Dale Andrade and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D.
A
s the United States ends its third year
of war in Iraq, the military continues to search
for ways to deal with an insurgency that shows no
sign of waning. The specter of Vietnam looms large,
and the media has been filled with comparisons
between the current situation and the “quagmire” of
the Vietnam War. The differences between the two
conflicts are legion, but observers can learn lessons
from the Vietnam experience—if they are judicious
in their search.
For better or worse, Vietnam is the most prominent
historical example of American counterinsurgency
(COIN)—and the longest—so it would be a mistake
to reject it because of its admittedly complex and
controversial nature. An examination of the pacification effort in Vietnam and the evolution of the
Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS) program provides useful insights
into the imperatives of a viable COIN program.
forces were organized into regiments and divisions,
and between 1965 and 1968 the enemy emphasized
main-force war rather than insurgency.1 During the
war the Communists launched three conventional
offensives: the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter
Offensive, and the final offensive in 1975. All were
major campaigns by any standard. Clearly, the insurgency and the enemy main forces had to be dealt
with simultaneously.
When faced with this sort of dual threat, what
is the correct response? Should military planners
gear up for a counterinsurgency, or should they
fight a war aimed at destroying the enemy main
forces? General William C. Westmoreland, the
overall commander of U.S. troops under the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), faced just
such a question. Westmoreland knew very well that
South Vietnam faced twin threats, but he believed
In Vietnam, the U.S. military faced arguably the
most complex, effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag band lurking in the
jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of
standing toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of
these would have been significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat.
When U.S. ground forces intervened in South
Vietnam in 1965, estimates of enemy guerrilla
and Communist Party front strength stood at more
than 300,000. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) and
North Vietnamese main forces numbered almost
230,000—and that number grew to 685,000 by the
time of the Communist victory in 1975. These main
Military Review  March-April 2006
U.S. Army
Twin Threats: Main Forces and
Guerrillas
Unidentified U.S. Army adviser and child in the III Corps
area north of Saigon, date unknown.
10
March-April 2006  Military Review
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
that the enemy main forces were
the most immediate problem. By
way of analogy, he referred to
them as “bully boys with crowbars” who were trying to tear
down the house that was South
Vietnam. The guerrillas and
political cadre, which he called
“termites,” could also destroy
the house, but it would take them
much longer to do it. So while he
clearly understood the need for
pacification, his attention turned
first to the bully boys, whom he
wanted to drive away from the
“house.”2
Westmoreland’s strategy of
chasing the enemy and forcing
him to fight or run (also known CORDS advisers with hamlet chief in Binh Dinh Province, 1969.
as search and destroy) worked in
the sense that it saved South Vietnam from immedi- it into the background. In January 1966, Westmoreate defeat, pushed the enemy main forces from the land wrote, “It is abundantly clear that all political,
populated areas, and temporarily took the initiative military, economic, and security (police) programs
away from the Communists. South Vietnam was must be completely integrated in order to attain any
safe in the short term, and Communist histories kind of success in a country which has been greatly
make clear that the intervention by U.S. troops was weakened by prolonged conflict.”4 He looked to the
a severe blow to their plans.3 In the end, however, enemy for an example of how this was done. “The
there were not enough U.S. troops to do much more Viet Cong, themselves, have learned this lesson
than produce a stalemate. The Communists contin- well. Their integration of efforts surpasses ours by
ued to infiltrate main-force units from neighboring a large order of magnitude.”5
Laos and Cambodia, and they split their forces into
Westmoreland knew that he lacked the forces to
smaller bands that could avoid combat if the battle- wage both a war of attrition and one of pacification,
so he chose the former. The argument over whether
field situation was not in their favor.
The enemy continued to build his strength, and or not this was the right course of action will likely
in January 1968 launched the Tet Offensive, a clear go on forever, but undoubtedly the shape of the war
indication that the Americans could never really changed dramatically after the Tet Offensive. The
hold the initiative. Although attacks on almost every enemy was badly mauled and, despite the political
major city and town were pushed back and as many gains made, militarily lost the initiative for quite
as 50,000 enemy soldiers and guerrillas were killed, some time.
the offensive proved to be a political victory for the
As the Communists withdrew from the Tet battleCommunists, who showed they could mount major fields to lick their wounds, the ensuing lull offered
attacks no matter what the Americans tried to do.
a more propitious environment for a pacification
Counterinsurgency, or pacification as it was plan. Westmoreland never had such an advantage.
more commonly known in Vietnam, was forced When American ground forces entered the war in
to deal with the twin threats of enemy main forces 1965, they faced an enemy on the offensive, but in
and a constant guerrilla presence in the rural areas. June 1968 the new MACV commander, General
MACV campaign plans for the first 2 years of the Creighton W. Abrams, confronted an enemy on the
war show that pacification was as important as ropes. Abrams plainly recognized his advantage
military operations, but battlefield realities forced and implemented a clear-and-hold strategy aimed
CORDS/PHOENIX
at moving into rural enclaves formerly dominated
by the VC. A Communist history of the war notes
that “[b]ecause we did not fully appreciate the new
enemy [allied] schemes and the changes the enemy
made in the conduct of the war and because we
underestimated the enemy’s capabilities and the
strength of his counterattack, when the United States
and its puppets [the South Vietnamese] began to
carry out their ‘clear and hold’ strategy our battlefronts were too slow in shifting over to attacking
the ‘pacification’ program. . . .”6
To cope with the new battlefield situation, the
Communist Politburo in Hanoi revised its strategy in
a document known as COSVN Resolution 9.7 North
Vietnam considered its Tet “general offensive and
uprising” to be a great success that “forced the enemy
[U.S. and South Vietnam] to . . . sink deeper into a
defensive and deadlocked position,” but admitted that
new techniques were required to force the Americans
out of the war.8 Rather than fight U.S. troops directly,
Resolution 9 dictated that guerrilla forces would
disperse and concentrate their efforts on attacking
pacification. The main objective was to outlast the
allies: “We should fight to force the Americans to
withdraw troops, cause the collapse of the puppets
and gain the decisive victory. . . .”9 Implicit in the plan
was a return to more traditional hit-and-run guerrilla
tactics with less emphasis on big battles.
