International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
Duration: 11 January 2002 – 10 August 2003; 31 March 2004 - present
Number of military personnel: 21,237
Honours and awards: Military Order of William 1; Bronze Lion 2; Bronze Cross 3;
Cross of Merit 22
Fatalities: 21
Background
In February 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan after more
than ten years of occupation. The war had cost a total of some 1.5 million lives and
had caused around five million Afghans to flee. The communist regime held out until
April 1992, when Kabul was captured by mujahedeen troops. In the years that
followed, Kabul became the focal point of the armed struggle between two resistance
movements, which was to result in the devastation of large parts of the city.
In 1994, a new military power emerged unexpectedly, the Taliban (plural of Talib,
which simply means religious student), mainly from Koran schools (madrassas) in
Pakistan. In the autumn of 1994, the fundamentalist Taliban began their advance in
Afghanistan. They captured large parts of the country within a few years. Only in the
north did a few mujahedeen groups, united in the Northern Alliance, hold their
ground.
In the war against the Soviet Union, one of the sources of support for the Afghan
resistance had been Al Qaida (which means 'the base’). This organisation of Islamic
fundamentalists numbered an estimated 50,000 members, most of whom, like their
leader Osama bin Laden, came from the Arabian peninsula. After the fall of the
communist regime, Osama bin Laden set up his base in Sudan and built Al Qaida up
into a sizeable international terrorist network. Under pressure from the United States,
the Sudanese government closed its doors to Al Qaida in 1996. Osama bin Laden and
his followers found a new refuge in the Taliban’s Afghanistan.
On 11 September 2001 – ‘9/11’ – Al Qaida carried out attacks in New York and
Washington DC. The United States responded by invoking Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter (the right to self-defence) and declared war on terror. The first target
in the war was the Taliban government, which was harbouring Osama bin Laden and
his organisation. The United States applied considerable pressure on the Taliban
regime to extradite the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. The uncooperative attitude
of the government in Kabul prompted the decision by the United States to join forces
with the United Kingdom and Australia and launch an attack on 7 October. Operation
Enduring Freedom was thus a fact.
The mandate and tasks of ISAF
After a coalition of the US, the United Kingdom and the Northern Alliance had
brought down the Taliban regime at the beginning of December, international
attention was focused on the future of Afghanistan. One of the consequences of the
25-year-long civil war was the lack of a functioning national government and police
apparatus. Afghanistan was ruled by a number of warlords, each of whom had his
own private army. The international community felt that it was important not to allow
another political and power vacuum to form in the country and that the rebuilding
should start as quickly as possible.
Representatives of the main ethnic, political and religious groups in Afghanistan, with
the exception of the Taliban, signed the Bonn agreement on 5 December 2001. Those
present agreed that an interim government – which should reflect the Afghan
population in terms of ethnic origin – would after six months convene a Loya Jirga or
Great Council in order to elect a transitional government. Hamid Karzai was elected
as interim prime minister of Afghanistan. In Bonn, the member states of the United
Nations were asked to play an active part in setting up a new army and police
apparatus. In the meantime, a UNSC-mandated peace force would assist the Afghan
authorities in maintaining security in Kabul and the surrounding area.
The Security Council ratified the Bonn agreement in resolution 1383 on 6 December
2001. On 20 December 2001 (resolution 1386), the Council approved the
establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF; approximately
4,800 military personnel). The Security Council mandated ISAF on the basis of
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. The mandate authorised the security force to
take all measures deemed necessary to accomplish the assigned task. The mandate
did, however, call upon the security force to conduct its mission in close consultation
with the Afghan interim government and the UN special representative. The Northern
Alliance had initially opposed the involvement of foreign troops. They only agreed to
it once it had been established that the peace force would be limited in size and of a
temporary nature. The Bonn Agreement also kept open the option of extending the
ISAF mandate to the rest of the country, although the Security Council did not
mandate ISAF explicitly in this regard until 13 October 2003 (resolution 1510).
ISAF’s actions served to improve the security situation in Kabul and thus helped the
Afghan authorities to maintain public order. ISAF also worked to restore the
infrastructure.
ISAF organisation
From December 2001 to August 2003, ISAF was what was known as a coalition of
willing and able states. Policy decisions and the exchange of information between the
participating countries thus took place through a Committee of Contributors to ISAF,
which was chaired by the lead nation. Successive lead nations were the United
Kingdom (22 December 2001 – 20 June 2002), Turkey (20 June 2002 – 10 February
2003) and Germany and the Netherlands jointly from February 2003 to 11 August of
the same year. NATO has been in command of ISAF since then. ISAF III, led by
Germany and the Netherlands, grew into a peace force of some 5,400 military
personnel, 900 of whom had national support tasks. ISAF used the standard NATO
command structure with a strategic headquarters and an operational (brigade)
headquarters, the Kabul Multinational Brigade (KMNB). The United Kingdom
supplied the KMNB commander until 20 March 2002, when the German Brigadier
General C.H. von Butler took over the command. Dutch Colonel H. de Koff was
appointed as the second-in-command (the Netherlands supplied this official until July
2003). The KMNB was partly made up of three reinforced battalions. ISAF was also
responsible for Kabul International Airport (KAIA). A number of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have also formed part of ISAF since 2004.
The military personnel taking part in Enduring Freedom operated throughout
Afghanistan. ISAF’s area of responsibility extended from Kabul to Baghram air base
to the north of the city and its operations were confined mainly to Kabul and the
surrounding area, where the KMNB had its own area of responsibility. Because of the
overlap in operational areas, USCENTCOM had the power to intervene if there was
any danger that the two operations would conflict. The headquarters of ISAF and the
Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) – responsible for Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan - regularly coordinated their planning with each other and the
two commanders also discussed operational matters on a regular basis. ISAF set great
store by developing and maintaining its own identity in respect of Enduring Freedom,
so that the people of Kabul and the opponents of the Karzai government did not tar
them both with the same brush.
On 13 October 2003, the Security Council authorised NATO (resolution 1510) to
expand ISAF's area of operations beyond Kabul. The first expansion phase, which
was known as ISAF ‘phase II’, was carried out by deploying Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the northern and western provinces. On 1 August
2006, NATO became operational in the south of Afghanistan during ‘phase III’ and
on 5 October 2006, when ‘phase IV’ started, NATO assumed command of the whole
country. The US-led operation Enduring Freedom did, however, remain active in
Afghanistan in parallel with ISAF.
Dutch participation in ISAF
Infantry company and contingent command in Kabul
In December 2001, the United Kingdom offered to take over the leadership of ISAF.
The first ISAF military personnel, who came from the British 16 Air Assault Brigade,
arrived in Kabul on 22 December, the day the Afghan interim government came to
power. The day before, the Dutch government had decided to send a reinforced
company of some two hundred military personnel to take part in ISAF. One of the
three airmobile battalions would in turn be responsible for providing an ISAF
company. Given the intensity and gravity of the operation, personnel were only
deployed for three months at a time. The infantry companies consisted of an infantry
platoon, a reconnaissance platoon (a second infantry platoon from November 2002),
an antitank platoon, an engineer platoon and a logistic platoon, as well as a mortar
group and of course a company staff. Each rotation was assigned a Commando Corps
(KCT) platoon to perform reconnaissance tasks. The KCT platoon was originally
assigned to the Dutch company, but was placed under the direct command of the
KMNB from 2 April 2002. From then on, it was also given reconnaissance tasks in
the area between Kabul and Baghram. The KMNB commander thus acknowledged
the exceptional qualities of the KCT platoon. The KCT personnel were
organisationally assigned to the German/Dutch ISAF headquarters on 10 February
2003. The KCT platoon’s place within the KMNB was taken over by an airmobile
reconnaissance platoon, while the infantry company was reinforced by a rapid
reaction unit (in fact a third infantry platoon) from February to August 2003.
The Dutch company formed part of the German battle group, which contained an
Austrian company as well as a German company. The KMNB headquarters were
stationed together with the German troops at a base camp (Camp Warehouse) on the
road from Kabul to the East Afghan town of Jalalabad. The Dutch company had its
own spot at this camp (nicknamed Dusty Dutch). The first Dutch serviceman,
company commander Major H. Quax, arrived in Afghanistan on 1 January 2002 to
participate in an international reconnaissance mission. Three days later, the Afghan
government formally agreed to the stationing of ISAF troops in Kabul. ISAF was thus
able to make a start.
