M EDE DEL I N GEN DER KON I N K L IJ KEN EDE R L A N D S E
AKADEMIE VAN WETENSCHAPPEN, AFD. LETTERKUNDE
NIEUWE REEKS - DEEL 37 - No. 6
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN
HERODOTUS
F. SOLMSEN
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16
SEPTEMBER
1974
Early in this century Felix Jacoby by his R.E. article
"Herodotus" 1 laid the basis for most subsequent work on
Herodotus. Besides bringing his intimate familiarity with Greek
historiography to bear on the questions concerning Herodotus' life,
his sources, his relation to his precursors and many others, he
offered a weIl reasoned account of Herodotus' development as
historian. According to J acoby Herodotus began as a geographer
but with his mind open to a large variety of impressions. His
travels took him to countries in the east, north and south, and
what he learned about countries and nations he organized in
"Books" or logoi. Originally independent units, they retained some
traces of this stage when they became parts of a large scale Persian
history.2 However what turned Herodotus into a historian was
not his occupation with Persian, or more generally Oriental
monarchs but the great war between Persia and Greece as it lived
in Athenian memory and as Herodotus during his stay in Athens
one may almost say, relived it there. For although he learned a
good deal ab out events of this war elsewhere in Greece--and had
of course acquired much information in Asia Minor and other
parts of the Persian Empire, Athens furnished the perspective.
The essential phases of the war are presented from the Greek side,
and with Athens in the center.
This theory of three successive stages, of Herodotus the
geographer, the writer of Persian history, and the historian of
the great war, has had its followers as weIl as its opponents. 3
Alternative reconstructions of Herodotus' development are not
easy to find,4 though there are many studies for which questions
relating to the growth of the work or the development of its
author are irrelevant, and others again for which they ought to
be relevant and where failure to take account of them impairs the
R.E. Suppl. II (1913) 279 ff., 352. See p. 34 for a short bibliography.
Ibid., 281 ff., 342 ff.
3
Not a few being on a priori grounds sure of a unified conception, see
no need for proofs and relieve us in turn of a need for reference to, and
discussion with them. John L. Myers, Heradatus. Father of History (Oxford,
1953) barely tackles the real iBBues and (ch. IV) remains stuck in enemal
aspects. Max Pohlenz in bis useful book makes a serious effort but bis
approach is disa.rm.ingly simple and the arguments (pp. 83 ff.) for a unified
original conception are inadequate. Regenbogen's brilliant essay moves on
a higher intellectuallevel and shows a firm grasp of the problems. We shall
have several occasions to comment on his theory.
4
On J. Enoch Powell, The History of Herodotus (Cambridge, 1939) I
cannot but endorse the judgement of von Fritz II 90. Specific observations
in bis book are however worth pondering; see N. 29.
1
2
139
TWO CRUClAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
value of inquiry and conclusion. 5 For our purpose it is unnecessary
to list, let alone discuss every recent work that faIls into one
or another of these categories. One book of the last decade is
however of immediate concern to us. Kurt von Fritz's Die
Griechische Geschichtsschreibung 6 includes an account of Herodotus'
"Entwicklung ZUID und als Historiker" (I 442-476), which may
be called a revival of Jacoby's theory, but it should be emphasized
at once that the differences are as important as the agreement.
The stages of Herodotus' development are roughly speaking the
same as in Jacoby's scheme, yet in the definition and description
of each stage von Fritz diverges widely from Jacoby. In the
intervening fifty years almost every concept employed for the
analysis of Herodotus' work has acquired a new meaning; and
it is actually concepts and conceptions that preoccupy von Fritz,
whereas they hardly mattered for Jacoby. First in the order of
importance are religious and moral convictions. Again and again
they have shaped Herodotus' account of a monarch's fate or of
some other chain of events.
What we here attempt, the analysis and comparison of two
scenes of decision, does not for its validity depend on Jacoby's,
von Fritz's or any other theory regarding the growth of Herodotus'
work. Still the theories of development, whether accepted or not,
have one inestimable merit. For the proponents of "development"
have--far more than any other Herodotean scholars-brought
home to us the divergence between Herodotus' approach to Oriental
and to Greek history . Although inclined to the thesis that Herodotus'
historical understanding changed and developed, we shall not use
this view as a premise for our analysis. Major differences between
Herodotus' Oriental and his Greek history are admitted also by
scholars who remain non-committal or negative in their attitude
to "development". 7 A brief recapitulation of the salient features
of the Oriental logoi will start us on our way.
The Oriental logoi have their geographical, ethnographical,
5
For bibliographical information I refer (besides L'Année philol.) to
Paul L. Ma.cKendrick's reports Cl.W. 56 (1963), 269 fI and 63 (1969) 37 fI.;
see also the "Literaturverzeichnis" in Marg's vol.
6
See below p. 34.
7
E.g., H. Kleinknecht, Hermea 75 (1940), 258; cf. 264 and n.; Immerwahr, Oh. IV and V (note however p. 189). On J. de Romilly see below
pp. 32 f. N oteworthy too are the views of Marcello Gigante, N omos Basileus
(Naples, 1956) 131 fI. Most recently Robert Drews, The Greek Accounts of
Eastern History (Oambridge, Mass., 1973) 46 fI., 71 fI. has scored some points
against Ja.coby and by sensible arguments for the unity of the finished
work reduced the importanee of "development". The unity, to be sure,
is of a peculiar kind, but this would be no serious objection. Drews' thesis
needs further scrutiny.
140
TWO CRUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
5
zoological sections, and such history as they contain is the story
of monarchs. For the Egyptian kings, anecdotes and a minimum
of "facts" satisfied Herodotus; yet the lives of Croesus, of Cyrus,
of Cambyses, Darius and Xerxes have their "meaning", and in
conformity with this meaning a certain structure. The structure
is by no means always the same; yet motifs do recur and these
help us to discover some constants within the variations.
The story of Croesus' pride and fall, the 7:TJÎ.avyèç :r&(!6aw:r&o'JI of
the entire work, exhibits most of the motifs in question. Croesus
displays hybris, and nemesis duly catches up with him. 8 Yet he
also by his own fate expiates the crime committed by his ancestor
Candaules; the 7:tatç was destined to materialize in his generation.
Related to this idea of destiny is the x(!ecfw. 9 Next we may list
Croesus' misunderstanding of the ambiguous Delphic oracle. Elated
by the confidence derived from this mistake, he crosses the
"boundary" (ö(!oç)-in this instance the Halys-and invades the
territory of Cyrus.l0 The original impulse for taking this step is
variously specified as the desire for expansion of his own realm,
as protection against the growing power of Cyrus, and as the
wish to avenge Cyrus' treatment of Alyattes. l l
The figure of a warner is so frequent in stories of hybris and
catastrophe that it seems integral to their conception. In the
Croesus logos the warner-Solon-appears rather early, long before
the fatal mistake where he more often has his place; 12 yet the
conversation between Croesus and Solon, and the latter's wise and
solemn admonitions are in any case unique. In Solon's speech the
cp{}6'J1oç {}ew'JI and the "v"Î.oç à'JI{}(!w:r&TJ{w'JI :r&(!TJYflá7:w'JI receive strong
emphasis. 13 Both are important in their own right. To the jealousy
8
I 30-45; note esp. 34.1 which should not be understood as limiting
nemesis to the death of Croesus' son.
9 Tünç I 91.1 (cf. 13.2); 1Ui7tewp.érn] p.oÏ(!a 1~bid.; for xeeÓJ1l see I 8.2.
Cf. Fritz Hellmann, Herodots Kroisos-Logos (Neue philolog. Untersuehgg. 9,
Berlin, 1934) pass., esp. 44.
10
For the misunderstanding see I 75.1; 91.4 ff. Rivers (I 75) are
boundaries not only in the geographical sense; (cf. the Danube in Darius'
Scythian campaign, the Hellespontos in VII 35); see Immerwahr 84 n. 17;
293). We may recall Soph. O.O. 1211 ff.
11
146.1 ff; 73.1; 75.1. Pragmatic-political motivations are not unknown
to Herodotus but the fear of Persia's growth is here peripheral. So is Croesus'
miscalculation (77.1).
12
On the figure of the warner cf. Heinr. Bischoff, Der Warner bei H.
(Diss. Marburg, 1932); Richmond Lattimore, O.P. 34 (1939), 24 ff.; Hellmann,
op. cito (N. 9) 77 ff.; Immerwahr 73 ff., 83 (also "Index" s.v. "warning").
Jaeger, SBBA 1926, 77 (= Scripta Minora, Rome, 1960, I 319 ff.) remains
important for earl ier use of the motif. Hes. Op. 295 èaOMç Ij'av "dxeivoç 8ç
ev el:rt6vn bt'TJTat seerns relevant.
13
I 32.1; 32.2-4; 5-9 relate to the ,ro,,;'oç. Cf. 86.5 ff.; 207.2 (I 5.4).
More will be said later.
141
6
TWO OBUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HEBODOTUS
motif we shall come back. The "v"Ä,oç materializes in the fate of
Croesus, yet it also determines the entire course of Persian hlstory
from the successful beginnings of Cyrus to the defeats of Xerxes.
More explicitly than in Solon's speech it appears in the shrewdly
worded advice 14 given by Croesus hlmself to Cyrus, whose counselor
he becomes after he has lost Lydia and who asks for hls opinion
after embarking on a war as disastrous for hlmself as Croesus'
was for hls own kingshlp. Tà lU flOt na-&rjfla-ra È6v-ra àxáet't'a
,fla-&rjfla-ra yéyove, says Croesus on thls occasion 15 to establish hls
qualification as warner. He later plays the same role when
accompanying Cambyses (lIl 36). Among other warners Amasis
(lIl 40 ff.), Hecataeus (V 36.4), Artabanus and Demaratus are
perhaps the most noteworthy.16 On Artabanus we shall have to
say more.
We were looking for constants in the more elaborately constructed
Oriental logoi. The brief examination of Croesus' fate will have
sharpened our eyes for them. Yet it is no part of our project to
consider how-and how far-the numerous motifs that we identified
in the Croesus logos have become integrated; nor can we here
study the variations of the hybris-d-rlJ sequence and the recurrence
of other motifs in the reign of successive Persian kings, of
Polycrates (lIl 39-43 or 56; 120-125) and of other public or
private figures. Much scholarly work has been done on these
14
Despite the good points made by Bischoff, op. cito (N. 12) 43 ff.-cf.
aIso Lattimore (N. 12) 29 n. 17-von Fritz (1236 ff.) regards Croesus' advice
as foolish. Cambyses in his ",wlT} (II 36.3) is poor support for this opinion.
If, ss von Fritz suggests, Herodotus incorporated aversion hostile to Croesus,
his efforts to modify the original tenor are evident. Though not consulted
about the wisdom of the war as such, Croesus tactfully yet unmistakeably
comments on its uncertainties (207.1 f.); then turning to the neol(slp.evov,
he proffers advice which, whatever its demerits, keeps the enemy from
entering and, after a victory, destroying the new empire (207.3). Cyrus'
defeat snd death in a foreign land do not hurt Persia's growth. The reference
to a capital (? deX1/, 4) of nomads is probably sheer Ïnadvertence. About
logistics Herodotus does not bother snd we have no business to bother
him or Croesus about it.