Between late 1968 and 1971 the battle for hearts
and minds went into full swing, and the government
made rapid advances in pacifying the countryside.
Historians and military analysts still debate the
merits of Abrams’s strategy vis-à-vis Westmoreland’s, but the bottom line is that the two generals
faced very different conflicts.10 There was no “correct” way to fight; the war was a fluid affair with the
enemy controlling the operational tempo most of the
time. The successes in pacification during Abrams’
command owed a lot to the severely weakened status
of the VC after the 1968 Tet Offensive. Even so, with
U.S. President Richard Nixon’s order to “Vietnamize” the war, the South Vietnamese would be left
to cope with both the enemy main forces and the
Communist insurgency in the villages. Pacification
alone simply could not do the job.
Essentials of Counterinsurgency
Insurgencies are complex affairs that defy all
attempts at seeking a common denominator. The
Military Review  March-April 2006
counterinsurgent’s strategy will depend on how he
is organized and how he chooses to fight. The enemy
is never static, and every situation will differ from
the next. Still, when an insurgency is stripped to
its essentials, there are some basic points that are
crucial to any COIN effort.
Security forces must be prepared to use armed
force to keep the enemy away from the population.
To conclude that large-scale operations play no role
in COIN is a mistake. The big-unit war of 1965 and
1966 robbed the Communists of a quick victory and
allowed the South Vietnamese breathing space in
which to begin pacifying the countryside. Without
the security generated by military force, pacification
cannot even be attempted.
At the same time, government forces must target
the insurgents’ ability to live and operate freely
among the population. Given time, insurgents will
try to create a clandestine political structure to
replace the government presence in the villages.
Such an infrastructure is the real basis of guerrilla
control during any insurgency; it is the thread that
ties the entire insurgency together. Without a widespread political presence, guerrillas cannot make
many gains, and those they do make cannot be reinforced. Any COIN effort must specifically target the
insurgent infrastructure if it is to win the war.
These objectives—providing security for the
people and targeting the insurgent infrastructure—
form the basis of a credible government campaign to
win hearts and minds. Programs aimed at bringing
a better quality of life to the population, including
things like land reform, medical care, schools, and
agricultural assistance, are crucial if the government
is to offer a viable alternative to the insurgents.
The reality, however, is that nothing can be accomplished without first establishing some semblance
of security.
Key to the entire strategy is the integration of
all efforts toward a single goal. This sounds obvious, but it rarely occurs. In most historical COIN
efforts, military forces concentrated on warfighting
objectives, leaving the job of building schools and
clinics, establishing power grids, and bolstering
local government (popularly referred to today as
nationbuilding) to civilian agencies. The reality is
that neither mission is more important than the other,
and failure to recognize this can be fatal. Virtually
all COIN plans claim they integrate the two: The
11
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
CORDS adviser, Tay Ninh Province, 1969.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan
and the defunct Coalition Provisional Authority
in Iraq were attempts to combine and coordinate
civilian and military agencies, although neither
really accomplished its objective. In this respect,
the development of the CORDS program during
the Vietnam War offers a good example of how to
establish a chain of command incorporating civilian
and military agencies into a focused effort.
Foundation for Successful
Pacification
During the early 1960s, the American advisory
effort in Vietnam aimed at thwarting Communist
influence in the countryside. The attempt failed for
many reasons, but one of the most profound was the
South Vietnamese Government’s inability to extend
security to the country’s countless villages and hamlets. This failure was, of course, the main factor leading to the introduction of American ground forces
and the subsequent rapid expansion of U.S. military
manpower in 1965. (U.S. troop strength grew from
23,300 in late 1964 to 184,300 one year later). The
huge increase in troop strength exacerbated the
already tenuous relationship between the military
mission and pacification. As a result, many officials
argued that the latter was being neglected.
In early 1965, the U.S. side of pacification consisted of several civilian agencies, of which the CIA,
the U.S. Agency for International Development
12
(USAID), the U.S. Information
Service, and the U.S. Department
of State were the most important. Each agency developed its
own program and coordinated it
through the American embassy.
On the military side, the rapid
expansion of troop strength meant
a corresponding increase in the
number of advisers. By early
1966, military advisory teams
worked in all of South Vietnam’s
44 provinces and most of its 243
districts. The extent of the military’s presence in the countryside
made it harder for the civilian-run
pacification program to cope—a
situation made worse because
there was no formal system combining the two efforts.
In the spring of 1966, President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s administration turned its attention toward
pacification in an attempt to make the existing
arrangement work. Official trips to South Vietnam
as well as studies by independent observers claimed
there was little coordination between civilian agencies. Most concluded that the entire system needed
a drastic overhaul. Johnson took a personal interest
in pacification, bringing the weight of his office to
the search for a better way to run the “other war,”
as he called pacification. American ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge received written authority from
the president to “exercise full responsibility” over
the entire advisory effort in Vietnam, using “the
degree of command and control that you consider
appropriate.”11
It was not enough. Westmoreland was cooperative, yet the civilian and military missions simply did
not mesh. After a trip to South Vietnam in November
1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
told Westmoreland, “I don’t think we have done a
thing we can point to that has been effective in five
years. I ask you to show me one area in this country
. . . that we have pacified.”12
McNamara’s observation prompted quick action.
