2014/ED/EFA/MRT/PI/03
Background paper prepared for the
Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4
Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all
Education and democratisation: tolerance of diversity,
political engagement, and understanding of democracy
Yekaterina Chzhen
2013
This paper was commissioned by the Education for All Global Monitoring Report as
background information to assist in drafting the 2013/4 report. It has not been edited by the
team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and should not
be attributed to the EFA Global Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The papers can be cited
with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the EFA Global Monitoring Report
2013/4, Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all” For further information, please
contact [email protected]
Education
and
democratisation:
tolerance
of
diversity,
political
engagement, and understanding of democracy
Yekaterina Chzhen (University of Oxford)
Abstract
While a positive relationship between education and pro-democracy attitudes in developed
countries is well documented, evidence for transition societies is more limited. This paper
analyses the effects of individual educational attainment on tolerance of diversity, political
engagement and understanding of democracy for a diverse sample of 30 upper middle, lower
middle and lower income countries from six world regions. More highly educated citizens are
found to be significantly more tolerant of out-groups and more engaged in politics. They are
also more likely to understand democracy in terms of free elections, civil rights, gender
equality, and economic prosperity.
Introduction
Cross-country studies show that the higher the level of education in society, the better the
democratic institutions. This has turned attention to the important question of why this might
be the case. The paper explores three possible mechanisms through which education can exert
an impact on democratic processes. Firstly, education can act through individual beliefs and
values, with more educated people being more tolerant of diversity, which is an essential
ingredient of a democratic state. Secondly, educated people are more likely to participate in
democratic processes, including protest politics, which deepen the roots of democracy.
Thirdly, educated individuals have a better understanding of the essential characteristics of
democracy.
The paper assesses these mechanisms using cross-national data from World Values Surveys
(WVS), which include questions on tolerance of diversity, political activity and attitudes
towards democracy. Harmonised data from the most recent wave of the WVS 1 are analysed
for approximately 30 upper middle, lower middle and lower income countries from six world
regions. The analyses then explores changes in the effects of education on political attitudes
1
European and World Values Surveys Four Wave Integrated Data File, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. The
European Values Study Foundation (www.europeanvalues.nl) and World Values Survey Association
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org).
1
over time using data from the last four waves of the WVS for six large countries: Argentina,
China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey.
Literature review
Modernization theories postulate that economic development leads to widespread basic
literacy and the expansion of tertiary education, which increase the skills and abilities of
citizens necessary for engaging in democratic processes (e.g. Lipset 1959). Thus, mass
education is conducive to democracy as a marker of cognitive mobilization: rising levels of
education “produce a more articulate public that is better equipped to organize and
communicate” (Inglehart 1997, p. 163). However, Inglehart finds only limited empirical
support for the role of education: although societies where high proportions of the population
have tertiary degrees are more likely to be stable democracies in 1995, there is no significant
effect of education on the level of democracy in 1990 or on the change in the level of
democratization between 1990 and 1995. In an alternative view of the effects of education on
democratic citizenship, Nie et al (1996) view formal education as a marker for social
position, emphasizing relative rather than absolute educational attainment. They find strong
positive effects of education on political knowledge, political participation and voting,
attentiveness to politics, and tolerance in the US in 1990, but stress that these would not
necessarily increase with higher aggregate levels of education in society. In a revision of
classic modernization theory, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) also suggest that education is not
only an indicator of cognitive awareness, but also a marker for social status, because
individuals from more privileged backgrounds are likely to receive more schooling in the first
place.
Empirical evidence for a diverse set of societies from the World Values Study (WVS) is
broadly in line with modernization theories. Using data from the WVS 1995-1997 for 36
countries, Kotzian (2011) finds higher levels of diffuse support for democracy, but lower
levels of specific support for their government, among the higher educated. In a more recent
study, Norris (2011) also finds the highest levels of “democratic deficit” among the better
educated, as they are simultaneously more supportive of democracy in principle but less
satisfied with the current governance of their country, using data for 43 diverse nations from
the WVS 2005-2007.
2
While a positive relationship between education and pro-democracy attitudes in developed
countries is well documented, evidence for transition societies is more limited. Using data
from the 1999-2000 Afrobarometer surveys for six young electoral democracies from SubSaharan Africa, Bratton and Mattes (2001a) find higher levels of understanding of democracy
among the higher educated, but no differences in diffuse support for democracy between
university graduates and those with no formal education. In a separate study, Bratton and
Mattes (2001b) find a positive effect of schooling on democratic support in Zambia, but no
effect in South Africa or Ghana. When using the combined sample of 12 countries from the
1999 round of Afrobarometer surveys, Bratton et al (2005) observe a strong positive
association between levels of completed education and support for democracy, controlling for
a host of other demographic characteristics and political attitudes. However, they find that
education affects demand for democracy indirectly through increased cognitive awareness of
public affairs. Indeed, they argue that education has a positive effect on support for
democracy in spite of rather than because of schooling, given the authoritarian features of the
school systems in the region.
In contrast, Evans and Rose find large positive effects of formal schooling on support for
democracy
in
Sub-Saharan
Africa,
controlling
for
individual
socio-demographic
characteristics, using data from the first wave of the Afrobarometer survey for Malawi (2007)
and from a more recent wave of the survey for 18 countries (2012). They show that the
positive effect of education is progressively attenuated with the inclusion of indicators of
political interest and comprehension. They interpret these findings as evidence for the
cognitive/motivational interpretation of educational effects rather than the hypothesis that
education is a marker for social status.
Analysis of other regional barometer surveys also suggests that more highly educated citizens
tend to prefer democracy to alternative political systems. Research on selected Arab countries
observes a positive micro-level association between educational attainment and support for
democracy (Tessler 2002; Jamal 2006). Studies of post-transition societies in Eastern Europe
document a positive relationship between levels of completed education and pro-democratic
attitudes on the individual level (Gibson et al 1992; Reisinger et al 1994; Rose et al 1998).
Formal education tends to be associated with greater support for democracy in Latin America
(Lagos 2008; Latinobarometro 2010), but there is evidence for this relationship being
weakest among younger citizens (Lagos 2001). At the same time, research on East Asia tends
3
to focus on support for the governing regime rather than diffuse support for democracy.
Using data from the Asian Barometer Survey 2010-2012, Park (2012) finds a negative effect
of education on support for the existing regime in electoral democracies (Mongolia,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand), with no significant effect of education observed in
liberal democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) or in “competitive authoritarian”
regimes (Malaysia and Singapore). Similarly, Huang et al (2012) observe a negative
association between education and support for the governing regime in 11 East Asian
countries, controlling for satisfaction with democracy.
Research on political tolerance also finds significant positive effects of education, but the
literature is largely limited to industrial and post-industrial societies. In a seminal study, Bobo
and Licari (1989) find a strong positive effect of education on political tolerance towards leftwing and right-wing out-groups, using data from the 1984 United States General Social
Survey. This association is mediated by verbal proficiency scores, suggesting that “cognitive
sophistication accounts for a substantial fraction of the effect of education on tolerance” (p.
303). Ohlander et al (2005) find significant positive effects of education on tolerance of
homosexuality in the US in 1988-1994, also using data from the GSS. Andersen and Fetner
(2008) also observe a positive association between education and tolerance of homosexuality,
using pooled data for the United States and Canada from the World Values Surveys 19812000. Evans and Need (2002) find higher levels of support for ethnic minority rights among
the higher educated in post-transition Eastern Europe. Analysis of the role of education in
promoting tolerance of diversity in developing counties is scarce, but findings from the
World Values Surveys show that although “agrarian” societies are substantially less tolerant
of women’s rights and sexual liberalisation, educational attainment is still significantly
associated with more egalitarian gender-role attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003).
Education tends to play a positive role in political engagement in developed countries (see
Almond and Verba 1989). Acting primarily through socialization, education is found to have
a positive effect on political participation (Glaeser et al 2007), as well as on trust and social
engagement (Helliwell and Putnam 2007), based on survey data for the US for the last three
decades of the 20th century. However, empirical evidence on the effects of education on
political engagement in transition democracies is more limited. In a cross-country analysis
based on data for 40 nations from the WVS, Norris (2011) observes a positive association
between education and measures of protest activism as well as citizen interest.
4
Direct questions about whether one prefers democratic institutions to other forms of
government tend to elicit high levels of diffuse support for democracy in all world regions,
although levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in practice are relatively
lower (Lagos 2003; Norris 2011). Education is typically positively associated with
democracy both on the macro and micro levels, so, to explore different mechanisms through
which education may affect support for democracy, this paper focuses on the effects of
education on individuals’ tolerance of diversity; political engagement; and understanding of
democracy. In line with the modernization and socialization theories, education is expected to
have large positive effects on each of these outcomes across transition societies, even after
controlling for other important individual socio-demographic characteristics and country
level factors, such as levels of democracy and economic development.
Data and measurement
Comparative analysis of public opinion and values relies on harmonized data from crosscountry social surveys. Regional barometer surveys 2 allow in-depth analysis of attitudes and
political action in particular world regions, but these instruments are not ideal for global
comparisons because they include only a limited number of common questions. In contrast,
the WVS is well suited to cross-national comparison of attitudes, values and beliefs due to its
comprehensive geographic coverage and a long running time series. Although not every
country participated in each of the five waves between 1981 and 2008, the survey covers 87
societies across the world over nearly three decades 3. The WVS is criticized for its limited set
of objective political behavior items (Bratton 2009), but it is a suitable data source for the
present analysis, as it focuses on individual attitudes.
This paper uses data from the most recent wave of the WVS, carried out in fifty-five
countries over the period 2005-2007. In addition, to explore changes in the effects of
education over time, data from the last three waves are analyzed for six large countries:
Argentina, China, India, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey. Twenty-three high income
countries were excluded in order to analyse the role of education in transition societies with
more comparable distributions of educational attainment. This leaves us approximately 30
2
For more information about the Global Barometer project, see http://www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/gbs.jsp.
The Sixth Wave (2010-2012) is currently in fieldwork. For more information about the World Values Surveys
project, see www.worldvaluessurvey.org
3
5
upper middle, lower middle and lower income countries from six world regions 4 (see Table
1).