16
A reference to A., Ag. 177 seerns inevitable but is misleading, since
the idea is present in Homer. Achilles' experience in the Iliad may be thus
summed up; cf. Gnomon 31 (1959), 471 ff. (= Kleine Schriften I 192 ff.).
The tendency to discover sn infiuence of Aeschylus or Sophocles even for
idess or motüs that are found in the epics strikes me ss unfortunste.
16
The name of Soclees (V 92) may be added.-Before taking the step
which leads to his death, Polycrates, who has been warned by Amasis,
receives further warnings, the strongest from his daughter (ill 124). We
might also record the massages sent to Cyrus by Queen Tomyris both
before snd after the consultation of Croesus (I 206, 212), but this would
imply a. departure from the "orthodox" type of a warner, however this
be defined.
142
TWO ORUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
7
subjects 17 and we shall not fail to use the results for our purposes.
Cyrus commits his fatal act of hybris-more precisely, of pleonexia--when he invades the Massagetan country. Cambyses' hybris,
glaringly manifested in his slaying of the holy Apis steer, turns
into p,av{a. Darius' most serious mistake is comparable to that
of Cyrus; for he too invades the territory of Scythian nomads;
here catastrophe threatens to overtake his expedition, and only
by a narrow margin is it avoided. His adventure and escape will
presently engage us in connection with Xerxes' conspicuous display
of self-deception.18
We gradually move nearer to our actual subject. The XV"AOÇ 19
of Persian history which begins with Cyrus continues upward to
the reign of Darius. The catalogue of the satrapies which he
organized and of the tribute paid byeach (111 89-97) shows Persian
power at its height. During his reign an expansion into Europe
begins (V 1-27, VI 33-45), and the Ionian revolt is crushed after
some initial success (VI 6-27). Yet there are at least three setbacks.
The expedition across the Danube is a failure; 20 Datis and
Artaphrenes, though successful in Euboea (VI 101) are defeated
at Marathon (VI 105-117); and the Libyan campaign does not
end in a particularly glorious fashion (IV 203). In the history of
Graeco-Persian antagonism the Athenian victory at Marathon is
doubtless the most significant event of Darius' reign. Still for some
reason-and it cannot be only because Darius himself takes part
in it-the Scythian expedition with its perils and its failure cuts
deeper into the texture of Persian history. Here, if anywhere, we
feel that the empire has passed its à"p,~ and the "cycle" turns
downward.
But all such setbacks are a mild prelude to the catastrophic
outcome of Xerxes' war against Greece. It is undertaken with high
expectation; an unusual display of pomp marks its beginning, and
the council scene 21 in which Xerxes announces his intention and
asks for opinions has been built on a scale of very large dimensions.
17 For the Croesus Iogo8 see in particular the distinguished analyses of
He1Ima.nn (see N. 9), Regenbogen, 101 ff. (= 375 ff. Marg) and von Fritz
I 216 ff.
18
For a fJPe1r;-warner-äTTJ sequence in the fata of Mardonius see
Lieselotte SoImsen, O.P. 39 (1944), 250 ff. (= 663 ff. Marg.)
19
On the rise and fall of Persia and the reign of Darius as marking the
high point see Immerwahr, 21 ff., 24 ff., 31 ff. and pass. As he makes clear,
the Greek ),61'01 are subordinated to and inserted into the Persian Myor;
(ibid. 34). Drews' (see N. 7) arguments point to a siInilar conclusion.
20
IV 83, 122-142. To the conquests may be added that of Samos (lIl
139-1(5), to the setbacks the disgra.ceful (VI (5) outcome of Mardonius'
Europea.n expedition which in VI 43.4; 44.1 is said to have ambitious
objectives.
21
VII 8-11. The council scene will be a.na.lysed on the next pages.
143
8
TWO ORUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
There are three speakers and four speeches, each of them remarkable
for its content as weU as for its function. Xerxes opens the meeting
by setting forth his plan; next Mardonius 22 eagerly supports
Xerxes' resolve, while the third speaker, Artabanus, tries to restrain
Xerxes and may indeed be considered as acting in the standard
role of a warner-but as we shaU see, this would not do him justice.
In the end Xerxes speaks once more, repudiating Artabanus'
warning and reaffirming his determination. There is nothing
comparable in Herodotus' work. Speeches of king and warner,
in fact a regular conversation between them are familiar to us
from the meeting of Croesus and Solon, but in council scenes
Herodotus may think it sufficient to state why a council is caUed
(e.g. by Cyrus) and to continue 't'wv /Jè xa't'à uov't'o al yvwp,a,
avveU:run't'ov before the "warner" comes forward with a different
opinion. 23
In Xerxes' speech we recognize some of the "recurrent" motlis. 24
For him the expedition has a punitive character, since the Athenian
{m;ije~av ä/J,xa not8Vv't'eç; in their support of the Ionian revolt; no
vengeance has yet been taken for this or for the defeat which
they infIicted on a Persian army at Marathon. 25 Even more
prominent among his motivations is the need for expansion. For
this he invokes the tradition he has inherited from his predecessors,
the vóp,oç; (8 a 1), as he caUs it, of Persian history. It is the history
which we know from Books I-IV. Xerxes understands it as a series
of conquests. For himself not to take his place in this line of
22
Mardonius is aIso in the earlier ch.s of VII (5 f.) an instigator of a
new war. Exiled Greek rulers use their influence with Xerxes for the same
purpose. These antecedents do not concern us.
23
I 206.3. Croesus is for Cyrus both a warner and the supporter of a
strategy not favored by the other advisers. See aIso VIII 62. Of the warnings
given to Polycrates before hls departure none is reported in direct speech
(ill 124). There are many variations in the form as weU as in the role and
significance of the warner.
24
Others will be found in the sequel to the council scene; see below
p. 15. For VII 1-19 cf. Pohlenz 120 fr.
25
V 97.3 where the ships sent by Athens in support of the Ionians are
caUed deXf} :I<:(lXWV for Greeks and barbarians is often cited for Xerxes'
Vnfje;av (cf. aIso V 102). However in I 5.3 ff. Croesus and slightly later
even previous Lydian kings (I 14 ff.) are the "fust" to vnc1e;at à6{,.;wv leywv.
The motif as such, scil. ne6.eeoç à6t:l<:wv iie;a.o leywv goes back to the epic.
In the Iliad Agamemnon, in the Odyssey the suitors are seen in thls role
(see also Il. III 351; Od. XX 394). Cf. also Hes., Theog. 166; 172. In Xerxes'
speech the motive is subordinated to other reasons by which Xerxes becomes
"guilty". This is probably typical for its reduced moral-as weU as compositional-importance. See, however, for a different assessment H. Strasburger,
Historia 4 (1955), 14. To prove the influence of tragedy on Herodotus
stronger support than a conception of epic provenience and weakened
significance would be needed. (Echoes of the Persae are something different.)
144
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
9
conquerors would mean to defy "manifest destiny" .26 A god, he
claims, supports the Persian kings as long as they continue to
move forward and enlarge their possession (8 al). Having thus
justified his project on both historical and moral grounds he gives
some more specific indications as to his plans and then turns to
the advantages (àym?á 8 y 1) that are connected with them.
Through the conquest of Athens and of its neighbors who inhabit
the land of "the Phrygian Pelops"-a "slave of Xerxes' fathers" ,
as we later learn (VII 11.4)-he will render Persian territory
"conterminous with the Heaven of Zeus" (8 y 1); for "the Sun
will see no country touching the border of ours". "And thus innocent
and guilty alike wiIl as slaves bear our yoke" (8 y 2 f.).
The language with its hyperboles and the content of the sentences
just quoted indicate sufficiently into what state of mind Xerxes
has worked himself. Reason has given way to infatuation. Hybris
appears at its worst; we may as weIl speak of megalomania.
Mardonius, as has been said, supports Xerxes' plan. Beginning his
speech with a not particularly subtIe flattery (9.1), he presents
his own reading of Persian history. On the whole it accords with
Xerxes', though he goes a step farther when he bluntly speaks
of past conquests as undertaken for the sake of aggrandizement
and describes the conquered races as à<5t,,~aav.a Iléeaaç ov<5év (9.2).
The Greeks by contrast are the initiators of injustice (vnáe~av.aç
à<5t"tTJç, ibid.) and must by all means be punished. He adds
disparaging remarks ab out Greek weaknesses,27 referring in
particular to ridiculous habits of warfare (9 (3). In connection with
misrepresenting these habits he falsi:6.es the record of his own
campaign against them in 492 (9 a 2, (3 2). A peculiar feature
of his speech is his suggestion how the Greeks ought to settle
differences between their communities-preferably by negotiations
but if war is necessary, he could teach them how to improve their
methods of warfare (9 (3 2). They wiIl hardly be foolish enough
to resist Xerxes. However, should they fight they would prove
a push-over for the Persians, who are àv{}eómwv Üf!ta.ot .à noUf-lta
(9 y).
Artabanus' speech contrasts with both of the others but more
strikingly with that of Mardonius. As he warns Xerxes against
rashly deciding on a course fraught with danger and uncertainties,
his speech, as we said, invites a comparison with those of other
warners. Typical features there are, yet the speech is decidedly
26
For Xerxes' (and Artabanus') reading ofPersia's history cf. Immerwahr
TAPA 85 (1954), 31 f. (= 520 f. Marg); 87 (1956), 274 ff.
27
Cf. in Thucydides the misrepresentation of the Athenian potential
by the Corinthians (I 121) and of Sicilian conditions by Alcibiades (VI 17).
145
10
TWO ORUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
unique. In its ethos it is superior to all others except Solon's,
whose wisdom and counsel it matches in seriousness and depth
-yet while Solon had time for quiet and in a way leisurely
contemplation of man's Iife, Artabanus' speech is intense, passionate,
somehow vibrant with a feeling for the urgent necessity of averting
disaster that is close at hand.
Speaking to a "tyrant," Artabanus prefaces hls advice not
indeed by crude flattery in the style of Mardonius but by a kind
of proem calculated to create a willingness to hear. 28 It is better
to have the choice between two opinions (Y'JIwp,at) than to know
but one (10 a 1). We remember the first senten ces in Croesus'
advice to Cyrus, when the latter had rashly moved ahead with
a similarly hazardous campaign (I 207.3). Mter these introductory
remarks Artabanus refers to a precedent, hls own warning when
Darius went to war against the Scythlans. Darius disregarded hls
warning, moved into the Scythlan territory, and lost a good part
of hls army before he finally decided to return. 29 Next, proceeding
a minore ad maius, Artabanus sets forth the far greater danger
connected with the projected expedition against Greece (a 3, (3 1).
Here and elsewhere in hls speech he extols Greek fighting power
((3 1; cf. 1/), partly to counteract Mardonius' derogatory comments,
yet also because of its intrinsic importance. Marathon, he believes,
should bear out hls estimate of their valor ((3 1 f.). Mter thls he
once more returns to Darius' expedition against the Scythlans,
thls time to dweIl on the most serious crisis of that adventure.
It developed when the lonians in charge of the bridge over the
Danube were urged by the Scythlans to break up thls bridge.
