Background Report:
The Fulani Herdsmen
Gregory Burton
Project Cyma
November 2016
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KEY FINDINGS
The current conflict in Nigeria between the Fulani herdsmen and their neighbors stems from a
long history of feuding, farming, and herding, and will not easily be resolved. Preexisting
communal conflicts have fueled violence as herdsmen turn militant in the face of urbanization,
desertification, and the indifference of the Nigerian government to their plight. Fulani violence
has taken more lives in the past six months than has Boko Haram, Nigeria’s most prominent
terrorist organization, and it shows no signs of slowing in its deadly pace.
Similarities have been observed between the Fulani militants and Boko Haram, and there have
been accusations of collusion between the two groups. However, these claims appear to be
largely unfounded. Despite certain connections in their methods and spirituality, the two
harbor vastly different aims, and thus are unlikely to be connected. The aim of Boko Haram is to
kill and inspire fear as a way to grasp official control of the northern region from the Nigerian
government, which it sees as the figurehead for a sinful western state. The Fulani militants
simply seek land and notice, and often vengeance.
Solutions to the crisis must address these goals not as the goals of terrorists but as goals that
the militants share with the people from which they have come. When the concerns of the
Fulani as an ethnic group are addressed, it will finally be possible to work toward peace in the
region. In resolving the area’s issues, however, there will be complications, and so the effort will
require communication and compromise on all levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year, the Global Terrorism Index compiles a list of the world’s most deadly terrorist
organizations. In 2013, Nigeria’s Fulani Ethnic Militia did not rank among the top five groups,
having been the cause of only 63 deaths throughout the year. The following year, however, the
militants were responsible for 1,229 deaths, which placed them at number four on the list,
outdone by only the Taliban, the Islamic State, and Boko Haram.1 Since then, the Fulani
militants have continued to cause death and destruction in Nigeria and the neighboring Central
African Republic. In the first quarter of 2016, Fulani militants were responsible for nearly 500
deaths, and have showed no signs of slowing down.2 Despite the havoc that has been wrought
by this group, the Fulani are largely ignored in discussions of world terror, and if mentioned are
overshadowed by Nigeria’s second terror group, Boko Haram. This may not be the case for much
longer, as Boko Haram begins to fall behind the Fulani in terms of casualties, having been
responsible for 330 deaths in early 2016 compared to the Fulani militants’ 488. As such, it has
been predicted that the Fulani might well surpass Boko Haram as Nigeria’s most dangerous
group within the year.
The Fulani militants share some similarities with Boko Haram, as both have plagued the
Nigerian government and populace for years. However, the groups also display marked
differences. While the more infamous terror group wages war against the Nigerian government
and the western way of life, its very name decrying western teachings as anathema to Islam, the
Fulani have simpler goals. The large majority of Fulani are herders, and their attacks, though
sometimes in retribution for the deaths of kinsmen or meant to target rival communities, are
focused on gaining grazeable land for the Fulani cattle. While the Fulani people’s Islamic faith
often sets them at odds with local communities, it is around their herds that the violence is
centered.
As their motivations for violence differ, so do the methods used by the Fulani and Boko Haram.
First and foremost, while Boko Haram targets the northern region of Nigeria, as well as small
parts of neighboring nations, the Fulani have confined their attacks to Nigeria’s middle belt and
some areas of the Central African Republic. In their attacks, the Fulani largely target civilians,
with very few Fulani attacks targeting sites that are solely military or governmental in nature.
Boko Haram targets private citizens as well, but also makes efforts to destabilize the
government and compromise military positions, at points engaging in full-fledged campaigns
against Nigerian armed forces. Additionally, the Fulani militia attacks are conducted primarily
by armed gunmen, focusing on clearing land and inflicting casualties through the use of
firearms. Their counterpart in the north, however, employs suicide bombers, roadside explosive
devices, and has more than once conducted the siege of a protected city. While the two groups
have both had significant impact on Nigeria in recent years, they have done so in vastly
different ways.
Government action has not been forthcoming against the Fulani militants, and bills intended to
resolve issues in the middle belt have been highly contested in the Nigerian legislature.
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2
Global Terrorism Index - 2015. Institute for Economics and Peace. Print.
Batten-Crew, Matt. "Nigeria - May 2016 Update." Acleddata Crisis. ACLED, 6 May 2016. Web.
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Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari has been accused of giving the Fulani preferential
treatment due to his own Fula heritage, and legislation proposed by his party has been met with
suspicion and outrage.3 This legislation, a series of attempts to provide grazing land for the
Fulani herdsmen, has been rejected at least once already, though the government continues its
attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. As of June 8, the Nigerian military was not being
used to counteract the efforts of Fulani militants, and members of the government have
expressed the improbable belief that local police forces have the resources to get the situation
under control.4 Though the seemingly-feeble government response to a recent surge in Fulani
attacks is disheartening to many of its constituents, it is somewhat understandable due to the
host of threats with which Nigeria is dealing.