To study differences in political attitudes across educational groups, controlling both for
individual and country level characteristics, multilevel models are used here (see Snijders and
Bosker 2012). Multilevel analysis accounts for the hierarchical structure of the dataset, i.e.
individuals being nested within countries. We model country-level residuals as normally
distributed ‘random’ effects, rather than fixed parameters estimated separately, because we
want to learn about the population of all countries in the analysis, rather than each specific
country; the number of countries is relatively large; and we can control for country level
variables (e.g. wealth; level of democracy).
Key variables are measured as follows.
Educational attainment
We use the highest level of completed education as a measure of educational attainment,
rather than total years of schooling or school leaving age. The WVS includes a 9-point
education level scale, from ‘no formal education’ to ‘university level education’. Although it
is still common to test for the effects of education on a linear scale (e.g. Norris 2011), we
model education as categorical in order to allow for non-linear effects and for consistency
with the concept of education as a series of transitions between levels. Due to substantial
differences in the proportions of voting-age population with no formal education and in
tertiary education rates between world regions, a number of categories were combined. This
resulted in four groupings: no formal education or incomplete primary school; complete
primary school; at least some secondary schooling (technical vocational or university
preparatory); and university education (with or without degree). The secondary school
category tends to be the largest in most countries, so it is used as the reference group here.
Tolerance of diversity
Tolerance of diversity is measured using the WVS question “Could you please mention any
[groups of people] that you would not like to have as neighbors?” Those who pick people of a
different race; immigrants/foreign workers; people of a different religion; people who speak a
4
Because some questions were not asked in certain countries, the number of countries varies across analyses.
6
different language; homosexuals; and AIDS sufferers are coded as intolerant on each of these
items separately 5. Although these items could be combined into a six-point scale and
modeled as a continuous variable, we analyze them separately using multilevel binary logistic
regression models. It has to be noted that these are not ideal measures of political tolerance
because they only gauge whether a particular out-group is disliked, without eliciting the
degree of support for political rights for these groups. The classical definition of political
tolerance is “a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes”
(Sullivan et al 1982: 2). The 2005-2007 WVS does not contain questions about political
rights of disliked out-groups, but Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) find a positive effect of
education on support for disliked groups’ rights to hold public office and hold
demonstrations, using data from the WVS 1995-1997.
Political engagement
Political engagement is operationalised here as a binary variable using responses about
experience of doing or willingness to do at least one of the following: signing a petition,
joining in boycotts or attending peaceful demonstrations 6. Those who respond that they
would never do any of these actions fall in the reference category. Norris (2011) uses this
indicator, converted onto a 100-point scale, as a measure of ‘protest politics’.
As a
robustness check, we also analyse interest in politics as a proxy for political engagement 7.
Understanding of democracy
The 2005-2007 wave of the WVS contains a battery of ten questions about democratic
knowledge, asking respondents to rate the importance of each item on a 10-point scale from 1
“not an essential characteristic of democracy” to 10 “an essential characteristic of
democracy”. These items refer to three types of understanding of democracy (see Norris
2011): procedural (women have the same rights as men; people choose their leaders in free
elections; civil liberties protect against oppression; people can change laws through
5
The WVS also includes drug addicts, heavy drinkers and unmarried couples living together, but these items
appear to measure a very different underlying construct (based on factor analysis and scale reliability analysis).
6
Respondents who have a missing value on all three items are coded as missing values on this binary variable.
Seven countries that have 10% or more missing values are excluded from the analysis: Morocco (10%), Iraq
(12%), Mali (14%), Burkina Faso (16%), India (19%), Ethiopia (26%) and Iraq (100%). Of the remaining
countries, four have between 5% and 8% missing values (Serbia, Indonesia, Georgia and Bulgaria), so the
results should be interpreted with caution. Jordan is excluded from all multivariate analyses because it lacks
valid information on labour market activity status.
7
“How interested would you say you are in politics?” is recoded as follows: 0-“not very/not at all interested”, 1“somewhat/very interested”.
7
referenda); instrumental (criminals are severely punished; people receive state aid for
unemployment; governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor; the economy is prospering);
and authoritarian (religious authorities interpret laws; army takes over when government is
incompetent). To allow for a more nuanced relationship between education and democratic
knowledge, we model each of these items separately instead of combining them into three
scales.
In addition to educational attainment, all multilevel models control for the relevant
individual-level characteristics, such as age, gender, labour market activity status (employed;
inactive; student; unemployed) and marital status (married or cohabiting; divorced, separated
or widowed; single or never married). It would be useful to be able to control for occupation
and the degree of urbanization, but these variables have disproportionate numbers of missing
values in the survey, particularly for lower income countries. On the country level, we control
for the world region, the level of economic development (GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing
power parity constant international US dollars) and the level of democracy (21-point Polity
IV score 8 for 2005). In line with modernization theories, the GDP per capita is expected to
have a positive effect on tolerance of diversity, political engagement and procedural
understanding of democracy. However, the polity score is used merely as a control. We also
test for a number of cross-level interactions between education and country-level predictors.
For instance, in a study of education and institutional trust, Hakverdian and Mayne (2012)
find a positive effect of education in clean societies, but a negative effect of trust in corrupt
societies.
Although the positive correlation between the level of democracy and average educational
level in a country is well established across nations, the causal effect of education is difficult
to identify. In a study of 95 societies for the period 1960-2000, Acemoglu et al (2008) find no
causal effect of education, measured as average years of total schooling in the population, on
the level of democracy. On the micro level, causal effects of education are also challenging to
model because unobserved characteristics of individuals can be correlated with the outcome
(see Card 1999 for the review of the effects of schooling on earnings). For instance,
unobserved intelligence may be simultaneously correlated with the level of education and
8
The polity score ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Countries with
scores between -10 and -6 are commonly described as autocracies; those with the scores from -5 to 5 as
anocracies, and the rest as democracies (see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm).
8
various political attitudes. A way to overcome this problem is to use an instrument, which is
correlated with education but not otherwise related to the outcome, but good instruments are
rare. Dee (2004) finds significant effects of additional schooling on voting turnout and
support for free speech in the United States, using the availability of junior colleges and
changes in teen exposure to child labour laws as instruments for schooling. However, it is not
clear whether this finding would hold for transition societies. Because the WVS does not
contain suitable instruments for education, its effects cannot be interpreted as causal here.
Results
There are substantial regional differences in the distributions of educational attainment in
2005-2007 (Table A1 in the Appendix). The majority of adults in Europe, Latin America and
the Middle East/North Africa (except Iraq and Morocco) have post-primary education.
University education rates are highest in Europe, with the exception of Turkey, and lowest in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Among East Asian countries, China and Thailand have the lowest
educational attainment rates, with the majority of the population having no post-primary
education, while at least three-quarters of adults in Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam have
secondary education or higher. India, the only South Asian country in the sample, has
education rates closer to those of China and Thailand, with only half of the adult population
educated to the secondary level or higher.
Thus, the most common educational level transitions tend to vary across the regions. In SubSaharan Africa, Middle East/North Africa, and South Asia (India), it is the transition from
below primary to primary education as well as from complete secondary to university
education. In Latin America, East Asia, and Europe, where the majority do complete primary
and at least some secondary education, the most typical transition is from secondary to
university education. Therefore, we expect to see the biggest differences in political attitudes
broadly in line with the most important educational transitions in each region.
Tolerance of diversity
Table 2a shows multilevel binary logistic regression estimates for three separate models:
whether a respondent expresses intolerance towards people of a different race, immigrants, or
people of a different religion by refusing to have these groups as neighbours, while Table 3a
presents the corresponding estimates for intolerance towards people who speak a different
language, homosexuals, and people with AIDS. The effect of education varies across
9
regions 9, so it cannot be analyzed in isolation from regional differences. Thus, Figures 1a-1f
compare the predicted probabilities of expressing intolerant attitudes across educational
categories and regions. Tables 2b and 3b show the corresponding differences between each
educational group and the reference category (secondary education) in the predicted
probability of expressing intolerant attitudes and the associated p-values.
Overall, the probability of reporting intolerance towards people of a different race tends to
decrease monotonically with higher educational attainment everywhere except in East Asia,
where those with incomplete primary education as well as those who attended university are
significantly more likely to express intolerant attitudes than those with secondary education.
In Europe, Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, those with education below the
secondary level are significantly more likely to express intolerant attitudes, while those with
university education are significantly less likely to do so, than those with at least some
secondary education. In South Asia (India), the only significant difference is between those
with no formal qualifications and those with secondary education. In contrast, the only
significant difference in Sub-Saharan Africa is between those who attended university and
those with secondary education. However, rates of university education are relatively low in
the Sub-Saharan sample, ranging from only 5 percent of adults in South Africa and Burkina
Faso to 14 per cent in Zambia.
Everywhere except in India, where adults without secondary education are significantly less
likely to be intolerant of immigrants than those with secondary education, higher levels of
education are associated with lower levels of intolerance towards immigrants. In East Asia
and Latin America, adults with no schooling and those with primary qualifications only are
significantly more likely to express intolerance of immigrants than those with secondary
education. However, there are sizeable proportions of individuals without secondary
education in both these regions. Only in Europe are there significant differences between the
secondary education category and every other educational group, but the most important
educational transition in the region is from secondary to university education. In the Middle
East/North Africa, the only significant difference is between those with primary
qualifications only and those with secondary education. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where
9
There were no significant interactions between education and GDP/capita or the democracy Polity IV score,
however.
10
between 20% and 60% of adults have no primary school qualifications, the significant
difference is between those with no formal qualifications and those with secondary education.
With the exception of East Asia, where those with primary qualifications are significantly
less likely to express intolerant attitudes towards people of a different religion than those with
secondary education, higher levels of completed education are associated with lower rates of
intolerance. In Europe, Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, there are significant
difference between each educational category and secondary education. In India, where 28%
and 22% of adults attended secondary school and university, respectively, the only significant
difference is between secondary and university education. There is no significant variation by
education in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the rates of intolerance towards people of a different
religion, net of important individual and country characteristics, are uniformly very low
(below 10%).
Higher levels of education are associated with lower levels of intolerance towards people
who speak a different language in every region. In the Middle East/North Africa, India and
Sub-Saharan Africa, the significant differences are between no qualifications and the
secondary education category. In East Asia and Latin America, the probability of expressing
intolerant attitudes for those with secondary education significantly differ from those with no
qualifications on the one hand and those with university education on the other. In Europe,
there are significant differences between secondary education and every other category: the
predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people who speak a different
language declines from 25% for those with no formal qualifications to 12% for those who
attended university.