The Dutch, German, Danish and Austrian ISAF military personnel were deployed in
close consultation with Germany. It was agreed in principle that Germany would
transport most of the equipment to Kabul and that the Netherlands would take care of
the transport of personnel. Only two Afghan airports were, however, equipped to deal
with the large quantities of troops and equipment. These were the severely damaged
and initially unusable airport at Kabul and the more northerly and smaller military
airfield at Baghram. A German/Dutch forward detachment (32 men) flew in a KDC10 to the eastern Turkish town of Trabzon on 11 and 14 January, where they
transferred to a C-130 Hercules for the flight to Baghram. The threat posed by antiaircraft weapons in Afghan airspace was too great for the KDC-10, because it was not
equipped with self-protection systems. The flying range of the C-130 was, on the
other hand, too limited to be able to fly direct from the Netherlands to Afghanistan.
Personnel moved in columns from Baghram to Kabul. In mid-February 2002, the
relay station of Trabzon was exchanged for the Uzbek town of Termez. The Dutch
ISAF contribution of 220 personnel had in the meantime reached full strength by 13
February 2002. They were joined from 1 May to 1 July 2002 by a surgical team (five
service personnel), which was stationed in the German field hospital at Camp
Warehouse. A 12-strong nursing team also arrived at this camp on 29 September
2002, also destined for the field hospital.
The ISAF commander, British Major General J. McColl, declared initial operational
capability on 16 January 2002. The KCT platoon was already busy with the
reconnaissance of the area of operations assigned to the Netherlands, namely districts
8 and 12 and Bagrami in the southeast of Kabul. Following in the footsteps of the
KCT platoon, the reconnaissance platoon, which arrived with the first part (92
personnel) of the main force on 26 January, was to start conducting independent or
combined patrols with the local police. These patrols were conducted around the
clock, either on foot on in open soft-top Mercedes Benz all-terrain vehicles. During
the patrols, troops sought contact with the authorities and with civilians in order to
keep their finger on the pulse and gather intelligence. On the whole, the Dutch
personnel thus developed a high level of situational awareness and were good at
responding to local circumstances and potential dangers. The six Patria armoured
vehicles that the company received in February were, therefore, only used in a limited
capacity for column protection, and then only when the security situation deteriorated
and during night patrols. The company also supplied a 24-hour guard for Camp
Warehouse every two days, carried out small humanitarian projects as part of the
hearts-and-minds campaign and set up incidental roadblocks to check passers-by.
They also watched the terrain from temporary observation posts. The airmobile
deployment of the troops proved highly effective. To surprise those who were up to
no good, foot patrols were occasionally set down by helicopter in the area of
operations. Every now and again, the detachment was deployed for tasks which fell
outside the scope of the mandate. For instance, on 27 March 2002, a KCT security
detachment with five vehicles and an ambulance (twenty personnel in all) set off as
part of an ISAF aid convoy for an area some 200 kilometres to the north which had
been struck by two earthquakes and severe aftershocks. The rescue workers returned
on 31 March.
Even after the revolution at the end of 2001, Afghanistan was a country which was
ruled by warlords and criminal gangs. The disarmament of the warlords’ private
armies and the establishment of a credible Afghan army were thus a priority. The
same day that the ISAF commander declared the security force fully operationally
capable, the first recruits for the 1st Battalion Afghan National Guard (1st BANG)
were undergoing their medical examination. The Netherlands provided financial
support for the training, supplied the doctor for the company’s aid station to do the
candidates' medicals and was involved in the training of the reconnaissance platoon.
The initial training was completed on 3 April 2002. At the beginning of March,
however, the ISAF commander voiced his concerns about the absence of a
programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). The DDR
process did not commence until the beginning of 2004.
The ISAF personnel were feeling the effects of the limited success of the DDR
programme, with more and more indications that the opposition to the new Afghan
government was getting itself organised. There had in the meantime been a meeting of
the Loya Jirga, which had elected Hamid Karzai as president on 13 June 2002.
However, his number two, Vice President Abdul Qadir, was murdered on 6 July. In
the same period, there were also several attacks on Karzai himself. Tensions were thus
rising and the stability in Kabul was under threat. Ex-Prime Minister Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's fundamentalist faction, Hezb-i-Islami, was particularly active around the
Afghan capital, the activities manifesting themselves in gun battles and small-scale
bombings. There were also leaflets circulating in Kabul inciting attacks on ISAF
soldiers and there were numerous reports of ‘bomb cars’ moving around the city.
There was also a threat from the unguided missiles launched towards Camp
Warehouse or the US embassy. Dutch personnel regularly sought refuge in the
underground shelters. The launch locations were thought to be to the southeast of
Kabul. ISAF responded by intensifying and targeting their patrols and by adapting the
KMNB's area of responsibility. The Dutch company extended its patrols to an area on
the eastern side of police district 12 (known as the Eastern Extension) and the police
district of Chahar Asiab to the south of Kabul. The KMNB’s area of responsibility
was extended accordingly, on 18 January, 31 March and 30 April 2003 to the east,
south and southeast.
Infantry company commanders
Maj H. Quax (1 January 2002 – 29 April 2002)
Maj B. Wijnhoud (29 April 2002 - 26 July 2002)
Maj A.J.W. Frieling (26 July 2002 - 2 November 2002)
Maj M.J. Lindeboom (2 November 2002 - 3 February 2003)
Maj R.P. Gillesse (3 February 2003 - 7 May 2003)
Maj C. Sutherland (7 May 2003 - 11 August 2003)
Senior National Representatives
Lt Col A.C.T. Hover (8 January 2002 - 29 April 2002)
Lt Col J. van Bruggen (29 April 2002 - 26 July 2002)
Lt Col J.S. van der Laan (26 July 2002 - 3 November 2002)
Lt Col drs. M.M. Broekema (3 November 2002 - 30 January 2003)
Contingent commanders and deputy SNR
Lt Col J. van der Woerdt (30 January 2003 - 1 May 2003)
Lt Col P.B. van Campen (7 May 2003 - 11 August 2003)
ISAF headquarters
Halfway through 2002, Germany suggested to the Netherlands that they should jointly
take over the leadership of ISAF from Turkey. To investigate the military feasibility,
both Ministries of Defence set up a Combined Joint Planning Group (CJPG), which
went to Kabul at the beginning of October to see how the land lay. The cabinet
decided on 1 November 2002, in close consultation with the German authorities and
on the basis of the recommendations of the CJPG, to take on joint leadership of ISAF
for a six-month period. Parts of the German-Dutch High Readiness Forces
Headquarters (HRF HQ) in Münster were deployed for this, supported by a signal
battalion and a staff support battalion. In all, the Netherlands sent an additional four
hundred military personnel to Afghanistan. The HRF HQ commander, German
Lieutenant General N. van Heyst, took over the command on 10 February 2003.
Dutch Brigadier General R.A.C. Bertholee was the chief of staff and deputy
commander of ISAF III. He was also the Senior National Representative from 30
January to 11 August 2003. Germany and the Netherlands were thus responsible for
the military-strategic and political running of the operation. The commander of the
German Einsatzführungskommando in Potsdam was appointed to the post of Joint
Commander, as such responsible for the operational management. For this, he had the
ISAF Operations Coordination Centre (IOCC – a continuation of the CJPG led by
Dutch Colonel R.J.W. Toma), also in Potsdam, at his disposal.
