Russia Plus China:
Removing The US Superpower From Central Asia?
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Russia Plus China:
Removing The US Superpower From Central Asia?∗
By Alexander G. Larin∗∗
According to a new conception developed in the US and Russia, the
advanced countries such as these two powers and probably China may
unite in order to modernize (to compel to modernize, if necessary) the
“failed” countries - origins of world instability - including those in the
Central Asia. Here Russia’s geographic location is a valuable
“international resource” for her (for Russia). The idea of the concept is
that Russia should assist to the US as a junior partner and her (Russia’s)
efforts will be paid for.
I have strong doubts that this concept can be fruitful for Russia:
US’ need of Russian help in the CA is not so sharp; US’ strategy easily
permits violation of the state’s sovereignty for the sake of stability and
democracy while Russia does not endorse it; Russia has never got any
real “payments” for its concessions to the US. Actually the main Russian
and American interests in the CA are contrary to each other, their
relations are a typical case of competing for regional influence.
American presence is perceived as a growing threat in Beijing too.
This raises an old question of possibility of a certain kind of “alliance”
∗
This article is translated from Russian by Tamara Karganova.
Dr. Larin is a fellow of the RAS Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Moscow. Dr. Larin is
a PhD of Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow. Dr.
Larin’s field of studies are Russian - Chinese relations - history and present state,
including the Chinese in Russia; China’s foreign policy; Taiwan problem and
contemporary Taiwan; Russia’s international relations.
∗∗
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between Russia and China, now - within regional framework. But the
alliance is impossible, as before, though divergences between the two in
the CA are mild. One local but crucial reasons for this conclusion is that
the countries of the CA welcome US’ presence. Uzbekistan is a single and,
I guess, temporary exception. But Beijing’s position is noteworthy: Russia
historically and traditionally should occupy leading position in the region
and China is willing to support Russia and act together, especially within
the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation. Beijing is not planning to
establish its own bases.
Meanwhile China is strengthening gradually its positions upon the
regional matters. One can foresee the reconstruction of the “failed” states
not according to the American expert’s ideas of democracy but according
to the Chinese model of gradual reforming. Or, at least, according to the
needs of China’s economy.
As for Russia it must by no means turn into junior partner of any
great power. Russia must conduct its own independent and constructive
policy in the world.
Key words: Strategic Triangle, Central Asia, Russia-China-US
Relations, Democratization, Shanghai Organization of
Cooperation
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In their Declaration of July 5, 2005, members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization articulated their wish for participants of the
anti-terrorist coalition to define the end-terms for temporary use of
infrastructure facilities and for presence of armed contingents in the
territories of SOC member-states. Quite certainly, this advise was
addressed to the United States.
On July 29, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov demanded that the
US should withdraw its armed forces from the Khanabad base within 180
days. One month earlier, Presidents Putin and Karimov signed the
memorandum on Russian military and military-technical assistance to
Uzbekistan, and Moscow gained the right to deploy its army units in the
Uzbekistan territory in case of crisis situations.
These and other similar facts evidence both Moscow’s and Beijing’s
intention to eliminate or at least to reduce the US military presence in the
post-Soviet part of Central Asia. How far would Russia and China be able
to go along the given direction? And, how effective this aspiration for the
shared purpose would be in bringing the two countries closer together?
However, let us first see whether Russia has selected a correct
strategic course in the given case, while Russia and US both have and
work on another model of their mutual relations in Central Asia.
By Russian architects of the alternative model 1 , the so-called
“failing” countries, accounting for the greater part of the global
community, “are not capable of autonomous development and pose a
serious threat to international stability”. With Central Asian states placed
in the same “failing” ranks, such authors say that in order to find a route
1
V.L. Inozemtsev, S. P. Karaganov. “O mirovom poryadke XXI veka”. [On the World
Order of the 21st Century], in: Rossiya v globalnoi politike, No. 1, January-February
2005 (http://www.globalsecurity.org)
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from the given dangerous situation, “advanced and most powerful nations
must impose the elementary order upon the ‘unfavorable’ states”, by
allying for this purpose in some international “center” to be comprised
evidently from “the United States, European Union, Japan, Russia, and,
maybe, China and India”.
While no outline of state-to-state relations within the “center” is seen
in the above sketch of the universal order, the authors – as they did in
their earlier publications – do outline Russian-US relations in quite
definite terms.
