Daniel Frosh
To what extent did the British Labour Party emulate the marketing
strategies, ideology and policy formation techniques of the United States
Democrats during the 1990s and early Twenty-First century?
Daniel Frosh
Abstract
This dissertation provides an examination of the relationship between the British Labour
party and the American Democrats during the 1990s and early twenty-first century. What is
measured here is the extent to which Labour emulated the marketing strategies, ideology and
policy formation techniques of the Democrats during what was a crucial time in the history of
both parties. Following the Democrats re-election in 1992, Labour was directly influenced by
their use of political marketing, and the 1997 election campaign saw Labour mirror the
Democrats’ techniques. In terms of ideology, however, distances between the parties
remained throughout this period. New Labour developed partially as a response to
Thatcherism and the fundamental way in which British society was changed by the
Conservatives during the 1980s and 90s. It also maintained elements of socialism, a longterm foundation for the party that could not be wholly abandoned.
Introduction
The year 1979 was a watershed for the British Labour Party. Having achieved
successful terms in power during the 1960s and 70s, Labour went into a state of shock when
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative party won a historic election, signifying the first of four
election losses for Labour in what was to be eighteen years out of power (Pelling and Reid,
1996, p. 160). By the 1983 election, Labour had developed arguably its most left-wing
manifesto to date and was widely perceived as out of touch with the public mood, and to be
pursuing a set of obsolete political objectives. Its subsequent defeat was the worst the party
had suffered since 1918; receiving just 27.6% of the vote, and narrowly avoiding third-party
status (King, 1998, p. 249). It had become apparent that for the party ever to regain the trust
of the electorate, a major overhaul of its ideology, policies and image would be needed. The
story of how Labour managed this is important not only for understanding how the
reinvention of a major political party was achieved, but also offers crucial insights into the
nature of contemporary politics.
Labour’s success in persuading the public that it was once again electable was a
demonstrative master-class in political marketing and image management that involved a
message of constant ‘reassurance’ to the voters (Gould, 1998a, p. 270). Changes to the
political marketing of the party began under Neil Kinnock during the 1980s when the Shadow
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Daniel Frosh
Communications Agency (SCA), an organisation made up of a ‘nexus of professional
strategists, aides and advisors’ developed into a permanent feature of the party’s structure,
taking key influence over strategy (Wring, 1997, p. 107). The contribution of the Boase
Massimi Pollitt (BMP) advertising agency in updating Labour’s image (Gould, 1998b, p.
315) was another notable progression, when in the run up to the 1997 election they became
the first agency to officially advise the party since 1983 (Wring, 2005, p. 145). Labour’s
‘strategic community’ (Shaw, 1994, p. 57 -59) of advisors and strategists, particularly Philip
Gould, Peter Mandelson and Alastair Campbell, all played key roles in the re-branding and
eventual ‘saving’ of the Labour party (Gould, 1998b, p. 39). It has, however, become
apparent that the development of Labour’s new image owed much to events that took place
across the Atlantic. The successful presidential election campaign of Bill Clinton in the
United States in 1992 served as a demonstration that a centre left party could return from the
political wilderness and regain power. The influence of the Clinton campaign on Labour
party strategy became clearer after Blair became leader in July 1994, with Labour’s
marketing arm identifying in the Democrats a strategy and style that they believed could
bring them success. Focusing on image was to become crucial during the 1997 campaign, by
which time New Labour was a machine of ‘tight discipline, a finely honed and repeated
message and a highly professional operation fighting the media war twenty-four hours a day’
(Riddell, 2004, p. 65).
During the period of modernisation, Labour’s ideology and policy formation
techniques were dramatically altered. The party moved from the far left of 1983 to occupying
the broad centre ground by the time it was re-elected in 1997. The re-drafting of Clause IV of
Labour’s constitution under Blair, in which a commitment to nationalisation was abandoned,
was symbolic of this shift and a reaffirmation of the power of the new leadership of the party.
The rhetoric of the ‘Third Way’ emerged during the 1990s in both Britain and America, and
was believed by both Clinton and Blair to be an ideology structured not upon ‘new dividing
lines’, but transcending both social democracy and the New-Right neo-liberalism that had
been so dominant in both countries during the previous decade (Gould, 1998a, p. 235).
Themes focused on by the New Democrats such as those of community, responsibility and
opportunity (White, 2001, p. 4) were mirrored by the Labour party. The way in which Labour
adopted the Third Way has led to accusations that the party left behind its socialist traditions
in favour of a populist, Americanised world-view whose centrist projects win elections by
attempting to appeal to as broad a spectrum of the electorate as possible, whilst in doing so
abandoning commitment to long-lasting principles.
This dissertation will consist of four chapters. The first chapter will examine the
recent history of both the Labour Party and the Democrats, taken from their loss of power in
1979 and 1980 respectively. It is significant that both parties were cast into the political
‘wilderness’ throughout the 1980s, whilst the New-Right duo of the Conservatives under
Thatcher and the Republicans under Reagan gained widespread support. Both parties
recognised the need to modernise at this time, and both were to witness bitter divides between
their respective left and right as to the direction that their party should take. It is also
significant that the Democrats were the first to succeed, winning election in 1992, the same
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Daniel Frosh
year that Labour suffered a fourth successive defeat. This chapter will look at the Labour
party’s loss of popularity during the late 1970s and will chart its decline following the defeat
by Thatcher and the following election defeat in 1983. The series of internal errors and
external factors (notably the party’s inability to adapt to the increasing dominance of
television in campaigning and the influence of a powerful business lobby (Edsall, 1984, p.
34) that contributed to the Democratic Party’s defeat in 1980 will then be detailed.
Continuing its focus on the Democrats, this chapter will look at how the Democrats
recovered, and regained election in 1992 under Clinton, with help from the party’s marketing
arm and the centrist influence of the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) (Hale, 1995, p.