Under the Turkish ISAF command, the KMNB was operating more and more
independently and had in effect become the public face of ISAF. Van Heyst again
made the headquarters responsible for ISAF’s policy and strategy, while the KMNB
became responsible for the operational task. In the run-up to the mission, the ISAF
staff developed what they called a campaign plan, the aim of which was to provide
more structure for the actions of the security force. ISAF's primary focus remained on
ensuring day-to-day security in Kabul. During his familiarisation visits to local
Afghan authorities, the commander was often told that ISAF should adopt a more
active, open and visible approach. The number of patrols were, therefore, doubled in
comparison to the preceding period, to eighty every 24 hours (in the second quarter,
patrols peaked at 130 per day). The higher intensity of patrols not only increased
ISAF's visibility but also its situational awareness. As well as ensuring safety in
Kabul, ISAF III supported the reorganisation of the Ministries of Internal Affairs and
Defence, the establishment of the Afghan army and the police, the DDR process, the
preparations for the Constitutional Loya Jirga – which would vote on a new Afghan
constitution – and the general elections, improvements to the situation at Kabul
International Airport, as well as updating the existing extraction and evacuation plans
and developing several new contingency plans.
The ISAF headquarters were based in the main building of the former Military Sports
Club, while the grounds belonging to it provided accommodation for the support
units. A Dutch engineer unit of eighty personnel was initially deployed for three
months, but eventually for six, to increase and improve the bunker capacity at the
headquarters and at Camp Warehouse. The unit was integrated into an Italian engineer
battalion. Germany and the Netherlands decided to further reduce the risk of security
incidents by assigning the KCT platoon in organisational terms direct to the
headquarters, thus providing sufficient reconnaissance capacity in the outer area. The
deployment of Dutch mortar locating radars on 8 February 2003 (24 personnel) meant
that ISAF was able to pinpoint the location from which missiles were fired so that
they could send patrols out. This brought the number of Dutch military personnel in
Kabul to 650.
Despite these security measures, ISAF remained vulnerable. The primitive and
inaccurate missile launches continued. Even the Minister of Defence, H.G.J. Kamp,
and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral L. Kroon, were given a personal taste of
the situation on 10 February 2003. In a letter to the Lower House, Minister Kamp
stated that the most direct threat was posed by anti-western elements operating
covertly in and around Kabul. This was confirmed a month later when a Dutch patrol
became the target of an attack. A remote controlled explosive device was detonated as
the group of vehicles went past. An Afghan interpreter was killed and a Dutch soldier
was wounded. Disaster struck again a few months later, when several Dutch forward
air controllers from the Commando Corps drove over an antitank mine. The mine had
been laid on a path that had already been used a few times by the Dutch.
Personnel at the ISAF headquarters had a lucky escape at 22.40 hrs on 30 March
2003, when a missile struck right in the middle of the premises. The impact of the
fragments was clearly visible in some of the sleeping quarters and in the Kabul Café,
which was frequented by staff officers. The worst incident, however, occurred on 7
June 2003, when an Afghan taxi packed with explosives blew up a shuttle bus
carrying German soldiers early in the morning. Besides the suicide bomber himself,
the attack cost the lives of four Germans and an Afghan. All 29 of the other German
military personnel were injured. The medical team that rushed to the scene and a
number of medics from the Dutch infantry company were able to provide first aid.
Some of the injured were admitted to the Mobile Medical Operating Room System
(42 people), which had deployed at Kabul airport on 23 February 2003 because the
Czech Republic had withdrawn the medical support for ISAF at KAIA. This Dutch
hospital also contained medical staff from Belgium, Latvia and Hungary.
General Van Heyst handed over the command to the commander of NATO’s Joint
Command Central Europe from Heidelberg, Lieutenant General G. Gliemeroth, on 11
August 2003. The return of some 650 Dutch service personnel and their equipment
was effected with the assistance of a C-130 transport aircraft from Termez air base
from 27 July to 23 August. But that was not the end of the Dutch participation in
ISAF. Some 25 to 35 military personnel continued to take an active part in ISAF's
staff from NATO headquarters. Two officers from the military legal corps were
stationed with the US Task Force Phoenix, which was assisting the establishment of
the new Afghan army. From 11 August 2004 to 13 February 2005, Major General
L.C.R.M van den Born was the deputy commander of ISAF, as was Major General
J.S. Willemse, who held the same post from 4 August 2005 to 14 February 2006. As
of 1 February 2007, Major General F.H. Meulman became Deputy Command Air
(and deputy commander of ISAF) at ISAF’s headquarters for a year; Major General
J.L.H. Eikelboom succeeded him on 22 January 2008. The post of ISAF deputy
commander was moved elsewhere in the organisation. A few months earlier, another
senior Dutch officer had arrived in Kabul, namely Major General (Marines) H.A. van
der Til. He began his tour as the deputy chief of staff for operations, but was
appointed as the director of ANA Training and Equipment Support (DATES) at the
beginning of 2008. DATES has been organising and coordinating NATO support for
the Afghan army since 1 November 2007.
Apache detachment
On 1 December 2003, NATO's Secretary-General, Lord Robertson, asked the
Netherlands to provide transport or combat helicopters for ISAF. The Dutch
government decided on 30 January to comply with this request by supplying six AH64D Apache helicopters and an accompanying air force detachment of 135 personnel.
The helicopters were incorporated as an independent unit in the German-led
helicopter battalion that formed part of the KMNB. On the one hand, they operated as
a rapid reaction unit and, on the other, they had to demonstrate ISAF's striking power
to malicious elements. As part of the latter activity, they conducted air reconnaissance
and escort tasks and provided protection for ground convoys or transport helicopters.
The commander of the ISAF peace force saw the aircraft as a force multiplier for his
infantry patrols, which could now literally see through walls. The detachment kept
two aircraft aside as an operational and technical reserve. In a few specific cases, the
Apaches were able to operate outside the Kabul area of operations. One of the
detachment’s first operational flights was to escort German transport helicopters to the
Baghlan province (in northern Afghanistan) on 4 April. The Apaches also helped on
several occasions with the arrest of armed opponents of the Afghan government and
with the search for suspect vehicles or weapons storage sites. At the beginning of
February 2005, the Apaches were successfully deployed in a search for a downed
passenger plane. There were unfortunately no survivors.
The Ministry of Defence posted liaison officers to the staff of the KMNB and to the
ISAF headquarters to evaluate the deployment of the helicopters against the mandate
and the rules of engagement. The detachment rotated every three months, as had the
infantry company before it. The main force arrived in Kabul on 31 March 2004 and
was operationally ready by 13 April. During a routine flight on 29 August 2004, an
Apache helicopter crashed and burst into flames. Both crew members were able to get
out of the aircraft alive.
Apache detachment commanders
Lt Col O. Eichelsheim (31 March 2004 - 1 July 2004)
Lt Col E. Hermans (1 July 2004 - 29 September 2004)
Lt Col J.J. Duinhof (29 September 2004 - 29 December 2004)
Lt Col J.J. Koedijk (29 December 2004 - 31 March 2005)
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Pol-e-Khomri
In February 2002, the United States took the initiative of setting up Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (then called Joint Regional Teams) as part of Operation
Enduring Freedom. The PRTs kept an eye on local and regional developments,
supported central government in the expansion and consolidation of its authority,
advised local leaders and facilitated cooperation between the various international and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The PRTs also cooperated with the local
population in supporting the rebuilding projects that the NGOs were unable or
unwilling to take on.
On 13 October 2003, the UN Security Council approved an extension of the ISAF
mandate to the rest of Afghanistan. Two days later, the German Bundestag decided to
post a PRT to the town of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan as part of that initiative.
The other seven PRTs still formed part of Operation Enduring Freedom. The North
Atlantic Council approved a new NATO operation plan for ISAF on 14 April 2004,
thus enabling ISAF to begin a phased expansion of the area of operations to cover the
whole of Afghanistan.
At the beginning of March 2004, the Dutch government informed the House of
Representatives of its intention to look into a Dutch contribution to a PRT and an
orientation mission was sent to Afghanistan from 5 to 18 March. The cabinet felt that
Afghanistan must not be allowed to degenerate into a nation governed by corrupt
regional administrators and international drug cartels. The government also offered to
contribute several service personnel in support of the German PRT at the end of
January 2004. A reconnaissance mission, supported by Apache helicopters, was active
in the province of Baghlan from 4 to 10 June. The Afghan authorities and the United
Nations were giving high priority to the deployment of a PRT in Baghlan because of
the strategic position of the province. Baghlan is half the size of the Netherlands and,
in July 2004, was home to some 875,000 inhabitants. The provincial capital is Pol-eKhomri, also the base of the PRT.