The Fulani crisis is a unique and emerging one, and will have to be resolved with care, any
possible solutions involving joint efforts by the Fulani, the Nigerian government, and the
people of the middle belt. The motives of the Fulani, while simple, can not be satisfied with any
simple resolution. The Fulani threat will likely continue to rise in coming months as a cycle of
enmity emerges between Fulani and the locals affected by militant action, and the national
government will find itself pressed more and more to intervene. Regardless of how tensions in
the region are alleviated, the solution will have a lasting impact on the region.
3
"Fulani Cows, Grazing Reserve Bill and the Looming Trouble - Vanguard News." Vanguard News. 23 Apr. 2016. Web.
18 June 2016.
4
"Buhari Won't Deploy Military." Riverine News. Web.
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THE FULANI HISTORICALLY
The Fulani in Nigeria are a part of the Peul, or Fula, ethnic group, which has existed in some
form for thousands of years. There are about 20 million Fulani in Africa today, but the largest
community is located in Nigeria, where they make up one of the nation’s largest ethnic groups.
The Fula people are almost solely Muslim, having converted to Islam from their traditional
belief system in the 1500s, and most Fulani maintain a semi-nomadic lifestyle, earning them
the appellation of “Fulani herdsmen.” The current struggle between the Fulani and other
peoples of Nigeria represents the end result of years of conflict between the Fulani and others
in the area and results from many social, economic, and environmental factors that have long
affected the Fulani.
As recently as 1903, there existed a Fula-led empire in West Africa, namely the Sokoto
Caliphate. When this caliphate was abolished by the British, its people remained, and have
endured to the present day. In the modern era, many West African governments have tried to
force the Fulani to abandon their pastoralist, nomadic way of life in favor of a more sedentary
existence, a demand that has not been met with uniform acceptance. 5 Along with governmental
restrictions, drought and desertification have conspired to shrink the amount of land available
in West Africa for Fulani herds, with some sources claiming that nearly half of Nigeria’s land
could be at risk of desertification in the future.6
Today, Nigeria’s Fulani constitute the fourth-largest ethnic group nationally, with a population
of over seven million. Roughly 13 million more Fulani reside outside Nigeria, in surrounding
countries like Niger, Mali, and Guinea.7 In Nigeria, the large majority of Fulani are nomadic, and
as such they have long requested land from the government for the dedicated purpose of
grazing. The Fulani in Nigeria have long competed with other communities like the Hausa for
land, and these conflicts have only increased since the 1999 democratization of Nigeria.
In the past, the Fulani have engaged in fighting with other local groups, specifically the Jukun,
Eggon, and Tiv communities; the disputes with these communities have been primarily focused
around land disputes, though religious concerns have fueled the violence as well. Never before,
however, have Fulani resorted to such widespread terrorist activity. In fact, between 2010 and
2013, only 80 people were killed by Fulani militants compared to more than 1,200 killed in 2014
alone, an escalation for which many factors have been credited. The Nigerian government has
not addressed Fulani concerns, and many Fulani have been forced to leave their lands in recent
years by deforestation, causing them to become unfamiliar with permissible grazing lands,
angering local communities. Additionally, some traditional pathways through which the
conflicts could have been resolved have been eliminated, and cattle rustling in Nigeria has
seriously increased, creating a great danger for Fulani herdsmen, both personally and
economically.
5
"Fulani." - Introduction, Location, Language, Folklore, Religion, Major Holidays, Rites of Passage. Every Culture.
Web. 19 June 2016.
6
"43.3% Land Area Prone to Desertification in Nigeria - Mailafia - Vanguard News." Vanguard News. 08 July 2013.
Web.
7
"Field Listing: Ethnic Groups." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency. Web.
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The history of the Fulani, and their nature as pastoralists, has contributed significantly to the
burgeoning conflict at hand. Generations-old conflicts with neighboring communities are being
dredged up on both sides, with many Fulani attacks contributed to these communal feuds,
either as an initiation of or a reprisal for hostilities. The widespread population of Fulani has
suffered as well, their reputations and their livelihoods challenged by shrinking pastures and
growing resentment due to militant activity. Gone are the days that the Fulani ruled the
farmland of central Nigeria, but the Fula ethnic group still constitutes a major factor in the
area, and they must be taken seriously, both as citizens, in the case of the innocent and
peaceful herdsmen, and, in the case of the militant members of the ethnic group, as a threat to
the fragile region. While any solution must benefit both the citizens and the militants, it is
important to recognize the distinction, and to not let the violence of some pollute the honor
and legacy of others.