207). Finally, Labour’s recovery, which began with Kinnock’s Policy Review and culminated
in the re-drafting of clause IV under Blair, will be documented. At this stage similarities
between the two parties begin to emerge, in particular the emphasis on being seen as
‘modern’.
The second chapter will examine the political marketing of New Labour. The party’s
decision to cast itself as ‘New’, a deliberate marketing to the middle-classes, the use of
soundbites, ‘spin doctors’ and the use of focus groups as a means of developing policies were
all key factors for Labour’s success in 1997. Importantly, all of these techniques were visible
in the Democrats’ campaign of 1992, and numerous direct links between the two campaigns
can be made, going as far as the personnel employed by the parties to work on the campaigns.
Here, it will be made clear that New Labour ‘borrowed’ multiple aspects of the Democrats’
1992 campaign, using Clinton’s success as a blueprint for Blair to proceed with his final
reforms, and as confirmation that Labour’s decision to move to the centre was the correct
move. Throughout the build up to the 1997 campaign and into the first years of Labour
government, the same marketing strategists who had served the Democrats worked for New
Labour, constantly refining the party’s message and acting as informants to politicians about
what had worked for them in America (Gould, 1998a, p. 173). As well as the structure of the
campaign being taken from that of the Democrats, Labour were able to campaign in a
presidential style, with Tony Blair, a young and charismatic leader, as the centre attraction.
This was highly similar to the Democrats’ marketing of Clinton as the candidate of change
(Popkin, 1995, p. 217).
The third chapter will be an analysis of the development of New Labour’s ideology.
Labour is now in many ways unrecognisable from its socialist past, and clearly developed a
new ideological format in the 1990s and early twenty-first century, holding values similar to
those of the Democratic Party. This new rhetoric was exemplified in the Third Way, which
was initiated in America by Democratic Party strategists such as Dick Morris (Wring, 2005,
p. 173), who introduced the notion of ‘triangulation’, in which the party attempted to bridge
the gap between left and right by incorporating the best elements of both. Following this,
much of the academic theory behind the Third Way as a political philosophy developed from
a British perspective (see Giddens, 1998), and became increasingly influential on the Labour
Party. Despite the initial American influence, this chapter will identify a number of separate
contributors to Labour’s ideology. New Labour was in many respects a response to
Thatcherism and the way in which the political climate had altered during eighteen years of
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Daniel Frosh
Conservative rule. Labour had to ‘catch up’ (Heffernan, 2000, p. 70) with the times, and
accept free-market capitalism and privatisation schemes in order to become electable. This
chapter will therefore examine the influence of the preceding Thatcher government on New
Labour and argue that the new right consensus of the 1990s meant that Labour had no choice
but to adapt and take on new values. Despite this, New Labour in the 1990s and early
Twenty-First century did hold on to some of its socialist ideology, demonstrated through
some of the policies it suggested and implemented during this time. This is particularly
important as it indicates the party’s separateness from the Democrats, who were never
associated with Socialism.
The fourth and final chapter will conclude the dissertation. In pursuit of determining
the extent to which Labour emulated the Democrats’ marketing strategies, ideology and
policy formation techniques, it will be argued here that Labour did copy the Democrats, but
only in some areas. In terms of political marketing, the party learnt almost all of its
techniques from the Democrats, and had consistent help from American pollsters and
strategists. It would also be true to suggest that the initial thought behind the Third Way came
from America, and parallels can be drawn in some key areas of policy, for instance Clinton’s
‘work-first’ policy was influential on New Labour’s welfare reform (Driver and Martell,
2002, p. 186). However, it would be far too simplistic to suggest that New Labour simply
took on the ideology of the New Democrats. To do so would ignore the specifically ‘British’
influences on the party, namely that of Thatcherism and also Labour’s history as a party of
socialism. It will be demonstrated here that Labour’s ideology at this time did not stem from
one single area but existed as a complex merging of ideological positions, from which it
based its decisions on policy formation.
1. The Historical Background
The Demise of Labour
The Labour Party came into office in March 1974 as a minority government, and
when another election was called later that year in October, the party’s position was
marginally improved to a majority of three (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 140). This was
workable as the other parties did not often cooperate in opposition, although the Labour party
itself was becoming divided over key issues, most notably a split over Britain’s terms of entry
to the European Economic Community (Thorpe, 2008, p. 194). However, in March 1976
Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced his retirement from office, and later in April James
Callaghan took over, winning 176 votes compared to Michael Foot’s 137. By 1978 there had
been some economic recovery in Britain; the pound was continuing to rise and inflation and
unemployment had decreased (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 157). It appeared that Labour’s
popularity with the electorate had improved, yet Callaghan decided not to call an election.
This proved to be a vital error as what followed was the ‘Winter of Discontent’ in which
strikes took place across the public sector, damaging the relationship between the unions and
the public. Pelling and Reid (1996, p. 158) note that Labour had lost control even at the local
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Daniel Frosh
level, stating ‘in the middle of a harsh winter, the roads were not gritted, and extra accidents
undoubtedly occurred.’ This eventually resulted in a vote of no confidence, and Callaghan
had no choice but to call an election for 3 May 1979. Labour entered the election divided
over the direction of the party and with a declining membership, whilst the Conservatives
under Margaret Thatcher put forward a slick advertising campaign designed by media firm
Saatchi and Saatchi. Their manifesto aimed to deal with the events of the previous winter,
focusing on trade union reform and the reduction of income tax and the Tories emerged
victorious, securing 339 seats to Labour’s 269, and the Liberal’s 11. In Southern England, the
swing from Labour to Conservative was up to 7 percent (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 160),
marking the beginning of a dramatic loss of support for Labour in the south.
