Committee of Ministers
of the
Council of Europe
Topic Area B: The rise of populist
nationalism and the risk to human
rights and security in Europe
The rise of populist nationalism and the risk to human
Council of Europe - Topic Area B
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Topic Area B: The rise of populist nationalism and the risk
to human rights and security in Europe
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Welcoming Letter …………….………….………………………………………..3
2. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe …………………………4
3. Introduction to the Agenda Item ……………………..………………………..…5
4. Clarification of Important Terms …………………..………………………….6
4.1 Nationalism ………………..……………………..……………………………..7
4.2 Populism ……………………..……………………..……………………..……7
5. Topic Analysis …………………..……………………..………………………..7
5.1 A threat to Human Rights ……………………..……………………..…………7
5.2 A threat to Security ……………………..……………………..………………..8
5.3 Why is populist nationalism different from populism? ………………………..9
6. Historical Background ……………………..……………………..…………….11
7. National Populism in the 21st century ……………………..…………………..12
7.1 The rise of populist nationalism ……………………..…………………….….12
7.1.1 The case of Greece ……..……………………..…………………………..13
7.1.2 The case of Turkey ……………………..……………………..…………..14
7.1.3 The case of France ……………………..……………………..……….…..14
7.1.4 The case of Hungary ……..……………………..…………………………14
7.1.5 The case of Poland ……..……………………..……………………..……17
7.1.6 The case of the UK and the Brexit ……..……………………..…………..17
8. The causes of populist nationalism .……………………..………………………18
8.1 The Financial Crisis .……………………..……………………..……………..18
8.2 Democratic Deficit .……………………..……………………..………………20
8.3 Immigration .……………………..……………………..……………………..21
8.4 Terrorism …..……………………..………..……………………..…………23
8.5 Globalization ……..……………………..………..……………………..……..24
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9. The consequences of populist nationalism to Human Rights …..……………24
9.1 Racism & Xenophobia …..……………………..…..………………………..24
9.2 Media Freedom & Freedom of Expression …..………………………………25
9.3 Freedom of Religion ………………………………………………………….26
10.
The consequences of populist nationalism to Security in Europe ………27
10.1 Democratic Contestation …………………………………………………….27
10.2 Isolationism ………………………………………………………………….28
10.3 Provocation of the popular feeling ……………………………………..……28
11.
International Legal Framework …………………………………………..29
12.
The Council’s of Europe Framework …………………………………….31
13.
Conclusion …………………………………………………………….……33
14.
Points to be Addressed ………………………………………………….…34
15.
Bibliography ……………………………………………………………….35
1. Welcoming Letter
Distinguished Ministers,
We would like to express our warmest welcome to all of you that will soon embrace the ThessISMUN 2017 journey with us, as Ministers of the Council of Europe! We are convinced that each and every one of you will have a significant
role in shaping this year’s CoE experience and thus, we would like to provide you
with some guidelines in order to ensure that your participation will be memorable.
The Study Guide at hand will help you throughout the course of your preparation
for the conference from now on. However, we need to stress the importance of
conducting your own research, prior to the committee’s sessions. This year’s
agenda consists of items, of exceptional importance that are currently affecting
the international community in numerous ways. This means that you will have to
dedicate your time on researching and studying in-depth the issues that will concern us during the conference so as to meet the expectations of the debate.
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We have to underline that we will firmly seek the engagement of all of you
in the debate and the committee work, so please, do not hesitate to disturb us for
anything you may need. We can assure you that we will remain at your disposal
during your preparation and your time in the committee, for any inquiries that
may arise. With regards to your share of responsibility, we kindly ask you to be
punctual and respect the given deadlines as a sign of fruitful cooperation.
Once again, we welcome you to the Committee of Ministers of the Council
of Europe of ThessISMUN 2017! Let us make wonderful memories together.
Best Regards,
Kontra Andrianna, President
Jason Lavdas, Vice-President
Kostas Kourtelis, Secretary General
2. The Committee of Ministers (CM) of the Council of Europe
The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 by the Treaty of London and is based
in Strasbourg, France. It is a regional intergovernmental organization with 47
member states, 28 of which are members of the European Union, and 6 observer
states. The CoE has three key areas of concern: Human Rights, Democracy and
the Rule of Law. Its two statutory and decision-making bodies are the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers.
Quoting the Article 1(a) of its statute: “The aim of the Council of Europe is to
achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and
realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.” 1
The Committee of Ministers acts on behalf of the CoE and each member state is
entitled to one representative, which must be a Minister of Foreign Affairs, and is
given one vote. Each member state chairs the Committee for a six-month period
in alphabetical order, with the chairmanship passing each year in November and
1
Council
of
Europe,
Statute
of
the
Council
of
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/RoP/Statut_CE_2015-EN.pdf, last accessed on: 09/12/16.
Council of Europe - Topic Area B
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May. The CoE is responsible for the adoption of common policies for particular
matters that concern all member states. Particularly, it promotes human rights
by signing international conventions; it monitors the progress of member states
in the aforementioned areas and their compliance with their undertakings. It is
authorized to recommend ways in which the member states can improve by using independent expert monitoring bodies. The decisions of the Committee of
Ministers require a two-third majority of votes in order for them to pass, since
the simple majority can only ensure the implementation of procedural rules.
3. Introduction to the Agenda Item
“On the surface nothing trembled, no walls collapsed,
even the windows remained intact,
but the earth moved in the depths”.
Epstein 1996:20
The past few years have awakened the European continent. The threats that Europe is facing are no longer imaginary or remote. We can see that Europe is at its
crossroads. What is it to blame? Is it the unrestrained influx of immigrants and
refugees? Or maybe it’s the increasing frequency of terrorist attacks that have
cost the lives of thousands of people? Some may say that the financial crises that
some European states are struggling with are causing a domino effect and hence,
damaging the whole European family. Although the typical causation is the interaction of all the aforementioned phenomena, we can advocate that whichever the
case, the aftereffect of the crisis is now beginning to show and it’s not other than
populist nationalism.
Populist Nationalism is a diverse and complex phenomenon with a variety of parameters that define its date of birth, its roots and its consequences. Depending
on the national context of each country, it can do more or less damage, but no
nation is immune. By observing the economic, social and cultural components of
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a state, we can usually predict if Populist Nationalism has a fertile ground in
which it can flourish and spread.
The complexity of the issue lies on the etymology of the phrase: It is composed
of two different concepts, namely Nationalism and Populism, which interrelate
and create an explosive mixture of nationalist behavior with the support of
populist methods. It is said that National Populism was a leading actor at the
Brexit campaign, which determined the future of the UK in the European Union.