In January 1966, representatives from Washington
agencies concerned with the conduct of the war
met with representatives from the U.S. mission
in Saigon at a conference in Virginia. During the
ensuing discussion, participants acknowledged that
March-April 2006  Military Review
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
CORDS/PHOENIX
Robert Komer (right), with William Colby (center) at MACV Headquarters, date unknown.
simply relying on the ambassador and the MACV
commander to “work things out” would not ensure
pacification cooperation. A single civil-military focus
on pacification was needed; however, the conference
ended without a concrete resolution.13
Although Johnson was displeased by slow progress and foot dragging, the embassy in Saigon continued to resist any changes that would take away its
authority over pacification. Then, at a summit held in
Honolulu in February 1966 with South Vietnamese
President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Nguyen
Cao Ky, Johnson pushed an agenda that tasked the
South Vietnamese Army with area security, allowing
the U.S. military to concentrate mostly on seeking
out enemy main forces. Johnson also demanded
greater American coordination in the pacification
effort and called for a single manager to head the
entire program. In April he assigned Robert W.
Komer, a trusted member of the National Security
Council, the task of coming up with a solution.
Johnson gave Komer a strong mandate that included
unrestrained access to the White House—a key asset
that was put in writing. That authority gave Komer
the clout he needed to bring recalcitrant officials
into line.14
Other steps followed in quick succession. In
August 1966 Komer authored a paper titled “Giving
a New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, Concept,
and Management,” in which he broke the pacification problem into three parts and argued that no
single part could work by itself.15 The first part,
not surprisingly, was security—keeping the main
forces away from the population. In the second
part he advocated breaking the Communists’ hold
on the people with anti-infrastructure operations
and programs designed to win back popular support. The third part stressed the concept of mass; in
Military Review  March-April 2006
other words, pacification had to be large-scale. Only
with a truly massive effort could a turnaround be
achieved, and that was what Johnson required if he
was to maintain public support for the war.
It was Westmoreland himself, however, who
brought the issue to the forefront. Contrary to
popular belief, the MACV commander understood
the need for pacification and, like a good politician,
figured it would be better to have the assignment
under his control than outside of it. On 6 October
1966, despite objections from his staff, he told
Komer: “I’m not asking for the responsibility, but I
believe that my headquarters could take it in stride
and perhaps carry out this important function more
economically and efficiently than the present complex arrangement.”16
Komer lobbied McNamara, arguing that with 90
percent of the resources, it was “obvious” that only
the military “had the clout” to get the job done.
Komer believed that the U.S. Defense Department
(DOD) was “far stronger behind pacification” than
the Department of State and was “infinitely more
dynamic and influential.”17
Now the DOD was on board, but the civilian agencies uniformly opposed the plan. As a compromise,
in November 1966 the Office of Civil Operations
(OCO) was formed, with Deputy Ambassador William Porter in charge. The OCO combined civilian
agencies under one chain of command, but failed
to bring the military into it. The entire plan was
doomed from the start.
The OCO was really no different from the old
way of doing business because it kept the civilian
and military chains of command separate. Johnson
was deeply dissatisfied. So in June 1966 Komer
went to Vietnam to assess the situation. He wrote
that the U.S. Embassy “needs to strengthen its
13
own machinery” for pacification. Komer met with
Westmoreland, and the two agreed on the need for
a single manager. “My problem is not with Westy,
but the reluctant civilian side,” Komer told the
president.18
The Birth of CORDS
In March 1967, Johnson convened a meeting on
Guam and made it clear that OCO was dead and
that Komer’s plan for a single manager would be
implemented. Only the paperwork remained, and
less than 2 months later, on 9 May 1967, National
Security Action Memorandum 362, “Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary
Development),” established Civil Operations and
Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS.19
The new system unambiguously placed the military
in charge of pacification. As MACV commander,
Westmoreland would have three deputies, one of
them a civilian with three-star-equivalent rank in
charge of pacification, and there would be a single
chain of command. Komer took the post of Deputy
for CORDS, which placed him alongside the Deputy
MACV commander, Abrams. Below that, various
other civilians and civilian agencies were integrated
into the military hierarchy, including an assistant
chief of staff for CORDS positioned alongside the
traditional military staff. For the first time, civilians
were embedded within a wartime command and
put in charge of military personnel and resources.
CORDS went into effect immediately and brought
with it a new urgency oriented toward making pacification work in the countryside.20 (See figure 1.)
The new organization did not solve all problems
immediately, and it was not always smooth sailing.
At first Komer attempted to gather as much power as
possible within his office, but Westmoreland made it
clear that his military deputies were more powerful
and performed a broad range of duties, while Komer
had authority only over pacification. In addition,
Westmoreland quashed Komer’s direct access to the
White House, rightly insisting that the chain of command be followed. Westmoreland naturally kept a
close watch over CORDS, occasionally prompting
Komer to complain that he was not yet sure that he
had Westmoreland’s “own full trust and confidence.”21
Their disagreements were few, however, and the
relationship between the MACV commander and
U.S.
AMBASSADOR
CIA
USAID
COMUSMACV
DEPUTY
COMUSMACV
DEPUTY CORDS
DEPUTY
AIR OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF
DIRECTOR
OF MACEVAL
AC of S AC of S AC of S
J2
J3
J1
AC of S
CORDS
AC of S AC of S AC of S AC of S
J5
MA
J4
J6
Source: Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1991).
Figure 1. Structure of U.S. mission showing position of cords, May 1967.
14
March-April 2006  Military Review
CORDS/PHOENIX
PROVINCE SENIOR
ADVISOR
DPSA
SUPPORT SECTION
PLANS AND
OPERATIONS
AREA
DEVELOPMENT
CHIEU
HOI
RD
CADRE
PUBLIC
HEALTH
AGR
PSYOPS
LOG
REF
S5/
PSYWAR
COMMUN
DEV
EDUC
PUBLIC
ADMIN
ENGR
DISTRICT
SENIOR
ADVISOR
YOUTH &
SPORTS
ETHNIC
MINORITY
MATS
CIVIL
AFFAIRS
SEABEES
PUBLIC
SAFETY
RF/PF
OTHER
UNITS
S3
FAC
PHOENIX
SIG
S2
S1/S4
ARVN UNITS
ADVISORS
A&
DSLC
MATS*
*One or more MATS were often supervised directly by the PSA
MILPHAP
Source: Ngo Quang Truong, Indochina Monographs: RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation and Coordination (Washington, D.C.: Army Center of Military
History, 1980), p. 154.