So, they say, Washington was the first, who “decided to
start – in its own fashion and, of course, in its own interests and according
to its own perception – bringing things into order: US launched a sort of
modernization process - first and foremost, in countries of Middle East
and Central Asia”2. As for Russia, “being situated in the very periphery of
this vast region and owing to our geopolitical position, she becomes a
very important power in terms of causing influence on Washington”3.
That is how they understand one of Russia’s major foreign-policy
resources, especially, in Russia’s relations with the US. By all evidence,
they mean that this resource should be used best of all by assisting the US
in setting the order and in modernization, and that such job would be paid
respectively, as any resource should bring revenues.
On their part, some political scientists in the US draw the more or less
similar vector of interaction. For example, Nickolai Zlobin, Director of
Russian and Asian program at the defense information center in
Washington, argues that the United States, acting on its own, would not be
able to cope with many problems, and it would be much more
2
3
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.05.2003 (Dipcourier, No. 8)
Op. cit.
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comfortable to resolve those on the basis of partnership relations with
other countries. In Eurasia, he argues, exactly Russia could and should be
such partner.4
Ay first glance, such model looks quite reasonable. Indeed, Russia
and US both are interested in preventing outbreaks of terrorism, conflicts
and chaos in Central Asia, as well as in consolidation of statehood and
development of democratic principles in that region. Western analysts, too,
take note of the current Russian-US rapprochement in Central Asia, as
none of the two powers is willing to see new conflicts to outburst in the
region. 5 Quite probably, the two powers would not hesitate to start
cooperating closely, should this be necessary in order to eliminate
disorders or to find a compromise in case of aggravated mutual frictions.
At the present time, Russia-US relations are quite cool, and their activated
cooperation in Central Asia would do well to both powers. However, it
seems doubtful that the two parties could build solid, lasting, and
strategically important cooperation on the basis of the above-described
model.
First, in the last several years the threat that the regional situation
would be destabilized by terrorism, separatism, religious extremism and
the like non-traditional “evils”, or by state-to-state conflicts reduced
tangibly and now is much less overwhelming than before. The turning
point is associated with Taliban defeat by the US with support from all
concerned countries. For the time being, we see a whole number of
4
Nickolai Zlobin. “Ogranichennye vozmozhnosti yi vozmozhnye organichenia”
[Limited Possibilities and Possible Limitations], in: Rossiya v globalnoi politike, No. 1,
January-February 2005: 112
5
B. Eikhenbaum. “Novaya ‘Bolshaya Igra’ v Srednei Azii” [New ‘Big Game’ in Central
Asia]. Eurasian Institue for Economic and Political Research). http://www.iicas.org
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factors performing the preventive function – such as the US military
presence, US military and economic assistance to Central Asian countries,
US investments, as well as the ever stronger SCO with its anti-terrorist
center, and a number of other regional organizations. The very existence
of these structures curbs activities of terrorist and other destructive forces,
and serves instrumental in normalization of relations between recently
conflicting states. In such circumstances, the less are the above-listed
threats, the less will be the reason to develop Russian-US partnership for
suppression of the perils.
On the other hand, however, the US, counter to its announced
missionary objectives in the region, seems to feel quite indifferent about
some sorts of the world evil, which, emanating from Central Asia, seed
grave concerns in Russia and in many other countries. In particular, we
mean the flow of drugs from Afghanistan. As Tajikistan President
Emamali Rakhmonov stated at the SCO summit, after the counter-Taliban
campaign the drug traffic in the region grew three times,6 while some
observers assume that the United States is not interested in stopping the
transit of Afghan narcotics.
Further on, Russia and the US have substantially different approaches
to stabilization, which involves their respective influence on behavior of
some or another state. The US strategy easily permits to violate
sovereignty of a state suspected in support of terrorism, development of
mass destruction weapons or violation of human rights. Russia, on the
other hand, treats violation of sovereignty as undermining the
fundamentals of international law, which is allowable only in special
cases under the UN sanction. By all evidence, the US stands on the point
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that exactly the Western-type democratic regimes are the best to provide
stability, and seems to be willing to reconstruct the space of the Middle
East and Central Asia exactly by the same pattern. As proven by Russia’s
experience, however, sometimes stability and democracy may not be in
concert with one another, and great caution is required for interference in
local ethnic, clan or confessional disagreements.
The above examples are sufficient to assert that Russia’s geographic,
economic, political and military vicinity of the Central Asian region with
all of its real and perceived threats, cannot serve the foreign-policy
resource that would make Russia a necessary and strategically important
partner of the US.
