Comparative Problems of Dynastic Succession in
European and East Asian Dynasties: Romanov Russia
(1613-1917) and Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868)
JEREMY SMITH
The Karelian Institute, University of Eastern Finland
email: [email protected]
Abstract
The article examines the social, political and cultural differences which contribute towards
explaining the different experiences in cases of dynastic succession between the Tokugawa
shoguns of Japan and the Romanov tsars and Empresses of Russia. The article begins with a
summary of the state of succession studies, which is based mostly in political science. Based
mainly on secondary sources, the analysis proceeds by examining different practices in family
structure, adoption and inheritance in Japanese and Russian early modern and modern societies.
It then looks at social structure and especially the position of the nobility as a key factor in
explaining the greater likelihood of noble families becoming involved in succession struggles in
the Russian case. The issue of legitimacy as then examined as one of the factors underpinning
dynastic succession, with the perverse finding that the less secure basis of legitimacy for the
shogunal dynasty strengthened its standing as the object of personal loyalty. The establishment
1
of precedents and legislation in both cases are then outlined before examination of a number of
cases of contested succession in both Russia and Japan. The article concludes that, while there
were elements in the cultural and social practices of Japan which favored a more stable
experience of succession there, ultimately it was the care addressed to this question by the
Tokugawa themselves, in contrast to the Romanovs, that mostly explains the different
experiences.
The difficulty of achieving a smooth transition from one ruler to the next can be traced back in
Russian history at least as far as the death of Vladimir the Great of Kiev in 1015. Vladimir’s
intention had been to divide up his lands between his sons, but one of them, Sviatopolk, usurped
power for himself. His father’s favourite sons, Boris and Gleb, gave up their lives rather than
engage in war with their brother. For this, they were canonized as the first saints of the Russian
Orthodox Church. This was just the first of a long line of struggles which would follow the death
of a ruler, often involving use of armed force and bloodshed, although rarely descending into allout civil war. The Romanov dynasty emerged from a succession crisis propelled by the complete
extinction of the ruling Rurikid dynasty on the death of tsar Fedor in 1598. Uncertainty and
instability over succession continued even into the Soviet period. The deaths of Lenin and Stalin
were followed by sharp and ultimately violent (much more so in the first than in the second case)
political struggles; Khrushchev was then overthrown by a conspiracy of oligarchs and it was only
in its final decade that the Soviet political system displayed the maturity which allowed for a
smooth transfer of power from one leader to the next. Boris Yeltsin was twice elected president
2
of Russia in open and, on the second occasion in 1996, closely contested elections. From 2000
onwards, succession has been managed in a way which is almost unique in Russian history,
leading to the paradoxical situation that leadership has become least contested in the
circumstances of most formal competition, i.e. elections.
In spite of propitious beginnings, in no era was succession more violently contested than in the
years of the Romanov dynasty, which ruled Russia from 1613 to 1917. Of the seventeen
successors to the dynasty’s founder, Mikhail Romanov (1613-16451), only in six cases was it a
straightforward case of the eldest surviving son succeeding his father. Most of these cases came
at the very beginning (Alexis, 1645-1676; Fedor III, 1676-1682) or the very end (Alexander II,
1855-1881; Alexander III, 1881-1894; Nicholas II, 1894-1917) of the dynasty. On two occasions
younger siblings succeeded their childless brothers, but in both (Ivan V, 1682-1696; Nicholas I,
1825-1855) the succession was contested. Twice the most recent wife of the deceased tsar
became Empress (Catherine I, 1725-1727; Catherine II, 1762-1796), in the second case only after
engineering the murder of her own husband Peter III (1761-1762). As well as Peter III three
other tsars (Peter II, 1727-1730; Ivan VI, 1740-1741; Paul, 1796-1801) were overthrown in
political coups. On four consecutive occasions in the eighteenth century (Peter II; Anna 1730-
For providing the possibility of spending time in Japan studying this question in 2014, I am most
grateful to the Academy of Finland, who provided a grant under its international mobility
scheme, and to the Centre for Integrated Area Studies at the University of Kyoto for hosting me
throughout this visit.
1
Dates refer to the period of formal rule.
3
1740; Ivan VI; Elizabeth, 1741-1761) a new tsar or Empress was selected only following a
period of political intrigue. In the most protracted succession crisis of the Romanov era, the
death of Fedor III in 1682 was followed by the formal joint rule of two co-tsars, Fedor’s brother
Ivan V and his half-brother Peter I (1682-1725), but in reality this was a period of constant
intrigue and violent confrontation lasting over a decade.
Nine of these rulers (which we should perhaps count as eight cases since Peter I and Catherine I
were married) died without a legitimate male heir, which suggests that the apparent genetic
inability of the Romanovs to produce healthy male offspring was the main cause of difficulties of
succession. But this is to ignore the complexities of political power and social structure which
underlay these successive crises. The fact that there was no clear understanding of principles as
to how succession was to be decided in the absence of a male heir in itself raises questions.
General theories of succession developed by political scientists provide one way of shedding
light on the travails of the Romanovs.
Comparative history offers another approach. The Tokugawa dynasty which held the post of
shogun in Japan from 1603-1868, in contrast to the Romanovs, experienced difficulties in
succession on only five occasions, and on each of these a solution was found in short time and
with relatively little friction. In the words of one of the leading historians of the politics of the
Tokugawa era, Conrad Totman, “For a period of fifty years the Tokugawa shoguns retained
control of the decision-making process. In the course of this half-century they established a
system of priorities for shogunal succession which remained operative during the entire Edo
period. Only rarely for a few weeks at a time did the bakufu [the governing bureaucracy headed
4
by the shogun] ever lack a shogun or an accepted shogun-designate”.2 Comparing the relative
stability of Tokugawa succession with the successive crises of the Romanovs promises to shed
light on the latter. There are obvious attractions to comparing the Romanovs and the Tokugawa:
the Tokugawas effectively ruled Japan from 1600 to 1867, only slightly earlier and shorter than
the Romanovs’ 1613-1917. There were fifteen Tokugawa shoguns in this period, compared to
eighteen Romanov tsars or empresses (including one co-tsar). While the Romanov dynasty
emerged from the Time of Troubles of 1598-1613, Tokugawa rule followed Japan’s much longer
Warring States or Sengoku era of 1467-1600. Both dynasties ruled over semi-feudal societies
and enjoyed autocratic powers. More accurately, the beginning of each dynasty coincided with
the process of establishing central control over atomized feudal lands. In the Tokugawa case, this
was achieved mostly by the early rulers of the dynasty themselves, while in Russia most
measures in this direction had already been undertaken by Ivan IV (1533-1584).
Equally if not more intriguing are the differences: in early modern Japan, power was much more
diffuse, with the daimyo nobles enjoying extensive autonomy over their own territories, which
were each maintained as distinct political entities under a daimyo overlord, in contrast to the
often dispersed estates of the Russian nobility. Japan adhered to a strict policy of isolation from
the rest of the world throughout the Tokugawa era, whereas the Romanovs vacillated between
Europeanisation and a more insular policy, while all the time expanding the territory of the
Empire. The Samurai warrior caste, which had its own code of honor but most of whose
members also owed loyalty to individual daimyo rather than the Shogun, had no Russian
2
Conrad Totman, “Political Succession in the Tokugawa Bakufu: Abe Masahiro’s Rise to Power,
1843-1845”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol.26, 1966, pp.102-124; 102.
5
equivalent. And while the tsar could claim he owed his appointment to God, in Japan the Shogun
was nominally appointed by the Emperor, who was held to be divine and continued to hold court
in Kyoto. Real power may have lain with the Shogun in Edo, but his legitimacy was always less
clear-cut. Other differences in social structure and traditions of the family which were important
to the issue of succession are discussed below.