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RECENT EVENTS
In October of 2014, the government of Nigeria’s Kogi State announced its plans to build an
international airport in the town of Lokoji. 8 The airport would bolster the regional economy
and create an agricultural hub. It would also monopolize an extensive area of prime grazing
land used largely by Fulani Herdsmen. This event and many like it have deprived the Fulani of
an essential resource, namely land, and the majority of Fulani militants’ efforts aim to reclaim
or repurpose areas for the grazing that is critical to the herdsmen’s livelihoods.
Several Tiv communities in Taraba State’s Gassol Local Government Area were attacked in May
of 2016, leaving 12 dead and nearly 20 more injured. 9 Altogether, 13 houses in the communities
were burned, and fear was such that military and police forces were needed to reestablish a
sense of security in the area. The attacks were all attributed to Fulani militants, and the
motivation behind them was clear: the militants intended to resolve by force an old dispute
about farming rights in the area. Many recent attacks perpetrated by the Fulani have stemmed
from long-standing disagreements, which are likely being finally brought to a head by the
increasing desperation with which the Fulani Herdsmen perceive themselves to facing.
On April 5, 2016, Fulani militants killed four individuals in Benue State. On the tenth of the
same month, they killed 15 in Taraba. Two farmers were killed the very next day by suspected
Fulani Herdsmen, and about 40 were killed in Enugu State on the 25th of the month. There
were nearly 60 significant attacks by Fulani Herdsmen in Nigeria from January 2015 to June
2016, and the frequency of such violence is rising. The number of attacks in the first half of
2016 has nearly equaled the sum of attacks in 2015, and governmental actions intended to
resolve the situation have as yet had little effect.
It is important to note that, despite common misconceptions, many Fulani are not at all
connected with the militants who have been active in Nigeria’s middle belt. While the militants
themselves are primarily herdsmen, the majority of the members of the expansive Fula ethnic
group are solely pastoralists, without connection to militant violence. Even these peaceful
members of the ethnic group, however, are largely viewed with suspicion and anger by the
sedentary peoples through whose land they take their cattle, largely as a result of the actions of
the ethnic group’s militant wing. 10 This tension between herdsmen and farmers has led to some
of the violence on both sides.
8
"Nigeria to Build an International Airport in Kogi, by 2016." Construction Review Online. Group Africa Publishing,
31 Oct. 2014. Web.
9
"Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen." Vanguard News. 09
May 2016. Web.
10
Oduah, Chika. "Deadly Nomad-versus-farmer Conflict Escalates." Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera. Web.
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Figure 1. Fulani Attacks from January 2015 to June 2016
The above map represents data collected by members of the Project Cyma research team regarding
violent acts between January of 2015 and June of 2016. 11
11
Burton, Gregory F. "Fulani Attacks: January 2015 - June 2016." Project Cyma. Web.
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RESPONSES
In response to the increased frequency of Fulani attacks, many Nigerians have been quick to
attribute the violence to ethnic or religious motivations. Though this view appears to be largely
unfounded, it is not unexpected. Nigeria has long been plagued by ethnic and religious
violence, with Boko Haram drawing upon its bleak reading of Islamic scripture and many rural
communities engaging in vicious feuds, so the assumption is reasonable, if not correct. While
the true motivation of the Fulani has been revealed as tied to the interests of their cattle, this
has not stopped many from citing other reasons for the violence, as well as for the seemingly
slow governmental response.
The new wave of Fulani attacks has led to much criticism of the Nigerian national government
as well as state and local governments. As noted above, governmental responses have been
measured, partially due to the many issues that draw focus away from the Fulani attacks, such
as the threats presented by Boko Haram, Ansaru, and the Niger Delta Avengers, but it is likely
that other factors have influenced this reaction as well.12 The situation in central Nigeria is a
fragile one, and the Fulani people make up a significant percentage of the population, so the
Nigerian government must handle the crisis delicately to protect the interests of all involved.
The most serious criticisms of leadership, however, address not reticence but corruption. The
Nigerian military has been accused of failing to act not due to incompetence or patient strategy,
but due to partisan ties within the leadership. At least one group of representatives for the Igbo
people have accused the military of covering up its failures by imprisoning innocents and
blaming impostors for their actions.13 The most serious accusations, though, have been those
directed at President Muhammadu Buhari, himself a member of the Fula ethnicity. Buhari, who
has remained silent in the wakes of attacks like the July 11 Benue Attack, has been accused of
sympathizing with and even directly supporting the actions of Fulani militants.14 Others, while
declaring him innocent of such motives, have attributed his inaction to the difficult politics of
the situation and an overwhelming desire to retain political power.15 Little evidence suggests
that the former is true, while the latter is simply a matter of speculation, but the public, at least
in communities often targeted by Fulani attacks, has come to its own conclusions.