The real essence of Russian-American relations in Central Asia does
not invite too much partnership. In fact, the United States pushed Russia
away from the dominating positions in the zone of Russia’s traditional,
natural and strategically important interests. The US itself has settled
down in Central Asia ‘for a good long while’, and withdrawal of US
military facilities – counter to predictions by some political observers in
Russia – has been postponed indefinitely.
The US general objective
number one is to strengthen its political influence in the region and thus to
have a decisive say in distribution of Central Asian hydrocarbons and
other natural resources. Objective number two – “to modernize” the local
states – is closely linked with and subordinated to the first one.
Indeed,
modernization, initiated externally, cannot be qualified as modernization
unless it creates favorable climate for foreign business.
The US general objectives and Russia’s interests run are targeted in
6
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15.06.2004
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different directions. So far, the two rivals just started to compete in the
given field and operate, so to say, at distance. However, their implicit
fight for the bigger amount of influence in some or another post-Soviet
republic has been underway for quite a time already, and has become
perfectly explicit in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, just to response to the
plans of Western states to build a new pipeline system in Central Asia,
Russia has activated her cooperation with the regional partners in
production and, especially, transportation of hydrocarbon resources.
US military installations in Central Asian countries extend the arch of
NATO bases circumventing Russia in the west and south. This
circumstance cannot and should not be neglected.
Chinese political analysts do have enough reason to state that
“Strategic balance of big-power forces would be sustained for a certain
time; further on, however, their aggravating struggle would cause the
gradually growing impacts on the level of security in Central Asia”.7
The US expansion is quite visibly wrapped in the well-tested
propaganda gift-pack. The label says: “In principle, Washington is quite
willing to see Russia as its main strategic partner in Eurasia, from the
Caspian Sea through to the Far East”.8 However, US observers say,
Russia, when acting alone, is not capable of securing stability in the given
space and in its own area of the war on terror – that is, in Chechnya.
Therefore, they conclude, the US has no other choice but to undertake a
part of such commitments to the world community. “Should we soon
7
Guoji zhanlue yanjiu, 2004, No. 2, p. 43
Nickolai Zlobin. “Ogranichennye vozmozhnosti yi vozmozhnye organichenia”
[Limited Possibilities and Possible Limitations], in: Rossiya v globalnoi politike, No. 1,
January-February 2005: 107
8
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witness the growing Western activity in the post-Soviet space, this will be
generated to a big extent by the growing doubts about Russia’s ability to
perform the role of a regional broker”.9 Meanwhile, Washington claims
that its task is not to squeeze Russia away, but rather, on the contrary, “to
strengthen her role of an ally in the fight on terror as well as in building
the new global system of security and stability”.10
With such passages, Washington seeks at least to alleviate Moscow’s
reaction to US infiltration in the zone of Russia’s traditional influence.
The best option for the United States would be to have partnership with
Russia, but the partnership should be ‘asymmetric’, fitting the weight
categories of the two powers, while Russia is expected to trade off her
interests and humbly follow the lead of the US policy. Certainly,
Washington would do everything to assign and support such role for
Russia.
Of course, nobody says such things openly and directly. However, it
is being made clear that Washington is not satisfied with Russia’s policy,
because the latter is perceived as the ever more imperial and would “the
ever more often come in contradiction with US interests”. 11 Such
approach shows nothing else but the intention to make Russia a junior
partner of the US.
As for the concrete spheres, in which Russia is advised to undertake
“the mission to introduce, to protect and to realize US fundamental
interests, which generally do not run counter to her own ones”,12 (this
9
Ibid.
Op. cit.: 105
11
Op. cit.: 107
12
Op. cit.: 112
10
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“compliance” of interests between the two powers has been discussed
above – A.L.), the US party quite graciously leaves the choice of such
spheres to Russia. As US Ambassador Vershbow said expressively, “There
is the asymmetry in the question as how important Russia is for America
and how important America is for Russia. Russia must prove her
importance for America”.13 In reality, the pressure, exerted by the US on
Russia in 2004 in order to force her – quite successfully – to sign off 80%
of Iraqi debts serves an ample evidence of the future “asymmetric”
partnership.