Heath et al (2001, p. 10) note that Thatcher’s first victory in 1979 marked a watershed
in terms of class based voting, claiming that ‘as the working class became smaller, the
prospects of Labour victory became bleaker’. Thatcher began to curb the unions and decrease
government-owned council housing, and subsequently Labour lost much of its traditional
working class base to the Conservatives. Additionally damaging for Labour was the
ideological identity crisis that it entered during this time. Despite the party having re-elected
James Callaghan as party leader, the National Executive Committee (the principle
administrative body within the party) favoured the strong left-wing outlook of Tony Benn,
and by 1980 the party had adopted the first version of the ‘rolling manifesto’, which
advocated ‘unilateral nuclear disarmament, abolition of the House of Lords and further
substantial extensions of public ownership’ (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 163). The election of
Michael Foot as party leader on November 10, 1980, indicated a further shift to the left
within the party. It also led to the ‘Gang of Four’ MPs - William Rodgers, David Owen,
Shirley Williams and Roy Jenkins, leaving the party to form the Social Democrats in 1981. It
was at this time that party was at its most polarised. Shaw (1996, p. 162) claims that the
division between Left and Right was such that ‘the party was split into two hostile camps
which were locked in combat over an extensive range of issues and the fault lines were deep
and mutually reinforcing.’ The 1983 election manifesto was perhaps Labour’s most Leftwing yet, calling for a programme aimed at regaining full employment and refurbishing
public services. Labour advocated mass nationalisation, with all privatised industries being
restored to the public sector (Shaw, 1996, p. 162). The manifesto also supported nuclear
disarmament, stating that ‘unilateralism and multilateralism must go hand in hand if either is
to succeed’ (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 170), irrespective of the public mood at the time.
Heath et al (2001, p. 85) note that ‘given Margaret Thatcher’s success in the Falklands War
and her new authority as a patriotic leader, 1983 was a particularly unfortunate time to be
trying to sell nuclear disarmament to the electorate’. The election result was a huge triumph
for the Conservative party, who took 397 seats, compared with 209 for Labour, of which
none were in the southern or southern-eastern regions of England (Thorpe, 2008, p. 219). On
the back of such a significant defeat, Labour MP Gerald Kaufman was to famously term the
manifesto ‘the longest suicide note in history’ (Mann, 2003).
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The Fall of the Democrats
Whilst 1979 was a highly damaging year for Labour, the Democratic Party in the
United States suffered a similar defeat in 1980 that relegated them to opposition status for the
next twelve years. Jimmy Carter’s defeat to Ronald Reagan was only the third time in history
that an incumbent president had been voted out of office, and Rothenberg (1980, p. 15)
makes the claim that ‘Carter’s defeat in 1980, coupled with the defeat of so many staunchly
liberal senators, was a purging of tradition, a message sent to the Democrats by the voters.’ In
the run up to the election, there had been a number of difficulties for the Democrats, both
internally over the shape and direction of the party, and also externally, with regards to the
changing nature of American society and politics, and the way in which the party responded
to this.
During the mid-1970s, the Democrats transferred power in Congress to ‘junior’
Democrats who had won election after the Watergate scandal in previously Republican
occupied seats. Thus, their first priority was to prevent their electorates of middle and upper
class voters from returning to the Republicans (Edsall, 1984, p. 33). These Democrats were
more inclined towards policies that did not particularly favour the lower classes, an
established stronghold for the party, causing a split between the party’s ‘new class’ and ‘old
guard’ to develop (Edsall, 1984, p. 49). Such a divide was based both around cultural
standpoints (the new class Democrats had risen from the civil rights movement, whilst the old
guard began their careers in union halls’ Democratic clubhouses) but was also economic,
with broad disagreement over whether the party should change direction and adhere to the
needs of the middle classes, or whether it should continue to appeal to its ‘traditional’ support
base of lower classes and minority groups (Edsall, 1984, p. 32). When the ‘new class’ did
eventually begin to dominate, with the party taking on reforms that further weakened their
traditional base, the Democrats became unable to enact their own agenda, and Edsall (1984,
p. 65) argues that ‘consumer protection, common situs picketing (legislation giving
construction unions power to shut down building sites), welfare reform, hospital cost
containment, and national health insurance – all ended up on the cutting room floor.’ A
further effect of the struggle within the party was that it began to lose the support of some
minority groups that it had previously relied upon. Greenberg (1990) notes that by 1988,
‘among major demographic groups, the Democratic coalition could now depend reliably on
only Jewish, African-American and Hispanic voters.’
There were also a number of external factors that contributed to the fall of the
Democratic Party in 1980, and their decline throughout the decade. Firstly, the increased
emphasis on campaigning through television broadcasts meant that the Democrats became
less effective at targeting specific groups, such as the black community, women and ethnic
minorities. Campaigns now had to appeal to everyone, as messages that were too specialised
or specific risked alienating sections of society. Edsall (1984, p. 34) claims that ‘without the
ability to target specific groups, a television commercial directed at any one of these groups
is, in fact, visible to all, and consequently can cost a candidate as many votes as it wins.’ This
made it more difficult for the Democrats to secure the support of minorities. A second factor
that was to cause difficulties for the Democrats was the Watergate scandal. The public
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Daniel Frosh
reaction to the corruption of the Republicans under Nixon was a key contributor to the
Democrats’ victory in 1976, and this allowed the party to postpone dealing with conflicts
over both policy and strategy that were emerging within the party; these conflicts were to
become significant weaknesses by 1980 (Edsall, 1984, p. 34). Additionally, the Democrats
began to be more influenced by an increasingly powerful business lobby, moving away from
its grass-roots support and failing to represent the working people. The Democrats suffered
defeat in 1984 and again in 1988, when they were deemed to have ‘lost touch with the
American people’ (Greenberg, 1990).
