Foto omslag: © Bram de Hollander – Hollandvideo.nl
© Mark Bovens en Anchrit Wille
DIPLOMA DEMOCRACY
On the Tensions between Meritocracy and Democracy
Mark Bovens
Utrecht University
School of Governance
[email protected]
Anchrit Wille
Leiden University
Department of Public Administration
[email protected]
Verkenning for the NWO programme Contested Democracies, Utrecht/ Leiden, April 2009
Foto omslag: © Bram de Hollander – Hollandvideo.nl
© Mark Bovens en Anchrit Wille
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE
1. An Education Gap
2. Plato’s Dream Come True
3. Diploma Democracy
4. Acknowledgements
1 DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMAS
1. Who Should Govern?
2. Representation and Representatives
3. Democracy Modernized
4. Isn’t Everybody Well Educated These Days?
2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE EDUCATION EFFECT
1. Revisiting the Education Effect
2. The Education Effect in the Different Forms of Participation
3. Has the Gap Widened?
4. The Education Effect
5. Why Do the Well Educated Come Out Ahead?
3 POLITICAL ELITES AS EDUCATIONAL ELITES
1. The Dominance of the Well Educated in Government
2. From Ascription to Achievement: the Meritocratization of Politics
i
3. The Supply and Demand of Higher Educated Political Candidates
4. From a Hereditary Elite to an Educational Elite
4 WHAT IS WRONG WITH DIPLOMA DEMOCRACY?
1. The Uneasy Relationship Between Meritocracy and Democracy
2. Mismatches in Representation
3. The Disparity of Political Voice
4. Diminishing Democratic Legitimacy
5. Increasing Political Instability
6. Not So Universal Suffrage
5 REMEDYING DIPLOMA DEMOCRACY
1. No to the Euro-academics
2. The Edification of the Least Educated
3. Adjusting the Arenas
4. Bringing the Ballot Back In
5. A More Responsive Political Elite
APPENDIX
REFERENCES
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
ii
1. PREFACE
The doctrine of meritocracy (is) the enduring rival to democratic ideas.
Robert Dahl (1979: 131)
1. An Education Gap
‘You could immediately tell if it was one of them or not, but it was difficult to give
them all a name…They were everywhere…You could bet that as a simple tram driver,
one of them would be facing you when you were tested, or that one of them would
give you the course on how to deal with passengers. The local council was full of
them, and it was they who became aldermen…They were in your office reorganizing
your work schedule. They appeared on television to give their high opinions, and they
filled the newspapers. They knew everything precisely, so they did not need to listen
− only to each other’ (Van Westerloo, 2004: 1 translated).
These words of an Amsterdam tram driver were the opening lines of a book on the
state of the Dutch democracy, written by journalist Gerard van Westerloo. The
complaint of the tram driver illustrates a remarkable political gap that exists in the
Low Countries, a chasm that opens up not along religious or ideological lines, but
mainly according to educational background. Standing on one side of this chasm are
the well-educated citizens, the academically trained professionals and managers, full
of political self-confidence and with ample access to political arenas and the social
and political elites. On the other side are the less educated citizens, the street level
officials, the blue collar workers and lower level white collar employees, who feel
disqualified and excluded from the political arenas.
This essay will explore this political chasm: its rise, its breadth, and its
significance for contemporary democracies.
1
2. Plato’s Dream Come True
As with many pieces of political theory, the roots of this essay can be traced to Plato.
Each year, the students at both our institutes read Plato’s Republic. In the introductory
lectures, Plato is traditionally portrayed as the counterpoint of democratic governance
as we know it. Over the past years we had both grown increasingly uncomfortable
with the juxtaposition of Plato’s meritocratic polity, run by philosopher-kings, and
contemporary parliamentary democracy, supposedly run by ordinary citizens. The
juxtaposition simply did not seem to be correct. Upon closer inspection, modern
parliamentary democracy does come surprisingly close to Plato’s ideal of a state
governed by academically trained experts.
Plato’s ideal state, as sketched at length in the Republic, is ruled by the best
and the brightest, carefully selected after years of study and rigorous intellectual tests
and academic trials. His political class is an academic upper crust, a small professorial
corps d’élite, consisting of the brightest men and women of the polis. This essay will
argue that Plato’s supposedly utopian ideal, of a state governed by academic experts,
more or less has been realized in contemporary parliamentary democracies. The
selection mechanisms and the institutional context may be different, but the outcomes
are surprisingly, and discomfortingly, alike.
Have a look, for example, at the Dutch Cabinet that was installed in 2007. All
sixteen new ministers are extremely well educated: thirteen have graduate diplomas
and three have undergraduate degrees. Several ministers completed two graduate
studies, and at least three of them graduated cum laude. On top of that, six ministers
have a PhD degree, four of whom had been tenured professors before embarking on a
political career. Not only the political executive, but also the legislative branch, is
completely dominated by the well-educated. This holds true for almost every other
political arena, as we will demonstrate in this essay.
Modern parliamentary democracy is a Platonic meritocracy, a state run by the
well-educated, by university graduates and former academics. Plato’s dream has come
true.
2
3. Diploma Democracy
Meritocracy is a contestable concept, as “merit” can be defined in many ways. In this
essay we define merit in the Platonic sense of prolonged intellectual and academic
training. In modern society there is a convenient indicator for this type of merit: the
length of formal education, as measured by the highest diploma. We therefore use the
term diploma democracy as shorthand for a modern Platonic meritocracy. A diploma
democracy is a democracy in which citizens have more tangible political influence the
higher their level of educational attainment, as measured by their formal
qualifications. In less academic terms: a diploma democracy is ruled by the citizens
with the highest degrees.
Of course, there hardly ever has been a democracy in which actual political
influence was neatly distributed among the citizens. In the past, political elites were
often formed on the basis of class or property − ownership of land in agrarian
societies and capital in the industrial society. In The Netherlands, for example,
members of the nobility and of the patrician class were disproportionately represented
among ministers and members of Parliament far into the twentieth century (Van den
Berg, 1983; Secker, 1991; Secker, 2000). Often they were better educated than the
average citizen – the upper classes in general had a much better access to education –
but this was not the prime source of their political power; that was based on status,
land or wealth.
In the information society, however, knowledge and information are the most
important social and economic goods, and political power is increasingly concentrated
not among the landed gentry, patricians or manufacturers, but among the welleducated professionals – the “symbolic analysts”, “creative professionals” and all
those other citizens with ample capacity to process information (Reich, 1991;
Castells, 1997; Florida, 2004). Aristocracy, rule by the nobility, and plutocracy, rule
by the wealthy, have given way to meritocracy, rule by the well-educated.
This essay explores the causes and consequences of the rise of such an
education-based meritocracy. Is the ideal of representative democracy reconcilable
with these meritocratic practices? We will confine ourselves in this essay mainly to
the Dutch parliamentary democracy, but the main arguments are applicable to most
3
advanced democracies. We will examine three different issues, based on three
different types of questions:
1. Substantiating the rise of diploma democracy: How novel is the overrepresentation
of the well-educated? After all, previous Dutch cabinets, such as those of Drees and
Den Uyl, also were extremely well educated. Political scientists have shown time and
again that education level substantially affects the political interest and participation
of citizens, although this bias has traditionally been stronger the United States than in
Western Europe.1 However, there are indications that the gap between the lower and
the higher educated has widened substantially over the past decades. This raises a
number of empirical issues: to what extent is The Netherlands a diploma democracy?
Has the disproportional representation of the highly educated increased in the postWWII period? How does the situation in The Netherlands compare with that of other
OECD countries? An analysis of national and international survey data will be used to
examine trends with regard to voting behaviour and a range of other forms of political
participation, as well as with the educational stratification of political elites. Special
attention will be given to “new”, deliberative and informal, forms of collective action.
2. Explaining the rise of diploma democracy: What are the social mechanisms that
might explain this dominance of the well-educated in politics? What is so important
about education? Is it efficacy, skills, or political socialization? Is the absence of the
less-educated in political office caused by self-exclusion, either because of
indifference or distrust, or by educational inflation (Eliasoph, 1998; Nie, Junn &
Stehlik-Barry, 1996: 131-132)? Or is it a side effect of the decline of mass
organizations and the transformation of political parties and social movements into
professional organizations (Koole, 1992; Skocpol, 2004)?
3. Evaluating the effects of diploma democracy: Why should one bother about the rise
of an education-based meritocracy? Is it not reassuring to know that our
representatives and leaders have had such a solid academic grounding? Plato, the
1
Compare: Almond & Verba, 1963: 379-387; Verba & Nie, 1972: 95-101, 340; Verba, Nie & Kim,
1978: 300; Verba et al., 1995: 433; Lijphart, 1997: 2-4; Aarts & Thomassen, 2000:48; Van Holsteyn &
De Ridder, 2005: 79.
4
founder of the first Academy, certainly thought so. He would probably have approved
of the professorial Balkenende-IV Cabinet. However, the rise of an education-based
meritocracy does not fit easily within the normative foundations of modern
representative democracy. Citizens with low or medium educational qualification
levels currently make up approximately 70% of the population, yet they are virtually
absent from the Cabinet, Parliament, and, for that matter, from all other political
arenas. The third, evaluative issue to be examined is whether the overrepresentation of
the well-educated leads to an “exclusion bias” in politics, in which particular types of
opinions are not represented. Surveys in The Netherlands suggest that the lesseducated predominantly worry about crime, social security and the cost of living,
whereas the well-educated are much more concerned about, for example, the quality
of schools (Becker & Dekker, 2005: 342). Also, the well-educated are much more
positive about the benefits of the EU than the less-educated (Dekker et al. 2006). Such
biases in representational relationships can be a serious threat to the legitimacy and
stability of parliamentary democracy.
The essay is built around these three issues. First we will try to substantiate the rise of
diploma democracy. Chapter 2 will examine the effect of education in all the major
forms of political participation; Chapter 3 will concentrate on the meritocratization of
the political elite. Both chapters will also try to answer the second question and will
analyse the causes of the dominance of the well-educated in these various political
arenas. The consequences, the subject of the third, evaluative question, will be dealt
with in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 will look at some possible ways to remedy, or at
least mitigate, some of the negative effects of diploma democracy. However, before
turning to these research questions, we will first shed more light on our main
concepts, democracy and education. This is done in the first chapter.
4. Acknowledgements
This project was funded by a grant from the NWO programme Contested
Democracies. Various chapters have been presented as academic papers at a variety of
conferences. We have benefited enormously from the comments of our discussants at
these conferences and from the help of our colleagues in Utrecht, Leiden and
5
Canberra. Paul Dekker and Tom van der Meer, nowadays both at the Dutch Sociaal
en Cultureel Planbureau, stand out amongst our peers at the conferences because of
their critical and constructive attempts to prevent us from jumping to conclusions. At
Utrecht University, Jeroen van Bockel, Gijs Jan Brandsma, Inge Claringbould, Ido de
Haan, Albert Meijer and Erik Schrijvers were very helpful in critically but
constructively reading our initial papers. Sebastiaan Steenman, research Master
student at the Utrecht University School of Governance, has been outstanding as a
research assistant, tracing documents, data and references, and helping out with tables
and figures. In Leiden, we benefited from the help of Joop van Holsteyn and Dave
Lowery. At the ANU Research School of Social Science, invaluable input was
received from Tim Besley, James Bohman, Keith Dowding, John Dryzek, Lina
Eriksson, Robert Goodin, Paul ‘t Hart and James Rice. An early attempt to make
sense of the argument was published in the Dutch academic journal B&M in 2006.
6
1. DEMOCRACY AND DIPLOMAS
In a political system where nearly every adult may
vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position,
access to officials and other resources are
unequally distributed, who actually governs?
(Robert Dahl, 1961: 1)
1. Who Should Govern?
A diploma democracy is a democracy which is ruled by the citizens with the highest
degrees. Whether you find this is problematic or not will depend on your concept of
democracy. Some might think that “diploma democracy” is a contradiction in terms.
Isn’t democracy all about rule by the people, as opposed to rule by a well-educated or
otherwise privileged elite? Although ideals of democratic governance can vary in
many ways, the definition “rule by the people”, originating etymologically from the
terms demos + kratia, is often used as a practical starting point (Dahl, 2006: 8). This
leaves open the question as to which “people” should rule. There are generally two
very broad views on this issue: a more direct one, of “government by the people”, and
a more representative view of “government for the people”.
In the first view, democracy implies the maximum possible participation of
citizens in shaping laws and policies. This means direct democracy and direct
involvement of ordinary citizens in decision- and policymaking. Governmental
institutions should facilitate participation by providing many points of access for
citizens to communicate their views, thus making the idea of “sovereignty of the
people” as real as possible (Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992: 4). From this perspective,
rule by an educational elite is an anathema.
The problem is, of course, that millions of citizens cannot meet in a single
place to discuss issues, nor do they speak clearly with one voice. That is why
democratic politics has adapted representative institutions. Representative government
places a limit on participation by the people. In this vision citizens are “controllers”
rather than participants (Parry, Moyser & Day, 1992: 5). However, this is not applied
for practical purposes only. Most liberal or representative models of democracy depart
from the notion that citizens in general are not sufficiently qualified to participate
7
directly in political decisions (Kriesi, 2005). The average citizen usually does not
think and deliberate enough about political issues and, above all, lacks the
competence to do so: ‘the mass of the citizens are not qualified to decide high policy’
(Budge, 1996: 69). One of the obvious difficulties of a direct democracy is that
everyone is given equal vote even though most citizens are not properly educated on
all political issues. The fear that uninformed masses would steer societies’ courses has
led many great political thinkers to express their concern about this “shortcoming” of
democracy. In the words of Schumpeter (1943: 283): ‘the electorate mass is incapable
of action other than a stampede’. Far from enhancing democracy, the encouragement
of more widespread participation might, in fact, destabilize it.
Representation in this vision of democracy is therefore not just a one-way road
from society to politics, from bottom to top; it is also seen as a process from top to
bottom, from politics to society, whereby representative elites take the initiative to
address the demos, proposing ideas and solutions, shaping interest and identities, and
asking the consent of the represented on these proposals (Cotta & Best, 2007: 4).
From this perspective, diploma democracy is not a contradiction in terms, but rather a
pleonasm.
2. Representation and Representatives
Even if one endorses a representative perspective on democracy, evaluations of
diploma democracy will vary greatly, depending on the view one has on what political
representation is and what representatives should do. The most straightforward
definition of representation comes from Hanna Pitkin (1967: 10), who says that
representation simply is ‘how the absent thing is made present’ again. In other words,
political representation is the activity of making citizens’ voices, opinions, and
perspectives “present” in the public policymaking processes, and it occurs ‘when
political actors speak, advocate, symbolize and act on the behalf of others in the
political arena’ (Dovi, 2008).
These almost misleadingly simple definitions hide the fact that representation
is a complex and much contested concept encompassing important questions. First,
there is the question of who or what is to be represented: the personal properties of
individuals (gender, age, profession, class, education), their opinions, their interests
8
(short- or long-term), or the common good. Second is the question as to by whom and
how should they be represented: as delegates bound by strict mandates or as trustees
free from specific instructions (Cotta, 2000: 492).
The question of who or what is to be represented touches on what Pitkin
(1967) refers to as “descriptive”, and Ankersmit (2002) as “mimetic” representation.
In essence, this suggests that policy makers should form a “microcosm” of society: a
representative sample of the population. From this perspective on representation, the
rise of diploma democracy, particularly with regard to members of Parliament and
holders of public office, is a serious problem.
The idea of descriptive or mimetic representation raises difficult questions,
however. To begin with, there is the problem of defining the characteristics according
to which representation is to be evaluated: ‘where − and on what basis − one draws
the line….at what point do efforts to achieve good descriptive representation start to
look ridiculous?’ (Farrell & Scully, 2007: 48). Which personal characteristics are
politically relevant: gender, age, ethnicity, educational achievements? Next, there is
the difficulty of achieving this. Since all societies are divided in complex ways along
multiple axes, descriptive representation on all relevant demographic dimensions
cannot be realized within the confines of a legislature or an executive of manageable
size (Verba et al., 1995: 165).
Elected politicians might not share the same characteristics as their
constituents, but that does not mean that they do not, to use Pitkin’s words (1967:
209), act ‘in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’. The next
question, therefore, is what representatives need to do. Again, this has been a
contested issue. In particular, the discussion focuses on whether representatives
should act as delegates or as trustees − this is also known as the mandateindependence controversy (Pitkin, 1967).
Delegate conceptions of representation require representatives to follow their
constituents’ preferences and act on a mandate. In this view, delegates should act only
as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the wishes of their constituency and have no autonomy from
their constituency. Essentially, representatives are to act as the voice of those who are
(literally) not present, simply following the expressed preferences of their
constituents, and there is little room for representatives to act according to their own
conscience.
9
In the trustee model, on the other hand, representatives have sufficient
autonomy to deliberate and act in favour of the greater common good and national
interest, even if it means going against the short-term interests of their own
constituencies (Pitkin, 1967; Dovi, 2008). The model, which was defended by
Edmund Burke and John Stuart Mill, provided a solution to the problem of
uninformed constituents who lack the necessary knowledge on issues to take an
educated position. Burke assumed that participation of the people in the elaboration of
public policy decisions presupposed an excessive simplification of issues; otherwise
the citizens would not be able to comprehend them. John Stuart Mill stated that while
all individuals have a right to be represented, not all political opinions are of equal
value. He suggested a model in which constituents would receive votes according to
their level of education (that is, citizens with university degrees receiving most votes,
and working class citizens receiving fewer votes). From this perspective, the rise of
diploma democracy is unproblematic and even to be applauded, because it will
enhance the quality of political debate and decision-making.
3. Democracy Modernized
Since the end of the 1960s The Netherlands, like other advanced industrial
democracies, has gone through a modernisation (or ‘rejuvenation’) of its democracy
by a so-called participatory revolution in which new forms of political action have
complemented the traditional style of ‘representative’ politics. From the 1960s
onwards there has been a general expansion of the political action repertory, with
new, direct forms of action, initiated by student protesters but later also used by
environmentalists, women’s lib, the peace movement and other social movements,
and eventually by neighbourhood associations, teachers, nurses, farmers and a wide
spectrum of society (Dalton, Scarrow & Cain et al., 2003: 8).
More citizens have the political resources and skills necessary to deal with the
complexities of politics and make their own political decisions (Dalton, 1996;
Inglehart, 1977). The public’s access to information about politics has increased in
many ways (due to expansion of the mass media, especially television). Second, there
has been an increase in political skills concerned, as well as an increase in the public’s
ability to process political information (due mainly to higher levels of education).
10
More people possess confidence in their own ability to make key policy decisions and
in the ability of the mass public in general to reflect upon decisions that were once left
almost entirely to elected leaders (Mendelsohn & Parkin, 2001; Craig et al., 2001).
The increasing skills and resources of average citizens have stimulated new
demands and expectations about citizenship and the organization of democratic
politics. There has been an emerging belief that “the people” can – and should − be
trusted to make complex political decisions and to otherwise actively participate in the
democratic governing of society. Engaged citizens still vote, but this is less central to
their definition of citizenship. It also means greater post-materialism and participation
in new forms of action (Inglehart, 1990).
Moreover, since the 1980s-1990s, attempts to come to grips with the
complexities and uncertainties in governing have brought shifts in governance styles
(Pierre & Peters, 2005: 50). “New governance”, which created horizontal modes of
governance among a multitude of actors both public and private, sought the
involvement of all sorts of relevant stakeholders (Smismans, 2008). This
transformation can be seen as a way to compensate for the “hollowing out” of
representational democracy and led to the introduction of government-initiated
arrangements in which citizens and civil society organisations can participate and
deliberate, such as interactive policymaking procedures, citizen boards, client panels
and user monitors. Networking, bargaining and interaction, rather than command and
control from the centre, are assumed to be the best ways to govern (Pierre & Peters,
2005: 51). As a result, new venues for citizen participation have evolved.
Finally, democracy has shifted significantly in the last decades toward the
output side of the public sector. More and more participation is directed toward the
output side of government, to boot participation at the input side. In addition to
attempts to influence the policy decisions made by legislatures and executives, a great
share of political activity is now directed at influencing the behaviour of
bureaucracies (Pierre & Peters, 2005: 58) − not only at the top of the bureaucracy but
also at the street level of the administrative system. Members of the public as well as
organized interests find it increasingly useful to directly exert influence upon local
schools, housing projects or local neighbourhood problems.
Governing is not a constant but rather tends to change as needs and values
change. The transformation of democracy is part of a broader modernization process
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that not only affects the demographic make-up of those who govern but also
influences the operation of (institutionalized) arrangements for political representation
and the channels of political participation. How have all these social and political
developments affected our democracy? What are the cumulative effects of these
social and political changes on who actually governs and who participates? Has it
given the people a real voice?
We started this essay with the observations of an Amsterdam tram driver about
a new inequality in today’s society − somewhat paradoxically, because in a time in
which democracy has evolved and the spread of democratic values has been
astounding, in an era in which we perceive the opening up of new channels at the
input side of the political process and the creation of opportunities of output
democracy, in this era in which democracy has become more democratic, society does
appear more and more to be evolving into a meritocracy.