So, what does the US side offer to Russia in exchange for Russia’s
at least partial sacrifice of her own interests? Would Washington be more
amicable in its decision-making on investments, transfer of advanced
technologies, granting of trade benefits, restructuring and sign-off of debts,
etc. – that is, would Russia’s most urgent needs be considered and
satisfied? Alas, nothing of such kind is offered from Washington, except a
rather vague promise “to turn towards Russia”. Therefore, there is no
reason for Moscow to count on any generous reward for her concessions.
Elimination of traditional and non-traditional threats plus domestic
stabilization in Central Asian countries would service Russia’s interests
even better than those of the US. If, for example, Russia and US together
undertake some actions against terrorists, a successful outcome would do
good to both actors. Exactly such benefit would be deemed as Russia’s
prize for her participation, because she would receive no other reward
from the US.
Such was the case after the operation in Afghanistan, and
such would be the case in future. There is nothing strange in the given
arrangement, and it would be strange to expect that the desired ‘golden
13
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 08.04.2002
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rain’ would fall on Russia from the West for her partnership with the US
in Central Asian “region of instability” or elsewhere.
At this point, we would see the end of Russia’s hypothetical if any
resource for her relations with the United States. Much is said these days
about Russia’s potential allegedly laid in her middle position between the
two clusters – that is, between prosperity and instability. However, such
position is neither a resource nor a trump card.
It is a buffer position,
and buffer always undertakes the tremors emanating from the zone of
instability. The buffer would receive support from the rears only if/when
those in the rears feel the danger of a blow that would destroy the buffer
and destroy themselves. Around Russia, no such situation is evident now
or is expected to take shape in the foreseeable future.
The US advent in Central Asia is seen as a threat not only in
Moscow, but in Beijing, too.
The reason is obvious – the long efforts,
taken by the PRC in order to build a friendly space around its borders,
now have quite questionable chances for success. Related to production
and testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, the strategic facilities in
Xinjiang have become more vulnerable, while new chances appear for
foreign interference in ethnic relations within the same province.
Commenting on US actions in Central Asia, Chinese experts note: “It was
only for a short term that in the US security strategy and foreign policy
the priority was given to war on terror. The main task of the American
strategy is ‘to deter’ and ‘to encircle’ China”.14
In the broader context, the US policy is seen in the PRC as realization
14
Dangjin Zhong “Ya da guo zhengzhi: chu zi Zhongguo shi jiao de pinggu”. [Current
Policy of Great Powers in Central Asia: A View From China], in: Guoji jingji pinglun,
2003, No. 7-8: 64
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of Bush Doctrine, aiming at “US global domination to be reached through
the use of military and other force”. 15 Today, Beijing is not at all
delighted by the current stand of Washington in the counter-terrorist
struggle: “China, manifesting its abidance by principles, extended
maximal assistance and support to the United States in the war on terror”,
note political scientists in the PRC. “However, the US does not at all
intend to reciprocate swiftly. Apart from placing the ‘East Turkestan’ in
the list of terrorist organizations, the US assistance to China appears very
insignificant”.16
All political-science publications in the PRC unanimously interpret
the US strategy in Central Asia and in Asia at large as targeted against
China. There is no discord of assessments – Chinese are free from the
“junior partner” syndrome and do not cherish illusions that the US would
be more generous if China becomes its “handy” partner in the unstable
area of Central Asia or elsewhere. China already feels sufficiently strong
to make the US reckon China, while the longed-for foreign capitals are
attracted successfully by the favorable investment climate.
US intentions in the energy sphere, too, are not quite in line with
China’s plans. The would-be largest consumer of energy resources in the
region, China sees the US as a potential rival seeking to turn the flow of
hydrocarbons to the West.
Also, Beijing cannot bur disapprove the US course to democratization
of Central Asian government regimes – that is, to their pro-US
reorientation in international affairs.
15
16
China Daily. 01.11.2005
Guoji wenti yanjiu, 2005, No. 2: 17
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Offensively occupying the political, economic and force space,
where Russia and China would like to have their playground, the US
quite naturally provokes them to organize resilience against American
expansion. Professed in Washington, the dogmatic and Messianic
approach to Western-style reconstruction of authoritarian regimes
actually plays into hands of Moscow and Beijing, because such
reconstruction would impinge on the interests of regionally dominating
political forces and incite them against the United States.