Reactions to recent events have not been limited to criticism and accusations. Oganiru Ndigbo,
or the Igbo Improvement Union, has allegedly filed suit against police and military forces in
Nigeria for their failure to protect the people of Nigeria.16 Other groups, such as the 21st
Century Wilberforce Initiative, have looked outside Nigeria for aid in light of the rise of groups
like Boko Haram and the increasingly deadly Fulani Ethnic Militia. The Wilberforce Initiative in
particular called for U.S. President Barack Obama to appoint a Special Envoy for Nigeria and the
12
"Nigeria's Government Must Ensure Balanced Response." Chatham House. Chatham House. Web.
"DSS And Nigerian Army: The Existential Dangers Of Security Outfits That Serve Ethnic Interests - News Biafra."
News Biafra. 19 Apr. 2016. Web.
14
Awala, Verity. "Reactions Trail FG’s Silence on Fulani Herdsmen Attack on Benue Communities." Information
Nigeria. Web.
15
Yusuf, Omotayo. "Fulani Herdsmen Attack and the Foolishness of Playing Ethnicity." Nigeria News Today. 04 May
2016. Web.
16
Newspaper, Punch. "Group to Sue Police Over Fulani Herdsmen Attack."Sahara Reporters. 01 July 2016. Web.
13
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Lake Chad Region to combat the efforts of such groups.17 Though neither of these attempts
have seen any success yet, they represent the embodiment of a public desire for action.
Though large-scale governmental action has not been forthcoming, the Nigerian government
has not been completely silent on the Fulani issue. The Deputy President of Nigeria’s Senate,
Ike Ekweremadu, has announced his condemnation of the attacks and has called on his Senate
to act. 18 The Governor of Nigeria’s Imo State, Rochas Okorocha, has called for unity and
dismissed the ethnic aspect of the crisis, saying that the Fulani violence “is a national issue that
also requires national approach to resolve” and that “an ethnic coloration… makes the solution
to such problem somewhat difficult.” 19 Furthermore, the police and members of the army have,
to some degree, entered the area in an effort to renew a sense of security.20 While the actions of
the government have not put a stop to Fulani violence, the powers that be in Nigeria have not
been as complacent in the face of this threat as many assert.
Though the Fulani themselves have largely remained silent about the actions of militant
herdsmen, spokespeople representing the ethnic group have on occasion offered justifications
and explanations for goings on in the troubled region. In response to a March 2016 attack on
multiple Agatu communities in Benue State, the National Secretary of a prominent Fulani
organization, Saleh Bayeri, explained that the attacks constituted a reprisal for the death of an
important Fulani at Agatu hands.21 It is important to note that, as part of the attack on Shehu
Abdullahi, the important Fulani, the purported Agatu attackers also killed or stole hundreds of
Fulani cattle. Later, in May of the same year, a series of attacks struck Buruku Local
Government Area in Benue State. While the government initially blamed Libyan herdsmen for
the violence, Fulani in the area took responsibility, claiming the attack as a reprisal for the theft
and killing of over 800 cattle by Tiv youth in the area.22
Apologists for the Fulani cause, like Alhaji Ngelzarma of the Meyatti Allah Cattle Breeders
Association, have blamed politicians like former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan for
ignoring problems facing the Fulani and disregarding proposed solutions.23 Sultan Alhaji
Abubakr of Sokoto, a regional spiritual leader, called for the people of Nigeria to stop blaming
the Fulani for every violent act, acknowledging that, though the Fulani militants were
responsible for some attacks, the Fulani “are only after their [own] cattle.”24 Though the
reasons provided perhaps do not adequately justify such violence, they indicate that the Fulani
militants may not be the only guilty parties in this conflict.
17
"US Lawmaker Pledges to Push for Special Envoy to Nigeria." World Watch Monitor. 12 May 2016. Web.
Bolashodun, Oluwatobi. "Ekweremadu Reacts to Fulani Herdsmen Attack in Enugu." Nigeria News Today. 26 Apr.
2016. Web.
19
Mamah, Emeka, Clifford Ndujihe, Chidi Nkwopara, and Chinenyeh Ozor. "Bloodbath in Enugu as Fulani Herdsmen
Kill 40." Vanguard News. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.
20
"Soldiers, Policemen Take over Communities over Killing of 12 People by Fulani Herdsmen." Vanguard News. 09
May 2016. Web.
21
Mayah, Emmanuel, Sani Turkur, and Hassan Adebayo. "Why We Struck in Agatu - Fulani Herdsmen - Premium
Times Nigeria." Premium Times Nigeria. The Premium Times, 19 Mar. 2016. Web.
22
Okoh, George, and Sunday Okobi. "Herdsmen Attack - We Killed Because Tiv Youths Stole 800 of Our Cows." All
Africa. 16 May 2016. Web.
23
Keobke, Alex. "Even Fulani Herdsmen Blame Jonathan." See Naija. 29 Apr. 2016. Web.
24
Aminu, Mohammed, and Hammed Shittu. "Stop Blaming Fulani Herdsmen for Every Attack, Sultan Tells Nigerians."