Figure 2. Organization of the cords team at province level.
his new deputy became close and respectful, which
started the new program on the right track.
Time was the crucial ingredient, and eventually
Komer’s assertive personality and Westmoreland’s
increasing trust in his new civilian subordinates
smoothed over many potential problems. According
to one study, “[a] combination of Westmoreland’s
flexibility and Komer’s ability to capitalize on it
through the absence of an intervening layer of command permitted Komer to run an unusual, innovative
program within what otherwise might have been the
overly strict confines of a military staff.”22
With the new organization, almost all pacification programs eventually came under CORDS.
From USAID, CORDS took control of “new life
development” (the catch-all term for an attempt to
improve government responsiveness to villagers’
needs), refugees, National Police, and the Chieu Hoi
program (the “Open Arms” campaign to encourage
Communist personnel in South Vietnam to defect).
The CIA’s Rural Development cadre, MACV’s civic
action and civil affairs, and the Joint U.S. Public
Affairs Office’s field psychological operations also
Military Review  March-April 2006
fell under the CORDS aegis. CORDS assumed
responsibility for reports, evaluations, and field
inspections from all agencies.23
CORDS organization. At corps level, the
CORDS organization was modeled on that of
CORDS at the MACV headquarters. (See figure 2.)
The U.S. military senior adviser, usually a threestar general who also served as the commander of
U.S. forces in the region, had a deputy for CORDS
(DepCORDS), usually a civilian. The DepCORDS
was responsible for supervising military and civilian
plans in support of the South Vietnamese pacification program within the corps area.24
Province advisory teams in the corps area of
responsibility reported directly to the regional
DepCORDS. Each of the 44 provinces in South
Vietnam was headed by a province chief, usually
a South Vietnamese Army or Marine colonel, who
supervised the provincial government apparatus
and commanded the provincial militia as well as
Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF).
The province advisory teams helped the province
chiefs administer the pacification program. The
15
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
health and administration, civil affairs,
education, agriculture, psychological
operations, and logistics. The other part
managed military issues. It helped the
province staff prepare plans and direct
security operations by the territorial
forces and associated support within
the province.
The province chief exercised authority
through district chiefs, and the province
senior adviser supervised district senior
advisers, each of whom had a staff of
about eight members (the actual size
depending on the particular situation in
a district). District-level advisory teams
helped the district chief with civil-miliFormer Viet Cong makes radio appeal calling former comrades to join
tary aspects of the pacification and rural
the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms” returnee) program.
development programs. Also, the district
team (and/or assigned mobile assistance
province chief’s American counterpart was the training teams) advised and trained the RF/PF
province senior adviser, who was either military or located in the district. All members of the province
civilian, depending on the security situation of the team were advisers; they worked closely with the
respective province. The province senior adviser and province chief and his staff, providing advice and
his staff were responsible for advising the province assistance, and coordinating U.S. support.
chief about civil-military aspects of the South VietCORDS gains muscle. Sheer numbers, made posnamese pacification and development programs.
sible by the military’s involvement, made CORDS
The province senior adviser’s staff, composed more effective than earlier pacification efforts. In
of both U.S. military and civilian personnel, was early 1966, about 1,000 U.S. advisers were involved
divided into two parts. The first part handled area in pacification; by September 1969—the highpoint
and community development, including public of the pacification effort in terms of total manpower—7,601 advisers were assigned to
province and district pacification teams.
Of those, 6,464 were military, and 95
percent of those came from the Army.25
CORDS’ ability to bring manpower,
money, and supplies to the countryside
where they were needed was impressive. Some statistics illustrate the point:
Between 1966 and 1970, money spent
on pacification and economic programs
rose from $582 million to $1.5 billion.
Advice and aid to the South Vietnamese
National Police allowed total police
paramilitary strength to climb from
60,000 in 1967 to more than 120,000
in 1971. Aid to the RF/PF grew from a
paltry $300,000 per year in 1966 to over
$1.5 million annually by 1971, enabling
RF/PF adviser and district chief inspect troops in Gia Dinh Province,
total strength to increase by more than
1969.
16
March-April 2006  Military Review
CORDS/PHOENIX
villages was more than just military. Cadre running
the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI) sought to form
a Communist shadow government to supplant the
Saigon regime’s influence.
In 1960, when Hanoi had formed the Viet Cong
movement (formally known as the National Liberation Front), the VCI cadre was its most important
component. Cadre were the building blocks of the
revolution, the mechanism by which the Communists spread their presence throughout South
Vietnam. Cadre did not wear uniforms, yet they
were as crucial to the armed struggle as any AKtoting guerrilla. The cadre spread the VCI from the
regional level down to almost every village and
hamlet in South Vietnam. A preferred tactic was
to kill local government officials as a warning for
others not to come back.
Indeed, the VC’s early success was due to the
VCI cadre, which by 1967 numbered somewhere
between 70,000 and 100,000 throughout South
Vietnam. The VCI was a simple organization. Virtually every village had a cell made up of a Communist Party secretary; a finance and supply unit;
The Phoenix Program
and information and culture, social welfare, and
Within CORDS were scores of programs designed proselytizing sections to gain recruits from among
to enhance South Vietnamese influence in the coun- the civilian population. They answered up a chain
tryside, but security remained paramount. At the root of command, with village cadre answering to the
of pacification’s success or failure was its ability district, then to the province, and finally to a series
to counter the insurgents’ grip on the population. of regional commands which, in turn, took orders
Military operations were designed to keep enemy from Hanoi.
main forces and guerrillas as far from the populaThe Communists consolidated their influence in
tion as possible, but the Communist presence in the the countryside by using a carrot-and-stick approach.
The VCI provided medical treatment,
education, and justice—along with
heavy doses of propaganda—backed
by threats from VC guerrillas. The VC
waged an effective terror campaign
aimed at selected village officials and
authority figures to convince fence-sitters that support for the revolution was
the best course. In short, the VCI was
the Communist alternative to the Saigon
government.