4. Isn’t Everybody Well Educated These Days?
Before we explore the effect of education on political participation in a variety of
channels, we need to be more precise about our independent variable: educational
differences. What do we mean by educated? And isn’t everybody well educated these
days? Are the less educated not rapidly disappearing in the information society?
Education shapes what you know; the content of education provides
knowledge, experience and know-how. In addition, education can also help one to
apply knowledge by developing skills and competencies. Education might also
cultivate attitudes, motivations, and values (Campbell, 2006) and opens up particular
positions in the social world. It is at the same time a resource and a social marker for
certain positions that are characterized and recognizable by symbols, such as clothing,
language and ways of thinking and behaving (Bourdieu, 1986).
Education can be the result of informal processes − through family,
neighbours, peers or life experiences − or of formal learning that is dispensed by
special institutions, such as schools and universities. Here we limit ourselves to the
latter form of formal education.
12
In this essay we will use the classification of the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS), which distinguishes between three levels of education: low, middle
and high. Citizens who have no formal qualifications at all, or who have been
educated up through the primary and/or lower secondary education level (primary
school, VMBO, MBO-1), are considered to have a low education level. Those with
higher secondary and/or junior vocational qualifications (HAVO, VWO, MBO-2, -3
and -4) are the middle group. Citizens with a higher vocational college or university
degree (HBO, WO) belong to the highly educated group.
The number of people who have received formal education in The Netherlands
has increased enormously since the introduction in 1901 of compulsory primary
education for children. A drastic change of the Dutch secondary school system that
began with the implementation of the Educational Act (Mammoetwet) of 1968 has
enlarged the portion of the population that has received at least a secondary education.
This act introduced four streams (LTS/VBO, MAVO, HAVO and VWO)2 and
contributed to a quantitative democratization of education.3 This transformation in the
education system also eased the access to colleges and universities.
As a consequence, the education level of the Dutch population, as measured by
the educational qualification and the numbers of years spent within the education
system, has steadily increased over the past decades. The highly educated group,
consisting of citizens with a higher vocational college or university qualification,
doubled from 14 to 28% over the past forty years. The less educated group has shrunk
rapidly in the past decades. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2007
29% of the workforce had low educational qualifications.4 In the 1960s this group was
twice as big: 58% of the workforce had no or a low-level diploma (Wolber & De
Graaf 1996: 199, as cited in SER 2006: 4).
The middle group, consisting of those with higher secondary education and/or
junior vocational education, is by far the largest, constituting 44 % of the workforce in
2007. It has grown substantially; in the 1960s only 28% of the workforce had a
medium educational qualification.
2 VBO and MAVO were fused into VMBO in 1999; the year new educational reforms, de
Basisvorming, were introduced.
3 End-of-secondary education diplomas have even tended to become the norm.
4 CBS has limited itself to the workforce (the 15-64 year olds who are not enrolled). The overall
percentage of the less educated will be higher, as the elderly citizens (65 and older) will have fewer
educational qualifications.
13
However, it should be noted that although education levels have increased
substantially in the past decades, the well-educated still remain the smallest
educational stratum. Less than 30% of the workforce, and even a smaller percentage
of the total population, has a college or graduate diploma. In 2007 more than 70% of
the workforce was not well educated. Similar percentages can be found in other
western countries. Approximately one-third of the workforce is well educated in other
advanced democracies, as can be seen from Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Highest Educational Qualifications of all 25- to 64-year-olds (% in 2004)
Education
Low
Medium
High
The Netherlands
29
42
28
Finland
23
43
34
Sweden
17
48
34
Belgium
35
34
30
UK
15
56
29
France
25
41
Germany
16
58
25
US
13
49
38
34
Source: OECD (2006), Education at a glance , Table A1.1a ; SER (2006: 16)
high educational ambitions of most governments notwithstanding, these figures may
not increase much further in the near future. Data currently available show that in the
EU-27 the share of young people (aged 20-24) who have completed at least uppersecondary education only slightly improved (by 1.5 percentage points) between 2000
en 2007.5 Similarly, for The Netherlands these figures will not change dramatically in
the next decade. It is estimated that the number of highly educated people in The
Netherlands will further increase in the future, but even in the most optimistic
calculations of the Ministry of Education, the number of well-educated people will
not grow much beyond approximately a third of the workforce by 2020, as can be
seen from Table 1.2.
5 Source: Eurostat (LFS).
14
Table 1.2: Distribution of Potential Workforce by Educational Qualifications (%) 2005-2020
Education
Low
Medium
High
2005
32
40
28
2010
29
40
31
2020
24
40
36
Source: SER (2006: 12)
Despite the impressive increase in educational qualifications in the past decades, the
highly educated will remain a minority in Dutch society, as will also be the case in
other advanced democracies. A very vocal and politically active minority we shall
see, but a minority nonetheless. Between two-thirds and three-quarters of all citizens
do not have − and will not have – a college or graduate education. How these formal
education qualifications affect democratic participation and citizenship will be the
subject of the coming chapters.
15
16
2. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THE EDUCATION EFFECT
There is probably no single variable in the survey
repertoire that generates as substantial correlations in
such a variety of directions in political behaviour
material as level of formal education…
Philip Converse (1972: 324)
1. Revisiting the Education Effect
A Fresh Look at an Old Variable
The fact that the higher educated are more politically active than the less educated is
common knowledge in political science. Political scientists have shown time and
again that educational level substantially affects the political interest and participation
of citizens.6 As far back as thirty-five years ago, Philip Converse (1972: 324)
considered education to be the universal solvent for ‘the puzzle of political
participation’. This same conventional wisdom echoes in today’s political science
literature. A recent study by a taskforce of the American Political Science Association
(APSA, 2006: 1) characterized political participation as being extremely unequal:
‘Those who enjoy high levels of income, occupational status and, especially,
education are much more likely to take part politically than are those who are less
well endowed with socio-economic resources.’
Although research on political participation has shown a disproportionate
representation of the higher educated strata, there is fairly little systematic analysis of
the mechanisms that bring this about and of the implications of this phenomenon for
the functioning of modern democracies. Empirical research has consistently observed
a robust and positive relationship between education and political engagement but has
made far less of an effort to adequately explain why education is so important. A
battery of variables (gender, age, education, income, etc.) − some theoretically
6
Compare, amongst others: Almond & Verba, 1963: 379-387; Verba & Nie, 1972: 95-101; Verba et
al., 1978; Marsh & Kaase, 1979; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba et al., 1995: 433; Nie et al.,
1996; Lijphart, 1997: 2-3; Putnam, 2000; Gesthuizen, 2005.
17
motivated, others simply used as controls − are usually included in survey analysis,
yet little attention is given to why these variables make a difference. This undertheorized approach to the meaning of these variables, and for our purposes education
in particular, inhibits a real understanding of the impact of educational differences on
the workings of our democracy. The differences in political behaviour between the
less- and well-educated emphasize the need to rethink the treatment of education as a
usual suspect in survey work (Achen, 1992).
This chapter will explore the degree to which educational differences matter in
the extent and form of political participation of Dutch citizens. Our intention is first to
examine whether individual educational differences are reflected in all political
arenas. Are well-educated citizens significantly more likely than those less educated
to be active in all forms of political participation? Or are the differences greater in
some arenas than others? How large are the disparities between groups with different
education levels? Further, have these alleged differences between these groups
changed over time, and if so, how? The empirical part of this chapter includes a
descriptive analysis of the development of political participation and the role of
different forms of activity in The Netherlands as compared to other Western European
countries. In the next part of the chapter we focus on the causes of this bias in
political participation: why do the well-educated monopolize almost all political
venues?
2. The Education Effect in the Different Forms of Participation
Education and Political Participation in The Netherlands
Are the well-educated significantly more likely to engage in all sorts of political
participation, and how large are the disparities between the higher, the medium, and
the lower educated? We have examined these questions in relation to different forms
of political participation, on the basis of the Dutch Election Studies (DES/NKO) of
2006. Table 2.1 shows how differences in education patterns not only shape
differences in electoral activities but also in non-electoral activities and organizational
affiliations.
18
Table 2.1: Education and Participation (%) in The Netherlands in 2006
Participation
Education respondent
Ratio
Voting, Elections & Parties
Low
Medium
High
(H/L)
Did vote in 2006 parliamentary elections
90
93
97
1.1
Did vote in 2003 parliamentary elections
81
88
95
1.2
Did vote in 2006 municipal elections
66
68
83
1.3
Voted on referendum to EU Constitution (2005)
56
67
83
1.5
Membership in a political party
5
3
9
1.8
Knowledge of vote matchers
33
67
83
2.5
Mobilized radio, television or newspaper
9
11
12
1.3
Joined a civic action group
3
3
6
2.0
Contacted a politician or civil servant
7
9
19
2.7
Joined a demonstration
4
7
12
3.0
Participated in government-organized meeting/debate
6
8
21
3.5
Used the Internet, e-mail or SMS
7
17
31
4.4
Got involved in a political party or organization
2
4
11
5.5
Church
37
32
35
0.95
Neighbourhood Organization
30
27
30
1.0
Trade Union
18
20
22
1.2
Music or Cultural Organization
15
17
23
1.5
Sports Organization
31
43
47
1.5
Employers’ Organization
2
4
4
2.0
Environmental Organization
20
27
46
2.3
Third World, Human Rights or Peace Organization
12
17
34
2.8
Professional Organization
7
10
27
3.9
Actions Outside Elections
Membership in Civil Society Organizations
Source: DES/NKO 2006
Based upon these figures, it is clear that there are significant differences between the
populations in question. We can see this, first of all, reflected in the category voting in
elections and membership of political parties, these being the more traditional forms
of political participation. The well-educated are substantially more inclined to vote,
19
both in national elections and at the EU level.7 Also, they are much more inclined to
join a political party and, faced with the choice among the many parties in the national
elections, most higher educated Dutch (4 out of 5) know about the existence of vote
matchers, such as Stemwijzer: Internet sites that offer to draw up the political profiles
and match voter with party. Of the lower educated, only 1 out of 3 voters is aware of
these voting guides.
Voting is a pivotal but relatively rare and general form of political
participation. Many citizens try to influence the political process during the times
between elections in a variety of other ways, often with regard to specific issues.
Figure 2.1 presents in graphic form the differences among the various levels of
education in terms of seven forms of political activity. This figure also displays the
size of the gap between higher and lower educated by means of the ratio. For instance,
for every less educated citizen who participated in a government meeting, 3.5 higher
educated citizens participated.
7
This measure of voting turnout relies on the accuracy of the reports supplied by survey respondents.
Days, weeks or even years after the election they were asked whether they had voted. Verbal selfreporting, to be sure, is not a totally reliable way of capturing actual behaviour. We must be especially
alert to this problem if the behaviour studied is of the socially desirable variety, as voting is. Many nonvoters may be too embarrassed to admit their failure to vote (Lewis Beck et al., 2008: 86). Selfreported turnout rates in NKO/ DES surveys also overstate/overestimate actual turnout (Schmeets,
2007). Actual turnout at the 2006 elections was 80.1 %, whereas 93.1 % of the NKO respondents
indicated that they had voted in the 2006 elections. Apart from the social desirability effect
(respondents do not admit that they didn’t vote) turnout in the NKO is overestimated by a stimulus
effect (respondents are stimulated to vote because they participated in the NKO survey) and selective
response (people who participated in the NKO survey are more interested in politics). These are
common problems of election studies. Election studies are therefore not good in predicting turnout.
NKO researchers have estimated to what degree these three factors contribute to the bias (difference
between real and estimated turnout) in the NKO2006 survey: 4.7% is estimated to be stimulus effect;
2% is estimated to be caused by social desirability; and 6% by selective response (Schmeets, 2007:
269).
20
Figure 1: Percentage Active in Various Activities:
Population with High and Low Education Levels (%)
(Source: NKO 2006)
Used the Internet, e-mail or SMSParticipated in governmentorganized meeting/debateContacted a politician or civil
servant -
high
medium
low
Involved political party or
organization Joined a demonstration -
Joined a civic action groupInvolved radio, television or
newspaper
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
The use of digital communication technologies such as the Internet, sms or e-mail −
the so called Internet activism − has become the most popular form of political
participation. These new technologies enable faster and broader communication and
mobilization; text messages and mass e-mail allow organizations to communicate
with individuals in an inexpensive and well-timed way, and make it possible to
broadcast messages rapidly and to a large audience. This relatively new form of
activism gives disproportionate representation to the higher educated: those with easy
access to Internet and technological abilities. Data from the DES/NKO of 2006 show
that the access to Internet is unevenly distributed among the Dutch population. More
than a third of the lower educated has no access to Internet, whereas virtually every
higher educated person has Internet access. About 93% of the higher educated uses
the Internet daily or at least once a week; less than half of the lower educated do so.
Given this constraints of no access and irregular Internet use, it is not surprising that
the digital divide becomes visible in this popular form of on-line political
participation.
21
For participating in a meeting or debate organized by the government, for
example consultations, deliberative assemblies or interactive policymaking sessions,
we find a gap (differential) between the less- and well-educated of nearly 18 points.
Nearly 1 out of every 4 highly educated people has taken part in this form of
participation, whereas only 1 out of every 20 of the less educated has attended these
sorts of meetings. This is consistent with more qualitative evaluations of these new
forms of political deliberation (Wille, 2001: 100-102; Van Stokkom, 2003). For other
forms of participation, such as joining a civic action group and mobilizing the media,
the differences are relatively small: the gap is limited to 5-6 points.
Similar variations can be found in the third category of participation,
membership in civil society organizations. There are few differences in membership
with regard to traditional, mass organizations, such as churches and unions. However,
the well-educated are much more involved in single-issue advocacy groups and
professional organizations. The lower educated are, on average, member of 1.9
organizations of the set of nine displayed in Table 2.1, whereas the higher educated
are, on average, member of 2.9 organizations. Moreover, membership may not always
equal participation within the organization and its activities. Qualitative research into
informal, civil initiatives and neighbourhood activities, for example, shows they are
dominated by the well-educated (Hurenkamp et al., 2006: 59).
It is also apparent from Figure 2.1 that the intermediate educational categories
do not take an exact middle position between the high and low educational levels. For
a number of activities there appears to be a sharp division between the higher
educated on the one hand, and the middle and lower level educated on the other. For
mobilizing the media, a political party or an organization, or when it comes to joining
a civic action group, the participation differences between the categories of low and
medium education levels are small. In fact, the main division is between the low and
middle groups on the one hand and the better educated on the other. To become
involved in these activities requires, perhaps, some ‘higher education skills’; this may
explain the split between the higher and the medium-lower groups.
Education and Political Participation in a Comparative Perspective
Are these alleged differences across these education levels typical for The
Netherlands, or are they comparable across all European countries? The ESS 2006
data provide evidence that political participation is proportional to education in all
22
European countries. Table 2.2 shows that everywhere across Europe, with the
exception of Ireland, the well-educated are more inclined to vote.
Table 2.2: Voted in Last National Election by Education (%), 2006
(Source: ESS)
education: 3 levels
Country
lower
medium
higher
Total
Austria
59
83
88
78
Belgium
78
74
93
81
Switzerland
39
53
66
55
Germany
43
69
87
74
Denmark
78
9
96
93
Estonia
37
48
68
52
Spain
78
64
81
72
Finland
76
68
89
76
France
69
64
76
68
United Kingdom
65
65
78
69
Hungary
62
78
94
75
Ireland
79
70
71
72
Netherlands
61
79
89
79
Norway
11
74
87
78
Poland
58
61
78
62
Portugal
76
63
84
73
Sweden
79
80
91
83
Slovenia
58
74
88
72
Slovakia
41
64
78
65
Ukraine
85
84
88
85
The ESS also contains cross-national data about participation in seven
different political activities. Table 2.3 displays, in aggregate figures for all European
countries and for each level of education (low-medium-high), the proportion of
respondents in the 2006 European Social Survey (ESS) who reported having engaged
in one or more of a variety of political acts in the last 12 months.8
8
We have aggregated the data to the European level, because our main interest here is educational
differences and not cross-national patterns.
23
The data display a consistency at the European level. Europe-wide, there is a
positive correlation between education and political participation. This is in line with
similar studies of participation and political equality in Europe: ‘the widest gulf
between activists and non-participants are in terms of educational attainment’ (Teorell
et al., 2007: 410). Recent research by Li and Marsh (2008) in the UK show that
educational differences have a far more pronounced effect than other variables, and
the latest studies performed under auspices of the OECD in Austria (2007) and
Norway (2007) show that education’s impact on civic engagement is strong.
Table 2.3: Education and Participation in Europe in 2006 (%) (N= 37500)
Participation outside elections
Education respondent
Ratio
Low
Medium
High
(H/L)
Wore or displayed a badge or sticker in the last 12 months
5
7
13
2.6
Contacted politicians in the last 12 months
9
13
23
2.6
Worked in an association or organization in the last 12 months
8
14
26
3.3
Took part in a lawful public demonstration in the last 12 months
3
6
10
3.3
Worked in a political party in the last 12 months
2
4
7
3.5
Signed petitions in the last 12 months
9
23
39
4.3
Boycotted certain products in the last 12 months
5
15
27
5.4
Source: ESS, 2006
3. Has the Gap Widened?
Voting and Political Action
In The Netherlands, as in most Western countries (Lijphart, 1997), the drop in voter
turnout has been more pronounced among the less educated than amongst the welleducated. In 1967, the last year with compulsory voting, 7% of the citizens with only
an elementary education did not turn out to vote for the parliamentary elections,
almost on a par with university graduates (Irwin, 1974: 2999; Verba, Nie & Kim,
1978: 7). In more recent parliamentary elections, some one in five of the citizens with
only an elementary education failed to vote, while only one in 25 of college or
university graduates did not vote (Boelhouwer, 2002: 23-25; Aarts, 2000: 67-68).
Hence, proportionally, the better-educated citizens have increasingly more political
clout when it comes to elections.
24
Figure 2.2: Did Vote in Recent Parliamentary Elections by
Education (%) 1971-2006 (Source: NKO)
105
100
95
low educ
90
middle educ
higher educ
85
80
75
1971 1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2003 2006
With regard to other forms of participation, this question is more difficult to
answer. Unfortunately, the Dutch Election Studies (DES) of 2006 contain few
participation variables that are comparable to the data of the DES in 1972 or 1977.
Most participation measures are not identical (questions are rephrased, or
participation items are dropped). This limits an analysis of these data over time.
Nonetheless, within these data limitations, we tried to test whether the gap between
the well-educated and the rest of the citizens has widened. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show
for two participation forms (those for which a comparison is possible) the changes in
political involvement by people of the different education levels from the early 1970s
to 2006. There are no direct hints of a widening of the gap; participation in these
25
“traditional” forms of political action has dwindled even among the well-educated.9
Figure 2.3: Joined Demonstration, 1972-2006 (%)
(Source: NKO)
50
40
low
30
medium
20
high
10
0
1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006
9
The sudden drop in 2002 in the participation in demonstrations and action groups might have been a
result of an alteration in the wording of the survey question (cf. Shuman, 2008: 91-118).
In 1998 the question posed was:
This card lists what you could do if the Second Chamber considers a bill that you felt to be unjust
or wrong. Would you please have a look at these options and then tell me which of those you have
ever used?
− Did (not) join civic action group
− Did (not) join demonstration
In 2002 the question changed to:There are various ways to try to bring something to attention in
politics or to exercise influence on politicians in government. Would you indicate for each of the
following possibilities which you have utilized during the past 5 years?
− Joined a civic action group
− Joined a demonstration
The difference in wording in the question and the introduction of a time frame in the 2002 question,
‘the past 5 years’, could have produced the patterns of change in 2002 as shown in both figures. The
alteration of the participation context by constraining the time frame of the political activity to the past
period of 5 years might have had an effect on the responses and can explain this drop in the degree of
activism. The alterations in the question’s wording may also explain why the variation between the
different educational levels appears to have become smaller since 2002.
26
Figure 2.4: Joined Civic Action Group, 1972-2006, (%)
(Source: NKO)
40
30
low
20
medium
high
10
0
1972 1977 1981 1982 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006
Participation forms such as joining a demonstration or a civic action group, which had
become part of the standard political action repertory in the eighties, appear to be
wearing out again. This may explain the closing gap between the well-educated and
less educated in these forms of activity. It may well be that the willingness among the
well-educated to use these “traditional” participation forms is decreasing, whereas they
are shifting their participation to new forms of political involvement like the use of
Internet, texting, and e-mail petitions. Newly emerging participation styles and
methods are replacing the old ones (Tilly, 1978; Wille, 1994; Stolle & Hooghe, 2004).
For these new, up-and-coming forms of participation we perceive large gaps in 2006
between the less and the well-educated (see Table 2.1). It is quite probable that the net
effect of this “resource” move is a widening rather than a closing of the gap between the
less- and well-educated.
Membership in Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations sometimes seem like the “wonder babies” of democracy.