This Day Live. This Day, 05 July 2016. Web.
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Recent attacks have demonstrated the growing nature of the Fulani militant threat, and
concurrent developments have increased the need of the Fulani for grazeable land. There has
been insufficient government action to relieve tensions in the central region of Nigeria, and
militants have shown few signs of stopping. All sides in the conflict have their critics and their
defenders, and though blame for the violence may lie primarily with the militants, there is
plenty to go around. Cooperation between innocent citizens, aggrieved Fulani, and the
government will be hard to come by, but the conflict will require multi-level cooperation if it is
to be resolved peacefully.
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FULANI ETHNIC MILITIA vs. BOKO HARAM
Nigeria has seen abundant terrorist activity in recent years, and the Fulani threat is just one of
many. The region faces threats from groups like the Niger Delta Avengers, a militant
organization that opposes oil interests in the river delta, and up until two years ago, when a
ceasefire was declared, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) posed a
threat to the nation as well. The most prominent threat, however, if not the largest, is posed by
Boko Haram and, to a lesser extent its splinter group Ansaru. While the goals of Boko Haram
are not in line with those of the Fulani, there are distinct similarities in their capability to cause
widespread devastation in a troubled country.
Boko Haram and the Fulani, though somewhat similar in the nature of their attacks, differ
greatly in the motivation for their violent acts. The founding tenet of Boko Haram is an
opposition to westernization in Nigeria, with the very name of the group often translated as
“Western Education is Forbidden.” To this end, the group aims to overthrow the Nigerian
government in the northern region of the country, and their attacks have often targeted
strategic locations in the furtherance of this goal. Additionally, Boko Haram often targets
Christians and other non-Muslims, attempting to ensure the region they strive to control is a
purely Islamic one. The Fulani have targeted Christians as well, but their attacks have focused
primarily on rival communities that are Christian rather than non-Muslims in general. The
main goal of the Fulani attacks is to take control of land in order to provide the herdsmen’s
cattle with more grazing room, and their attacks are meant to drive away farmers and
intimidate local landowners. Further Fulani attacks have been reprisal for the deaths of
herdsmen, but the Fulani have aimed to get the attention of the government in order to achieve
their goals rather than attempting to topple it.
The methods and target regions used by the Fulani have differed from those employed by Boko
Haram. The Fulani have focused their attacks in Nigeria’s Middle Belt, particularly Benue,
Kaduna, Nasarawa, Plateau, and Taraba States. Boko Haram, on the other hand, has
concentrated its violence in Borno, Yobe, Kano, and Adamawa States in the north of the
country, as well as the Federal Capital Territory. For the eight years of its active insurgency,
Boko Haram has used bombings, suicide attacks, shootings, and prolonged attacks on cities and
towns to achieve its goals. In contrast, the Fulani have mainly used shootings and physical
confrontations, refraining from conducting bombings or extended assaults. Both terrorist
groups, however, primarily target private citizens, with civilians representing 81% of deaths in
Fulani attacks and 77% in Boko Haram attacks. 25
The line between the two terrorist groups has recently become blurred, especially in the wake
of several attacks in Enugu State in April of 2016. After the attack, rumors have begun to
circulate that those responsible for the violence were not Fulani herdsmen at all, but rather
Boko Haram militants in disguise. Ijaw Youths Council (IYC) Worldwide was one of the
organizations responsible for this theory, asserting that traditional Fulani herdsmen have not
employed such violence in decades past, and that Boko Haram may be using their Fulani guise
25
Global Terrorism Index - 2015. Institute for Economics and Peace. Print.
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as a means of fostering tension and between tribal groups in Nigeria.26 It would not be out of
character for Boko Haram militants to masquerade as members of another group, as suicide
bombers and fighters from the group have previously disguised themselves as women and
pilgrims to avoid scrutiny on several occasions. 27 In fact, alleged Fulani herdsmen captured
after an attack in Taraba State in 2014 confessed that they were in fact agents of Boko Haram,
providing evidence that Boko Haram has done the same thing in the past.28 Other individuals
have expressed suspicion that, while the Fulani are not members of Boko Haram in disguise, the
two groups may be working together in order to sow discord in the already-conflicted region,
though this scenario is unlikely given their vastly different goals and recent attacks on
herdsmen.29, 30
The Fulani militants have been less publicized than Boko Haram, and their attacks, while
deadly, have been on a smaller scale than those of the other terror group. The successes of the
two groups’ respective agendas have differed greatly, however, with some indicators suggesting
that the Fulani are much closer to realizing their goals. Despite Boko Haram’s continued efforts
to subvert the Nigerian government and abolish western ways in the nation, they have not
managed to gain total control over the region as intended. The Fulani attacks, which many
believe focus on gaining land for grazing, have attracted less attention, but have nonetheless
inspired government action, with a contentious grazing bill introduced into the Nigerian
congress. Though, as of June 2016, this bill has not been approved, it signals progress toward
achieving the Fulani ends and inspires hope for the end of Fulani hostilities. This success is
something that Boko Haram has not achieved, and, by the very nature of their goals, will likely
never achieve.