The cabinet decided on 28 June to participate in the PRT in Baghlan and a start-up
team of around sixty people arrived in Pol-e-Khomri on 24 August. Just over a month
later (1 October), the PRT was operational. The PRT numbered 130 military
personnel and was made up of a command group, three military observation and
liaison teams (MOLTs), an operations centre, a rapid response unit (forty people) and
a logistics organisation.
In an emergency, the PRT could call upon an infantry company in Mazar-e-Sharif and
two NATO ‘over-the-horizon’ battalions, which were located outside Afghanistan.
The Netherlands for its part provided the German PRT in Kunduz with a 40-strong
security detachment for the duration of the elections in October 2004.
A CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) element joined forces with the local authorities
in initiating some small-scale aid projects. The commander was assisted by a political
adviser from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the ‘polad’), who, in 2005, was given a
budget of five million euros by the Ministry of Development Cooperation to fund
larger-scale building activities in the province.
The PRT aimed to curb the misuse of power by local leaders by keeping a finger on
the pulse, according to reports by the responsible ministers to the House of
Representatives in June 2005. This allowed the local and provincial powers, appointed
by the government in Kabul, to increase their authority. Given the high levels of
corruption in the official government and police apparatus, this proved to be no easy
task. The PRT's range of tasks was gradually expanded. The MOLTs, also called
mission teams, conducted long-range reconnaissance operations lasting several days
and extending to the farthest reaches of the mountainous province in order to get an
idea of political-administrative relations and social needs. A number of reserve
officers were assigned to the PRT to supervise the CIMIC projects and marechaussees
provided basic training for Afghan police officers. More personnel were also needed
for the logistic support from Kabul, and the size of the detachment rose accordingly to
around 180 people. The PRT also provided support in the voting rounds for the
presidential elections in October 2004 and the parliamentary elections in September
2005.
When the fourth Dutch PRT rotation started up in September 2005, the Royal
Netherlands Navy took over the lead role within the unit. The Marine Corps now
formed the force protection element, which was increased to 51 men. In order to
contribute to the security and stability in the province, this infantry component
conducted joint patrols with the Afghan security services. The PRT also continued to
collect weapons and ammunition from the former warlords. Although in general terms
the security situation remained stable, the second year saw an increase in the number
of incidents. In particular the threat of improvised explosives planted at the side of the
road (roadside bombs) posed an increasing problem throughout Afghanistan. On 21
October 2005, a vehicle in a Dutch convoy was severely damaged by a roadside
bomb. Fortunately, there were no casualties. In February 2006, the tension increased
temporarily in the whole of the country as a result of the anger of Muslims all over the
world about Danish cartoons which were regarded as insulting to their religion. There
was even a disturbance in front of the gate of the PRT compound in Pol-e Khomri, in
which a marine sustained minor injuries. A missile was fired at a Dutch convoy on 23
June 2006.
With the gradual increase in the PRT, partly because of extra intelligence capacity to
improve its own security, the numbers eventually rose to 220. During the second year
of the unit's operations in Baghlan, the PRT, together with the local authorities and
NGOs, executed hundreds of small projects and a few large-scale projects, such as
erecting extra television and radio masts, setting up schools and installing several
small hydroelectric power stations to generate electricity. Hungary took over the PRT
in Pol-e Khomri from the Netherlands on 1 October 2006.
Provincial Reconstruction Team commanders
Col J.A.H. van Hoof (29 August 2004 – 1 February 2005)
Col T.C.M. Rikken (1 February 2005 – 22 May 2005)
Col drs. A.A.H. de Bok (22 May 2005 - 1 September 2005)
Col (Marines) J. van Putten (1 September 2005 - 30 February 2006)
Capt (Navy) P. de Harder (1 March 2006 - 1 October 2006)
ISAF F-16/KDC-10 detachment
On 20 August 2004, the cabinet decided to supply six F-16 fighter aircraft and a
KDC-10 tanker aircraft to ISAF to assist with the presidential elections on 9 October.
The first of the total of 180 military personnel arrived at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan
on 8 September, followed two days later by five F-16s and a KDC-10. The first
operational mission was flown on 15 September. One of the tasks of the F-16s was to
escort the convoys that had to take the ballot boxes to Kabul. The detachment returned
to the Netherlands in two waves on 13 and 20 November. Karzai was inaugurated as
president of Afghanistan on 7 December 2004.
ISAF had a permanent requirement for combat aircraft to protect the PRTs and other
ISAF units, as well as a temporary need for aircraft to support the parliamentary and
local elections expected to take place in September 2005. At the beginning of
February, NATO sounded out its member states about possible participation. The
Dutch government decided on 25 February 2005 to supply three combat aircraft and a
reserve aircraft, as well as approximately 100 military personnel, from 1 April for a
period of one year. The aircraft arrived at Kabul airport on 24 March. This meant that
the deployment of a tanker aircraft, which would have been needed in Kyrgyzstan,
was no longer necessary. The detachment moved to Baghram when the necessary
repairs to the airport’s runway and the infrastructural improvements had been made.
From 14 July 2005, four Dutch F-16s and four Belgian aircraft formed the 1st
Netherlands/Belgian European Participating Air Forces Expeditionary Air Wing (1
NLD/BEL EEAW). After the Belgian detachment left in January 2006, it was
replaced by a Norwegian detachment with four F-16s, operating under the name 1
NLD/NOR EEAW. The overall leadership was in the hands of the Dutch detachment
commander, both during the cooperation with the Belgian air force and during the
cooperation with the Norwegian air force. The Dutch-Norwegian cooperation came to
an end on 12 May 2006. On the same day, four extra F-16s arrived from the
Netherlands, bringing the total number of fighter jets from the Dutch F-16 detachment
in Kabul to eight. The Dutch fighter-bombers were deployed in support of their own
ground troops and the troops of the coalition partners. British troops in Helmand
province, for instance, received air support from Dutch F-16s on several occasions.
In the context of its participation in ISAF 'phase III', the F-16 detachment relocated
from Kabul to Kandahar. The move was originally planned for 1 May 2006, but did
not actually take place until 12 November 2006 because of a delay in the completion
of sufficient parking spaces and the renovation of the runway. The move substantially
reduced the response time for deployment over the southern provinces, although the
fighter-bombers were still deployed out of Kandahar throughout the whole of
Afghanistan as well.
ISAF F-16/KDC-10 detachment commanders
Lt Col B.O.B. Verkroost (8 September 2004 - 20 November 2004)
Lt Col L.W.E.N. van Geel (24 March 2005 - 14 July 2005)
Lt Col P.T.M. Tankink (14 July 2005 - 14 September 2005)
Lt Col W.R. van de Mast (14 September 2005 - 10 January 2006)
Lt Col J. Leenders (10 January 2006 - 20 April 2006)
Lt Col J.A.C. Goense (20 April 2006 - 1 August 2006)
Lt Col L.W.E.N. van Geel (1 August 2006 - 10 November 2006)
Regional Command North (RC-North)
To better coordinate the activities of the ISAF PRT’s in northern Afghanistan the
Regional Area Co-ordinator North was setup in July 2005. The Netherlands claimed
the position of chief-of-staff in 2005, because we had a PRT in Baghlan and a marine
battalion in Mazar-i-Sharif. There wasn’t enough time to fill the position via the
customary procedures. Therefore, Colonel A.J. Schouwenaars, who was posted at the
Bundeswehr Operations Command in Potsdam, was sent to Afghanistan on short
notice. He was replaced in mid-September by Colonel G.H.J. Noordanus. His stay
was cut short because the position of chief-of staff RAC-North was claimed by
Norway. He returned to the Netherlands on 13 December 2005. The senior
Netherlands position in the RAC-North staff after Noordanus left, was the chief J2
chair.
Return of the contingent command
Because of the deployment of the Dutch air force detachment in Kabul and the PRT in
Baghlan in the second half of 2004, a need arose to re-establish the Dutch contingent
command in Kabul. As the Dutch military presence in Afghanistan grew steadily, the
responsibilities of the contingent command increased over the next few years. On 9
February 2007, the contingent command moved from Kabul to Kandahar, as the
Dutch point of main effort now lay in the south.