Democratic Party Recovery
When the Republican party under George Bush came from behind to defeat Michael
Dukakis in order to achieve a third successive election victory in 1988, the future appeared
bleak for a Democratic party considered to have ‘no alternative to the liberalism caricatured
so effectively by the Bush campaign’ (Hale, 1995, p. 219). Yet in 1992 the Democrats were
to emphatically regain office with the election of Bill Clinton as president. The party had
finally successfully reshaped and rebranded itself as the ‘New Democrats’ (Hale, 1995, p.
207), a centrist party who had the capability to deal with the concerns of middle-class voters
and big businesses, rather than just the aspirations to do so. A successful political marketing
team was undoubtedly highly significant in assisting with the Democrat s’ victory. However,
Hale (1995, p. 207) notes that the formation and success of the New Democrats owes much to
the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), an unofficial party organisation of elected
Democrats formed in 1985, which held the aim of moving the party into the political centreground both in terms of public perception and of actual policies. In terms of substance, the
DLC sponsored policy forums and put out policy papers on economics and defence. They
outlined moderate positions in these areas and gained recognition as a progressive section of
the Democratic Party, increasing its membership from forty-one Democratic Congressmen in
1985 to nearly 200 by 1988 (Hale, 1995, p. 216). Despite suffering defeat in 1988, the DLC
became more prevalent within the Democratic Party, publishing a magazine called the New
Democrat, and gained support for its message from potential Democratic leaders (Hale, 1995,
p. 220). Bill Clinton became chair of the DLC in 1990, which provided him with the ‘readymade message and agenda of the New Democrats to use in his campaign’ (Hale, 1995, p.
225). It was at this time that rhetoric surrounding the values of opportunity, community and
responsibility fully emerged, as well as a renewed effort to appeal to the American middle
class. Having secured party nomination and with Al Gore as running mate, Clinton set about
attempting to re-establish the Democrats’ claim to represent the majority of working
Americans, focusing on ‘work, reward for work and restraint’ (Greenberg, 1997).
Finally, in 1992 the Democratic Party, following its gradual transformation and
successful move towards the centre, was able to make a realistic challenge to the presidency.
George Bush, the incumbent Republican president, repeated the negative campaigning
strategy that had been so successful for him in the 1988 election, focusing on Clinton’s
avoidance of being drafted into the army and questioning his patriotism (Glad, 1988, p. 16).
Yet the public were not taken in by this form of campaigning for a second time, and Bush
was to sustain ‘the highest drop in presidential popularity ever recorded’, slipping from a
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nearly 90 percent positive ranking in March 1991 to 47 percent in December 1991, according
to a Washington Post poll (Glad, 1995, p. 16). One of the major issues of the campaign was
the economy, which was steadily declining in the run-up to the election. The 1981 tax cuts
had permanently unbalanced the federal budget, and the Republican Party refused to raise
taxes in order to rectify this (Glad, 1995, p. 17). The United States was also going into a
recession at the time, with unemployment on the rise. Clinton’s campaign capitalised on the
weakness of the Republicans in this area, using the economy as their key focus, and
attempted to move away from the potentially divisive issues of race, abortion and class (Glad,
1995, p. 18). The DLC’s carefully developed agenda, messages and set of centrist policies
(Hale, 1995, p. 228), combined with Clinton’s popularity as a leader for the ‘New’ Democrats
eventually succeeded in bringing the Democratic Party back into power. Clinton won election
on November 3, achieving 43 percent of the vote compared to Bush’s 38 and independent
candidate Ross Perot’s 19 percent, with the Democrats victorious in states such as New
Hampshire, California and Montana that had been Republican since 1964 (Glad, 1995, p. 16).
The success of the New Democrats was to extend into the 1996 presidential election, with
Clinton defeating challenger Bob Dole. Marshall (1997) thus notes that ‘in trouncing an
estimable opponent, Clinton joined Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt as the only
Democratic presidents in [the twentieth century] to win back-to-back elections’, a huge
achievement for the newly shaped party.
Bringing Labour Back
Following the miserable defeat in 1983, members of the Labour Party began to
recognise that a dramatic modernisation programme would have to occur if the party was to
ever gain re-election. Michael Foot announced his retirement as leader almost immediately
after the defeat, and Neil Kinnock took over, gaining widespread support from the trade
unions, constituency parties and the parliamentary party (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 172).
Kinnock appointed Peter Mandelson as director of campaigns and communications in 1985
(Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 175), recognising the need for the party to begin to ‘rebrand’
itself. He had to deal with a heavily divided party, and attempted to counteract the ‘hard left’,
making an attack on Liverpool council’s militant control in his keynote speech in 1985,
which gained support from many party members (Thorpe, 2008, p. 226). Moving away from
the hard left had to be balanced against attacking the government, and this made Kinnock’s
task all the more difficult. Party policy was altered to make it more ‘popular’ and credible
with the public (Thorpe, 2008, p. 227). The next election was called for June 11, 1987 and the
Labour manifesto, Britain Will Win, dropped some of the radical proposals that had failed in
1983, such as abolishing the House of Lords and closing down the American nuclear bases in
Britain (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 177). In the event, the party made few advances. Labour
increased its poll share by only 3.2 points to 30.8 percent over 1983, achieving a gain of 20
seats (Thorpe, 2008, p. 228), whilst the Conservatives achieved a majority of 102. Labour
continued to have no success in the south of England, losing three seats in the south-east. In
the wake of a third successive election defeat, it was clear that the party needed to modernise
further and develop a clear message.