The events
of 2005 in Andizhan (Uzbekistan) served an ample case in point. As
known, in Andizhan disorders, where hundreds of people were killed, the
US took the position, which was quite unfavorable and even dangerous
for President Karimov – Washington demanded an independent
investigation and later on acted against return of refugees into Karimov’s
domain. In response, the Uzbek side blamed the US Embassy for
instigation of rebels, while Uzbekistan President demanded withdrawal
of US troops. In that conflict, Tashkent gained support on the part of
SCO member-states – especially, from Russia that replaced US as a
military partner of Uzbekistan.
The US defeat in Uzbekistan reveals another factor, once overlooked
in Washington: owing to the higher oil prices and additional revenues,
Russia has gained the bigger opportunities to operate in the post-Soviet
space more intensively. The proofs can be found, for example, in the
current consolidation of Russia-Kyrgyzstan armed group and in growing
supplies of Russian weaponry to Kyrgyzstan. Also, it seems appropriate
to refer to the statement by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,
who spoke of the need to use oil, gas and electric energy as diplomatic
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resources in relations with the neighbor CIS countries.17 By all evidence,
to supplement the given circumstance, some CIS countries now hope for
the more substantial assistance on the part of China.
Thus, Tashkent’s break with Washington has been caused by defects
of the US policy and activation of Russian policy in Central Asia.
All these factors, however, are not weighty enough to undermine the
US military presence in the region. First, the reserves that Russia and
China can allocate for counter-US action in Central Asia are quite limited.
The perimeter of Russia’s confrontation with her neighbors in the
post-Soviet space is too long, while China, on its part, does not feel like
undertaking the main burden in standing counter the US either in Central
Asia or elsewhere.
Second, leaders of Central Asian countries (unless Americans touch
them on the raw) for quite understandable economic considerations sense
the US presence quite positively. Their joint call on the SCO behalf to
set the schedule for withdrawal of US troops is motivated by the
intention to grip the chance and to raise stakes in their bargain with the
US. In the given case, Washington is not unwilling to pay – the higher
rent revenues for the Manas military base, plus 200 million USD as
financial aid were promised to Kyrgyzstan, and in exchange the Kyrgyz
government did not withhold its consent for enlargement of the same
base.18 By experts’ forecasts, the US military presence in Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan may grow, as after withdrawal of its troops from Iraq,
scheduled for 2006, the US would be able to pay bigger attention to
17
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13.10.2005
18
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28.07.2005
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Central Asia.
So, should the US choose to postpone infiltration of democratic
values in the given region to the better time and proceed to a more
pragmatic policy without inciting the local ruling elites against itself,
then its positions in Central Asia would become invulnerable for many
years ahead.
Another question: Can it happen in the course of lasting although not
too fierce rivalry with the US that the Russian-Chinese cooperation
would be featured by a sort of alliance, let it be informal and placed
within the regional limits?
Such prospect does not appear realistic. The formula ‘Russia Plus
China Versus US’ would be realized only in a latent form of a vague
trend – although, with sporadic fountains of rivalry springing around
some major economic projects – for example, such as oil pipeline
construction. The foregoing can be explained by the following factors.
First, the Russia-China alliance may destroy their beloved offspring
named SCO – the more so that no borders between the zones of influence
are visible in Central Asia. The region is an area of coexistence for such
organizations as SCO, CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization),
EurasEC (Eurasian Economic Cooperation, now merging with Central
Asian Cooperation Organization), and, on the other part – Partnership for
Peace and NATO, which allotted a vast “zone of responsibility” for itself.
The same states of Central Asia are members in organizations on both
sides and receive assistance from both parts.
Political or economic
influence of Russia prevails in some states and of the United States in
other ones, but none of those feels committed to lean to one pole only. By
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all evidence, such situation would last for quite a time.
Second, some of Russia’s and China’s interests are not in perfect
harmony, although such disconcert does not go to the level of sharp
contradictions.
China’s strategy in Central Asia and within SCO has the following
objectives:
-
in the economic sphere: to get access to raw materials as well as
to fuel and energy resources of the region and to promote its
commodities on the regional markets;
-
in security sphere: to eradicate or at least to minimize separatism
and other current threats; to counter the possible growth of US
political and military presence in the vicinity of north-western
borders of the PRC;
-
as a precondition for, and concomitantly as an implication of the
above-listed objective
– to strengthen China’s political
influence.
Central Asian countries welcome China and see the latter as a new
rich partner, potential investor and sponsor of their development. Apart
from all other benefits, arrival of such partner would consolidate their
positions in the dialogue with Russia. The US presence is treated in
Central Asia in similar terms.