The South Vietnamese Government,
on the other hand, was rarely able to
keep such a presence in the villages, and
when they could, the lack of a permanent
armed force at that level meant that
Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Team in field operations, Tay Ninh Province,
officials were usually limited to daytime
1969.
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
50 percent. By 1971 total territorial militia strength
was around 500,000—about 50 percent of overall
South Vietnamese military strength. Advisory numbers increased correspondingly: In 1967 there were
108 U.S. advisers attached to the militia; in 1969
there were 2,243.”26 The enemy saw this buildup
as a serious threat to his control in the countryside,
and Communist sources consistently cited the need
to attack as central to their strategy.27
What effect did all of this have on the security
situation? Numbers alone do not make for successful pacification, but they are a big step in the right
direction. By placing so much manpower in the villages, the allies were able to confront the guerrillas
consistently, resulting in significant gains by 1970.
Although pacification statistics are complicated
and often misleading, they do indicate that CORDS
affected the insurgency. For example, by early 1970,
93 percent of South Vietnamese lived in “relatively
secure” villages, an increase of almost 20 percent
from the middle of 1968, the year marred by the
Tet Offensive.28
Military Review  March-April 2006
17
U.S. Army
visits only. Unfortunately, in the earliest days of the effort across the board, and the Phoenix program
insurgency (1960 to 1963), when the infrastructure was benefited. Within months all 44 provinces and most
most vulnerable, neither the South Vietnamese nor their of the districts had American Phoenix advisers. This
American advisers understood the VCI’s importance. proved vital to the effort. Only by maintaining a conThey concentrated on fighting the guerrillas who, ironi- stant presence in the countryside—in other words,
cally, grew stronger because of the freedom they gained by mirroring the insurgents—could the government
through the VCI’s strength and influence.
hope to wage an effective counterinsurgency. By
The VCI was nothing less than a second center of 1970 there were 704 U.S. Phoenix advisers throughgravity. By 1965, when the United States intervened out South Vietnam.30
in South Vietnam with ground troops, Communist
For the Phoenix program—as with most other
strength had grown exponentially, forcing Westmore­ things during the war—the Tet Offensive proved
land to deal with the main force threat first and pivotal. The entire pacification program went on
making pacification secondary.
hold as the allies fought to keep the Communists
The U.S. did not completely ignore the VCI. from taking entire cities. If there was any doubt
As early as 1964 the CIA used
before, Tet showed just how
counterterror teams to seek out
crucial the VCI was to the
and destroy cadre hiding in vilinsurgency, for it was the covert
lages. But the CIA had only a
cadres who paved the way for
few dozen Americans devoted
the guerrillas and ensured that
to the task, far too few to have
supplies and replacements were
much effect on tens of thouavailable to sustain the offensands of VCI. The advent of
sive. On the other hand, the
CORDS changed that, and antifailure of the attacks exposed
infrastructure operations began
the VCI and made it vulnerable.
to evolve. In July 1967, the
As a result, anti-infrastructure
Intelligence Coordination and
operations became one of the
Exploitation Program (ICEX)
most important aspects of the
was created. It was basically a
pacification program.
clearinghouse for information
In July 1968, after the enemy
on the VCI, information that
offensive had spent most of its
was then disseminated to district
fury, the allies launched the
advisers.29 Unfortunately, given
Accelerated Pacification Camthe lack of anti-VCI operapaign (APC), which devoted
tions during the first 3 years of
new resources to pacification
Operations under the Phoenix program
the war, little intelligence was sought to target and neutralize members in an attempt to capitalize on
available at the start. A few of the Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI).
post-Tet Communist weakness.
A U.S. Navy SEAL in the Mekong Delta
organizations, such as the RF/ leads away a VC suspect.
While enemy main forces and
PF, actually lived in the villages
guerrillas licked their wounds,
and gathered information, but their main task was they were less able to hinder pacification in the
security, not intelligence gathering.
villages.
Phoenix rising. In December 1967 ICEX was
Under the APC, Phoenix emphasized four aspects
given new emphasis and renamed Phoenix. The in its attack on the VCI:
South Vietnamese side was called Phung Hoang,
● Decentralization of the old ICEX command
after a mythical bird that appeared as a sign of and control (C2) apparatus by placing most of the
prosperity and luck. CORDS made Phoenix a high responsibility on the provinces and districts. This
priority and within weeks expanded intelligence included building intelligence-gathering and intercenters in most of South Vietnam’s provinces.
rogation centers (called district intelligence and
At this stage, the most important part of Phoenix operations coordinating centers, or DIOCCs) in the
was numbers. CORDS expanded the U.S. advisory regions where the VCI operated.
18
March-April 2006  Military Review
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
CORDS/PHOENIX
RF platoon, date and location unknown.
● Establishment of files and dossiers on suspects,
and placing of emphasis on “neutralizing” (capturing, converting, or killing) members of the VCI.
● Institution of rules by which suspected VCI
could be tried and imprisoned.
● Emphasis on local militia and police rather
than the military as the main operational arm of
the program.31
This last aspect was crucial. While military forces
could be used to attack the VCI, they had other pressing responsibilities, and anti-infrastructure operations would always be on the back burner. So the
program concentrated on existing forces that could
be tailored to seek out the VCI, the most important
of these being the RF/PF militia, the National Police,
and Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).
Recruited locally, the RF/PF were ideally suited
to anti-VCI operations because they lived in the
villages. In addition to providing security against
marauding VC guerrillas, the RF/PF reacted to intelligence sent from the DIOCC. The National Police
had two units specially tailored to VCI operations:
the intelligence-gathering Police Special Branch and
the paramilitary National Police Field Force. For
the most part, however, the police did not perform
well, although there were exceptions. PRUs, which
were recruited and trained by the CIA, were the best
action arm available to Phoenix. However, as was
Military Review  March-April 2006
generally the problem with CIA assets, PRUs were
not numerous enough to deal effectively with the
VCI. Never numbering more than 4,000 men nationwide, the PRU also had other paramilitary tasks to
perform and so were not always available.32
DIOCCs. The district was the program’s basic
building block, and the DIOCC was its nerve center.