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In July 1987, Kinnock announced the initiation of a ‘Policy Review’, to be conducted
by seven groups who would present their findings at the 1989 party conference (Thorpe,
2008, p. 230). The results of the Policy Review were clearly aimed towards widening
Labour’s electoral appeal, with the party abandoning policies such as widespread
nationalisation, high taxation, and nuclear disarmament that had been so unpopular in
previous years (Jones, 1996, p. 120). The party also became more sympathetic towards
business, and gradually became more ‘pro-European’ (Thorpe, 2008, p. 231). Importantly,
Labour started to become more united at this stage, as the centrists began to dominate in key
policy areas. Pelling and Reid (1996, p. 181) note that ‘the 1989 conference of the party...was
free of the bitterness which had animated previous conferences. It approved the Policy
Reviews and elected a new executive still more favourable to Kinnock than its predecessor.’
Kinnock’s determination to haul the party out of its electoral crisis appeared to be paying off
when in late 1989 Labour held a 10 percent lead in the opinion polls, which was assisted by
some highly unpopular actions by the government, most notably the poll tax (Pelling and
Reid, 1996, p. 175). However, when Thatcher was forced to withdraw from party leadership
and was replaced by John Major, the Conservatives regained their edge in the polls, even
though Labour felt they could win the election, which was called for April 9, 1992.The final
outcome was another Conservative government, albeit a much depleted one, with Major’s
party taking 336 seats and 41.9 per cent of the vote, whilst Labour took 271 seats, gaining
34.4 percent (Thorpe, 2008, p. 234).
After the shock election defeat, Kinnock resigned as Labour Party leader, and in July
1992 John Smith became leader of the party, receiving large majorities amongst MPs, trade
unions and constituency Labour parties (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 186). The key events that
took place under Smith’s leadership took place at the 1993 party conference. These were the
adoption of all-women shortlists for parliamentary candidature in half of all vacant Labourheld and marginal seats and also the adoption of the ‘one-member-one-vote’ revisions to the
party constitution (Thorpe, 2008, p. 240). This act limited the power of the trade unions
within the Labour party, thus enabling the modernisers to further strengthen their grip on the
party. However, on May 12, 1994, Smith unexpectedly died of a heart attack. A new leader
had to be elected, and out of a contest between Tony Blair, Margaret Beckett and John
Prescott, Blair was victorious, taking 57 percent of the Electoral College vote, and at the age
of 41 became the youngest leader in the party’s history.
Tony Blair’s leadership symbolised the final stage in the modernisation project. At the
party conference in September 1994, Blair outlined plans for renewal both on a national level
and within the Labour party itself, by removing its commitment to ‘old-style’ socialism
(Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 189). Blair underlined his commitment to updating Labour by
calling for the re-drafting of Clause IV of the party’s constitution. The original clause, written
by Fabian theorist Sidney Webb and adopted in 1918, committed the party to pursue:
‘the most equitable distribution...that may be possible, upon the basis of the common
ownership of the means of production and the best obtainable system of popular
administration and control of each industry or service’ (Jones, 1996, p. 4).
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Like Gaitskell before him, Blair sought to move away from this broad commitment to
nationalisation, arguing that modern socialism was no longer based on economics, through a
commitment to public ownership, but was instead based on values such as community and
mutualism, whilst recognising the autonomy of individuals (Jones, 1996, p. 136). The key
section of the new Clause IV stated that Labour aims to create:
‘for each of us the means to realise our true potential and for all of us a community in
which power, wealth and opportunity are in the hands of the many not the few, where
the rights we enjoy reflect the duties we owe, and where we live together, freely, in a
spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect’ (Pelling and Reid, 1996, p. 191)
This move was a clear demonstration to the public of the party’s new intentions and
capabilities, as well as the power of Blair’s leadership. Whilst the move inevitably received
criticism from those on the left of the party, those in the media praised Blair’s ‘ideological
revision’, and on 29 April 1995, approval was secured for the new section by a 65 percent
party vote (Jones, 1996, p. 145).
This push had finally made Labour once again electable. New Labour’s values gained
widespread popular support, in contrast with a self-destructing Conservative party, although
right up to election day on May 1, 1997, Labour strategists were leaving nothing to chance,
fearful of a repeat of the 1992 result (Gould, 1998, p. 386). This time, however, Labour won
by a landslide. They took a total of 419 MPs, a record number, with a majority of 179 (Butler
and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 244). Labour made gains across all social groups and closed the
gender gap: women became as likely to vote Labour as men were. Finally, the party reversed
the long-term Conservative dominance in the south, gaining its biggest increase in vote share
in Greater London and the south-east (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 244). Just as Clinton
had won back the ‘Reagan Democrats’, Blair had been successful in retrieving voters lost in
the Thatcher years (Dumbrell, 2001, p. 119).
In the run up to the 1997 election and in the early years of New Labour in power,
strong ties were made with America, and observers recognised links between Labour and the
Democratic Party that began to offer explanations for New Labour’s successful rise to power.
In an age in which political marketing is recognised as critical for election victory, this is the
most obvious area in which to begin to explore these links.
2. Political Marketing
Being ‘New’
In The Unfinished Revolution, Labour Party strategist Philip Gould (1998a, p. 175)
documents the thought process behind marketing Labour as a party that had learnt from its
past mistakes, stating that ‘a changed Labour Party is the basis of a new relationship of trust
with the British electorate.’ Labour had to put forward a definite, positive message that it had
updated itself, a message that had to be ‘open’, as strategists believed that ‘Labour has not
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changed until it announces that it has changed’ (Gould,1998a, p. 175). Although it may
appear to have been a simple name change, the re-branding of the Labour Party was to
signify a move away from being the party ‘of the poor and of the past’ and of the ‘looney
left’ (Wring, 2005, p. 128, 103) towards an electable party of the centre that appealed to
‘Middle-England’ (Riddell, 2004, p. 66). Whilst he has on occasion been credited with
devising the formula for ‘New’ Labour, Gould (1998a, p. 219) rejects this claim, arguing ‘I
do not claim the credit for inventing New Labour. I had first mentioned it at as a concept in
the spring of 1989, and it had stayed in the ether in the years to 1992...but it was Alastair
Campbell who turned the term ‘New’ Labour into an entirely new identity for the party.’
