Divine-Command Theory: Objections and Replies
Keith Burgess-Jackson
30 January 2014
Divine-Command Theory (DCT): Act x is right iff x is permitted (i.e., not forbidden) by God.1
The Atheistic Objection:
1. DCT implies that God exists.2
2. God does not exist.
Therefore,
3. DCT is false/unacceptable (from 1 and 2, modus tollens).3
Reply: The divine-command theorist will bite the bullet and reject 2.4 (Ordinarily, it’s painful to
reject the second premise of a modus tollens argument, but in this case, the divine-command
theorist will experience no pain in doing so. Indeed, the divine-command theorist will be happy to
affirm the existence of God.) Note that if one rejects the proposition that God does not exist, then
one accepts the proposition that God exists.
The Terrible-Commands Objection:
1. DCT implies that torture of the innocent (for example) would be right (indeed, obligatory) if
God commanded it.
2. Torture of the innocent wouldn’t be right (much less obligatory) even if God commanded
it.
Therefore,
3. DCT is false/unacceptable (from 1 and 2, modus tollens).5
Replies: (a) Some divine-command theorists grasp the bull by the horn and reject 1. They say that
DCT, properly understood, does not have the stated implication. (b) Some divine-command
theorists bite the bullet and reject 2. They say that torture of the innocent would be right if God
commanded it. Some of those who reject 2 do so by claiming that God, being essentially good,
1
The theory says that being permitted by God is both necessary and sufficient for rightness. Four things
follow from this: (1) If act x is right, then x is permitted (i.e., not forbidden) by God; (2) if act x is permitted (i.e., not
forbidden) by God, then x is right; (3) if act x is not right, then x is forbidden (i.e., not permitted) by God; and (4) if act x
is forbidden (i.e., not permitted) by God, then x is not right.
2
“A implies B” is another way of saying “If A, then B.” It is a conditional sentence, A being its antecedent and
B its consequent.
3
Anything that has a false implication is false. Anything that has an unacceptable implication is unacceptable.
This argument says that DCT has a false/unacceptable implication, and is therefore false/unacceptable.
4
You may be wondering whether, with respect to a particular argument, someone can both grasp the bull by
the horn and bite the bullet. The answer is no. It’s impossible for both premises of a modus tollens argument to be
false. Both can be true, but it’s not possible for both to be false. Therefore, if you say that both are false, you are
contradicting yourself.
5
Formally: (1) DCT ‫( ﬤ‬Ct ‫ ﬤ‬Rt); (2) ~(Ct ‫ ﬤ‬Rt); therefore, (3) ~DCT.
1
cannot (and hence does not) command such things as torture of the innocent. The problem with
this is that God appears to have commanded such things (see, e.g., Genesis 22:1-19; Exodus 11:2;
Hosea 1:2). Others who reject 2 do so by accepting as right whatever God commands.6
The Nihilistic Objection:
1. DCT implies that if God doesn’t exist, then no act (even murder) is wrong.
2. Some acts (such as murder) are wrong even if God doesn’t exist.
Therefore,
3. DCT is false/unacceptable (from 1 and 2, modus tollens).
Reply: The divine-command theorist will bite the bullet and reject 2. If you reject 2, you are saying
(painful as it may be to do so) that if God doesn’t exist, then no act (even murder) is wrong. In
other words, you are saying that an act is wrong only if God exists.
The Skeptical Objection:
1. DCT implies that knowledge of moral rightness requires knowledge of God’s will.
2. Knowledge of God’s will is impossible.
Therefore,
3. DCT implies that knowledge of moral rightness is impossible (from 1 and 2).
4. Knowledge of moral rightness is not impossible.
Therefore,
5. DCT is false/unacceptable (from 3 and 4, modus tollens).
Replies: (a) The divine-command theorist will grasp the bull by the horn and reject 1, on the
ground that DCT makes no epistemological claims. (It makes only a metaphysical claim about the
dependency of rightness on God’s will.) (b) The divine-command theorist will also reject 2, on the
ground that there are, in fact, sources of knowledge—e.g., scripture, religious tradition, personal
revelation, natural law, and conscience—about what God wills (or has willed).
The Divisiveness Objection:
1. A normative ethical theory is acceptable only if it is not divisive.
2. DCT (a normative ethical theory) is divisive.
Therefore,
3. DCT is unacceptable (from 1 and 2, modus tollens).
Reply: The divine-command theorist will bite the bullet and reject 2, on the following grounds:
first, not all religious disagreement is moral disagreement; second, not all moral disagreement is
divisive; and third, DCT is no more divisive than any other normative ethical theory (such as
utilitarianism).
6
Remember that biting the bullet consists of sticking by one’s theory, come what may.
2