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Article
Abstract This study analyses the history of Hindu
fundamentalism up to the present time, as it developed since
India’s independence. In the course of its rise, Hindutva destroyed
the Gandhian symbolism of non-violence, reinterpreted cultural
symbols to become political signs and prepared the ground for
communal violence. Secularists and the religious out-group,
Muslims, became targeted as enemies. During the resulting Hindu
ethnic dominance, religion was converted from a faith into an
ideology. The sequence of events in the development of this
movement repeats the common scheme of a religious
fundamentalist movement that serves the nationalist goals of
political leaders. It is argued that such groups cannot reasonably
be conceptualized in terms of an individual psychology or
personality, that is, a trait, but as a cultural movement that unites
people sharing membership of a social class, that is, a
sociocultural state. Such movements, in contrast to Abrahamic
religious fundamentalisms, do not form well-established stable
groups over time, but are more like a waxing and waning political
movement where membership is determined by social class and
ethnic identity. Their politics trigger a heightened awareness of
ethnic identity, prime a religiously ideological mindset and, as a
consequence, release communal violence.
Key Words culture change, ethnic identity, fundamentalism,
Gandhi, Hindu religion, symbolism, violence
Ragini Sen
Logistics, Mumbai, India
Wolfgang Wagner
Johannes Kepler Universität Linz, Austria, and;
University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain
Cultural Mechanics of
Fundamentalism: Religion as
Ideology, Divided Identities and
Violence in Post-Gandhi India
Introduction
The rise of religious fundamentalism appears to be inversely related to
modernity and secularism. Even if something like religious orthodoxy
Culture & Psychology Copyright © 2009 SAGE Publications
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Vol. 15(3): 299–326 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X09337869]
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Culture & Psychology 15(3)
and fundamentalism has always existed in the past, its presence, when
in contrast to secular world views, becomes particularly apparent
(Berger, 1992; Fox, 2007; Rock, 2004). These shades of religious beliefs
and ways of living are conspicuously resistant to scientific advancement, economic change and development, and periodically erupt into
bouts of individual and collective violence against people, groups
and symbolically charged objects. None of the big religions is exempt
from such tendencies, be it the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism,
Christianity and Islam, or Hinduism, Confucianism and, to a certain
extent, even Buddhism (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Bermanis,
Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2004; Bhatt & Mukta, 2000; Ellens & Ellens,
2004; Keyes & Wellman, 2007). This topic, hence, is without doubt a
central issue in modern times and a source of increasing worry in
contemporary societies. In this study we focus on Hindutva fundamentalism in contemporary India, how it developed in recent history
and how it depends on rejecting the symbolism of Gandhi’s nonviolence, which is widely esteemed as a landmark achievement in the
course of India’s struggle for independence from the British Empire.
Fundamentalism is an iridescent concept; everybody understands it
in everyday and academic talk, but being a contextual phenomenon, it
escapes easy definition. May it suffice to call religious fundamentalism
the activity of a group that is directed against the dissolution of
traditional order in the course of modernization (Riesebrodt, 1993) and
that is characterized by ‘a discernible pattern of religious militancy’
(Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003, p. 17). This mindset draws on a
distinct religious and ethnic identity, erects strict borders towards other
groups and justifies violence against them by their mere otherness.
Emerson and Hartman (2006) name some ideological and organizational characteristics. For these authors, fundamentalism is a reaction
to the marginalization of religion in contemporary society; it has a
dualistic world view whereby everything is either good or evil; fundamentalists believe absolutely in the divine origin of their sacred texts;
and some share a belief in millennialism and messianism, which will
leave true believers victorious at the end.
Not all fundamentalist movements fulfil all these criteria simultaneously and indeed there are differences between the group of
Abrahamic religions and those of Middle and East Asian origin
(Billings & Scott, 1994; Munson, 1995). In the former religions, mostly,
fundamentalist groups exist as a stable phenomenon where members
socialize their children through the family and special schools to
become members themselves (Altemeyer, 2003; Bermanis, CanettiNisim, & Pedahzur, 2004; Beyerlein, 2004; Godwin, Godwin, &
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Martinez-Ebers, 2004). The latter versions of fundamentalism appear
as more transitory states, a waxing and waning of religiously justified
ethnocentrism that is a highly relevant factor in the political life of a
country for some decades, but may lose their importance thereafter.
These fundamentalisms are organized along the lines of social class
and are often instrumentalized in political campaigns (Rogers et al.,
2007; A. Sen, 2006). Despite these differences, however, we consider the
more ethnocentrically orientated fundamentalisms such as Hindutva
and Abrahamic versions as large enough to subsume them under one
label (Riesebrodt, 2000).
According to some authors, religious fundamentalism is to be
conceived as a psychological phenomenon of the personality or a form
of psychopathology (Ellens, 2006; Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005;
Rock, 2004). While a psychological analysis may be helpful for understanding the membership dynamics of sects and relatively stable
fundamentalist groups (Altemeyer, 2003; Altemeyer & Hunsberger,
1992; Ellens & Ellens, 2004; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), as well as for
understanding why individuals commit terrorist acts (Rogers et al.,
2007), this is less clear with fundamentalism as a dynamic phenomenon. Membership in fundamentalist movements that show cycles of
activity and silence largely exhibits a pattern of distinct class culture
(Coreno, 2002) and is organized in terms of cultural and institutional
constellations (Thomas, 1996). Its dynamics are much more focused on
ethnic identity politics (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000) by constructing unambiguous symbolic boundaries that firmly exclude the Other as
‘demonic’ and it shows an active engagement against secularists who
relativize the good and bad in the world (Nagata, 2001). Because of
these characteristics of cyclic fundamentalist movements, our focus is
more on societal states than on individual traits; that is, on the medium
scale of cultural dynamics.
In the present research we take up the Hindu case and investigate
the cultural consequences of the resurgence of a militant and politically
inspired fundamentalism. This movement faced the task of changing a
series of semiotic mediators (Valsiner, 2003) that were inherited from
the times of the Indian struggle for independence and of reinterpreting historical events to fit the fundamentalist ideological agenda. In an
earlier publication focusing on the Indian situation, we showed how
popular representations of history are being reframed and interrelated
to convey justification of, and to endow them with the emotional force
necessary for, mass action. Historical events, as represented in groups,
form a narrative network that informs the actions, cognitions and
affects of their holders. In the case of antagonistic groups, such as
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Hindus and Muslims in India, historical events and the derivative
interpretations following from their narratives are more often than not
hetero-referential in the sense that each group’s representation is validated by, and indeed depends on, the respective antagonistic representation of the other group (R. Sen & Wagner, 2005).