It holds responsibility for the National Front’s increasingly high reputation in
France and for the implementation of laws that are discriminatory and antiEuropean in Poland and Hungary with regards to immigrants and refugees. National Populism opened the way for Donald Trump2 to be the next President of
the US and ensured the rise of SYRIZA (a left-wing Greek coalition) in power3.
We can see populist nationalism prevailing and spreading rapidly across the continent like a disease and this is what makes the issue of paramount importance.
Each member state has to engage in debates to detect, examine and tackle the
phenomenon in their countries and foremost give a collective response with the
adoption
of
policies
within
the
framework
of
the
Committee.
4. Clarification of Important Terms
Before proceeding with the explanation of the historical background, that will
enable us to understand why Populist Nationalism inflamed in the 21st century,
it is wise to clarify some of the most important terms that you will come across
with during your research. We will also pursue the diversification of “Populist
2
Müller, J. (2016). Trump, Erdoğan, Farage: The attractions of populism for politicians, the dangers for
democracy.
[online]
the
Guardian.
Available
at:
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/02/trump-erdogan-farage-the-attractions-ofpopulism-for-politicians-the-dangers-for-democracy [Accessed 7 Jan. 2017].
3 Katsambekis, G. (2016). Radical Left Populism in Contemporary Greece: Syriza's Trajectory from Minoritarian Opposition to Power. [online] Wiley Online Library.
Available at:
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8675.12234/full [Accessed 7 Jan. 2017].
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Nationalism” to the traditional term “Populism” and further elaborate on the elements that differentiate Populist Nationalism from Populism itself.
4.1 Nationalism
As defined by Oxford Dictionary of Politics, it is a primarily political principle
which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent 4.
The Oxford Dictionary defines Nationalism as “patriotic feelings, principles or efforts”, “advocacy of political independence for a particular country” and “an extreme form of this, especially marked by a feeling of superiority over other countries”5.
4.2 Populism
Populism is understood as “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be
ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the pure
people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.”6
5. Topic Analysis
5.1 A threat to Human Rights
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights is a milestone in human rights
history. The definition stems from this Declaration: “Human rights are universal
legal guarantees protecting individuals and groups against actions and omissions
that interfere with fundamental freedoms, entitlements and human dignity. Hu-
4
McLean, I. and McMillan, A. (2009).Nationalism. In: Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 3rd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, p.357.
5 Oxford Dictionaries | English.(2016). nationalism - definition of nationalism in English | Oxford Dictionaries. [online] Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/nationalism [Accessed 10
Dec. 2016].
6 Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. 1st ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p.23.
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man rights law obliges Governments (principally) and other duty-bearers to do
certain things and prevents them from doing others7.”
The Human Rights that Populist Nationalism directly affects and can cause great
damage at, are:
1. The right to equal protection from the law
2. The right to just and favorable working conditions
3. The right to adequate food, housing and social security
4. Freedom of association, expression, assembly and movement
5. The right to life, liberty and security of a person
6. The right to education
5.2 A threat to Security
The United Nations Commission on Human Security has defined the notion of
Human Security as “…to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that
enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means
protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and
situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and
cultural systems that together give the people the building blocks of survival,
livelihood and dignity.”8
Although this definition of Human Security is illuminating, we have to make
something clear. In respect to our agenda item we have to focus on how populist
nationalism is threatening the secure democratic institutions in Europe and
how it can create turmoil in democratic states which can ultimately abandon
7 Frequently asked questions on Human Rights.(2006).
8. [online] Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf [Accessed 10 Dec. 2016].
8 Commission on Human Security, (2003).Human Security Now. [online] New York: Commission on
Human
Security,
p.12.
Available
at:
http://www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_final_report__english.pdf [Accessed 10 Dec. 2016].
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or alienate the European ideals. These are the ways in which, inter alia, populist
nationalism can risk security in Europe.
5.3 Why is populist nationalism different from populism?
The trickiness of defining the word “nation” is leading to a confusion when it
comes to nationalism. Making it more simple, we could say that nationalism is an
ideology, a behavior or a feeling that gives a nation a sense of unity by imposing
on them the same set of identities (linguistic, historical, cultural) which make
people feel that they are different from others. But populist nationalism differs as
a concept from populism or Nationalism themselves. As we described earlier,
populism is an ideology that separates society into two groups: the people and
the corrupt. Populism wants the government to be replaced by a leader and the
people to be replaced by a crowd. Populists, often but not always charismatic,
proclaim that they have a special connection with “the people”. They simplify political reality by implicating the “corrupt elites” for all the suffering of the world.
By overthrowing the elites, justice will be restored and the leader of the Populist
Party will be in place to implement the general will of the people. Populists pose
a threat to democracy as they use democratic institutions (elections, parliaments) to try and establish an anti-democratic political scene. As we understand,
populist ideologies are not a concept that fades in the course of time. Populist
practises and norms prevail in all societies timelessly and can be detected regardless the economic, political, social or cultural status of a country. Demagogy is an
inter-temporal practise with timeless value for those who seek to provoke “the
people”, with –most of the time- mendacious propaganda, in order to gain power.
The case for National Populism is different. The “national” element gives a certain orientation to demagogues that follow, more or less, a specific agenda which
indicates who the enemy is. Depending on the party’s or movement’s ideology
(right or left) national populism targets different social groups and implicates
different factors for social illnesses. As we’ll explain below, national populism
can be detected at both right-wing and left-wing parties and movements. But the
risks Europe is now facing, namely terrorism, uncontrollable immigration, lack of
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trust to democratic institutions and the financial crisis is causing mostly rightwing national populism to rise.
National populists in the 21st century have developed a discourse which, in short,
argues that:
1. The process of European integration has to slow down or completely
stop and that powers must be returned to national governments·
2. All things evil are linked to globalization which is a multifaceted enemy·
3. Non-European immigrants are not welcome to their countries while the
immigrant communities and mostly Muslims are being attacked·
4. National elites are the true culprits for the suffering of “the people”·
5. Representative democracy is dysfunctional and needs to be replaced
with Direct democracy which will include plethora of referendums·
6. Nations are in danger as western-values (ranging from materialism to
human rights) are undermining national values, traditions and identities·
7. Homosexuals are part of the perverted internal enemy·
8. The media acts like puppets of the established parties and behave with
an unpatriotic manner.
This said, we now have a well-defined framework which explains why populist
nationalism is rising and hence, why it poses great threats to European democracies.