Drawing on one example in order to clarify analysis of another case entails the danger faced by
comparative historians of holding one example as ‘normal’, thereby failing to give equal
analytical weight to all cases.3 This is avoided by treating each case as specific to a particular
social, cultural and political context. Any notion of what is a ‘normal’ set of succession practices
would rely on the study of a much larger number of cases. Accordingly, after giving some
consideration to the findings of political scientists about succession, this paper proceeds by
looking at social structure, family and inheritance practices, notions of lineage and divinity, and
political legitimacy before going on to examine policies that were developed to manage dynastic
succession in both cases, and finally examining some cases of actual succession practices.
Theories of Succession
If the literature on succession in pre-Soviet Russian history is somewhat thin, it is equally true
that a sub-discipline of ‘Succession Studies’ has barely developed. To date historians have not
ventured to undertake any general study of succession. In contemporary social science,
3
John Breuilly, Labour and liberalism in nineteenth-century Europe: essays in comparative
history (Manchester: 1994), pp.1-5.
6
succession is mostly treated under the rubric of democratization.4 While there are several studies
of succession in specific regions (the Middle East, Africa, Latin America) and large global
databases of presidential and other power transfers have been created, the main focus of general
studies of succession seems to be Africa since the Second World War. The basic point of
reference for succession studies remains Robbins Burling’s 1974 book The Passage of Power:
Studies in Political Succession (New York and London: Academic Press). Drawing on case
studies as diverse as the Siuai tribe of the Solomon Islands and post-War communist regimes of
Eastern Europe, Burling sought to develop a general theory of succession summed up in eleven
points: 1. the need for succession; 2. the inevitability of succession struggles; 3. succession at the
top and its relation to other offices; 4.change; 5. cycles, trends and predictability; 6.heredity and
its alternatives; 7. range of participation; 8. stability; 9. centralisation; 10. appointment of one’s
own successor; 11. centralization weakness. Some of these propositions appear relevant to the
Russian historical case. The inevitability of succession struggles (2), argues Burling, is due to the
impossibility of a ruler allowing a clear number two to emerge during the former’s reign. The
Soviet Union provides one of his cases for illustrating this point, and while it may appear
counter-intuitive to allow for this influence in a dynastic monarchy, it might help explain the
failure of a clear successor to emerge in certain cases. Centralisation weakness (11) points to the
fact that, when potential successors are in a position to contend for power in a centralized regime
it involves them in unusual (for them) relationships of power, which may serve to prolong and/or
intensify the violence of succession struggles.
4
For example, Alexander Baturo, ’Presidential Succession and Democratic Transitions’, IISS
Discussion Paper no.209, March 2007.
7
Point 10 has been addressed in other studies of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian presidential
systems (or equivalent) that find a correlation behind successful transfers of power from one
ruler to a named successor, which is much more likely to succeed where the successor is named
early and, preferably, given some role in the exercise of power before having to face election or
other formal endorsement as ruler.5 The literature on succession also owes much to Samuel P.
Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies which, while concerned more generally with
issues of power and modernisation, draws attention to the concept of ‘praetorianism’- a situation
where a group, usually of military officers, puts itself at the head of a modernizing society which
has outstripped a conservative regime and seeks to establish a new political order through a
coup.6
Families and Inheritance
Many of the differences in succession practices between Russia and Japan can be traced to
centuries old differences in the structure and traditions of noble families. In the basic principle of
inheritance Japan was closer to the English and other European systems than the Russian ones. In
Japan and England, noble (and other) estates and titles generally passed in their entirety to the
eldest son. Younger sons were only entitled to small remittances, and in England would more
often than not need to seek employment, in the army, the Church, or government. In Japan
5
Baturo, ‘Presidential Succession’
6
Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London, 1968.
Reprinted 2006).
8
younger sons, unless adopted as an heir, left to form their own households with considerably less
wealth potential than the main patrilineal family branch. Daughters were to be married off and
became the responsibility of their husband’s family (except in cases of adoption by the father-inlaw). In Russia, by contrast, noble estates were usually divided up between all of the male
children, each of whom also inherited a title. A 1714 law of Peter the Great requiring nobles to
bequeath estates to a sole heir proved so unpopular and unworkable that it was repealed in 1730.7
The consequence was the steady reduction in many cases in the size of noble estates and the
proliferation of noble titles, which was one of the causes of the crisis of the nobility in the
nineteenth century.
The second difference was that between what Kasaya terms as ‘the lineal family’ and ‘the
nuclear family’.8 In the lineal family, the eldest son continues to live with his parents, together
with his wife and their children. So in the Japanese family or ie, three generations would
typically be living together. The ie was a corporate organization in two senses: first, as well as
being a family, the ie members were an administrative unit with responsibility for managing the
household estate, with a division of labour agreed between them. Second, in the Japanese ie the
estates and wealth were regarded as the property of the collective household, not the individual
possessions of the head of the household. While the head of the household had absolute decisionmaking power, tradition dictated that the use of that power be directed towards the maintenance
7
Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (Harmondsworth, 1977), p.176.
8
Kazuhiko Kasaya, The origin and development of Japanese-style organization, (Kyoto, 2000),
pp.8-9. A third type, the complex family, though common to many societies does not concern us
in this discussion.
9
and furthering of the interests of the household, not of the individual head. In cases where the
head of household did not exercise this position with due responsibility, he could be challenged
by relatives.9
The corporate nature of the household had implications for systems of political succession. In the
ie, the cohabitation of three generations together combined with the notion of family wealth
belonging to the household not just to its head meant that, with the passing of the head of the
household, the transition to a new son was more or less seamless and a high degree of continuity
could be expected. With the English nobility, a son and his wife returning to take over a
deceased father’s estate was more of an outsider, and could immediately institute a completely
turnaround in the management of the estate. This practice was in itself a frequent topic of early
modern novels in England. In the political succession of Shoguns in the Tokugawa period, the
proximity of the heir to the ruler in the Edo palace replicated the ie system, with the consequence
that a new ruler would be expected to continue very much in the same way as his father. Hence
the stability of both the system of rule and of society generally was reinforced. Arguably the
main exception to this came with the last Tokugawa shogun Yoshinobu, who sanctioned the
radical break with the Tokugawa policy of isolation before bringing the dynasty to an end.
Yoshinobu’s distance from the household of his predecessor could be seen as a necessary
condition for this break, but not necessarily as the reason for it.
9
Kasaya, The origin and development , pp.25-6. See also Takie Sugiyama Lebra, “Adoption
among the Hereditary Elite of Japan: Status Preservation through Mobility”, Ethnology, Vol. 28,
No. 3 (Jul., 1989), pp. 185-218, 188-90.
10
In Russia, by contrast, a change of leader often led to sharp policy breaks even when the
succession was straightforward. Tsar Paul (1796-1801) kept a distance during his upbringing
from his mother Catherine II, in direct contrast to the Tokugawa, and spent much of his reign
reversing his mother’s reforms. Alexander II (1855-1881), while groomed for the succession by
his father Nicholas I, all the same took a markedly different stance towards reform from both his
predecessor and his successor, Alexander III. Such discontinuities were more pronounced where
succession jumped across different family branches and there was little direct connection
between a ruler and his or her successor, as was the case with the transition from Anna (17301740) to Elizabeth (1741-1761). Where succession was contested, a new policy attitude could be
associated with attempts to establish legitimacy, as was the case with both Anna and Catherine II,
both of whom made substantial concessions to the nobility in the early years of their reigns.
Adoption
Most (but by no means all) crises of succession in Russia in the Romanov era were prompted by
the failure of the ruler to produce a legitimate son who survived him or her. One reason for the
relative scarcity of succession crises in Tokugawa Japan was that this particular problem was
avoided through a simple expediency based on another tradition of the Japanese family – the
practice of adoption. The patrilineal three generation household depended on a male heir, and
where such an heir was not naturally produced, one would be adopted. In China and Korea, from
where the practice was imported to Japan, a male heir adopted by a head of household could only
be selected from members of his own clan – typically nephews or the children of cousins. In
Japan there were no such strictures, and a head could choose freely to adopt a male heir. Given
11
that second and subsequent sons in other households received little or no inheritance, there was
generally no shortage of suitable and willing candidates for adoption as an heir. A common
practice, where a head had at least one daughter but no son, was to adopt a son-in-law. In this
case the husband of the daughter would be selected with a view to his becoming heir, or as a
‘spare’ in case the head’s son or sons should pass away before he did. Japanese heads of
household could therefore, especially when they had no surviving sons, choose an heir on the
basis of merit, someone who he figured could efficiently and in the correct spirit manage the
fortunes of the household after his own passing.10 The practice of adoption was common to many
ruling dynasties in history, including pharonic Egypt and Ancient Rome, but had no place in
Russia.