They are thought to be the training grounds for civic skills that foster participation −
De Tocqueville’s “schools of democracy” − they foster societal integration and the
functioning of democracy (Putnam, 2000: 290), and they are important venues for
political recruitment (Nie et al., 1995: 369). Moreover, organizations in civil society
are perceived to be important building blocks for governance and governability
(Pierre & Peters, 2005: 69). They provide the infrastructure between the state and the
individual, they serve as channels between society and government, and they are also
27
increasingly relevant to the implementation of public programmes. It’s no wonder that
with all these valuable qualities, civil society has been embraced by many theorists
and governments alike, to bring citizens closer to decision-making procedures and to
defeat “big government”.
The problem is, however, that many popularly rooted mass organizations, such
as trade unions, women’s federations, veterans’ associations and fraternal groups,
have witnessed a sharp decline in membership and political influence in a number of
advanced democracies. Their role as intermediary between politics and society is
being taken over by professionally managed advocacy groups. Many of these singleissue advocacy groups have no members, let alone local chapters, and operate solely
through mailing lists, newsletters and financial donations. Even more important for
us, these advocacy groups are heavily skewed towards well-educated citizens. They
are run by highly educated professionals; they interact with university educated
Congressional or parliamentary staff, professional policymakers and academically
trained public managers; and they recruit their members and acquire their financial
donations almost exclusively from the well-educated (Skocpol, 2002; 2003; 2004).
Skocpol (2004:12), who has documented this for the United States, has
estimated that in six out of seven of the most important US advocacy groups, more
than 75% of the members have a college or graduate degree, compared to 16% of the
national electorate. She argues that the shift from huge membership organizations to
lean professional advocacy groups, which has occurred over the past three decades,
has made American society very oligarchic.
(The) best-educated Americans are much more privileged in this new civic
world than their (less numerous) counterparts were in the traditional world of
cross-class membership federations. Of course, better-educated and wealthier
men, and women married to them, have always been on top. But in the past
they had to interact with citizens of middling means and prospects. Average
Americans also had chances to participate and work their way up in
associations that built bridges across classes and places, between local and
translocal affairs. Now the bridges are eroding. Ordinary citizens have fewer
venues for membership in associations with real clout. Meanwhile, the most
powerful Americans are interacting – and arguing – almost exclusively with
one another. (Skocpol 2002: 135).
28
Very similar trends can be observed in The Netherlands. The role of political
parties and other mass organizations in preference articulation and social and political
agenda-setting is increasingly being taken over by public interest associations, singleissue advocacy groups and professional societies. In the past three decades, the
memberships of mass organizations such as political parties, broadcasting associations
and churches have declined substantially, whereas single-issue organizations focusing
on consumer affaires (ANWB, Vereniging Eigen Huis, Consumentenbond), nature,
environment
and
animal
welfare
(Natuurmonumenten,
Greenpeace,
WNF,
Dierenbescherming) and international solidarity (Novib, Unicef, Amnesty, Aidsfonds)
witnessed sharp increases in membership, as can be observed from Figure 2.5. (Van
den Berg & de Hart, 2008).
Figure 2.5. Member/Supporters of Civil Society Organizations 1980-2006
(absolute numbers *1000)
(Source: Van den Berg & de Hart 2008: 18)
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1980
1994
1997
2000
internat.aid & solidarity
nature & environment
consumer organisation
trade unions
2003
2006
political parties
Figure 2.5 indicates a shift from “secondary” to “tertiary” organizational forms (De
Hart, 2005: 65): ‘from organizations with intensive mutual contacts between the
members to organizations in which there are (virtually) no contacts at all’. Traditional
mass organizations, such as political parties and trade unions, which offered less
privileged groups channels to participate more fully in politics and society, have given
way to single-issue advocacy groups.
29
With this shift in membership of organizations we also witness a change
towards a different form of participation. Organizations estimate that two-thirds of
their membership comprises passive members or donor members and that the relative
size of this group has grown in recent decades at the expense of the percentage of
active members and volunteers (De Hart, 2005: 65). This process of increasing
passivity is coupled to a trend towards professionalization: two-thirds of organizations
have seen an increase in the numbers of paid staff over the last 10 years (De Hart,
2005: 65). An important unintended consequence of this development is that civic
engagement and grassroots political involvement is needed less and less in these types
of voluntary organizations.
Increasingly, these single-issue organizations are run by a well-educated
‘professional elite’ (De Hart, 2005: 61), the number of university graduates amongst
their members and donors is burgeoning, and the share of the less educated among
their membership is dwindling (De Hart, 2005: 32- 36, 53). The net effect of these
transitions in civil society is a further increase in the political clout of the welleducated. The traditional mass organizations had high percentages of less educated
citizens among their members, whereas the single-issue organizations are dominated
by university graduates.
New Deliberative Forms of Democracy
One might object that our diagnosis has so far been based upon a rather traditional
and narrow definition of politics and that contemporary modes of political
participation are far less organized, more fluid and less focused on the traditional
political arenas (Bang, 2005). However, the displacement of politics to more fluid
arenas and “subpolitics” in many cases also implicates a shift in political participation
from less educated laymen to well-educated professionals and has therefore reinforced
the rise of diploma democracy.
The tension between meritocracy and democracy is probably most strongly felt
in the series of new, deliberative forms of democracy that have been developed and
propagated over the past decades. Interactive policymaking, citizens’ panels and selfregulatory networks are pre-eminently the domain of the well-educated middle-aged
male. Meetings at which people have to discuss about policies in their community are
fraught with the possibility of conflict. Mansbridge (1980) found that open and
egalitarian settings for face-to-face democracy can be quite intimidating to many
30
citizens. She concluded that face-to-face assembly allows those who have no trouble
speaking in public to defend their interests. Rather than creating community, face-toface meetings ‘may frighten away the very people’ they are trying to enlist as
participants. Such meetings are difficult because they usually increase the level of
emotional tension. Moreover, citizens who can speak or write well or who are more
comfortable organizing and taking part in meetings are likely to be more effective
when they get involved in politics. Those who possess civic skills find political
activity less daunting and costly and, therefore, are more likely to take part (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady, 1995).
Analysis of different forms of citizen participation reveals that the more
demanding the act of participation is in terms of the required commitment of time and
energy, the more likely that that type of participation will be disproportionately
engaged in by people of higher socio-economic status. Studies into interactive and
deliberative forms of policymaking have repeatedly demonstrated that highly
educated men have more influence than other citizens (Wille, 2001: 100-102; Van
Stokkom, 2003). They are over-represented in these arenas, they converse more easily
(and especially more loudly) and they are rhetorically skilled, which means that they
are listened to more often than other participants (Sanders, 1997; Hartman, 1998;
Hooghe, 1999). According to Hartman (2000), those with a lower education level
regularly concede in the deliberative arenas to the participation elite of mellifluous
males. In informal, deliberative settings, the voice of a confident lawyer carries more
weight than that of a self-conscious cleaning lady.
4. The Education Effect
.
The Concentration of Activity
It is important to ask not only whether the higher educated are overrepresented in each
particular participation area, but also how much overlap there is in these activities. Do
the same higher educated citizens participate in this set of political activities, or is
participation more equally distributed when considered on an overall basis? How many
engage in more activities than average? How many have been engaged in one or two
activities in addition to voting? And how many are merely “spectators” and have not
participated in any of these activities? To examine the extent of concentration of
31
political activity, we counted the number of activities undertaken by each respondent,
and we have classified citizens on the basis of the frequency of their participation.
We have distinguished three groups: the non-participants, who have engaged
in no activity at all; the incidental participants, who have been engaged in solely one
or two activities in addition to voting; and the participants, who have been engaged in
three or more activities. This new classification provides a clear picture of how much
political activity the average citizen undertakes and what the backgrounds of the (non-)
participants are.
Figure 2.6: Percentage Non-Participants, Incidental Participants and
Participants by Education Levels (%); N=2194
(Source: NKO 2006)
80
70
60
50
higher education
40
medium education
30
lower education
20
10
0
non participants
incidental
participants
participants
Figure 2.6 displays data relevant to this issue and it is clear that activists come
disproportionately from the higher education groups. The higher educated are
overrepresented among the activists and incidental activists (gamma = 0.40). Among
the higher educated we see a proportion of active participants that is three times
higher (15%) than that of people with lower education (4%). Not only the amount of
active participants differs between the higher and lower educated. Figure 2.7 shows
that university graduates are five times more likely to be involved in political
activities than persons with only an elementary school background. The higher
educated are clearly overrepresented in the participatory arenas (as in their
32
membership of voluntary organizations). The data indicate a strong association
between education and level of participation.
Figure 2.7: Mean Number of Political Acts by Different Educational
Levels N=2194 (Source: NKO 2006)
higher vocational/
university
middle vocational
secondary
lower vocational
elementary
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
The Participation Input
How dominant are the well-educated? Thus far we have considered the extent to
which political participation comes from distinct educational groups, and we have
looked at the differences in political participation between the least and the best
educated. But to determine how far-reaching the prevalence of higher educated is, we
need to know how large these groups are.
Figure 2.8 presents the relevant information in the form of a tree diagram. We
first divided the 2006 Dutch election sample into smaller groups with distinct
educational levels. Then each of these groups was sub-divided in three groups,
according to their level of political participation outside the elections. The percentages
indicate the number of people in the sample that can be observed for each one of the
groups thus defined.
These figures describe very concisely the participation input in a diploma
democracy. A quarter of the sample belongs to the best educated group. More than
half of this group participates in political activities, either on an incidental or more
regular basis: 15% of the total sample proves to be highly educated and politically
active. The least educated group is somewhat smaller − 22% of the complete sample −
33
but the large majority of this group belongs to the non-participants. Only 5% of the
total sample has a low education level and is politically active, while only 1% of the
sample is less educated and still politically active on a structural basis.
Figure 2.8: Profile of Participation Input in Diploma Democracy (total %)
Total sample
100% (N=2194)
Least educated
22% (N=489)
Middle educated
51% (N=1128)
Best educated
26% (N=577)
Non Participants
17%
Non Participants
33%
Non Participants
12%
Incidental Participants
4%
Incidental Participants
16%
Incidental Participants
11%
Participants
1%
Participants
3%
Participants
4%
The Education Effect is not Spurious
The data show an educational elite that is also a participatory elite. Educational
resources seem to have a clear effect on political participation. It is possible though,
that at least part of these variations may be spurious: the result of income
differentials, of group-based factors (Parry, et al., 1992: 70), or of age and life-cycle
effects (Nie et al., 1996: 180; Gesthuizen, 2005) rather than intrinsic to education
level. Another explanation could be that the education variable serves as a stand-in for
pre-adult experiences. Compared to highly educated people, the less educated are
more likely to come from financially and culturally disadvantaged families and from
families in which the parents were less likely to be socially active themselves. Once
their influence is taken into account, some contend (Kam & Palmer, 2007) that
education is left with no independent effect.
34
We therefore analyzed the relationship between education and participation
while simultaneously controlling for a number of other confounding factors.10 After
controlling for the influence of other background variables, it is evident that education
still matters. The inclusion of the various social background variables did not result in
an improved fit; the causality of the relationship of participation to education (the
educational effect) is somewhat reduced, but remains largely intact. Again, this is a
constant finding in other studies as well (Almond & Verba, 1963: 315-316; Nie, Jun
& Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Teorell et al., 2007: 399-403; Lauglo & Oia, 2007: 13). Of all
of these background characteristics, education is clearly the key variable in explaining
democratic participation. This educational effect is so consistent that it is reasonable
to assume a considerable independent causal influence of “education” on “political
participation”.11
5. Why Do the Well-Educated Come Out Ahead?
Why Education?
In The Netherlands, just as in the US and elsewhere in Europe, the well-educated are
increasingly overrepresented in almost every political venue. The well-educated vote
more often, are much more politically active and much more involved in civic
organizations. But what is so important about education? Is it efficacy, skills, or
political socialization? Is education important in instilling the norm that one should
vote and participate in more engaged forms of citizenship?
Campbell (2006: 54) indicates that very little is known about the content of
education in terms of what people actually learn: ‘To speak of education strictly by
referring to the attainment level or years in school is to remain at a level of abstraction
that conceals much, presumably most, of what is important about the educational
process.’ Given this limited insight in the learning mechanism, we try to explain why
education has such a strong effect. The explanations we focus on are the effect of
education on political engagement, skills, ethos, networks, and socialization..
10
If these background factors are not taken into account, this will result in a biased estimate of the
relationship between education and political participation (Verba et al., 1995: 299; Gesthuizen, 2005:
92). The details of this analysis can be found in Appendix D.
11
Similar strong and independent effects have been found for the economic returns of education.
Research into genetically identical twins with different education levels indicates that each additional
year of schooling increases wages by 12 to 16% (Krueger & Ashenfelter, 1994).
35
Political engagement
Many people lack the motivation to engage in civic life in general, let alone in
political life (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). Politics simply involves ‘too many
evenings’ (Hooghe, 1999). The demands of job and family, not to mention the appeal
of sports, movies, TV and a host of other things that compete with politics for the
public’s attention, all tend to make politics a fairly low priority for the average voter.
People view democratic processes as messy, inefficient, unprincipled and filled with
conflict. ‘Making collective decisions in the context of heterogeneous opinions is a
challenging and frustrating experience, one that many people could do without’
(Theiss-Morse & Hibbing, 2005: 244). Theiss-Morse and Hibbing’s message is clear:
politics is distasteful or difficult to many ordinary people, and most people do not
want to get involved in politics.
As a result, the majority of citizens undertake no political activities aside from
voting. Only a minority engages in more demanding forms of political participation
and becomes member of a political party or even runs for political office. A necessary
condition for these more demanding political activities is motivation. As Verba et al.
(1995: 354) put it: ‘Political participation is the result of political engagement.’ The
various indicators of political engagement − for example, interest in politics, efficacy
and political knowledge − provide insight in the desire, knowledge and self-assurance
that impel people to be engaged in politics; and education is an extremely powerful
predictor of civic engagement (Putnam, 1995; Verba et al., 1995; Nie et al., 1996: 17).
Do the higher educated in The Netherlands show more political engagement?
Figure 2.9 lays out the differences in political engagement for the different levels of
education. The data show that education has a positive and substantial effect on the
different attributes of political engagement.
Education is strongly related to political interest; resulting in the higher
educated being interested in much larger percentages than the lower educated.
Moreover, Figure 2.9 shows that the people with higher educational attainment
consider themselves significantly more qualified, competent and less negative about
politics than do the lower educated. Education imparts a feeling of confidence in
one’s ability to understand politics and to contribute positively to it. The analysis
shows clearly that education influences political engagement.
36
Figure 2.9: Political Engagement and Education inThe Netherlands 2006
(%) (Source: NKO )
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
very interested in
politics
consider myself
qualified for politics
(agree)
higher education
good understanding of
politics (agree)
medium education
lower education
politics is too
complicated (disagree)
people like me have no
influence on politics
(disagree)
Political skills
Civic skills, the communication and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use
time and money effectively in political life, constitute an important resource for
political participation. ‘Citizens who can speak or write well, or who are comfortable
organizing and taking part in meetings are likely to be more effective when they get
involved in politics. Those who possess civic skills should find political activity less
daunting and costly and, therefore, should be more likely to take part’ (Verba et al.,
1995: 304). Civic skills are acquired throughout one’s lifetime at home and,
especially, in school. Education enhances participation by developing skills that are
relevant to politics (Verba et al., 1995: 305).
Nie et al. (1996: 40-44) call this the cognitive pathway to political
engagement. They argue that verbal cognitive proficiency is the most relevant
cognitive skill in relation to democratic citizenship. Success in democratic politics
largely depends on analytical and rhetorical skills, because democratic politics largely
37
relies on the utilization and manipulation of language through argument and debate.
For many higher educated people, things like writing letters, engaging in debates and
running meetings may seem like everyday activities. Yet they can be very
intimidating for people for whom these are not regular activities. The data presented
in Figure 2.10 show that talking about politics and news − at parties, around the
dinner table, or at the office − is for 70% of the higher educated a common part of
everyday life. Of the lower educated, just over a third indicated that they engage in
these kind of conversations; the majority (43%) merely listens with interest, and one
out of five of the lower educated is not interested at all. There is a strong positive
relationship between educational attainment and verbal cognitive proficiency (gamma
= 0.40) (cf. Nie et al., 1996: 44).
Figure 2.10: Political Skill and Education (%) (Source: NKO 2006)
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE
higher education
medium education
high
lower education
medium
low
TALKS ABOUT NATIONAL NEWS
joins conversation
listens with interest
does not listen
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Education can make participation easier also by providing individuals with political
knowledge. Education has a large impact on cognitive capacity, i.e., the ability of
individuals to gather information on a variety of subjects, organize facts and
efficiently process information (Campbell, 2006: 59). Figure 2.10 indicates for the
NKO 2006 data that there is a strong relationship between political knowledge and
education (gamma = 0.49). Better informed citizens are more likely to participate in
politics, are better able to discern their self-interests, and are better able to connect
38
their enlightened self-interest to specific opinions about the political world (DelliCarpini & Keeter, 1996).
This explains, for example, why even in neighbourhood committees the welleducated tend to be more active (Hurenkamp et al., 2006). They possess the political
and bureaucratic skills, such as chairing a meeting, writing letters or contacting
politicians and civil servants, necessary for keeping the committee running and for
communicating effectively with the local authorities.
Political Ethos
Like civic skills, civic attitudes and values develop slowly over time and as a result of
what one learns and experiences at home and at school. Many studies indicate the
power of education in shaping images of citizenship (Dalton, 2006). At school,
children are socialized in norms and values that are generally held to be important for
society (Hyman and Wright, 1979). Civic values such respect for other human beings,
respect for the rule of law, responsibility, integrity and tolerance are traits learned at
school that should engender support for democracy and its institutions. Figure 2.11
shows that as a result the higher educated have a stronger trust in these institutions than
the lower educated. The political ethos in higher education has generally shifted
towards the norms of engaged citizenship and critical-mindedness, with increased
emphasis on social responsibility (Wittebrood, 1995; Dalton, 2006: 6). All of these
factors make political participation more likely.
39
Figure 2.11: Trust in Public Institutions by Education (%)
(Source: NKO 2006)
Parliament
higher education
medium education
Judges
lower education
Civil Service
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Networks
Education stimulates social participation. Social settings often function as the
recruitment networks through which solicitation for political activities are mediated
(Nie et al., 1995, Verba et al., 1996) and which bring citizens into politics by exposing
them to political cues, even in the context of activities having no connection to
politics. Since the social networks of the lower educated include mostly like-educated
people, and since they are less integrated in civil society organizations (see Figure
2.12), they are less likely than higher educated people to become stimulated to take on
political activities (Nie et al., 1995, Dekker & Uslaner, 2001; Gesthuizen, 2005).
Figure 2.12: Mean Number of Organizational Memberships
by Education; N=2186 (Source: NKO 2006)
higher education
medium education
lower education
0
40
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
Socialization
Schools are important arenas within which political socialization occurs. In school we
learn political facts and how to think about them. This happens directly through
classes on history and society, as well as indirectly through informal discussions with
peers (Campbell, 2006; Lewis, Beck et al., 2008). The longer one is socialized in a
school environment and the more knowledge one receives, the more likely it is that
one will develop a general and broad interest in what happens in society (Gesthuizen,
2005: 92). Wittebrood (1995) has shown how civic education at high schools in The
Netherlands contributes to political involvement. Students in her study who followed an
intensive course in civic education showed an increased interest in political issues and
political efficacy, and a larger readiness to participate in politics.
Yet the development of civic engagement is not the exclusive domain of life at
school. Home is a significant arena for political socialization, too. The way parents
spend their leisure time and share their knowledge, values and interests with their
children bends and shapes the political makeup of their children (Kent, Jennings et al.,
1979). Figure 2.13 shows that the impact of family background is different for the
higher and lower educated. Half of the higher educated respondents discussed politics at
home during adolescence, whereas only a quarter of the lower educated did so. More
often than not, children tend to enter adulthood looking more like than unlike their
parents as a result of socialization processes within the family.
41
Figure 2.13: Discussed Politics at Home in Adolescence (%)
(Source: NKO 2006)
higher education
medium education
lower education
0
20
40
60
Direct and Indirect Impact of Education
As we have seen, education plays multiple roles with regard to participation. There is
a direct relationship between education and political activity. Education also enhances
nearly every single factor that we expect fosters participation: those who are well
educated are more politically interested and informed, have more skills, more civic
values and are more likely to be in social settings from which they can be recruited
into politics. Possibly, these are the factors that intervene between education and
political activity and that explain why more educated citizens are more likely to
participate in politics.
In order to get an idea of the extent to which these resources and motivations
foster political activity, we conducted another regression. Table 2.4 presents the
results of an analysis in which we added the alleged intervening variables as
explanatory variables. When these variables are included in the regression, the impact
of education is reduced substantially. This means that part of the impact of education
is indirect (cf. Verba et al., 1995: 420).