Campbell, previously political editor of the Daily Mirror, and later the Prime Minister’s
Director of Communications, came up with the line ‘New Labour, New Britain’ (Gould,
1998b, p. 111). The release of this slogan on September 25, 1994 at the Labour Party
conference was to be a defining moment. Gould (1998a, p. 220) emphasises this: ‘It was a
huge risk. But the slogan was used and there wasn’t a murmur from the conference. This was
the moment New Labour became a reality.’
The marketing of ‘New’ Labour immediately draws a number of parallels with that of
the Democratic Party in the United States. The word ‘new’ itself was used to re-brand the
Democrats under Clinton as the ‘New’ Democrats, and Labour took note of Clinton’s
success. Gould (1998a, p. 219) admits that it was only once the New Democrats had achieved
office that the notion of ‘New’ Labour became the natural next step in the modernisation of
the party, when ‘Blair grabbed the idea with both hands.’ Blair was extremely conscious of
the need to contrast his ‘new’ party with the ‘old’ politics of the past in order to gain trust and
support from the electorate and to show that the party had actively made a change. Gould
states (1998a, p. 175) ‘this was exactly what the Democrats had done when they called
themselves the “New Democrats”.’ In seeking to achieve similar success to the New
Democrats, Labour’s modernisers made visits to America, including one well documented
meeting between Blair, Brown and the Clinton team in January 1993, in which leading
Clinton strategists outlined to British visitors exactly how they had won (Riddell, 2004, p.
64). Philip Gould, who had worked on the Clinton campaign, wrote a long document
summarising what had been done, and what Labour needed to strategically achieve to
succeed in a similar fashion, arguing that in terms of campaigning Labour ‘lacked executive
capacity; message; a persuasive economic argument; an effective rapid response and attack
capacity; flexibility; integration and resources’ (Gould, 1998a, p. 175). Gould later worked on
an article for Renewal magazine, arguing that Labour should ‘emulate Clinton’s success...by
forging a populism of the centre rather than the left’ (Gould, 1998a, p. 176). Although Gould
(1998a, p. 175) describes this advice as at the time going down ‘like a lead balloon’ with the
party membership, the Labour leadership took it seriously, leading to the eventual borrowing
of several of Clinton’s messages in 1992 for the 1997 election campaign. These included:
‘time for change’, an emphasis on the failure of the opposition (Bush and Major), Blair
(Clinton) as a young and dynamic leader and that Labour (Democrats) offer a partnership
between government and people (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997, p. 57). Additionally, Labour
performed a ‘symbolic sacrifice’ in order to reinforce its image as a new party by redrafting
Clause IV in 1995. This technique was also previously used by the Democrats, when Clinton
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signed the controversial Workfare Bill, sacrificing the interventionist welfare policies of old
to show how much the Democrats had changed (Seawright, 2010, p. 173).
Marketing to the Middle-Classes
A fundamental part of the modernisation process of the Labour Party involved
redirecting their focus away from traditional working-class backing towards what became
referred to as ‘Middle-England’ (Riddell, 2004, p. 56). Aside from the policy restructuring
that was required to gain middle-class support, modernisation also involved a well organised
media campaign, in which the image of a changed Labour Party that could appeal to those
who were, or aspired to be, middle-class was constructed. Blair gave support to Giles
Radice’s (1992) article Southern Discomfort, which turned the attention of the party towards
lost voters in the South of England (Wring, 2005, p. 139). Labour strategists recognised that
for the party to be able to form a government, it had to attract voters outside of its traditional
support base, which came from a declining sector of the population (Gould, 1998b, p. 84).
This realisation led to ‘Labour and Britain in the 1990s’, what Gould (1998b, p. 84) refers to
as ‘the most comprehensive review of public opinion ever undertaken by Labour’ and ‘the
polling foundation upon which the party’s modernisation was built.’ What had to be done
was to convince Conservative voters that the party had radically changed and was now
relevant to their lives. Chris Powell (1998, p. 29), an executive of BMP, describes the way in
which Labour used the media in the attempt to do this:
‘The advertising strategy focused on ‘switcher voters’ in marginal seats – primarily
those who had voted Conservative in 1992, in order to strengthen their resolve to vote
Labour, and primarily to persuade them that they will be worse off economically if
they vote Tory than Labour.’
Many of Labour’s techniques of campaigning to the middle-classes were learnt from
the Democrats. Following Clinton’s victory, Blair and Brown made visits to the United States
to meet with Democrat officials, discussing issues like the ‘enabling state’, which emerged
from popular American books such as Reinventing Government (Wring, 2005, p. 128). Philip
Gould and Labour MP Patricia Hewitt (in the article Lessons From America, published in the
Labour journal Renewal in 1993) openly suggested that Labour followed the Democrats in
attempting to win middle-class voters, and Gould (1998a, p. 173) admits that he was inspired
by Democrat pollster, and later Labour consultant, Stanley Greenberg, who ‘repeatedly wrote
about a new politics of the middle class.’ Greenberg argued that the Democrats needed to be
seen to represent the majority of working Americans, bringing together the values of
opportunity with the values of responsibility. This kind of rhetoric was quickly adopted by
Labour, for instance in policies based on ‘rights and responsibilities’ (Wring, 2005, p. 138).
The Democrats coined the term ‘forgotten middle-class’ during their campaign, and on
becoming president in July 1992 Clinton made special acknowledgement of this sector of
society:
‘In the name of all the hard-working Americans who make up our forgotten middle
class, I proudly accept your nomination for the presidency of the United States. I am a
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product of that middle class, and when I am president you will be forgotten no more’
(Gould, 1998a, p. 174).