Symbolic change on the temporal scale of approximately 60 years is
well beyond the usual toolbox of psychological methodology. Hence,
we rely on historical and political accounts to cover the background
and prehistory of the recent events that are reflected in the qualitative
interviews. Given this unusual procedure, the report is not a straightforward account of the interviews’ semantic analysis, but depends on
the cross-references that we can draw from our respondents’ stories to
the wider societal field. We think that the theoretical approach of social
representations provides a fitting framework for this task (for example,
Jovchelovitch, 2007; Moscovici, 1988, 2000; Wagner & Hayes, 2005).
A central task for fundamentalist groups is to justify the strict
division between ethnic identities (that is, Hindu and Muslim in the
present case; Bhatt & Mukta, 2000). Ethnic identity depends on the
brace of historical fate being imagined as inevitable and goal-directed.
Anything less than a coherent tale of the foundation of a group’s existence, its charter, would not do (Liu & Hilton, 2005). Hence, adapting
historical accounts to fit current identities is one consequence of fundamentalist politics (cf. Liu & Laszlo, 2007). The success of concocting a
fitting historical account depends to a large extent on taking up a series
of culturally rooted representations and symbols and either giving
them a new meaning or rejecting their present day value altogether. In
the present case, it is the religious symbolism of the saffron colour, the
cultural meaning of the swastik and of Om that were given new, or at
least added, meanings by the movement. The prevailing social representation of Gandhi and his politics of non-violence—which appeared
acceptable during the struggle against the colonizers, but had lost its
positive connotation for Hindus after independence to a large degree—
had to be condemned as secularist, anti-Hindu and as an obstacle to
violent politics.
In this text we focus more on the mechanics of using cultural resources
and less on the psychological underpinnings of these processes. We
maintain that for analyzing socially meaningful phenomena, it is
necessary to depart from the habitually close confines of psychology’s
argumentation and to include historical, social representational and
collective activity in analysis and theorizing (Valsiner, 2001). Just as an
individual draws on cultural resources to serve in individual meaning
making (Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & Aveling, 2008), so do collectives
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by being engulfed in a web of representational systems that endow
meaning on the social objects and events, and that are ‘polyphasic’
enough to allow orientation in the multitude of situations, small or
large scale, that one may face (Moscovici, 1976; Wagner, 1998; Wagner,
Duveen, Verma, & Themel, 2000). The collective character of the
processes makes them a prime illustration of how representational
systems come into being and are transformed by concerted action and
interaction that is often instigated by powerful individuals (Marx,
1919); indeed, collective co-action is the source of the force that representational systems exert in societies. Despite the specificity of the
Indian case, we think that the cultural events recounted and analysed
here do not preclude their cultural mechanics being generalized to
other societies.
Gandhi’s Symbolism, British India and Orientalism
In pre-independent India, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s sharp
understanding of the Indian psyche helped him to create a powerful
repertoire of symbolic representations associated with non-violence,
which took the form of a sociopolitical movement. This legacy of nonviolence, which was both spiritual and political, played an important
role in the world.
Gandhi’s appeal to symbols arousing the collective imagination took
British imperialists completely by surprise. They were ill-equipped to
control the unusual forms of protests developed by Gandhi. Gandhi
represented insignificant events and daily objects, endowed them with
meaning and ultimately these symbols condensed into unusual forms
of protests gained mass support and became socially accepted. Not
surprisingly, the British were stupefied by Gandhi’s civil disobedience
movement, which became one of the major forces during India’s
independence movement. Gandhi’s ways were not Brahminic, but
struck a chord within the ordinary person and were immediately
accepted by the masses since they were tuned to the ‘philosophia plebia’.
Below are some typical examples that were used to create a representation in word as well as in deed.
In Indian culture, salt is perceived as the lifeline of a person and
when a tax was imposed by the imperial powers on this commodity,
Gandhi used this opportunity to create a civil disobedience movement
called the ‘great salt march’. Tax on salt was represented as slavery and
the symbol of exploitation. Thus, by sensitively exploiting the cultural
meaning of an insignificant object, Gandhi captured the highest form
of national spirit ever witnessed in the country. Through the salt march,
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Gandhi represented resistance as peaceful; a new representation in
itself (Weber, 1997).
Similarly, Gandhi made Khadi (homespun) a widely accepted
symbol, a common bond uniting people from diverse backgrounds. It
was a representation that made abstract political ideas, such as the
struggle against colonialism, concrete. The spirit of the people, weary
of domination, was turned into action through the use of Khadi. To
wear or not to wear Khadi was a personal decision, which anyone could
take and thereby be involved in the task of attaining an independent
India. Gandhi, with his astute perception and psychological insight,
imbued a seemingly mundane sphere of life with political and moral
significance. Thus, the sting of supposed western superiority, which
had eroded the spirit of mid- and late Victorian India, boomeranged
on the British. Through the agency of Gandhi’s non-violence, the
common Indian took position on the high horse of moral superiority
(Thapar, 1990b). Their perceived image began to differ from the image
created of them by the colonizers. This ushered in a collective change
in identity.
In contrast to the western concept of secularism, Gandhi suggested
Sarvadharma Sambhav (peaceful co-existence of all religions) to prevent
conflicts caused by religious bigotry. The concept was introduced by
Gandhi to counter the British policy of divide and rule and thereby to
unify the various factions into which the institutional politic had been
divided.
Internationally, Mahatma Gandhi became the iconic representation
of non-violence. Not surprisingly, after Gandhi, there is a widely
accepted myth in the West that non-violence is a cardinal principle of
Hinduism and that it is widely practised. This perspective is a spin-off
from the view popularized by a small section of European scholars and
in particular German Romanticism, which had discovered India
through its ancient philosophy and literature in Sanskrit (Thapar,
1990a). For Romanticists, in contrast to the materialistic West, India
symbolized spiritualism and peace. This image also received support
from a section of Indian thinkers during the last 100 years and was
enhanced by the orientalization of India (Ludden, 1996; Said, 1993).
European imperialism coupled with Romanticism thus invented a
religious traditionalist image of India.