In Japan adoption also implied exit from the birth family, underlined by a change of name. This
made adoption a double-edged sword and affected prospects for succession. When the seventh
Tokugawa shogun Ietsugu died at the age of eight, his uncle (brother of the sixth shogun Ienobu)
Matsudaira Ukon-shogen Kiyotake, was one obvious candidate to succeed him. However, he had
been adopted by the Matsudaira family which, his opponents in the Gekkoin faction argued,
meant he had divested his Tokugawa lineage.11
The practise of adoption in principal gave nobles and samurai the freedom to dispose of their
estates and titles to an heir of their choice. But this potential for arbitrariness militated against the
10
Kasaya, The origin and development , 12-14.
11
Cecilia Segawa Seigle, ‘The Shogun’s Consort: Konoe Hiroko and Tokugawa Ienobu’,
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 59/2, December 1999, 485-522, p.486.
12
Tokugawa desire for order. So a combination of customary and legal restrictions grew up to
govern the process.
Social Structure
On the surface, Early Modern Russia and Japan had similar social systems: an autocratic ruler
presiding over a semi-feudal estate system. But there were enormous differences in both the
formal organisation and the actual functions of these estates. Since it was the leading nobility
that had most say in cases of contested succession, and who presented the greatest potential
threats to the dynasty itself, the focus here is on the upper strata of society.
The early Tokugawa reinforced and systematized the ranking of the population into four status
groups, shimin, derived from Chinese Confucian principles. In descending order of status they
were samurai, farmers, artisans and merchants. In addition there was a disparate non-status group
including beggars, prostitutes, and people who worked with the carcasses of dead animals. The
older aristocratic families were not samurai, but were largely restricted to Kyoto and the Imperial
Court, and were distanced from structures of political power, although they did provide most of
the wives of the Tokugawa shoguns. Strict and complex regulations governed each group, what
functions they could perform, where they could live, the size of their dwellings, what clothes
they could wear and so on.12 Although status was arranged on a hierarchical basis, and
movement between statuses was extremely difficult to achieve, over the Tokugawa era the
12
Donald H. Shively, “Sumptuary Regulation and Status in Early Tokugawa Japan”, Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol.25, 1964-1965, 123-164.
13
shimin increasingly overlapped in terms of wealth and influence. Especially in the nineteenth
century, some merchants, and even non-status entrepreneurs in the leather industry, amassed
considerable fortunes, while large numbers of samurai became impoverished and almost
indistinguishable from peasant farmers or artisans. The status groups are perhaps best thought of
in terms of function – military, productive, creative, distributional - although there is
considerable disagreement among historians over their nature.13
The exercise of political power at both the national and the regional levels resided exclusively
with the samurai, indeed this is what came to define their status. The wide differences in function
and wealth of the samurai was reflected in a series of formal and informal distinctions. At the
broadest level, samurai were divided into four layers: the bakufu, which was the central
administration headed by the shogun himself; the daimyo, who were the regional warlords who
governed one of Japan’s 185-260 provinces or han. Under the daimyo were his bannermen, and
finally ordinary samurai retainers. Tokugawa Ieyasu further divided the daimyo families into
three distinct groups: the shinpan were the families directly related to Ieyasu, prime among them
the houses of Kii, Owari and Mito, which were based on the descendants of three of Ieyasu’s
sons. These junior families were accorded special status in order specifically to provide heirs to
the dynasty in the event of the main line dying out. The second group of daimyo were the fudai,
the families who had sided with the Tokugawa before the decisive Battle of Sekigahara, while
the tozama were former opponents of Ieyasu, or at least those had not supported him prior to
13
For a full discussion of the arguments surrounding status, see Douglas R. Howland, “Status,
Class, and Bureaucracy: A Historiographical Essay”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol.60, no.2,
2001, 353-380.
14
1600. Ieyasu used an elaborate system of privileges, rewards, punishments and geographical
location to ensure that these groups kept each other in check. Domains were confiscated and
redistributed in such a way as to ensure the most loyal daimyo controlled the most important
lines of communication to Edo, while the most suspect tozama were kept at a distance as well as
apart from each other. Another way in which daimyo were differentiated was according to wealth,
measured in the output in koku of rice that their estates could produce in each year. This ranking
affected such formal markers as the proximity of the family residence in Edo to the shogun’s
castle, the permitted size of their dwellings, and their rights of audience with the shogun. The
senior posts in the bakufu were reserved for a select group of about forty families, those that
satisfied both the status of fudai and the economic criteria of holding estates worth between
30,000 and 100,000 koku. This was a formal rule and similar regulations maintained a strict
correlation between status and office all the way down the bakufu administration.14
The aim of much of the early reorganization of Tokugawa society was to limit the power and
military capability of potential challengers, especially suspect families. One measure was the
move of the shogun’s capital to Edo, which not only reinforced his independence from the
Imperial Court but also served as a means to subjugate the daimyo. The requirement of all
daimyo to build and maintain residences in Edo had an economic function as well as a political
one. Having a lavish Edo residence as well as a castle or mansion in his province proved a heavy
financial burden on the daimyo, reducing his ability to organize rebellion. This was reinforced in
the 1830s by the rule that daimyo would alternate their residence, spending a year at a time in
Edo and then in his provincial domain, while his immediate family would reside permanently in
14
Totman, “Political Succession”, 104-105.
15
Edo. This was, in effect, a hostage system which provided a strong disincentive to any daimyo to
attempt to raise opposition to the shogun while in his provincial domain.
In spite of Ieyasu’s centralizing measures and differentiated restrictions imposed on the daimyo,
they retained considerable power in the provinces and in this respect the system retained
elements of classical feudalism. In the regions, daimyo enjoyed virtually unlimited power on
their estates, and could and did issue their own laws. Each domain, then, worked along the model
of Japan as a whole, with a hierarchical system of samurai under the daimyo lord responsible for
administration and tax collection as well as military affairs.
Russian society was also divided into a more simple system of social estates – nobility, peasants
and townspeople. Nobles were initially all landowners, and like the daimyo their wealth was
compared, although in this case it was the number of ‘souls’- serf households controlled by the
nobleman - rather than the area or productive potential of land, that was measured. The key
social relationship was that of serfdom, which survived much longer in Russia (until 1861) than
in other European countries, and which entailed clearly distinct obligations, rights, and legal
systems for the different social estates. But this was a long way from the rigid system of status
aligned with function that characterized the Tokugawa system. While peasants farmed and most
townspeople had clearly defined functions, for the nobility the picture was much murkier. This
was principally because of the system of service obligations, whereby all nobles were required to
perform service for the tsar either in the officer ranks of the army, or in the civil service, or at the
tsar’s court. At the same time, nobles were expected to manage their estates. Entitlement to land
and serfs was conditional on the rendering of service, and so these functions were not separated
as they were in Japan.
16
Russian nobles did not enjoy the independent powers in the provinces that the daimyo had in
Japan. Faced with the task of governing an ever growing Empire, the typical approach from Peter
I onwards was the reorganization of the Empire into a series of provinces under a governor
appointed by the tsar. Nobles did enjoy considerable authority on their own estates, but could not
issue separate laws and the larger landholdings were often scattered across different regions,
making it more difficult to build up a local power base. Peter I’s introduction of a modern system
of military conscription also ended the dependence on the nobility for military manpower and
further weakened any potential noble families might have had to challenge the ruling dynasty.