Political trust, political knowledge and discussing politics at home during
one’s youth are not significant as predictors for participation. This means that simply
being politically knowledgeable, trustful or coming from a more political family
background is not enough to lead one to become involved in political activities. What
matters for participation is a sense of political efficacy − the belief that citizen
42
influence can make difference − and organizational affiliation (or network centrality)
as measured by memberships of organizations.12
Table 2.4: Predicting Overall Participation by Education and Background Variables:
Ordinary Least Square Regression
B
(Constant)
highest education (completed) of
Beta
-0.195
0.069**
0.073
0.073
political interest score
0.062*
0.057
0.057
internal efficacy score
0.288**
0.258
0.258
political knowledge score
0.012
0.032
0.032
membership organizations
0.120**
0.174
0.174
trust in Parliament
-0.033
-0.017
-0.017
-0.044
-0.035
-0.035
respondent
discussed politics at home when
adolescent
R2= 0.18 ; Adj. R2= 0.18 Sample Size: 2800
* significant at .05 level ** significant at .01 level
Together, skills, engagement, political ethos and network centrality provide political
resources for more engaged forms of citizenship (Dalton, 2006: 6). Verba et al. (1995)
trace the acquisition of these resources not only through formal education; the
workplace and participation in voluntary associations provide another important path.
Consequently, education has a direct impact on political activity, but more
importantly, education also has indirect effects through its consequences for the
acquisition of nearly every other participatory factor: ‘The well-educated earn higher
incomes on the job; are more likely to develop civil skills at work, in organizations
12
Interestingly, family background (discussing politics at home during adolescence) has no significant
direct effect on political participation. Gesthuizen (2005) also concluded that the impact of parental
background was overestimated and that familial cultural resources affect social commitment through
people’s own resources. A lack of resources throughout a person’s lifetime proved to be important in
explaining why people with lower education tend to be socially less committed than those with a higher
education: ‘A lack of verbal ability, labour market success and having a lower educated partner
imposes cognitive, financial and social restrictions on low educated people, which probably results in
their withdrawal from activities that express social commitment’ (Gesthuizen, 2005: 102).
43
and, to a lesser extent, in church; are more likely to receive requests for political
activity; and are more politically interested and knowledgeable’ (Schlozman et al.,
2006: 26).
This not only has a direct impact on their political participation, but it also
results in a much higher willingness to fulfil political offices – the topic of the next
chapter.
44
3. POLITICAL ELITES AS EDUCATIONAL ELITES
There are two ways of making politics one’s vocation:
Either one lives “for” politics or one lives “off” politics.
Max Weber, 1919
1. The Dominance of the Well-Educated in Government
The Elitist Political Tradition of the Dutch Executive13
In The Netherlands, the political and governing elite, made up of ministers and
members of Parliament, to some extent has always been a diploma democracy. This is
particularly true of the Cabinet. Ministers in The Netherlands are extraordinarily well
educated compared to the rest of the population. We already mentioned the extremely
high academic qualifications of the Balkenende IV Cabinet, which was installed in
2007. All sixteen new ministers are highly educated; six even have a PhD degree, and
four are former university professors.
The Balkenende Cabinet fits a long post-WWII tradition of recruiting
university graduates for political office, as can be observed from Table 3.1. Although
a university education always has been important for a career as a political executive,
the figures in Table 3.1 show that in the decades since WWII a graduate diploma has
developed into a crucial credential for those who want to reach political office. At
least 82% of all ministers have a graduate education, and between 93 and 97% belong
to the well-educated.
Table 3.1: Education Level of Cabinet Ministers in The Netherlands (%)
184818881918194019461967Education
1888
1918
1940
1946
1967
1994
Graduate
58
58
69
83
84
85
College
15
35
31
14
12
8
Secondary
13
7
3
3
7
Primary
3
1
Unknown
11
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total
(N)
(118)
(72)
(61)
(29)
(68)
(89)
Source: Secker (1991: 84) and Parlement & Politiek (www.parlement.com)
19942007
82
13
5
100
(45)
Total
72
18
7
1
2
100
(482)
13
Most data used in this chapter on the careers and background of ministers originate from Seckers’
(1991) study (See Appendix A).
45
In the post-WWII period, the Dutch Cabinet has always been very well educated,
compared to other European democracies. Figure 3.1 presents some educational
background data of Western European cabinet ministers from the post-war period
through 1984. The Netherlands, together with Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg and France,
was among the democracies with the largest percentages of university graduates in the
Cabinet (Thiebault, 1991: 25-26). Elsewhere, the percentage of university graduates
was 75% or less. Particularly in countries with a high proportion of ministers from
socialist or social democratic parties, the less educated stood a larger chance of
becoming a cabinet minister. In recent decades, in most Western European countries,
the number of university graduates among the ministers has increased substantially
and is approaching the Dutch figures (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003: 192, 329, 360).
Figure 3.1: University-educated Cabinet Ministers by Country in period 1945-1984,
(%) (Source: Thiebault 1991)
Italy
Netherlands
Belgium
Luxembourg
France
Finland
UK
Germany
Sw eden
Austria
Ireland
Norw ay
Denmark
Iceland
0
46
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
The Elitist Political Tradition of the Dutch Legislative
The well-educated dominate Parliament, too. Of the newly elected members of the
2006 Dutch Parliament, 85% have an academic or university degree and 15% have a
medium educational background. Only one of the 150 members falls within the
category of the less educated. However, university graduates have been less
prominent in Parliament than in the Cabinet. In the 19th century, when the nobility and
the patrician class dominated Parliament, some 75 to 80% of MPs had completed
university in The Netherlands (Van den Berg, 1983; Secker, 1991). As suffrage was
expanded, this percentage declined substantially. In the decades after 1918, the year in
which universal suffrage was introduced, the percentage of university graduates
among members of Parliament averaged between 40 and 50%. It was not until the late
fifties that this percentage started to rise, and since the sixties some two-thirds of the
members of Parliament have been university graduates (Secker, 2000: 292; Cotta,
2000: 514-516). Since the nineties, this group has been joined by another 25% who
hold higher vocational (HBO) degrees; which means that nowadays, on average some
90% of all members of Parliament belong to the group with the highest level of
educational attainment. The remainder mainly holds upper secondary vocational
education diplomas, with one or two MPs who hold a secondary school diploma as
their highest qualification. There are virtually no MPs who have only an elementary
education (Van den Berg & Van den Braak, 2004: 75).
The “Academization” of Parliaments in Europe
The Dutch Parliament is extremely elitist in terms of educational qualifications as
compared to some other Western European democracies. Particularly the Nordic
countries traditionally have had far fewer members of Parliament with university
degrees (Borchert & Zeiss, 2003: 93, 192, 306, 361).14 However, in most other
European parliaments the proportion of MPs with university educations has currently
reached much higher levels (up to 85%).
In many European countries the proportion of members of Parliament with a
university education has roughly followed a ‘U’ curve, as can be seen from Figure 3.2
14
The explanation of this Nordic exception lies in the numerical importance of parliamentarians with
an intermediate education. Their proportion has increased in Denmark and Norway since the beginning
of the 19th century. It reached high levels in the past decades. An intermediate education is regarded in
this countries ‘as a valuable resource producing the same legitimizing effect as university degrees do in
other countries’ (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 114).
47
(Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 111). The proportion of university graduates was high
during the second half of the nineteenth century. The only two partial exceptions were
Denmark and Norway. At the beginning of the 20th century, less educated social
groups entered parliaments due to the rise of new political parties, particularly
socialist parties (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 111). During the first half of the 20th
century, the proportion of deputies with university degrees decreased in many
countries or remained stable.
Figure 3.2: MPs with Higher Education since 1854 (%)
(Source: Gaxie & Godmer 2007: 112)
100
90
80
70
Netherlands
France
60
50
40
UK
Italy
Germany
Denmark
30
Norway
20
10
0
1854 1864 1872 1881 1890 1900 1910 1920 1925 1933 1943 1951 1959 1969 1977 1987 1997
After WWII, the number of MPs with high educational qualifications in most
countries increased again, first gradually and then sharply from the seventies onwards.
Particularly the social democratic parties have seen rapid increases of the number of
MPs with university degrees. This is also documented for the British Labour party:
‘Manual workers and trade union secretaries with low formal qualifications have been
almost wholly replaced by graduates of public (i.e., private) schools and/or
universities. After the general elections of 1997 and 2001, the percentage of manual
workers in Labour’s parliamentary party was the lowest in the party’s history.’ (Jun
2003: 173).
48
Consequently, parliamentarians with only primary education are disappearing
rapidly at the beginning of the twenty-first century. In some countries, such as Italy,
The Netherlands and Portugal, the proportion of elected national parliamentarians
with primary degrees as their highest diplomas has always been low, and today they
have disappeared almost completely. However, in most other European countries,
between 30 and 40% of the parliamentarians used to belong to the least educated
segment of the population. Nowadays, they are less and less numerous in Finland,
France and Germany. In Denmark and the UK they account for less than 20 percent,
and their numbers are declining quickly (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 109).
2. From Ascription to Achievement: the Meritocratization of Politics
From Upper Class to Middle Class
The importance of educational credentials for the recruitment of political executive
positions and members of Parliament has increased substantially in the past century.
This can be seen as a mark of an emerging meritocracy. In the 19th century, higher
education was accessible only to a very limited group of the population, and the level
of education was just another indicator of social status (Aberbach et al., 1981; Cotta &
Best, 2000: 508). While access to education was dependent on social status, the
selection of a well-educated executive was tantamount to selecting ministers from the
upper social strata.
49
100
Figure 3.3: Social Background of Academically Educated Ministers, 1848-2007 (% )
(Source: Secker 1991: 94; Parlement & Politiek (www. Parlement.com)
upper class
middle class
80
lower class
60
40
20
0
1848-1888 1888-1918 1918-1940 1940-1946 1946-1967 1967-1990 1994-2007
This strong link between social origins and educational attainments in The
Netherlands is evident in Figure 3.3. The diagram shows that at first, universityeducated ministers were mainly drawn from the upper classes. Of all the universityeducated ministers in office in the period 1848-1888, 88% came from an upper class
background, whereas 4% had a middle class background. In the period after WWII we
see that differences in status between university-educated ministers disappeared: half
of the ministers with an academic education originated from a middle class
background; half came from a higher class background; and highly educated ministers
with a lower class background were, and still are, uncommon.
The strong increase in university-educated ministers in the period after 1940 is
due to an increase in ministers coming from the middle class. Achievement became
more significant for the political elite access than ascription.
Figure 3.4 helps to clarify the transformation into a diploma democracy.
Arrow (a) represents the impact of social origins on educational opportunities; arrow
(b) represents the impact of educational achievement on access to elite posts. Thus,
the indirect effect of social origins on ministerial recruitment is the product of (a) and
(b) and decreased in the period 1988-1940 (see Figure 3.3). Arrow (c) represents the
50
direct effect of social origins on the recruitment of ministers. If this effect is strong,
then the recruitment for minister posts is biased towards members of upper classes,
even if they have no educational attainment. Yet the percentage of ministers from the
upper classes without a graduate degree decreased from 64% in the period 1848-1888
and even 77% in the period 1888-1918 to 0% in the period 1967-1994 (not presented
in Figure 3.3).
(a)
Social origin
Education
(b)
(c)
Access to
political elite
Figure 3.4: Social Origins, Education and Recruitment of Political Elites.
(Figure adapted from Aberbach et al., 1981: 57).
The pattern of ministerial recruitment changed because the increasing accessibility of
higher education diversified the social composition of the pool of university
graduates, thus weakening the direct effect of social origin on education (a). The
greater accessibility of universities made tertiary education less socially exclusive and
significantly enlarged the pool of university-educated personnel available for political
careers (Aberbach et al., 1981; Cotta & Best, 2000: 17).
Education has become a dominant political sorting mechanism in determining
access to the political elite. Graduates from middle class backgrounds have as much
opportunity for advancement in the political hierarchy as do upper class graduates, if
not
more.
For example, in
the Balkenende
IV Cabinet, ministers
are
disproportionately drawn from the well-educated segment of the population; but when
the professions of the fathers of the ministers are considered, the social origins of the
current Dutch political executive appear to be predominantly middle class. The fathers
of the Balkenende IV ministers owned a grocery store or dress shops, two of them
51
were cattle farmers, others were teacher, furniture maker, insurance agent, accountant,
and another two were professional politicians.
For parliamentarians we see similar mechanisms at work. Data show a marked
decline in the representation of the nobility, to a point that this group became nonexistent or negligible in Parliament (Rush, 2007: 30). The post-war accessibility of
tertiary education contributed to an opening of the parliamentary profession for a
rapidly increasing number of graduates (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 125). Opportunity
structures widened, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. This made
it easier for certain political party members, coming from middle class sections of the
population, to attain tertiary education and to become ready for a parliamentary
career. As a result, a fast-growing number of would-be parliamentarians or political
leaders held university degrees and were ready to compete within their political
parties (whereas in previous periods their middle-level origins would have prevented
them from entering either university or parliamentarian positions). At the same time,
this trend also contributed to the closing of the political profession; an academic
degree became a prerequisite for such a career (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 129).
Political parties have played a significant role in this transformation to a
diploma democracy. In the period 1920-1960, the new mass political parties and
interest groups provided the organizational environments and channels through which
the well-educated graduates from the lower and middle classes could emerge as
pivotal political figures (Cotta & Best, 2000: 516). They offered aspiring ministers a
functional substitute for the prestige, skills and relationships previously derived from
social status and high state office.
Increasing Diversification of Disciplinary Backgrounds
With time, not only has the threshold to participate in higher education been lowered,
but education has become more diversified. Turning to the type of university training
ministers have received (see Table 3.2), most notable is the increasing diversification
of academic disciplines. In the 19th century and long into the 20th century, lawyers
dominated cabinets. The predominance of lawyers in executive positions (and also in
Parliament) is often attributed to the specific features of this profession: ‘to deal with
other people, and to work as advocates of their interests, combined with the flexibility
of their work’ (Cotta & Best, 2000: 510). These features made their job easily
adaptable to political life. We see a rather gradual decline of the proportion of lawyers
52
in the first 100 years. After the expansion of higher education in the sixties, lawyers
lost substantial ground to other disciplines, particularly to economists and graduates
with a background in social sciences, such as sociology, political science and public
administration.
Table 3.2: Disciplinary Backgrounds of University Graduates Among Ministers (%)
1848188819181940194619671994Discipline
1888
1918
1940
1946
1967
1994
2007
Law
94
95
76
46
63
34
38
Economics
2
8
19
24
11
Humanities
3
2
4
3
4
3
Social Sciences
5
17
33
Engineering.
33
2
3
5
Natural Sciences 3
5
2
8
5
Other
5
10
8
10
10
5
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Total
(N)
(69)
(42)
(42)
(24)
(57)
(78)
(37)
Source: Secker (1991) and Parlement & Politiek (www.parlement.com)
Total
64
10
3
8
4
4
7
100
(349)
Similar shifts are also visible in the legislative branch. Lawyers dominated
parliaments in all European countries in the second half of the 19th century. The
percentage of deputies who held a law degree varied between 50% in Denmark and
Norway, to 70% in France and Germany, and to even 80% and more in Italy and The
Netherlands. Presently, lawyers are in a minority among the elected MPs, their
percentages fluctuate between 20% and 40%. Parliamentarians holding university
degrees in public administration, politics and other social sciences, or in the
humanities, have replaced the lawyers and economists (see Figure 3.5). These shifts in
academic specializations of parliamentarians are partly due to the changing
organization of university programmes, but also reflect the changing nature of
government intervention that includes a shift to new forms of governance apart from
legal regulations (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 123).
53
Figure 3.5: Academic Degrees of MPs in The Netherlands, 1970-2006
(%) (Source: Van Den Berg, 2007: 154)
50
40
law
economy
30
political-social
engineering
20
natural science
medical
humanities
10
0
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2003
2006
Politics as a Vocation: The Professionalization of Politics
These changes in the educational background of individual ministers were to a large
extent the consequence of social developments. Secker (1991: 393) points out that
during the 19th century, ministerial offices came to require new expertise in a variety
of fields: ‘experience of high public office, specific knowledge of the respective
departments, and the skill and ability to defend government against the criticism of a
parliamentary opposition’. A shift in the sort of first-hand experience that is
considered functional to occupy such a position is visible in the shifting occupational
backgrounds of ministers (Table 3.3). Given the high percentage of ministers who had
a prior career in the civil service, familiarity with the public sector had always been an
important asset for political executive office; however, this declined substantially over
time. In the 19th century, two-thirds of all ministers were employed in government at
the time of their first appointment. Nowadays, the proportion coming from civil
service, though still important as an occupational source of recruitment, has dropped
to about a third. Other sectors in society (education, business, and social-economic
organizations) have become important as recruitment channels.
54
Table 3.3: Original Occupations of Incoming Ministers (%)
184818881918194019461888
1918
1940
1946
1967
Civil service
65
60
48
38
47
Teaching/University 4
4
8
21
15
Self-employed
9
13
13
7
11
Business
3
3
5
27
7
Pol./Soc.Ec.organiz. 3
8
3
10
Other occupations
1
2
1
No occupation
9
4
11
Parliament (no other 9
13
7
3
7
occupation)
Total
100
100
100
100
100
(N)
(118)
(72)
(61)
(29)
(68)
Source: Secker (1991) and Parlement & Politiek (www.parlement.com)
19671994
30
14
2
7
8
1
37
19942007
33
2
5
11
11
2
36
Total
48
9
9
7
6
1
4
16
100
(89)
100
(45)
100
(482)
One of the most important changes in the professional background of ministers has
been the rise in the number of members of Parliament who have become ministers
(Secker, 1991: 393). This is remarkable, because one of the most important and most
emphasized differences in background characteristics of Dutch ministers was the
small proportion of members of Parliament compared to the other European countries:
after 1945, slightly more than half of the Dutch ministers had previously sat in
Parliament, whereas in the other countries this was an average of 75% (Secker, 1991:
398; Blondel, 1991). One explanation for this low proportion of MPs among Dutch
ministers was that technical or professional expertise had always been regarded as an
important criterion for their recruitment, because politically neutral specialists were
assumed to safeguard elite accommodation (De Winter, 1991: 49). Since 1967, with
the decline of the politics of accommodation, the numbers of specialists has decreased
and “political” appointments have grown in number (Bakema & Secker, 1988).
Parliament, as the figures in Table 3.3 show, has become an important recruiting
ground.15 Skills and power resources that can be acquired in the political process
apparently have become more important assets for a ministerial office.
A long-term analysis of the recruitment of parliamentarians evokes a similar
trend of political professionalization. MPs owe their position in Parliament in the first
place to a political party. This has been the case since the beginning of party
formation at the end of the 19th century. In the period from 1900 up to WWII,
characterized as a period of formation and consolidation of political parties in the
15
In the Balkenende IV Cabinet, even three-quarters of the ministers have parliamentary experience.
55
democratic decision-making processes everywhere in European democracies, we
witness the rise of a new type of delegate/MP: the career politician (Fiers & Secker,
2007: 141). The tasks of MPs increased and it became hardly possible to combine
parliamentary activities with any other occupation. As a result, MPs in Europe
became more and more paid party politicians; they received a salary comparable to
the senior civil service (Fiers & Secker, 2007: 158). Parliamentarians became what
Weber (1919) called Berufspolitiker, professionals who effectively live for and off
politics.
The professionalization of politicians, in terms of recruitments paths and
educational background, would not have been possible without the evolution of
political parties (Fiers & Secker, 2007: 154). Starting at the beginning of the 20th
century, political parties began to act as a representative of predefined interests and
groups in society (Katz & Mair 1995). With the emergence and success of the mass
party, with its motivation to appeal to large possible parts of the electorate, it was
crucial for parties to have strong and influential representatives in key positions of the
state system (Fiers & Secker, 2007: 154).
With the development toward catch-all parties, with their openness to a wider
electorate, the ties to trade unions and predefined sectors in society became looser;
this brought a stabilization in the recruitment of party officials. Electoral strategies
became more competitive and the profile of the candidates became important. With
the development toward cartel parties, political parties became an integral part of the
state itself, helped by the allocation of state subsidies (Katz and Mair, 1995). Politics
has become more and more a profession in itself. The opportunity to prolong one’s
career in the party was extended. Party functionaries had a real chance to climb the
ladder in politics.
From Outsider Recruitment to Insider Recruitment
This professionalization of politics also had an effect on the profile of politicians that
dominate parliaments. The need for new skills, knowledge and know-how has
contributed to an over-representation of public sector employees among MPs in all
European parliaments, especially among left-wing parties. The proportion of former
public sector employees is presently close to, or even greater than, 50% in the
parliaments of several countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and The
Netherlands).
56
This shift in background and career lines of ministers and parliamentarians
implied a shift in the access to political office from an outsider recruitment system,
characterized by a high degree of lateral entry into the elite from outside careers and
institutions, towards an insider recruitment system, which required a long
apprenticeship within an institution as a prerequisite for admission to the political
executive (Aberbach et al., 1981: 67). Insider recruitment systems ensure that political
executives have political experience and will be more experienced and fully
socialized into the norms of the political institutions. Outsider systems, on the other
hand, provide the executive with fresh ideas. Insider recruitment systems maximize
internal integration within the elite, whereas outside systems maximize integration of
the elite and other parts of society.
Moreover, politics has become a full-time career. The professionalization of
politics means less transferability of skills between politics and other careers
(Kavenagh & Richards, 2003: 190). Specialization encourages political relevant
communication and networking skills needed for professional politicians, but at the
same time produces allegations of a narrowing of political outlook and experience.