6. Historical Background
In this chapter, we will try to give you some insight into the background of Populism and Nationalism, which both have a long history in Europe. Although the
combination of these two elements, namely populist nationalism, has been detected as a phenomenon in Europe since the late 19 th century, when the “Narodniks” in Russia rebelled against the Tsar, we could say that the National Populism
thrives and has an actual impact only when people feel threatened, justifiably or
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not, by an external enemy (e.g. immigrants, technocratic Brussels, neo-liberal
capitalist system).
Many say that nationalism was born during the French Revolution which played
a crucial role in the creation of modern nation-states. Following the example of
the French people, many Revolutions took place during the 19 th century from nations claiming their independence. National identity became an idea strong
enough to unite people in the fight against their emperors while seeking national
political autonomy and self-determination. The power of nationalism also prevailed in the First and Second World War that reshaped the European status quo
while triggering civil wars throughout Eastern Europe. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, liberal democracies were to be established in post-communist
states. Nationalism was vindicated and many of the newly liberated democracies
now viewed the European family’s ideals in a positive light. Nevertheless, nationalistic elements that turned down openness did not vanish from the political
scene. Scholars indicate that from the 1990’s, right-wing populist parties became
established in the legislatures of various democracies including France, Russia,
Austria, the Netherlands and Italy9 (Norris, 2005). Since then, there have been
times when nationalists participated in government coalitions but without having a great capacity to implement their party’s policies. The turning point for nationalists came after the first decade of the 21st century, namely 2010, when the
European debt crisis erupted and quickly deteriorated the standard of living for
many countries in the European continent. It was that moment when nationalism
and populism joined forces and articulated dangerous rhetoric that allayed
the fears of the people; the ground was now fertile for them to win the trust of
the
disappointed,
the
frightened
and
the
indignant.
With regard to populism, it is hard to define its birth date as it is more of a
political doctrine that is being adopted from parties and movements in different
forms for attaining different targets throughout the course of history. Populism
9
Norris, P. (2005). Radical right. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
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has been adopted from movements and parties since the late 19 th century when
these entities began to establish themselves politically and legally. Since then,
populist rhetoric appeared in numerous political campaigns and political parties/movements· it was even adopted from people just fighting for a greater
cause. Nevertheless, populists never had great appeal to “the people”. History
has shown that populist methods have a direct impact on shaping public opinion
only if a crisis, of whichever kind, arises. Thus, as with the issue of nationalism,
populism multiplied dangerously in the 21st century.
We could say that, National Populism is a modern phenomenon of recycled conservatism with radical tendencies that arose from the ashes of the financial crisis
and from the impoverishment of the popular strata. Its sudden strength became
evident for the first time in modern history when SYRIZA won the 2015 parliamentary elections in Greece10, followed by the “Leave Vote” at the Brexit referendum in the UK.
7. Populist Nationalism in the 21st century
The purpose of this division is to closely examine Populist Nationalism and the
threats it poses to human rights and security across Europe.
7.1 The rise of Populist Nationalism
If we picture the broader European context, we can firmly support that national
populist movements are on the rise. Most experts argue that the upsurge of this
phenomenon is strongly related to the European debt crisis that emerged in
2009 after the Great recession1112. Sure enough, the current European reality
10
Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G. (2016). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: the case
of SYRIZA: Journal of Political Ideologies: Vol 19, No 2. [online] Tandfonline.com. Available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2014.909266?src=recsys [Accessed 12 Dec.
2016].
11 Mudde, Cas and Petros Papasarantopoulos. 2016. SYRIZA. 1st ed. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
12 Anduiza, Eva and Rico Guillem. 2016. Economic Correlates Of Populist Attitudes: An Analysis Of Nine
European
Countries.
Ebook.
1st
ed.
Universitat
Autònoma
de
Barcelona.
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proves that these assumptions are true. One of the cases in which, inter alia, this
has been proven, is the case of Greece.
7.1.1 The case of Greece
Greece is one of the few cases in Europe where populist nationalism has become
a useful tool of a party belonging to the left of the political spectrum. In January
2015, the left-wing populist coalition named SYRIZA won the parliamentary elections gaining 36,34% of the votes. As they were in need of forming a coalition so
as to govern the country, they formed an alliance with ANEL (Independent
Greeks) which has been characterized a right-wing populist party. In Greece,
though, it is not only the parties that are leading the country which have been
exercising populism, as the surprisingly high uprising of the Golden Dawn, a neoNazi populist fascist party which won the 6,28% of the votes, alarmed European
leaders for the actual power that national populists had started to gain.
7.1.2 The case of Turkey
At the same time, the national populist rhetoric which Turkey’s president, Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, has adopted is distancing his country from the EU membership.
Turkey had always been an oppressive regime in regards to human rights, freedom of expression and the freedom of press. Allegedly security reasons, make
the violation of those rights a common practice in the country. The ruling party
has also strongly interfered with court and prosecutors undermining judicial independence and the rule of law. After the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the
situation quickly deteriorated as the government took “disproportionate repressive measures” (Emilie Tournier 2016) to safeguard its position in power. As a
result, on the 24th of November 2016 the European Parliament voted to tempo-
https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/event/14668/economic-correlates-populistattitudes-eva-anduiza.pdf.
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rarily suspend the EU accession talks with Turkey over human rights and rule of
law concerns13.
7.1.3 The case of France
The political landscape in France is not any better as the popularity of France’s
right-wing and anti-euro populist party, the “National Front”, continues to grow
apace. Its leader, Marine Le Pen, has publicly supported the national populist
identity of her part with great pride. In 2014, it was the first French party to win
25% of the European election votes14. As the NF is gaining more and more
ground, various analysts and polls have forecasted that it will lead the first round
of the May 2017 presidential elections15. National Front popularity grew tremendously after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris and Saint-Denis as
the party has repeatedly promised to tighten national security and to follow an
anti-immigrant policy16.
7.1.4 The case of Hungary
As for Hungary, national populists couldn’t have done better in the last few years.
The overwhelming victory of Victor Orbán, the country’s leader since 2010, showed
that demagogy had started to influence Hungarians for the first time in the 21st century. It has now become a dominant feature in European politics as leaders as Orbán are
not showing any signs of regretting populist nationalist rhetoric. His policies are
soaked through nationalism and he has shown that “not following the European
standards” is starting to have an major appeal to the people that feel threatened from
immigration, globalization and further European integration. He has stated that Mid13
Emilie Tournier,. 2016. Freeze EU Accession Talks With Turkey Until It Halts Repression, Urge Meps.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20161117IPR51549/freeze-eu-accession-talkswith-turkey-until-it-halts-repression-urge-meps.
14 Scarpetta, Vincenzo. 2016. "Local Election Confirms Front National Strength | Open Europe". Open
Europe.
http://openeurope.org.uk/today/blog/local-elections-confirm-a-quarter-of-french-voterssupport-front-national/.