Had they complied, Darius and hls army would have been deprived
of the only escape available in their retreat from the fruitIess
campaign. The idea of ná'JIl'a -rà (3aat).éwç neáyp,al'a hanging in
the balance, and being at the mercy of one man, Histiaeus, who
prevailed against Scythlan pressure,30 is appalling, e5EtVó'JI (y 2,
this is the third e5EtVó'JI in the speech; cf. a 3, (3 2). Now in an
28
Later in technical rhetoric the erellotion of eiWOUl figures among the
main objectives of the proem; cf. Arist., rhet. r 14,141511. 34 ff.; Rhet ad
Alex. 30,143611. 36 ff.
29
See for the episode IV 82. As recowlted there, it includes Artabanus'
warning, but the parallel between IV 82 and VII 10 is so striking that the
two scenes cannot ha.ve origina.ted independently of one another. No doubt
Powell (N. 4) 58 is right in calling IV 82 a. "pale reflection", seil. of Artabanus'
role in VII. I do not think that Herodotus invented the episode of IV;
if it was reported to him, the role of Artabanus as a wa.rner must have
been firmly esta.blished in the tradition. This is altogether proba.ble.
80
Cf. VIII 108 for Greek deliberations regllording such a course. The
historicity of the events a.t the Danube (IV 136-142) can hardly be
questioned (cf. Ja.coby, 434, where a. "Miltiadesquelle" is suggested).
146
TWO CRUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
11
expedition against Greece the bridge thrown across the Rellespontos
would be similarly crucial for a safe return, and the Greek Heet,
if it proves superior, might destroy it. 31 Artabanus' reading of
Persian history is at variance with Xerxes' and Mardonius'; here
as weIl as somewhat later when he again looks at the past (18.2),
he selects failures of Persian enterprises, including Cyrus' last war.
They are, so to speak, negative naea(Je{yp,a-ra, from which a lesson
should be learned.
Artabanus' own advice is that Xerxes give the whole project
more thought and put the results of maturer reHection before
another meeting of the council. This advice is backed up by a
number of new gnomai which though beginning in a low key soon
rise to a vtpoç ((J 2 ff.) more genuine and solemn than Xerxes'
burst of megalomania. For the words and thoughts are the
summation of a lifetime's experience. Artabanus himself refers
later to his opinion as vfJew "a-ra1Cavovaa (16 a 2). Like Solon he
knows the deity to be jealous, unwilling to suffer any other
greatness, and bent on destroying whatever rises too high. It is
the peaks which stick out that are struck by lightning; nothing
smaIl provokes divine wrath (10 e, ç). We read these sentences
with Xerxes' boast to make Persian possession -rqJ L1ulç ai/Het
op,oveéovaa fresh in our mind. The final section of Artabanus'
speech is addressed to Mardonius who should cease to encourage
the king by a distorted picture of Greek capacities: (JtafJoA-YJ Yele Èan
(Jewóm-ro1l (10 'fJ 2). Xerxes himself ought on no account expose
his person to the hazards of the expedition. If Mardonius insists
on leading an army against Greece, Artabanus is willing to stake
the life of his children and his own on the outcome of his prediction
about a disastrous defeat. Ris last sentence, a prophecy-not to
say, an ecstatic vision-of amiserable death awaiting Mardonius,
ris es once more to epic grandeur.
Next Xerxes speaks again. Ris reaction to Artabanus' warning
is thoroughly emotional ({}vp,w{}elç 11.1). Re is if possible even
more firmly determined than in his former speech to fight it out
with the Greeks and finds even stronger words for his obligation
to prove himself a worthy descendent of L1aee{ov -roV 'Ya-ráaneoç
-rov "d. (up to Achaemenes, 11.2) as weIl as for his conviction
31
In the commentaries (Heinrich Stein; How and Wells) we find
"Homeric anaphora" noted ad 10 f} 3. For the tone cf. e, esp. 15,' Wv èq;fJÓ{!1JC1av.
Other thoughts of this speech on which I cannot here comment are e.g. the
1;,1Jp.la awaiting hasty decision (1;,) and the condemnation of t5wfloÄIj (1J 2).
Unusual is aIso the phrasing in fl 1; "al MJ "al O'tJIIIjve"'e.... On the
"jealous" and the "just" god in Herodotus cf. Ph.-E. Legrand, in the Budé
edition, Hérodote, "Introduction" (Paris, 1932) 135 ff.
147
12
TWO CRUClAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
that vengeance for what the Greeks have done to Persia and
Persian pride is a necessity. Losing his sense of proportion, he
is carried away to an exaggeration as fantastic as this: cLUà :n:otÉetv
IJ :n:a/hïv :n:emeü-rat àywv-for if Greece is not conquered by the
Persians, all of Persia will fall to the Greeks. Artabanus barely
escapes unharmed owing to his privileged status as Xerxes' uncle.
Still, there is something particularly revolting in Xerxes' rude
outburst against a far older man, whose heart and soul had been
in every word of his advice, who had spoken in profound concern,
in fact in anxiety about the fate of Persia, and who had sealed
the statement of his conviction by offering up his life and that
of his children in case his predictions should prove wrong.
In Herodotus warners cannot be wrong. 32 Artabanus' advice,
weIl reasoned and supported by historical as weIl as religious
arguments, and Xerxes' haughty repudiation of the warner might
weIl suffice as a prelude to a large enterprise ending in catastrophe.
Taken as a whoIe, the council scene, full of dramatic tension, is
a literary achievement of high order. Four speeches, bristling with
passages of intense emotions, firm convictions and-to all
appearances-irrevocable declarations of intent mark this scene
as the peripeteia of Persian fortunes. At the end of VII 11 Xerxes
has made the fatal decision. However Herodotus knows about
events that came to pass after the council scene and in their final
effect confirmed Xerxes in his determination. During the night
following the deliberations Xerxes thought once more about his
decision. He now feIt the weight of Artabanus' advice and was
prepared to call off the war against Greece (12.1) when he had
a dream vision "as is reported by the Persians". A man of noble
appearance speaks to him; he reproaches Xerxes for his change
of mind and in the end resorts to veiled threats oiJ-re Ó avyyvwaÓf.lE11Óç
-rOt :n:áea, 12.2) to make him persevere in his war plans. Xerxes
nevertheless on the following day announces a reversal of the
previous decision. More than this, he blames his immature judgment
for the rash declaration of his will and apologizes for his unseemly
rudeness toward Artabanus. There is a general feeling of relief
(eh. 13). Yet in the next night the vision reappears, and this time
the threats are more specific ; if Xerxes gives up his plan, he should
know wç xat f.liyaç xat :n:oÄ.Ä.oç lyiveo lv oÄ.tycp xeóvcp, oi5-rw xat -ra:n:et1loç
o:n:{aw xa-rà -ráxoç Éaeat (eh. 14). Xerxes, thoroughly frightened
(:n:eeu5e~ç) wonders whether dream and threats reveal to him a
32
The statement should perhaps be qualified because it is not always
easy to distinguish the warner from other types of advisers (see Lattimore,
loc. cit., N. 12, 29).
148
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
13
divine win so that he must bow to a god's command (cf. 15.2).
He communicates hls visions to Artabanus and suggests that
Artabanus don the king's attire, and lie down to sleep on the
king's couch. For ifit is a god who announces hls will in the dreams,
Artabanus when taking the king's role will have the same experience
as Xerxes (15.3). Artabanus, although not sure about the wisdom of
Xerxes' suggestion,33 and inclined to give the dream a "rationalistic"
explanation, consents and acts as Xerxes had bidden hlm. The
same figure appears and speaks ; however Artabanus is not mistaken
for the king but at once identified as the opponent of Xerxes'
war plans. In the most frightening words he is told that hls efforts
to prevent the expedition are futile. "To Xerxes has been revealed
what he is fated to experience if he does not obey" are the last
words of the dream figure, who then turns to Artabanus and seems
about to burn out his eyes with fiery irons. 34 When Artabanus
reports thls horrifying experience to Xerxes he explains once more
that hls opposition was based on knowledge about the instability
of human fortunes and in particular on some adverse results of
previous enterprises; this time (18.2) he mentions even more
instances than in the council scene. However, he continues, he has
become conscious of a "daemonic thrust" (è'Jatl-lOvt'YJ óep,~), whlch
can only portend that the Greeks are marked out for destruction
(18.3). Xerxes should no longer hesitate to cooperate with the gods
who win deliver the Greeks into hls hands. It is in thls spirit of
fun confidence, bwe{}éVu,ç -rfi Ö'Ijl8t, that the final decision is taken.
A further dream vision is interpreted by the magi, evidently in
a manner apt to enhance the general optimism. 35
33
The comparison with the sea, another poetic touch (cf. Solon 12, but
aIso 9 West), imparts a special nobility to Artabanus' words and enhances
authority. For àv{}(!wnwv "alewv óp.,J.ia, ch.s 5, 7-9 provide ample justification. On the parallel in the Persae see below p. 19.
34
VII 17-18.1. Artabanus' dream vision is fatal to all efforts of "internalizing" the daemon. He cannot, as Reinhardt would like us to think, be
"Xerxes' eigener Schicksalsdaemon, sein eigenes ... Selbst noch einmal"
172; cf. 169 = 367; cf. 362 Marg). Nor is it possible with von Fritz (1249)
to divest the daemon of hls religious, awe-inspiring quality and reduce his
threats to the plain secular and political meaning: a king like you cannot
draw back from an enterprise begun with such pomp. The atmosphere of
ch.s 12-18 forbids such interpretations. If rationalistic explanations of
dreams were current at Herodotus' time, Artabanus who advocates them,
leams by his subsequent experience that they are out of place. Von Fritz
ignores this experienee, nor does he tell us whether the political shrewdness
of the daemon is to be understood as Herodotus' own, as that of his Persian
authorities, or as the product of Xerxes' subconscious (on the assumption
that the story is historically authentic). K. Latte's objections, Entretiens
sur l'antiquité, Fond. Hardt 4, 1957, 26, have not been refuted by von Fritz.
35
A misunderstanding of the daemon's words (and of the oracles) Inay
well have been at one time essential to the story, but for Herodotus himself
this is no longer the case. Immerwahr (TAPA 85, 1954, 34 f. = 524 f. Marg)
149
14
TWO CRUOIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
As we have said, Xerxes' behavior in the stormy crown council
session would have sufficed to account for the fateful decision.
We also have realized how many of Herodotus' favorite motifs
are woven into the fabric ofthis scene and how by their combination
they provide the scene with its particular moral quality and give
it its dramatic function. So extreme a manifestation of hybris is
the appropriate fust act of a drama ending in a Persian disaster. 36
Still after the council scene which in a large measure must be
his own creation,37 Herodotus has seen fit to incorporate a Persian
version of events preceding Xerxes' decision. This version too
would be a complete and satisfactory explanation for the great
enterprise. In outlook and conception it is completely different;
most notably because the responsibility is attributed to a deity
or other superhuman figure. We may, like others before us, caU
the figure a daemon, and since he has his place in a Persian story,
he should be a Persian daemon. 38 Attempts to find a name for
him would be futile. Still devas, foUowers of Areiman, were known
in Xerxes' environment; he himself issued edicts to restrict their
worship.39 And since Satan with his army of devils has his origin
cautiously charges only Artabanus with misinterpreting the daemon's word
as promise of a victory. Note also the critical report about other theories
in von Fritz II 129 ff., n. 23. In the Croesus Ä,6yoç Herodotus had good
reasons for emphasizing the misunderstanding. Another difference between
Croesus and Xerxes is that the latter has not to pay Ttrnç for an ancestral sin but is linked to his "ancestors" through the 'I'6p.oç motif. Cf. von
Fritz I 250.