Clinton’s success with appealing to the middle class in America thus served as an inspiration
for Labour that a party of the left could market itself, with a carefully selected rhetoric, in
order to achieve support with the middle-classes in a way it had failed to do in the past. As
Gould (1998a, p. 175) reflects ‘when Clinton spoke in this way, he also spoke for me, and for
the people I had come from. The land that Labour had forgotten, the forgotten middle class.’
Clintonisation of Labour
The manner in which those within the Labour Party demonstrated their admiration for
the Democrats’ victory in 1992 was criticised by some, who deemed the party’s change in
direction to be a process of ‘Clintonisation’ (Wring, 2005, p. 127). There was a strong feeling
on the political left that Labour had abandoned its traditional principles in favour of an
‘Americanised’ marketing plan. Much of this criticism came from within the Labour Party
itself, and John Prescott was one vocal critic, who used ‘Clintonisation’ as a term of
suspicion and abuse (Riddell, 2004, p. 65). Despite this split within the party, the modernisers
continued to study the Democrats’ techniques, employing strategists such as Philip Gould and
Stanley Greenberg who had first-hand experience working on the 1992 Democrat campaign.
In the run-up to the 1997 election, Labour was also advised by James Carville, who was the
campaign manager for Clinton in 1992 and is credited with being responsible for the efficient
nature of the Democrats’ campaign (Wring, 2005, p. 128).
Those who accused Labour of accepting ‘Clintonisation’ were further angered in 1993
when Gould organised a one-day ‘Clinton conference’ for party members and affiliates. The
conference included most of Clinton’s major campaign personnel, with Greenberg talking of
Labour’s need to broaden class appeal in a way similar to the Democrats, and strategist Paul
Begala’s praise of Clinton for changing the dialogue from left/right politics, to ‘that of the old
and the new, between elitism and populism’ (Begala in Wring, 2005, p. 128). Peter
Mandelson, who had been Labour’s director of communications and had managed the Labour
party’s 1987 campaign, was also in attendance and ‘sucked it all in’ (Gould, 1998a, p. 176).
Gould (1998a, p. 176) stresses that he was not alone in support of Clinton’s influence on
Labour, citing officials such as Jonathan Powell, who worked for the British Embassy in
Washington and later became Blair’s chief of staff, as someone who had witnessed Clinton’s
campaign firsthand and taken ideas from it. What is particularly revealing around this issue,
however, is the strategist’s belief that ‘the Clinton experience was seminal for the Labour
Party...modernisation of Labour did not depend on Clinton, it would have happened anyway,
but his election did give modernisation a road map. Above all it offered hope’ (Gould, 1998a,
p. 177)
Campaigning Techniques
The fact that several of the key strategists working for New Labour during the 1990s
had either worked on or had first-hand experience of the Democratic campaign gave the
opportunity for some marketing techniques to be lifted from one country to the other. The
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concept of the ‘War Room’, in which all members of the campaign team worked together in
the same space, was initially developed by James Carville during the Clinton campaign as
means of ensuring everyone was involved in meetings and decisions. The War Room was
brought to the Labour Party by Philip Gould, and during the mid-1990s the leadership
relocated to take up two offices in Millbank Tower, Westminster, where a £2 million purpose
built media centre was established (Wring, 2005, p. 141). As well providing as an overall
sense of professionalism and structure, the War Room greatly assisted the efficiency of the
Labour campaign, as Gould (1998b, p. 7) notes: ‘opposition activity was constantly
monitored; attacks were instantly rebutted; dialogue with the electorate was constant.’ In the
United States, the expanding significance of media image led to some commentators claiming
that a ‘permanent campaign’ was taking place under Clinton, in that politics had become
characterised by the power of political consultants and emphasis on campaign style tactics
and advertising, in which parties campaign to govern as well as to gain office (Davies, 2000,
p. 231). Similarly, in Britain, the War Room served as a venue from which Labour could
remain ‘on message’, and to influence the media agenda as far as possible (Wring, 2005, p.
147).
The use of political slogans and soundbites also became particularly important for
New Labour. The Democrats had had much success with the phrase ‘It’s the economy,
stupid’, which was developed by James Carville, and designed to highlight George Bush’s
inability to address the economy. Popkin (1995, p. 213) notes that this phrase became so well
known that it was used in campaigns throughout the world, despite the fact that ‘ironically,
neither inflation nor unemployment was high in 1992, and a standard economic model of
presidential elections, based on changes in inflation and economic growth, predicted that
President Bush would win comfortably with 57% of the vote.’ Nevertheless, people voted for
Clinton as they no longer believed that the Republican Party could manage the economy, and
Clinton was able ‘to use the campaign to convince voters unhappy with the Democratic Party
that he was a new kind of Democrat’ (Popkin, 1995, p. 213). The Labour Party had already
learnt from previous defeats that it was financial competence that was of particular concern to
the electorate, and so focused their campaign on the notion that the party had changed and
was now economically responsible and future orientated, with Blair stating that there would
be ‘no special favours’ for the trade unions under New Labour (Wheatcroft, 1996). Like the
Democrats in 1992, Labour distanced itself from its ‘tax and spend’ image, instead marketing
itself as a party that embraced ‘the rigour of the market’ (Wring, 2005, p. 138). Further
slogans such as ‘partnership with the people’ and ‘stakeholding’ (Wring, 2005, p. 138) were
intended to act as simple demonstrations that the party had changed. Labour developed a set
of ‘pledge cards’ on which promises to the electorate over issues such as class sizes, reducing
NHS waiting lists and fast track punishment for persistent young offenders were placed. This
served as a concise and convenient message to which Labour politicians could refer
throughout the campaign. Yet even this idea was ‘borrowed’ from Clinton’s campaign in
1992, in which promises were made in a similar style, and the term ‘pledge cards’ was
invented (Grice, 2010). Whilst in power in 1999, Blair stated that ‘In future, welfare will be a
hand-up not a hand-out’ (Mchugh, 2007), directly mimicking a slogan first used by the
Democrats (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1995).