Levels of intolerance towards homosexuals and people with AIDS tend to be higher than
towards any other out-group studied here in every region (see Table A2 in the Annex).
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV prevalence is highest, levels of intolerance
towards people with AIDS are generally lower than those towards homosexuals 10. In Europe,
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, higher educated respondents tend to be less intolerant
of homosexuals, although in Sub-Saharan Africa the significant difference is between those
with primary qualifications and those with secondary education, while in Latin America and
10
In South Africa, where the prevalence of HIV among adults aged 15-49 in 2005 was 18%, according to the
World Health Organisation, only 8% of WVS respondents refuse to live near AIDS sufferers. Yet, HIV
prevalence was not statistically significant in the models of intolerance of homosexuals or people with AIDS
(results available on request).
11
Europe the differences between those with secondary schooling and university education are
also significant. However, in South-East Asian countries those with no secondary
qualifications are significantly less likely to be intolerant of homosexuals than those with
secondary education. In the Middle East/North Africa, where levels of intolerance towards
homosexuals are highest of all regions (93%-96%), educational attainment has a small but
significant negative effect on intolerance.
In Europe, Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, educational attainment has a
monotonically negative effect on intolerance towards people with AIDS, with significant
differences between secondary education and every other category. In Sub-Saharan Africa,
where levels of intolerance towards AIDS sufferers are lowest, there are significant
differences between those with no qualifications and those with secondary education.
Educational attainment has no significant effect on intolerance in East Asia, while in South
Asia, those with no formal qualifications are significantly less likely to express intolerant
attitudes than those with secondary education.
To sum up, educational attainment tends to be positively associated with higher levels of
tolerance towards out-groups, although evidence for South-East Asian countries is mixed. In
Europe, Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, where the majority of adults have
at least some secondary education, the most notable differences in the levels of tolerance are
between those with no formal qualifications and those with secondary education, as well as
between those with secondary and university education. By contrast, the biggest effects of
education in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be associated with the transition from primary to
secondary education. Across regions, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to have the
lowest rates of intolerance towards different out-groups, after adjusting for important
individual and country level characteristics.
Political engagement
Table 4a presents multilevel logistic regression estimates for political engagement and
political interest. The predicted probabilities of engaging in protest politics (reporting
experience or willingness of signing a petition, joining in boycotts or attending peaceful
demonstrations) across educational attainment categories and regions are presented in Figure
2a, while Figure 2b shows the corresponding probabilities of reporting moderate or high
interest in politics. Table 4b presents the differences in probabilities of political engagement
12
and interest, respectively, between each educational group and the reference category of
secondary education.
As expected, educational attainment has a substantial positive effect on the likelihood of
reported political engagement in every region. Those with higher qualifications tend to be
noticeably more likely to engage in protest politics than those with lower levels of attainment,
with the biggest differences being associated with the transition from secondary to university
education. However, only 26 countries were included in this analysis, with the rest being
excluded due to more than 10% of missing values on the outcome variable. Thus, Egypt is the
only remaining country in the Middle East/North Africa region, while the results for SubSaharan Africa are based on the South African, Rwandan and Zambian samples only.
Therefore, these results need to be interpreted with caution.
Educational attainment is associated with a significantly higher likelihood of reporting
interest in politics across all regions studied here. In East Asia, the transition from no
qualifications to primary education has the largest absolute effect on the propensity to be
interested in politics, while in Europe and Latin America, it is the transition from secondary
to university education. Both of these transitions have sizeable effects in the Middle
East/North Africa. Educational attainment differences are the least pronounced in SubSaharan Africa, however. Indeed, the only significant differences are between those with no
qualifications, and those with primary education only, compared with respondents who
attended secondary school. This is not surprising given that the most common transitions in
Sub-Saharan African tend to be those between no schooling to primary qualifications and
between primary and secondary education. Although the results of the two models are not
strictly comparable, being based on somewhat different samples, there is less regional
variation in political interest than in political engagement.
Understanding of democracy
Table 5 presents multilevel linear regression estimates for four different types of procedural
understanding of democracy: people choose their leaders in free elections; civil liberties
protect against oppression; people can change laws through referenda; and women have the
same rights as men. Each item is measured on the 10-point scale from 1 “not an essential
characteristic of democracy” to 10 “an essential characteristic of democracy”. Figures 3a-3d
13
report the corresponding predicted scores, adjusted for important individual and country level
characteristics.
Higher educational attainment tends to be associated with higher scores on each of the
elements of procedural understanding of democracy, although the differences across
educational groups are not substantively very large. In East Asia, the most notable transition
tends to be the one between no schooling and primary education. In Europe, procedural
understanding of democracy is uniformly high (around 9 points), irrespective of educational
attainment. In Latin America and in Sub-Saharan Africa, the biggest differences tend to be
between those with secondary education and those who attended university.
Across regions, procedural understanding of democracy is least prevalent, on the whole, in
the Middle East/North Africa, with small but significant differences between university
educated respondents and the rest. On the other hand, respondents tend to overwhelmingly
understand democracy in procedural terms in Europe and Latin America. The most striking
regional differences are observed with regards to gender equality: net of individual and
country characteristics, the mean score is around 7 out of 10 in the Middle East/North Africa,
irrespective of educational attainment, compared with around 8 in East Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa, where there is a pronounced education gradient, and 9 out of 10 in Europe and Latin
America, regardless of education. Overall, these results are consistent with the finding in
Inglehart and Norris (2003) that gender-role attitudes are substantially more traditional in the
Middle East/North African region.
Table 6 covers regression estimates for four different types of instrumental understanding of
democracy: governments tax the rich and subsidise the poor; people receive state aid for
unemployment; the economy is prospering; and criminals are severely punished. Figures 4a4d report the corresponding predicted scores, net of individual and country level
characteristics. Unlike for procedural understanding of democracy, there is no uniform
pattern for the four instrumental items. Educational attainment has a negative effect on the
first two, ‘governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor’ and ‘people receive state aid for
unemployment’, although its strength varies by region, but an overall positive effect on the
third item, ‘the economy is prospering’. There is no discernible effect of education on the
degree of agreement with the fourth statement, ‘criminals are severely punished’. Norris
14
(2011) combines these four items into one linear scale and finds a small, albeit significant,
positive effect of educational attainment.
The analyses of last two items, ‘religious authorities interpret the laws’ and ‘army takes over
when the government is incompetent’, are based on only 15 and 16 countries, respectively,
with fewer than 10% of missing cases on the outcome variables. Although these results need
to be interpreted with caution, educational attainment has a negative effect on the degree of
agreement with each of these statements. For instance, in Europe and in Latin America, the
mean fitted score for the first item, ‘religious authorities interpret the laws’, is around one
whole point higher among those with no qualifications than among the university educated.
In the Middle East/North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the overall levels of
agreement with this authoritarian interpretation of democracy is highest, the corresponding
differences between the lowest and highest educated are about half a point. Only in East Asia
are there no significant differences by educational attainment at all.
As regards the second item, the largest differences by education are observed in Latin
America. This is not surprising given the history of military rule in the region. The mean
level of agreement with the statement that it is an essential characteristic of democracy for the
army to take over when the government is incompetent, net of other predictors, is 1.6 points
higher for those with no formal qualifications (5.35) than for the university educated (3.75).
This is a substantively and statistically significant difference. However, there are no notable
differences across regions for this item: the mean adjusted score is around 5 out of 10 across
the board.
Education and attitudes in six transition societies over time
This section analyses the effects of education on tolerance of diversity, political engagement
and support for democracy in six large countries – Argentina, Mexico, China, India, South
Africa and Turkey – for the period of nearly two decades. Tolerance of diversity is measured
here using the survey question about attitudes to homosexuality, as well as the questions
about refusing to have people of a difference race, immigrants, or those with AIDS as
neighbours. Political engagement is measured using the indicator of protest politics.
Unfortunately, India had to be excluded from the analysis because of the high prevalence of
15
missing values 11. Interest in politics, which has valid information for every country except
China, is also analysed here. Finally, support for democracy is measured using the 4-point
scale describing “having a democratic political system” as 1 “very good”, 2 “good”, 3 “bad”
or 4 “very bad”. However, it is only available in the last three rounds of the survey and it
tends to have substantial numbers of missing values. Excluding the samples with more than
10% missing data on this indicator leaves only Argentina and Turkey. Alternative measures
of support for democracy suffer from similar drawbacks 12.
Table 8a shows average levels of agreement with the statement that homosexuality is
justifiable. The 10-pont scale ranges from 1 “never justifiable” to 10 “always justifiable” 13.
Everywhere except China, mean levels of tolerance of homosexuality rise noticeably over
time. In China, average support dipped slightly from 1.4 to 1.1 between 1995 and 2001, rising
to 1.6 in 2007. Overall, the two Latin American countries, Argentina and Mexico, show the
highest levels of tolerance, while China and Turkey appear to be the least permissive of
homosexuality.
Educational attainment is significantly associated with higher levels of tolerance, on average,
in each of the countries studied here except India, even after controlling for age, gender,
labour market activity, marital status and religiosity, as well as year of the survey. Some of
the largest effects of education are observed in Argentina and Mexico. Those with no formal
qualifications or primary education only report levels of tolerance around one point lower on
the 1-10 scale, on average, than those with secondary education in these two countries. In
contrast, university educated respondents have mean tolerance scores of around half a point
higher than those with secondary education, everything else being equal. The effects of
education in China and South Africa are somewhat smaller in magnitude, albeit still
statistically significant and of the expected sign. In Turkey, the only significant difference is
between the university educated, who are the most tolerant, and those with secondary
education or lower. At the same time, levels of tolerance do not vary significantly by
education in India, except that respondents with no qualifications have higher average
tolerance scores than those with secondary education. This difference of one-fifth of a point
11
8% in 1990, 31% in 1995, 16% in 2001 and 19% in 2006.
Importance of democracy and understanding of democracy are only available in the fifth wave, while
“democracy is the best form of government” is only available in the third and fourth waves.
13
Missing values were imputed with the mean score for each year that this survey item was available. However,
the effects of education and other predictors are very similar if the original variable is used instead (results
available on request).
12
16
is not substantively significant, however. Although education has substantial positive effects
on tolerance of homosexuality, on average, these models explain relatively little of its
variance: the adjusted R-squared ranges from only 3% in South Africa to 13% in Argentina
and India. This suggests that various other important predictors have been omitted, such as
the respondents’ own sexual orientation, for example, although marital status may capture
some of its effects.