36
Axtabanus, as we shaU see, plays the same role in both stories. He
was probably for Greeks as weU as for Persians associated with anti-war
sentiments, just as Mardonius was generaUy known as a "hawk" .
37
What may we consider the historical substratum ofthe council scene?
Quite possibly one or several meetings were convened to deliberate about
the war-but before the mobilization rather than at so late a stage-and
there may weU have been a vehement outburst of Xerxes. Alternatively,
the outburst may not have occurred but formed part of the "tradition"
for some time before Herodotus. One need not know much about Persian
crown counclls to realize the deliberate dramatic composition of ch.s 8-11.
Herodotus must be credited with the words, the thoughts, and the structure
of the speeches. Cf. A. Hauvette's (Hérodote Historien des guerres médiques,
Paris 1894, 283 ff.) eminently sensible analysis of the council scene and
the subsequent dreams. FoUowing others, he distinguishes 1) a Persian
substratum, 2) modification "cà et là par des idées grecques," 3) Herodotus'
own views and contributions.
38
Reinhardt (171. = 366 Marg) and Regenbogen (92 = 98 Marg) have
laid the groundwork for distinguishing between Persian and Greek elements.
Change of dress, donning of the king's robe are typicaUy Oriental motifs.
The Hellenizing features have been particularly stressed by Immerwahr,
TAP A 84,33 (= 523 ff. Marg).
39
For an English translation of an edict see James B. Pritchard,
Anc. Noor Eastern TextB relating to the O.T. (Princeton, New Jersey, 2nd
ed., 1955) 317. Since daivas were familiar in Xerxes' environment, controversies as to whether the Persian kings were foUowers of Zoroaster and
160
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
15
ultimately in Iranian dualism, which via late Judaism influenced
Christian beliefs, we may without undue sensationalism recognize
this fatal àv~(! I'iyaç ~ai evw5~ç as the first appearance of a devil
in Greek literature.40 A tall, good-Iooking man recurs in a
Herodotean dream story and need not have been an unfamiliar
experience; but a fiend who threatens his victim's eyes with fiery
irons has no place in Greek religion, where even the Erinyes do
not resort to so devilish a practice. A (JoÄ6p.1jTtç Má't'a #eov is known
to and feared by the Aeschylean chorus-n.b. in the Persians. 41
In fact the conception as such is older; the o.vÄoç ovet(!oç sent to
Agamemnon (TI. II 5 ff.) is the first instance of a divine deception
intended to produce misfortune. 42 It stands to reason that beliefs
and fears of this kind extended from the lowest stratum of
superstition to the highest level of poetic sophistication. The dream
vision has been Hellenized. How far this process had gone before
Herodotus and how much he himself contributed to it we are in
no position to know.
We may, however, with reasonable certainty infer what the
"Persian" story presupposes and how Herodotus turned it into
a sequel to the other thoroughly Hellenic version. The daemon's
operations presuppose Xerxes as entertaining plans for a large scale
war against Greece, yet uncertain about the wisdom of this project
and-we probably should add-influenced by his uncle who opposes
the idea. Xerxes' wavering is at variance with his conduct in the
council scene, at the conclusion of which he is firmly resolved on
whether good and bad daemons were integral to his religion need not concern
us. (To an outsider the treatment of these questions in H. 8. Nyberg, Die
Religionen des alten Iran, Osnabrück, 1938 and 1966, 366 seems most
satisfactory).
40
lam aware of a tendency (though I do not know its extent) to question
the exclusively Iranian origin of tbis dualism. Cumont was very positive
on this infiuence (The Oriental Religians in Rom. PaganiBm, New York, 1911
and 1956, 152). 80 was Wilamowitz (Glaube d. Hellenen 11 529: "bei dem
Christen steht neben dem gutem Prinzip das böse ... das kommt über die
Juden von den Persern"). RLAO s.v. "Engel" is less definite and The
IllU8trated Bibl. Encyclopaedia s.v. "angel" still less. Nilsson, Gesch. d.
griech. Relig. 11 (Munich, 1950) stresses the continuity of Greek t5alp.oveç (e.g.
201 ff., 287, 514); the more important are bis concessions to Persia pp.
424-428; esp. 425, n. 3, where for Xenocrates too Iranian infiuence ought
to have been admitted.
However even if Mesopotamians and Ugarites share these beliefs with
the Persians, the suggestion advanced in the text would hardly be affected
-as long as Aeschylus' t5alp.oveç are allowed to remain Greek. Cf. Dodds,
The Greek8 and the Irrational, 38 ff.; also H. Herter, Rheinisches Jahrbuch
f. Volk8kunde 1 (1950), 118 ff., esp. 138 ff.
41
VVo 93-100 (107-114 Page); see on the Persians below p. 19.
42
For other Homeric examples see Regenbogen 92 f. (= 98 f. Marg).
Homeric features in the dream vision are noted in Heinr. 8tein's commentary.
151
16
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
war. The character of Artabanus is identical in both versions, and
his opposition to Xerxes' plan common to both. This, we may
assume, facilitated their coordination. A divine, or as the outcome
shows, devilish power intervenes to resolve Xerxes' indecision and
to turn Artabanus from an adversary into a supporter of the
expedition. Whether the Persian version included a "fatalistic"
motif or whether it simply told of a divine command accompanied
by threats I leave to Iranists to decide. We know Herodotus' habit
of resorting to xeewv and similar concepts when disaster overtakes
a powerful kingdom or individua1. 43 Appearances may be deceptive ;44
yet what seems to have been Herodotus' task was to combine
two stories each of which was complete and would have sufficed
for his purpose.
If we rightly consider Xerxes' wavering as a part--indeed as
the starting point--of the Persian story, Herodotus constructed
a bridge from the firm determination at the end of the council
scene to the dream by the simplest of means. A few brief sentences
describe the change from one frame of mind to another: (in the
night) Eée~1Jv bmCe ij ,Ae-cafJávov yvwP1J· vv"Ti, ~è fJovÎ.~v ~l~OVÇ
Jláyxv eveu1"é Ot ov Jlefjy pa elval a7:eaUvea{}al ÈJlt 7:~V 'EÎ.Î.á~a.
These words could weil have followed a far less heated deliberation.
They set the stage for the intervention of a higher power. Yet,
as fashioned by Herodotus, the story of this intervention includes
some further-and stronger-links with the council scene. Several
times reference is made to the conflict of opinions at that meeting;
Xerxes apologizes for his rude outburst,45 and Artabanus again
-in fact not once but twice--expounds the reasons for his
apprehensions. 46 Herodotus has availed himself of the speeches
and the freedom which they permitted him to show Xerxes going
through a succession of emotions. In ch. 13 we find him in a
state ofregret, indeed ofrepentance; next (in ch. 15) he is frightened,
perplexed, unable to make up his mind; in the end (18.4) he has
regained his confidence. Artabanus too has an agonizing experience
(17; cf. 18.1), but his fear soon gives way to a rational assessment
43
See e.g. I 91.1; 120.1; V 92 ~ 1 (l~et) and for an extreme statement
IX 16.4.
44
I put in this word of eaution beeause it is beyond us to reeonstruet
the reports and traditions that Herodotus synthesized. The "hellenization"
of the Persian story may have been weIl on its way before Herodotus
applied the last-yet in any case very eonsiderable-touehes to it. It is
also quite eoneeivable that some of his informants "knew" that Xerxes
having energetieally detied all opposition in a erown eouneil lost his nerve
in the night whieh followed but was by the intervention of a daemon brought
back to bis original intention.
45
13.2 (bad advisers, cf. 16 a); an apology also 15.1.
46
16 a 2; 18.2.
152
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
17
of the situation. Being a wiser man, he has the perspective and
the grasp which Xerxes lacks. After recovering from the shock
into which the horrible threats of the daemon have thrown him
-Herodotus deliberately uses but three words: àflf3ÓJaaç fliya
àva1}(!rfJaXEt (18.1) for this stage-he at on ce knows how to
understand the dream. Most vividly and with a true artist's touch
Herodotus brings out the contrast between Xerxes' confusion and
bewilderment and Artabanus' ripe wisdom. Xerxes, who in the
council scene had excessive confidence in his own judgment, is
in the end unable to make up his mind without his uncle's
assistance. That Artabanus despite his balanced and superior
judgment succumbs to the daemon and accepts his indications as
true is the height of irony. Any attentive reader will appreciate
this, but an interpreter cannot acquiesce in silent admiration but
must, like Artabanus, try to account for what happens.
A divine power has asserted itself. Whoever reads the fust
eighteen or nineteen chapters of Book VII at a stretch may hold
this power ultimately responsible for the fatal resolution. Xerxes
has after all regretted his loss of self control and has apologized
to his uncle in words showing this proud monarch for once in
a genuinely contrite state of mind. Are we to accept his apology
and acquit him of any "guilt" (alTea) and responsibility1 47 It
surely is difficult to see how he could have defi.ed the daemon
who forces even Artabanus to change his conviction. Actually
Xerxes goes as far as he can in his resistance to the threats and
urgings of the daemon.
If this opinion is correct, the council scene is hardly more than
a prelude to the manifestations of divine will; human beings are
the natyvta of gods, who if it pleases them guide them toward
disaster . However this is not the only possible explanation.
Herodotus who considers it his duty -rà ï.eyóflEva UyEtV 48 may
have put before the readers the main versions that he knew and
47
Scholars of the highest authority favor this view. According to Jacoby
(426) Herodotus deliberately cites bis "Persian" authorities for the "decisive"
event. See aIso Regenbogen 93 (= 99 Marg) on "Gätterwille" ... "Trug" ...
"der Weisheit letzter Schluss" and Reinhardt (171 f. = 366 Marg) , who
speaks of the "welthistorische Entscheidung in der Kläglichkeit ihrer
Fatalität". Von Fritz (see above N. 34) may be said to represent the opposite
extreme, although Legrand (op. cito N. 31) 54 too speaks of the insatiable
desire for expansion as "cause première" and ["cause ] profonde" . Pohlenz
126 f. seerns basically correct, although his summary of VII 7-19 remains
on the surface.
48
See esp. VII 152.3. Still Herodotus makes clear that reporting does
not imply consent or acceptance, and he repeatedly indicates bis preference.
Nor would I doubt that he dismissed much that he heard and ignored versions
that he did not consider worth reporting.
153
18
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
feIt able to bring to life. In this case he would deliberately have
refrained from imposing his own judgment. Every reader might
understand the sequence in accordance with his own inclination.
Again, as we have begun this paper by a reference to Herodotus'
development, we may experiment with this approach and wonder
whether the "secular" and the "metaphysical" version reflect
different stages in Herodotus' historical outlook. And finally it is
possible to think that Herodotus himself had made up his mind
about the relationship of two alternative explanations but did not
succeed in communicating his conclusion.
When trying to bring some light into this tangle of problems
we must be most careful to refrain from apodictic statements.
Herodotus himself stands in awe of the divine and is ready to
suspend judgment; it behooves us to respect this attitude. Still
if we wish to see clearer, no solution is acceptable that ignores
the close coordination of the two versions by means of the links
we have noticed (above p. 16). On the face of it, this coordination
lends support to the decisive importance of the metaphysical
motivation. The case for this seems flawless.