Perversely, however, the lack of regional power seems to have encouraged the nobility to engage
in political intrigue at court. With the exception of the failed 1825 Decembrist revolt, which was
led by officers of noble birth, and the later involvement of the children of some noble families in
the revolutionary movements, noblemen did not engage in direct challenges to the Romanov
dynasty itself. The more powerful families did, however, frequently align themselves with one
side or other in cases of contested succession.
Peter I’s move of the capital from Moscow to his new city of St Petersburg at the beginning of
the eighteenth centuries can be compared in many ways to Ieyasu’s relocation of the bakufu to
Edo. For the modernizing Peter, this represented a move away from the stifling atmosphere of
traditional Muscovite politics and infighting, including the violent scenes associated with
succession which he had witnessed as a boy. It also served as a means of exerting control over
the nobility. Each leading family was obliged to build a mansion in the new capital, although this
seems to have been aimed at easing the burdens on the state treasury rather than a deliberate
strategy of impoverishing the nobles. Through a series of minute regulations, Peter I determined
17
the styles of architecture, modes of dress, and social life of the nobles around his new court,
based on European inspirations.
If Peter’s aim was (as seems to have been the case) to subordinate and politically neutralize the
nobility, he did not succeed. The eighteenth century was the heyday of the Russian nobility.
During the disputes surrounding each of the subsequent successions up until 1762, leading noble
families operated independently and in competition with each other in promoting rival claims.
On the accession of Anna in 1730, nobles were even able to enforce a constitution of sorts on the
new monarch. Anna successfully exploited divisions among the nobility, however, in order to
circumnavigate the restrictions on her power. The conditions had been drawn up by the nobles
who were centred on Moscow and St Petersburg, but this led the more provincial nobility to
conclude that it was the noble families of the two capitals who would be able to impose their will
under the new provisions. Anna was able, therefore, to draw on their support in ignoring the
conditions to which she had initially agreed.
The nobility continued to flourish for a time and appeared to have reached a new high when
Catherine II freed them from their service obligations. Perversely, however, it was Catherine’s
reinforcement of the rights and privileges of nobles that was their undoing. No longer required to
provide service, many nobles switched their attention to their estates and a life of leisure, thus
removing themselves from the levers of political power. Nobles still continued to dominate in the
administration and the army, and it was not until well into the nineteenth century that a stratum
of professional civil servants came to dominate in the state bureaucracy. The increase in numbers
of nobles contributed, alongside changing economic circumstances, to the growth of large
numbers of impoverished and indebted nobles, which can well be compared to the
18
impoverishment of the samurai at the same time. The declining economic and political status of
many noble families was an important factor in helping to stabilize dynastic succession in Russia
in the nineteenth century. This was accompanied, finally, by a flourishing of the Romanov
family tree, which now provided not only plenty of possible heirs, but also advisors and top
administrators, thereby diluting further the influence of other noble families.
Retirement
A practice that appears not to have been available to the Romanovs was that of a ruler standing
aside before his death and allowing his heir to take over the reins of government during his
lifetime. This was an established practice in Japanese society, one which for centuries had been
followed by Emperors (especially during the Kamakura period, when Emperors were regularly
forced by shoguns to retire at a young age as a means of ensuring shogunal supremacy).
Tokugawa Ieyasu himself set the precedent for his successors. Just five years after achieving
power and two years after his official appointment as shogun, in 1605 Ieyasu retired in favour of
his son Hidetada. Ieyasu lived until 1616 and was the real power behind the throne, including
masterminding the final military defeat of Hideyori, the main legitimate challenger to his
family’s rule, in 1615. This practise of standing aside to allow the heir to rule while the father
still lived was followed by Hidetada, and later by Ieshige (1745-1760), allowing the old shogun
to advise and groom his successor for a period. It also made challenges to the new shogun less
likely, as it ensured that the loyalty to the previous ruler was transferred seamlessly to the new
one. Even where retirement did not take place, in most cases the heir to the shogun could be
identified at an early stage, either as the eldest son or as an adopted heir of the incumbent. This
19
both allowed for the heir to learn his calling, and ensured a smooth transition when the time
came. In terms of the political science literature on presidential succession (above) this fits well
with the model for most stable successions.
By contrast the Romanovs saw themselves and were regarded as receiving their duties at God’s
will and with the responsibility to carry their tasks through to the end. The popular story that
Alexander I had hidden away as a hermit in the Urals rather than dying in 1825 illustrates the
point that, had Alexander indeed wanted to relinquish his office, he could not do so by
announcing his retirement and passing his position to one of his brothers. The only Romanov tsar
to actually abdicate while still alive was the last one, Nicholas II. During the upheavals of
February 1917, Nicholas was prevailed on by his generals and other advisors to admit that his
abdication would best serve the interests of his country, which was facing economic collapse and
a high rate of desertions from the army with the First World War at its height. When he did stand
aside, he abdicated in favor of his brother Mikhail rather than his natural heir. Nicholas thus
sought to protect his son Alexis, who was still young and in poor health, from the strains of
leading the country at the moment of its greatest crisis. When Mikhail in turn refused to take on
the position of tsar, the Romanov dynasty and imperial rule in Russia came to an end.15
This is not to say that, where the heir apparent was identified early on, he could not be groomed
for succession. Alexander II, for example, was involved by his father in government from an
early age, toured the provinces as part of a preparation for becoming tsar, and chaired the
government at times when his father was absent on diplomatic missions. His was a rare example,
15
Some genealogies show Mikhail as having been tsar for a single day. Technically, he became
tsar on being passed the title by his brother, and then resigned from the post.
20
however, and the typical inability of the Romanovs to identify a clear heir in advance of their
own demise contributed to the instability provoked by succession.
A practice closer to the Tokugawa one was actually available to the Romanovs since in the
fifteenth century the Rurikid Grand Princes of Moscow, Vasilii II and his son Ivan II,I bestowed
on their sons the same titles they themselves held, in principle making them co-rulers. This
followed a Byzantine practice, but was not copied by any Romanovs.
A woman behind every man
Russia was ruled by four Empresses during the eighteenth century. But the influence of women
on politics in general and on succession in particular went further than the accessions of
Catherine I, Anna, Elizabeth and Catherine II. The choice of wives for rulers and heirs in the
sixteenth century and earlier were an important way of forging alliances with leading families.
The status of a bride’s family could influence succession claims and a marriage into the ruling
house would give the family a direct stake in the outcome of succession contests. This feature
came most clearly to the fore in 1682 on the death of the heirless Fedor II. Fedor’s father tsar
Alexis was married twice, to Maria Miloslavskaya and then to Natalya Naryshkina. Each of these
bore Alexis a son who survived Fedor – Ivan V (1682-1696) and Peter I (1682-1725). The fact
that there could be any discussion about the relative claims of these two is one of the main pieces
of evidence that primogeniture was not a clearly established practice in Russia. Had it been,
clearly the older son, Ivan, would have succeeded his brother Fedor. In fact it was Peter who was
first proclaimed tsar by the boyars and the Russian Orthodox Church. A preference for Peter was
based on the poor health of Ivan, but Ivan himself also accepted Peter’s accession on the basis
21
that his mother Natalya was still alive. Just as Mikhail Romanov’s wife Evdokia had played a
major role in the ceremonies surrounding the investiture of her son Alexis, so Natalya’s presence
was seen as an important factor in this succession.
Figure 1: Heirs of tsar Alexis
Maria
Miloslavskaya
Fedor III
1661-1682
r. 1676-1682
=
Sofia
1657-1704
Alexis
1629-1676
r. 1645-1676
Ivan V
1666-1696
r.1682-1696
Natalya Naryshkina
=
Peter 1
1672-1725
r.1682-1725
This situation lasted just one day, however, before Ivan was appointed a co-tsar alongside Peter.