Two Faces of Diploma Democracy: Democratization and Professionalization
In short, two contradictory processes affect the selection of political executives:
‘democratization’ and ‘professionalization’ (Cotta & Best, 2000: 495). Whereas
democratization refers to an extension of the social niches from which the political
executives are drawn, professionalization refers to a restriction of the admission to the
political arena through specific rules for access and reward. These trends are
contradictory, since democratization is socially inclusive while professionalization is
exclusive. Democratization resulted in an opening up of the political executive and
the replacement of the old upper class elites by a university-educated middle class.
Professionalization, on the other hand, meant the emergence of fully professionalized,
highly educated politicians.16
Although the educational attainment of two-thirds of the citizens does not
extend beyond the level of secondary education, virtually all members of Parliament,
all ministers and other political representatives (and almost all political advocates and
16
A similar pattern of democratization and professionalization can be found amongst the corporate elite
in The Netherlands. In the past two decades, the old boys’ network, which was dominated by the
nobility and the patriciate, has given way to a loosely connected, internationally oriented, meritocratic
network of highly educated professionals (Heemskerk, 2007).
57
lobbyists) have a college or graduate degree. Nowadays, much more so than in the
first half of the twentieth century, The Netherlands and most other Western
democracies are ruled by the well-educated.
3. The Supply and Demand of Higher Educated Political Candidates
How can the present and persisting dominance of the well-educated among the Dutch
political elites be explained? In the previous chapter we discussed the positive effect
of education on political engagement, skills and ethos. Together, these provide
political resources for more engaged forms of citizenship. However, holding political
office is a special and exclusive form of political participation. Modern parliamentary
democracies have only a limited number of positions available, and candidates are
often subjected to extensive formal and informal selection procedures.
One approach to explaining the rise of diploma democracy is to consider the
political recruitment process as any other job market and to look to supply and
demand for candidates in the political market place (see also Norris, 1997: 209). The
supply side of candidates is determined by the motivation and political capital of the
candidates. By political capital we mean all the assets that facilitate political careers,
which vary by party or political networks. The demand for candidates is produced by
the qualities of the job and by the attitudes of “recruiters” to get the right people on
board.17
The Supply Side: Network Centrality
Nie et al. (1996: 45) argue that, in addition to interest in politics, there is a second
pathway to political engagement, which they call social network centrality: ‘Those
with higher levels of formal education are substantially more likely to be found closer
to the central nodes of politically important social networks, while those with less
education are more likely to be found at the periphery.’ There is a three-fold relation
between education and social network centrality. A high level of educational
attainment leads to high status occupations that involve a variety of managerial and
17
In comparative research one should take into account that varying features of the political system
also influence the structure of opportunities in the political market place, affecting the selection of
political executives.
58
supervisory responsibilities, which pull people towards the centre of social networks.
Second, educational attainment leads to higher family incomes, which reinforces the
centrality of university graduates in social and economic networks. Third, university
graduates are much more likely to be members of voluntary organizations, which also
reinforces their position in social networks that are relevant for political recruitment.
University graduates are very prominent among the social elites that supply
candidates for the political elites. Although Nie et al. focus on political engagement
and forms of political participation such as voting, working on political campaigns
and attending meetings, these explanations also appear relevant for occupying
political office. Ministers of the present Balkenende IV Cabinet, for instance, appear
to have occupied, beyond their regular professional activities, on average 16 positions
in voluntary associations and non-political organizations, which indicates an
extremely high social network centrality.
The Supply Side: Educational Inflation
Another reason for the increasing numbers of the well-educated among political
executives is the increasing supply of university graduates due to the rise in level of
education in the post-WWII decades. The decline in participation of the less educated,
which can clearly be observed in the Dutch Parliament, is therefore also due to
educational inflation. As the number of positions in the political networks and the
representative arenas remains more or less constant, the educational environment
becomes more competitive. ‘As the population becomes more and more educated, an
ever increasing amount of education is required to arrive at the same relative position
in the networks that, in turn, act to facilitate political engagement.’ (Nie, Junn &
Stehlik-Barry, 1996: 131-132). This means that the relative position of the least
educated has deteriorated substantially. A secondary school diploma, which in the
1950s would have been quite an achievement, nowadays has little value in most
political arenas, because there are so many university graduates to compete with.
Similarly, the elitist character of an average university title has declined with its
relative diffusion. This also explains the disappearance of the less educated in public
office – they have simply been crowded out by the increasing number of the welleducated among their peers. As on the job market, their relative position has
deteriorated; they increasingly find themselves at the end of the queue. The reason for
this is that the well-educated are in higher demand on the political market.
59
The Demand Side: Political Skills
What does the job of minister demand of its holders? What are the activities and tasks
of executive officeholders? Do these tasks require specific skills or competencies? It
is no simple matter to define a ministers’ job. Their tasks are managerial and
executive, policy-making but also symbolic or expressive, and they imply the key
functions of government: fostering collective responsibility, giving strategic
leadership and involving themselves in policy issues (‘t Hart & Wille, 2006). The
political executive job always has required the exercise of political skills, such as
communication skills. Yet the role of public communication has increased
enormously in the past several decades. Performances of political executives, whether
at party conferences or ministerial visits to schools, that used to be given to a fairly
small audience are currently witnessed by potential TV, radio, and Internet audiences.
The opportunities to broadcast public performances have become much larger. The
effect of these developments on the nature of the executive job and on the required
relevant competencies has been to highlight the scope and scale of the minister’s
public communication skills. Public communication takes up more and more of
executives’ time resources.
Not only in public, but also in the confinements of the office and in the
corridors of power, a large part of the job of the political executive consists of talking:
talking with other members of the Cabinet; talking with the legislature; with senior
civil servants; with interest groups; or with party members. It comes as no surprise
that university graduates, lawyers and social scientists in particular, are dominant
among the Dutch political executives. They have acquired a very high verbal
proficiency, which is a very relevant skill if one is to be successful as a political
executive. Mutates mutandis, these skills also are needed to be successful as a
member of Parliament (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 129).
The Demand Side: Cadres that Clone
Another reason for a bias in political participation of the higher educated seems to be
the transformation of most political parties from mass parties into cadre or cartel
parties (Koole, 1992; Katz & Mair, 1995). In earlier decades, mass parties, such as the
Democrats in the US, Labour in the UK, and social-democratic and Christiandemocratic parties on the European continent, used to recruit large memberships and
would use those memberships to educate citizens, form policy platforms and mobilize
60
voters (Edwards, 2005: 161). In addition, the mass parties offered the less educated
training for, and access to, political office. The modern cadre party, on the other hand,
is a party of, and for, well-educated professionals. In 1999, for example, no less than
60% of the members of all Dutch political parties were well educated, and only 16%
belonged to the least educated (Koole et al., 2000: 48). The well-educated were also
much more active within the party, and almost two-thirds of them were members of a
party committee, compared to less than half of the least educated.
The decline of mass organizations and the transformation of political parties
into professional organizations have effectively closed major venues for the political
education and political mobility of the least educated. As we saw, this is particularly
the case for the Western European social democratic parties. Mass political parties,
unions and fraternities had many active members with little formal education to whom
they provided courses and trainings, as well as hands-on experience in discussing,
lobbying, negotiating and running a meeting. Local activists could get ‘on leadership
ladders that could lead to responsibilities at district, state, and national levels’
(Skocpol, 2004:10).
In the cartel party, neither the voters nor the average rank and file members of
political parties have very little influence upon the composition of the list of
candidates. The cadres in political parties determine which individuals can represent
them in Parliament and in political offices. Comparing the social background and
political experience of political candidates with the members and voters of Dutch
parties, Hillebrand (1992) concluded that party members have higher levels of
education than the electorate in general. Aspiring candidates high on the list are on
average even more highly educated; almost all successful candidates appear to have a
university education (see Figure 3.4). These data confirm ‘the law of increasing
disproportion’ at the top of the political hierarchy (Aberbach et al., 1981: 47). In
addition, the party background of potential candidates plays an important role in
candidate selection in all of the parties. Virtually all candidates possess extensive
experience in representative bodies at the local or regional level, and almost all have
held some office within the party. This is even more so for the candidates high on the
list. Very little selection or recruitment occurs outside the group of party activists.
61
Figure 3.6. University Education of Voters, Members and
Candidates of the 3 Largest Political Parties in The Netherlands
(%)(Source: Hillebrand 1992: 255)
70
60
PvdA
50
CDA
40
VVD
30
20
10
0
voters
members
unsuccessful
candidates
successful
candidates
4. From a Hereditary Elite to an Educational Elite
The rise of diploma democracy resulted in the replacement of a hereditary patrician
elite by a meritocratic, educational elite. University-trained politicians took over the
executive and legislative branches of government. The decline of social barriers as a
result of emancipatory movements at the start of the 20th century (first the religious
parties, later the social-democrats, and in the sixties the democratization process)
opened up the ranks for political office and brought about a substantial change in the
recruitment of ministers and members of Parliament. The connection between social
milieu and the opportunities for a political career weakened, and in the 20th century a
university education became nearly an essential credential for being recruited to
political office. Various supply and demand factors in the selection process have led
to extraordinary large numbers of highly educated people having a career in politics.
The end result is a somewhat less biased executive than before the emergence
of diploma democracy; but still a highly biased executive. In 2007, about 27% of the
population in the age category of 15 to 64 years had obtained a higher vocational
college or university degree. This means that citizens with primary and secondary
level diplomas still account for almost three-quarters of the adult population.
62
Nevertheless, they are virtually absent in the Cabinet and in Parliament and, as we
have seen in the previous chapter, in almost any other layer of the participation
pyramid. As a consequence, some voices may be much better heard in the political
arena than others – and to these consequences we now turn.
63
64
4. WHAT IS WRONG WITH DIPLOMA DEMOCRACY?
Today the eminent (…) are trained in science, and it is
scientists who have inherited the earth. What can they have in
common with people whose education stopped at sixteen or
seventeen, leaving them with the merest smattering of dog
science? How can they carry on a two-sided conversation with
the lower classes when they speak another, richer, and more
exact language?
Michael Young (1958/1994: 96-97)
1. The Uneasy Relationship Between Meritocracy and Democracy
Why bother about the rise of diploma democracy? What is so terrible about highly
educated citizens having a disproportionate amount of political influence? Is it not
reassuring to know that our representatives and leaders have had such a solid
academic grounding and that education and expertise are dominant in shaping and
determining policy (Zakaria, 2003)? Are we not much better off with a diploma
democracy?
Plato certainly thought so. In his Republic, he argued that only the most
intelligent and well-balanced citizens were to be permitted to govern the State. He
developed an extensive system of examinations and tests designed to select children
on the basis of courage, intellect and insight. The chosen, the youths with a “golden”
nature, were subsequently required to study for many years before they qualified for
admission to governmental positions. The second choice, the “silver” souls who were
brave but not as brilliant, were allowed to become soldiers and policemen; while the
“bronze” masses, the ignorant souls who were mainly driven by their emotions, were
to be kept far away from state administration and were required to confine themselves
to trade and agriculture.
Plato was convinced that brilliance was hereditary and consequently
developed an ingenious system of mandatory mating festivals to ensure that gold only
paired with gold. This eugenistic element in Plato’s work is always read with a
65
considerable degree of discomfort today, reminiscent as it is of the Lebensborn homes
of the Nazis. For decades, the linking of social problems to genetic factors has been
strongly taboo, as has the coupling of political power to hereditary talents and
educational background.
Only in the long forgotten, brilliant satirical essay written by the eccentric
British sociologist Michael Young in 1958 could Plato’s philosophical fiction be
heard, loud and clear.18 Young’s quasi-scientific equation, ‘IQ + effort = MERIT’, is
vintage Plato. After all, intelligence and perseverance are precisely the characteristics
for which Plato held that the philosopher-kings were to be selected. Young describes
in a quasi-historic report how Great Britain gradually becomes a radical meritocracy
in the period 1870-2033, thanks to a combination of drastic education reforms, a
system of annual IQ tests and the emergence of genetic testing. These make it
possible to select promising children at an extremely early age and to school them for
the top positions in society. In the England of 2033, just as in Plato’s Republic, IQ and
education wholly determine one’s place in society.
Ultimately, the meritocracy comes to grief in both Plato and Young. The
meritocracy proves to be an unstable form of government. In Plato, this is because the
elite fail to maintain a rigorous selection, as a result of which weaker characters are
able to come to power. In line with the spirit of the times, Young’s The Rise of the
Meritocracy was also revealed as a dystopia. Revolts break out in 2033 and 2034 − in
which the author of the report is killed (sic) – because the masses, driven by rage and
resentment, are no longer content with their inferior social position.
This sums up the uneasy relationship between meritocracy and democracy in a
nutshell. Is a meritocracy compatible with democracy? Is it fair that the well-educated
wield more political power than the lesser educated masses? Is a diploma democracy
ultimately an unstable form of government that is doomed to end in anarchy and
revolt? We will investigate various forms of uneasiness that are created by the rise of
an educational meritocracy in the context of advanced Western democracies.
18
See Donovan (2006) for the mixed reception of Young’s essay.
66
2. Mismatches in Representation
We saw in the first chapter that the evaluation of the rise of diploma democracy will
highly depend upon your perspective on democracy and representation. For those who
are sceptical about the willingness and ability of ordinary citizens to reflect upon
complicated policy issues, and therefore favour a trustee approach to representative
government, such as Burke and Mill in the 19th century, the rise of diploma
democracy is a blessing in disguise. However, if one leans only a bit more towards
delegate or descriptive conceptions of representation, the complete dominance of the
well-educated in virtually every political venue, is not so easily brushed aside.
Understandings
of
political
representation
gradually
evolve.
The
modernization of democracy has inspired new ideas about the operation of
representative democracies and democratic representation. The concept of popular
sovereignty has become more legitimate; parliamentary sovereignty is no longer
absolute (cf. Dalton, Cain & Scarrow, 2003: 254). This has also changed expectations
regarding the role of elected representatives. Representative institutions are more and
more insisted to be responsive the public, i.e., to take the interest of citizen into
account in the process of policymaking; representatives are expected to act as
delegates rather than trustees (Zittel, 2007: 224).
We also saw that representation is more than simply a match between the
people and politicians. The question is not only who or what is to be represented, but
also by whom and how this is to be done. We will discuss several mismatches in the
who, how and by whom of representation that are brought about by the rise of
diploma democracy.
The Decoupling of Democratic Representation
In recent years, most democracies have seen a striking expansion in the number and
roles of societal bodies that exercise official authority but are not headed by elected
politicians and have been deliberately set apart, or that are only loosely tied to the
elected institutions of democracy. This ‘rise of the unelected’, as Vibert (2007) calls
it, means that professional bodies set apart from electoral politics now play a much
larger role in the life of democratic regimes than in previous periods. A common
feature of these bodies is their specialized information and operation in technically
sophisticated areas. These unelected bodies now make many of the detailed decisions
67
that affect people’s lives and may have, in practice, greater impact on the people’s
daily lives than the activities of elected politicians: ‘The words of an independent
bank governor may carry more weight in financial markets than the words of a
finance minister’ (Vibert, 2007: 6).
The “outsourcing” of government functions to unelected bodies has
implications for democratic representation. It has decoupled political representation
from the way public policies are made and implemented. Unelected bodies −
international, transnational and non-governmental actors – nowadays play an
important role in governance (Grant & Keohane, 2005). There is a growing mismatch
between the traditional focus of political representation through elections within the
nation-states, these newly evolving arenas of public policymaking, and the
mechanisms that can make representatives speak for, act for and even stand for
citizens.
Similar trends of decoupled representation are observable in the organized
civil society. Interest groups, civic associations and social movements are increasingly
integrated in representative democracies. They write policy papers and play a central
role in implementing and regulating policies. Many of these groups no longer try to
influence policy via the mobilization of large numbers of members and supporters but
through the deployment of expertise and technical knowledge (Crenson and Ginsberg,
2002). As a consequence, these groups have become increasingly professionalized
(Saurugger, 2007: 397-398).
‘Members are a non-lucrative distraction’ as Skocpol (2003: 134) put it.
Beginning in the 1970s, civic groups lost ground among many less educated citizens.
The professionalization in the 1980s was one in which local volunteers were replaced
by paid staff. Increased financial support and funding of citizen interests groups by
governmental organizations ruled out the need for contributions by members. Seeking
and servicing members becomes unnecessary when funding by governmental bodies
permits an interest group to focus fully on professional activities. Why spend a great
deal of organizational resources on grass-root membership? Consequentially,
members of these groups became less connected, and the people who did the lion’s
share of the outreach in associations became less embedded in organizations. These
transformations of associational life also illustrate the need to update contemporary
understandings of representation of citizens by civic organizations. The willingness of
68
governments to extend participatory democracy and to ‘bring citizens in’ by funding
civic organizations has, as a side effect, actually ‘driven citizens out’ (Greenwood
2007).
The professionalization of politics, as described in the last chapter, has
reinforced this decoupling between representatives and represented. The high
educational backgrounds of political representatives have made the political class
more homogeneous and more parochial. Selection of representatives has made politics
a sphere of its own, only very loosely coupled to churches, unions, businesses, and
grass-roots civil society. Changes in the social make-up of parliaments and the
disappearance from them of members with certain backgrounds, namely blue-collar
workers and the less educated, have made representation more indirect. The political
field has become more autonomous. Meritocratization has increased the social
distance between the executive and the legislative branches, on the one hand, and
large parts of the general public on the other (Gaxie & Godmer, 2007: 131).
Parliamentary representation is generally perceived as being more and more separate
from the population and from “the real world”.
Diverging Styles of Representation
In descriptive terms, therefore, the quality of political representation is deteriorating.
However, the fact that representatives do not match the represented in important
demographic characteristics, such as educational background, does not necessarily
imply a failure of substantive representation of the needs and interests of the
represented (Verba et al., 1995: 166). Elected officials have incentives to represent
more than their own narrow selfish interests − at least if they wish to remain in office.
Therefore the “how” of representation becomes relevant.
How do parliamentarians perceive their roles as representatives? Data from
the Dutch Parliament Surveys (see Figure 4.1) show that the view of strong and
responsible leadership, related to a “trustee” image of political representation, has
been dominant since the period of consociationalism in The Netherlands. The
proportion of politicians who perceive their role as acting independently, as trustees
who follow their own understanding of the best action to pursue – the Burkian view of
representation − declined from 71% in 1972 to 49% in 2006. The percentage of MPs
who perceived their role as a representative as one of a delegate, bound by strict
69
mandates of the voter, increased somewhat, from 7% in 1972 to 19% in 2006
(Andeweg & Thomassen, 2007: 16). Although this may indicate a shift towards a
more responsive style of representation, Burke’s ideas still echo loudly in the way the
majority of parliamentarians view and seek to carry out their role as representatives
(cf. Koops & Holsteyn, 2008).
Figure 4.1: Representation Styles of MPs 1972-2006 (% )
(Source: Parliament Survey)
80
70
trustee
60
depends
delegate
50
40
30
20
10
0
1972
1979
1990
2001
2006
The trustee style of representation of the Dutch MPs does not match very well with
the style of representation which is preferred by most contemporary citizens. This
becomes clear from Figure 4.2, which shows the views of MPs and citizens on
representation. A majority of citizens (based on the 2002 DES) think that the most
important task of a representative is ‘to translate preferences of citizens into policy’.
Nearly 4 out of every 5 voters support this perspective of representation from below,
but only a third of the MPs shared this view. They support alternatively a view of
representation from above.
70
Figure 4.2: MPs and Citizens on Representation from Below or Above in 2002 (%)
(Source: Parliament Survey)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
MPs
Citizens
Representation from below : to translate preferences of citizens into policy
Representation from above: to ask support for the policy preferences of the own political party
This means that the political elites are out of touch with the electorate regarding the
nature and style of political representation. They still perceive representation as taking
initiatives to address the people by asking their consent on policy proposals. Three out
of four MPs considered this as the as the most significant aspect of their relationship
with voters (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2007: 16).
3. The Disparity of Political Voice
The Exclusion Bias: Missing Opinions in Political Arenas
Then, there is the “who” issue. One of the attributes of democratic societies is that
governments in one way or another ought to be responsive to the “will of the people”.
A problem for elected representatives in contemporary democracies is, however, that
in many cases they have no direct way of knowing the positions of “their” voters on
political issues. The role of ideology or belief systems as a common yardstick for
masses and elites has lost much of its importance (Converse, 1964), and elections and
political parties have become rather incomplete transmission belts for the
71
communication of popular preferences to the political circuits (Thomassen, 1999: 45).
New and supplementary communication channels are sought to perk up the
aggregation of citizen’s interests in the policymaking process. Government-initiated
arrangements in which citizens can participate and have their say, such as interactive
policymaking procedures, town meetings, citizen boards, voter panels and Internet
polls, are used as a substitute for the “hollowing out” of the electoral connection. It is
expected that these forms of participation can convey more information on citizen’s
preferences than through election campaigns. But what voices are heard if policymakers focus on these forms of input?