And yet how repugnant is it to believe that a scene as elaborately
constructed as the crown council and with it the climax of Xerxes'
arrogant self-delusion should be simply wiped out by subsequent
events. It has settled in the readers' minds and it stays there.
We also remember that over-confidence in some form or other
causes the fall of Croesus, of Cyrus, and of Cambyses as weIl as
the most serious and periIous setback suffered by Darius. 49 Should
this motivation, whiIe operative in the fate of the other monarchs,
be of no account in tanto cardine rerum, even though it has nowhere
else received so dramatic a presentation? We have no right to
"postulate" something analogous to the history of the other kings;
yet intrinsic probability should be conceded to the opinion that
Xerxes' megalomania must have some function in unleashing the
disastrous war. Mter the lavish use of colors and color contrasts
the few words which teIl us of Xerxes' change of mood are pale.
Some episodes on the march into Greece confirm the impression
of Xerxes' hybris. Outstanding among them is of course the flogging
of the "divine" Hellespontus; others would be the despotic volteface in his dealings with Pythius (VII 39),50 the defilement of
49
Cf. Reinhardt 148 (= 338 Marg) on the "grossen durchgängigen
SchicksaJslinien" of the Oriental kings. However, for reasons indicated
above (N. 47) he seems to question the presence of the hybris-retribution
scheme in the case of Xerxes.
50
VII 35. On Xerxes' hybris cf. lmmerwahr 176 ff., 261, 279 and pass.
The Athos channel is for Herodotus not in the same c1ass as the bridge
acroBB the Hellespontos. He looks upon it primarily as an admirably planned
154
TWO CRUClAL DECIBIONS IN HEBODOTUS
19
Leonidas' corpse (VII 238, where Herodotus' comments are
significant), and perhaps also the parading of the entire Persian
forces on more than one occasion. 51 Yet the last item is open to
different interpretations, and as soon as we do not look exclusively
for outbursts of pride or brutality, we must allow that Xerxes
is shown in a variety of moods. The over-all impression is of a
man unsure ofhis ground, wavering between one extreme disposition
and the opposite, perhaps least certain ofhimself and most dependent
on others when his assertions-and ambitions-take an extreme
form. 52 In the last analysis it barely matters whether the
megalomania of the council scene is typical or exceptional. lts
significance for Herodotus' understanding of the Persian disaster
does not depend on such extraneous considerations.
In our state of uncertainty a glance at Aeschylus' Persae may
help toward clarification. lt surely is noteworthy how many of
the motivations that Herodotus embodies in the council scene and
its sequence were familiar even in 472, seven years after Plataeae. 53
We have quoted the doMflTJnç àná-ra iJeov, which leads man into
the net of áTTJ (above p. 15) but have not yet mentioned the
frequent references to a daemon (èJatflwv nç, v. 345). A daemon
has destroyed the Persian army, has with excessive weight fallen
upon the whole of Persia, has led astray the minds, and has
contributed rus share to Xerxes' foolish decision; in fact taking up
engineering feat (VII 22); nevertheless the impulse was provided by Xerxes'
p,eyaÄofPl!oaVvTJ (ch. 24). Pythius has a parallel in the history of Darius
(IV 84, cf. Pohlenz, 93).
51
Cf. VII 44; 56-100. In these sections as weIl as in ch.s 184-187
Herodotus' own desire to commemorate the size and composition of the
Persian forces is patent. At the same time xaTáÄoyot of the enormous army
and navy heighten the glory of the victors. Note in thls connection aIso the
aiJ~TJatç in VII 21 and the display of pomp in ch.s 40 f.
52
On the wavering see Reinhardt's excellent remarks (169 = 363 Marg),
aIso e.g. von Fritz I 247. Xerxes is capable of p,eyaÄofPl!oaVvTJ in the better
sense of the word (VII 28.3 ff., 136.2), may show surprising intelligence
(VII 146.2 ff.) or indulge in melancholic thoughts as he suddenly changes
from one mood to the opposite (VII 45). Not a few of the anecdotes have
their point in themselves rather than in their association with Xerxes.
In Immerwahr's comprehensive treatment of Xerxes' character (178 ff.;
esp. 181 ff.) all traits I have mentioned have a place; for some I should
have preferred a different one.
53
Echoes of the Persians have been recognized in Herodotus phrasing
(note esp. v. 728: VIII 68 y, also t5ovÄtoV Cvy6v of v. 50 (cf. VII 815) and
the yij avp,p,axoç, v. 792 (see VII 49.2); they seem to have kept ringing
in hls ears after he had read or, what I should not rule out, seen the play,
seil. as naÄatá. Cf. Hauvette, loc. cit., N. 37; Pohlenz 116 n. 3; 125 n. 2.
Yet neither agreements in language nor identical motifs prove an "influence" of Attic tragedy on Herodotus. The basic themes antedate tragedy
and we have no right to contine their sway to the motherland. In structure
Herodotus VII 7-18 and Aeschylean tragedy have very little in common.
See aIso above N. 15 and N. 25.
155
20
TWO CRUClAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
this last point (made by the queen) Darius, the voice of wisdom
and authority declares: cpev· piyaç nç 1j).:fJe ~atpwv wa-re p~ CP(!OVetV
XaAWÇ (v. 725).54 We must beware of rash conclusions which this
line seems to invite. For Darius shortly afterwards speaks of his
hopes that oracles (evidently prophecying Persia's downfall) would
be fulfiUed in the far future, but {hav aneV~n nç av-róç, xcV f}edç
aVVWtu't"al (v. 742). Whatever the effect and power of the ~atpwv
in v. 725, here it clearly is Xerxes' youthful boldness, his viov
{}(!áaoç (v. 745; cf. 782), his lack of evf3ov).ta and vóaoç cp(!evwv
(v. 750) which have caused the catastrophe. Where such dispositions
seek an outlet, a god joins in and leads man to his ruin! When
Darius has ended, Atossa speaks of evil men with whom Xerxes
consorted: xa"oiç ÓplÀWV aV~(!áal (v. 753). We know such men, of
whom Mardonius is but one,55 from Herodotus. They told him
(she continues) of his obligation to increase Persia's power, insisting
that he owed this to the tradition of his empire and to his own
reputation. 56
Disaster has not yet run its fuU course. Darius knows of terrible
defeats still to come. Zeus is the chastiser of boastful thoughts;
hybris when in fuU bIoom wiU bear u-r'fJ (vv. 821 ff.). What Xerxes
lacks is awcp(!oaVv'fJ (v. 829); he must give up the desire for the
possession of others and be content with the na(!wv ~atpwv
(vv. 824 ff.). No warner is mentioned (except that Darius as long as
he ruled taught his son better ways, v. 763).57 Still the essential
religious and moral ideas are present, and of the secular and
political motives there are in any case intimations, even if here
too they are overlaid by a stratum of religious and ethical
convictions. 58 Quite clearly, the explanations of the great war that
Herodotus incorporated in his magnificent composition had been
current for decades. Even the realization that Xerxes' defeats
marked the peripeteia of Persian history had its origin in the
54
See for the datp.wv also v.v. 345, 515, 911, 942. On the relation between
the 15atp.wv and Zeus R. P. Winnington.lngram's recent article, JHS
93 (1973), 210 ff. is illuminating. See also Immerwahr, TAPA 85 (1954)
29 (= 517 Marg).
55
Cf. Herod. VII 5.2-6; 13.2; 16.
56
v.v. 754 ff. Note also what the chorus says (v.v. 94 ff.) about the
Moïea as Ieading Persia to wars, etc. This corresponds to the v6p.oç invoked
by Xerxes ·VII 8a.
57
Here Herodotus differs; what he knows of Darius' own extensive
preparation for a settling of accounts with Athens (VIII) is probably
closer to the facts. Also Darius himself had been engaged in wars of conquest
in Europe. Cf. W. Kirdorf, Erlebnis und Darstellung der Perserkriege (Hypomnemata 16, Göttingen, 1966) 61 and, on Xerxes' attitude to his forebears,
77. For Darius as associated with the expansion motif see aIso 111 134-137;
cf. Immerwahr TAPA 87 (1956), 261.
58
vvo 94 ff. (Page); 754 ff.; 759-794; 823-826. See our comments above.
156
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
21
generation of the victors. 59 In the Persians the daemon, frightful
and sinister as he is, in no way lessens the responsibility of man's
own folly and arrogance.
Rerodotus was free to distribute the weights differently. If the
oa{f-lwv had his place among the causes of the war, Rerodotus very
probably knew more than one story of his operation. We need
not speculate about the reasons why he chose the Persian A,óyoç
(Artabanus' role in it facilitated the connection with the council
scene). In this A,óyoç the ba{f-lwv determines the king's final
decision,60 or should we rather say that he acts as aVA.A.~nTWe now
that Aeschylus has provided us with this clue (éhav anevorJ nç
aVTóç "TA; see above p. 20)? Fortunately an episode of Book VII
which we have not yet considered saves us from taking this
easy way out.
After the deliberations and colloquies between Xerxes and
Artabanus that precede the expedition there is one more extended
conversation between them. It takes place when Xerxes having
seen his entire forces, army as weIl as navy, pass in review, has
first enjoyed and gloried in the consciousness of his might, yet
suddenly from such proud feelings turned to pessimistic reflections
about man's lot (VII 44 f.). Artabanus is more than ready to
sympathize with su eh thoughts, and as they meet in this gloomy
mood, Xerxes after a while returns to Artabanus' warning. 61 W ould
his uncle without the dream apparition have stuck to his original
attitude toward the war or would he have changed his opinion
in any case? Artabanus promptly discounts the daemon (47.2). Ris
own opinion, he declares, has not changed, and proceeds to set
forth the reasons for his pessimism. This time they are, on the
whoie, remarkably concrete; for he dwells on the formidable
difficulties to be faced on land and sea. Still between these items
of strategie prognosis there is again some wisdom about man as
subject to chances (49.3) that defy control and about the necessity
of forethought to consider every conceivable adversity (49.5).62
The seriousness of one of these thoughts is heightened by the
words f-lMfe ön which introduce it. Yet Artabanus nowhere raises
his voice to the same pitch as in the council scene; nor does Xerxes'
answer (eh. 50) show any sign of passion. Quite rationally, he
sets forth that great enterprises must be undertaken in a disposition
See vvo 739-826 (828).
See above p. 13.
61
At 47,1 Xerxes professes to ebange tbe topic and to turn from xaxá
to X(,!1)<Tl'á (seil. tbe expedition against Greeee).
62
Tbe former of tbese generalizations concludes tbe observations about
tbe land, the latter those about the sea as formidable enemy.
59
60
157
22
TWO CRUClAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
ready to face great risks (50.3). It is true, he admits, that man ean
never be certain about the outcome of his plans (50.1 f.), but
this very uncertainty-and the impossibility of foretelling the
future-gives daring aetion its prospect of success (ibid.). Appealing
once more to the Persian tradition-the VÓf.lOç of VII 8a-of
continuous expansion, he asserts that if his predeeessors had before
every enterprise been too coneerned about adverse possibilities,
Persia would never have grown to its present greatness (50.3).