Contingent commanders
Air Cdre J.J. Franken (23 March 2005 - 18 May 2005)
Air Cdre J.L.H. Eikelboom (18 May 2005 – 28 June 2005)
Air Cdre E.J. Oliemans (28 June 2005 – 5 August 2005)
Col J. Abma (5 August 2005 – 2 September 2005)
Col A. den Drijver (2 September 2005 – 7 December 2005)
Col J. Abma (7 December 2005 – 7 February 2006)
Brig Gen ir. R. Tieskens (7 February 2006 – 27 June 2006)
Brig Gen mr. J.P. Spijk (27 June 2006 – 6 November 2006)
Brig Gen H.J. Scheffer (6 November 2006 – 4 Maart 2007)
Brig Gen M.F.P. van den Broek (4 March 2007 – 4 July 2007)
Brig Gen A.J. van der Hoek (4 July 2007 - 11 November 2007)
Brig Gen mr. R. in ’t Veld (11 November 2007 – 10 March 2008)
Air Cdre ir. M. de Zeeuw (10 March 2008 – 8 July 2008)
Air Cdre B. Buitenga (8 July 2008 – 20 November 2008)
Air Cdre G.M. Bergsma (20 November 2008 – 12 march 2009)
Cdre J. Snoeks (12 March 2009 – 13 July 2009)
Brig Gen drs P.A. Grootendorst EMIA (13 July 2009 – 7 November 2009)
Brig Gen dr R. van der Meer (7 November 2009 – present)
Election Support Force (ESF)
On 3 June 2005, the Dutch government decided to further reinforce ISAF during the
election period in September 2005 with a marine battalion (750 troops), which had
been part of NATO's Strategic Reserve Forces (SRF) since 1 April 2005. The unit was
augmented with specialist units, such as a field hospital and a CH47-D Chinook
helicopter for medical evacuations. Given the presence of the Dutch PRT in Pol-e
Khomri, the Dutch government requested that the battalion, led by Lieutenant Colonel
(Marines) mr. R.G. Oppelaar, be deployed in the north of Afghanistan. This meant
that one of the battalion’s platoons could be assigned to the PRT for reinforcement.
The first group of a hundred military personnel left the Netherlands on 2 August. The
deployment was unique in that it was the first time that an entire battalion task force
had been transported by air to the area of operations. From 22 July to 20 August, this
operation was largely conducted with chartered aircraft, supported by a Dutch C-130.
The marines set up their base camp, built by a Royal NLD Army engineer unit, at
Mazar-e Sharif airport, which was also the location of ISAF's forward support base
for the northern provinces. The vastness of the area of operations (925 by 250
kilometres) meant that an infantry company descended on both Faisabad and
Maimana (where there was also a German and a British PRT respectively). The other
two companies, the battalion staff and supporting elements operated out of Mazar-e
Sharif. For periods of several days or a few weeks around the time of the election,
smaller units were stationed in another three provincial capitals.
The Election Support Force (ESF), to which the Dutch battalion belonged, was
responsible for ensuring that no irregularities occurred before, during or after the
elections. As well as the Dutch ESF battalion, a Romanian ESF battalion had also
been deployed around Kabul and a Spanish ESF battalion was operating in the
western part of Afghanistan. The Afghan police and the Afghan army, however, were
still primarily responsible for security at the 1,663 voting stations in the north. In the
run-up to the elections, the marine battalion conducted numerous patrols in the entire
northern section of the ISAF area, working closely with other ISAF units in the
region, including the German, Norwegian and, of course, the Dutch PRT. It was not
only the subversive elements that were a threat to the marines; they were also plagued
by sandflies. 186 of the troops were diagnosed with cutaneous leishmaniasis, a skin
disease which can cause ulcerating lesions.
The elections for parliament and for the provincial councils on 18 September 2005
proceeded smoothly by Afghan standards. Only in a few cases did the marines have to
intervene to assist the local security services; apart from that, they concentrated on
guarding the transports carrying the completed ballot papers. After the voting had
been successfully completed, the battalion’s tasks were adjusted, but not reduced.
Although the vast majority of the population was favourably disposed towards ISAF,
the number of incidents increased during this period. For instance, a British patrol was
ambushed at Mazar-e Sharif, as a result of which one person was killed and six
wounded. The Dutch and British PRTs received intensive support, often through
patrolling and cooperation with the Afghan army. The battalion also carried out smallscale CIMIC projects, such as assisting with the renovation of the stadium in the
centre of Mazar-e Sharif, in order to create and maintain public support for the ISAF's
increased presence. When Pakistan was struck by a major earthquake on 8 October,
personnel from the Dutch ESF battalion were assembled in a medical support
detachment around the field hospital in order to provide humanitarian aid in and
around the Pakistani town of Bagh. The last service personnel, with the exception of
the medical detachment, returned to the Netherlands on 9 November 2005.
Deployment Task Force (DTF)
Since the middle of 2005, the Netherlands had been holding intensive talks with a
number of NATO allies and the Afghan government about possible participation in
the ISAF mission in southern Afghanistan. The ultimate aim was for NATO to
operate as a stabilisation force in the whole of Afghanistan and thus enable the
rebuilding of the country. The security situation in the southern region was much
worse than the area in which NATO forces had been deployed until then. On 13
January 2006, the Dutch government decided to take part in a mission in the Uruzgan
province. The operation in the south, ISAF ‘phase III’, began on 1 August 2006 when
British, Canadian and Dutch NATO forces officially took over the three southern
provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan. For the time being, the Dutch only
took on the southern part of Uruzgan. The Netherlands was to lead a task force,
namely Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) for a period of two years and would provide more
than 1,200 military personnel (rising to almost 2,000 in 2009) for this mission. On 30
November 2007, the Dutch government decided to extend the mission in Uruzgan by
two years.
It was clear that the Dutch armed forces were embarking on a highly dangerous
mission. Until then, the three southern provinces had been nothing more than the
working area for Operation Enduring Freedom. After four years of military operations
by US and other coalition troops, the region was still teeming with insurgents, who
were referred to collectively as Opposing Militant Forces (OMF). Their common
ground was their opposition to the Afghan government and to the presence of foreign
troops. The term OMF referred to regrouped Taliban fighters, groups affiliated to the
Taliban, members of Al Qaida, armed Hezb-I Islami Gulbuddin rebels, drug barons'
private armies and militias of local warlords who wanted nothing to do with the
legitimate government in Kabul.
From April 2006, a Deployment Task Force (DTF) set up two Dutch camps near the
provincial capital Tarin Kowt and the district capital Deh Rawod. This special
construction mission was led by Colonel H. Morsink. The unit comprised around 850
quartermasters, who operated from the international military base, Kandahar Airfield
(KAF), and was made up of engineer and logistic elements, had a security detachment
and was supported by an air force detachment with helicopters. The logistics
specialists and engineers brought in hundreds of containers and vehicles via the
United Arab Emirates and Pakistan and transported them from the storage and crossloading point near the city of Kandahar to the two sites in Uruzgan.
At the same time, a Commando Corps (KCT) detachment set up base in Tarin Kowt
and later in Deh Rawod. The commandos conducted reconnaissance in the area
surrounding the construction activities and along the supply routes from Kandahar.
This involved the inevitable engagements with rebels of every persuasion, as a result
of which dozens of enemy fighters were killed. An advance party was sent from
Kandahar to Uruzgan to start building the two camps. The first construction team,
mainly engineers and the infantry to protect them, started receiving materials from
convoys from Kandahar. The DTF personnel and the other Dutch troops stationed in
the south of Afghanistan were given ISAF status, even though they were already in
the area before the official transition to ISAF on 1 August. The construction phase
officially lasted from April until July 2006, but work continued on the Dutch camps
until the spring of 2007 under the protection of the TFU.