At the heart of the conflict that ensued was a rivalry between factions headed by the families of
the earlier tsar’s two wives, the Miloslavskys and the Naryshkins. While Natalya Naryshkina
22
championed her son’s cause, it was another woman, Alexis’ oldest daughter Sofia, who headed
the Miloslavsky faction. Sofia became the effective ruler of Russia after securing her
appointment as regent to the two young tsars. This post could, perhaps should, have gone to
Natalya, and it was Sofia’s ability to manipulate support at court and to win the loyalty of the
palace guards that lay behind her initial triumph. As Peter I grew to maturity, however, she found
herself facing a formidable opponent. In spite of the support of the streltsy guard units for Sofia
and Ivan, Peter succeeded in establishing his sole authority following a prolonged and bloody
conflict and the natural death of Ivan, ending with Sofia’s confinement to a monastery.
Tokugawa men generally married women from the Kyoto nobility, but at the same time took
concubines. Most of the time, it was these concubines who were the actual birth mothers of the
shoguns’ heirs. There is even some speculation that the Tokugawa deliberately avoided bearing
children by their official wives, since this would have given additional noble families undue
influence at court16 - exactly the problem experienced by the Romanovs. On the other hand, the
shogun’s wife often played a key role in maintaining a good relationship between the Edo bakufu
and the Imperial court in Kyoto.17 Wives could be very active in politics, including in matters of
succession, although Hidetada’s wife Sugen-in was unsuccessful in her efforts to get the younger
of her two sons recognized as heir as a result of Ieyasu’s intervention.18 Official wives generally
16
Atsuko Hirai, Government by Mourning: Death and Political Integration in Japan, 1603-1912.
(Cambridge (Mass.), 2014), 165
17
Seigle, ‘The Shogun’s Consort’, 487.
18
Beatrice M. Bodart-Bailey, The Dog Shogun: The Personality and Policies of Tokugawa
Tsuanyoshi (Honolulu, 2006), 13.
23
adopted their husband’s heirs. In 1687, Tsunayoshi even had Ietsuna’s wife Asa posthumously
declared his mother. While this move added to Tsunayoshi’s ancestry, he still gave greater
honour to his own natural mother, and this was mirrored in his mourning edicts. This remained
the usual practise case until 1842, when an edict decreed that ‘the adoptive mother come first and
the birth mother next’.19 The importance of the adoptive mother was shown on the death of
Ietsugu in1716, who had been adopted by his father’s wife, Ten’eiin, from the Konoe family.
Ten’eiin played a key role in persuading Yoshimune to become regent to her adopted son, and to
then succeed Ietsugu.20
Legitimacy
One of the features of dynastic rule was that of legitimacy – a ruler’s claim to the throne needed
to be based on socially accepted practises or rules if it was to gain immediate acceptance
popularly as well as among political and social elites. In Russia, despite the lack of clear written
rules, in popular imagination correct bloodline was so important that the Romanov period, and
especially the Time of Troubles that immediately preceded it, were littered with cases of
imposters claiming to be deceased members of the ruling dynasty (‘pretenders’) and winning
substantial popular support. 21 When direct descent did not legitimise rule it was incumbent on
the new monarch to take major measures to establish legitimacy in other ways, through
19
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 166.
20
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 166-7.
21
Maureen Perrie, Pretenders and Popular Monarchism in Early Modern Russia: The False Tsars of the Time of
Troubles, (New York and Cambridge, 1995).
24
compromises on their power or through enacting measures that were popular at least among
elites, as was the case in the early years of rule of both Anna and Catherine II in the eighteenth
century. For the Tokugawa the situation was different in certain respects, since in theory the
shogunate was not a hereditary post but was bestowed by the Emperor. By the early eighteenth
century, Tokugawa historians had found ways of undermining the ultimate legitimacy of the
Impeiral family, but this was never fully accepted in Japan.22 Ieyasu Tokugawa owed his
authority to his military victories, not his ancestry, and finding ways of passing on this
legitimacy to descendants who had no military experience taxed Tokugawa ideologists over the
coming centuries. 23
The main way of bypassing the challenges posed by the supposedly superior status of the
Emperor was to remove concepts of the state altogether from ideology, ceremony, symbols and
regalia. The loyalty and subordination of the samurai was not to an abstract state, but to the
Tokugawa family, reinforced by a renewal of oaths on each succession. Lands distributed to
daimyo in reward for service were Tokugawa lands acquired by conquest, not state lands.24 Thus
in a roundabout way, the family ties of the ruler became at least as important for the Tokugawa
as for the Romanovs.
22
John S. Brownlee, Japanese Historians and the National Myths, 1600-1945: The Age of the Gods and Emperor
Jinmu (Vancouver and Tokyo, 1997), 6-7; 46-60.
23
Wai-ming Ng, “Redefining Legitimacy in Tokugawa Historiography”, Sino-Japanese Studies 18, 2011, 1-20, p.7.
24
Mary Elizabeth Berry, “Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern
Japan” Journal of Japanese Studies, vol.12, no.2, 1986, 237-271.
25
The Tokugawa System of Succession
Tokugawa Ieyasu assumed the shogunate at the end of the Age of Warring States, and there were
no guarantees at the time that the country had seen the last of civil war, or that his own family
should not suffer the same fate as his predecessor Hideyoshi’s. The main thrust of the Tokugawa
system was to avoid such an eventuality and it aimed at stabilizing the social order as well as
ensuring the stability of his own dynasty. Many of these measures have already been briefly
outlined. But some others were expressly designed at ensuring orderly succession. This was not a
question of direct legislation, since the shogun was appointed by the Emperor, but measures
taken by the founder of the dynasty set precedents and could be called on in the event of future
disputes. Ieyasu nominated two junior branches of his own family to provide heirs in the event of
his own direct male descent running out. Indeed a century after this system was devised, one of
these junior houses, the Kii, was called on to furnish the eighth shogun, Yoshimune (1716-1745).
Figure 2: Heirs of Tokugawa Ieyasu
Ieyasu
1543-1616
r.1603-1605
26
Nobuyasu
1559-1579
Yuki Hideyasu
1574-1607
(ad. Hideyoshi)
Iemitsu
1604-1651
r.1623-1651
Hidetada
1579-1632
r.1605-1623
Tadateru
1592-1685
Tadanaga
1606-1634
Yoshinao
1601-1650
House
of
Owari
Yorinobu
1602-1671
Yorifusa
1603-1661
House
of
Kii
House
of
Mito
Ieyasu had eleven sons, by a number of different mothers. His eldest and only son by his official
wife and the heir apparent, Nobuyasu, was forced to take his own life on his father’s orders as
instructed by Hideyoshi in 1579. His next son Yaki Hideyasu was adopted by Hideyoshi and
thereby, under Japanese custom, exited the Tokugawa family and was not considered as an heir
to Ieyasu. Therefore it was his third son, Hidetada, who was appointed shogun on Ieyasu’s
retirement in 1605. As noted above, the early appointment of Hidetada ensured the continuation
of the dynasty in a smooth succession. This first succession was not entirely without its
controversial points, however. Hidetada had disappointed his father by failing to get the forces
under his command to Sekigahara in time for the decisive battle of 1600, a failure which
continued to rankle with Ieyasu. Ieyasu raised with his courtiers the idea that he should appoint a
younger son to succeed him, passing over Hidetada. Japanese family custom would have allowed
27
him to do this, but his councilors prevailed on him to follow the principle of primogeniture.25
Ieyasu confirmed this principle in 1611, when he intervened to ensure that his grandson, the
sickly and introvert Iemitsu, should be confirmed as Hidetada’s heir rather than his younger
brother, the more talented Tadanaga, who was preferred by Hidetada and his wife Sugen-in.26
Thus the right of the eldest son to succeed was confirmed for Ieyasu’s dynasty rather than
favouring the Japanese tradition of choosing the most able son as an heir. The most likely
explanation for why Ieyasu favoured, in both the cases of his sons and his grandsons, the claims
of the eldest son was to avoid any potential conflicts between brothers, or between factions
supporting them, making rival claims to succession. Through these precedents, and through the
establishment of the collateral Mito and Kii Tokugawa houses as possible fall-backs from which
his descendants could emerge as shogun, Ieyasu clearly established that inheritance of his family
positions and the shogunate would proceed according to bloodlines, supplemented by adoption
of a relative when needed.