Each DIOCC was led by a Vietnamese Phung Hoang
chief, aided by an American Phoenix adviser. The
adviser had no authority to order operations; he could
only advise and call on U.S. military support. The
DIOCC was answerable to the Vietnamese district
chief, who in turn reported to the province chief.
DIOCC personnel compiled intelligence on VCI
in their district and made blacklists with data on
VCI members. If possible, the DIOCC sought out a
suspect’s location and planned an operation to capture
him (or her). Once captured, the VCI was taken to the
DIOCC and interrogated, then sent to the province
headquarters for further interrogation and trial.33
Because Phoenix was decentralized, the programs
differed from district to district, and some worked
better than others. Many DIOCCs did little work,
taking months to establish even the most basic
blacklists. In many cases the Phung Hoang chief was
an incompetent bureaucrat who used his position to
enrich himself. Phoenix tried to address this problem
by establishing monthly neutralization quotas, but
19
Misconceptions about
Phoenix
The picture of Phoenix that
emerges is not of a rogue operation,
as it is sometimes accused of being,
but rather of one that operated within
a system of rules. Special laws,
called An Tri, allowed the arrest
and prosecution of suspected communists, but only within the legal PF platoon on guard in Phu My village, Duip Tuong Province, 1970.
system. Moreover, to avoid abuses
such as phony accusations for personal reasons, or
Phoenix was also accused of sometimes targeting
to rein in overzealous officials who might not be civilians, because the VCI did not wear military
diligent enough in pursuing evidence before making uniforms. But the VCI was an integral—indeed
arrests, An Tri required three separate sources of paramount—aspect of the insurgency and a legitievidence to convict any individual targeted for mate target. We Americans should have done a better
neutralization.
job of pointing this out to critics.
If a suspected VCI was found guilty, he or she
Contracting out the dirty work? Another charge
could be held in prison for 2 years, with renewable was that Phoenix relied on other units to neutralize
2-year sentences totaling up to 6 years. While this the VCI. Of the 26,000 VCI killed, 87 percent died
was probably fair on its surface, hardcore VCI were during operations by conventional units. How effecout in 6 years at most and then rejoined the guerrillas. tive was Phoenix if it accounted for only 13 percent
The legal system was never really ironed out. The of those killed in action? A later study found that a
U.S. has the same problem today: Accused terrorists still-low 20 percent of the killed or captured neuheld at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in other prisons tralizations came from Phoenix assets, with most of
fall within a shadowy middle ground that our poli- the rest caught up in sweeps by regular units or by
cymakers and legal system have yet to deal with.
the RF/PF. Both claims are almost irrelevant: Direct
An assassination bureau? Between 1968 and physical action was the conventional force, RF/PF
1972 Phoenix neutralized 81,740 VC, of whom part of a two-part job. The bottom line should have
26,369 were killed. This was a large piece taken been 26,000 VCI permanently eliminated, never
out of the VCI, and between 1969 and 1971 the mind by whom.
program was quite successful in destroying the
Statistics themselves caused problems. During the
VCI in many important areas.35 However, these first 2 years of Phoenix, each province was given a
statistics have been used to suggest that Phoenix monthly quota of VC to neutralize, depending on
was an assassination program. It was not. People the size of the infrastructure in the province. The
were killed, yes, but statistics show that more than quotas were often unrealistic and encouraged false
two-thirds of neutralized VC were captured, not reporting—or the capture of innocent people with
killed. Indeed, only by capturing Viet Cong could whom South Vietnamese officials had a grudge. The
Phoenix develop the intelligence needed to net addi- quotas were lowered in 1969, and thereafter no VC
tional Viet Cong. Abuses did occur, such as torture, could be counted in the total unless he or she had
which U.S. advisers could not always halt, but most been convicted in court.36
advisers understood the adage that dead Viet Cong
Aiming low? Others critics attacked Phoenix
do not tell about live ones.
for netting mostly middle- and low-level VC while
20
March-April 2006  Military Review
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
these often led to fabrications or,
worse, false arrests. In some cases,
district officials accepted bribes from
the VC to release certain suspects.
Some districts released as many as
60 percent of VCI suspects.34`
CORDS/PHOENIX
Texas Tech Vietnam Virtual Archive
ically, the VC practiced the very thing for
which critics excoriated Phoenix—the
assassination of officials. The VC even
imposed quotas. In 1970, for example,
Communist officials near Danang in
northern South Vietnam instructed VC
assassins to “kill 1,400 persons” deemed
to be government “tyrant[s]” and to
“annihilate” anyone involved with the
pacification program.39
Although the anti-infrastructure program did not crush the VCI, in combination with other pacification programs it
probably did hinder insurgent progress.
In Vietnam, with its blend of guerrilla
and main-force war, this was not enough
RF/PF adviser with counterpart in Binh Duong Province, 1969.
to prevail, but it seems clear that without
Phoenix, pacification would have fared
senior leaders eluded capture. In fact, in 1968, far worse. Communist accounts after the war bear this
before the VCI adapted to aggressive pursuit by out. In Vietnam: A History, Stanley Karnow quotes
Phoenix, about 13 percent of neutralizations were the North Vietnamese deputy commander in South
district and higher level cadre. In 1970 and 1971, Vietnam, General Tran Do, as saying that Phoenix was
that figure dropped to about 3 percent.37 The drop, “extremely destructive.”40 Former Viet Cong Minister
however, masks two positive results: Thanks to of Justice Truong Nhu Tang wrote in his memoirs that
Phoenix, ranking VC had been forced to move to “Phoenix was dangerously effective” and that in Hau
safer areas, thereby removing themselves from the Nghia Province west of Saigon, “the Front Infrastruc“sea of the people (which did not negate their abil- ture was virtually eliminated.”41 Nguyen Co Thach,
ity to control village populations, but did make the who became the Vietnamese foreign minister after
job more difficult); and by attacking mid level Viet the war, claimed that “[w]e had many weaknesses
Cong, Phoenix actually severed the link between in the South because of Phoenix.”42
the population and the Party-level cadre calling the
Clearly, the political infrastructure is the basic
shots—a serious blow to the VCI.