15 Bon, Gerard. 2016. "France's Le Pen Would Lead First Round Of 2017 Presidential Vote - Poll". Reuters UK. http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-france-poll-lepen-idUKKBN0L22QM20150129.
16 BBC News. (2016). French turn to Le Pen and Front National after terror attacks - BBC News.
[online] Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36980909 [Accessed 13 Dec. 2016].
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dle East immigrants are not wanted in his country as they will harm the homogeneity
of the Hungarian society which is a traditionally a society of Christians. Quoting his
public statements on the migration crisis that shocked Europe in 2016, he said that:
“Hungary does not need a single migrant for the economy to work, or the population
to sustain itself, or for the country to have a future […] This is why there is no need
for a common European migration policy: whoever needs migrants can take them, but
don’t force them on us, we don’t need them […] every single migrant poses a public
security and terror risk. For us migration is not a solution but a problem ... not medicine but a poison, we don’t need it and won’t swallow it 17.” The Prime Minister also
announced that a referendum related to the European Union’s migrant relocation
scheme will take place on the 2nd of October 201618. Although the Hungarians voted
for the rejection of migrant quotas, the turnout was too low and thus the referendum
wasn’t considered to be valid.
In Hungary, far-right and populist rhetoric has deep roots in the history of the Magyars. The two most famous populist parties right now in Hungary are the ruling party
of Prime Minister Victor Orbán and Jobbik. The far-right opposition party Jobbik
(Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Movement for a Better Hungary) is the third
largest and the most prominent political faction in the parliament. Through their hate
speech, members of the party are targeting the large Roma community, the Jews and
the refugees as the most important threats to Hungary’s existence19. The party has also create its own vigilante paramilitary groups claimed that they will restore order in
the country.
17
The Guardian. (2016). Hungarian prime minister says migrants are 'poison' and 'not needed'.
[online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/hungarian-prime-ministerviktor-orban-praises-donald-trump [Accessed 13 Dec. 2016].
18 Reuters. (2016). Hungary to hold referendum on mandatory EU migrant quotas on October 2.
[online]
Available
at:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungaryreferendum-idUSKCN0ZL0QW [Accessed 13 Dec. 2016].
19 (www.dw.com), D. (2016). EU report finds rampant racism, xenophobia in Hungary | Europe |
DW.COM | 09.06.2015. [online] DW.COM. Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/eu-report-findsrampant-racism-xenophobia-in-hungary/a-18505689 [Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
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The rise of nationalism and far-right rhetoric in Hungary can be found in several factors. The deep economic crisis in Europe is one of them. The unemployment rate
amongst the youth played a vital role when the party was seeking for new supporters20. In recent years, Jobbik has begun targeting globalization and capitalism. This
sentiment was attractive to many Magyars whose jobs have been threatened by the
European economic slowdown. Victor’s Orbán party Fidesz (Magyar Polgári
Szövetség, Hungarian Civic Alliance) increasingly has been using Jobbik rhetoric to
combat Jobbiks growing popularity 21 . The Council of Europe has criticized many
times the xenophobia that the government is spreading to the people of Hungary but
Orbán denies any wrongdoing The refugee crisis gave a new boost to the anti immigration rhetoric. Hungary build a fence to ιτσ borders with Serbia and Croatia
and the government accused the other European countries and the European Union
that they did nothing to stop the flows coming from the Balkan route.
National Populism in Hungary has found important allies in other European states especially in Visegrad Group like Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic 22. The Muslim
hysteria has swept across Europe and those countries are no exception. The recent terrorist attacks in France, Germany and Switzerland have helped the nationalistic and
xenophobic rhetoric of Hungary’s populist parties and their popularity is still high.
7.1.5 The case of Poland
In 2015, the Polish people voted for the authoritarian Law and Justice (PiS) party
which is considered to be eurosceptic and opposes a federal Europe. On October 27th
2015, the Financial Times wrote that “the return of Mr. Kaczynski’s party, which ran
Poland between 2005 and 2007, poses a number of difficulties for Brussels, already
struggling to handle nationalist governments in Hungary and Slovakia over how to
20
Jones, O. (2016). Hungary’s future looks worryingly like Europe’s past | Owen Jones. [online] the
Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/13/hungary-futureeurope-far-right-viktor-orban [Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
21 The National Interest. (2016). The Hungary Model: Resurgent Nationalism. [online] Available at:
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-hungary-model-resurgent-nationalism-14025 [Accessed 20
Dec. 2016].
22
The
Economist.
(2016).
Big,
bad
Visegrad.
[online]
Available
at:
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21689629-migration-crisis-has-given-unsettling-newdirection-old-alliance-big-bad-visegrad [Accessed 19 Dec. 2016].
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tackle the continent’s migrant crisis The bloc had been on good terms with Poland’s
outgoing centrist administration that EU officials saw as a powerful progressive voice
in eastern Europe. Mr. Kaczynski, who has condemned Warsaw’s decision to accept
refugees and said that they could bring diseases to Europe, is an outspoken admirer
of Viktor Orbán, Hungary’s antagonistic prime minister. He has a chequered history
with German chancellor Angela Merkel, and is a fierce critic of Donald Tusk, European Council president and a former Polish prime minister23”. In respect to National
Populism, the situation in Poland is alarming because of the unexpected turn to the
right-wing populist party, based on an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and eurosceptic
rhetoric, which is making Poland take a step backwards instead of taking a step forwards.
7.1.6 The case of the UK and the Brexit
The incredible victory of the “Leave” vote that determined the UK’s future in the
EU, shocked the international community and alarmed European leaders to give
an immediate response to the uprising of National Populism. Nigel Farage and
Boris Johnson, the two leading actors of the Leave Campaign, engaged in public
debates and released statements that had a solely purpose of propagandizing the
British people. Their arguments, as it turned out, had little factual basis and were
mostly based on anti-immigration, anti-European and anti-Muslim foundations
with a special concern about the lawmaking process that the EU has took over
control of24.
Anti-European sentiments are capitalizing across the continent, showing that the development and consolidation of democracy, human rights and the rule of law are classified as of secondary importance for national populists that exercise power in a rather
simplistic and dangerous manner. Abandoning these ideals is endangering security
23
Ft.com. (2015). Poland returns most rightwing parliament in Europe. [online] Available at:
https://www.ft.com/content/f0a994e8-7bdf-11e5-a1fe-567b37f80b64 [Accessed 13 Dec. 2016].
24 Travis, A. (2016). The leave campaign made three key promises – are they keeping them?. [online]
the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/eu-referendumreality-check-leave-campaign-promises [Accessed 13 Dec. 2016].