Table 3: Heirs to Iemitsu
Iemitsu
1604-1651
r.1623-1651
Ietsuna
25
1651-1680
26
Tsunashige
1641-1680
Hirai,
Government by Mourning, p.75. 1644-1678
Tsunayoshi
1646-1709
r.1680-1709
Bodart-Bailey, The Dog Shogun, p.14.
28
Ienobu
1662-1712
r.1709-1712
adopted
The precepts of Ieyasu failed, however, to provide precise guidance in all contingencies. The
first controversy over succession arose on the death of the fourth Tokugawa shogun Ietsuna in
1680. According to tradition, Ietsuna’s titles would have passed to his next eldest brother, but in
this case there were arguably two potential heirs. Ietsuna’s next brother, Tsunashige, had
predeceased him in 1678, but not before he had fathered a healthy son, Ienobu.27 This left
Tsunayoshi as his eldest surviving brother. But who should succeed Ietsuna? Ienobu who, had
his father lived a couple of years longer, would have been the eldest son of the shogun and next
in line after him? Or Tsunayoshi, Ietsuna’s eldest surviving brother at the time of his death?
Ietsuna took the decision on his deathbed to appoint Tsunayoshi as his heir, following procedure
by declaring his adoption of his younger brother. This was not the only complication: one of
Ietsuna’s concubines was pregnant at the time of his death, leaving the possibility that a male
heir would be born some months after the shogun’s demise. As it turned out the concubine
miscarried and Tsunayoshi could be confirmed as shogun, but it appears that Tsunayoshi had
agreed to act as regent should a son be born, and Ietsuna’s wish was that Tsunayoshi’s infant son
27
To avoid confusion over names, throughout I use the name adopted on becoming shogun.
Ienobu, for example, was named Tsunatoyo until he became shogun in 1709.
29
not be named as heir to the shogunate in case of such an eventuality. Proper procedures had been
followed, but the process did cast some doubt on Tsunayoshi’s legitimacy, one that was seized
on by opponents such as the Tokugawa of the Mito house, Mitsukuni.28 As it turned out,
Tsunayoshi’s only son died age 4, leaving Tsunayoshi little choice but to adopt his nephew as
heir. In due course then, Ienobu did become shogun after all.
Tsunayoshi was well versed in Confucian principles and was aware that, in spite of his adoption
by Ietsuna, the basis of his inheritance was not crystal clear. Having become established as
shogun, he sought to justify his position through legislation, but was unable to legislate directly
over shogunal succession, as the post depended in law only on appointment by the Emperor.
Instead he tackled the issue from the side by legislating on the Japanese family. Tsunayoshi’s
1683 amendments to the Buke shohatto (Laws for the Military Houses) included some provisions
on the correct order of succession in daimyo families.29 Tsunayoshi’s 1684 Edict on Mourning
and Abstention established details of the correct periods of mourning for different relatives. By
indicating a longer period of mourning as appropriate for a brother than was the case for a
nephew, he posited the brother as being of more importance than a nephew, even where the
nephew was the son of an elder brother. The laws on mourning served as the model for correct
inheritance, so that later shoguns refused to approve requests by daimyo to name a nephew as
heir ahead of a brother.30
28
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 73-75.
29
Constantine Nomikos Vaporis, Voices of Early Modern Japan: Contemporary Accounts of
Daily Life during the Age of the Shoguns (Santa Barbara, 2012), 69.
30
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 76-82.
30
Thus, through a combination of precedent, adoption, and sideways legislation, the Tokugawa
were able to clarify the principles of dynastic succession. The principle of male primogeniture
came first, with more complex cases decided by a system of precedence confirmed by adoption.
Romanov efforts to legislate over Succession
Unlike the Tokugawa, Russia’s Romanovs could legislate directly over succession. But up until
1722 there were no written laws on succession, which were governed instead by custom. The
lack of clarity this engendered contributed to not only the Time of Troubles, but also to the
protracted succession crisis that preceded Peter I (the Great)’s assumption of sole rule after the
death of his half-brother Ivan V in 1696. The best known legislation on succession was Peter’s
1922 law. Peter’s traumatic accession meant that he, like Tsunayoshi, had an interest in
promoting principles of succession and inheritance that would help to justify his own rule, as
well as setting down an orderly process for the succession after his passing. Given that
primogeniture would have favoured his elder half-brother Ivan V and his family, it is perhaps not
surprising that the major thrust of Peter’s law was to reject primogeniture as the basic principle
of succession. A second reason for this was that in 1718 Peter had excluded his son Aleksei from
the succession (Aleksei was eventually executed).
In a legal commentary on Peter’s law “The Right of the Monarch’s Will in Designating the Heir
to his Realm” by the Bishop of Pskov Feofan Prokopovich, written in defense of the law and the
departure from principles of primogeniture, two tacks are taken. Firstly, Prokopovich drew on
biblical texts to discuss the rights and duties of parents towards children, concluding that parents
naturally felt a duty to provide for their offspring, but that children did not enjoy any right to
31
such inheritance, which could be withdrawn in case of immorality or lack of capacity to
govern.31 Secondly, the commentary examined the origin of all governments in the will of the
people, which in the case of a monarchy implied that the monarch should provide an heir to his
title. Taken together, the logic of these two arguments was that the monarch had the obligation
and duty to name his own successor without regards to primogeniture.32
The immediate drawback with Peter I’s law was that he himself had failed to clearly name a
successor by the time of his death three years later, leading to a period of intense political
struggle before his second wife, Catherine I (1725-1727) was confirmed as Empress. Similar
disputes surrounded the next four successions, underlining the inadequacy of Peter I’s law,
although the childless Empress Elisabeth (1741-1761) did deploy it in naming her nephew Peter
III (1761-1762) as heir soon after she took the throne.
Peter I’s law was supplanted by tsar Paul’s (1796-1801) 1797 Law which reestablished the
principle of primogeniture and provided detailed rules as to the order of succession in the event
that a direct male heir should not be available. Paul justified the law on the basis “that the
successor be determined by the law itself and that there be not the slightest doubt as to the
successor”. This in itself was an admirable aim, given the uncertainty that had overtaken the
succession in the course of the eighteenth century, and was more in line with Tokugawa thinking
31
James Cracraft, “Did Feofan Prokopovich Really Write Pravda voli monarshei”, Slavic
Review, vol.40, no.2, 1981, pp.173-193; 174.
32
Paul Bushkovitch, ‘Political Ideology in the Reign of Peter I: Feofan Prokopovich, Succession
to the Throne and the West,’ in: ГИИМ: Доклады по истории 18 и 19 вв. – DHI Moskau:
Vorträge zum 18. und 19. Jahrhundert Nr. 11, 2012.
32
on the subject. The law also gave the tsar a right already enjoyed by the heads of the Tokugawa
house – all marriages of members of the royal family had to be sanctioned by the tsar himself.
But there was also a personal motive involved. Paul had enjoyed a tense relationship with his
mother Catherine II, who had herself usurped the throne from her husband Peter III. It was
widely rumored that Catherine II had given serious consideration to passing over her son as a
person unfit to rule, instead naming her grandson Alexander I as her immediate heir. In the end
she did not take this drastic step, which Peter I’s law would have entitled her to, but Paul was
aware of its implications. Under his own law, in fact, Paul would have succeeded his father
directly in 1762, an outcome which Paul presented as historical fact through a ritual reinterment
of his father’s remains and the effective blanking out of his mother’s reign.33’
Table 4: Heirs to tsar Paul
Paul
1754-1801
r.1796-1801
Alexander I
1777-1825
r.1801-1825
33
Konstantin
1779-1831
Nicholas I
1796-1855
r.1825-1855
Richard Wortman, “The Representation of Dynasty and ‘Fundamental Laws’ in the Evolution
of Russian Monarchy”, Kritika, vol.13, no.2, 2012, pp.265-300; 279.