Task Force Uruzgan (TFU)
On 31 July, Colonel Morsink handed the two Dutch bases in Uruzgan over to Colonel
T.W.B. Vleugels, the first commander of the TFU. The actual mission in Uruzgan had
begun. The main location at Tarin Kowt was christened Kamp Holland and provided
accommodation for more than 1,100 Dutch troops and 400 Australian troops from the
Reconstruction Task Force (RTF). Because of the substantial Australian contribution,
the task force, which also contained a PRT and a battle group, was given the official
name of 1 NLD/AUS Task Force Uruzgan. The official language within the unit was
English. Kamp Holland had a runway which could be used by, for example, a C-130
Hercules and a C-17 Globemaster III. There was also a field hospital whose facilities
included an operating theatre, intensive care and an X-ray laboratory. In Deh Rawod
in the southwest of the province, there was a second Dutch base - Camp Hadrian –
upon which around 370 Dutch troops eventually descended. US special forces and
Afghan security troops operated out of the towns of Khas Uruzgan and Shahidi
Hassas, in the east and northwest, respectively, of the province. The TFU commander
officially coordinates the deployment of these international troops in the province.
Uruzgan lies in the southern foothills of the Hindu Kush mountains and occupies an
area of approximately two-thirds the size of the Netherlands. The landscape is mainly
mountainous, but the province is relatively flat in the south, in the area surrounding
Tarin Kowt. The main rivers are the Helmand, the Teri Rud and the Dea Kowt. All the
roads in the province are unsurfaced. The population of Uruzgan is estimated at
290,000, with the town of Tarin Kowt numbering some 17,000 inhabitants. Other
sizeable towns are Deh Rawod and Chora. Uruzgan is in an isolated and
underdeveloped area and its community is extremely conservative and traditional. The
Pashtun represent the largest ethnic group in the province and have their own
language and tribal community. As well as Islamic law, the Pashtun have their own
system of unwritten rules, known as the Pashtunwali. Uruzgan is governed by just a
few of the various Pashtun tribes.
The TFU’s task was to create a safe environment in Uruzgan in order to facilitate a
properly functioning public administration as well as rebuilding. To this end, the
Dutch helped the Afghan authorities to set up new authority structures. Although the
Dutch government placed the emphasis on facilitating the reconstruction of the
province, it had already announced in a letter to the House of Representatives on 22
December 2005 that it would in all probability also be necessary to conduct offensive
actions in certain areas. This would be necessary to enable operations by the PRT and
the Afghan government in those areas or in the event that enemy elements restricted
the freedom of movement of ISAF or the Afghan security organisations.
The hard core of the TFU consisted of a reinforced infantry battalion (the battle
group), made up of three companies and a headquarters and combat service support
company. The first battle group was assembled from two companies of airmobile
infantry and one armoured infantry company. The composition of subsequent battle
groups varied per rotation. The combat units were equipped with armoured vehicles of
the types YPR, Patria, Nyala and, from September 2006, the Australian Bushmaster, a
wheeled armoured vehicle purchased specially for the mission in Uruzgan because of
its extra protection against mines and roadside bombs. Because of the constant threat
of these improvised explosives, personnel from the TFU's engineer company were
assigned to patrols.
The task force of over 1,200 troops was formally set up ‘around’ the PRT, according
to the cabinet’s report to the House of Representatives. The reconstruction team itself
was made up of no more than forty military personnel. Just as in the case of the PRT
in Baghlan, the three mission teams were the main sub-units of the reconstruction
team, but in Uruzgan the mission teams set forth into the province with a good deal
more force protection. Their numbers were increased with CIMIC personnel. The
Dutch task force commander in Uruzgan was not only supported by a political adviser
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (polad), but also by an adviser from the Ministry
for Development Cooperation (osad) and someone who coordinated the setting up of
provincial administrative bodies (civrep). The mission teams and the CIMIC
personnel were out and about as much as possible and held shuras (consultations) with
tribal leaders and government officials in order to identify potential development
projects (referred to as Quick and Visible Projects). The aim was to increase popular
support for the Dutch presence and create the conditions for sustainable development.
A significant proportion of the activities was focused on communities which had long
been marginalised by the government and the international community. As well as the
‘polad’ and the ‘osad’, the TFU also had a cultural adviser with specialist knowledge
of tribal relations in Afghanistan. Unlike the PRT, its Australian counterpart, the
Reconstruction Task Force, did have its own engineer capacity and, in contrast to the
Dutch PRT, aimed to execute the reconstruction projects itself.
Most of the Dutch money for the province was spent on sustainable development
projects, such as improving the infrastructure, the education system (Education
Quality Improvement Program: EQUIP), health care (the construction of twelve basic
health centres and sub-centres) and the quality of the Afghan administrators. The
Netherlands also allocated funds for the diversification of agricultural land, the
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (25 million euros in 2007) and the Law and
Order Trust Fund Afghanistan (12.5 million euros in 2007).
The TFU also had three 155 mm self-propelled howitzers from the artillery. These
mechanised howitzers were first used in September 2006, during Operation Medusa,
when they were still in Kandahar. They were used to support Canadian troops
engaged in combat with the Taliban. This sort of mutual support was a regular
occurrence in the Regional Command South (RC-South), which was still under
Canadian command at the time. The Dutch F-16s and Apache helicopters were, for
instance, deployed throughout the region. The six Dutch Apaches were transferred
from Kandahar to Kamp Holland on 20 October 2006. During Operation Medusa, a
Dutch company also manned the Canadian forward operating base Martello, where
the unit was involved in frequent clashes with rebels.
On 20 October, the Dutch government decided to boost its military presence in the
south of Afghanistan with around 130 men. This brought the total to 1,540 troops, 200
of whom were in Kandahar. As well as two infantry platoons to increase the security
and patrol capacity, the TFU was expanded with extra logistics personnel and
additional police instructors to train the Afghan police. Because of the demanding
terrain conditions, the vehicles were subject to more wear and tear and a slight
increase in maintenance capacity was also required.
The TFU’s motto, ‘put an Afghan face on everything’, applied particularly to the
Dutch efforts with regard to security. The Dutch troops helped the Afghan security
services to maintain public order and to fight the OMF; at least that was the intention.
It soon became clear, however, that both the Afghan army and the police were sorely
lacking in terms of quantity and quality. Many of the police officers were poorly
trained for the task at hand and were susceptible to corruption. The quality of the
Afghan soldiers was better, mainly thanks to the efforts of the United States. But this
did not detract from the fact that there were initially huge shortfalls in the south of
Afghanistan.
In the south, President Karzai was able to use 205 Corps, which comprised three
brigades. Each brigade was made up of five battalions: three infantry battalions, a
combat support battalion and a service support battalion. Virtually all battalions were
undermanned. Ideally, an infantry battalion contained 375 soldiers, but a 30% fill rate
was no exception. The Afghan government had great difficulty finding enough
soldiers and the shortfall, in combination with the high operational tempo, put a heavy
strain on the soldiers of 205 Corps. In the course of 2007, the Afghan Ministry of
Defence succeeded in overcoming these problems. A fourth brigade was assigned to
205 Corps, while the existing brigades were brought up to strength. The provinces of
Kandahar and Uruzgan previously had to share a brigade, as the other two brigades
were active in the provinces of Helmand and Zabul. Each province was now given its
‘own’ brigade. 1 That did not mean, however, that there was a wealth of soldiers
available. Since January 2007, Afghan army units had been on what was known as an
operational cycle. No longer were the soldiers being permanently deployed;
operational duty was alternated according to a strict timetable with leave, education
and training.
Each Afghan unit was coached by an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
(OMLT: pronounced ‘omlet’). In November 2006, the Netherlands also provided a
12-man OMLT to support the Afghan battalion that was in Uruzgan at the time. Each
member of the OMLT was partnered with a key official in the battalion. They
accompanied the unit in the field and also advised them during the training phase of
1
The brigade in Uruzgan province had to release one infantry battalion for deployment in Helmand
province.
the operational cycle. The arrival of what was virtually a complete ANA brigade –
minus one infantry battalion that had been released for deployment in Helmand
province – meant that in 2007 the Dutch OMLT organisation increased to 65
personnel, under the command of a colonel.