Fulani action has elicited strong responses from members of the public, ranging from the
understandable anger of displaced farmers to stronger outcries that draw from religious or
racial motivation. Because the militants come from a culture that is familiar to many Nigerians,
the actions of militants have turned many citizens against an entire subdivision of their
population in much the same way that Boko Haram and other fundamentalist sects have
inspired the alienation of innocent Muslims. Now that the Fulani militants have increased the
frequency of attacks and killed hundreds more Nigerians, they have often been ascribed the
status as “the next Boko Haram,” a designation which, while ignoring the vast differences in
ideologies, signifies the seriousness of the emerging threat.31 The Fulani Ethnic Militia are not
Boko Haram, and they do not pursue the same goals, but they present as much of a threat to the
average people of Nigeria, and will continue to do so until drastic change occurs in the region.
26
Nwachukwu, John Owen. "Boko Haram Terrorists Disguising as Herdsmen to Kill." Daily Post Nigeria. 27 Apr. 2016.
Web.
27
"Nigerian Troops Nab Boko Haram Fighters Who Disguised as Women."Nigeria News. Nigerian Eye. Web.
28
"Boko Haram Members Disguised As Fulani Herdsmen Arrested In Taraba State." Naija Gists. 23 Apr. 2014. Web.
29
Chandler, Diana. "Boko Haram Aiding Islamic Herdsmen, Expert Says."Baptist Press. Southern Baptist Convention,
29 Apr. 2016. Web.
30
Okpeahior, Kingsley. "30 Fulani Herdsmen Killed By Boko Haram Militants In Borno." Reports Afrique News. 30
Apr. 2016. Web.
31
Akinwotu, Emmanuel. "The next Boko Haram? Nigerian Attacks Raise Fears of New 'terror' Threat." The Guardian.
Guardian News and Media, 12 July 2016. Web.
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ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Motivations for Middle Belt Conflict
The surge of Fulani activity in the middle belt of Nigeria has stemmed from many factors, and
the threat will continue to grow unless these are addressed. These influences are internal and
external, including the needs and actions of the Fulani themselves as well as the actions of local
and national governments, Nigerian farmers, and other outside parties. Despite many
assertions to the contrary, it does not appear that the Fulani militants in central Nigeria are
motivated by ideology, but rather by simpler factors, if not more justifiable ones. The crisis in
the region must be resolved through careful action, beginning with negotiation and
compromise from all involved.
The internal factors that have influenced the Fulani militants who direct attacks in the middle
belt are numerous. Population expansion, both of the Fula people in Nigeria due to immigration
and natural growth, and of the Fulani herds, has necessitated the use of greater and greater
swaths of land for grazing and encampment. This, in tandem with drought and desertification
in the area, has forced the Fulani to range further and further afield, inspiring feuds with many
communities that feel infringed upon. Furthermore, the increasing urbanization of Nigeria has
deprived the pastoralists of valuable grassland, again forcing the Fulani to attempt to expand
their “grass kingdom.”
As a people, the Fulani are overwhelmingly Muslim, and many have attributed the recent
attacks by militants to religious causes. Religious elements have influenced many communal
conflicts related to the Fulani, including recurring disputes with the Tiv, Jukun, and Eggon, all
of whom practice alternate religious traditions, and members of the Fulani-Hausa ethnic group
were implicated in the religiously-motivated 2010 Jos Riots.32 Despite past events, however, it
seems that religious motivations are absent in the most recent attacks by militant herdsmen.
Though the attackers are Muslim, their attacks are not in the name of Islam, but rather in the
name of the cattle that need space to graze.
It is vital when looking at the rising Fulani conflict to understand that the militants responsible
for these attacks are not Boko Haram. They do not pursue an organized agenda against the
Nigerian government, and they do not campaign against westernization. Their goals are much
simpler, and, as such, much more easily addressed. Without the significant religious and
ideological motivations that drive Boko Haram, the Fulani are more likely to accept
compromise, as long as it helps them and their cattle.
External influences have contributed to the conflict as well, coming from multiple sources.
Previously mentioned communal feuds, as with the Tiv who have often been targeted by
militant attacks, have worsened due to actions of all involved, and have provided targets for the
militants, who commonly ascribe attacks to retribution.33 These communities have also
32
Nossiter, Adam. "Toll From Religious and Ethnic Violence in Nigeria Rises to 500." The New York Times. The New
York Times, 08 Mar. 2010. Web.