Against the strategic and logistie worries of Artabanus he points
to the elaborate provisions that have been made (ibid. 4).63 The
episode ends with a speeific piece of advice tendered by Artabanus
who thinks it imprudent to include the ronians in an expedition
against their motherland (ch. 50). Here again Xerxes' reaction is
negative. On a previous occasion which is known to Artabanus
-and which he actually has cited in an earlier speeeh-they have
given proof of their reliability (ch. 51).64
As we have said, throughout this scene Xerxes argues rationally;
there is no sign of hybris. Emotional outbursts, visions of phantastic
grandeur, intense feelings are absent; and so is the daemon. The
style shows but minor fluctuations. It looks as if Herodotus had
made it a point to debate the issue onee more, yet this time on
a down-to-earth level. Still we cannot seriously credit him with
an intention to forestall misunderstandings of the earlier scenes.
Whatever his reasons for composing this episode, it is clear that
daemon or no daemon, excessive ambition, bad influences, need
for vengeance or none of all this, there is a conflict of two attitudes,
both of which find support in strategie considerations as well as in
more general reflections about ..à àv{}eÓJntva. The day is earried
by the opinion which justifies daring risks-on rational or quasirational grounds-and relates them to the Persian "law" of activity
and expansion. It would be amistake to ignore this scene, where
the seale is tipped by arguments of a "secular" type and no claim
63
Here it may be held that his confidence comes close to that of eh. 8;
note esp. fJpûç .•• 6pmOVpE:IIOL b,,;{vOLIJL ••• "aT:arn:eE1pápE:IIOL nál1av T:1}v EvedmTJV
vorn:TJaopE:II •• oITre ).LpijJ èvrvX6vuç oiIt5ap61h oITre 1eT;).. Still in tone and style
there is nothing comparable to VII 8 or 11.
64
Artabanus is a witness to their loyalty beca.use he referred to the
episode in IOy. It is immaterial for Xerxes-a.nd for the dra.ma.tic effect
of this dia.logue-that content and purpose of Arta.banus' warnings ibid.
would support his point of view rather than Xerxes'. Cf. von Fritz I 252 f.,
with whose observations I agree, though when he once more a.ffirms the
historical necessity of continuous Persian expansion, I feel doubtful.
Herodotus may indeed have perceived a "trend" -this is as far as I should
go-seil. the v6poç referred to by Xerxes. von Fritz tends to forget that
Xerxes speaks. Too readily he regards Xerxes = Herodotus = historica.l
truth.
158
TWO ORUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
23
is made that God helps the bold and enterprising. 65 If Xerxes'
responsibility in the earlier scenes is open to doubt, here he accepts
it without hesitation. But while no god is counted upon for
assistance, none is provoked either . Nemesis and ate would not
be caIled forth by a speech in which Xerxes refers to himself as
áv1}(!wnov ÈÓvm and therefore in no position to have certain
knowledge (50.2).66 We may, if we like, distinguish between a
pragmatic and a moral responsibility and recognize the former in
this scene, while finding the latter with increased confidence in
the speeches where Xerxes sees himself as ruler of a territory equal
to Zeus' aether. 67
Herodotus has indeed, as we expected, assigned each influence
its proper weight. He has presented us with Xerxes' fJ{3(!U;, has
shown us the lJa{/-lwv at work, has given us a rational "justification"
of Persia's law of growth. The necessity of punishing Athenian
aggression has been mentioned, and so have the evil advisers to
whom Xerxes listens and who put a wrong idea about the Greeks
into his mind. Should we still try to assess the relative importance
of each of these motivations? Surely the futility of any su eh
attempt is obvious after we have realized that Herodotus resorts
even to different styles for motives that have no common
denominator. Artistic representation may keep a balance between
factors as heterogeneous as supernatural powers and the immanent
political tendency of a country, megalomania and careful strategie
calculations. It can show us the ruler over-confident as weIl as
timid. Sober, pedestrian analysis of the kind we here attempt can
do none of these things. It has to recognize Herodotus' superbly
skillful handling of a complex tradition and must warn of a trap
65
We may contrast Toiat . Pov:Aollé:vOtat notÉuv ooç Tà èntnav lPtUet ylvea{}at Tà 'XÉet5ea (50.2) with 8 al : {}eàç ofhw liyet ')(TÄ.
66
I do not argue at length for my suggestion that Xerxes desires confirmation for hls profe88ed confidence and if he does not receive it, supplies
it himself. After Artabanus is sent back to Persia (52.2), Demaratus in
some sense succeeds to hls role. With hlm however advice and admonition
take a clifferent form. He explains to an incredulous Xerxes the Greek
attitude and habits that bear on the outcome of the war (VII 101 ff.; 209;
but note aIso 234 ff.).
67
On the "historical substratum" of this last conversation of Xerxes
and Artabanus very little can be said and every suggestion is bound to be
speculative. It would certainly be amistake to underrate the number of
stories and anecdotes about X erxes' expedition that had sprung up in the
years and decades following this spectacular event. The story of Xerxes'
joy and gloom after a review of his forces may have been widely known.
As for the conversation with a warner (and we believe that Artabanus was
familiar in this role), my conjecture would be that it likewise reached
Herodotus as aBSociated with a display of the troops. Very probably it is
he who connected the stories, and he of course is responsibie for form and
content of the speeches.
159
24
TWO CRUClAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
into which the daemon has lured some scholars and confidence
in their own acumen some others. Herodotus' achievement is
misunderstood as soon as one of the diverse influences is declared
to be supremely important and the others are interpreted with
reference to it. 67
Having followed Xerxes and his forces fust on their way to
the Hellespontus and then on the European side as far as Thessaly,
Herodotus changes the focus ofhis narrative to theGreeks (VII 138).
Although he does return to the Persians several times and often
stays with them for a while, the change of orientation is fundamental.
We do see the "V"AOÇ of Persian history on its downward turn
-and this, I assume, is a part of the original conception 6s-but
at the same time and more conspicuously Greek fortunes move
upward from discouragement and defeat to victorious battIes and
the final triumph. The material that Herodotus could gather for
this subject was plentiful but so disparate that a controlling idea,
whether ethical, religious or political would hardly emerge from
it. To be sure, there are recurrent motifs of unquestionable
importance. Freedom is the ultimate goal of the Greek activities ;
all preparations and negotiations as well as the actual battIes are
oriented toward securing it. Even the use of guile, to which
Themistocles resorts on two occasions,69 serves the cause of Greek
freedom (as well as his own interests). Still the idea of freedom
does not shape the narrative in the same degree in which VfJr!tç,
nAeove~ta and their inevitable sequel unify the histories of Croesus,
Cambyses, and Xerxes, the last enterprise of Cyrus and the major
setback of Darius. Again discord and disruptive tendencies
continuously interfere with the Greek efforts at a united defense,
a fact which makes their frequent appearance in Herodotus a
necessity.70 Recurrent too, and doubtless of great importance, are
&
67&
An alternative theory regarding VII 47-50 would be that Herodotus
feIt impeUed to write these chapters when having acquired a more realistic
or pragmatic view of history he feIt dissatisfied with VII 7-11 as weU as
with VII 12-18. I prefer the opinion set forth above but admit that I cannot
disprove the other explanation. It remains possible as long as ch.s 47-50
are regarded as supplementing ch.s 12-18. For that they were maant to
replace them is out of the question.
68
This does not seem to be the general opinion. For approximations see
Jacoby 347 ff.; 353.; Regenbogen 95, 98 ff. (= lOl, 105 ff. Marg); von
Fritz I 277; Immerwahr 184 (though on the whole he finds more significanee
in the "cycle" of outstanding individuals). C. Highnet, Xerxes' Invasion
of Greece (Oxford, 1963) 27 ff. misunderstands the problem.
69
VII 75, 109 f.
70
See von Fritz I 254-279; Greek discord is in his view secondary to
the opposition between Greek freedom and Oriental despotism. This
opposition (freedom vs. hybris) is the keynote aIso for Pohlenz, 120-169
(nota 163!).
160
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
25
the manifestations of Greek arete. Herodotus' admiration goes to
the heroic deeds of Leonidas and his men and to the courage and
superior ability that won the batties of Salamis and Plataeae. But
he remains impartial, listing the a(!tGrevGavreç not only on the
Greek but also on the Persian side. 71 Moreover courage and fighting
prowess do not suffice to secure victory. Even the Iliad is far
more than a record of heroic a(!tGretat, and to look upon Herodotus'
story of the Greek victory as a series of historical a(!tGretm would
not lead us to a correct appreciation. Such truth as underlies this
impression must be supplemented by recognizing on the Greek
side another form of àeeT~ and a heroism different from that
displayed in battle. Not by accident this heroism is the same that
also in the Iliad transcends excellence in combat. It is a nobility
of moral purpose. Moreover, to paraphrase rather freely Herodotus'
own judgment, the glorious deeds of valor would have proved
fruitless-and this is as true of the Trojan as it is of the GraecoPersian war-if this higher form of heroism had not at critical
stages come into play. It does so by means of a decision, and thus
we are back at the subject of our study, the comparison between
the decision taken at the Persian court with the decision of the
Athenians as it is summarized and appreciated in VII 139 and
as it is acted out in VIII 140-144.
For this Athenian decision we are in the fortunate position of
proceeding on the foundations laid by Hermann Kleinknecht and
Lieselotte Solmsen. 72 It remains to show the contrast between
the influences at work in Athens and those contributing to Xerxes'
resolution. Curiously enough, there is a good deal of similarity
in point of composition between the crown council scene in Book VII
and the negotiations in Athens at the end of Book VIII. Here
as wen as there we find a triptych. As Xerxes is urged on by
Mardonius and warned by Artabanus, so the Athenians are placed
between Alexander of Macedon who urges them to accept Xerxes'
attractive offer and the Lacedaemonian envoys who use every
argument to keep Athens fighting on the Greek side.
In VII 139 Herodotus is singularly outspoken about the event
71
See e.g. VI 181.1; 211.220, 223 ff., 226 ff.; VIII 11.2; 86 (noteworthy),
a.l., Persia.n detOTeVGaneç VIII 17; IX 17.1. Artemisia's case is something
special. Consult for a genera! backgrouhd Legra.nd (op. cit., N. 31) 93 ff.
a.nd Entretiens sur l'antiq. class., VIII : Greeks and Barbarians (Fond Hardt,
Va.ndoeuvre-Geneva, 1962), esp. Diller's contribution (pp. 37 ff. = Hans
Diller, Kleine Schriften, Munich, 1971, 417 ff.).
72
Herma.nn Kleinknecht, "Herodot und Athen. 7,139/8,140--144,"
Hermes 75 (1940),241 ff. (=541 ff. Marg); Lieselotte Solmsen, "Die Reden in
Herodots Bericht der Schla.cht von Platää," e.p. 39 (1944), 341 ff. (= 645 ff.
Marg).
161
26
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
which determined the victory. The outcome lay in the hands of
the Athenians. "Whichever side they might join, that would cause
the balance to sink. Who caIls the Athenians saviors of Greece
would not miss the truth" (139.5). This judgment rests on a most
elaborate step by step reconstruction of what would have happened,
if the Athenians had moved to some other country or surrendered
to the Persians (139.1-4). By a type of reasoning which we may
call a reductio ad absurdum Herodotus builds up two possible
sequences of events that would have resulted if Athens had deserted
the Greek cause; 73 in either case the complete subjugation of
Greece by the Persians would have been inevitabie. So high an
estimate of Athens' merits was almost certainly current during
the years while Herodotus lived there. In the circles in which he
moved he is likely to have become acquainted with such arguments.