Activists differ in politically consequential ways from those who do not
engage in politics, and this means that the exercise of political voice is stratified. As
Verba et al. (1995: 2) argue: ‘The voice of the people as expressed through
participation comes from a limited and unrepresentative set of citizens.’ They show
that in the US the over-representation of the well-educated in the political process
systematically produces a skewed picture of the public: ‘Over and over, our data
showed that participatory input is tilted in the direction of the more advantaged
groups in society – especially in terms of economic and educational position (...). The
voices of the well educated and the well-heeled (...) sound more loudly’ (Verba et al.,
1995: 512). Accordingly, some interests might be muted, not because citizens lack
concerns relevant to a particular controversy, but instead because they have difficulty
making themselves heard on the political stage. Skocpol (2003: 236-244; 2004: 1314) argues, on the basis of legislative studies conducted by Jeffrey Berry (1999), that
in the US the transition from membership to advocacy has greatly diminished the
political room for inclusive and generous public social provision and warns for
upward-tilted public agendas and policymaking: ‘As new advocacy politics surged
between 1963 and 1979 (…) economic legislation taken up in Congress moved
increasingly away from the issues of wages and job training affecting blue collar
workers’ (Skocpol 2003: 239). Instead, the attention given by Congress to postmaterial and lifestyle issues, pushed by citizen advocacy groups, doubled in that
period.
Participation may therefore fail to equally represent the preferences of all
citizens with regard to some of the important political issues of our time. This
misrepresentation arises from what Berinsky (2004) calls an ‘exclusion bias’: the
exclusion of the preferences of a sometimes sizable portion of the public. The political
72
voice of these abstainers is, in certain cases, systematically different from the voice of
those who do participate.
Disparate Issue Agendas
This raises the question of whether the higher educated participants in The
Netherlands differ from less educated non-participants in their issue agendas. In order
to get an idea of the issues that are on the ‘public agenda’, building on Cobb and
Elder’s (1972) conception of issue agenda’s, an open ended question was posed on
what respondents consider to be the most important problems facing our society
today. The top five problems that respondents mentioned in the DES/NKO of 2006
are displayed at the top of Figure 4.3. There is a consensus on the most important
problems: 41% of the less educated mentioned ethnic minorities as the most important
problem facing the country today, and 44% of the higher educated did so. Both
groups − higher and lower educated – also mention health care and crime as salient
problems, but the higher educated see health care as a larger problem than crime (30%
and 25%, respectively); whereas the less educated consider crime to be a more
important problem than health care (respectively 33% and 25%).
Figure 4.3: Issue Agenda by Education (Source : NKO 2006)
minorities
health care
lower education
crime
middle education
ethics
higher education
income
education
environment
traffic
population
0
10
20
30
40
50
73
Large differences appear on the issue agenda, however, when it comes to the problem
of ethics in contemporary society. About 36% of the higher educated mentioned this
as an important national issue, whereas only 18% of the less educated raised this
problem. Similar disparities in the issue agendas of the higher and less educated were
found outside of the top five national problems (displayed at the bottom of Figure
4.3). The well-educated are much more concerned about education: over 22%
mentioned education as a problem, compared to only 4% of the less educated.
Similarly, approximately 17% of the higher educated mentioned the environment as
an important concern, whereas only 6% of the less educated mentioned this issue.
Different Levels of Activity
The disparate issue agendas of the higher and less educated bring in the crucial
question of what issues come into the decision-making arena and what ones are left
out? By looking at the differential rates of participation among those who mentioned
certain national problems as important, we can obtain insight in what problems (or
what definitions of the problems) are likely to remain invisible and what sort of
problems are more likely to have an entry into the “political” agenda because of their
being perceived as salient by the activist segment.
Figure 4.4 shows, for the top five national problems, the activity levels of the
higher and less educated groups who considered these problems as salient. Each of the
bars in Figure 4.4 reports the mean activity levels of the higher and less educated
groups who mentioned these particular problems as important. This figure shows that
the higher educated people who mentioned the issue of ethnic minorities as a salient
problem are thrice as politically active (participating in 1.2 activities) as those less
educated who also mentioned this issue (and who participate in less than 0.4 political
activities). These data reveal for the five largest “public issues” very significant
differences between the active higher educated and the inactive less educated.
74
Figure 4.4: Mean Activity Levels by Education
for the Most Salient Problems on the Issue agenda
(source:: NKO 2006)
1,2
1
0,8
lower educated
0,6
middle educated
higher educated
0,4
0,2
0
Minorities Health Care
Crime
Ethics
Income
Different Policy Preferences
These different activity levels need not be a problem if the activists and non-activists
share the same preferences on these salient issues. The well-educated could then act
as active spokesmen for the least educated, who are less able and willing to devote
their time to engage in political debate and advocacy. In this vein, protestant
ministers, teachers, “Red Barons” and an army of university graduates have defended
the interests of the working class in Parliament during the past century.
This raises the question of to what extent these higher-educated activist groups
differ in their policy preferences from the politically passive less educated groups. Do
the higher educated differ in their particular policy preferences from less educated
groups regarding the most important matters on the issue agenda? Data displayed in
table 4.1 show that policy congruence between the higher and lower educated is quite
low on the “non-structural” issues, such as crime, the admittance of asylum seekers,
cultural integration of immigrants and EU unification. The higher educated favour
more liberal policies with regard to cultural integration, crime fighting and refugees,
and they are more positive about the European unification. The differences in mean
issue positions between the highest and the least educated (presented in the last
75
column in Table 4.1) show that for these issues the differences in policy preferences
between citizens with low and high education levels are the largest. On euthanasia,
incomes and nuclear energy, the policy match between the higher and less educated is
considerably stronger.
The data on the issue of immigrants are fairly clear. The political preferences
of the higher educated are more in favour of a liberal position (immigrants to keep
their own culture), whereas the less educated are less liberal in their policy stand
(adjust to Dutch culture). The figures in Table 4.2 indicate that there is a significant
correlation between a respondent’s level of education and his/her position on this
issues. This pattern is paralleled by an association between the level of political
activity and issue preference: the more politically active population is also in favour
of a more liberal position. This pattern of differences in responses between the higher
and less educated is consistently and consequently repeated in the Dutch Election
Studies for similar sorts of questions having to do with the issues of the political
minority.
Table 4.1: Mean Issue Position in The Netherlands in 2006 by Education
Education
Deviation
respondent
(H-L)
Position of Respondent on Political Issues
Low
Mid
High
1.
Immigrants - keep own culture (1) adjust to Dutch culture (7)
5.9
5.1
4.6
1.3
2.
EU unification - should go further (1) has gone too far (7)
5.2
4.7
4.2
1.0
3.
Asylum seekers - admit more (1) expel more (7)
5.2
4.7
4.2
1.0
4.
Crime – too strict (1) much stricter (7)
6.4
6.0
5.5
0.9
5.
Nuclear Power Plants - quickly build more (1) no more plants
5.0
4.7
4.4
0.6
(7)
6.
Income differences – bigger (1) smaller (7)
5.6
5.2
4.9
0.6
7.
Euthanasia – forbidden (1) allow (7)
5.8
5.9
5.8
0.0
Source: NKO 2006
76
Table 4.2: Pearson Correlations between Level of Education and
Level of Political Activity and Issue Positions
Immigrants
Highest
education
-0.293(**)
Participation
Index
-0.167(**)
Crime
-0.246(**)
-0.161(**)
Asylum seekers
-0.223(**)
-0.136(**)
European unification
-0.195(**)
-0.085(**)
Income differences
-0.155(**)
-0.051(*)
Nuclear plants
-0.109(**)
-0.040
Euthanasia
0.018
-0.024
Source: NKO 2006
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
The well-educated are also much more positive about the benefits of the EU than the
less educated.19 In fact, throughout Europe the less educated show significantly less
support for EU membership and trust in the European Commission than university
graduates, and they are far less positive about the benefits of the EU. For example,
43% of the least educated think their country has not benefited from the EU (41%
thinks it did), as opposed to 25% of the university educated (67% is positive).20 Given
these figures, the negative outcomes of the referenda on the EU convention in France,
The Netherlands and Ireland do not come as a surprise and may even be valued as a
healthy correction of the dominance of the well-educated in the debates about
European integration.
Growing concerns about whether representative institutions are able to sustain
the legitimacy and effectiveness of government have given rise to debates on
improving the quality of democracy. Participatory reforms to engage citizens in a
greater number in political decision-making have been widely discussed in The
Netherlands, particularly the introduction of referendums and the election of mayors;
and these policy proposals have had firm supporters and critics.
To what extent are these debates also divided along educational lines? Figures
from the Dutch Election Study 2006 (NKO2006), presented in Table 4.3, show that
less educated groups perceive a much greater need for political reforms − and are
more supportive of them − than the higher educated. They place a greater reliance on
19
20
Compare the survey 21minuten.nl 2006 (www.21minuten.nl), pages 28-29.
Standard Eurobarometer 66/ Autumn 2006; First Results, pages 6-16.
77
referendums as a tool for influencing the political agenda, they have a larger
preference for a direct election of mayors and the Prime Minister and favour
increasing the democratic control of political elites.
Table 4.3: Support for Political Reform Initiatives in The Netherlands in 2006 (%)
by the General Public by Education and of Members of Parliament
General Public
Education respondents
Low
Mid
High
MPs
76
77
69
49
68
64
49
31
60
46
32
17
Citizens should be able to decide important national issues
by referendum
The inhabitants of the municipality should elect the mayor
The Prime Ministers should be directly elected by the
voters
Source: NKO 2006 & Parliament Survey 2006 (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2007)
Members of Parliament, on the other hand, are not at all supportive of these new
venues for popular participation. They have been very reluctant to support the use of
referendums; in fact, most MPs considered the national EU referendum as an
unfortunate incident which should not be repeated in the future (Andeweg &
Thomassen, 2007). Very few MPs favour the introduction of more direct elections of
political executives such as mayors and the Prime Minister. This makes democratic
renewal one of the areas in which there is a major divide between the preferences of
the less and medium educated citizens on the one hand and the well-educated
representatives on the other hand.
Hard and Easy Issues
These major differences in policy preferences between the less- and well-educated,
and between represented and representatives, are not specific to the Dutch
parliamentary system. Research in numerous European multi-party systems based on
proportional representation shows, for instance, a strong relative responsiveness
connection between voters and representatives on the left-right scale (Powell, 2004:
286). But on other issues the absolute positions of voters and parties are more widely
removed. Responsiveness on the European issues has, for instance, remained
comparatively low (Andeweg & Thomassen 2007: 84-85). The policy goals of
78
politicians have diverged from what the median voter favours with regard to European
matters, with most of the well-educated politicians being far more pro-European than
their less educated voters.
When politicians have no information on where voters stand on political issues
they will try to estimate the opinions of their voters by projecting their own perception
of the voters’ positions (Thomassen, 1999: 53). Empirical data show that politicians
do much better on older, highly politicized, left-right issues than on newer, less
politicized and non-left-right issues. Carmines and Stimson’s (1980) distinction
between hard and easy issues may help to explain why the match between citizens and
representatives is better for some issues than for others.
Easy issues have been ingrained in political culture for so long that they are
easily structured by “gut” feeling for both well-informed political representatives and
ill-informed citizens alike. The question of income differences is such a prototypically
easy issue. Positions on both sides of the issues are well defined. However, some
issues are hard in the sense that they require careful consideration of (technically)
difficult choices relating to the means by which government should respond. This is
especially so for novel problems on the issue agenda or for newer political conflicts
that came along later and fit less comfortably in the left-right alignment (Berinsky,
2004; Stimson, 2004: 51).
This idea of issue difficulty makes it possible to group political controversies
and determine the issues where we expect opinion congruence to occur. On easy
issues, the potential of concurrence between the higher and less educated is much
more likely. But as the difficulty of particular issue increases, the gap between less
and higher educated groups, and between citizens and representatives, may grow.
Issues that are relatively difficult will foster opinion distortions in the representative
spheres. Public opinion on those issues may, therefore, be contaminated by significant
exclusion biases.
The result of these participatory distortions is that representative institutions
include the opinions, perspectives, and interests of the well-educated citizens at the
expense of marginalizing the opinions, perspectives and interests of the less educated.
Because the higher educated are over-represented among political participants and
politicians, the political issue agenda is heavily biased towards their preferences and
priorities. The voice of the segment of the population with the highest levels of
79
education resonates stronger in the ballot box, is heard more loudly in campaigns for
participation and protest, and is absolutely dominant in Parliament and the Cabinet.
4. Diminishing Democratic Legitimacy
Distaste and Distrust
Will the permanent absence of less educated representatives in Parliament and in the
Cabinet lead to a crisis of confidence, as large segments of the citizens with medium
and lower levels of educational attainment no longer identify with the governing
political elite and hence become cynical and indifferent towards politics? This is
termed the disaffection hypothesis in the survey literature on trust (Nye et al., 1997;
Norris, 1999; Phar & Putnam, eds., 2000). It suggests that citizens with low education
levels in particular will have a low or decreasing amount of trust in government and
politics because they increasingly feel excluded from meaningful political and social
participation.
A meritocracy depends largely on output legitimacy. The result is what counts;
government by experts offers the best guarantee for sound policy and hence the best
chance of prosperity for as many voters as possible (Scharpf, 1999). However,
democracy is more than the sum of a number of outcomes. Democracy is also about
input; citizens must have the feeling that they count, that their contribution is valued
and can lead to a change in policy. Citizens holding low-level diploma qualifications
may come to mistrust the legitimacy of a diploma democracy, as it leaves them with
very little opportunities to exercise any influence on policy. ‘No one listens to us
ordinary people’, or ‘they are too busy lining their own pockets up there in The
Hague’ (or Brussels, for that matter) are the stereotypical cynical views expressing a
lack of political trust and a feeling of social exclusion.
Some data from the trust surveys appear to support the diasaffection
hypothesis. In most Western democracies there seems to have been a gradual decline
in trust in government and in political institutions over the past decades (Kaase &
Newton, 1995; Norris 1999; Nye et al., 1997; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton, 2004).
Citizens with little schooling are far more cynical and distrustful when it comes to
politics than highly educated citizens (Hall, 1999; Li & Marsh, 2006; Elchardus &
Smits, 2002: 54; Van Holsteyn & De Ridder, 2005: 85). Elchardus & Smits (2002), in
80
their analysis of the Belgian drop in public trust in the mid-nineties, have suggested
that particularly the least educated and the elderly have become distrustful of
government. They lack the skills to adapt to the demands of the information society,
they face increasing competition on the labour market, and their social environment is
rapidly changing because of immigration and globalization. These so called “losers of
modernity” are resentful; they believe that politicians are not aware of their daily
predicaments and that they refuse to listen. Social unease and political mistrust go
hand in hand. These groups are hardly involved in voluntary work and civil society;
they have little trust in other people, nor in public institutions; they are cynical about
politicians; they are in favour of strong political leaders and inclined not to vote at
elections.
The empirical data for The Netherlands do indeed show that levels of trust in
government vary between social groups. The lowest levels of trust in government and
politics can be found among the least educated, non-religious, lower classes (Becker
& Dekker, 2005: 351; WRR, 2005; Tammes & Dekker, 2007: 79). However, there are
no indications of a structural decrease in trust in the recent years being particularly
more pronounced among the least educated.21
The less educated, much more often than more educated people, dislike and
distrust politicians. They perceive politics as a flow of abstract speeches made up by
“fine talkers” and “profiteers”. Only a third of the less educated think that politicians
can solve problems in society (compared with nearly half of the higher educated), and
only a fifth of the lower educated believes that politicians are reliable, as can be seen
from Table 4.4.
21
According to Dalton (2004: 87-91), the importance of education for trust has weakened in the past
decades. In some countries, such as the US, the correlation between education and political support has
even reversed. However, this is not the case in The Netherlands (Van der Brug & Van Praag, 2007).
Between 2001 and 2004, all educational cohorts became less trustful (Van Praag & Van der Brug,
2006: 40).
81
Table 4.4: Public Images of Politicians (%) in The Netherlands in 2006 by Education
Education respondent
Gap
(fully) agree
Low
Mid
High
(H-L)
Politicians are capable of solving problems in society
36
46
47
+11
Politicians are reliable
19
21
28
+9
Politicians are honest
15
17
24
+9
Politicians keep their promises
7
7
8
+1
Politicians only have fine talk
38
24
15
-23
Politicians are profiteers
27
15
6
-21
Politicians are corrupt
7
4
2
-5
Politicians get a kick out of power
39
34
37
-2
Source: NKO 2006
Even more disturbing are the large proportions of lower educated in Table 4.5 who
think MPs and parties are not interested in their opinions. They feel that politicians
are not listening to them and that the way politics is currently run ignores the opinions
of the common person. The higher educated are considerably more positive and
favourable in their attitudes towards politicians. This pattern of results suggests that
many less educated people feel shut out of the political process by ‘a careerist elite
whose lifetime political preoccupation has separated them from most people’
(Ehrenhalt, 1991: xx).
Table 4.5: Attitudes towards Politicians (%) in The Netherlands in 2006 by Education
Education respondent
Gap
Attitudes towards Politicians (agree)
Low
Mid
High
(H-L)
MPs do not care about opinions of people like me
54
37
22
32
Parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion
63
47
33
30
Ministers and junior ministers are primarily self-interested
57
35
25
32
Politicians promise more than they can deliver
95
93
89
6
Friends are more important than ability to become MP
52
42
47
5
Source: NKO 2006
Citizenship and Commitment
If one looks at diploma democracy from a somewhat more republican perspective on
democracy, its shortcomings become evident. A meritocracy is, in the most literal
82
sense of the word, not a democracy. While experts and political representation by
deputy may yield a government for the people, it is not the same as a government by
the people. A diploma democracy hardly leaves any room for active citizenship on the
part of the less educated part of the population. Their citizenship deteriorates into a
kind of passive consumerism. Their interests may be well looked after, but they have
few opportunities to establish themselves actively – as citizens − in the public arena.
From a republican perspective, active citizenship has an intrinsic value that is
lost when governance is left to experts and other well-educated citizens. In a diploma
democracy, in the terms of Hannah Arendt (1958), the vita activa of those with low
levels of education are confined to “labour” and “work”; and they are excluded from
“action”, from the active shaping of the polis, the community of equals. With that, the
segment of the population with a lower level of education loses an important source of
self-respect, as it becomes a quantité négligeable, a political segment that barely
counts. A diploma democracy is, moreover, rather one dimensional from the classic
perspective on citizenship. The emphasis on expertise and on output legitimacy leaves
little room for the more normative, emotional aspects of politics. Democracy is more
than technocracy; it also encompasses struggle, rhetoric, and visions of the good life.
Again, this may be an important source of resentment against the political system that
can reduce the loyalty to the government and the respect for law and justice. Some of
this suddenly became visible during the referendum on the European Constitution.
5. Increasing Political Instability
The Rise of Populist Parties
These representational distortions may occasionally lead to serious political
instabilities. The rejection of the European convention in the Dutch referendum of
2005 was a serious defeat for the Dutch government and has slowed down the process
of European integration for years. One of the more notable aspects of the referendum
was, indeed, that the group backing the European Constitution and those opposing it
were not divided along the traditional political clefts, but mainly differed according to
educational background. According to some exit polls, among the group with the
highest level of education, only a tiny majority (51%) opposed the Constitution, a
83
proportion that rose to nearly three-quarters among high school graduates (72%), to
become an overwhelming majority (82%) among voters with a low level of
educational attainment.22
Similarly, some of the major swings in voter preferences in the 2002, 2003 and
2006 elections in The Netherlands, and the emergence of more radical populist parties
at both ends of the political spectrum, can be explained at least partially by the
dissatisfaction of the least educated with the dominant political elites in the traditional
political parties and arenas. Particularly the LPF and the PVV, both parties that
attracted relatively high percentages of the less educated voters, as shown by the
results in Table 4.6 for the PVV, campaigned on a platform of non-structural topics,
such as crime, asylum seekers, cultural integration and the EU unification issues,
where the discrepancies in preferences between the well-educated political elite and
the less educated citizenry were high. Not surprisingly, these populist parties have
significantly more support among the least educated.
Table 4.6: Vote in 2006 Election by Education (%)
Education respondent
Voted for
Low
Mid
High
CDA
32
27
26
PvdA
26
19
19
VVD
8
15
18
GroenLinks
2
4
10
SP
16
20
14
D66
0
2
ChristenUnie
5
4
5
SGP
1
1
1
Partij vd Dieren
1
2
1
Partij vd Vrijheid
9
5
2
3
Source: NKO 2006
22
These data derive from the exit polls on website of Maurice de Hond (www.peil.nl; consulted 7 July
2005). The DES/NKO 2006 data on the EU referendum (N=1637) show similar, but less extreme
differences. Of the well-educated respondents in the DES/NKO 2006, 47% reported to have voted
against, compared to 62% of the least educated.
84
A New Conflict Dimension: Cosmopolitans versus Nationalists
The rise of these new populist parties ran parallel to the emergence of a new conflict
dimension in Western politics (Tiemeyer, 2006: 191-195; Achterberg, 2006; Pellikaan
et al., 2007; Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Houtman et al., 2008). Traditionally, most
voters and political parties in Western Europe can be positioned along a left-right,
social-economic dimension and along a religious-secular dimension. In addition to
these traditional conflict dimensions, which reach back to the late 19th and early 20th
century, a new cultural conflict dimension has manifested itself in the past three
decades – first among the citizenry and only much later among the political parties.