33
Mkom, John. "10 Killed in Fresh Fulani, Tiv Clash in Taraba - Vanguard News." Vanguard News. 15 Sept. 2015. Web.
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retaliated indiscriminately, failing to distinguish the militants from the herdsmen. This cycle of
violence must be a focus of any attempted resolutions of the conflict at hand.
Governmental action, or the lack thereof, has impacted the rise of the conflict as well. The need
for increased room to graze is not new, and Fulani have previously called upon the government
to rectify the situation. 34 Due in part to ethnic and religious factors, as well as constituency
concerns, there has been little action in the Nigerian government to resolve these problems,
and proposed solutions have been rejected on the same grounds.35 The militants within the
Fulani have grown restless, and their impatience has led them to take violent action. As any
solution must involve the Nigerian government, biases held by both the Fulani and legislators
must be put aside to achieve peace.
What Can Be Done?
As evidenced by the massive human cost of Nigeria’s fastest-growing conflict, an expedient
resolution is necessary. Methods have been proposed by many parties in Nigeria, ranging from
the Fulani themselves to ordinary citizens. Predictably, all of these proposals have their
positives and negatives, and each boasts both promoters and detractors. If a uniformly positive
and uniquely well-received solution exists, it is yet to be discovered, and so any agreement to
end the conflict will require compromise.
Proposed Solutions
One proposed solution to conflict in the region, and perhaps the simplest if most dangerous
option, is the deployment of soldiers to combat Fulani militants. This approach has been
advocated in two manners, some proponents recommending that the military be used as a
defense against attacks and some calling for armed prophylaxis. Alhaji Ikelegbe, the Otaru of
Auchi, advocated the use of soldiers to defend the citizenry, stating that the region would
welcome “any support by government to dislodge these violent people,” concluding that there
was a desperate need for “soldiers to come to the aid of [the] people.”36 Individuals like popular
Nigerian radio host “Freeze” have recommended more extreme action, like the issuance of a
“shoot on sight” order for herdsmen.37 These solutions, while certainly decisive, would likely
only inflame the conflict, and should be kept at best as a last resort.
More peaceful solutions have been proposed which, while remaining authoritative, would allow
for nonviolent resolution of the conflict. One such possibility was proposed by the Chinua
Achebe Center for Leadership and Development, recommending the introduction of a complete
ban on grazing in affected areas and the imposition of strict ranching guidelines on Fulani
herdsmen.38 This proposal, while it would constrain the nomadic lifestyle of the Fulani, calls
34
Shuaib, Shuaib. "Fulani Demand Land Rights." All Africa. 8 Sept. 2012. Web.
Jibueze, Joseph. "Ex-NBA President Rejects Grazing Bill." The Nation Nigeria. 02 May 2016. Web.
36
Ibiwale, Jefferson. "Fulani Herdsmen Attacks: Edo Traditional Rulers Want Military Operatives Deployed." Naij. 06
May 2016. Web.
37
Igwe, H. "Harsh? How Popular Broadcaster Wants Fulani Herdsmen Punished for Killings." Naij. 26 Apr. 2016. Web.
38
"Total Ban Is Only Solution to Recurrent Fulani Herdsmen Terror Attacks – Achebe Center." Lower Niger Congress
USA. 23 May 2016. Web.
35
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upon the government to provide resources for the relocated pastoralists and attempts to
resolve a delicate situation.
Another nonviolent solution was proposed two years ago by a conference held by the National
Judicial Institute, which attempted to resolve communal conflicts between herdsmen and
farmers. The conference recommended the establishment of long-term cattle trails and grazing
routes, and, like the Achebe Center recommendation, placed emphasis on the importance of
establishing ranches. 39 Furthermore, this report advised that traditional rulers be tasked with
resolving conflicts between the Fulani and local farmers, with additional arbitration methods
available to them if they should fail.40 This would encounter logistical issues, and may not be
well received by any parties involved, but would provide reasonable concessions to all parties
involved. Members of the Fula ethnic group have offered solutions similar to those
recommended by the National Conference, but these have been similarly ignored in recent
years. In 2013, the Miyette Allah Cattle Rearers Association called on the Nigerian government
to create grazing routes throughout Nigeria in order to end conflict between herdsmen and
farmers. 41 As the report and suggestions were issued prior to the surge in tensions in the
region, recommendations would have to be reexamined in light of recent events, but could still
prove quite useful.