No doubt that China, having appeared in the zone of Russia’s
traditional interests and welcomed there by the new states, would operate
as their alternative partner, which thus would deprive Russia of her
monopoly position and weaken her political as well as economic status.
For example, construction of the oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to China
would reduce Kazakhstan’s dependence on transit of its oil to Russia.
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Some observers already discuss possibilities for transformation of
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into the zone of China’s influence. By the way,
once in while some Chinese academics argue in press that Russia “seeks
to preserve and expand her control and influence in the southern belt of
the CIS, and such intention bears certain features of expansionism”.19
On their part, Russian pro-US-minded politicians readily discuss
confrontation of Russia’s and China’s interests in Central Asia. In their
loudly voiced view, Moscow should unite with Washington in order not to
let Chinese domination in Central Asia. “For Americans, we can be junior
partners, but for China – only junior vassals”, argues one of such
authors.20
In reality, however, everybody sees clearly that the current
differences between Moscow and Beijing with regard to Central Asia are
not at all irreconcilable. In their discussions with Russian colleagues,
Chinese experts say bluntly that China intends to operate in Central Asia
in no other way but together with Russia and with SCO. China, they say,
wants to see consolidation of Russia’s economic, political and security
positions in the region. Counter to the rumors circulating in mass media,
China neither intends to build its own military bases in Central Asia, nor
shows any special interest in deployment of collectively held facilities.
In development of Russia-China cooperation, special role is
provided for SCO, and there are serious grounds for such assignment.
Within SCO, however, each member-state has its own interests, and the
benefits coming from membership cannot be at all times the same and
equal for everybody. It is believed widely that establishment of SCO
19
20
Op.cit.: 62
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13.07.2005
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turned out more beneficial for China than for Russia. Indeed, while Russia
had been enjoying broad ties and influence in Central Asia since the long
time ago, for China the SCO served the ever first reliable instrument to
assert its permanent presence in the given region. Therefore, China is so
proud with its initiator role in foundation of SCO, and announces the
latter as innovative phenomena in the history of China’s foreign policy as
well as in the history of international relations in Central Asia. Step by
step, China gradually moves forward to playing the role of the leader and
the main center of gravitation within SCO.
In this context, China’s
recent offer to lend 1 billion USD to the former Soviet republics can be
qualified as a quite meaningful overture.
With all its broad potential, SCO has not yet become an arena of
Russia-China cooperation. For example, so far Russia cannot accept
China’s grand proposal on setting the free-trade regime within the
framework of SCO. Countering the drug traffic is a potentially important
avenue of cooperation that has become most timely as Russian
border-guard units withdrew from Tajikistan and thus its border with
Afghanistan is left unprotected.
In life of Central Asia, too, SOC plays a limited role so far. Its
main function is to serve a preventive or prophylactic instrument against
terrorism and other modern threats in the region. (This merit should be
divided between SCO and United States). While performance of the given
function requires certain efforts to be taken by SCO members, there is no
need for them to build up such efforts further on. As far as the economic
sphere is concerned, a number of fundamental factors stand in the way of
progressive cooperation – such as different interests of SCO
member-countries, insufficiency of infrastructure facilities in the region,
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need in big investments, etc. Therefore, SCO sometimes is understated as
a ‘discussion club’. Neither China nor other member-countries intend at
all to squeeze their Central Asian policy within the framework of SCO, as
they actively develop bilateral ties with one another and participate in
other international organizations. Events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
did not require any interference on the part of SCO, and this circumstance
serves an extra evidence of its modest role in the regional life.
In future, however, significance of SCO would grow – first and
foremost, through activation of the economic component. Hence, China
will become the increasingly weighty factor in Central Asian affairs, and
the Chinese model of economic reforms will probably gain the even wider
popularity.
What impact will SCO strengthening cause to Russia’s and
China’s relations with the United States? Today, when SCO does not haste
to satisfy the US request to be admitted in the observer capacity, it is
difficult to answer this question. However, apart from rivalry, certain
imperatives of cooperation, too, are evident within the framework of the
Big Triangle because interaction among the three powers appears
necessary as a precondition for enhancement of stability in Central Asia –
first, for competition among the Big Three to be peaceful and civilized;
and, second, in order to prevent conflagration of conflicts, terrorist acts
and other similar evils lingering in the region. The three powers could
also cooperate in planning and realization of social and humanitarian
actions as well as in conducting joint military exercises. Of course, all
such prospects might become a reality only with active co-participation of
other states in the region.