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and stability in the continent while putting a brake on the progress that has been made
in these fields, jeopardizing the progress of European societies themselves.
8. The causes of populist nationalism
In the previous chapter, we introduced the issue of populist nationalism by mentioning the most disturbing cases in which we detected its rise across Europe. Now, we
will try to answer the key question: Why is this phenomenon flourishing? By searching the answers to this question we are one step closer to finding solutions that will
tackle the problem. In order to thoroughly examine the causes, we have categorized
them in five (5) subsections:
A. Financial crisis
B. Democratic deficit
C. Immigration
D. Terrorism
E. Globalization
8.1 Financial Crisis
The financial crisis that emerged in 2009, otherwise known as the euro debt crisis, is
undoubtedly a key factor to the upsurge of populist nationalism. Many countries,
amongst them Greece, Italy and Cyprus, were found unable to repay their government
debt and therefore signed “Memoranda of Understanding” with the IMF, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank. The crisis created a domino effect, in which
pretty much all states were more or less affected by the depreciation of euro. But how
is this related to populist nationalism? Experts suggest that “being unemployed seems
to have different effects depending on the country. In France, Greece, Italy, Spain and
the UK it increases populist attitudes25.” Populist nationalists constantly try to simplify problems that emerge by giving simplistic answers to them· this is rather appeal-
25 Anduiza, E. and Rico, G. (2016). Economic correlates of populist attitudes: An analysis of nine European
countries.
[online]
Available
at:
https://www.ceu.edu/sites/default/files/attachment/event/14668/economic-correlates-populistattitudes-eva-anduiza.pdf [Accessed 14 Dec. 2016].
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ing for the people that have been directly affected by an economic crisis in whatever
means (e.g. unemployment, pension cuts, tax raises etc.). There is a number of works
inquiring that a crisis can lead to the regeneration of populism. Particularly, in Taggart’s (2004, p. 275) words, “populism is a reaction to a sense of extreme crisis” that
“spills over into acritique of politics and into the sense that politics as usual cannot
deal with the unusual conditions of crisis”. According to Laclau (2005, pp. 37–38),
populism is the result of “a situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and
an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially coexist”.
In a similar vein, Panizza (2005, p. 11) argues that populism typically emerges out of
critical circumstances that produce “a breakdown of social order and the loss of confidence in the political system’s ability to restore it.” The rationale behind such theoretical accounts is thus that the perception of persistent unresponsiveness to popular
demands undermines the public’s confidence in the political establishment to the
point that it calls into question the whole institutional system’s capacity—and allegedly its resolve—to satisfactorily handle the situation. Current European reality is proving these statements. Wherever an economic crisis occurred, a political crisis followed. Populist nationalists claim that they will return powers to the nation, giving it
back its autonomy while freeing it from foreign forces that are trying to exercise control over its people.
8.2 Democratic deficit
It is hard to determine if the distrustful relationship that has been developed between the governments and the people is a symptom of the financial crisis or if it
it’s an incurable disease that has always existed. What we can determine though,
is that the “democratic deficit” plays a vital role in the shaping of politics when it
becomes a widespread feeling. As Levinson has underlined, “a democratic deficit
(or democracy deficit) occurs when ostensibly democratic organizations or institutions (particularly governments) fall short of fulfilling the principles of democracy
in their practices or operation where representative and linked parliamentary in-
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tegrity becomes widely discussed 26.” The apparent political failure of the established parties costed them the people’s trust in all areas of interest. People now
feel disappointed, non-represented and dissatisfied with mainstream politics
and are looking for other options. This is the perfect chance for national populists to take advantage of the lack of trust that people are presenting. Besides,
this is exactly where their rhetoric lies: the established elites are “traitors of the
nation and corruptors of the people27.” European institutions, organizations and
structures are incapable of adapting to people’s needs and are offering less than
what is needed for nation-states and the EU to progress.
On the 15th of December 2016, Martin Schulz addressed the European Council at
his last speech as the President of the European Parliament stressing that national populists are now directly threatening European democracies. Particularly, he mentioned that: “I know that in these difficult times, times in which more
and more citizens lose faith in representative democracy and turn to demagogues
who promise a better future in nationalism, that in these times it is fundamental
that we strengthen our democratic institutions in the best way we can. If we fail to
do so, we risk losing everything that was built on this continent after the Second
World War and the fall of the Iron Curtain: a Union for peace and prosperity, based
on the principles of freedom, equality and the Rule of Law.” With regards to populists’ anti-Brussels rhetoric, which has deteriorated the last few years, he said
that: “the Brussels blame game has to stop. What we all do in Brussels can only become a success if everybody takes proper ownership. Stop pretending that all success is national and all failure European. Explain to our citizens how you managed
to get things done, rather than blaming others for results that were not achieved.
The gain of Brussels-bashing might be immediate, but the damages are longlasting. They are so dramatic that if you continue this Brussels blame game the
Levinson, S. (2007). 859,860. [online] Drake Law Review. Available at:
https://lawreviewdrake.files.wordpress.com/2015/07/lrvol55-4_levinson.pdf [Accessed 14 Dec.
2016].
27 Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. 1st ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p.65.
26
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chances are high that sooner than you
think there will not be any Brussels to
blame anymore.”28
8.3 Immigration
Immigration is the most controversial
and divisive political issue in Europe today. The issue of immigration is also on
the top of the list for national populists.
Depending on the party’s ideology, immigration can become a very important asset in the battle against mainstream
politics. The refugee crisis that started in 2015 made Europe witness the highest
levels of displacement on record. European politicians showed unwillingness to
tackle the issue until it became evident that Greece and Italy, the two countries
with the highest numbers of migrants and refuges arrivals, were unable to handle the situation by themselves. Mass media coverage showed displaced people
in search for a more prominent and safe future for them and their children.
A survey released in September 2016 revealed the disapproval that people expressed regarding the handling of refugees by the EU. Specifically, 94% and 88%
of the Greek and Swedish people respectively, disapprove the way the EU is dealing with the refugee issue.29
28
European Parliament. (2016). Speech of the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz at
the
European
Council
of
15
December
2016.
[online]
Available
at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press-room/speech-of-the-president-of-theeuropean-parliament-martin-schulz-at-the-european-council-of-15-december2016?webaction=view.acceptCookies [Accessed 15 Dec. 2016].
29 Pew Research Center, (2016). Many Europeans concerned refugees will increase domestic terrorism.
[image] Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-therefugee-crisis-in-5-charts/refugees_1/ [Accessed 14 Dec. 2016].
