1990s, to have recourse
groups throughout
more recent ancestors, he would end up with a much more narrowly defined
group that might not encompass
many of the sections he would like to recruit
to his side. Thus warlords, too, are prisoners
of their own logic and do not
freed himto the type of homo oeconomicus who has completely
correspond
or herself of social constraints
on an entirely individual
and makes decisions
of
and opportunistic
basis. Furthermore,
warlords act within the framework
1976: 161) at
social structures, which are constraining
and enabling (Giddens
the same time. The clan organization
provides them with the tools and the
material of military recruitment
while, at the same time, it limits their freedom
of choice
in recruiting
whom
processes, under the
they want. In historical
influence
of repeated action, structures do change (in ways which have been
more-or-less
and tend to be explained
satisfactorily
only in
rarely predicted
need
to
and
But for any given actor at any time, they are there
retrospect).
152
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
and enabling
be taken into account
as they are, with both their restricting
characteristics.
In his 1995 article, Elwert himself deals more closely with Somalia. Suras a new phenomenon,
he describes
the fight for waterholes
prisingly,
out that among the Somali
Lewis (1961a: 44) had already pointed
although
wooden
it is not the sword or gun but rather the transportable,
wateringThe 'state courts
trough that stands as a symbol for disputes and bloodshed.
of law and notaries' who according
to Elwert (1995: 132) previously
regueffeclated rights to watering
places do not seem to have been particularly
tive even at the height of colonial
rule (Lewis 19616). The 'clan courts' that
bodies which
in the same context were in reality mediating
Elwert mentions
of the damaged party accepting blood-money
(Arabic,
explored the possibility
was simply
diya; Somali, mag) rather than resorting to revenge. Blood-money
was a means of taking revenge,
another aspect of violence:
open violence
In the absence of a nonwhile latent violence
served to obtain compensation.
was too weak to take revenge would
partisan law-enforcing
agency, whoever
and would not receive
also be too weak to enforce compensation
payment
justice from these 'clan courts', no matter how evident the injustice he had
that is, to a
suffered. It was thus necessary to belong to a strong community,
to
bound
or to one that was contractually
demographically
strong lineage
other lineages in order to form a blood-money
community.
This is identity
politics of size once more. And so, repeatedly, we come
back to precisely
that area of overlap where the issue is to link economic
with sociological
The simple solution - which is really a way of
perspectives.
the existence
consists either in completely
ignoring
avoiding the problem
of social structures and systems and reducing
all that is social to the sum of
that
individual
calculations
or, alternatively,
pure systems theories
developing
'those
schools
leave out the people. As far back as 1979, Giddens regretted that
of thought
with action have paid little attenwhich have been preoccupied
or social
tion to, or have found no way of coping with, structural explanation
causation; they have also failed to relate action theory to problems of institu?
tional transformation'
Giddens, that
(1979: 49). One might add, also following
other theories unilaterally
focus on structure and disregard agency. The sociin a way that
do
not seem to have reconciled
these contradictions
ologists
Esser (1999)
Hartmut
themselves
find
they
years later,
satisfactory. Twenty
In
still
afflict
that the same deficiencies
contemporary
sociology.
complained
social anthropology
at theory-building
there is (or was before
attempts
Thus Asad (1972)
drowned in a flood of postmodernism)
a parallel discussion.
the analysis of the Swat political
1959:
criticizes
1981) cited
system (Barth
too
that
Barth
sees
above, by saying
narrowly and simpolitical organization
he
when
as
the
it
product of strategic choice
plistically
presents
being merely
and calculation
structures
that restrict choice
1972:
the
(Asad
75), neglecting
this
class
and
case,
(in
caste).
have
More recent trends in economics,
such as institutional
economics,
followed
economic
this linkage
and
between
by
approaches
sociological
an economist
and a
Hirshleifer,
adopting sociological
undoubtedly
categories.
famous one at that, makes social identity into the core question
of economy.
He maintains that no economic
the question, 'for
calculation
can do without
whom?' Who benefits
is
what group boundaries?
and within
'[EJfficiency
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
153
of the society or group envisioned
... We
always relative to the boundaries
all draw the line somewhere,
at the boundary
of "us" versus "them". Efficiency
thus is ultimately a concept relating group advantage over the competing groups'
in Anderson
& Simmons
1993: 8). Elwert
and other
conflict
theorists
come from the other side and econoIn doing so, they enter the identical,
and exceptionvarious
area, where
ally interesting
disciplinary
approaches
overlap. What
we need is a new synthesis of economic
and sociological
I do
perspectives.
not claim to have presented
such a new synthesis here in anything
resemthe importance
of the
bling a final shape, but I hope to have demonstrated
and to have defined some of the questions
which
deserve further
problem,
research.
(Hirshleifer
quoted
resource-orientated
mize anthropology.
NOTES
This article is the revised text of a lecture delivered at the Institut fur Ethnologie of the
Free University of Berlin in December 1998. I thank my host, Georg Elwert and other discussants for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to John Eidson and Andrea Behrends
for their comments on an earlier version.
^his process has been called 'switching' by Elwert (2002).
2This consideration
is akin to what Hechter (1987) has called 'crowding'.
* Cost-benefit
calculations in connection with identification during violent conflicts present
complex problems. How is one to assess the gains and losses of war when the losers are adopted
into the winners' ethnic group at the end of the conflict? This is in no way a rare case: in
some regions of Africa there is much evidence of ethnic groups ceasing to exist when they
are numerically no longer able to defend themselves successfully, since they either join with
other splinter groups to form a larger alliance or simply attach themselves to their attackers,
that is, to their enemies (e.g. Turton 1994). In this way they would themselves - perhaps later,
perhaps only indirectly, but in some form or another - benefit from the spoils earlier taken
from them by their enemies. In such a case, an analyst wishing to draw up a balance-sheet of
who did what against whom, who lost, who won, and who lost or won what, would find disentangling the strands a difficult job.