Controlling for individual characteristics, average tolerance levels tend to be significantly
higher in 2005-2007 than in 1994-1999, with the largest increases in India, Mexico and
Argentina, and the smallest wave-on-wave differences in China and Turkey. Interacting
educational attainment with the year of the survey shows that everywhere except in Mexico
and Turkey average tolerance levels of various educational groups vary at different rates over
time (see Figures A1a-A1d in the Appendix; full estimates available on request). In
Argentina, mean tolerance scores, adjusted for other characteristics in the model, rose fastest
between 1995 and 2006 for adults with secondary education or higher, suggesting that the
substantial overall increase in tolerance levels over this period was concentrated among the
higher educated. At the same time, despite virtually no change in mean tolerance levels in
China between 1995 and 2007, there was a non-negligible increase among the university
educated from 1.6 to 2.6 on the 10-point scale. A similar pattern is observed in South Africa,
with the largest increases concentrated among the university educated. In contrast, the largest
increases in tolerance of homosexuality in India are observed among those without secondary
education.
Table 8c shows the proportions of adults in each of the last three waves expressing
unwillingness to live near people of a different race, immigrants, or those with AIDS. Table
8d reports the differences in intolerance levels by education and year of the survey
controlling for other relevant demographic characteristics. Overall, the two Latin American
countries appear to be the most tolerant of diversity. More highly educated respondents tend
to be the most tolerant everywhere on each of the three indicators. Average levels of racial
intolerance tend to decrease over time in each of the countries studied here except India,
where intolerance increases somewhat. There is some evidence to suggest that the effects of
education on racial intolerance vary over time in Mexico, India, South Africa and Turkey (see
Figures A2a-A2d in the Appendix), but the university educated remain the most racially
tolerant in every period.
17
Average levels of intolerance of immigrants decrease in Argentina, Mexico and Turkey, stay
roughly the same in China, and increase in India and South Africa. Including an interaction
term between education and year of the survey shows that in China those with secondary
education or higher became increasingly less intolerant between 1995 and 2001, while in the
next period average levels of intolerance increased somewhat among all educational groups
(Figure A3b). In India, intolerance levels went up among those with primary education or
lower in the first period but decreased in the second period, while actually rising somewhat
among the higher educated (Figure A3c).
Intolerance of people with AIDS tends to decrease over time in Argentina, Mexico, South
Africa and India, while remaining relatively stable at over 60% in China and Turkey. In
India, intolerance levels decrease substantially from 60% to 39% between 1995 and 2001,
only to go up to 44% by 2006. These fluctuations were largely due to the changing attitudes
among the lower educated, while intolerance levels were gradually falling among those with
secondary education or above (Figure A4c). The largest wave-on-wave decreases are
observed in South Africa, the country with the largest prevalence of HIV in the sample,
where the proportion of adults expressing intolerance of people with AIDS went down from
38% in 1996 to 25% in 2001 to 8% in 2007, at roughly equal rates among all educational
groups. In China average levels of intolerance went up from 62% to 79% between 1995 and
2001, but decreased somewhat to 76% by 2006. Most of this later decrease was accounted for
by steeply falling intolerance levels among the university educated, although intolerance was
rising among those with incomplete primary education in this period (Figure A4b).
Educational attainment is associated with significantly higher likelihood of political
engagement in each country (Table 9). University educated respondents are between 1.6 and
2.8 times more likely to report experience of signing a petition, joining in boycotts or
attending peaceful demonstrations than those with secondary education, all else being equal.
In contrast, those with no formal qualifications are only 33% - 44% as likely to do so as those
with secondary education. Figure 6 summarises the observed relationship between education
and self-reported political engagement, net of other relevant individual characteristics.
Among the lowest educated, between 42% and 61% are expected to engage in protest
politics, compared with 73% and 88% of the highest educated. Overall, the lowest adjusted
rates are observed in China and the highest in Mexico.
18
Average levels of political engagement tend to decrease in all countries over time, although
for Argentina this may be an artefact of the survey year. Levels of political engagement were
significantly lower in Argentina in 1999 than in 1995, with no differences between 1995 and
2006, while there was no survey in 2001, the year of mass protests. In South Africa, average
rates of political engagement were highest in 1990, compared with subsequent survey rounds
in 1996, 2001 and 2007.
Levels of reported interest in politics are also significantly higher among the more highly
educated, everything else being equal (Table 10). This is consistent with the results of multilevel analysis for the full sample of countries. The odds of being very interested in politics, as
opposed to the combined categories of ‘somewhat’, ‘not very’, or ‘not at all’ interested, are
between 1.2 and 2.5 times higher for the university educated than for those with secondary
education, holding other predictors constant. At the same time, those with no formal
qualifications are only 63% - 33% as likely to report the highest level of interest in politics as
those with secondary education. Figure 7a shows the predicted probabilities of reporting high
interest in politics, ranging from 2% - 11% among the lowest educated to 14% - 25% among
the highest educated. Figure 7b shows the corresponding predicted probabilities of reporting
moderate interest, going from 8% - 28% among the lowest educated to 28% - 49% among the
highest educated. The effects of education on political engagement and political interest tend
to be stable over time.
Higher educated citizens in both Argentina and Turkey are significantly more likely to view
democracy more positively, even controlling for other relevant individual characteristics
(Table 11). Those with no formal qualifications are about half as likely to describe “having a
democratic political system” as “very good” rather than “good”, “bad” or “very bad” than
those with secondary education, while the university educated are, in contrast, around 50%60% more likely to do so than the reference group. Figure 8 illustrates the magnitude of the
positive effect of educational attainment on diffuse support for democracy. The probability to
describe a democratic system as “very good” rises from 34% and 53% among the lowest
educated to 63% and 65% among the highest educated in Argentina and Turkey, respectively.
Overall, individual support for democracy in Argentina was significantly higher in 1995 and
in 2006 than in 1999, while in Turkey, it was higher in 2007 than in 2001 or 1996.
19
Conclusion
Although higher educated adults are more likely to support democracy in all world regions, it
is less clear why education is positively associated with pro-democratic attitudes. To explore
some of the mechanisms through which education may affect democratic preferences at the
individual level, this paper analyses the effects of educational attainment on tolerance of
diversity, political engagement, and understanding of democracy for a diverse sample of 30
transition societies, using data from the World Values Survey 2005-2007.
Educational attainment tends to be positively associated with higher levels of tolerance
towards people of a different race and religion, those who speak a different language,
immigrants, homosexuals, and people with AIDS, although the magnitude of this effect tends
to vary by region. In Europe, Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa, the most
notable differences in the levels of tolerance are between those with secondary and university
education. By contrast, the biggest effects of education in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to be
associated with the transition from primary to secondary education. Across regions, the
lowest rates of intolerance towards different out-groups are observed in Latin America and
Sub-Saharan Africa. Educational attainment has a substantial positive effect on political
engagement and interest in politics in every region. Higher educated citizens are also more
likely to understand democracy in terms of free elections, civil rights, gender equality, and
economic prosperity.
20
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23
Tables
Table 1
country
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Vietnam
Bulgaria
Georgia
Moldova
Romania
Russia
Serbia
Turkey
Ukraine
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Guatemala
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Jordan
Morocco
India
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Ghana
Mali
Rwanda
South Africa
Zambia
Country-level indicators
region
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
East Asia & Pacific
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Europe & Central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
Middle East & North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
GDP per capita
4,115
3,102
11,544
6,675
2,161
9,809
3,611
2,362
9,361
11,853
8,517
11,465
5,583
10,833
8,509
12,663
7,305
4,062
12,191
6,387
9,683
4,491
9,228
2,990
4,334
3,508
2,209
1,014
636
1,208
885
840
8,597
1,158
WB income
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Upper middle
Lower middle
Lower middle
Low
Low
Lower middle
Low
Low
Upper middle
Lower middle
Polity IV
-7
8
3
9
-7
9
7
8
9
6
8
7
6
8
8
9
7
8
8
9
10
-3
-6
-6.6
-2
-6
9
0
1
8
7
-3
9
5
24
Table 2a
Multilevel logistic regression of expressing intolerant attitudes
Different race
Immigrants/
Foreign workers
Different religion
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
0.248**
0.270**
0.048
Complete primary
-0.124
0.137*
-0.149*
University (degree/non-degree)
0.225**
0.062
-0.063
Male
0.014
-0.001
-0.020
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.132***
0.039
0.039
Student
-0.017
-0.083
-0.045
Unemployed
0.023
0.052
0.014
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
-0.141**
-0.061
-0.136**
35-44
-0.103*
-0.044
-0.162**
45 and over
-0.123*
-0.035
-0.126**
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
-0.005
-0.036
-0.012
Single/never married
-0.127**
-0.082*
-0.143***
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
-0.251
-0.875**
-0.322
Latin America & Caribbean
-2.052***
-2.573***
-1.625***
Middle East & North Africa
0.135
0.172
0.519
South Asia
0.383
0.354
0.217
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.861*
-0.402
-1.434***
Region # education
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
0.327**
0.218
0.566***
Europe: Complete primary
0.462***
0.089
0.507***
Europe: University
-0.568***
-0.209*
-0.202*
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
0.579***
0.211
0.545***
Latin America: Complete primary
0.805***
0.173
0.696***
Latin America: University
-0.680***
-0.238
-0.420**
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
0.211
-0.077
0.206
Middle East: Complete primary
0.622***
0.170
0.417***
Middle East: University
-0.584***
-0.182
-0.229*
South Asia: Incomplete primary/none
0.160
-0.724***
0.056
South Asia: Complete primary
0.171
-0.535**
0.050
South Asia: University
-0.345*
-0.307
-0.269
Africa: Complete secondary
-0.172
-0.146
0.008
Africa: Incomplete secondary
0.158
-0.078
0.261*
Africa: Complete primary
-0.485***
-0.145
-0.091
Log GDP/capita
-0.344*
0.259
-0.617***
Polity score
0.017
0.015
0.021
Intercept
1.847
-2.741*
4.335**
Var(intercept)
0.179 (0.048)
0.180 (0.049)
0.222 (0.060)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.052
0.052
0.063
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
40,074
43,599
43,939
N (observations)
45,813
42,793
47,034
N (countries)
31
30
31
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Estimated using maximum likelihood with 15 quadrature points. “Different
race”: no data for Egypt, Iraq or Jordan; “immigrants”: no data for Colombia, Egypt, Iraq or Jordan; “different
religion”: no data for Egypt, Guatemala or Jordan.