But this is, indeed, a misrepresentation that Gandhi himself recognized by pointing out that both the Mahabharatha and Ramayana (the
major Indian epics) were replete with instances of violence (Vidal,
Tarabout, & Meyer, 2003). The Bhagvad Gita shows that the space for
violence is not new in India. Violence has been a much debated subject
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here and open to various interpretations since ancient times. In ancient
India, violence, if justifiable, was regarded as a religious duty (dharma)
and war was often sanctioned if it was used to correct the dharmic
(religious) balance.
In pre-independent India, Gandhi faced stiff resistance and much
criticism, but had ultimately been successful in operationalizing the
concept of non-violence in the Indian subcontinent. Against huge
hurdles, Gandhi practised non-violence and when he failed, he recognized his errors and made efforts to correct them. This, however, does
not establish that because of Gandhi, violence was set aside and culture
and religion were rewritten. Violence continued to exist. Gandhi
himself regarded non-violence as merely a strategy to be used circumspectly to foil a cunning adversary. In fact, Gandhi’s non-violence, with
which he had already experimented in South Africa, can be interpreted
as collective resistance at a moderate and regulated level of militancy.
In Gandhi’s estimation, violence would have stripped resistance of its
mass character and would have thereby threatened its sustainability
(S. Sen, 2007).
In contrast to popular representation, Gandhi, who had a singularly
versatile philosophy, believed that for the prevalence of truth, the
concept of Ahimsa (non-violence) could also be sacrificed. This should
not come as a surprise since Gandhi’s views were, among others,
inspired by the Gita and the Gita never underplayed the utility of
violence. Nonetheless, non-violence, as it is everywhere, was
considered desirable in the face of a global public and Gandhi, over
time, became a symbol of non-violence per se.
In fact, one lone man, Mahatma Gandhi, the non-violent secularist,
mourned the killings of the innocent and fasted in Kolkata (formerly
Calcutta) while the country celebrated the onset of free India. Divisive
politics, as embodied in partition, which had taken recourse in largescale retributive violence and set aside the norms of religion as faith,
had left a deep scar on his secular soul; he did not rejoice. For his
cussed stand on secularism, he even lost his life. Nathuram Godse, a
Hindu fundamentalist, shot Gandhi for his supposed pro-Muslim
leanings. This is a clear indicator of the fact that opinion was divided
about Gandhi even in pre-independent India: Gandhi was shot by a
Hindu.
The Study’s Historical and Geographical Background
Questionnaires are not the method of choice in the context of religion
(Williamson & Ahmad, 2007) and particularly when the respondents
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are largely illiterate, the choice of qualitative interviews is mandatory.
One of the authors (R. Sen) conducted the interviews during the
summer of 2003, when the atmosphere in India was charged with
communal tension and the hawkish Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was
still in power. The general belief was that it would win the parliamentary elections to be held in 2004 with a thumping majority; the US
had invaded Iraq; and, for the first time in independent India, political
clout was used in Gujarat in 2002 to inflame communal riots. The
results are hence context specific.
The research locale was Dharavi in the heart of Mumbai, which is
supposed to be Asia’s largest slum and is a communally sensitive area.
Here, religion has a significant presence as testified by the fact that it
has 28 temples and 35 ‘faith schools’ (madarsas) and mosques (Sharma,
2000). On several occasions, Dharavi has witnessed riots between
Hindus and Muslims. Major riots broke out in Dharavi in December
1992 (motivated by the demolition of the Babri mosque at Ayodhya).
Since then, there has been palpable communal tension. Following the
riots in 1992, there was high polarization around communal lines and
tenuous co-existence of different communities. Dharavi’s temperament
was described as highly mercurial. In the words of the interviewees,
Dharavi is symbolic of a world that ‘changes everyday and nobody
knows when it might explode’ and ‘what spark will trigger it off’. Here
the mafia and underworld ruled; drug peddling, prostitution and gang
wars were still routine.
In Dharavi, violence had become part of daily discourse, internalized
and accepted as a norm. Given its volatile nature, Dharavi has created
a discourse of violence that has become normative and has been used
by politicians over many decades to incite communal violence. This
tinderbox, which was highly inflammable, was the locale of the present
research.
Mumbai lies in the state of Maharashtra, which, together with
Gujarat, has the highest per capita death rate and incidence of riots.
They also account for the largest number of total deaths in riots. In
Maharashtra, there is a pattern of consistent violence which contrasts
starkly with its image as an industrial and modern state (Varshney,
2000). Given its high propensity to riots, it became the natural choice
for our study on violence.
Communal rioting is essentially an urban phenomenon, whereas
rural India, with two-thirds of the Indian population, accounts for less
than 4 percent of deaths through communal violence (1950–1995).
Hindu-Muslim riots are concentrated in eight cities representing 5
percent of India’s population (see Table 1). This cluster accounts for a
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Table 1. India’s riot-prone cities, 1950–1995 (Varshney, 2000)
Cities
Deaths due to riots 1990–1995
Mumbai
Ahmedabad
Hyderabad
Meerut
Aligarh
Vadodra
Delhi
Kolkata
1137
1119
312
265
160
109
93
63
disproportionate share of communal violence (45.5 percent). Given that
communal rioting is city specific, Mumbai, with its highly riot-prone
nature, was selected as the appropriate city for research on ethnic
violence. This metropolis, beset with contradictions, its Manhattan
skyline juxtaposed with slums, has been witness to large-scale
communal violence.
For the study, literacy was used as a principal basis of stratification.
Semi-literacy (less than nine years of education) is a good indicator for
poverty and deprivation in India. To counter the frequent critique that
research supposedly representing the plebeian voice in reality draws
on elitist or official material, we focused on low literacy coupled with
socioeconomic deprivation. Additionally, we targeted married, 25–35year-old slum residents. Amidst the deprived there is a high prevalence of early marriage and, second, communal politics generally
flourishes amidst the 25–35-year-old age group. Consequently, this age
group is actively involved in the creation of inflammatory situations.
Finally, the study was restricted to a riot-prone area. In order to
understand ethnic conflict, this does not suffice. A similar study
conducted in a peaceful slum would have greatly enriched the analysis
and understanding of the nature of conflict, and its attendant violence,
retributive violence and non-violence. Unfortunately this was not
possible.