Our chapter is best looked upon as a synthesis of what he had
heard; yet as synthesis it is critical and selective. He surely did
not incorporate every argument or assertion that had come to
his knowiedge, he may weIl have included some of his own
insights,74 and he finally organized what he considered relevant
and true, assigning to each suggestion the appropriate place in
his argument. 75
The Athenians by their own example gave moral support and
provided a raIlying point for all others who were willing to defend
themselves. "Next to the gods" it is they who have turned the
Great King back (139.5). Their glory stands out clearly enough,
and so does the heroic nature of their decision, even though the
tenor of VII 139 is rational, political, and as has rightly been said,
eminently historical. For it is a part of the historian's task to
pinpoint the initial situation when if events had taken a different
turn the final success would have fallen to the other side. 76
73
Cf. Kleinknecht 244 f. (546), also for the use of similar reasoning
elsewhere in Herodotus-II 120 may be added to his examples. I am not
convineed that this method originated in medical thought.
74
He surely does not hesitate to come forward with his own opinion.
See besides the first sentence esp. his judgment-emphatic and if not
original with him, adopted with conviction-regarding the strategie value
of the waU across the Isthmus (139.4).
75
Herodotus is no longer the "mouthpiece" of a clique. Cf. L. Solmsen
246 (= 654 Marg), n. 11; she lists ibid. a number of scholsrs who accuse
Herodotus of pro-Athenian bias and of others who concur with his opinion.
H. Strasburger's very bslanced and careful discussion of Herodotus' attitude
to Athens, to democracy etc. (Historia 4, 1955, 1 ff. = 574 ff. Marg) is
familiar.
76
Kleinknecht 246 f. (549 Marg) reminds us in this connection of a weU
known debste between Edusrd Meyer and Max Weber about the historian's
duty to reconstruct the course which events would have taken if a particular
act had not materialized.
162
TWO ORUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HEBODOTUS
27
In the chapters VIII 139-144 there is no such construction of
alternatives, but we read them with VII 139 in our minds and
are aware of the historical significance of the negotiation. The
urgent effort, the apprehensions and the promises of the Spartans
(esp. 142.2 ff.) show how much depends on Athens' choice.
Nevertheless, the accent is this time on ethical aspects, the highminded determination of the Athenians, their wholehearted
devotion to the "aM, to Greece, to liberty, to their homeland.
Unlike Xerxes in the crown council scene, they do not speak fust,
but wait with the declaration of their policy until they have heard
both sides. At that point the statement of their resolution is far
more effective. 77
Alexander of Macedon comes as an envoy of Mardonius but
begins with a message of the Great King to Mardonius, then passes
to Mardonius' promise to implement this message and finally
volunteers hisown advice (ch. 140).78 Xerxes' offer is most generous.
He is ready to forgive whatever injustice the Athenians have
done him, to restore their territory, grant them additional land,
rebuild the homes of the gods which have been burned down by
his troops, and most important of all, to allow Athens the
enjoyment of its independence (140 alf.). All he expects of them
in return is that they "agree" with him (ÓflOÄoyéew a 2), which
as Mardonius makes clear (a 4), is tantamount to an alliance.
Mardonius passes on the offer with comments on the advisability
of accepting it. The king's resources are inexhaustible; of the power
at his disposal the Athenians have met and defeated only a small
part. The promise of freedom is meant honestly (ibid. a 3 f.).79
Altogether the choice is between the "á).).una (a 4) and, on the
other side, a grave and permanent danger; to persist in the war
would be "madness" . Mter Xerxes and Mardonius, Alexander who
has come as their spokesman adds his own words of recommendation
(140 fJ). As an old friend of the Athenians he feels bound to
express his doubts about their capacity of continued resistance
against Persia and the king's "superhuman" might (fJ 2). Their
geographical position in the path of every army exposes them
more than any other community to sufferings from the military
operations. Moreover the offer is large and the Athenians would
be the sole recipients of amnesty and of the king's friendship (fJ 4).
Throughout his speech the advantages of the offer are emphasized.
77
This, I take it, is the result of deliberate composition. The "coincidence"
created in VIII 141 (note u1JIIÉn=e, 2) contributes a calculated dramatic
effect.
78
For the struoture of the speeoh of. L. Solmsen 244 (651).
79
Did the offer reaIly have Xerxes' backing? We may doubt it (of.
VIlI 136 and see L. Solmsen 244 [6511 n. 10).
163
28
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
To have Alexander speak fust in the name of the king, then in
that of Mardonius, finally in his own was Herodotus' brilliant
device of rendering the offer increasingly attractive. The urgent
recommendation at the end comes with special aplomb from an
old friend.
In the speech of the Lacedaemonians (eh. 142) a different note
is sounded. For them to negotiate with the Persians is ovre rà{l
M"aLOv ovbaftwç ovre "óaftov rpéeov (142.2)-moral concepts absent
from Alexander's message and arguments. 80 Moreover the Athenians
have special obligations toward Greece as being responsible for
the war which at fust was directed against them but has now
spread so far that it engulfs all of Greece. This would make
any understanding between them and the Persians especially
objectionable. It would also do irreparable damage to Athens'
historical record as the protector of freedom, a role in which they
have saved many (142.2 ff.). Important too is the promise here
given of substantial assistance to the Athenians in their plight
during the war. 81 Alexander, the envoys say in concluding, is a
tyrant and feels bound to side with another tyrant; thence his
support of the offer; but promises of the barbaroi are notoriously
untrustworthy (142.4).
The speech has an air of Laconian brevity, saying multum in
paucis, and in contrast to Alexander's, avoiding all repetition. We
need not on such grounds consider it as of minor importance.
Still there is no denying-nor do the Lacedaemonians attempt to
deny-that the practical advantages are entirelyon the other
side. 82 In the Athenian reply the part addressed to the
Lacedaemonians exceeds in length the answer given to Alexander
(eh. 143). In both parts there are vigorous affirmations of their
devotion to freedom and it is stated in both that the devastation
of Athens and in particular of the homes and statues of gods and
heroes makes it necessary to punish the perpetrator of such impiety
and excludes any agreement with the enemy, however formidable
his might--a point which is made earIy in the answer to Alexander
and once made spreads its light over the entire courageous
declaration (see 143.1).
In the reply to the Lacedaemonians, whose worry the Athenians
call "shameful" (alaxewç, 144.1) ignorance of the Athenian ethos,
one more obligation is added to those previously mentioned. This
See Kleinknecht 251 (555).
The promise is to take care of the Athenian women and children
(142, 4). As we shall see, the Athenians are far more interested in military
help.
82
See L. Solmsen, 245 (652).
80
81
164
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
29
is n) 'E),).'YjVl"ÓV (144.2), the tie which unites the Greeks, the same
blood, same language, common gods-more precisely common
places and practices of worship-and a common outlook or way
of life (rj"lea). None of them would it be fitting for Athens to
betray. The Lacedaemonians' offer of help is appreciated but the
fust need is for military forces (4 f.). This ought to be understood
in Sparta.
In both parts of the Athenian answer we notice passages where
the language, in order to express a very fum resolve, soars far
above the norm al level of these and most other speeches in
Herodotus: (Alexander is to report back, 143.1) lar liv 83 ó fjÀ.wç
TiJV aVT~V óc5dv 'irJ Tfj né(! "at vVv l(!XéTal, fl~"o-re ófloÀ.oy~aélv nfléaç
Eé(!~rJ. àÀ.À.à "leoia{ -re aVflfláxolal n{avvol .... The Lacedaemonians
ought to know, 144.1) ön ov-re x(!vaóç lan yfjç ovc5afló1h TMOVTOÇ
ov-re XW(!'Yj "á)..À.ei: "ai à(!éTfj fléya vné(!q;é(!ovaa, Tà nflÛç c5e~áfléVOl
l{)i)..olflév liv fl'YjMaav-reç "aTac5ovÀ.waal TiJV 'EÀ.À.ác5a .... laT' liv "ai
elç né(!lfj , A1hJvalwv, fl'Yjc5aflà ófl0À.oy~aovTaç nfléaç Eé(!~rJ.
We have found instances of stylistic elevation also in Xerxes'
two speeches and in Artabanus' words of warning and ominous
predictions. The intensity of feeling is of the same order, but as
soon as we give attention to the content, the differences between
these passages are considerable. 84
While in Xerxes' mouth grandiose language marks the extreme
of his megalomania, in the Athenian speech a dedication to the
true "aÀ.á-not to such spurious "áMlaTa as Mardonius held out
as bait-culminates in sentences of genuine grandeur. Moreover
the Athenian commitment reflects the ethos of the city and is
irrevocable, not like the loud assurances of Xerxes liable to weaken
in the following night. 85 Surely, he too feels obligations, namely
83
On this stylistic element (lCJT' <lv . .. or lwç <lv . •• ) and its recurrence
in determined assurances, esp. of the neoal(!EXnç type see Kleinknecht 255
(560) ff., where he compares passages in other authors. The fust to recognize
the peculiar formula was Erwin Wolff, Plato's Apologie (Neue Philol.
Untersuchgg. 6, 1929), 37 in his perceptive comments on Socrates' vow:
lwanee <lV èp.nvÉw xal ol6ç Te W, ov p.-Yj navaop.at qJL).oaorpwv (Apol. 29d).
84
Closer analysis would also discover remarkable dissimilarities in the
sentence formation. Only Artabanus resorts to generalizations such as
óeij.ç Tà vneeÉxovra Cepa ... óeij.ç c5É (1Oe). In his speech sublimity of style
reflects an anxiety that results from long experience. Ris apprehension
borders on despair after Mardonius' irresponsible Inisrepresentations have
added fuel to Xerxes' eagerness.
85
On Xerxes' wavering see above pp. 16, 19. Very often sudden changes
after emphatic declarations are indicative of a fundamental insecurity.
In Xerxes' case the insecurity is so obvious that we need not worry about
importing a modern psychological awareness alien to the Greek knowledge
of man. Elsewhere, most notably in tragedy, it is an intriguing question
whether we are justified in detecting insecurity beneath stern and irrevocable
announcements or statements of principle (Creon in Med. 271 ff., 316 ff.
and Creon in the Antigone are cases in point).
165
30
TWO CRUOIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
to his predecessors on the throne and the tradition they have
established. But to define bis place in this tradition he resorts
to exaggerations so phantastic that we feel the approach of a
crisis; for what else could such loss of contact with reality portend?
The Athenian declarations, far from including any invidious and
almost blasphemous comparison with the gods, preserve the spirit
of distance and devotion. Gods and heroes occupy a high place
in the inheritance whose violation cannot go unpunished. Statements
of the eene ... or lwç ... type have been shown to belong to the
pattern of options between the safe course of expediency and the
way of à(le't~ which does not shirk from danger and sacrifices.