25
Table 2b
Differences in the probability of expressing intolerant attitudes between
each educational group and the reference category (secondary education),
by region
Incomplete primary/none Complete primary
University
Different race
East Asia
0.050**
-0.023
0.045**
Europe & Central Asia
0.111***
0.062***
-0.052***
Latin America & Caribbean
0.050***
0.038***
-0.015**
Middle East & North Africa
0.102***
0.111***
-0.067**
South Asia
0.096**
0.010
-0.026
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.009
0.004
-0.026*
Immigrants/foreign workers
East Asia
0.065**
0.032*
0.015
Europe & Central Asia
0.088***
0.038*
-0.022*
Latin America & Caribbean
0.024**
0.015*
-0.007
Middle East & North Africa
0.047
0.076**
-0.029
South Asia
-0.108**
-0.096*
-0.060
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.026*
0.012
-0.016
Different religion
East Asia
0.010
-0.029*
-0.013
Europe & Central Asia
0.123***
0.068***
-0.042***
Latin America & Caribbean
0.051***
0.046***
-0.026**
Middle East & North Africa
0.062**
0.066**
-0.067**
South Asia
0.023
-0.021
-0.069*
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.004
0.009
-0.011
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Marginal effects estimated at the means of all predictors.
26
Table 3a
Multilevel logistic regression of expressing intolerant attitudes (cont.)
Different language
Homosexuals
People with AIDS
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
0.212*
-0.222**
0.109
Complete primary
-0.044
-0.177**
0.073
University (degree/non-degree)
-0.238**
-0.095
-0.109
Male
0.021
0.188***
0.052*
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.051
0.118***
0.097**
Student
-0.139*
-0.047
0.027
Unemployed
0.041
0.028
0.047
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
-0.218***
-0.035
-0.120**
35-44
-0.219***
0.027
-0.148**
45 and over
-0.248***
0.093*
-0.069
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
0.044
-0.095*
-0.041
Single/never married
-0.060
-0.066*
-0.163***
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
-0.571*
0.936*
0.258
Latin America & Caribbean
-1.490***
-1.250**
-2.020***
Middle East & North Africa
-0.348
2.522**
0.553
South Asia (India)
0.339
-0.489
-0.741
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.979**
0.318
-2.101***
Region # education
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
0.374**
0.551***
0.360**
Europe: Complete primary
0.428***
0.280*
0.176
Europe: University
-0.024
-0.311**
-0.344***
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
0.300*
0.813***
0.825***
Latin America: Complete primary
0.301
0.748***
0.713***
Latin America: University
-0.067
-0.235*
-0.465***
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
0.370
0.738
0.718***
Middle East: Complete primary
0.584
0.266
0.532**
Middle East: University
0.808*
-0.003
-0.336*
South Asia: Incomplete primary/none
0.113
-0.307*
-0.509***
South Asia: Complete primary
0.256
-0.174
-0.410*
South Asia: University
0.193
-0.028
0.102
Africa: Complete secondary
0.018
0.243*
0.204*
Africa: Incomplete secondary
0.069
0.322**
0.114
Africa: Complete primary
0.204
-0.030
0.075
Log GDP/capita
-0.378*
-0.292
-0.303
Polity score
0.008
-0.002
-0.006
Intercept
2.176
2.566
3.115
Var(intercept)
0.179 (0.050)
0.440 (0.115)
0.400 (0.103)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.05147
0.118
0.108
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
33,409
50,888
50,602
N (observations)
39,264
44,685
45,836
N (countries)
28
30
31
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Estimated using maximum likelihood with 15 quadrature points. “Different
language”: no data for Colombia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Guatemala or Jordan; “homosexuals”: no data for Egypt,
Morocco, Iraq or Jordan; “AIDS”: no data for Egypt, Iraq or Jordan.
27
Table 3b
Differences in the probability of expressing intolerant attitudes between
each educational group and the reference category (secondary education),
by region
Incomplete primary/none Complete primary
University
Different language
East Asia
0.041*
-0.008
-0.041**
Europe & Central Asia
0.093***
0.057***
-0.031**
Latin America & Caribbean
0.041**
0.018
-0.017*
Middle East & North Africa
0.105**
0.096
0.102
South Asia
0.074*
0.047
-0.010
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.024**
0.002
-0.003
Homosexuals
East Asia
-0.055**
-0.044**
-0.024
Europe & Central Asia
0.055**
0.018
-0.082***
Latin America & Caribbean
0.128***
0.124***
-0.059***
Middle East & North Africa
0.024
0.005
-0.006
South Asia
-0.122**
-0.083*
-0.030
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.005
0.033*
-0.029
People with AIDS
East Asia
0.026
0.017
-0.026
Europe & Central Asia
0.094***
0.052**
-0.107***
Latin America & Caribbean
0.174***
0.142*
-0.068***
Middle East & North Africa
0.130**
0.101*
-0.096**
South Asia
-0.094**
-0.080
-0.002
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.047**
0.027*
-0.005
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Marginal effects estimated at the means of all predictors.
28
Table 4a
Multilevel logistic regression of political engagement and political interest
Political engagement
Interest in politics
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.704***
-0.700***
Complete primary
-0.489***
-0.188*
University (degree/non-degree)
0.479***
0.234**
Male
0.231***
0.421***
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
-0.256***
-0.114***
Student
0.167**
-0.068
Unemployed
-0.107**
-0.105**
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
0.077
0.123***
35-44
0.087
0.162***
45 and over
0.051
0.359***
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
-0.108**
-0.204***
Single/never married
0.067
-0.058
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
0.455
-0.618
Latin America & Caribbean
1.393***
-1.082**
Middle East & North Africa
-0.653
-0.618
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.999**
-0.077
Region # education
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
-0.119
0.085
Europe: Complete primary
0.052
-0.171
Europe: University
0.039
0.172
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
-0.048
0.240
Latin America: Complete primary
-0.084
-0.227*
Latin America: University
0.367***
0.576***
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
-0.048
-0.192
Middle East: Complete primary
0.182
-0.026
Middle East: University
0.039
0.155
Africa: Complete secondary
-0.071
0.359**
Africa: Incomplete secondary
0.013
0.027
Africa: Complete primary
0.013
-0.117
Log GDP/capita
0.033
-0.186
Polity score
-0.011
-0.032
Intercept
-0.682
1.770
Var(intercept)
0.215 (0.061)
0.254 (0.067)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.061
0.072
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
47,236
57,452
N (observations)
37,765
46,409
N (countries)
26
30
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Estimated using maximum likelihood with 15 quadrature points. “Political
engagement”: data are excluded for Morocco, Iraq, Mali, Burkina Faso, India, Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan; “political
interest”: data are excluded for India, China, Rwanda, and Jordan.
29
Table 4b
Differences in the probability of political engagement between each
educational group and the reference category (secondary education), by
region
Incomplete primary/none Complete primary
University
Political engagement
East Asia
-0.154***
-0.111***
0.119***
Europe & Central Asia
-0.198***
-0.109***
0.125***
Latin America & Caribbean
-0.168***
-0.125***
0.130***
Middle East & North Africa
-0.120**
-0.056
0.112**
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.188***
-0.114***
0.101***
Political interest
East Asia
-0.173***
-0.046*
0.055**
Europe & Central Asia
-0.141***
-0.085***
0.101***
Latin America & Caribbean
-0.092***
-0.084***
0.195***
Middle East & North Africa
-0.195***
-0.052**
0.097***
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.085***
-0.040*
0.028
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Marginal effects estimated at the means of all predictors.
30
Table 5
Multilevel regression of procedural understanding of democracy
Free elections
Civil rights
Referenda
Gender equality
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.228*
-0.284*
-0.413**
-0.426***
Complete primary
-0.099
-0.133
-0.017
-0.274**
University (degree/non-degree)
0.045
0.009
-0.003
0.129
Male
0.048*
0.062*
0.061*
-0.312***
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.013
-0.027
0.055
0.061
Student
0.001
0.115
0.061
-0.024
Unemployed
0.004
-0.090*
0.061
-0.060
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
0.073*
0.098*
0.157**
-0.067
35-44
0.151***
0.180***
0.263***
-0.026
45 and over
0.155***
0.164**
0.259***
-0.015
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
-0.068
-0.061
-0.076
-0.157
Single/never married
-0.005
-0.018
0.029
-0.035
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
0.906**
1.434*
1.642**
1.072**
Latin America & Caribbean
0.768*
0.692
1.567**
0.961**
Middle East & North Africa
0.644
-0.530
-0.102
-0.987*
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.113
-0.549
0.371
0.140
Region # education
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
0.099
-0.180
0.427
0.216
Europe: Complete primary
0.020
0.018
0.076
0.046
Europe: University
-0.035
0.056
-0.004
-0.069
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
-0.107
0.059
0.245
0.330**
Latin America: Complete primary
-0.141
-0.058
-0.024
0.288
Latin America: University
0.365***
0.524***
0.055
0.168
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
-0.001
0.120
0.091
0.240
Middle East: Complete primary
-0.011
0.107
-0.096
0.044
Middle East: University
0.109
0.250*
0.128
0.036
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
0.127
0.394**
0.193
0.144
Middle East: Complete primary
0.013
0.393**
-0.059
0.094
Middle East: University
0.342**
0.272*
0.326
0.284*
Log GDP/capita
-0.219
-0.076
-0.298
-0.157
Polity score
-0.024
-0.116
-0.123**
-0.035
Intercept
9.816***
8.571**
10.006***
9.635
Var(intercept)
0.235 (0.064)
0.678 (0.211)
0.282 (0.096)
0.242 (0.066)
Var(residual)
4.479 (0.031)
5.328 (0.042)
5.510 (0.046)
5.289 (0.037)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.050
0.113
0.049
0.044
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
180,603
149,415
129,750
187,725
N (observations)
41,531
33,022
28460
41,580
N (countries)
28
21
18
28
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Due to more than 10% of missing values, data are excluded for: (Free
elections) India, China, Colombia, Morocco, Guatemala, Jordan; (civil rights) India, Bulgaria, Romania, China,
Ukraine, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Iraq, Guatemala; Burkina Faso, Mali; Jordan; (referenda) Mexico,
Argentina, India, Bulgaria, Romania, China, Ukraine, Indonesia, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala,
Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, Jordan; (gender equality) India, China, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala,
Burkina Faso, Jordan.