Riker's (1962) theory of the minimal winning coalition, which takes parliamentary politics
as its starting-point, is very inspiring for such considerations.
Similar patterns can be found in Melanesia. In Harrison's account of the Manembu of the
Sepik region, villages take the place of 'political groups' in Turton's sense. They are combinations and recombinations of fragments of clans, which exist independently of these major units
into which they combine (Harrison 1993: 46).
Many genocides do not fit the current defmitions of war as conflict between organized
groups with deadly weapons. The victims are often unarmed civilians. Also the attackers may
be civilian mobs armed with agricultural implements.
7
Spencer 1973: 35, 143.
Whether this strategy was successful is doubtful. Natalist programmes appear to have had
no measurable results. I thank G. Elwert for this comment.
At least this is the case among groups who practise clan exogamy - for example the Rendille
who pursue this principle to great lengths.
Harrison summarizes his findings as: 'In Melanesia it is not so much groups that make
war, but war that makes groups' (1993: 18). A radical interpretation might deduce from this
that without war there would be no groups; more cautiously one might infer that those
groups which assert themselves as separate fighting units capable of contesting the resources of
other such groups acquire this character by doing just that: they sever outside ties which link
some of them to some of their prospective enemies, and jointly wage war on these outsiders.
In the course of war, the composition of the warring parties changes: victims of massacres
join larger groups to secure survival; alliances are forged and broken. It is not the existence of
154
GUNTHER
SCHLEE
groups but, first, their character as separate fighting entities, which for a time succeeds in letting
internal coherence outweigh external ties, and, secondly, their composition, which is caused by
war.
Generalizations about the relationship between marriage and war remain difficult. For the
Manambu, even the possibility of village out-marriage is a 'danger to the very conceptualexis?
tence'of a group, while in highland New Guinea the fighting units tend to be exogamous so
that marriage partners are of necessity members of actual or potential enemy groups. (Harrison 1993: 137). 'Those whom we marry are those whom we fight', is a saying that applies to
many societies around the world (Lang 1977). I infer from Harrison's examples, given the case
with which Melanesians and many other people with large exogamous clans combine intermarriage with hostility, that intermarriage is less a complication between warring villages than
is the presence of people with whom one can not intermarry because they are brothers and
sisters, that is, members of the same exogamous clans in the other village.
11In a more recent
study of rivalry and honour among the Pashtun, based on the biographies of prominent personalities, Edwards (1996: 157-8 and passim) concludes that, typically, it
is patrilateral parallel cousins (sons of brothers) who come into conflict with one another. Here,
the unquestioning (in Durkheimian terms, mechanical) solidarity within the lineage limits itself
to full- and half-brothers, to a man's sons. Beyond this, the enemy of my rival is more likely
to be my friend than a more closely related lineage member.
12'Ethnic' is used both in the sense of the
- which enumerates distinpopular definition
of
features
ethnic
guishing
groups (language, history, customs, habits, and so on), and which is
flawed in that in each case different features from such a catalogue may be highlighted or passed
over in silence - and in the more sophisticated sense used by Barth (1969: 9), when he speaks
of cultural discontinuities.
13A further distinction can be made
among theories of conflict concerning the question that
they seek to answer. Contra Gluckman (as noted above), who starts with the Hobbesian notion
of bellum omnium contraomnes and thus considers peace and social integration to require explanation, there is another historico-theoretical strand, associated with Rousseau, which views this
condition as natural and attempts to explain evil. These are axioms that are difficult to ques?
tion in theoretical terms. Empirically, we can always find examples of both 'goodness' and 'evil'
among humans, just as among other closely related species. (Male/male relations among chimpanzees have been found to be murderous in contrast to the peaceful bonobos.) If one starts
with 'goodness' as the normal moral condition, then 'evil' needs to be explained; if 'evil'
(unbounded egotism) is the starting-point, then 'goodness' needs to be explained. Such a struggle with the explanation of'goodness' can be observed, for example, in the sociobiologists' and
rational-choice theoreticians' treatment of the 'problem' of altruism (cf. Grafrath 1997). Our
expectations of normality lead us to wish to explain why some aggressors inflict appalling atrocities on their opponents or on defenceless non-combatants, rather than why other people do
not behave in this way. One may ask where to situate Elwert between Rousseau and Hobbes
probably closer to Rousseau because whoever searches for rational reasons behind apparently
arbitrary cruelty does not start from the self-evidence of wickedness but rather from the need
to explain it.
14All translations of
quotations from German are mine.
13In the discussion of the lecture on which this article is
based, Elwert explained that his
reference was to Italian as well as eastern and southeastern European authors. It would have
been difficult to find such positions in the northwest European or North American mainstream. His criticisms in an earlier work (1997: 86) were of unspecified opponents.
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Prendre
theorie
et construire
parti
des conflits
son
identite
: reflexions
sur
la
Resume
On explique volontiers les conflits en termes d'interets des groupes impliques et notamment
de la concurrence a laquelle ils se livrent pour des ressources ou des profits. Cette approche
a quelque merite. Les theories de ce type paraissent souvent plus realistes que celles qui prennent pour argent comptant les discours de legitimation des belligerants. La question de l'enjeu
est fondamentale pour l'analyse des conflits, mais il y en a une autre, tout aussi importante
et mal comprise jusqu'a present : qui lutte contre qui, et pourquoi ? Comment et pourquoi
trace-t-on la ligne de demarcation entre ami et ennemi la plutot qu'ailleurs ?
Max Planck Institutefor Social Anthroplogy,PO Box 11 03 51, 06017 Halle/Saale, Germany.
[email protected]