Method
Sample
Twenty in-depth interviews, 10 by each author, were carried out
among Hindu and Muslim, semi-literate married males, aged 25–35
years, who resided in Dharavi. In order to establish a social network,
help was received from contacts (i.e. people familiar with the milieu,
social class and religion).
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Material and Procedure
The interviews were conducted in Hindi/Hindustani (a mix of Hindi
and Urdu) and lasted 60–75 minutes. They probed the different symbols
and representations being used to bolster communal politics and
focused on violence and non-violence. Given the communal surcharge
and politically sensitive nature of the research, use was made of visual
stimuli. The respondents were shown the visuals and then their
reactions, which became akin to storytelling, were probed. This method
helped to build a rapport with the respondents, who were otherwise
reluctant to talk on the subject of violence. However, since the interviewer was a Hindu woman, initially the respondents, in particular the
Muslims, were reticent, but once a rapport had been established, they
became emotionally invested (Mamali, 2006; R. Sen, 2005).
Setting aside interview-related logistics, visual stimuli were also
used because we believe that historical symbols are part of a cultural
narrative that can be used to mobilize public opinion, since it is
assumed that there is a feedback loop between representations of the
past and the social identities of the here and now.
In the ensuing analysis, recourse has been taken to a multi-level
analysis, but is largely dependent on interviewee responses. Personal
surmises and observations have been mentioned separately; sources of
secondary data, used to help understand interviewee responses, are
mentioned in the text. Quotes from interviewees’ statements are
marked with ‘M’ for Muslim and ‘H’ for Hindu.
Analysis and Interpretation
Divergent Perceptions of Gandhi’s Non-violence
In pre-independent India, Gandhi, although controversial, was highly
respected and independent India declared him the ‘father of the
nation’. However, in contemporary India, due to an upsurge in Hindu
fundamentalism, the image of Gandhi has undergone a radical transformation among a growing number of Hindus.
The simple question, ‘are you a Gandhi?’ became a pejorative for
anyone who espoused any act of simplicity. Gandhi was beginning to
be looked down upon or at least considered eccentric. Further, according to the respondents, responsibility for the partition of India in 1947
was now being differently assigned and Gandhi’s intentions were
beginning to be questioned by an increasing number of Hindus.
Gandhi had pampered the Muslims, hence they are now trying to dominate
in our country. This should not be allowed. They got Pakistan because of
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him and now why do they not leave us in peace? Why don’t they take
Gandhism to Pakistan? (H)
According to the respondents, for those people who were wedded to
the cause of Hindu revivalism, Gandhi had become anathema and the
final insult. Historical perceptions of events such as the partition of
India became strongly linked with the stand the respondents were
taking on topical political issues such as the rise of Hindutva.
One reason for this change in representation, Gandhi’s ‘big mistake’,
was the organized bid to write a history that was manipulated to suit
an agenda of Hindu revivalism. The data show that during this time,
history was open to elaborate oral arguments and was not, as it is often
believed to be, a repository of facts (Wertsch, 2002; White, 1987). The
following responses reflect the distortions of history and the new oral
history debates used to justify current political understanding: ‘He
should not have given Pakistan to Muslims, should have left it in India.
This was Gandhi’s big mistake. Why are Hindus today missing in
Pakistan and Bangladesh whereas over here they [Muslims] keep
increasing?’ (H).
Thus, the BJP’s politics of oral augmentations constituted a history
and began to retain, alter or reappropriate social knowledge, which
began to condition the behaviour, emotion and perception of Hindu
Rashtra (nation), Hindutva, secularism and Gandhi. The tenets
(Jhingran, 1995), on the basis of which the BJP tried to create a fundamentalist mindset, were:
(1) Hindus constitute the Indian nation, since they are the original
inhabitants and sole creators of its society and culture;
(2) Hinduism is uniquely ubiquitous and tolerant and, hence, superior to
any other faith;
(3) The subsequent entry of foreigners created the illusion that India
was a land of many different and equal cultures; and,
(4) Only a ‘truly secular’ Hindu Rashtra will afford protection to nonHindus.
All four points reflect a rather clear fundamentalist ideology: claim
to a region by descent; superiority of one’s culture; and the rejection of
secularism. This reorientation of history, which can be challenged and
is controversial (for example, Lal, 2003; McGuire, Reeves, & Brasted,
1996; Pandey, 2001; Punyani, 2003; Varshney, 2000; Zakaria, 2002),
became akin to a charter (Liu & Hilton, 2005). It contained ‘invented’
traditional memory (see the italicized terms in the four points given
above), which was used to serve current social purposes (Anderson,
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1991; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Kammen, 1993; Wagner, 1998) and
helped in the creation of a strong Hindu identity.
The present data provide an example of how political entrepreneurs
concoct stories to help create new political realities (Hunt, 1984). We
believe that Hindu revivalists, in their attempt to create a Hindu India,
superimposed the new element—that Gandhi was responsible for the
division of India—on memories of the past. Gandhi’s ‘big mistake’
began to occupy centre stage and became the anchor for anti-Gandhi
discourse.
Our surmise is that the first attempts to rewrite history begin with
whispered smear campaigns and in an atmosphere charged with
communal distrust, the person who upholds the middle ground
becomes the first casualty. Gandhi, who had for a long time stood as a
supreme product of this multi-religious history and was a symbol of
communal harmony and peace, thus became its primary target.
Thereby, through manipulation of a symbol and the rewriting of
history, Hindu ideologues tried to modify the existing knowledge base.
Our data show the dynamics whereby historical events and the
surrounding narratives were selectively employed by politicians (in
this case, Hindu revivalists) to legitimize their hidden agendas (Liu &
Laszlo, 2007). They astutely used significant images rooted in the past
to manipulate the present. Experiences were thus concretized into
symbols (R. Sen & Wagner, 2005), which led to representation of events
and figures. Gandhi too was meted this fate by Hindu revivalists.
Destroying Cultural Symbolism
The research highlights the fact that in the changed circumstances of
contemporary Indian society, the perception of Gandhi’s cultural
symbolism, used for non-violence or peaceful resistance, had moved
towards a more Hindutva framework. Respondents from both the
communities in Dharavi were quick to reject the basic tenets of
Gandhian thinking in relation to non-violence. Gandhi’s ideas were
viewed as anachronistic and not in synch with modern reality,
although the views on Gandhi himself were divided: ‘The world has
changed, people want to move fast. All this is for the old fashioned and
not in keeping with the present’ (H).