31
Table 6
Multilevel regression of instrumental understanding of democracy
Taxing the rich
State aid
Economy
prospering
Criminals
punished
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
0.016
0.045
-0.154
-0.408**
Complete primary
-0.094
0.174
-0.138
0.059
University (degree/non-degree)
-0.108
0.0003
0.027
-0.005
Male
-0.023
-0.006
0.064*
0.060*
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.046
0.077*
0.025
0.019
Student
-0.111
0.133*
0.038
0.059
Unemployed
0.016
0.185***
0.066
0.014
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
-0.0003
0.070
0.094*
0.008
35-44
0.012
0.100
0.112*
0.010
45 and over
0.026
0.082
0.124**
0.044
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
0.014
0.038
-0.076
-0.010
Single/never married
0.009
0.045
0.003
-0.078*
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
0.143
2.676
0.789
0.584
Latin America & Caribbean
-1.100
1.370
-0.200
-0.766
Middle East & North Africa
-0.075
-0.417
0.408
0.214
Sub-Saharan Africa
-0.827
1.731
-0.372
-0.190
Region # education
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
0.434*
0.004
0.125
0.407*
Europe: Complete primary
0.447**
-0.128
0.111
0.028
Europe: University
-0.405**
-0.166
-0.042
-0.010
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
0.328
0.299
0.197
0.601***
Latin America: Complete primary
0.400**
-0.015
0.189
-0.098
Latin America: University
-0.100
-0.292*
0.062
0.058
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
0.203
0.159
0.011
0.266
Middle East: Complete primary
0.260
0.016
0.086
-0.223
Middle East: University
-0.042
-0.034
0.079
-0.040
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
0.378*
0.263
0.160
0.342*
Middle East: Complete primary
0.520***
0.123
0.192
-0.199
Middle East: University
-0.034
0.129
0.270*
-0.212
Log GDP/capita
0.029
0.365
-0.241
-0.249
Polity score
-0.058
-0.184***
-0.020
-0.036
Intercept
6.940*
3.652
9.941
10.009
Var(intercept)
0.798 (0.242)
0.344 (0.101)
0.510 (0.145)
0.637 (0.182)
Var(residual)
7.803 (0.059)
6.687 (0.049)
4.784 (0.035)
6.482 (0.047)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.093
0.049
0.096
0.090
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
169,872
175,592
166,477
179,801
N (observations)
34,629
36,965
37,702
38,099
N (countries)
22
24
25
25
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Due to more than 10% of missing values, data are excluded for: (taxing the
rich) Argentina, India, Bulgaria, China, Ukraine, Georgia, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala, Burkina
Faso, Jordan; (state aid) Argentina, India, China, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala, Burkina Faso,
Rwanda, Jordan; (economy) India, China, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala, Burkina Faso, Mali, Jordan;
(criminals) India, China, Ukraine, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala, Burkina Faso, Jordan.
32
Table 7
Multilevel regression of authoritarian understanding of democracy
Religious authorities interpret laws
The army takes over if government
is incompetent
Education (ref: secondary – East Asia)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.169
-0.219
Complete primary
0.004
-0.653***
University (degree/non-degree)
0.087
-0.045
Male
-0.121**
-0.006
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.079
-0.008
Student
-0.125
0.014
Unemployed
0.217***
0.193**
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
-0.015
-0.040
35-44
0.025
0.013
45 and over
0.039
-0.046
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
-0.190**
0.029
Single/never married
-0.099
0.033
Region (ref: East Asia)
Europe & Central Asia
-0.855
-0.220
Latin America & Caribbean
-1.513*
-0.592
Middle East & North Africa
1.455
-0.875
Sub-Saharan Africa
0.276
-0.675
Region # education
Europe: Complete secondary
0.962**
0.242
Europe: Complete primary
0.514*
0.915***
Europe: Incomplete primary/none
-0.162
-0.313
Latin America: Complete secondary
0.833***
0.758**
Latin America: Complete primary
0.471*
1.038***
Latin America: Incomplete primary/none
-0.565**
-1.017***
Middle East: Complete secondary
0.380
0.454
Middle East: Incomplete secondary
0.154
1.183***
Middle East: Incomplete primary/none
-0.456*
-0.146
Africa: Complete secondary
0.371
0.269
Africa: Complete primary
0.268
0.893***
Africa: Incomplete primary/none
-0.496*
-0.452
Log GDP/capita
0.250
0.041
Polity score
0.010
-0.140
Intercept
2.952
5.685
Var(intercept)
0.461 (0.170)
0.761 (0.272)
Var(residual)
7.568 (0.069)
8.919 (0.082)
Intra-class correlation (ICC)
0.057
0.079
Bayesian information criterion (BIC)
117,834
120,875
N (observations)
24,154
23,968
N (countries)
15
16
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Due to more than 10% of missing values, data are excluded for: (religious
authorities) Argentina, Chile, India, Bulgaria, Romania, China, Ukraine, Russia, Peru, Georgia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala, Burkina Faso, Mali, Jordan; (military rule) India, Bulgaria,
Romania, China, Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Colombia, Serbia, Morocco, Guatemala,
Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, Jordan.
33
Table 8a
Argentina
Mexico
China
India
S Africa
Turkey
Table 8b
Mean attitudes towards homosexuality over time
(1 “never justifiable” – 10 “always justifiable”)
1989-1993
1.2
2.3
1.5
1994-1999
4.3
2.9
1.4
1.7
2.6
1999-2004
4.3
3.7
1.1
3.1
2.9
2005-2007
5.6
4.5
1.6
3.0
3.1
1.7
Linear regression of attitudes towards homosexuality
(1 “never justifiable” – 10 “always justifiable”)
Argentina
Mexico
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
-1.266***
-0.606***
Complete primary
-0.888***
-0.615***
University (degree/non0.656***
0.508***
degree)
Male
-0.874***
-0.417
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
-0.426**
-0.169
Student
-0.375
0.107
Unemployed
-0.324
0.021
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
-0.291
0.008
35-44
-0.387
-0.169
45 and over
-0.744***
-0.434**
Marital status (ref: married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed -0.096
-0.044
Single/never married
0.097
0.397**
Religiosity (ref: religious)
Not religious
0.982***
0.255**
Convinced atheist
2.005***
0.662**
Wave
Ref: 94-99
Ref: 94-99
1994-1999
1999-2004
0.067
1.054**
2005-2007
1.158***
1.837**
Intercept
5.428***
3.082***
Adjusted R-squared
0.132
0.104
N (observations)
3,233
5174
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Robust standard errors.
China
India
S Africa
Turkey
-0.112*
-0.108*
0.176*
0.148
-0.167*
-0.134
-0.155
-0.111
0.590***
-0.085
0.370***
0.438**
-0.052
-0.101
-0.283***
-0.303**
-0.056
0.160
0.029
-0.073
-0.128
0.034
-0.151*
-0.060
-0.030
-0.139
0.216
-0.157
0.157
0.132
0.118
-0.061
-0.075
-0.017
-0.028
0.022
-0.170
0.022
0.041
-0.035
0.012
0.235*
-0.129
0.119
0.063
0.178*
0.148
0.397**
0.148*
0.100
Ref: 89-93
0.508**
1.840***
1.720***
1.275***
0.133
7,765
0.419***
0.853***
Ref: 89-93
0.330***
0.723***
0.862***
2.307***
0.032
10,770
0.512***
2.636***
Ref: 89-93
Ref: 94-99
-0.191***
0.303***
1.232***
0.047
4,377
0.171**
1.540***
0.101
2,240
34
Table 8c
Proportions expressing intolerance towards different groups
1994-1999
People of a different race
Argentina
0.05
Mexico
0.26
China
0.23
India
0.36
S Africa
0.12
Turkey
0.31
Immigrants/foreign workers
Argentina
0.05
Mexico
0.26
China
0.20
India
0.33
S Africa
0.19
Turkey
0.35
People with AIDS
Argentina
0.16
Mexico
0.31
China
0.62
India
0.60
S Africa
0.38
Turkey
0.74
Table 8d
1999-2004
2005-2007
0.05
0.14
0.15
0.42
0.20
0.27
0.02
0.08
0.16
0.44
0.07
0.28
0.06
0.14
0.16
0.38
0.25
0.34
0.03
0.10
0.20
0.35
0.24
0.29
0.12
0.31
0.79
0.39
0.25
0.82
0.07
0.21
0.76
0.44
0.08
0.77
Logistic regression of expressing intolerant attitudes
Argentina
Mexico
China
India
South
Africa
Turkey
People of a different race
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
0.807**
0.465***
0.274*
0.300***
0.060
1.450***
Complete primary
0.556*
0.313**
-0.076
0.037
0.094
0.933***
University (degree/non-degree) -0.997
-0.261*
-0.361
-0.211**
-0.210
-1.172***
Wave (ref: 1994-99)
1999-2004
0.015
-0.792***
-0.586***
0.260***
0.605***
-0.225**
2005-2007
-0.838**
-1.375***
-0.563***
0.384***
-0.671***
-0.113
Immigrants/foreign workers
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
0.293
0.363**
0.564***
-0.057
0.258***
1.057
Complete primary
0.409*
0.304**
0.304**
-0.125
0.203*
0.707
University (degree/non-degree) -0.639
-0.414***
-0.270
-0.128
-0.588***
-0.535
Wave (ref: 1994-99)
1999-2004
0.062
-0.867***
-0.342**
0.296***
0.350***
-0.029
2005-2007
-0.584*
-1.189***
-0.165
0.203**
0.291***
-0.251**
People with AIDS
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
0.884***
0.713***
-0.270**
-0.477***
0.317***
1.011***
Complete primary
0.532***
0.716***
-0.138
-0.320**
0.274**
0.732***
University (degree/non-degree) -0.955**
-0.287**
-0.588***
-0.015
-0.480***
-0.819***
Wave (ref: 1994-99)
1999-2004
-0.381**
-0.157*
0.795**
-0.767***
-0.649***
0.472***
2005-2007
-0.895***
-0.687***
0.707***
-0.633***
-2.044***
0.235**
N (observations)
3357
5295
4331
5708
8309
6313
Controls included for sex, labour market activity, age group and marital status. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
35
Table 9
Logistic regression of political engagement (protest politics)
Argentina
Mexico
China
S Africa
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.907***
-0.855***
-0.826***
-0.817***
Complete primary
-0.797***
-0.418***
-0.431***
-0.606***
University (degree/non-degree) 1.020***
0.719***
0.483*
0.855***
Male
0.129
0.316***
0.104
0.333***
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
-0.120
-0.132
0.149
-0.589***
Student
0.456*
-0.157
1.373*
0.008
Unemployed
-0.173
0.042
0.307
-0.146*
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
0.214
0.210
-0.360
0.228**
35-44
0.116
0.122
-0.328
0.223*
45 and over
0.108
0.330**
-0.605*
0.061
Marital status (ref:
married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
-0.163
-0.082
0.047
-0.116
Single/never married
-0.248*
0.021
-0.022
0.019
Religiosity (ref: religious)
Not religious
0.096
0.109
-0.040
Convinced atheist
0.242
0.138
-0.128
Wave
Ref: 94-99
Ref: 94-99
Ref: 89-93
1994-1999
-0.738***
1999-2004
-0.533***
-1.186***
-0.491***
2005-2007
-0.064
-0.505***
-0.991***
Intercept
1.092
1.443***
0.838**
1.501***
Pseudo R-squared
0.070
0.092
0.048
0.081
N (observations)
3,164
4,962
1,892
10,481
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. Only Wave 5 (2005-2007) is available for China.