The crucial themes along this dimension are immigration and integration,
globalization and European unification.
On the one side of this new line of conflict stand the citizens and parties who
accept social and cultural heterogeneity and who favour, or at least condone,
multiculturalism. These are the well-educated, cosmopolitan urban gentry, who are
internationally oriented and in The Netherlands vote for D66, GroenLinks, the PvdA,
and for the VVD of Dijkstal. On the other side one finds the citizens and parties who
are very critical about multiculturalism and prefer a more homogeneous national
culture. These are predominantly the lesser educated residents of the post-WWII
suburbs and the urbanized countryside, for whom the pace of immigration and
internationalization has gone much too fast. Before 2002, their concerns were hardly
addressed by the traditional political parties, with the exception of the VVD of
Bolkestein. Since 2002, several nationalist parties have emerged in The Netherlands,
first the LPF of Fortuyn, later also the PVV of Wilders and TON of Verdonk. The SP,
too, is at the nationalistic end of this conflict dimension, given its views on
immigration and its campaign against the EU convention.
This new division between cosmopolitans and nationalists has emerged
gradually and was fuelled by the waves of non-Western immigration and the process
of European unification. It manifested itself much earlier among the voters than
amongst the political elites. Already in the early 1990s, issues related to immigration
and asylum seekers showed a sharp rise in the public’s list of priorities (Aarts &
Thomassen, 2008). However, the well-educated political elites effectively kept the
negative aspects of immigration and further European unification of the political
agenda. Explicit nationalism was taboo, and the only nationalist and xenophobic
political party, the Centrum Democrats of Janmaat, was ridiculed and isolated. In
85
2002, Pim Fortuyn was the first politician who broke the taboo and successfully
campaigned on a nationalist, cultural agenda.
This new, cultural and political cleft between the less and well-educated can
be observed in many Western democracies. The least educated increasingly vote for
right-wing, authoritarian or xenophobic parties, whereas the well-educated members
of the middle class increasingly vote for social liberal, leftist parties. Less educated
citizens with little cultural capital, who have traditionally voted for social democratic
parties, have turned to nationalistic right-wing parties because they value social order
and traditional moral values. The well-educated, on the other hand, who posses
extensive social and cultural capital, vote for leftist liberal parties because they value
individual freedom and cultural tolerance (Achterberg, 2006).
Social Exclusion: The Winners Take All
Over-representation of well-educated citizens in the political system is particularly
problematic if diplomas confer benefits in other social spheres as well. Plato resolved
this by prohibiting philosopher-kings from owning personal goods and property. Nor
were they allowed to know who their children were, in order to prevent nepotism. The
meritocracy of Michael Young, by contrast, was a typical “winner-takes-all society”.
Those with the highest levels of education had the best jobs, owned the most property
and wielded the greatest amount of political power. Because this social capital was
largely transferable via heritage and upbringing, Young foresaw a closed society in
which social mobility would die out within a few generations. Power and wealth was
concentrated among a self-satisfied intellectual elite and the vast, poverty stricken and
cynical underclass had little to lose by rebelling (according to Young, the revolts in
the England of 2033 were mainly caused by government proposals to institute a
hereditary meritocracy and to reserve the right to education for the children of the
elite – who, in a full-fledged meritocracy, would be on average the most intelligent
children.).
Young’s fictitious rebellion can serve as a warning. A diploma democracy
may not remain stable if large parts of the population have the sense that they are no
longer represented politically, and if they have no hope of ever being able to improve
their social position. A diploma democracy is more stable in the presence of a huge
pluriformity in the areas in which and criteria by which merit is accrued, and where
social class is not solely determined by educational background. Social coherency and
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democracy both may come under pressure wherever social failure and educational
failure systematically co-occur.
There are sufficient indications that this may be the case to an increasing
extent. According to Elchardus (2002: 269), huge inequalities are developing
regarding the outcome of the educational attainment level. Nowadays, the amount of
education received is strongly correlated with a person’s chances on the labour market
and in life. ‘At the same time, the level of educational attainment strongly determines
an individual’s attitudes and opinions. The chasm between those with high levels and
those with low levels of education is therefore not only socio-economic, but also
socio-cultural in nature.’ (Elchardus, 2002: 270). He points out that that this chasm
could threaten social coherency and democracy, as it leads to structural feelings of
dissatisfaction and to the rejection of fundamental democratic principles by those who
find themselves systematically excluded.
In The Netherlands there is one group in particular that is increasingly
indifferent towards politics: poorly educated youths. ‘If the notion of a “growing
chasm” in Dutch politics is at all applicable, it is (…) to the process of alienation in
progress between a dwindling group of poorly educated youths and the growing group
of those with a high level of educational attainment’ (Dekker, 2002b: 6).
6. Not So Universal Suffrage
Diploma democracy is a flawed form of democracy, as ultimately a sizeable
proportion of the population is excluded from any kind of meaningful political
participation. Citizens with low or medium educational qualification levels currently
make up approximately 70% of the population, yet they are extremely
underrepresented on nearly all rungs of the participation ladder. The situation is not
that different from the late nineteenth century, when formal diplomas sometimes
determined whether or not a citizen was entitled to vote. Almost a century after
universal suffrage was introduced, some advanced Western democracies are,
practically speaking, back to where they started. A further meritocratization of society
may offer a serious threat to political and social stability. A rebellion of the less
educated, as described by Michael Young, could be less of a fiction than this may
seem. The “revolt” of Fortuyn and the subsequent rise of populist parties in the first
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decade of the 21st century is a manifestation of a sudden eruption of resentment
against the rise of diploma democracy. How, then, can we mitigate, or even remedy,
the rise of diploma democracy?
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5. REMEDYING DIPLOMA DEMOCRACY
Democratic equality entails a principle that everyone whose
basic interests are affected by policies should be included in the
process of making them.
Iris Marion Young
(2000)
1. No to the Euro-academics
In June 2005, in the days preceding the referendum on the European Constitution in
The Netherlands, a lone picketer could be seen demonstrating in the market square in
Leiden carrying a sign that read: ‘National politicians before Euro-academics’. That
sign was a succinct reflection of the predominantly negative sentiments regarding the
EU Constitution. The project of European unity may have made substantial advances
over the past fifty years – at least in the view of its supporters − but somewhere along
the way, the EU has left many of the ordinary citizens behind.
One of the more notable aspects of the referendum was that the group
backing the European Constitution and those opposing it were not divided along the
traditional political cleavages but mainly differed according to educational
background. The European referendum laid bare an educational chasm in the Low
Countries − a chasm which was already, albeit tentatively, identified by the
Amsterdam tram driver who was cited in the preface. The supporters of the EU
convention and of the process of Europeanization in general can be found almost
exclusively amongst the well-educated citizens. They are politically self-confident,
internationally oriented, and have ample access to the relevant political arenas and
social elites. The opponents are the relatively poorly educated population groups, who
are socially less active, who feel excluded and for whom the pace of
internationalization is simply too high.
The almost unanimous ‘no’ of the least educated against the European
Constitution was not an irrational, populist flare-up. The EU in general, and the
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European Constitution in particular, have been projects masterminded and managed
by legal scholars and other well-educated technocrats, who, far away in the corridors
and cubicles of Brussels, have made decisions without consulting the “ordinary”
people to whom these decisions relate. For the least educated, the process of European
unification has not been an unequivocal blessing. It brought an end to strong national
symbols, such as national currencies, industries and airlines. The common market
provided ample opportunities for the creative class, but brought insecurity and, in
some instances, massive unemployment for the unskilled. The referendum offered the
latter an opportunity to say ‘no’ for the first time to all these Euro-academics.
The example of European unification illustrates how in a diploma democracy
the “educated” opinions are included and the “non-educated” opinions are sometimes
excluded from the participatory and political representative arenas. However, the
example of the EU referendum points also to one possible way to remedy the rise of
diploma democracy: introducing more direct, plebiscitary forms of democracy. We
will discuss a variety of remedies − some instrumental, others more structural − which
may help to mitigate the dominance of the well-educated in the information society.
In order to do so we will first reconsider the main features of diploma democracies.
One thing that has become clear throughout the book is that education does
make a difference. For some this is hardly surprising; most studies of participation
have referred to it. Yet it has not often been demonstrated at such a systematic way.
The first column of Table 5.1 summarizes a good deal of what we have found in terms
of orientation, inequalities in participation and mismatches in representation. The
second column lists a number of potential remedies, which we explain in the
following sections.
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Table 5.1: Features of Diploma Democracy
Issues
Remedies
Civic Orientations
Low engagement, skills and ethos
of least educated
Civic education
Participation
Patterns
Little activity beyond voting by
least educated
Bringing the ballot back in
Absence of least educated in new
arenas
Adjustment of arenas
Decoupling
Party renewal
Exclusion bias
Descriptive representation
Low trust by least educated
Plebiscitary elements
Negative image of politicians by
least educated
Enlightened populism
Representation
2. The Edification of the Least Educated
Civic Education
The sophists, Plato’s intellectual adversaries in ancient Athens, had a straightforward
answer to the rise of meritocracy: democratize diplomas. They provided training in
academic and rhetorical skills to any citizen who could afford their fees. In
contemporary democracies, too, this can be a powerful remedy. If education is the
universal solvent for the puzzle of political participation, why not increase the
education levels of as many citizens as possible?
Education, for all its overlap with other status indicators, such as class,
occupation and income, does have an independent impact on political behaviour
(Lewis-Beck, 2008). This is because the educational experience is a main source of
political information for most citizens. In school we learn political facts and how to
think and talk about them. More extensive education provides citizens with relevant
knowledge and skills, plus the attitudes and dispositions of effective citizenship. The
first possible venue for remedying diploma democracy would thus be to provide more
extensive education to all citizens.
However, raising the general level of education may not always reduce the
gap, due to educational inflation. Education, by its very nature, is meritocratic. The
gap between the well- and the least educated may very well remain, but at a higher
level. The well-educated will acquire extra qualifications, beyond college, such as
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graduate degrees and international diplomas. Moreover, education is a positional
good, and raising the general level of education will not help to open up political
office to the least educated – on the contrary, as we saw in Chapter 3. As long as the
number of positions in the political networks and in the representative arenas remains
more or less constant, the educational environment becomes increasingly competitive.
‘An ever-increasing amount of education is required to arrive at the same relative
position in the networks that, in turn, act to facilitate political engagement.’ (Nie et
al.,1996: 131-132). The least educated – soon to be those citizens with secondary
qualifications only − will still be crowded out by the increasing number of peers that
have graduate or even post-graduate qualifications.
Another venue would be to focus on the extension of civic education
programmes. We saw in Chapter 2 that well-designed, school-based courses can have
a positive effect on the civic dispositions of students: it may increase their levels of
political tolerance and can equip them with the civic knowledge and the participatory
skills necessary for informed and effective citizenship. As we saw in the previous
chapter, Wittebrood (1995) has shown how civic education at secondary schools in The
Netherlands contributes to political involvement. Students in her study who followed an
intensive course in civic education showed an increased interest in political issues,
political efficacy, and a larger readiness to participate in politics. Civic education as
such is not a positional good, and introducing more intensive civic education
programmes across the board would raise the levels of civic engagement and civic
skills of all segments of the population. This would not remedy the dominance of the
well-educated in political office, but it may provide less educated citizens with more
of a stimulus for engagement, as well as the skills to operate in a variety of
participatory and deliberative arenas.
Combating Status Monopolies
David Miller (1996: 300), following Michael Walzer (1983), argues that a
meritocracy is not only more stable but also socially more just, the greater the variety
of socially valued merit available: ‘Economic contribution would be one kind of
merit, education and scholarship another, artistic achievement a third, public service
yet another, and so forth.’ If each of these dimensions comes complete with its own
status ladders from which citizens may derive self-respect, the risk of status
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monopolies declines markedly. If becoming a minister, a professor, or a top executive
is not in the cards, a person can always become a TV presenter, professional football
player, an Idols finalist, or Volunteer of the Year and earn a hefty salary and acquire
high social status or considerable social recognition.
This means, in the first place, that sufficient channels should remain open in
society to allow social mobility and stratification that is not associated with formal
qualifications. It also means that the value of all the diplomas and tests, which, as a
proxy for merit have become such an important factor in our society (Vries, 1993),
should be put into perspective. The tyranny of the diplomas will have to be
challenged, and competences acquired other than through formal education will also
have to be recognized (Elchardus, 2002: 270).
Moreover, it means that access to essential social goods and services, such as
health care, social security and education, should not be yoked to an individual’s
formal qualifications or social position: ‘Merit of any sort should only be allowed to
govern the distribution of a certain range of goods and services, and in particular not
those goods and services which people regard as necessities’ (Miller, 1996: 300).
There are huge disparities in disposition and talents between people, and there will
always be large groups of citizens lacking the formal or informal competences in
demand on the job market. For these groups, too, it should be possible to have a
decent and meaningful existence (De Vries, 2008).
3. Adjusting the Arenas
Mini publics
The changing educational stratification of modern democracies is here to stay, and, so
it seems, are the cadre parties and the advocacy groups; there is little chance of
returning to the mass political parties that dominated much of the twentieth century
(Galston, 2003: 103). As political parties increasingly become footloose, deliberative
forms of policymaking may become important venues in legitimizing policy proposals
socially and politically. In what ways then, can the inordinate amount of influence
wielded by highly educated citizens in these political arenas be toned down?
Experiments with urban democracy suggest that it is possible to involve the
least educated in deliberative policymaking. However, this requires specific reforms,
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such as decentralization, that allow deliberations to focus on specific, practical issues,
the selection and training of participants, and an active involvement of street-level
professionals (Fung, 2004). Also, recent years have seen a burgeoning of so-called
mini publics (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). These are relatively small deliberative forums
who involve not only the self-selected activists and professional experts but also lay
citizens and non-partisans. In these mini publics, the representativeness of the public
at large is enhanced through random selection, stratified sampling or quality seats.
Examples are the citizen panels which were introduced by the Blair government in the
UK (Duggett, 1998), the consensus conferences in Denmark and the Citizen’s
Assembly on electoral reform which was organized in British Columbia in 2004
(Goodin & Dryzek, 2006: 5-6).
Deliberative Polling and Citizen Juries
Another way to gauge the feelings of the not so vocal, less educated majority of
citizens is the deliberative poll, a method designed and applied by James Fishkin
(1995: 134-176). The case Fishkin describes involved a random and representative
sample of several hundred citizens from the electorate. These citizens were gathered
together for a weekend and divided into smaller groups in which a number of
important social themes were intensively discussed. They were provided with
carefully balanced informational materials and could consult with experts, lobbyists
and politicians holding a wide range of views. After a number of days of intensive,
face-to-face discussions, their opinions on the issues discussed were polled. In this
major UK example, the result was a combination of Big Brother, Parliament Question
Time, and Adventure Island rolled into one, as the deliberations and polls were held
and recorded in the studios of Channel 4 and subsequently extensively aired on
television.
Whoever may find this a bit too taxing – after all, not everyone wants to
participate in lengthy discussions in television studios – could also consider the
possibility of randomly composed citizen’s juries (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006: 5). These
are relatively small groups of ordinary citizens, either selected at random or by
stratified sampling, who receive information, can hear evidence and cross-examine
witnesses and, after deliberating a proposal, can cast a vote. The outcomes can be
used by an agency or by a municipal council in weighing the advisability of the
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proposal at hand. While not a full-fledged alternative to party politics, it does offer a
certain equality check on deliberative decision-making (Huitema et al., 2005).
4. Bringing the Ballot Back In
Ballots
The example of the EU-referendum with which we began this chapter suggests
another important way of involving the least educated which is less time consuming
and more egalitarian than deliberative policymaking. This is remedying diploma
democracy by bringing the ballot box back in. Ballots are a tested and tried means to
redress the incommensurate influence of participatory elites. After all, in a ballot,
every voice, whether loud or soft, eloquent or brusque, well educated or not, is
equally important. For this reason, one should strive to conclude deliberative
processes where possible by balloting. The ground rule to be applied as far as possible
in this case is: one person, one vote. This ensures that the small group of ‘dominant,
dexterous and verbally skilled fellow citizens’ (Hartman 2000) is prevented from
imposing its will against the wishes of the majority. By limiting the ballots to the final
phase of decision-making, sufficient room remains to mobilize expertise and
creativity during the conceptual and planning stage (Van Stokkom 2003). This could
be thought of as deliberating in the shadow of the direct democracy.
Referendums
Such ballots can also take the form of corrective referendums. These allow enough
room for professionals, advocacy groups, and expert citizens to provide professional
input, map out scenarios and to draft policy proposals. At the same time, citizens who
lack the desire, time, or courage to participate in the deliberations, have at least the
opportunity to express their opinion about the final plans on equal terms. Corrective
referendums provide less of a solution for the tilted agenda setting problem, discussed
in chapter 4, but at least they provide an egalitarian check on expert decision making.
The British Columbia Citizen’s Assembly recommendations were put to a referendum
in just this way. Similarly, the Dutch and French referendums on the European
constitution offered the lower educated segments of the population the chance to raise
their voice, loudly and clearly.
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Referendums can clearly strengthen the public’s ability to shape the decisionmaking (Dalton, Cain & Scarrow . 2003: 261). Issues that elites do not wish to
address can be brought into the political arena through organizing a referendum and
can force political elites to be more sensitive to public interests. For instance, the
French, Dutch and Irish rejections of the Lisbon treaty have had serious consequences
for the EU integration project. All these EU referendum outcomes were part of a
bigger picture of discontent, showing European political elites that they apparently
were unable to secure a popular endorsement of a European Treaty. Referendum
democracy may, hence, allow for power to be more widely distributed through the
system and referendums can be perfectly integrated into consociational frameworks
for deliberation and bargaining (Papadopoulos 2005: 461). A greater number of entry
points to the political system are created, the pool of political actors is enlarged, and
the monopolization of power is diminished. It can open up the political process to
groups emerging from civil society rather than from the established party system
(Mendelsohn & Parkin 2001: 18).
Moreover, referendum votes are more immediate than voting through channels
of representative democracy and the direct link to a specific policy action is clear.
This unmediated and direct policy impact of referendum votes can ensure effective
participation and voice. It is shown that referendums can politicize topics and can
engage citizen and make them more knowledgeable of certain issues (Mendelsohn &
Parkin 2001). In the US, participation in direct democratic votes enhances the voters’
general awareness. Moreover, the direct democratic votes constitute an incentive for
potential information suppliers - political elites, the government, the parties and
interest groups, to provide more information about the issue in question. Empirical
studies show that citizens are politically better informed when they have more
extended political participation rights (Kriesi 2005: 90). Referendums can thus be
valuable instruments to complement the traditional forms of indirect democracy
(Dalton, Cain & Scarrow et al. 2003: 261). Its direct policy impact makes the
referendum a powerful means to represent specific issue interests and to influence the
political agenda. But the referendum instrument in itself does not guarantee an equal
actual access of all citizens. An expanded use of referendums and its greater
information demands can even lead to lower turn outs of less politically advantaged
groups.
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Compulsory Voting
Arend Lijphart (1997) has suggested reintroducing compulsory voting to remedy the
unequal influence at elections. Making voting a legal obligation would at least draw
groups with low education qualifications back to the polls – whether they actually cast
a ballot is something else entirely (Dekker & Hooghe 2003:159). It is argued that
compulsory voting would provide incentives for alienated citizens to become more
informed about politics (Engelen 2007: 31). But even if this is not the case,
compulsory voting surely gives political parties an electoral motive to continue to
devote attention to the interests of the least educated voters. They are not a quantite
negligable anymore, as they are in countries where voting is no longer compulsory
and where large numbers of the least educated can be expected not to turn up at the
polling booth.
A number of empirical studies, both within and between countries, suggest
that compulsory voting raises turnout substantially (Engelen 2007). Before the
Netherlands abolished compulsory voting in 1970, there was only a 4% difference
between the voting levels of the top and bottom classes. After abolition the difference
jumped to 21% (Rogers 2005). Cross country comparisons suggest that compulsory
voting tends to increase participation at the ballot box by 10-15% (Engelen 2007:26).
Compulsory voting therefore is a relatively cheap and efficient way to remedy
diploma democracy.
Aside from compulsion, turnout can be raised by making voting easier or more
attractive. This can be done with large-scale schemes affecting the way votes are cast,
such as postal voting or e-voting, or with smaller initiatives that makes voting easier providing a choice of polling stations; increasing the number of places where it is
possible to cast one's vote; allowing people to vote in places like at a bus or railway
station - on the way to work - at shopping centres, or during the weekends. These are
often perceived as sensible measures towards higher turnout. The costs and benefits of
such schemes are, however, unclear, as is it difficult to estimate how many more
people it would encourage to vote. Whether these additional measures will raise the
turnout of the least educated groups is even more uncertain. Compulsory voting is
therefore still a very effective instrument to raise political equality.