Respondents felt that Gandhi’s beliefs had become history, which,
when read, was a wonderful tale, but was perceived as many light
years away from reality. There was a mute desire, a mere glimmer, to
replicate it, but it was perceived as wishful thinking and set aside when
referenced to the harsh reality of their existing situations. The respondents across the communities also showed a desire for the ‘common
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day, gentler existence’ (aam, siddhi-saadhi zindagi). However, given the
general sociopolitical ambience, this was seen as ‘gibberish’ (bakwaas),
since there was a well-entrenched belief that politicians were beyond
redemption and that, in order to preserve their terrain, they would
immediately remove a Gandhi who was spartan and self-sacrificing
and would therefore challenge their ways.
The analysis of the interviewees’ discourse shows that Khadi
(homespun), which was one of the powerful symbols of a classless
ideology and was used by Gandhi to unify the fragmented polity
against British imperialism, was now viewed altogether differently. It
was represented as a luxury. Muslim and Hindu respondents alike
were unanimously cynical about its usage and felt that it had now
classed itself in the designer niche—a product for the rich. Khadi users
had become a class by themselves (see Figure 1).
For most respondents, Khadi signified the hypocritical posture of
politicians who:
. . . just as actors wear clothes appropriate for the character they are playing,
politicians wear Khadi. They are all hypocrites (dhongi). We should all stay
away from the Khadiwaalas [those who wear Khadi]. They just come to make
a fool of us. No one is a Gandhi amongst them. They just live in luxury using
his name. We should beat them up. (H)
Figure 1. Khadi (homespun)
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The philosophy of ‘simple living; high thinking’ and ‘peaceful coexistence of all religions’ (sarvadharma sambhav) was used by Gandhi to
bring about a change in social perception. Amongst our respondents,
this philosophy had been turned on its head and was perceived as a
luxury that could be indulged in only by the privileged. They felt that
all these ‘high thoughts’ could only be the prerogative of those who
were comfortable and did not have to fight for their daily survival:
They have the time and means to be good. We survive. No time for all this
goodness stuff. Do your job and get on. At best don’t pick up a fight (lafda).
Besides, what do we have to give up . . . our clothes, our children? All this
is time-pass (pastime) for the rich (bade log). (H)
The above examples indicate that when a bundle of signifiers are
assimilated, they create representations, which often help in the sociocultural interpretation of events. The change in perception shows that
these multi-level meaning complexes are not closed units, but are open
to constant innovation (Valsiner, 2003). Representations are not fixed
entities, but are dynamic, open and subject to social change. Gandhi’s
symbols in contemporary India, as testified by the interviewees’
responses, had lost their impact.
Corroborating the above surmise, respondents from both the
communities were also sceptical regarding the use of peaceful resistance as an effective conflict resolution process. Although the desire for
peaceful resistance existed, it was not considered viable. They did not
place great faith in such a process: ‘In today’s circumstances violence
cannot be countered with non-violence. Nobody wants to follow the
peace route. The attitude is: I have to kill; will kill’ (M).
The Beginnings of Retributive Violence
Historical Context
Retributive violence has, since ancient times, been a legacy that has,
time and again, been revoked in the name of correcting dharmic
imbalance, to strengthen a pan-Hindu sociopolitical identity or to
consolidate power in institutional politics. Britain and modern India
have been witness to the formation of militant organizations: the RSS
(Rashtriya Swayam Sevak, an extreme rightwing organization) project
commenced in 1925; Hindu Mahasabha, which stood for Hinduizing
India and militarizing Hinduism; and the Muslim League, organized in
1906 (Hardy, 1972; Jalal, 1985). All these political outfits were driven by
a strong religious ideology under the disguise of cultural nationalism.
In independent India, all hues of ideological players have taken part
in unleashing retributive violence: the Congress party spearheaded the
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anti-Sikh violence of 1984; a Gandhian, Hitendra Desai, featured in the
bout of violence against Muslims in Gujarat, 1969; and, finally, the BJP
and Hindutva (Akbar, 2003; Engineer, 1995).
Taking their lessons from this multilayered history, the BJP
(1999–2004) made an attempt to orchestrate social transition, whereby
an attempt was made to systematically crystallize ethnic identities.
This trait is perceived in almost all kinds of nationalisms where, in the
bid to create a nationalist identity, the immortality of the group is
emphasized and the arguments in favour of its continuity underlined,
so that people feel impelled to be the torch bearers (Smith, 1998). Our
respondents’ supported this thesis. According to the interviewees,
during the BJP regime, the idea was that the core identity of a true
Hindu be constructed around ancient Hindu lineage, militancy be
accepted, retributive violence be justified, secular acts be perceived as
pretentious and those who espoused such views be considered lackeys
of western spirit and, thus, the superiority and immortality of Hindu
and Hindu-sthan (land of Hindus) be firmly established.
Thus, stoking Hindu revivalism, through the ancient Indian civilization theme—an astute use of tradition and past experiences to justify
political agendas (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins,
2001)—the BJP was able to inflame the embers of Hindu pride and
kindle the desire for retributive violence as exemplified by responses
such as ‘will wage a higher form of violence’ in order to establish
Hindu superiority. In fact, throughout the interviewees’ discourse, the
underlying emotion, expressed in different forms, was ‘an eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth’. This discourse of violence had become
normative. Undoubtedly, with this shift in identity politics having been
set in motion, it exerted a strong motivational pull on the people.
With social changes during the late 1970s and early 1980s, communalism got a strong boost and started attacking secularism in a big
way. The BJP took up the mantle of ‘the’ communal party, quickly
mushroomed, introduced a communal rhetoric in the social space and
openly declared its agenda of Hindu Rashtra (Jhingran, 1995).
The Symbolic Antecedents of Violence
The events that followed show that the agenda of balancing the acts of
history through Hindu revivalism, and thereby domination of the
Muslim community, was beginning to be accepted. For instance,
colours also began to be endowed with different sociopolitical significance. The significance of the saffron colour (bhagwa) has its origin in
the Vedic ages, when it was associated with fire (Agni) worship and it
was customary for sages to carry fire when they moved from one
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ashram to another. It is conjectured that perhaps because of the inconvenience of carrying ‘fire’ over long distances, a safe symbol—the
saffron flag—was created. Triangular and often forked saffron flags are
seen fluttering atop most Sikh and Hindu temples. While Sikhs regard
it as a militant colour, Buddhist monks and Hindu saints wear robes of
this colour as a mark of the renunciation of material life. However, our
respondents in Dharavi immediately associated the saffron colour with
the BJP and its allies: ‘This [the saffron flag] is symbolic of the Shiv Sena
and the BJP. Whole of Mumbai is full of such flags. In Dharavi they are
all over the place’ (H).