33
Alexander II
1818-1881
1855-1881
Paul’s law on succession was subjected to regular amendment and codification. The most
comprehensive codification was completed by Mikhail Speransky under the instruction of
Nicholas I (1825-1855) and held a prominent place in the Digest of Laws published in 1832.
Nicholas’ laws were an elaboration and affirmation of his father Paul’s, a move he considered
necessary in part because his predecessor Alexander I (1801-1825) had expressed (to Napoleon
no less) his distaste for the principle of heredity. Nicholas’ own right to rule was in doubt under
Paul’s laws. Alexander I had died childless, and in principle his next eldest brother Konstantin
should have succeeded as tsar. Konstantin was unwilling to become tsar, in part because of his
desire to marry a Polish noblewoman Joanna Grudzinska. In permitting this marriage in 1820,
Alexander ruled that because Grudzinska was not of royal status, Konstantin’s children could not
succeed to the throne, but Konstantin himself remained as the immediate heir. In 1822
Konstantin persuaded Alexander to accept his renunciation of his right to succeed, but
Alexander’s decree on this was kept secret, even from his younger brother Nicholas. On the
sudden death of Alexander on 19th November 1825, accordingly, Nicholas himself, the generals
and the soldiers of the guards regiments swore allegiance to Konstantin. Even when Alexander’s
1822 decree was revealed Nicholas insisted on upholding the law of his father, Paul, until a letter
from Konstantin, then in Warsaw, arrived confirming his abdication on 12th December. In the
meantime revolutionary officers in St Petersburg and Ukraine seized the opportunity to launch an
34
unsuccessful rebellion which became known as the Decembrist revolt. The conspirators spread
rumors that Nicholas was staging a coup against the legitimate tsar Konstantin. Thus the laws of
Paul, confirmed by Nicholas, which were intended to remove any possibility of the succession
being contested, failed to avert a crisis when the actual heir declined to become tsar.
The failure of the Romanovs to legislate in ways which accorded with practice has been
explained in terms of the absence from Russia of a firm grounding in feudal and Roman law.34
Added to this was a conflicting legacy of practices that involved heredity, popular acclamation,
nomination, and divine appointment with different emphases at different periods. From Nicholas
I onwards ever greater efforts were made to ensure a smooth succession from father to son which
had not been achieved in Russia since Fedor in 1676. Measures included legal adjustments,
control of marriages, and demonstrative displays of the heir as heir. In the event, for the last three
generations of the Romanovs there was no shortage of willing sons, making such legislative
efforts superfluous.
Contested Tokugawa Successions
The Tokugawa system was not entirely devoid of potential for clashes over succession. For most
of the early period, continuity not only in the line of succession but in the shared beliefs and
policy stances of successive shoguns, combined with a ruthless attitude towards factionalism
buttressed by the morality of the samurai code helped to ensure that influential groups did not
emerge which might engage in contests over succession. By the end of the seventeenth century,
34
Wortman, “The Representation of Dynasty”, 265.
35
however, actual power was slipping away from the shoguns themselves and was increasingly
exercised by the leadership of the bakufu, first among them the Chief Councillor. With the
impoverishment of many of the samurai, the rise in economic power of the merchant class, and
the strains placed upon Japan’s isolationist policy, the emergence of reformist tendencies which
eventually resulted in the Meiji restoration meant that struggles between reforming and
conservative factions began to emerge in a number of forms, and might have destabilized
shogunal succession. The comprehensive regulation of succession mitigated these risks, but had
the potential to heighten the danger should competing tendencies emerge within the ruling house
itself. In the 1830s and 1840s, the reforming stance taken by the daimyo and head of the
collateral house of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, led him into frequent clashes with the leaders of the
bakufu and caused civil unrest within Mito. The political crisis this caused came to a head in
1844 and resulted in Nariaki’s enforced retirement as daimyo.35 This took place during the early
part of the reign of Tokugawa Ieyoshi (1837-1853) and therefore did not impact on succession.
But the important point was that now it was the bakufu that had succeeded in keeping a
potentially destabilizing element of the Tokugawa household in check, implying that struggles
within the bakufu, which did not enjoy the same regularity of succession as the shogunate, might
impinge on the overall stability of the regime.
House
of
Kii
Table 5: Heirs to Ienobu
Tokugawa Tsunashige
1644-1678
35
Tsunayoshi
1646-1709
r.1680-1709
Totman, “Political Succession”, 113-116.
36
Ten’eiin
(Konoe Hiroko)
1666-1741
=
Ietsugu
1709-1716
r. 1713-1716
Ienobu
1662-1712
r.1709-1712
Yoshimune
1684-1751
r.1716-1745
Matsudaira Kiyotake
1663-1724
ad. Matsudaira
Ieshige
1711-1761
r. 1745-1760
Tayasu Munetake
1716-1771
Some historians posit the death of Ietsuna and the accession of Tsunayoshi in 1680 as the first
Tokugawa succession crisis. But, as we have seen, this was handled according to established
procedures and required only a minor legal adjustment to create a post hoc justification. The
process did not provoke any interference from forces outside the immediate family of the shogun.
A greater problem was presented by the death of the seventh Tokugawa shogun Ietsugu (17121716), who succeeded his father Ienobu at the age of three and died himself only four years later.
Ienobu’s brother Matsudaira Ukon-shogen Kiyotake was one possible heir, but had been adopted
into the Matsudaira family. This left no eligible heirs from the main Tokugawa house, and a
factional struggle ensued between supporters of the collateral Kii and Owari houses, from which
Yoshimune (1716-1745) of the Kii emerged as the new shogun. Thus, and not for the last time,
Ieyasu’s careful planning had the unintended effect of promoting rivalry between two of the
houses he had established in order to meet such a contingency. Ienobu’s widow Ten’eiin (or
Konoe Hiroko) appears to have played a key role in this dispute. Some sources suggest she
initially favoured Kiyotake, but the broader consensus is that she was instrumental in furthering
37
the claims of Yoshimune, and was able to represent the will of the dead child shogun, her son, in
the absence of any express instructions from him.36
Not only did Yoshimune come from a collateral house, he had two elder brothers and hence his
chances of becoming shogun had always been remote. But his brothers had both died before the
issue of succession came up. Although Yoshimune was regarded as an effective daimyo of the
Kii domains, he had not been prepared for the shogunship, and it was perhaps for this reason and
a general insecurity about the legitimacy of his rule that he ostentatiously framed his extensive
reform programme in terms of returning to the traditions of Ieyasu.37
Yoshimune followed the example of Ieyasu by retiring in good health in 1745, leaving his eldest
son Ieshige as shogun. This move was itself controversial, as Ieshige was an invalid, in poor
health, and regarded as a bad administrator. This led some to push the claims of his younger
brother Tayasu Munetake. This may have been the reason that Yoshimune’s respected Senior
Councillor Matsudaira Norimura was removed from his office shortly after Yoshimune’s
retirement, and put under house arrest two years later.38 In maintaining the principle of
primogeniture and allowing the punishment of those who questioned it, as well as by retiring
early in order to oversee the early rule of his less competent son, Yoshimune showed that his
adherence to Ieyasu’s example was not merely rhetorical. He understood as well as Ieyasu the
36
Seigle, “The Shogun’s Consort”, 486, 518; Hirai, Government by Mourning, 166-167.
37
Kasaya, Origin and development of Japanese-style organization, 65-77.
38
Tsuji Tatsya, “Politics in the Eighteenth Century”, The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 4,
Early Modern Japan (Cambridge: 1991), 456-457.
38
need for a stable system of succession, even when this might not have optimal outcomes in terms
of personnel.
Similar considerations surrounded the death of Ieyoshi and the accession of Iesada (1853-1858)
in 1853. Iesada was in poor health, but more importantly, Ieyoshi’s death occurred at the height
of the political turmoil caused by the arrival in July 1853 of the warships of US Commodore
Matthew Perry at Uraga harbor, bringing an end to Japan’s policy of isolation. The sensitivity of
this question led the senior bakufu to conceal Ieyoshi’s death for a period while its consequences
were being resolved.39
It was during Iesada’s rule that the results of the social and economic changes of the preceding
century, combined with the political crisis prompted by Perry’s appearance, threw the Tokugawa
political system into a crisis which eventually led to its downfall. During this time, the Imperial
Court in Kyoto reemerged as a political force, and factional fighting involving the collateral
Tokugawa houses and close family of the shogun himself threatened a fatal rift in the bakufu.