building block of almost all insurgencies, and it
must be a high-priority target for the counterinsurCommunist Testimony to
gent from the very beginning. In Vietnam the allies
Phoenix’s Success
faced an insurgency that emphasized political and
In the end, attacking the VCI was not as difficult
military options in equal measure, but before the Tet
as it might seem. The VCI was a secret organizaOffensive weakened the Communists sufficiently
tion, but to be effective in the villages it had to stay
to allow concentration on both main-force warfare
among the population, which made it vulnerable.
and pacification, it was difficult to place sufficient
Guerrillas could melt into the bush; in contrast, the
emphasis on anti-infrastructure operations. Yet in
VCI had to maintain contact with the people.
just 2 years—between 1968 and 1970—the Phoenix
Although they were not completely successful,
anti-infrastructure operations were a serious prob- program made significant progress against the VCI.
lem for the enemy, and he took drastic steps to limit What might have happened had the Americans and
the damage. By 1970, Communist plans repeatedly South Vietnamese begun it in 1960, when the Viet
emphasized attacking the government’s pacification Cong were much weaker?
program and specifically targeted Phoenix officials.38
District and village officials became targets of VC
assassination and terror as the Communists sought to
reassert control over areas lost in 1969 and 1970. Iron-
Military Review  March-April 2006
Assessing Pacification in
Vietnam
Historian Richard A. Hunt characterizes the
achievements of CORDS and the pacification
21
program in Vietnam as “ambiguous.”43 Many highranking civilians and other officials who participated
in the program, such as Komer, CIA director William
Colby, and Westmoreland’s military deputy, General
Bruce Palmer, assert that CORDS made great gains
between 1969 and 1972.44 Some historians disagree
with this assessment, but clearly the program made
some progress in the years following the Tet Offensive. The security situation in many areas improved
dramatically, releasing regular South Vietnamese
troops to do battle with the North Vietnamese and
main-force VC units. The program also spread
Saigon’s influence and increased the government’s
credibility with the South Vietnamese people.
Evidence suggests that one of the reasons Hanoi
launched a major offensive in 1972 was to offset
the progress that South Vietnam had made in pacification and in eliminating the VCI.45 In the long
run, however, those gains proved to be irrelevant.
Although the South Vietnamese, with U.S. advisers and massive air support, successfully blunted
North Vietnam’s 1972 invasion, U.S. forces subsequently withdrew after the signing of the Paris
Peace Accords. When the fighting resumed shortly
after the ceasefire in 1973, South Vietnamese forces
acquitted themselves reasonably well, only to succumb to the final North Vietnamese offensive in
1975. In the end, Communist conventional forces,
not the insurgents, defeated the South Vietnamese.
Lessons Learned
Despite the final outcome, there were lessons to
be learned from Vietnam. The U.S. military applied
some of these lessons to conflicts in the Philippines
and El Salvador during the 1980s, and now that
counterinsurgency is again in vogue, it would be
wise for planners to reexamine pacification operations in Vietnam. The most important lessons to
heed follow:
● Unity of effort is imperative; there must be a
unified structure that combines military and pacification efforts. The pacification program in Vietnam
did not make any headway until the different agencies involved were brought together under a single
manager within the military C2 architecture. Once
CORDS and Phoenix became part of the military
22
chain of command, it was easier to get things done.
The military tends to regard pacification tasks as
something civilian agencies do; however, only the
military has the budget, materiel, and manpower to
get the job done.
● An insurgency thrives only as long as it can
sustain a presence among the population. Make
anti-infrastructure operations a first step in any
COIN plan. Immediately establish an intelligence
capability to identify targets, and use local forces
to go after them.
● Do not keep the anti-infrastructure program a
secret or it will develop a sinister reputation. Tell
the people that the government intends to target the
infrastructure as part of the security program. Locals
must do most of the anti-infrastructure work, with
the Americans staying in the background.
● Establish a clear legal framework for the pacification program, especially the anti-infrastructure
effort. If this is done immediately and the program
is run consistently, people will be more likely to
accept it. Legality was a problem in Vietnam, and
it is clearly a problem today.
● An insurgency will not be defeated on the
battlefield. The fight is for the loyalty of the people,
so establish a government-wide program to better
the lives of people in the countryside. Improvement
must go hand in hand with anti-infrastructure operations, or the population will likely regard government efforts as repressive.
● Above all, Americans must never forget that the
host nation is responsible for maintaining security
and establishing viable institutions that meet the
people’s needs, especially since the host nation
will have to do the heavy lifting for itself after U.S.
forces leave.
These lessons might seem obvious, and it is true
that with hindsight they might be easily identified;
however, in practice, they are hard to execute.
This should not, however, stop us from trying to
apply the lessons learned in Southeast Asia to Iraq
and Afghanistan. CORDS was one of the Vietnam
War’s success stories, and its well-conceived, wellexecuted programs and successful synthesis of civilian and military efforts offer a useful template for
current and future COIN operations. MR
March-April 2006  Military Review
CORDS/PHOENIX
NOTES
1. Thomas C. Thayer, How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam, 1965-72
(Washington, DC: Defense Research Projects Agency, 1975), 788-89.
2. William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
1976), 175.
3. For an important source from the Communist perspective, see Merle L. Pribbenow, trans., Victory in Vietnam: The Official History of the People’s Army of Vietnam,
1954-1975 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
4. Message, Westmoreland Military Advisory Command 0117 to BG James Lawton
Collins, Jr., Washington, 7 January 1966, Westmoreland files, U.S. Army Center of
Military History (CMH), Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
5. Ibid.
6. Pribbenow, 237.
7. Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution 9, 4, 19. English translation available at the Texas Tech Virtual Vietnam Archive, item no. 4080418002.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. The leading source taking the viewpoint that General Creighton Abrams had
the only correct strategy is Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories
and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co., 1999).