This is the Maratha Tiger’s [local name by which Bal Thackeray, who is head
of the rightwing Shiv Sena, is addressed in Maharashtra] colour. When he
roars (garajna) everybody stops in their tracks. We should have his flag
everywhere. (H)
On the basis of these reactions, it is clear that its former meaning in
Hindu culture as a symbol for renunciation had been transformed.
Instead of being a symbol of piety, it had become symbolic of Hindu
revivalism, since both the BJP and Shiv Sena have appropriated the
saffron colour and, in contemporary India, saffron has become a social
representation of Hindutva to the extent that if anyone wears saffroncoloured apparel, he or she is teased as having become a part of the
Hindutva brigade. Thus, a new representation was created—the
colour had taken on a different connotation and been effectively
instrumentalized.
Figure 2. Rightwing flag
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Figure 3. Aum or Om (this was not a separate visual shown to the respondents, but is a
modified version of the symbol embedded in the visual of the saffron flag)
The respondents expressed that an escalation in Hindu militancy
had been given a clear mandate. The Hindu flag in the saffron colour,
bearing Hindu symbols (om and swastik), along with a sword, was
unanimously appreciated by the Hindu respondents.
In Hinduism, om or aum is considered a sacred syllable representing
the Brahman or the Absolute—the source of all existence. In ancient
India, as elsewhere, the incomprehensible, such as Brahman, was represented as a symbol and was used to anchor the Unknowable. It is an
important symbol in Hinduism, occurring in every prayer, and invocation to most deities begins with it.
Second in importance only to the om, the swastik holds great religious
significance for Hindus. Swastik is not a syllable or a letter, but a
pictorial character in the shape of a cross with branches bent at right
angles and facing in a clockwise direction. A must for all religious
celebrations and festivals, swastik symbolizes the eternal nature of the
Brahman, for it points in all directions, thus representing the omnipresence of the Absolute. The term is believed to be a fusion of the
two Sanskrit words ‘Su’ (good) and ‘Asati’ (to exist), which, when
combined, means ‘may good prevail’.
Coming back to the local, among our Hindu respondents, the saffron
flag with Hindu symbols, along with the new addition, the sword, was
seen as a statement of the rise of Hindu militancy. ‘It has no symbols of
the Muslims . . . only Hindu symbols. The sword can kill. It heralds that
Hindus are now thinking of violence’ (H). It is important to make note
of the pride factor and aggressive tone being associated with Hinduism.
Hinduism, a philosophy of life, was thus beginning to take on the hues
of canonical thought and began to be treated as religion as ideology.
In contrast, when this visual was shown to the Muslim respondents,
there was a feeling of unease and a ‘no comment’/brushing aside
scenario was common. The few who did speak appeared apprehensive
at this change in Hindu identity: ‘Why does this flag have the sword?
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The rest of the symbols are religious. Now they are trying to provoke
the Hindus to become militant. This is clear and we feel insecure’ (M).
Here it is perhaps worth emphasizing that this change in cultural
tools, such as social representations, was not driven by an internal
dialogue, but was fuelled by collective controversy. The decodification
of visuals did not take place in a cultural, semantic or political void,
but in an environment that was heavily loaded with discourse. Sometimes our respondents reduced a semiotic mediator (e.g. the saffron
colour), which represented several things simultaneously, to a sign
with a single meaning (Hindutva). Through this reduction, the colour
was objectified as a representation of Hindutva. The addition of a new
element, the sword, to a repertoire of religious symbols and the
concomitant reactions, which gathered momentum at the societal level,
were a by-product of a social trend, which was then known as the
saffron (bhagwa) wave.
From 1991 onwards, the distribution of tridents for the symbolic
self-defence of the Hindus and trishul-diksha (consecration or initiation
by giving a trident; Shrimali, 2003) had gained currency. In such an
atmosphere, as the interviewees indicate, the Hindus became more
belligerent and the Muslims apprehensive, but retaliatory. Such actions
and accounts, an escalation in militancy and aggression amongst both
the communities are clear examples of social representations going
public in words and deeds. Social representing is not a sterile process
limited to theoretical and image factors, but comprises behaviour.
Violence was ‘justifiably’ unleashed and led to riots. When this occurs,
noticeable changes in the symbolic sphere more often than not precede
the enactment of a representation.
Condemning Secularism
According to Hindu and Muslim respondents, the spirit of retributive
violence engulfed both communities. The interviewees’ responses
show that any dissidence against the holy alliance between religion
and politics was generally not tolerated. It was brushed aside as
‘pseudo-secularism’. Hindus described secularists as clones of the
anglicized native who, having imbibed western values, was elitist, out
of touch with the real India and was always ashamed to assert his or
her own religious demands. They stood in the dock accused of using
‘double standards’ when taking a stand on religious issues and the
general feeling among the respondents was that most English-speaking
Hindus are not open to shedding their anti-Hindu rhetoric. In affective
terms, the respondents resented this group, calling them ‘glamorous’
and arrogant.
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The general feeling among Hindu respondents was that ‘enough was
enough’ and it was time that Hindus demanded respect and ‘put
people—Muslims and secularists—in their place’. Proponents of the
Hindu cohort also often referred to secularists as ideological enemies
and had coined a term for them: Macaulay’s children. The descriptors
associated with Hindu secularists by the Hindu respondents—’head in
the clouds’ (airy fairy), ‘talk gibberish in English’ (angrezi mein git-pit),
‘weak Indians, without spine’, ‘brown sahibs/memsahibs’, ‘clones of the
British (angrez)’, ‘westernized’, ‘smug’—show, and we surmise, that by
prefixing secularism with ‘pseudo-’, the definition of the entire
baggage associated with secularism, a previously firmly held representation, was being changed. Thus, by changing the definition of secularism, the Hindu ideologues had successfully, to some extent, changed
collective thought and thereby increased their hold on the Hindu
mindset. We believe that this representation of the secularists, when
intertwined with the Hindutva slogan, ‘Say with pride that you are a
Hindu (Garv se kaho ki Hindu ho), not only increased the distance of the
common people from the secularists, but also helped in consolidating
ethnic identities and further fragmented the society along communal
lines. Thereby, Hindutva, through the use of cultural signs, created
social turmoil and impacted the thinking of the common man.