Altogether proairesis, as an option of this kind is called,86 has
its hallowed moral quality ever since Achilles' choice of a warrior's
obligations, glory, and death over a long, yet inglorious, life had
established it as a test of human worth. 87 The bistory of 7t(loat(leaLç
has been traced from Homer to Plato and AristotIe; yet the idea
does not pass out of existence with them; it is still alive-or given
new life-in Panaetius and through him reaches Cicero whose
de officiis in turn passes it on to later generations. 88
It is "after the gods" (VII 139,5) that the Athenians are the
saviours of Greece, and one of their reasons for staying in the war
is the concern about their sanctuaries (VIII 143,2; 144,2). Thus
the gods receive their full share of recognition. 89 Yet in the scene
of choice between two courses of action in VIII 139-144 the motives
on both sides are basically secular. The Athenians act out their
86
Good illustrations are to be found in Sophocles, e.g. in the first of
Ajax's three monologues (Ai. 457 ff., esp. 470-480), one of the few exwnples
not studied by Kleinknecht. See also Ant. 456-468 and Neoptolemus'
change of hea.rt, Phil. 1224 ff., 1235 ff.
87
See the excellent discussion of Wolff, op. cit. (N. 83) 39 ff.; cf. 37. Unfortunately R. Hackforth, The Oomposition of Plato'8 Apology (Cwnbridge,
1933) did not avail himself at all of Wolff's insights. Uncongenial though
they may have been to him, serious consideration of them would have
enriched his own work.
88
utik and honeatum, words to which I shall presently resort, are Cicero's
rendering of Pa.naetius' (and earlier Greek) u'lJfJrpé(!ov and "aMv. Cf. de 00.
III 11 and pass. and see Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, Oicero de officiiB und
das Lebensideal des Panaetiua (Leipzig and Berlin, 1934) 15 ff. This is not
the place to compare the relation between the two principles in Ambrosius'
de officiiB miniBtrorum. Whether a 1t(!oateeu~ of this kind is "competitive"
or "cooperative" would be an embarrassing question. It In8.y vary according
to circumatances; but the truth is probably that like many other ethical
values it refuses to fit into this scheme.
89
To us the gods, in view of their ambiguous attitude, hardly seem to
deserve such devotion; does Herodotus not himself immediately aftar the
sentence which includes the words ptrrá ye {}eoVç refer to "fea.r-inspiring
oracles" coming from Delphi that were calculated to shake Athenian
determination, yet failed to do so (139,6)? Still, he a.lso records instanees
of divine help to the Greeks in their struggle (VII 188 f.; 192.2; VIII 13; 65).
Cf. Kleinknecht 264 (573 Marg).
166
TWO OBUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
31
historical role, because when confronted with the alternative of
utile and honestum they chose the honestum, the "aÀÓp. Feats of
courage abound in the Greek conduct in battle. As has been
mentioned, Herodotus describes the heroic fight to the end of
Leonidas and hls men with unmistakable admiration ; 90 yet as he
himself points out, "great deeds" and "nobIe deaths" would have
been of no avail if the Athenians, like so many other Greek
communities, had thrown in their lot with Xerxes. 91 1reoateec1I,ç,
performed with a fuIl realization of what is at issue--does retain
the morallustre which it had acquired in Homer but has in addition
become a key concept of historical understanding. It gives access
to a causality underneath the surface of events. Once grasped,
thls causality would help later historians to identify as turning
point the choice of one policy in preference to another, though it
need hardly be said that very often neither of them would be
inspired by motives nobIer than ambition or material advantage.
Surely the distance is large between the alternatives calling
for a decision in the dramatic scene of VIII 139-144 and the
sequence of hybris, warner, divine deception (èlT'I'j) that produces
Xerxes' decision and points ahead to nemesis and catastrophe to
complete the pattern. Modern historians ofthe Graeco-Persian War
may not agree with Herodotus' treatment of the Athenian decision
as the hinge of fate. They may argue that in 480 when Athens
was the prime target of the large Persian expedition, an "alliance"
with Xerxes was out of the question, submission would have been
no guarantee against severe punishment, aJ;ld a wholesale emigration,
though not without precedents, would have been fuIl of difficulties,
hazards, and losses. They may endorse the Lacedaemonian
statement about the deceptive nature of Persian promises
(VIII 142.5), or again, taking their clue from Thucydides, emphasize
the exceptional foresight of Themistocles to whose merits Herodotus
does less than justice. 92 Such opinions may be correct but do not
touch the core of the problem. Once again it is not the answer
but the question which matters. If Kleinknecht is on the right
See esp. VII 208 f., 220 ff., 224-228 (cf. above p. 25).
VII 139.3: the Lacedaemonians, if their allies had been conquered
one by one dnooe;ápevo, €eya peyáÄa dné{}avov (d",) YeJIValwç.
92
Thue. I 138.3 ff. All black eolors notwithstanding, Herodotus provides
enough evidenee for Themistocles' salutary neÓVota. lts importanee is
stressed by Highnet, op. cito (N. 68) 96. For modem historians who endorse
Herodotus' judgment see L. Solmsen (as eited above N. 72). It may be
added that N. G. L. Hammond (A HitJtory of Greece to 223 B.O., 223) gives
Sparta. what he eonsiders its due and that H. Bengtson (Griech. Geschichte
in Handbuch d. Altertu17l8Wi8. m 4, 2nd ed., 1960, 164 ff.) trea.ts Athens
and Sparta. as equally eommitted to resistance against Persia- but what
about equal activity? and equal temptations? K. J. Beloch, Griech. Geschichte
(IT, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1927 paas.) takes the view one would expect of him.
90
91
167
32
TWO CRUCIAL DECISIONS IN HERODOTUS
track,93 Herodotus has in his account of the Greek struggle against
Persia focussed on an eminently historical problem: What event
or events determined the outcome of the war and why did the
events take this form rather than another? 94
Would it be legitimate to say that with the story of the Greek
victory thus understood and explained Western historiography
comes into its own? By selecting from the enormous material one
fact which "made all the difference" Herodotus has certainly
taken an essential step toward this goal. Inevitably opinions
regarding his achievement will vary in accordance with theories
entertained about a historian's task. Moreover-and this complicates
the problem-it would surely be unjust to regard the account of
Xerxes' decision in VII 8-18 as devoid of historical value because
divine influence is at work and ethical points of view dominate.
Our analysis of Athens' reaction to Mardonius has shown how
fertile ethical traditions may prove for a most valuable historical
discovery. Moreover the growth of Persia by wars and conquest
is certainly a historical fact; that for Xerxes this record of growth
was a tradition, an obligation, and hence a powerful impulse is
a genuine historical insight (the Persians furnish a contrast but
can hardly be said to share the insight). Lessons to be learned
from past expeditions into unknown lands might have counteracted
this influence but did not prove strong enough. This too is a
historical truth whose validity would hardly be impaired if these
lessons were never actually presented to Xerxes. 95 Finally what
are we to say about hybris? Historians living in happier days could
afford to be supercilious about it. Our own generation has come
to know it as a terrible reality.
Great interest attaches to the suggestion that differences between
Herodotus' approach to Oriental and to Greek history correspond
to the heterogeneous nature of the subjects. 96 Surely a 1teoateeatç
261 f. (= 568 f. Marg).
Cf. L. SoImsen 244 (= 652 Marg). Mardonius' strong desire to secure
Athens as ally and Sparta's no less strong efforts to prevent this indicate
sufficiently how critical the situation is. In VII 139,5 the choice which as
we know turned the Bcales is described by the worde: éÀ6P.f;VOt • n}v 'Ellá!5a
:neetûvat È).ev{}ierrv. Cf. again L. SoImsen 245 (653 ff.). I need not here disCUBS
Mardonius' second offer (IX 4 f.) or the Athenian message urgently requesting
that Sparta implement its promise of help (IX 6 ff.).
95
Today a historian may argue that considerations of this kind might
or ought to have given Xerxes pause. Perhaps our analysis has made clear
how much more impressive Herodotus' procedure is. We may caU it
"artistic", without denying an artistic element to scenes of deliberation
in Thucydides; but in him, inteUectual penetration predominates.
98
Cf. esp. J. de Romilly, Rév. ét. gr. 84 (1971) 314 ff., 334 ff. (a brief
indication of her view aIso in Entretiens BUr l'antiquité, Fond. Hardt, 4,
1957, 36).
93
94
168
TWO CRUOIAL DEOISIONS IN HERODOTUS
33
like the Athenian would be inconceivable in the palace of an
Oriental despot. For Greek hlstory this motif, although of poetic
origin and bristling with ethical implications, has proved illuIninating
and appropriate. Is the hybris-nemesis complex with all that
pertains to, and clusters around it equally germane to Oriental
hlstory1 The fact that it is of Greek, not of Oriental provenienee
does not encourage the idea. In the ancient N ear East stories
about the life and reign of kings that have attained some degree
of "form" are not easy to find. In the Old Testament-by all
odds our best hunting ground-the hybris, warner, nemesis scheme
is absent; nor does the God of the O.T. smite the Inighty simply
because he is Inighty; and if he is a "jealous god," hls "jealousy"
cannot be equated with the rp{}óvoç of the Herodotean and archaic
Greek deity.97 In some instanees it might not have overtaxed
Herodotus' powers to recast an O.T. story into hls favorite
pattern;98 but would the pattern have been true to the spirit of
Old Testament narrative 1 The judgment must be left to the
professional students of the Ancient Near East, and as long as
they have not recognized Herodotus' approach as germane, I prefer
to admire hls stories of Persian kings as artistic creations, by no
means devoid of hlstorically valuable information but formed in
a Greek, not in an Oriental mould. 99
Regenbogen 94 (= 100 Marg) shows sueh inelinationB.
With hesitation I mention the fate of Saul (Sam. I 15 ff.) and of
Jerobeam (King8 I 14; Chron. 11 12).
99
What bearing, if any, do our eonelusions have on the question of
Herodotus' "development" ? Subjeetivity may be involved if I think it
natural to assoeiate Herodotus' appreeiation of the Athenian neoaleeall;
with hls stay in Greeee (that he should have formed this judgment and
written VIII 140 ff. while still in Asia seems almost impossible). As for
Persia and the Persian kings, I adhere to what I have said in N. 15 and
N. 25. There is no sound reason for supposing that those Myo, eould not
find their shape before Herodotus was exposed to Athenian infiuenee;
but neither is there a reason why they would lose their meaning for him
when he had moved to Athens or Thurioi.
97
98
169
The following hooks and articles will he cited hy author's name:
Henry R., Form and Thought in HerodotU8 (American Philological A880Ciation Monographs 23, Cleveland, Ohio, 1966).
IMMERWAHR,
JAOOBY,
Felix, R. E., Suppl. II (1913), s.v. "Herodot."
POHLENZ, MAx, Herodot. der er8te Historiker des Abendlands (Leipzig, 1937,
repro Stuttgart, 1961).
REGENBOGEN, OTrO, "Herodot mld sein Werk," Kleine Schriften (MWlÏch,
1961) 57; alao in Marg (800 below).
REINRARDT, KARL, "Herodots Persergeschichten," Vermächtnis der Antike
(Götingen, 1960), 133 ff.
VON FRITZ, KURT, Die griechische Geschichts8chreibung, vol. I, Text II:
(Berlin, 1967).
The volume "Herodot" (Darmstadt, 1962) in Wege der For8chung edited
by Walter Marg includes besides a few extra.cts from books many valuable
articles. We refer to articles by their original pla.ce of publication and
wherever possible add a reference in the form: (= xxx Marg.).
170