The most prominent proposal to combat the conflict in the region, as well as the most
controversial one, takes the form of the National Grazing Bill that has been submitted in the
Nigerian legislature. The bill undertakes to establish a Grazing Reserve made of federal land
and land deemed necessary by the commission that it would create as a regulatory body.42 It
would endow such a commission with limited powers of eminent domain, aiming to create
paths for Fulani to use in order to assuage the tensions that have led to violence. Met with
anger and objection by many, it has been outright rejected by some local leaders and
legislators.43 The primary oppositions to it focus on the potential seizure of land and the
perceived slant towards the aggressing militants, though some reactions have been stronger,
with one former minister declaring the bill to be “more evil than the deadly Boko Haram
insurgency.”44 Though the bill has failed once already, fears pertaining to it abound, and it is
considered by many not to be viable as a solution to the crisis.45
Potential Alternatives
Though many solutions have been proposed, each has its drawbacks, and none are universally
accepted. There is, of course, no perfect way to resolve a conflict of this scale, but the ideal
peace will be built from elements of many proposals. The concerns of the Fulani must be taken
39
National Conference 2014 Report. 5.1.8.1a. Rep. Abuja, Nigeria: National Conference, 2014. Print.
Ibid.
41
Duru, Peter. "Fulani Herdsmen Proffer Solution to Clashes with Tiv."Vanguard News. 06 Jan. 2013. Web.
42
Udegbe, Clement. "The National Grazing Bill." All Africa. 22 Apr. 2016. Web.
43
Gbolagunte, Bamigbola. "Afenifere, Mimiko Reject Grazing Commission Bill." The Sun News. Sun News Nigeria, 15
Apr. 2016. Web.
44
Olu-Kayode, Olufemi. "National Grazing Bill More Evil than Boko Haram."Naij. 19 Apr. 2016. Web.
45
Nwankwo, Arthur Agwuncha. "The National Grazing Reserve Bill And Islamization Of Nigeria: Matters Arising By
Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo." Sahara Reporters. 29 Apr. 2016. Web.
40
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into account for violence to end, and the underlying causes of such concerns must also be
addressed. Furthermore, preventative measures must be enacted in order to prevent such a
crisis from emerging again in the future.
It seems clear that any agreement must begin with a ceasefire and a gift of amnesty. Those who
have been imprisoned for their actions must be fairly tried, and governing bodies in the region
must refrain from pursuing legal action against those who lay down their arms to accept a
cessation of hostilities. The Fulani represent too large a group to be punished as a whole for
their actions, and such punishment would likely only lead to later violence. Additionally, it may
be nearly impossible to distinguish the militant herdsmen from the peaceful herdsmen once a
peace has been reached, and so anything but amnesty would be an exercise in futility.
In order to resolve the symptoms of the problem at hand, the government should establish
ranches and grazing paths, as recommended by the National Conference and others, but it
should ensure that land is acquired as carefully and fairly as possible. Stricter penalties must be
established for the use of land not designated as grazeable, and these must be determinedly
enforced to prevent future conflict between herdsmen and farmers. To ease the transition and
migration to the proper areas, the national government could provide subsidies to keep the
prices of food low for Fulani cattle.
The solution cannot end with the symptoms, however; it must address the root causes of the
conflict. While desertification and population problems cannot be easily combatted, communal
conflicts can be resolved. The government must appoint impartial arbiters to settle known
disputes between the Fulani and other communities, and must commission studies to identify
other disputes for immediate resolution as well. The Fulani themselves could be called upon to
aid in reconciliation, and must participate in recovery efforts in the battered region.
Cooperation between the communities must be fostered by local leaders, thus reducing the
potential for a resurgence of militant activity. Every step in the recovery process will require
compromise and cooperation, and resolution of the crisis in the middle belt will be a difficult
task that can only be accomplished if bias is set aside and the interests of all Nigerians are
considered.
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CONCLUSION
In Nigeria’s middle belt, a crisis grows daily, and it must be resolved for danger of further loss of
prosperity, property, and life. The region’s conflict has been growing for a long time, and it is
not easily managed. Numerous factors are at play in central Nigeria, and each of them
complicates the embattled climate. For tensions in the area to be fully relieved, the causes of
the conflict - internal and external - will have to be addressed along with the damage to which
it has led.
It is unlikely that the Fulani militants will allow tensions in the middle belt to decline until
either they are stopped or their grievances are addressed. Since stopping the violence without
negotiation and compromise would result in great loss of life and could worsen the situation, it
is in the best interest of both the militants and the government to cooperate with one another.
The militants do not seek to destroy the government as some of Nigeria’s terrorist groups do, so
the powers that be in the nation have little to fear by resorting to negotiations. The Fulani
themselves can benefit from talks with the government as well, perhaps achieving their end
goal, if in a diminished form.
A long history has led to the recent events in central Nigeria, and it has created a dangerous
problem, but one that can be solved with care. Those affected will have to stop casting
accusations and blame and begin to work together toward peace in the region. There may be a
long period of tension and recovery, but the threat of Fulani militants only grows as their true
goals are ignored, and so the work towards an answer must begin now. The solution may be
simple or it may be infinitely complex, but it surely must start with a recognition of others not
as militant and victim, Muslim and Christian, or herdsman and farmer, but as citizen and
citizen, each with needs and concerns that must be weighed.
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