At the time of the fieldwork, there was movement taking place
regarding the perception of secularists and Gandhi. The perception of
both by a section of Hindu respondents, as discussed above, was in
direct contrast to that held by the Muslim respondents as well as some
Hindus. This group referred to secularists as, ‘saviours’, ‘symbolic of
hope and security’, ‘protectors of the minorities’ and, ‘because of them
we can still live in India’. Muslim respondents, as well as some Hindu
respondents, echoed a similar feeling for Gandhi, remarking that he
symbolized hope in an increasingly hostile atmosphere and, hence,
was seen as the sole protector of the Muslims: ‘Gandhi’s philosophy
did not create partition. Gandhi had said that, “first cut me into two
pieces, then divide the country”’ (9M).
The overall responses show that the perceptions of Hindu/Muslim
secularists and of Gandhi had begun to serve as markers of salient
group boundaries. These boundaries were beginning to catalyze the
formation of ethnic identity, which was becoming increasingly rigid and
tenets of religious behaviour were getting less fuzzy and more clearly
demarcated. Testimony to this social change is reflected in the interviewees’ responses. If Muslim secularists were perceived as having
‘sold out to the trio of Zionists, Hindu revivalists and US’, ‘forgotten
Islam’ and were ‘mere pretenders’ and there was underscoring of the
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view that ‘Kattar (fundamentalist) Muslims were the true followers’ by
some of the Muslim respondents, the feeling towards Gandhi among
some of our Hindu respondents was: ‘Nobody wants a Gandhi today.
People want a leader who is strong and thinks about the Hindus. In all
this, where does Gandhi figure?’ (H).
These descriptors/emotions, whether they be associated with
Hindu/Muslim secularists or Gandhi, show that the space for secularism, also perceived by some as symbolic of syncretism, was getting
reduced, and religion as faith was gradually becoming religion as
ideology and in the bargain creating new ethnic identities. Concomitantly, this led to a rise in retributive violence.
Hindu Ethnic Dominance
As discussed earlier, in the atmosphere of divisive politics that
permeated India during 1999–2004, the agenda of Hindu revivalism
had begun to overshadow institutional politics. Our interviewees’
responses indicate that those who opposed the rise of Hindutva and
retributive violence were symbolically represented as westernized,
pseudo-secularist and, hence, not representative of the true India.
In this sacred/profane dichotomy, it appeared that the fundamentalists had found a competitive edge. In contrast, Gandhi, who could not
be faulted for his westernization, was projected as a leader responsible
for the partition of the country. In the changed circumstances, as indicated by the material, new politicians were beginning to gain respect
within the public space and in the minds of many Hindus. Their
success hinged on an escalation of violence, which had become an
accepted way of life, and only a few respondents belonging to both the
communities felt that this trend will change. Violence was here to stay.
The material shows that, as instigated by Hindu revivalism, most
Hindu respondents exhibited a complete transformation in the representation of Gandhi. A process of collective coping on the symbolic
level, a societal renegotiating of representations, was taking place. A
new social representation of Gandhi and non-violence was emerging
since, in the atmosphere existing at that time in Dharavi, group
identity, whether it be Hindu or Muslim, was being threatened. In
order to promote the formation of ethnic identity, communication and
rhetoric were being used to subvert social rules: ‘People have no one
to guide them. They do have a space for peace, but nobody touches
that. It’s only violence that they see and follow’ (H).
This transformation ushered in profound change in sociocultural
patterns. While it would be difficult to assign any one overriding
reason, our research suggests that one of the main causes for this
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divided identity may have been as a result of the shift from religion
as faith (Nandy, 1990) to religion as ideology and concomitantly a
crystallizing of a fundamentalist and uni-dimensional religious
identity. In the following discussion, we use the term religion as faith
in a Gandhian sense, meaning the lived experience, the deeds, the
personal example. Traditionally, Hinduism is not a religion, but a
philosophy of life and hence open to change. However, religion as
ideology, as defined here, is perceived as didactic, demanding commitment, expansion of its territory, and has a set of commandments that
are not to be trespassed. The boundaries are defined and its protection
attains paramount significance.
Religion as Ideology and Consolidation of Ethnic Identity
Our respondents pointed out that during the BJP regime, both Hindus
and Muslims had gradually set aside the rich cultural heritage of
syncretic religion and rode roughshod on these little traditions. Rustic
homilies, exotic and integrated remixes, which served as a spiritual
balm, were replaced by didactic religious tenets. Consequently, the
lines of ethnic identity were becoming clearly demarcated and
syncretic culture did not seem to be attractive. It appeared to have lost
its pull.
Some people in the villages are just Muslims in name. They live with Hindus
and have forgotten the ways of Islam. What is the right thing to eat? They
drink [alcohol]. This is not allowed in Islam; it is haram (prohibited). That
which is made by rotting is haram. (M)
This trend was in sharp contrast to earlier Indian culture where,
often enough, the religious space of common people remained fluid
and incorporated elements from the great traditions, whatever their
origin: Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist or tribal. This eclectic assimilation,
which was free from the boundaries of religion, had helped people to
come to terms with the often hostile environment within which they
existed. The most outstanding example of such cultural intermingling
was that which took place between Hindus and Muslims over an
extended period and gave rise to syncretic popular cultures, which are
not centrally organized and lack a formal canon. Both religions had
integrated some aspects of the other within their own mainstream
religio-cultural matrices. As a result, syncretic cultures grew. Consequently, unusual gurus, ‘the dramatist of popular angst’ (Banerjee,
2002), struck a chord in people’s imagination. Banerjee’s account of
saint Satyapir or Satyanarayan, who claimed that, ‘I am Rahim in Mecca,
in Ayodhya Ram’, lucidly illustrates this dual religious identity. Two
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distinct religious identities (Hindu and Muslim) were merged and
used interchangeably. Yet another testimony of this cultural intermingling was that all over India, posters were sold which, together
with the icons of Mecca and Medina, depicted the portraits of saints and
a pictorial version of the legends and miracles associated with them.