From November 2006, Dutch military personnel operated out of a forward patrol post
more than twelve kilometres north of Kamp Holland. The heavily guarded platoon
location near the town of Shurk Murgab, nicknamed 'Poentjak', enabled the soldiers to
keep a closer eye on the southern approach to the Baluchi Valley and the Kakarak
area. Given that this location was seen by the Taliban and other insurgent elements as
a threat to their freedom of movement, it regularly came under fire. A similar platoon
location was also set up near Deh Rawod. Unlike Poentjak, this platoon location,
because of its more accessible appearance, was referred to as 'Multifunctional Quala'
(MFQ), after the typical Afghan walled-in buildings made of hardened mud. The
outpost was later named ‘Volendam’. Both posts were dismantled in March 2008 and
were replaced by various police posts. The Afghan army also took over the patrol
bases that ISAF had built: Worsley (now Buman, near Shurk Morghab), Qudus (in the
Baluchi valley) and Khyber-Lyddiard (south of the Baluchi valley). ISAF and the
ANA jointly manned the patrol bases Coyote (also called Jahan Gul) and Phoenix,
both in the Deh Rawod district. The PRT house in Tarin Kowt was another site which
was taken over by the TFU in conjunction with the local authorities, partly for use as a
technical school, where, from January 2007, Afghans were able to train as, for
example, carpenters, welders or bricklayers.
The TFU’s rotation schedule allowed the battle group and the PRT to be relieved after
four months. In order to ensure continuity, the Dutch armed forces had opted to rotate
the TFU staff only after six months. PRT personnel soon realised that a deployment
period of four months was too short to gain the trust of the Afghans with whom they
were dealing, so from March 2007, PRT personnel were also deployed for six-month
periods.
While British and Canadian troops in Helmand and Kandahar provinces suffered
losses during combat actions from the outset, there were no Dutch fatalities as a result
of enemy fire, mines or improvised explosive devices during the first ten months.
Because the Dutch appeared to have luck on their side in many situations during
engagements and attacks, they were referred to by their coalition partners as the
‘lucky Dutch’. This situation changed in the spring and summer of 2007 with the first
Dutch fatalities.
Despite the fact that the anticipated spring offensive by the OMF did not materialise,
the number of violent incidents rose sharply. This was partly as a result of the high
operational tempo maintained by ISAF and the coalition troops in the south of
Afghanistan. The OMF were capable of influencing the security situation in large
parts of Uruzgan province and thus attempted to seize the Chora district in June 2007.
Chora had for the last year been a main source of concern to the TFU. The district,
situated on a crossroads, was extremely important to both the TFU and the OMF, and
as early as June 2006, the Deployment Task Force was deployed here with Australian
troops to repel the OMF. The threat increased again at the end of April 2007. OMF
fighters captured the Kala Kala ANP post, whereupon ISAF aircraft bombed and
destroyed the post. Reason enough for the RC(S) commander at the time, British
Major General J.D. ‘Jacko’ Page, to deploy his regional reserve – a British infantry
company – in Chora on 16 May. On the assumption that a possible attack by the OMF
had thus been averted, the company was withdrawn on 2 June. Nothing could have
been further from the truth. Two weeks later, the battle group had to pull out all the
stops to hold its position and a major attack by hundreds of insurgents was repelled. In
the months that followed, TFU made a supreme effort to stabilise the situation in
Chora, but the OMF were able, from the Baluchi valley to the southwest of Chora, to
frustrate the efforts of both the battle group and the PRT in Chora. At the end of 2007,
the TFU commander at the time, Colonel N. Geerts, decided to plan a major operation
(Spin Ghar) with the aim of driving out the OMF. The regional ISAF commander,
Major General Page, once again made his reserve available.
In the meantime, the OMF were shifting their attention to the Deh Rawod district. In
the autumn of 2007, the TFU managed with some difficulty to hold its own in the
bazaar of the village of the same name. Here too, a major multinational operation,
Patan Ghar, was to turn the tide. Dutch, Afghan and US (a battalion from 82nd
Airborne Division) troops were successful on this occasion too. The main challenge,
however, lay not in driving out the OMF but in the establishment of a credible
government apparatus. The TFU found that in both Chora and Deh Rawod the
appalling quality of the police and the government had allowed the OMF to seize their
opportunity. The quality of the administrators and police officers thus became one of
the TFU's main areas of attention.
The Afghan government had already realised in 2006 that there was a chronic
shortage of police officers. In advance of the establishment of a credible police
apparatus, they created the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) as an interim
solution. ANAP personnel were recruited locally and deployed in their own
communities. The plan was to integrate the ANAP in the ANP after two years.
Training was given in Uruzgan by marechaussee personnel. The problem was not in
finding enough auxiliary officers, but in keeping them after their training. The salary
was poor and the risk was considerable. In 2008, the auxiliary officers were given the
opportunity of transferring to the ANP, now called the Afghan Uniformed Police
(AUP), but they were only able to join this new organisation after they had undergone
retraining. It was thus possible to separate the wheat from the chaff.
Task Force Uruzgan commanders
Col T.W.B. Vleugels (1 August 2006 – 24 January 2007)
Col J.F.A.M. van Griensven (24 January – 1 August 2007)
Col N. Geerts (1 August 2007 – 30 January 2008)
Col R.H. van Harskamp (30 January – 31 July 2008)
Col C.J. Matthijssen (31 July 2008 – 2 February 2008)
Brig Gen T.A. Middendorp (2 February 2009 – 3 August 2009)
Brig Gen M.J.H.M. van Uhm (3 August 2009 – present)
TFU Battle Group commanders
Lt Col P. van der Sar (1 August - 28 November 2006)
Lt Col T. Luiten (28 November 2006 – 31 March 2007)
Lt Col R.J. Querido (31 March – 6 August 2007)
Lt Col J.R. Groen (6 August – 2 December 2007)
Lt Col T.A. Hogeveen (2 December – 29 March 2008)
Lt Col C.A. de Rijke (29 March – 1 August 2008)
Lt Col drs L.A. de Vos (1 August 2008 – 25 November 2008)
Lt Col J.R. Swillens (25 November 2008 – 30 March 2009)
Lt Col A. Nijkamp (30 March 2009 – 28 July 2009)
Lt Col J. Doense (28 July 2009 – 25 November 2009)
Lt Col A.M.J. Wagemakers (25 November 2009 – present)
TFU Provincial Reconstruction Team commanders
Lt Col N.W. Tak (1 August – 28 November 2006)
Lt Col G.F. Koot (28 November 2006 - 22 March 2007)
Lt Col G.S. van der Voet (22 March – 22 September 2007)
Lt Col W.S. Rietdijk (22 September 2007 – 24 March 2008)
Lt Col M.A. Hubregtse (24 March 2008 – 20 September 2008)
Lt Col ir R.J.M. Hamelink (20 September 2008 – 21 March 2009)
TFU Provincial Reconstruction Team director 2
mr J.C.S. Wijnands (21 March 2009 – 3 August 2009)
drs M. Rentenaar (3 August 2009 – present)
OMLT commanders
Col T. Baartman (18 September 2007 – 19 December 2007)
Col drs R.T. Sondag (19 December 2007 – 29 May 2008)
Col ing A. Ooms (29 May 2008 – 28 November 2008)
Col W.J.M. Verweij (28 November 2008 – 31 May 2009)
Col M.J.H.M. Bastin (31 May 2009 – 25 November 2009)
Col A.A. Leuvering (25 November 2009 – present)
2
The title of PRT-commander changed to PRT-director.
Regional Command South (RC-South)
From February 2006, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom alternately
held the command over all NATO troops in Southern Afghanistan from the regional
ISAF headquarters in Kandahar, Regional Command South (RC-South). From 1
November 2006 to 1 May 2007, Dutch Major General A.J.H. van Loon was in charge
of more than 11,000 ISAF troops. With his staff from 43 Mechanised Brigade from
Havelte, supplemented by personnel from other NATO states, he led RC-South,
which officially encompassed not only the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and
Uruzgan, but also those of Zabul, Nimroz and Dai Kundi. In four of the six provinces,
there were military units from countries including the Netherlands, Canada, the UK,
the US, Romania, Australia and Denmark. The provinces of Nimroz and Dai Kundi
had to manage without ISAF troops.