Turkey
-1.113***
-0.671***
0.703***
0.197**
-0.430***
0.282
-0.090
0.058
0.194
0.052
0.024
0.001
0.396***
3.355**
Ref: 89-93
0.038
-0.115
-0.695***
0.921***
0.100
6,646
36
Table 10
Ordered logistic regression of political interest
Argentina
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.937***
Complete primary
-0.532***
University (degree/non-degree) 0.926***
Male
0.322***
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
-0.141
Student
0.170
Unemployed
-0.179
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
0.090
35-44
0.263
45 and over
0.560***
Marital status (ref:
married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
0.065
Single/never married
0.069
Religiosity (ref: religious)
Not religious
0.012
Convinced atheist
0.448*
Wave
Ref: 94-99
1994-1999
1999-2004
-0.308***
2005-2007
-0.113
Cut point 1
-0.062
Cut point 2
1.508
Cut point 3
3.025
Pseudo R-squared
0.038
N (observations)
3206
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Mexico
India
S Africa
Turkey
-0.626***
-0.368***
0.621***
0.268***
-0.732***
-0.383***
0.172**
0.814***
-0.465***
-0.525***
0.564***
0.503***
-1.126***
-0.464***
0.643***
0.467***
-0.109
0.179
-0.114
-0.137*
0.020
0.077
-0.238***
0.260**
0.047
-0.094
-0.079
-0.030
0.204*
0.350***
0.462***
0.007
0.023
0.094
0.230***
0.343***
0.302***
0.196*
0.284**
0.411***
0.064
-0.018
-0.284**
0.073
-0.159*
0.054
-0.061
-0.066
-0.156*
0.314*
Ref: 94-99
0.162**
0.392**
Ref: 89-93
-0.245***
-0.073
0.022
-0.877
0.536
2.392
0.044
7420
-0.129*
0.038
Ref: 89-93
-0.430***
-0.720***
-0.471***
-1.389
0.010
1.689
0.031
10650
0.053
1.736***
Ref: 89-93
0.443***
-0.299***
-0.348***
-0.866
0.239
2.458
0.054
6703
-0.296***
-0.502***
-1.053
0.542
2.493
0.030
5060
37
Table 11
Ordered logistic regression of attitudes towards democracy as a political
system (1 “very bad” – 4 “very good”)
Argentina
Education (ref: secondary)
Incomplete primary/none
-0.733***
Complete primary
-0.531***
University (degree/non-degree) 0.507***
Male
-0.036
Activity (ref: employed)
Inactive
0.017
Student
0.316
Unemployed
-0.147
Age group (ref: 18-24)
25-34
0.182
35-44
0.112
45 and over
0.375**
Marital status (ref:
married/cohabiting)
Divorced/separated/widowed
0.099
Single/never married
-0.212*
Religiosity (ref: religious)
Not religious
0.087
Convinced atheist
0.370
Wave (ref: 1994-1999)
1999-2004
-0.283**
2005-2007
0.002
Cut point 1
-3.858
Cut point 2
-2.622
Cut point 3
0.032
Pseudo R-squared
0.0226
N (observations)
3043
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Turkey
-0.388***
-0.447***
0.499***
0.017
-0.191*
0.324*
-0.069
0.163
0.380***
0.537***
0.021
-0.009
0.169*
-0.367
0.066
0.487***
-3.721
-2.257
0.253
0.0249
5359
38
Figures
Figure 1a
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a
different race
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 1b
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards immigrants
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 1c
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a
different religion
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
39
Figure 1d
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people who speak
a different language
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 1e
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards homosexuals
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 1f
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people suffering
from AIDS
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central Latin America &
Asia
Caribbean
Incomplete primary/none
Middle East &
North Africa
Complete primary
South Asia
Secondary
Sub-Saharan
Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
40
Figure 2a
Predicted probability of political engagement
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 2b
Predicted probability of political interest
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
41
Figure 3a
Differences in the predicted ‘understanding of democracy’ scores: People
choose their leaders in free elections.
10
9
8
7
6
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East & North Sub-Saharan Africa
Africa
Secondary
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 3b
Differences in the predicted procedural understanding of democracy
scores: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression.
10
9
8
7
6
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 3c
Differences in the predicted procedural understanding of democracy
scores: People can change the laws in referendums.
10
9
8
7
6
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
42
Figure 3d
Differences in the predicted procedural understanding of democracy
scores: Women have the same rights as men.
10
9
8
7
6
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 4a
Differences in the predicted instrumental understanding of democracy
scores: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor.
10
9
8
7
6
5
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 4b
Differences in the predicted instrumental understanding of democracy
scores: People receive state aid for unemployment.
10
9
8
7
6
5
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
43
Figure 4c
Differences in the predicted instrumental understanding of democracy
scores: The economy is prospering.
9
8.5
8
7.5
7
6.5
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 4d
Differences in the predicted instrumental understanding of democracy
scores: Criminals are severely punished.
10
9
8
7
6
5
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
44
Figure 5a
Differences in the predicted authoritarian understanding of democracy
scores: Religious authorities interpret the laws.
10
8
6
4
2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 5b
Differences in the predicted authoritarian understanding of democracy
scores: the army takes over.
10
8
6
4
2
0
East Asia
Europe & Central
Asia
Incomplete primary/none
Latin America &
Caribbean
Complete primary
Middle East &
North Africa
Secondary
Sub-Saharan Africa
University
Predicted scores calculated at the means of all predictors.
45
Figure 6
Predicted probability of political engagement (protest politics)
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
Argentina
Mexico
Incomplete primary/none
China
Complete primary
South Africa
Secondary
Turkey
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 7a
Predicted probability of interest in politics (very interested)
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
Argentina
Mexico
Incomplete primary/none
India
Complete primary
South Africa
Secondary
Turkey
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
Figure 7b
Predicted probability of interest in politics (somewhat interested)
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Argentina
Mexico
Incomplete primary/none
India
Complete primary
South Africa
Secondary
Turkey
University
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
46
Figure 8
Predicted probability of support for democracy (very good)
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Incomplete
primary/none
Complete primary
Argentina
Secondary
University
Turkey
Predicted probabilities calculated at the means of all predictors.
47
Appendix A
Table A1
Highest level of completed education (%)
country
Incomplete primary
/ none
Complete primary
Complete
secondary
University
China
Thailand
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Bulgaria
Romania
Turkey
Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Georgia
Serbia
Mexico
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Peru
Uruguay
Colombia
Guatemala
Egypt
Morocco
Iran
Jordan
Iraq
India
South Africa
Ghana
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mali
Rwanda
Zambia
26.4
14.8
5.9
13.0
3.8
5.5
25.2
12.1
0.7
1.1
1.9
0.7
5.5
19.8
12.2
35.0
27.2
13.2
15.3
5.3
15.3
37.3
67.2
13.4
19.1
29.5
38.4
20.2
33.6
57.8
21.4
61.1
42.5
17.2
25.9
44.0
11.7
13.4
11.7
12.1
10.0
36.6
2.4
2.0
9.4
1.1
16.4
16.7
24.6
13.8
16.1
10.7
23.9
30.1
16.9
9.2
5.8
17.3
13.1
21.2
12.0
8.4
26.1
9.2
12.9
8.3
27.6
8.9
41.4
28.3
48.7
66.0
70.7
60.8
44.9
39.5
62.9
68.1
71.0
64.5
49.2
41.4
49.2
35.5
39.6
55.3
45.9
45.3
50.1
39.3
22.5
45.2
41.2
33.1
27.6
66.4
34.7
27.9
53.7
23.2
27.3
60.4
6.3
13.0
33.7
7.7
13.8
21.5
20.0
11.8
34.0
28.9
17.7
33.7
29.0
22.2
14.0
15.7
17.2
20.8
14.8
19.3
17.7
14.2
4.5
24.2
26.6
16.2
22.0
5.0
5.6
5.0
12.1
7.4
2.5
13.5
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2007.
48
Table A2
Proportion expressing intolerance towards different groups
country
People of a
different race
Immigrants/for
eign workers
China
0.16
0.20
Thailand
0.27
0.43
Indonesia
0.32
0.36
Vietnam
0.35
0.37
Malaysia
0.21
0.57
Bulgaria
0.20
0.18
Romania
0.18
0.17
Turkey
0.28
0.29
Ukraine
0.12
0.19
Russia
0.17
0.31
Moldova
0.24
0.19
Georgia
0.25
0.25
Serbia
0.19
0.26
Mexico
0.08
0.10
Argentina
0.02
0.03
Brazil
0.04
0.07
Chile
0.08
0.09
Peru
0.06
0.06
Uruguay
0.04
0.05
Colombia
0.04
Guatemala
0.05
0.04
Egypt
Morocco
0.23
0.24
Iran
0.31
0.59
Jordan
0.51
0.67
Iraq
India
0.44
0.35
South Africa
0.07
0.24
Ghana
0.22
0.26
Burkina Faso
0.10
0.11
Ethiopia
0.17
0.15
Mali
0.22
0.25
Rwanda
0.37
0.36
Zambia
0.29
0.28
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2007.