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The fact that most of the refugees were Muslims (39%), who are attributed with
all kinds of fundamentalist generalizations, raised people’s worries. Muslims are
frequently being presented as people that are not willing to assimilate in their
host countries. After ISIS claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks that
shocked France in November 2015, uncertainty increased regarding the Muslim
population and a general anxiety started to prevail on the cultural clash of Islam
and the West among the European public.
Additionally, 73% of the Polish and 69% of the
Hungarians believe that large numbers of refugees leaving Iraq and Syria is a major threat to
their countries.
In this sense, public opinion on the issue of
immigration dramatically favored the flowering of national populists. People
turned to right-wing populists’ parties that seemed to emphasize more on the
high risk of immigrants entering their countries, which will be addressed by
them through highest security measures and, in the most extreme cases, closed
borders.
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30
8.4 Terrorism
Many have argued that the terrorist attacks in France, Brussels and Turkey gave
national populists a miracle boost regarding their popularity. Europe’s populists,
as we have mentioned before, tend to respond in a simplistic manner to the occurrence of any possible issue. In this context, populists link Europe’s terrorism
with refugees, promising that they can ultimately “wipe out” terrorism. As we
saw in the graph above, 76% of Hungarians believe that “refugees will increase
the likelihood of terrorism in their country”. The next country to have the most
positive stance to this assumption is Poland with a 71% of its people believing
that refugees can pose a great threat to their national safety. The truth is that
little can be done by national populists themselves to tackle terrorist attacks. It is
widely acknowledged that only a collective European response will be capable of
addressing this issue with potential success.
8.5 Globalization
The word “global” stands for exactly the opposite of the word “nation”. Globalization is the ultimate enemy for national populists as it embodies all the elements
that can “harm their countries”, namely connected economies, social and economic openness, competition, cultural intermingling from which each country is
learning more about other cultures, immediate and user-friendly communication
platforms that allow people from different backgrounds to interact, , fast traveling procedures and global media coverage. According to a survey that took place
in November 2011, while the word “nation” is interpreted as a positive notion
for 81% of the French people, the EU is a positive concept for barely 60%. 31
9. The consequences of populist nationalism to human rights
30
Pew Research Center, (2016). Many Europeans see refugees from Syria and Iraq as a major threat.
[image] Available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-therefugee-crisis-in-5-charts/refugees_1/ [Accessed 14 Dec. 2016].
31 Taguieff, P. (2012). Le nouveau national-populisme. 1st ed. Paris: CNRS Editions, p.59.
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These bursts of national populists’ turbulence are unsettling for human rights and security in Europe. Populists of both the left and the right wing are often responsible for
undermining key institutions of liberal democracies. This can be, inter alia, damaging
for newly established democracies, namely post-soviet countries that are still trying to
reach a respected level of rule of law and civil liberties. The impact of populist nationalism will be examined in two directions: Human Rights and Security in Europe.
The consequences of national populism on human rights can be easily identified in
three fields:
9.1 Racism & Xenophobia
Demagogues that present themselves as the ultimate salvation for people’s worries
often need a “scapegoat” that is to blame for the occurrence of a problem. The scapegoat in our case is, inter alia, immigrants. Immigrants are being targeted and attacked
from national populists as undesirable elements in their countries. They are taking native people’s jobs; they are converting Europe in a continent mostly inhabited by
Muslims and they are to blame for the numerous terrorist attacks of the last years. According to Jens Rydgren, “the presence of a xenophobic Radical Right Populist party
may cause the increase in racism and xenophobia because (1) it has an influence on
people’s frame of thought; and (2) because it has an influence on other political actors.32” Indeed, the outburst of racist violence in European countries has been verified
by numerous events, public opinion surveys and experts. One of the most indicative
reports on this issue was released by the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance33 which, with regards to the migration crisis, mentioned that: “Some countries along the Balkan route facilitated the passage of migrants northwards, while at
the same time succumbing to xenophobic public opinion in their own countries and
discouraging them from remaining on their territory. In other cases, governments
were openly hostile, resorting to restrictive border regimes and even the construction
32
Rydgren, J. (2003). The populist challenge. 1st ed. New York: Berghahn, p.60.
ANNUAL REPORT ON ECRI’S ACTIVITIES. (2016). [online] Strasbourg: ECRI Secretariat Directorate
General
II
Democracy
Council
of
Europe.
Available
at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/Annual_Reports/Annual%20report%202015.pdf
[Accessed 19 Dec. 2016].
33
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of fences to prevent migrants from entering their territory. In some cases, governments criminalised the provision of aid to irregular migrants, needlessly blurring the
legal boundaries between aiding and abetting human trafficking and providing humanitarian assistance.” These deep divisions in Europe’s population are being enhanced by national populists’ discriminatory rhetoric that encourages xenophobic and
racist behaviors directly or indirectly.
9.2 Media Freedom & Freedom of Expression
Populist nationalists that are currently governing countries in the European continent
are trying to interfere with the media sector in order to affect the news reporting process, especially when the reporting is critical against the ruling party and its leader.
Media outlets are sometimes denied access to events and information for political reasons. As authoritarianism is one of the main characteristics of a national populist once
in power they mostly target freedom of expression as an enemy to the nation’s safety.
Recent developments in Turkey advocate in this direction. Particularly, Erdoğan stated that “Their titles as an MP, an academic, an author, a journalist do not change the
fact that they are actually terrorists. It’s not only the person who pulls the trigger, but
those who made that possible who should also be defined as terrorists….There was no
difference between a terrorist holding a gun or a bomb and those who use their position and pen to serve the aims.34”, making clear that freedom of expression is not a
priority for the Turkish government. The most frightening fact is that populist nationalists actually use social media and other media outlets to spread their message and
articulate their beliefs, but simultaneously fight media actors and journalists once they
gain enough power to shape or implement policies in their respected countries. The
media environment is continually deteriorating in Europe and has recorded the biggest
decline in decades since 2015.35 Limited access to information as well as censored
media are gradually giving power to populists that are seeking to take advantage of
34
Human Rights in Turkey. (2016). In Turkey, freedom of expression early casualty of “anti-terror”
campaign. [online] Available at: https://humanrightsturkey.org/2016/03/25/in-turkey-freedom-ofexpression-early-casualty-of-anti-terror-campaign/ [Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
35
Freedomhouse.org.
(2016).
|
Freedom
House.
[online]
Available
at:
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016 [Accessed 11 Jan. 2017].
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any
possible
chance
given
to
control
and
influence
public
opinion.