All this was beginning to be lost.
The respondents felt that both Hindus and Muslims were moving
towards a communal ideology whereby religion moved out of the
bounds of the private and entered the public arena and became
the basis of an antagonistic relation between the two groups. The
responses reveal that religion as an ideology was fast replacing religion
as faith. When such a shift takes place, the issues related to identity and
selfhood become so fissile that, if torched, they subsume individual
rationality, ‘heighten community emotion’ (komi jazba) and ‘the devil
comes in’. Consequently, they become highly susceptible to collective
controversies, especially when such controversies have their origin in
religious ethos. The ‘mix between fundamentalist and secular’ disappears and hardlining becomes the rule.
Most of us are a mix of fundamentalist (kattar) and secular. When an incident
occurs, then there is a heightened community emotion (komi jazba). Then
anything can happen. You are angry. If you see something, a devil comes in,
an influx of emotion. You don’t understand anything. You might regret this
later but then it’s real. It sweeps you. (M)
The respondents felt that there had been an erosion of their ethnic
identity and that this should be rectified. Thus, social positions and
newly emerging ethnic identities had to be enacted and the use of
violence became sanctioned.
Importantly, in the entire discourse, affect and cognition were invariably discussed in terms of the collective: communal passion (kaumi
jazba), protectors of Hindus/Hinduism (Hinduoan ke rakshak), we
(humsab), those people (woh log), social pressure (samaj ka dabav), and
so on. The attribution for any act or deed was rarely in the first person
singular. In fact, the common people, through whom most acts of
violence were committed, absolved themselves from all responsibility
regarding such violence. Although they conducted the violence, it was
not seen as an act associated with their own identity, but was solely
attributed to political ambition. Philosophically stated, the underlying
element was: ‘Those who have to dig a hole every day to drink water
[the poor] how can they be involved?’ (H). ‘Dig a hole every day’
characterizes their helplessness and justifies the behaviour of those
who dwell in the slums. Their harsh reality allowed them to ‘explain
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away’ the threatening phenomenon of guilt. All our respondents
cutting across religion did not bear the burden of guilt. Violence was
justified, explained away or seen almost as a ‘dharmic’ (religious)
necessity used to protect ethnic identity.
One other reason for rationalizing acts of violence and maintenance
of an ethnic order was the extensive deployment of rhetoric, in particular, to rationalize the existence of Hindu-Muslim antagonism and to
prove that communalism is morally correct, inevitable and necessary.
These ideas circulated widely and freely in the public domain and
acquired a commonsense quality by their institutionalized repetition.
This narration helped in the creation of a new ethnic order whereby
the group dominates and one’s identity absolves from guilt. Retributive violence was not perceived as individually driven and responsibility rested with the group as a whole, not with the individual who
committed the act.
Conclusions
The present research shows how fundamentalist politics is based on a
redefinition of what constitutes religion, in the course of which the
symbolic realm undergoes profound changes. The meaning of the
saffron colour, for example, changed from sacred fire to signify incendiary militancy, as did other cultural elements. Equally, the representation of the past is being cleansed and historical events are
rearranged in the interest of ethnic division and readiness for collective violence.
Our respondents alluded to religion as their all-encompassing and
exclusive identity that sets them apart from their neighbours who do
not share in the same creed, hence creating sharp divisions between the
proximal ethnic groups of Hindus and Muslims. Driven by factors
more akin to an ideological mindset, people begin to mould their
behaviour within the straitjacket of pre-specified terms of reference,
which are circulated at the collective level. Such overarching systems
of partitioning lead to the creation of different ethnic identities where
a singular trait, based on religion, foments the entire structure of the
identity and hastily reduces the complexity of identity to a unidimensional phenomenon (A. Sen, 2006).
In the present case of the growth of Hindu fundamentalism, the
symbolic non-violence inherited from Gandhi’s struggle for Indian
independence from the British Empire was one of the symbolic
obstacles that had to be turned from its feet onto its head, and successfully so. Gandhi’s symbolism, non-violence and ethnic tolerance
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became despised and interpreted as a major cause of many of the
current problems. At its core, all fundamentalism is an exercise in the
radical remoulding of the past.
One final comment is in order here. The cultural dynamics analyzed
in this study throw some doubt on the view that religious fundamentalism is first and foremost a psychological phenomenon (Ellens,
2006; Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). We do not wish to lessen the
role of psychological factors in general, but movements such as
Hindutva, as well as others around the world, embrace too many different people to be accounted for solely by shared psychological traits.
Instead, the actors share a similar background of culture, social class
and cast. Fundamentalist movements that blossom hand in hand with
nationalist politics are, at their core, collective events that irresistibly
engulf the individual actors and bring them to commit acts that
become possible only against the background of mass action; and the
underlying psychology is a societal psychology of collective representing and acting rather than a psychology of personality. We are talking
here of collective states and not of individual traits.
Our material shows that through the manipulation of cultural
symbolism, collective controversy and group-related feelings of
impunity, violence is allowed to be committed without feelings of
personal guilt. Once identity shifts have taken place and ideology
replaces faith, a new ethnic order may emerge. We think that the
present example illustrates many similar conflicts around the world,
where a dominant political interest governs public discourse, appropriates religious feelings and redefines the cultural and historical tools
at disposal in a society.
Acknowledgements
Our special thanks to Catalin Mamali and Sukla Sen for their incisive
comments and suggestions.
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Biographies
RAGINI SEN earned her PhD from the London School of Economics and
Political Sciences and is the author of We, the Billion (Sage, 2003). She has
worked as Head of Social Research, India and Nepal, with MARG (now
AC-Nielsen). Dr Sen has been a senior fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation and has also lectured at the University of Delhi. She is currently
Director, Logistics India. ADDRESS: 103 Marian Terrace, 68 Chapel Road,
Bandra West, Mumbai-400050, India. [email: [email protected]]
WOLFGANG WAGNER is Professor at Johannes Kepler University, Linz,
Austria and at the University of the Basque Country, San Sebastián, Spain. His
research is on societal psychology, social representations, racism and the
popularization of science. He recently co-published Everyday discourse and
common sense: The theory of social representations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and
co-edited Meaning in action: Construction, narratives and representations
(Springer, 2008). [email: [email protected]]
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