11. Lyndon B. Johnson to Henry Cabot Lodge, 28 July 1965, Historians files, CMH,
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
12. Robert S. McNamara, quoted in Military Advisory Command Vietnam Command
History, 1965, 229, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
13. Thomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification Support (Washington, DC:
CMH, 1991), 18-19.
14. National Security Action Memorandum 343 of 28 March 1966 charged Robert
W. Komer with assuring “that adequate plans are prepared and coordinated covering all
aspects [of pacification]. [Komer] will also assure that the Rural Construction/Pacification Program is properly coordinated with the programs for combat force employment
and military operations.”
15. Memorandum from Komer to John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, “Giving A New Thrust to Pacification: Analysis, Concept, and Management,” 7 August 1967.
16. Westmoreland Historical Briefing, 17 October 1966, cited in Scoville, 38.
17. Komer, The Organization and Management of the New Model Pacification
Program, 1966-1969 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1970), 38.
18. Memorandum from Lyndon B. Johnson to Komer, Subject: Second Komer
Trip to Vietnam, 23-29 June 1966, 1 July 1966, 6, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair,
Washington, D.C.
19. Johnson to Komer, National Security Action Memorandum 362, Responsibility
for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development), on-line at <http://www.lbjlib.
utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam362.asp>, accessed 27 March 2006.
20. For more detail on the CORDS organization, see Scoville, Reorganizing for
Pacification Support, 62-68.
21. Ibid., 72.
22. Ibid., 76.
23. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam’s Hearts
and Minds (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 93.
24. The CORDS organization in IV Corps was different. Because there were
fewer U.S. forces in the Mekong Delta than in the other corps areas, IV Corps had
no U.S. three-star general.
25. These figures have been compiled by the authors from several sources. For
statistics on 1969-70, see Jeffrey J. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years,
1965-1973 (Washington, DC: CMH, 1988), 373.
26. Thayer, 884-87.
27. The history of the North Vietnamese 9th Division points out that one of its
primary missions in 1969-1970 was to “frustrate the enemy’s pacification plan.” See
Su Doan 9 [9th Division] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People’s Army
Publishing House], 1990), 100.
28. Hamlet Evaluation Survey (HES) Annual Statistical Analysis, 1968-71, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
29. The Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program (ICEX) was established
by MACV Directive 381-41, “Military Intelligence: Coordination and Exploitation for
Attack on the VC Infrastructure; Short Title: ICEX,” 9 July 1967, Historians files, CMH,
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. For a detailed study of ICEX, see Ralph W. Johnson,
“Phoenix/Phung Hoang: A Study of Wartime Intelligence Management” (Ph.D. diss,
The American University, 1985).
30. Dale Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), Appen. A-2, “Resource Allocations.”
31. Ibid., 87-91.
32. Data on the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) is scarce, but some
useful documents exist. For general information see MACV “Fact Sheet: Provincial
Reconnaissance Units (PRU), RVN,” 16 October 1969. For neutralization statistics
see Thayer, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, 1965-1972, 10 (publishing
information unavailable), 91.
33. Deputy Undersecretary of the Army John Siena to Secretary of Defense Melvin
Laird, Subject: Memorandum of Army Vietnam Trip, 28 August 1969, Historians files,
CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
34. Ibid., 61; Military Advisory Command CORDS-PSD, “Fact Sheet: Legal
Processing of VCI Detainees,” 8 June 1970, 3, Historians’ files, CMH, Fort McNair,
Washington, D.C.
35. Andrade, appen. A-1, “Phoenix/Phung Hoang Neutralization Results.”
36. Phuong Hoang 1970 End of Year Report, 11 May 1971, 4-5, Historians’ files,
CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
37. MACCORDS-PSD, “Fact Sheet,” 2.
38. By mid-1969, U.S. Army division operational reports contained numerous
references to captured enemy plans that aimed to “disrupt pacification,” in particular
the Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) and Phoenix programs, because these
were a constant threat to Communist domination in the villages. See also memorandum to William Colby from Wilbur Wilson, Deputy for CORDS, Subject: Motivation
of [Government of Vietnam] GVN Leadership in the Phung Hoang Program, 24 June
1971, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
39. “Military Activity Plan of Sub-Region 5: July-September 1970, no. 25/KH,”
from captured document log no. 09-1366-70, 3, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair,
Washington, D.C.
40. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), 602.
41. Truong Nhu Tang, A Viet Cong Memoir: An Inside Account of the Vietnam War
and Its Aftermath (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1985), 268.
42. Nguyen Co Thach, cited in Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The
CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 1997), 246.
43. Hunt, 252.
44. Colby, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989); Komer, Bureacracy Does Its
Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam, (Santa Monica:
Rand, R-967-ARPA, 1972); Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America’s Military
Role in Vietnam (New York: Touchstone, 1984). Taking the opposite stance from Colby,
Komer, and Palmer are William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), and William S. Turley, The Second Indochina War
(New York: Mentor, 1987), among others.
45. Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official History
of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. Merele L. Pribbenow (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2002), 283; Hunt, 255.
Dale Andrade is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C., where he is writing the
official volume on U.S. Army combat operations in Vietnam between 1969 and 1973. He is the author of three books on the
Vietnam War: Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990); Spies and Commandos:
How America Lost the Secret War in North Vietnam (University Press of Kansas, 2000), with co-author Kenneth Conboy; and
America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive (University Press of Kansas, 2001).
Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army, Retired, is Director of the Department of Military History, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He received a B.A from Texas A&M University, an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University of
Kansas, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies.
He served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Panama, Japan, and Germany, and was an
adviser in Vietnam to a South Vietnamese Army infantry regiment during the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive. He is
the author of Abandoning Vietnam (University Press of Kansas, 2004), The Battle of An Loc (Indiana University Press, 2005),
and a forthcoming book on the 1968 Tet Offensive to be published by Columbia University Press.
Military Review  March-April 2006
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