9.3 Freedom of Religion
As we stated before, the presence of a xenophobic populist party can significantly influence other political actors as well as the public opinion. Although a national populist may not gain the reins of the government, it can directly exercise pressure through
opposition or public rhetoric. The ban of the “Hijab” in France seems to be one of
these cases. Since April 2011 it is considered illegal for French citizens, Muslim or
not, to wear a face-covering veil or any other short of masks. Amnesty International,
the United Nations and various Human Rights organizations condemned this development as a violation to religious freedom. But the rising number of Muslims in Europe (7,6%) is not orienting the continent in the different direction. In November
2015, the Belgian PM threatened to close “certain radical mosques” due to security
measures36. The core value of national populists, which in the case of right-wing populists is the homogeneity of a nation with regards to religion, ethnicity and language,
is not only threatening religious freedom of Muslims and other civilians. It is also creating a new behavioral norm which indicates that the oppression of different religions
will help the battle against terrorism in Europe, while providing people with certainty
about their fellow citizens.
10. The consequences of populist nationalism to security in Europe
The impact of populist nationalism on Europe’s security, as defined in the previous
chapter of this Study Guide, is prevailing in three sectors:
10.1 Democratic contestation
The questioning of democracy as the ultimate system of governance is also a
cause and a consequence of national populism. As experts indicate “Populism is in
fact associated with declines in key features of liberal democracy, including civil
36 Oliver,
C. (2016). Belgian PM threatens to close ‘certain radical mosques’. [online] Ft.com. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/765af108-8c7b-11e5-a549-b89a1dfede9b [Accessed 20
Dec. 2016].
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liberties, horizontal accountability, and the quality of elections. Populists in power
tend to undermine civil liberties, concentrate power in the hands of the executive
branch, and skew the electoral playing field. Thus, they produce hybrid democracies (Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). 37” Democratic participation and civil engagement is also in decline as people that do not support national populists tend to feel discouraged and are possessed by cynicism.The weakening of Representative Democracy is closely associated with the
weakening of the Rule of Law which is being marginalized through national populist’s policies.
10.2 Isolationism
Isolationism constitutes one of the most damaging consequences of National Populism. The idea that nation-states are more powerful by themselves without participating in and cooperating with international and European organizations and the EU –for
members of the EU- is currently gaining ground. The populist message emphasizes
that the nation-state alone can take back control and look after its own defense efficiently without external help. Furthermore, isolationism leads to the rejection of
openness (trade, cultural, social and economic) as a practice that is inevitably needed
for democracies to progress in the 21st century. Countries in the European continent
need to form alliances among them in order to counter potential risks from foreign
forces and tackle issues (financial crisis, human rights violations, migration crisis etc.)
that
have
a
domino
effect
across
Europe.
10.3 Provocation of the popular feeling
As we have underlined, the upsurge of populist nationalism is accompanied by a
number of serious implications that have been mostly discussed above. Apparently,
37
Hawkins, K., Allred, N. and Ruth, S. (2016). The Impact of Populism on Liberal Democracy. 1st
ed. [ebook] pp.3-9. Available at:
https://populism.byu.edu/SiteAssets/AllredHawkinsRuth_ALACIP2015.pdf [Accessed 20 Dec.
2016].
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the phenomenon is also largely account for many protests and outbursts of violence
that have taken place in recent years. Populist nationalists are fond of provoking the
popular feeling to lead “the people” in protesting against the national elites or even
their governments. After the right-wing populist party Golden Dawn gained an electoral foothold in the 2012 Greek parliamentary elections, the rise of violence predominated in many parts of the country, with the recipients being mostly immigrants and
homosexuals38. The same applies to the UK as researchers and media actors support
that the Brexit vote triggered violence and hate crimes in the country. According to
the Independent, “hate crimes surged by 42% in England and Wales since Brexit result 39 ” most possibly due to the anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric that was
adopted by Leave advocates during the referendum campaign.
11. International Legal Framework
As populist nationalism is considered to be a behavior, a feeling, or an ideology we
can hardly say that national or even international legislation can refrain it from occurring and spreading. There is no legal framework to counter national populism but
there are thousands of legislations that are meant to protect people from its consequences.
The “International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms on Racial Discrimination”, which defines racial discrimination as “..any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment
or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life40”, has gained al-
38Alderman,
L. (2012). As Golden Dawn Rises in Greece, Anti-Immigrant Violence Follows. [online]
Nytimes.com. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/world/europe/as-goldendawn-rises-in-greece-anti-immigrant-violence-follows.html [Accessed 11 Jan. 2017].
39 Mortimer, C. (2016). Hate crime incidents up 42% on last year after Brexit vote. [online] The
Independent. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/brexit-hate-crimeracism-stats-spike-police-england-wales-eu-referendum-a7126706.html#gallery [Accessed 11
Jan. 2017].
40
ICERD,
Articles
1.2
and
1.4.,
Available
at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx [Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
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most universal acceptance. All members of the CoE are parties to this convention but
some of them, e.g. Greece, Turkey, UK and Ukraine, do not recognize competence
under article 14 which allows individuals to complain if they are claiming that their
rights under the convention have been violated.
The “Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and countering violent extremism” is an initiative that seeks to protect freedom of expression and prevent acts
of violent extremism universally. The Declaration states clearly in its general principles that (a) “Everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, especially on matters of public concern, including issues relating to
violence and terrorism, as well as to comment on and criticize the manner in which
States and politicians respond to these phenomena” and (b) that “States have an obligation to ensure that the media are able to keep society informed, particularly in
times of heightened social or political tensions, including by creating an environment
in which a free, independent and diverse media can flourish.41” With regards to the
CoE member states, data has not been particularly encouraging. According to the
Freedom House, while western and central European countries are performing better,
in Moldova journalists face barriers due to presidential reporting contest while Russia,
Azerbaijan, Turkey and Armenia are categorized as a “not free” country in respect to
the press and “partly free” in respect to the internet 42 . Anti-extremism and antiterrorism legislation has been adopted but mostly under the pressure of the recent terrorist attacks of the last few years. Extremist rhetoric of national populists has started
to draw the attention of the public but still needs to be addressed with a legal manner.
Combating hate speech is also included in the agenda of international and intergovernmental organizations as it occupies an exceptional position in international law. Article 20(2) of the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) requires states to prohibit hate speech: “Any advocacy of na41 Ohchr.org.
(2016). Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and countering violent extremism.
[online]
Available
at:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19915&LangID=E
[Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
42 Freedomhouse.org.
(2016). Europe | Freedom House. [online] Available at:
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/europe [Accessed 19 Dec. 2016].
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tional, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.43” Nevertheless, many incidents of
hate speech by national populists have been reported44 45, especially in the last
few years that media coverage is more regular and intense regarding the issue.