Although Iesada was only 29 when became shogun, his physical incapacity led to pessimism
over whether he would sire an heir. According to the system of precedence as clarified by
Tsunayoshi, Iesada’s cousin Iemochi should be next in line. But he was still a child, born in 1846,
and amid a time of intense political uncertainty a strong faction emerged lobbying for the
energetic member of the Mito house, Yoshinobu (Keiki) to be named as heir. Among
Yoshinobu’s most active supporters was Shimazu Nariakira, daimyo of Satsuma, who was
instrumental in arranging the marriage of his adopted daughter Atsuhime to Iesada. Atsuhime
pressed the claims of Yoshinobu, but was trumped by Iesada’s mother Honjuin, who threatened
39
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 335-336.
39
to take her own life if Iemochi was passed over as heir. The leader of the conservative forces
emerged as Ii Naosuke, the obscure daimyo of Hikone who rose to the position of Chief
Councillor in 1858.
Ii’s predecessor Hotta Masayoshi inadvertently prompted a constitutional crisis by seeking the
formal approval of the Emperor for Japan’s signing of the Harris treaty ending Japan’s isolation.
When this approval was not forthcoming, Ii was able to take advantage and eclipse Hotta. At the
same time, Yoshinobu’s advocates saw an opportunity to involve the Imperial Court in the
matter of shogunal succession. But at this juncture Ii was able to outmanoeuvre his opponents,
securing an Imperial edict that Iesada should choose his own successor, ensuring that mentions
of a ‘mature, intelligent and popular’ heir – a clear reference to Yoshinobu over Iemochi – were
removed from the Emperor’s edict. On 24th June 1858, Iemochi was named as Iesada’s heir, and
in the aftermath of his victory Ii placed the daimyo of two of the collateral houses – Tokugawa
Nariaki of Mito (Yoshinobu’s father) and Tokugawa Yoshikatsu of Owari – under house arrest.
Ii argued for the unbridled supremacy of the shogun and accused Yoshinobu’s advocates of
breaching this principle through their uninvited interference in the matter of succession.40 Iesada
died shortly after, on 14th August 1858, and Iemochi was duly installed as shogun.
The struggle for the succession to Iesada included many of the hallmarks of the Romanov
struggles of the eighteenth century: although alternative candidates for shogun had been
proposed earlier in Tokugawa history, this was the first time that powerful families had aligned
themselves behind either candidate, women of the shogun’s family became involved, and
40
Mark Ravina, The Last Samurai: The Life and Battles of Saigo Takamori (Hoboken NJ, 2004),
62-74.
40
fundamental questions about the future of the country were linked to the succession. But the
vehemence of this struggle derived from the fact that it occurred simultaneously with a crisis
over foreign relations and the constitutional crisis over the relationship between the bakufu and
the Imperial Court. No bloodshed was involved, and the matter was resolved in advance (just, as
it turned out) of the death of the shogun. In the end the precepts of Ieyasu and Tsunayoshi
prevailed to ensure an orderly succession amidst heightened political turmoil.
This was not the end of the matter. Ii’s assassination outside the shogun’s castle on 24th March
1860 was carried out in the name of opposition to opening up trade with the outside world. But
the fact that the assassins were a group of Mito and Satsuma samurai suggests that Ii’s success in
opposing Yoshinobu was a factor. It is also noteworthy that on Iemochi’s accession at the age of
twelve, Yoshinobu was appointed as his regent by the Emperor. This was a conciliatory move
designed to placate to some extent the supporters of both candidates, and left the way open for
Yoshinobu in turn to succeed Iemochi in 1867.41 But in confirming this appointment the
Emperor performed an unprecedented interference in shogunal authority which was a clear
indication of the shift of power which was to lead in 1868, and with Yoshinobu’s connivance, to
the Meiji Restoration and an end to the rule of the Tokugawa dynasty.
Conclusion
From this summary investigation of the problem of succession in Romanov Russia, it can be
concluded that there were four main reasons for the frequency of succession crises in Russia: 1.
41
Hirai, Government by Mourning, 333.
41
There were no clear rules about succession. 2. Elites in Russia were always disparate and
divided, and therefore liable to compete with each other when the opportunity was
presented at a time of succession. 3. The absolute nature of centralised authoritarian power
meant that the stakes were incredibly high in matters of succession. (an aspect which is not
elaborated here) 4. The preferences of the palace guards and other key military forces were
often crucial in determining outcomes. This became especially apparent in the eighteenth
century, when the palace guards were mobilised on several occasions, most notably when
Catherine the Great overthrew her husband Peter III and with the murder of her son Paul. The
potential for a praetorian move by military officers at a time of power transfer was highlighted in
the Decembrist Rebellion of 1825. After 1825, if we discount the role of soldiers in the 1917
revolutions, the military in Russia seems to have mostly withdrawn from any political role.
Each of these factors was addressed by the Tokugawa dynasty: through the practice of adoption
of heirs, the setting of clear precedents and informal rules of succession, backed up by proxy
legislation concerning inheritance for the country as a whole, they established a clarity over
political succession that was absent in the Russian case.42 The potential for conflict among
leading families was addressed by the strict disaggregation and status ranking of the daimyo, and
through the careful arrangement of marriages which were intended not to produce offspring, but
rather to maintain a balance among the noble families. Allowing daimyo to maintain their
positions as feudal lords, in some cases over substantial domains, and with relative freedom of
42
The mounting volume of legislation on succession and royal marriages in the 19th century led
to some contradictions and further lack of clarity, but were never put to the test in the matter of
the tsar’s succession. Wortman, “The Representation of Dynasty”.
42
action in the provinces, the incentives for powerful families to attempt to seize control of the
shogunate or intervene in matters of succession were not as great as they might have been. On
the other hand, the “hostage system” of keeping daimyo families in Edo and a ruthless attitude to
anyone who might be seen to be opposing the shogun provided considerable disincentives to any
interference with the succession. Finally, the system of status and strict enforcement of codes of
behavior and honor on samurai, together with elaborate mechanisms for the personal security of
the shogun made the praetorian problem much less of a likely occurrence in Japan.
It was not until 1702 that the first Japanese man, a merchant called Dembei, was introduced at
the Russian court. Up until 1855 encounters were limited to mostly unsuccessful diplomatic and
trade initiatives from the Russian side, and the efforts of Russian explorers to record geographic
and ethnological features of Japan.43 While the shoguns were no doubt in receipt of some
information about the fortunes of the dynasty whose empire had reached the Sea of Japan early
in the Tokugawa era, they did not have any particular interest in Romanov politics. The policy of
isolation ensured that the policies of Tokugawa Ieyasu and his descendants were not based at all
on learning from the experiences of other contemporary civilizations. If anything, it was the
lessons from the history of Japan itself, as well as perhaps China and Korea, that inspired the
Tokugawa system. This makes the fact that the Tokugawa addressed exactly those problems that
the Romanovs encountered all the more intriguing. Possibly, it suggests that there are
generalisable conclusions to be drawn about the nature of dynastic rule at a time of consolidation
of feudal society under a more centralized state, regardless of cultural or philosophical context.
43
Albena Simeonova, Japan Through Russian Eyes (1855-1905), (Sofia, 2007), 37.
43
The Tokugawa benefitted, in matters of succession, from the traditional practices of Japanese
families and social orders, and the inspiration of Neo-Confucianism with its love of order. But
they also initiated concrete measures to deal with issues that might upset dynastic succession. It
was ultimately the failure of the Romanovs, in spite of the clear urgency of the problem, to take
seriously the proactive measures that might have preempted challenges to succession that
allowed it to continue to be such a weighty problem up until 1825.
44