In addition to the 200 Dutch military personnel already in Kandahar, a further 200
troops were deployed during this period. These also included two infantry platoons
which formed part of the regional reserve that was assigned to the headquarters when
Van Loon took command. Together with British, Canadian and US troops, the
airmobile platoons took part in Operation Baaz Tsuka in Kandahar province. This
operation was a follow-up to Operation Medusa. It started on 15 December 2006 and
focused on isolating the hard core of the Taliban from the local fighters and the
population in the Panjwayi valley. The aim was to thus create a stable environment in
which the Afghan authorities and security forces could hold their own and to enable
reconstruction to take place. Another major ISAF operation conducted at the time
when the Netherlands was the lead nation in RC-South was Operation Achilles. The
objective of this RC-South-led operation was to create a safe and stable environment
in the north of Helmand province around the strategically important Kajaki Dam. The
idea was to make use of the dam again for the production of electricity and for
irrigation purposes. On 20 April, the Netherlands suffered its first fatality as a result
of enemy actions in Southern Afghanistan. Major General Van Loon handed over
responsibility for the southern region to British Major General J.D. 'Jacko' Page on 1
May; several dozen individually deployed Dutch personnel continued to work for this
command. On 1 November 2008 Major General M.C. de Kruif took command of RCS
for a full year.
Air Task Force (ATF)
With the setting up of Task Force Uruzgan, the Royal Netherlands Air Force
incorporated all its units in Afghanistan in the 1(NLD) Air Task Force (ATF) from the
summer of 2006. The ATF staff were posted to Kandahar. From 1 August 2006, the
air force units active in Afghanistan came under the administrative command of the
ATF commander. Air tasks for the transport and fighter aircraft came from ISAF’s
Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) in Kabul. The helicopters received their
orders from RC-South. Initially, the ATF consisted of five Cougar transport
helicopters and six Apache combat helicopters at Kandahar itself. The eight F-16s
stationed at Kabul and a C-130 transport aircraft also came under the command of the
ATF from that point onwards.
The inevitable changes followed in the months after the establishment of the ATF. On
20 October 2006, the C-130 returned to the Netherlands after a deployment of
precisely one year. A C-130 was again in Afghanistan for a while in the spring of
2007. This Hercules left for Kandahar on 2 March, mainly to perform flight tasks
from there for the rotation of the TFU sub-units. In all, some 4,000 personnel and 180
tons of cargo were flown between Kabul, Kandahar and Tarin Kowt during this
period. On 12 November 2006, the F-16 detachment moved from Kabul to Kandahar.
The transfer to this base in Southern Afghanistan meant a considerable reduction in
response times. After the move, the F-16s provided emergency assistance for ISAF
ground troops on numerous occasions in, for example, the provinces of Helmand,
Kandahar and Uruzgan.
The Apaches performed their first flight tasks on 29 April 2006. At first, they were
mainly involved in providing protection for the Dutch ground troops who were
deploying in Uruzgan. They also performed reconnaissance and escorted convoys. As
well as that, they provided direct air support for ground troops and, if necessary,
formed a rapid reaction force. There was a memorable mission on 31 May 2006, when
the helicopters fired on enemy troops for the first time since their introduction into the
RNLAF in 1996. In the same month, one of the combat helicopters sustained damage
when a Russian cargo plane knocked it over during a taxi manoeuvre. This Apache
was replaced by another one from the Netherlands a short time later.
On 20 October 2006, the combat helicopters relocated to Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan, for
which a platform with six parking spaces was built at Kamp Holland and a large
maintenance tent erected. Stationing the helicopters at the Dutch base in Uruzgan
meant that better protection could be provided for the Dutch ground troops. In April
2007, the Netherlands reduced the number of Apaches at Tarin Kowt from six to four
in order to ensure long-term deployment. By way of compensation, there were from
then on two additional F-16s on standby in the Netherlands, which could be flown in
within three weeks.
The five Cougar transport helicopters operated from Kandahar during their
deployment period. Besides the regular transport tasks, three transport helicopters,
together with three Dutch platoons, were deployed in March 2007 for the evacuation
of Afghans in the vicinity of the rising Helmand river. The Netherlands did not have
enough of the same type of helicopters to station them in Afghanistan on a permanent
basis so on 1 May 2007 three Chinooks took over the tasks of the five Cougars.
1(NLD) Air Task Force commanders
Lt Col C.C. Duinhof (1 May 2006 – 17 July 2006)
Lt Col W. Gerdsen (17 July 2006 – 30 July 2006)
Col H. van der Vlies (30 July 2006 – 29 October 2006)
Col E. van Heumen (29 October 2006 – 25 February 2007)
Col B.A.F. Ruijs (25 February 2007 – 1 July 2007)
Col R.E.P. Hagemeijer (1 July 2007 – 22 October 2007)
Col T.H.W. ten Haaf (22 October 2007 – 10 January 2008)
Col C.J. Lorraine (10 January 2008 – 25 February 2008)
Col P. Mulder (25 February 2008 – 1 July 2008)
Col A. den Drijver (1 July 2008 – 21 October 2008)
Col R.M. Arns (21 October 2008 - 10 February 2009)
Col S.H.P.M. Pellemans (10 February 2009 – 9 June 2009)
Col F.P.M. Rombouts (9 June 2009 – 4 October 2009)
Col P.T.M. Tankink (4 October 2009 – present)
Honours and awards
Capt M.J. Kroon (Knight 4th class Military Order of William)
Capt B.J.C. Peterse † (Bronze Lion)
1st Lt Gijs (Bronze Lion)
Capt Arthur (Bronze Cross)
Sgt Maj Maurice (Bronze Cross)
1st Lt J.A. Spanhak (Bronze Cross)
Capt Bart (Cross of Merit)
Sgt A. Beekman (Cross of Merit)
Sgt-1 M. Brian (Cross of Merit)
Cpl M. Groen (Cross of Merit)
Sgt Maj M.A. Hammink (Cross of Merit)
Pte-1 E. van der Meijde (Cross of Merit)
Sgt B. Neef (Cross of Merit)
Cpl-1 M.B.H. Nieuwenhuis (Cross of Merit)
1st Lt Robbert (Cross of Merit)
Cpl-1 Robin (Cross of Merit)
Pte-1 W.E. Schol (Cross of Merit)
Cpl S. Schoonhoven (Cross of Merit)
Cpl J. van der Sman (Cross of Merit)
Sgt (US) A. van Aalten (Cross of Merit)
Cpl B.J.M. Smits (Cross of Merit)
Sgt Sven (Cross of Merit)
Sgt Maj J.J. van Velsen (Cross of Merit)
Cpl D.J. Veneberg (Cross of Merit)
Cpl M. van de Vondevoort (Cross of Merit)
Cpl J.R.W. Vijgen (Cross of Merit)
Sgt W.J. Vissers (Cross of Merit)
Cpl A.C.H. van den Wege (Cross of Merit)
Sgt D.X.M. Wiesken (Cross of Merit)
Fatalities
Lt Col J. van Twist (26 July 2006)
Sgt B. van Boxtel (26 July 2006)
Capt (pilot) C.M. Donkervoort (31 August 2006)
Sgt-1 W. Dijkstra (11 October 2006)
Sgt-1 R.G. Donkers (6 April 2007)
Cpl L.C.S. Strik (20 April 2007)
Pte-1 T.A. Smeehuijzen (15 June 2007)
Sgt Maj J.M.B. Leunissen (18 June 2007)
1st Lt T.A.W. Krist (12 July 2007)
Sgt-1 M.R. Rosier (27 August 2007)
Pte-1 T.R. Hoogland (20 September 2007)
Cpl-1 R. Groen (3 November 2007)
Pte-1 A.G. Poortema (12 January 2008)
Pte-1 W.E. Schol (12 January 2008)
Pte-1 M. Schouwink (18 April 2008)
1st Lt D. van Uhm (18 April 2008)
Pte-1 J. ten Brinke (7 September 2008)
Sgt M. Weijdt (19 December 2008)
Pte-1 A. Chadli (6 April 2009)
Cpl K.A.R. van de Rijdt (6 September 2009)
Sgt Maj M.J.W. Leijsen (7 September 2009)
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Updated: 1 November 2009