12. The Council’s of Europe framework
Deeply alarmed from the recent events across the continent, the Council of Europe understands the threat that populism and nationalism are posing to human
rights, democracy and security. Nationalistic sentiments have managed to exploit
the refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks for their benefit and the trust of the
people to European institutions is dropping. Basic human rights including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and the right of privacy have been restricted
by many member states of the Council. Actions have been taken to combat these
phenomena using all legal and institutional frameworks46.
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance or ECRI is in
charge of combating hate speech47. Hate speech covers all forms of expression
that may spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, antiSemitism and other forms of hatred. ECRI’s main activities are the monitoring of
the countries, raising awareness among the people and working on general
themes by addressing General Policy Recommendations to the governments of
all member States.
43 Ohchr.org.
(2016). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. [online] Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [Accessed 19 Dec. 2016].
44 Breeden, A. (2015). French Court Acquits Marine Le Pen of Hate Speech. [online] Nytimes.com.
Available
at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/16/world/europe/french-court-acquitsmarine-le-pen-of-hate-speech.html?_r=0 [Accessed 9 Jan. 2017].
45 Hjelmgaard, K. (2016). Dutch populist Geert Wilders guilty of hate speech. [online] USA TODAY.
Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/12/09/dutch-populist-geertwilders-guilty-hate-speech/95188604/ [Accessed 9 Jan. 2017].
46 Bref, C. and do, W. (2016). Values. [online] The Council of Europe in brief. Available at:
http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values [Accessed 18 Dec. 2016].
47 Expression, F., Speech, H. and Europe, C. (2016). Hate Speech. [online] Freedom of Expression.
Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/hate-speech [Accessed 19 Dec. 2016].
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Safety of journalists is another important aspect that the Council of Europe is trying to protect on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights and
the European Court of Human Rights’ case law48. All member states must not
forget that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. The right to freedom
of expression also applies to new forms of mass communication, including the
Internet. The Rule of Law must be applied to every Member State of the Council
and that’s the role of the European Commission for Democracy through Law better known as the Venice Commission49.
After the recent terrorist attacks in many European countries the Council has
strongly support the further cooperation between the Member States without
compromising human rights by strengthening the legal framework, tackling the
causes of terrorism and safeguarding fundamental values. According to the CoE,
the commitment to the rule of law and human rights is essential in the battle
against terrorism and national populists:
 In its annual report, the Secretary General of the CoE underlined that “Europe
is currently struggling with many serious challenges, including terrorism, migration and conflict. This is being successfully exploited by nationalists and
populists in many places, and trust in national and European institutions is
dwindling50”. He also added that “human rights, democracy and security are
under threat across Europe because of populist nationalism51”, giving a clear
48
Human Rights, H. and Europe, C. (2016). Human rights. [online] Available at:
http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/human-rights [Accessed 20 Dec. 2016].
49 Venice.coe.int. (2016). Venice Commission :: Council of Europe. [online] Available at:
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN [Accessed 20 Dec.
2016].
50 Nationalism, T. and Europe, C. (2016). Thorbjørn Jagland: Europe’s human rights and security at risk
through populist nationalism. [online] Council of Europe Office in Venice. Available at:
http://www.coe.int/el/web/venice/-/thorbj-rn-jagland-europe-s-human-rights-and-security-at-riskthrough-populist-nationalism [Accessed 10 Jan. 2017].
51 Council of Europe, A. (2016). Directorate of Communications - Thorbjørn Jagland: Europe's human
rights and security at risk through populist nationalism. [online] Wcd.coe.int. Available at:
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&id=2430773&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColorIn
tranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE&direct=true [Accessed 10 Jan. 2017].
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message to European institutions and leaders that actions must be taken immediately.
 In the context of free speech being abused by populist nationalists, Secretary
Jagland mentioned the following on Human Rights Day, December 10th:
“Hate speech is an abuse of freedom of expression. We are free to express
ourselves, even to the extent that our opinion may offend shock or disturb others. But not everything is acceptable as free speech. The moment people start publicly inciting to violence, hostility or discrimination against a
group of persons, then this is hate speech not free speech 52 .” The CoE has
worked intensively to counter hate speech and extremism by drafting a “Manual on Hate Speech” and introducing several Recommendations (No. 1805,
(97) 21, (97) 2053) on how to address the issue.
13. Conclusion
Populist nationalism is an issue that reflects the pathogenic features of many societies across Europe. The Council of Europe is committed to enhance the progress of human societies and help member states build strong, liberal and democratic institutions which will resemble people’s willingness to advance and respect human rights and the rule of law. As we have stated before, no country is
immune to populist behaviors· in this sense, member states of the CoE where
populist nationalists haven’t yet gained much ground ought to take preventive
measures for its spreading and also lead the way for countries that are being directly threatened to counter the phenomenon. Experts on national populism
agree that suppressing the voice of demagogues and extremist political actors is
going to have a reverse effect in their attempt to influence public opinion. This
52 News, F.,
Hate speech is not free speech, s. and Europe, C. (2016). Hate speech is not free speech,
says Secretary General ahead of Human Rights Day. [online] CoE. Available at:
http://www.coe.int/nl/web/portal/-/hate-speech-is-not-free-speech-says-secretary-generalahead-of-human-rights-day [Accessed 10 Jan. 2017].
53 Anon, (1997). RECOMMENDATION No. R (97) 20. [online] Available at:
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/other_committees/dhlgbt_docs/CM_Rec(97)20_en.pdf [Accessed 10 Jan. 2017].
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means that if their voices are restricted from being heard it is more likely that
their popularity will rise even more. The wiser choice would be to confront national populist elements, while trying to combat the phenomenon. The question
you are being called to answer is “how”?
14. Points to be Addressed
➢
Which is the reason behind the alarming increase of populist nationalism in
your respective country? How is populist nationalism multiplying inside and
outside your borders?
➢
Is this phenomenon a solely national issue or does it need a collective and coordinated response from all member states?
➢
Do International and Intergovernmental Organizations have a share of responsibility in dealing with the phenomenon?
➢
What is the role that the Council of Europe needs to play in the context of combating its rapid growth in Europe?
➢
How can state actors safeguard citizens from propaganda and demagogy without trampling freedom of expression and media freedom?
➢
Would raising restrictions to national populists decrease civil liberties in general?
➢
In the case that National Populists hold the reins of the government, what can
non-state actors do to suppress national populist policies? The case of checks
and balances.
➢
How can Human Rights, Pluralism and the Rule of Law be protected from national populists?
➢
How can the Council of Europe warn the continent about the decline of democracy and civil liberties?
➢
What kinds of measures are required for the adoption of a more strict and concrete framework to the matter?
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➢
Do all Member States agree on the current threats that National Populism poses?
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