People of a
different
religion
0.17
0.27
0.34
0.34
0.22
0.15
0.15
0.32
0.13
0.15
0.26
0.37
0.15
0.14
0.01
0.06
0.05
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.37
0.38
0.52
0.36
0.44
0.03
0.24
0.12
0.15
0.24
0.36
0.26
People who
speak a
different
language
0.14
0.20
0.33
0.35
0.20
0.13
0.12
0.24
0.12
0.13
0.16
0.14
0.10
0.11
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.06
Homosexuals
People with
AIDS
0.68
0.34
0.67
0.29
0.71
0.49
0.61
0.88
0.57
0.65
0.71
0.93
0.72
0.30
0.14
0.22
0.33
0.42
0.16
0.46
0.16
0.76
0.58
0.57
0.45
0.70
0.50
0.39
0.77
0.52
0.58
0.69
0.85
0.61
0.21
0.07
0.15
0.21
0.25
0.11
0.32
0.26
0.495
0.93
0.97
0.67
0.86
0.96
0.40
0.06
0.25
0.10
0.13
0.20
0.40
0.24
0.41
0.43
0.79
0.81
0.82
0.66
0.63
0.73
0.44
0.08
0.47
0.29
0.14
0.42
0.38
0.18
0.26
49
Table A3
Proportion politically engaged or interested in politics
country
China
Thailand
Indonesia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Bulgaria
Romania
Turkey
Ukraine
Russia
Moldova
Georgia
Serbia
Mexico
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Peru
Uruguay
Colombia
Guatemala
Egypt
Morocco
Iran
Jordan
Iraq
India
South Africa
Ghana
Burkina Faso
Ethiopia
Mali
Rwanda
Zambia
Politically engaged
0.55
0.26
0.53
0.30
0.41
0.52
0.42
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.60
0.45
0.68
0.75
0.71
0.86
0.49
0.77
0.63
0.77
0.56
0.23
0.49
0.15
0.60
0.61
0.62
0.59
0.82
0.73
0.74
0.45
0.71
Interested in politics
0.64
0.84
0.36
0.73
0.34
0.43
0.32
0.39
0.49
0.38
0.37
0.55
0.33
0.34
0.24
0.49
0.24
0.22
0.37
0.22
0.23
0.34
0.33
0.46
0.41
0.64
0.44
0.45
0.49
0.62
0.67
0.67
0.55
0.56
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2007.
50
Criminals
punished
Religious
authority
Military rule
Economy
prospering
8.03
6.93
6.51
9.09
6.27
7.96
8.45
8.44
8.17
8.56
7.59
9.21
8.31
5.98
8.83
8.05
7.93
7.40
8.48
7.62
5.27
7.90
8.07
6.63
4.69
6.77
7.15
7.11
7.76
5.96
5.51
6.63
5.37
6.19
4.27
6.46
6.32
5.94
8.34
6.61
4.49
8.39
5.70
7.97
8.87
8.26
7.97
8.80
7.52
8.52
7.58
5.79
6.16
7.84
7.48
6.27
7.16
8.69
6.31
9.32
8.86
7.17
7.35
9.49
8.50
8.14
9.47
8.28
8.77
8.07
6.68
8.44
6.76
7.46
8.52
7.20
8.83
6.20
8.80
9.02
7.11
7.02
9.35
7.82
7.73
8.67
7.60
8.53
7.63
5.77
7.96
5.54
6.48
8.27
6.26
3.89
4.48
6.06
7.83
5.95
2.77
4.74
4.88
4.57
3.19
3.96
4.64
3.99
4.39
4.39
3.78
4.31
4.31
3.58
6.25
4.92
5.63
6.22
5.10
4.18
4.70
5.40
3.95
5.29
4.16
4.18
4.25
5.46
3.32
4.92
3.26
5.14
3.11
8.93
8.04
7.47
8.40
8.10
7.36
6.86
7.01
8.59
8.87
8.03
7.95
7.85
8.57
7.01
6.49
8.46
7.36
8.13
6.66
5.95
5.31
8.24
5.23
5.45
5.83
6.88
8.08
7.74
7.41
7.89
8.30
7.70
6.60
6.67
8.23
7.17
5.95
6.48
8.88
8.04
7.98
8.98
8.65
7.39
8.07
7.88
7.03
8.46
7.78
7.56
7.49
8.32
8.42
7.63
9.20
8.78
7.53
8.00
8.35
7.94
7.65
7.94
7.92
7.04
8.09
5.69
5.31
7.36
5.95
4.17
5.71
4.60
3.81
5.64
5.59
4.30
5.00
6.88
4.17
4.91
7.36
6.69
5.47
4.90
3.06
5.14
5.91
6.19
State aid
Taxing the
rich
China
8.61
8.76
8.03
Thailand
6.94
6.14
6.93
Indonesia
8.71
8.74
6.51
Vietnam
9.08
9.12
9.09
Malaysia
7.10
6.49
6.27
Bulgaria
8.51
7.75
7.96
Romania
9.48
9.28
8.45
Turkey
8.52
8.36
8.44
Ukraine
8.42
8.07
8.17
Russia
8.87
9.13
8.56
Moldova
8.31
8.01
7.59
Georgia
9.22
9.06
9.21
Serbia
8.38
8.00
8.31
Mexico
7.76
6.88
5.98
Argentina
9.34
8.92
8.83
Brazil
8.27
7.36
8.05
Chile
8.51
7.56
7.93
Peru
8.14
7.82
7.40
Uruguay
8.79
7.66
8.48
Colombia
Guatemala
Egypt
9.41
8.52
8.93
Morocco
8.22
7.74
8.04
Iran
8.15
7.70
7.47
Jordan
8.46
8.44
8.40
Iraq
8.78
8.12
8.10
India
8.62
7.95
7.36
South Africa
8.31
7.62
6.86
Ghana
8.52
4.76
7.01
Burkina Faso 8.55
8.12
8.59
Ethiopia
8.67
8.34
8.87
Mali
8.14
7.77
8.03
Rwanda
8.17
7.85
7.95
Zambia
8.11
7.39
7.85
Source: World Values Survey 2005-2007.
Gender
equality
Referenda
Civil rights
country
Mean understanding of democracy scores (1-10)
Free
elections
Table A4
4.24
51
Mean predicted tolerance of homosexuality score (Argentina)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure A1a
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Mean predicted tolerance of homosexuality score (China)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure A1b
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
52
Mean predicted tolerance of homosexuality score (India)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure A1c
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
Mean
predicted
incomplete primary
university
tolerance
of
homosexuality
score
(South
Africa)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Figure A1d
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
53
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a different
race (Mexico)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Figure A2a
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a different
race (India)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Figure A2b
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
54
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a different
race (South Africa)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Figure A2c
1994-1999
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people of a different
race (Turkey)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Figure A2d
2005-2007
1999-2004
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
55
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards immigrants (Mexico)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Figure A3a
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards immigrants (China)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Figure A3b
2005-2007
1999-2004
1994-1999
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
56
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards immigrants (India)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Figure A3c
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards immigrants (South
America)
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Figure A3d
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
57
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people with AIDS
(Mexico)
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Figure A4a
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people with AIDS
(China)
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Figure A4b
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
58
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people with AIDS
(India)
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
Figure A4c
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
incomplete primary
university
Predicted probability of expressing intolerance towards people with AIDS
(Turkey)
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Figure A4d
2005-2007
1994-1999
1999-2004
secondary
primary
2005-2007
incomplete primary
university
59
Appendix B
Education and support for democracy (brief summary of selected literature)
Author
Data
Dependent variable
Inglehart (1997)
42 countries in the
1990 World
Values Survey
sample
Level of democracy in
1995 (Freedom House
Scores)
Kotzian (2011)
World Values
Survey 19951997, 36
countries
Norris (2011)
World Values
Survey 20052007, 43
countries
Support for democracy
(“Is democracy better
than any other form of
government?”1
‘Disagree strongly’, 4
‘Agree strongly’)
Democratic aspirations
(“How important is it
for you to live in a
country that is
governed
democratically?” 1-‘not
at all important’, 10
‘absolutely important’
standardized to 100
points.)
Education variable
Per cent of college-age
population enrolled in
higher education in1988
(World Development
Report 1993)
Continuous 9-point
measure (9=university
degree)
Continuous 9-point
measure (9=university
degree)
Bratton et al
(2005)
Afrobarometer
1999-2001, 12
countries
Support for democracy
(“Democracy is
preferable to any other
form of government” )
No formal schooling;
primary education;
secondary education;
postsecondary education
Evans and
Rose (2007)
Malawi
Afrobarometer
survey, 1999
Support for democracy
(“Democracy is
preferable to any other
form of government” )
No formal schooling, some
primary; primary;
secondary; post-secondary
Evans and
Rose (2012)
Afrobarometer
2005, 18
countries
Support for democracy
(“Democracy is
preferable to any other
form of government” )
No formal schooling, some
primary; primary;
secondary; post-secondary
Jamal (2006)
World Values
Survey (wave
four) data for
Jordan and Egypt
Support for democracy
(“Democracy may
have its problems, but
it is better than any
other form of
government”)
Continuous 9-point
measure (9=university
degree)
Lagos (2008)
Latinobarometro
1995-2006, 18
countries
Support for democracy
(“Democracy is
preferable to any other
form of government” )
Primary; secondary; higher
Effect of education
0.08 (p<0.01), controlling
for the size of the service
sector (as a share of the
GDP in 1988). Ordinary
least squares regression.
0.133 (p<0.001) controlling
for a host of individual and
country level
characteristics. Ordinal
multilevel regression
model.
2.09 (p<0.001) controlling
for age, sex, household
income, news media use,
social trust, associational
activism and country
Human Development
Index. Linear multilevel
regression model.
Per cent agreeing that
‘democracy is always
preferable’ goes up from
62% of those with no
formal schooling to 78% of
those with post-secondary
education.
The effect of education,
controlling for other
individual characteristics,
is positive and significant
at p<0.05. Logistic
regression.
The effect of education,
controlling for other
individual characteristics,
is positive and significant
at p<0.05. Logistic
regression with country
dummies.
The effects of education
are positive and
statistically significant in
both Jordan and Egypt,
controlling for other
individual characteristics.
Per cent agreeing that
democracy is always
preferable goes up from
51% among the lowest
educated to 67% among
the highest educated.
60