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5. A More Responsive Political Elite
Party Renewal
Calls for party renewal resound periodically. Many political scientists trace
representation problems in contemporary politics to the role of traditional political
parties (Cotta & Best 2007; Dalton 2004). With the emergence of the cartel party
from the 1970s onwards (Katz & Mair 1995) the role of the party in the structure of
the state has fundamentally altered. Political parties became integral part of the state
itself, helped by the allocation of state subsidies, and politics became a profession of
its own (Fiers & Secker 2007). This party cartels assumed and required a considerable
elite autonomy (Rahat & Hazan 2007: 68)
One of the ways that citizens are brought back in by political elites is through
increasing their role inside the parties. Party primaries that give rank and file party
members the right to decide on the leadership and the composition of the
parliamentary list for the elections is a way to democratize the party leadership and
candidate selection (Rahat & Hazan 2007: 57-58). In the Netherlands both VVD and
PvdA tried to proceed with internal democratic procedures and elected their party
leader after referendum amongst party members. But it is questionable whether these
forms of party renewal will diminish the problem: that only a minority is motivated to
participate in political parties at all - and this minority is unrepresentative. Perhaps
today’s political parties are part of the problem, not the solution (Fiorina 1999: 414).
From Outsiders to Insiders: Descriptive Representation
When groups in society are systematically excluded from the political process,
selective representation can be a means to compensate for these representational
distortions. Particularly group mistrust and low legitimacy by disadvantaged groups
can be good reasons for more descriptive representation, argues Jane Mansbridge. In
these circumstances, descriptive representation enables ‘enhanced communication’.
Shared societal characteristics between representatives and constituents may make
people more prepared to trust their representatives (Mansbridge 1999: 641).
Descriptive representation denotes not only visible characteristics, but also
shared experiences. “Being one of us” is assumed to promote loyalty to the interests
of the group. Moreover, in cases where interests are not fully formed, it can help to
have a representative whose characteristics match those of their constituents. This can
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result in what Mansbridge (1999: 646-7) calls ‘introspective representation’; in which
representatives act on the basis of what they believe their core voters would wish.
Descriptive representation is highly contested among political scientists
(Farrell & Scully 2007: 48; Dovi 2008). Similarity tells little about what a
representative does, i.e. what interests will be promoted - Pitkin’s “acting for” simply because “being” does not equal “doing”. Next, there is the problem of
“essentialism”, for example, the notion that ‘only women can understand women’s
issues’ (Mansbridge 1999: 637); or the problem, where and on what basis one selects
the group that needs to be represented - and where to draw the line. Finally, carried to
its extremes, descriptive representation may actually perpetuate the very problems it
seeks to address; that is, by typecasting representatives (women only representing
women, blacks only representing blacks, the unschooled only the least educated) one
adds to societal divisions or at least erodes ‘the ties or unity’ (Mansbridge 1999: 639).
All this being said, some degree of representative description can help to
remedy some of the pitfalls of diploma democracy, such as the feelings of distrust and
distaste the least educated nowadays harbour towards politicians (Farrell & Scully
2007: 48-49). Just as with gender, age, or ethnic background, political parties should
strive for more educational balance when selecting their candidates for parliament and
other representative bodies.
Introducing Plebiscitary Elements
What remains is the political and governing elite. In Plato’s Athens, there were
various institutions in place to guard against a meritocratization of public life – to
Plato’s great displeasure, it should be noted. After the reforms of Cleisthenes, for
example, all citizens could vote directly in the popular assembly of Athens and nearly
all administrative positions were fulfilled by citizens chosen by lot. In theory (practice
proved otherwise over time), this acted to restrain the formation of a governing elite.
In a knowledge society, choosing aldermen, mayors or ministers by lot can be tricky
business. Direct elections for governing officials, preferably in combination with
compulsory voting, could be an alternative. The vote of those with a low level of
education would thus have an impact equal to that of those with a high level of
educational attainment, forcing political parties and candidates to take their interests
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into account – instead of the present situation in which extremely well educated party
elites select the candidates, as we saw in chapter 3.
Introducing some plebiscitary elements into the representative democracy not
only means that the voice of groups with a low level of education can be more clearly
heard during the process of recruiting the political elite, they can also bring more
variety to the political style and expertise. Electing government administrators can,
for example, lead to more room for the symbolic and emotive dimensions of politics.
Next to formal qualifications, in the form of titles and diplomas, informal
competences such as charisma and persuasiveness are also relevant. In this way, a
bridge can be laid between the daily life, the Lebenswelt, of the less educated and the
policy world of the academic elites. It may help to increase the degree of
identification with the political system and promote trust in the political leaders.
Enlightened Populism
The rise of populist parties, which was the by-product of the rise of diploma
democracy, need not necessarily be the political catastrophe which it is often
perceived to be. The rise of populism can be a blessing in disguise. Populist parties,
such as the SP, LPF, TON and PVV in the Netherlands, Lijst Dedecker in Flanders,
Lega Nord in Italy, or the FPÖ in Austria, can be an outlet for the feelings of
discontent and resentment against the political elites of large numbers of
predominantly less educated citizens. These parliamentary parties operate as a
mouthpiece for the least educated and they have forced the traditional, main stream
political parties to pay more attention to the negative effects of immigration,
globalisation, and European unification. Populist parties, provided they operate within
the limits of the constitutional state, can operate as safety valves in a democracy
which is dominated by the well educated.
The Flemish writer David van Reybrouck (2008) even argues in favour of a
democratic populism, a populism which is against the establishment and the elites, but
which operates within the framework of parliamentary democracy. ‘No one has to be
afraid of absurd policy proposals and sweeping statements. Populism can be as antielitist and anti-establishment as it wishes to be, provided it is not anti-parliamentary
and anti-democratic. It is an enrichment to society if the least educated can find
democratic parties within the political spectrum to which they can relate.’ (Van
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Reybrouck 2008:64). Such a democratic populism is part and parcel of democracy; it
helps to stir political conflict and debate, which is the essence of democratic politics.
Van Reybrouck hopes for the rise of an enlightened populism, a populism
‘which does not shout, but speaks’; a populism which acknowledges the needs of the
least educated but goes beyond simplistic solutions; a populism that takes seriously
the new chasm between well and less educated citizens and that can reconcile
globalisation with the need for a sense of belonging.
Beyond Democratic Representation
This essay has limited itself to the more traditional forms of politics, participation and
representation. However, as politics has become more complex and multi-layered, so,
too, has the question of who can legitimately claim to be a democratic representative
(Castiglione & Warren, 2005). The standard answer that representatives are elected is
increasingly inadequate and no longer satisfactory, due to international and domestic
political
transformations.
Increasingly
international,
transnational
and
non-
governmental actors play an important role in advancing public policies on behalf of
democratic citizens (Dove, 2008). The growth of these new political arenas, and with
them newly emerging representative activities, clearly occurs in the spheres outside of
elected representation and familiar forms of interest group representation (Castiglione
& Warren, 2005: 18).
In these new professional and transnational ecologies, elections, government
meetings and civic action may no longer be the basis for politics. But who counts,
then, as a democratic representative? Where elections are lacking, accountability and
participation in these new arenas becomes more and more the dominant mechanism
(Castiglione & Warren, 2005: 18; Peters, 2008). Yet as the point of access and
opportunities for participation multiply, so do the resource requirement for
participation: education, skills, information, time, money and social capital. It is likely
that citizens with these resources and capacities, particularly the best educated, will be
better represented than the groups lacking these resources.
These new arenas will have to be the subject of other essays. Here we have
confined ourselves to the nation state and to the classic question: ‘Who should
govern?’
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A Wake-Up Call for Modern Day Platonists
Referenda, plebiscites, polls and enlightened populist parties will not in themselves
bring the least educated back on all of the rungs of the participation ladder.
Democracy will remain dominated by the better educated, the rhetorically and
intellectually skilled, as it has been since its beginnings in ancient Athens. However,
as in the Athenian democracy, so despised by Plato, they do give the least educated
important veto powers. The EU referendum, for example, has been a wake-up call for
the Euro-academics who have been so busy in governing for the people instead of
with the people.
Referenda, compulsory voting, plebiscites, polls and enlightened populist
parties force the political elites to take into account the perspectives of the least
educated, for whom Europe is a threat rather than an opportunity. At the very least,
these reforms force the Euro-academics to contemplate further how they can get to a
“yes”.
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APPENDIX
A. Overview of Data Sources
We relied for the analyses in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 on several sources of data for our
research. We used the following studies:
The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES)
The Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies are a series of national surveys carried out
under the auspices of the Dutch Electoral Research Foundation (SKON). These
surveys have been conducted since 1971. Studies are conducted before and after the
national parliamentary elections. Many questions are replicated across studies,
although each has questions not asked in the others. The major substantive areas
consistently covered include the respondents' attitudes toward and expectations of the
government and its effectiveness in both domestic and foreign policy, the most
important problems facing the people of The Netherlands, the respondents' voting
behaviour and participation history, and his/her knowledge of and faith in the nation's
political leaders. The questionnaires (both Dutch and English) used in this survey are
available at: www.dpes.nl.
The European Social Survey (ESS)
The European Social Survey is a biennial multi-country survey covering over 30
nations. Its aim is to measure and explain trends in attitudes, beliefs and values across
countries in Europe and its close neighbours. The first, second and third rounds were
fielded in 2002/2003, 2004/2005 and 2006/2007. The project is funded by the
European Commission, the European Science Foundation, academic funding bodies
and National Science Foundations in each participating country. More information is
available at the ESS Home Site: www.europeansocialsurvey.org.
Data on Political Executives (Ministers)
Most data used in Chapter 3 on the careers and background of ministers originate
from Seckers’ study (1991). This study takes the year 1848 as its starting point,
because the revision of the Constitution in that year brought a new phase in political
relations. Seckers covered all ministers who were members of the Dutch cabinets up
to and including the 1990 Lubbers Cabinet (junior ministers were excluded). The
103
collection of the career data of ministers that were members of the cabinets in the
period 1994-2007 was conducted by the authors of this paper. The first cabinet
considered was the Purple Cabinet Kok I, and the last cabinet was that of Balkenende
IV. The details about the number of ministers in the period 1994-2007 included in the
analysis are represented in Table A. The biographic material was collected from the
website Parlement en Politiek (www.parlement.com ).
Cabinets
Number of Ministers
1994-1998 Kok I
14
1998-2002 Kok II
15
2002-2003 Balkenende I
14
2003-2006 Balkenende II
17
2006-2007 Balkenende III
decommissionary
2007- present Balkenende IV
16
Total
76
Data preceding 1990 are based on the earlier research of Secker (1991: 16-21; 2000:
279). She distinguishes the following periods in political history:
1848-1888
1888-1918
1918-1946
1946-1967
1967-1994
1994-2007
Responsible government; highly limited franchise; no or weak party organization
From limited to universal male suffrage; increasing party organization
Stabilization of party forces; rapidly increasingly social segmentation
Pillarization, rise of the welfare state
First polarization; consensus on cutback welfare state; floating voters
From purple to populism; voters adrift
We ourselves added the last period (1994-2007) to Secker’s categorization. The
division into six different stages is used to examine the change and continuities in the
personal characteristics of the ministers.
Data on Legislators (Parliamentarians)
For the analysis in Chapter 2 we used the long-term data of the Dutch MPs collected
by Van den Berg (2007).
The international comparative data about MPs are obtained from Best & Cotta,
2000, 2007). The empirical base for their research is the DATACUBE, a collection of
data concerning the characteristics of national legislators in European countries. The
DATACUBE is a cooperative effort of scholars from different European countries
and supported financially by the European Science Foundation and national research
104
funds. It is available to scholars from the websites of the universities of Jena and
Siena.
The data used in Chapter 4 on representation styles among parliamentarians
are obtained from a survey of Dutch MPs (Andeweg & Thomassen, 2006).
Data on Civil Society Organizations
Figures in Chapter 2 on the membership of civil society organizations are based on
the data of Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP). Two reports
were used as sources: Esther van den Berg and Joep de Hart (2008) and De Hart
(2005). These are available at www.scp.nl.
B. The Conceptualization and Measurement of Variables and Indicators
Creation of Educational Level (Indicators with three levels):
There is a wide variety in educational systems among contemporary Western
democracies and, therefore, also in the classification of diplomas and the level of
education. In this study we use a tripartite division: high, middle, and low. We qualify
persons with a higher vocational college or university degree as belonging to the
highly educated group: the college and university graduates. The low education group
is comprised of citizens educated up to or through the primary and/or lower secondary
education level. The middle group consists of those with a higher secondary education
and/or junior vocational education.
105
C. Supplementary Tables
The Following Tables provide results that were omitted from the tables in the main
part of the study to simplify the presentation:
Table X. Education and Political Interest (%) in The Netherlands in 2006
Education respondent
Interested in politics
Low
Mid
High
Very
8
9
22
Fairly
57
71
72
Not
35
20
6
Total
100%
(635)
100%
(1338)
100%
(645)
Source: DES/NKO 2006
Table X. Education and Political Engagement (%) in The Netherlands in 2006
Education respondent
Attitudes towards Politics
Low
Mid
High
1. Consider myself qualified for politics
9
20
38
2. Good understanding of political problems
46
57
76
3. Politics too complicated for people like me
23
39
68
4. People like me have no influence on politics
41
63
71
Source: DES/NKO 2006
Table X. Talks About National
News
enters conversation
Total
low
37.9%
middle
51.1%
high
70.1%
52.6%
42.7%
41.7%
28.1%
38.6%
19.4%
7.2%
1.9%
8.8%
633
1334
645
2612
Gamma = 0.392
100.0%
100.0%
10.0%
100.0%
Table X.
Political Knowledge
education respondent
listens with interest
does not listen/not interested
Total
low
middle
high
Total
Gamma = 0.490
106
education respondent
Total
low
middle
high
65%
34%
19%
16.5%
28%
37%
37%
34.7%
7%
19%
44%
7.8%
573
1249
613
2435
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
education
Table X.
Trust (very and fairly) in…
low
middle
high
judges
Parliament
59%
52%
75%
63%
74%
74%
Civil service
31%
38%
48%
EU
34%
41%
46%
Other people
44%
65%
81%
Table X.
Socialization at Home
Discussed politics at home when
adolescent (often/fairly often)
education respondent
low
middle
high
27%
40%
50%
Knows party preference father
during childhood
78%
79%
92%
Knows party preference mother
during childhood
69%
75%
87%
education respondent
Access
internet
to
yes
no
Total
Gamma = 0.601
Total
low
middle
high
64 0%
86.6%
94.6%
83.7%
36.0%
13.4%
5.4%
16.3%
489
1128
577
2194
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
education respondent
How
often
use internet?
Total
Gamma = 0.538
Total
low
middle
high
31.7%
61.3%
78.7%
59.4%
at least once a week
16.1%
18.5%
14.0%
16.8%
at least once a month
2.9%
3.3%
1.9%
2.8%
less than once a month
49.3%
16.9%
5.4%
21.0%
483
1125
577
2185
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
(almost) daily
107
Table X. Pearson Correlations between
Education/Political Participation and Issue
Position
Issue: the immigration of Muslims should be
stopped
Issue: gay marriage should be forbidden
Highest
education
(completed) of
respondent
overall index
participation
0.380(**)
0.165(**)
0.186(**)
0.063(**)
Issue: taxes should be cut
0.184(**)
0.117(**)
Issue: shops should be closed on Sundays
0.180(**)
0.044(*)
Issue: adoption by homosexual couples
-0.177(**)
-0.064(**)
-0.160(**)
-0.116(**)
0.137(**)
0.029
Issue: more money for foreign aid
Issue: genetic manipulation should
forbidden
Issue: Turkey may become EU member
be
-0.119(**)
-0.039
Issue: big companies threat to democracy
0.097(**)
0.001
Issue: it was rightful to send soldiers to
Afghanistan
-0.086(**)
0.009
-0.030
-0.020
-0.011
-0.072(**)
Issue: illegal immigrants should be allowed
to stay
Issue: mortgage deduction should be
abolished
Issue: pensioners should pay for AOW
-0.004
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table X. Pearson Correlations between
Education/Political Participation and Issue
Position
Crime – introduction of death penalty for
certain crimes
Crime - holding suspect of terrorist attack in
prison
Crime – punishment of crimes
Crime – strictly upholding law no matter
consequences
Crime – torture should never be allowed
Highest
education
(completed) of
respondent
overall index
participation
0.203(**)
0.115(**)
0.177(**)
0.154(**)
0.160(**)
0.156(**)
0.154(**)
0.109(**)
-0.126(**)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
108
-0.040
-0.087(**)
D. Details on the Regression Analysis Used in Chapter 2.4
We analyzed the relationship between education and participation while
simultaneously controlling for a number of other confounding factors/variables in
order to determine whether the relation was spurious. Table 2.4 presents the results of
a linear regression analysis. We use a linear equation because of its simplicity. The
results are robust across many other functional forms, including the participation
logarithms of some of the independent variables such as family income (see Verba et
al., 1995: 295, 339, 604).
The first table (2.4a) reports the strength of the effect of education on the
overall index of participation. In the next step (reported in table 2.4b) we also
included measures of family income, social class (self-image); age and gender in the
regression equation to explain political participation. The tables report the regression
coefficients (including the standard errors and beta weights) for the impact of these
background variables on participation.
Table 2.4a: Predicting Overall Participation by Education (Ordinary Least Square Regression)
B
(Constant)
-0.122
Highest education (completed) of
respondent
R2= .06 ; Adj. R2= .06
Beta
0.221**
0.238
Sample Size: 2800
* significant at .05 level ** significant at .01 level
109
Table 2.4b: Predicting Overall Participation by Education and Background Variables
(Ordinary Least Square Regression)
B
(Constant)
Beta
-0.841
Disposable income of household
-0.003
-0.013
Sex of respondent
-0.201**
-0.091
Age of respondent
0.001
0.012
Social class / self image
-0.091**
-0.084
0.180**
0.193
(after taxes)
Highest education (completed) of
respondent
R2= 0.07 ; Adj. R2= 0.07 Sample Size: 2800
* significant at .05 level
** significant at .01 level
Multiple regression is a commonly used statistical technique that indicates which
independent variables are associated with a dependent variable. The general purpose
of multiple regression is to learn more about the relationship between several
independent (or predictor) variables and a dependent variable. It was developed to
deal with multiple overlapping causes and to distinguish these causes that are
systematic across people and situations from those that are idiosyncratic to particular
people and situations (Verba et al., 1995: 295-301).
In the regression analysis the regression coefficients give an estimate of the
impact (effect) of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The
unstandardized regression coefficient (B) in the first column in Table 2.4b measures
the effect on the dependent variable of a change in the independent. Because the
equation contains multiple independent variables, the coefficient for the impact of
education on political participation measure that effect while taking into account of
(controlling for) the other factors included in the analysis, for instance family income.
Education is measured as 5 steps that go from elementary education through
university. Thus, everything else remaining the same, a respondent whose education
increases one level will increase his/her political activities by 0.18 activities.
The asterisks in Table 2.4 indicate that a coefficient has a statistically
significant impact. Table 2.4 also contains the beta weight, which is a standardized
110
measure of the effect of the independent on the dependent variable and which makes
it possible to make comparisons across the variables. The beta weight indicates how
much of a standard deviation change will result from one standard deviation change in
the independent variable.
111
112
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
MARK BOVENS is Professor of Public Administration and Research Director at the
Utrecht University School of Governance in The Netherlands.
He studied law, political science and philosophy at Leiden University and at
Columbia University in New York.
Before coming to Utrecht in 1997, first as Professor of Legal Philosophy and
later also as Professor of Public Administration, he was a lecturer at the Departments
of Political Science and Public Administration of Leiden University, where he taught
political and legal philosophy, government, policy analysis and public administration.
In 2000 he became a full professor of public administration and co-founded the
Utrecht University School of Governance.
Mark Bovens has been a visiting fellow at Nuffield College in Oxford, the
University of Western Sydney, the London School of Economics and Political
Science and the Australian National University. He is a member of the Royal Dutch
Academy of Sciences and Adjunct Professor at the Department of Political Science in
the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University in
Canberra.
He has published approximately 15 monographs or edited volumes, and
approximately 75 articles in the areas of politics, government, and legal theory and
has received a number of academic awards and prizes.
Books in English: Success and Failure in Public Governance: A Comparative
Analysis (edited with P. 't Hart and B. Guy Peters), London: Edward Elgar, 2001; The
Quest for Responsibility: Accountability and Citizenship in Complex Organizations,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Understanding Policy Fiascoes (with
P. 't Hart), New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1995.
ANCHRIT WILLE is a senior researcher and lecturer at Leiden University's
Department of Public Administration. She teaches and conducts research on executive
politics, citizen politics, policy analysis, public administration and research methods.
She obtained her doctoral degree in political science from the University of
Amsterdam.
Prior to joining the Public Administration Department in Leiden, she held
positions at the Political Science Departments of the University of Amsterdam and
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Leiden University. She worked as a Research Fellow at the Utrecht University School
of Governance and served as Research Manager of the international and
multidisciplinary CONNEX (Connecting Excellence on European Governance)
Network of Excellence.
Previous books: The Accidental Activist: Potential Political Participation in
The Netherlands, Amsterdam, 1994; Politiek-ambtelijke verhoudingen in beweging
(with Paul ’t Hart), Amsterdam: Boom, 2003. Anchrit Wille is currently finalizing a
book project on the evolution of executive politics and leadership in the 21st century
European Commission.
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