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The Democrats’ marketing of Bill Clinton was a further area from which the Labour
Party drew influence. A key message of the Clinton campaign was ‘change verses more of
the same’ (Popkin, 1995, p. 217); the Democrats focused on Bush’s failure to keep his
promises since 1988, and depicted Clinton as a man who could offer something alternative,
with Clinton’s natural charisma becoming an integral focus of the campaign. Meanwhile, the
Republicans could only focus on attempting to lower the ratings of Clinton and the
Democrats, arguing that Clinton was a radical, and that the Democrats were a party of
‘minorities and losers’ (Popkin, 1995, p. 220). This was similar to the Conservatives under
Major, who resorted to the negative campaign with the ‘New Labour, New Danger’ slogan
and released an advertising campaign depicting Blair with demon eyes (Gould, 1998a, p.
278). Once Tony Blair became Labour leader in July 1994, much of the party’s campaigning
was focused directly on him, in a rather presidential style, as Blair’s appeal as a leader in
Britain drew similarities with Clinton’s popularity in America. Blair too was cast as ‘young’,
‘strong’ and ‘dynamic’ in the party’s ‘War Book’, which documented Labour’s campaign
plan, and a film by Molley Dineen depicted Blair as a ‘dynamic leader, concerned parent and
“bloke”’ (Wring, 2005, p. 146). Labour learnt that running campaigns highlighting the
popularity of their leader would enable them to better engage with the electorate, and King
(1998, p. 205) believes that this directly influenced their dramatic success in 1997, stating
‘There is no way in which Labour could have won such a large majority...without Tony Blair
and the Labour party having persuaded millions of voters that the party had indeed changed
and changed fundamentally.’
3. Ideology and Policy Formation Techniques
In order to be seen as a changed party, it was not enough for Labour to simply depict
itself as having a ‘new’ image. It had to demonstrate that its policies had changed too, and
that it had caught up with the times. Strategists working for Labour recognised the need to
engage with the electorate and understand their views. This was achieved through the use of
focus groups, which have been popular for a long time in politics, and were used by Labour
during the Policy Review of 1987 – 1992 (Wring, 2005, p. 128). However, it was in the runup to the 1997 election that they were utilised to great effect by Labour as a means of
formulating policy, under the guidance of Democrat strategists who had achieved success for
Clinton with the use of such methods.
Focus Grouping for Policies
Philip Gould (1998, p. 326) dismisses the controversy surrounding focus groups as
‘ridiculous’, stating that ‘they are simply eight people in a room talking. Their importance in
modern politics is that they enable politicians to hear directly the voters’ voices.’ Yet the way
in which Labour began to rely on them caused a number of members to accuse the party of
abandoning its principles, in favour of doing whatever it considered necessary to get elected.
Such concerns emerged as early as 1987, with the then Deputy Leader of the Labour Party
Roy Hattersley claiming ‘[We] say, “what are the policies people want and then when we
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find out what they’ll vote for, we’ll write it into our manifesto” – that is not the sort of
politics I want to be involved in’ (Wring, 2005, p. 102). Yet despite Labour’s shock defeat in
the 1992 election, it was decided that unreliable opinion polls, rather than the collection of
qualitative data, were to blame (Wring, 2005, p. 122). This view was supported in Labour MP
Giles Radice’s pamphlet, Southern Discomfort, released in September 1992, which examined
discussions involving voters from Conservative held, marginal seats in southern England. It
was found that the participants had intended to vote Labour but switched to Conservative
(Wring, 2005, p. 128). Labour strategists thus adopted the belief that gaining the support of
these people would win them the election. Following this conviction, and the wish to avoid
yet another election defeat, Gould conducted focus groups one night a week from 1994, and
in the six weeks before the election increased this to six nights a week, focusing on 1992
Conservative voters who were considering switching to Labour (Gould, 1998, p. 329). As
well as worries over taxation levels, the power of the unions proved to be a concern for these
voters, and Labour aimed to reassure the public that it could control the unions, rather than be
controlled by them (Gould, 1998, p. 258).
Although Labour had used focus groups as a means of aiding policy formation for
some time before the Clinton era, the success of the Democrats was instrumental in the
decision to increase the emphasis on focus groups. The pre-election period saw American
pollster Stanley Greenberg, who had conducted focus groups and opinion polls during the
1992 United States election for the Democrats, volunteer to assist Labour. It was Greenberg
who emphasised the need for focus groups to be used to reassure voters that Labour was
‘safe’, and that it could be trusted not to raise taxes for everyone and to control the unions.
Greenberg’s views were taken seriously by Labour, with Gould (1998, p. 333) referring to his
work as ‘strategic research at its best...incredibly valuable to a political campaign’. Gould
also documents having attended focus groups conducted in America by Greenberg in 1995
(Gould, 1998, p. 331), two years before he was to employ them himself. In using similar
techniques to that of the Democrats, Clinton’s success became all the more important for
Labour. Wring (2005, p. 132) notes Clare Short’s view that the Democrats’ victory was being
used by strategists to remove Labour’s traditional values, to block the power of the unions
and to stop focusing on the poor. It is evident that Labour utilised the Democrats’ experiences
and election victory in order to advance the policy formation technique of focus grouping, but
Clinton’s party was to assist Blair and Labour not just at the practical but also the ideological
level. This came in the form of the international Third Way.
The Third Way
There is considerable debate as to where the term ‘Third Way’ originated. Gould
(1998, p. 235) notes the possibility that the concept was first used by Pope Pius XII in the late
nineteenth century, whilst Giddens (1998, p. 25) claims that the phrase was in use in the early
twentieth century, assuming popularity among right-wing groups in the 1920s. However, the
phrase was to be reinvented as a symbol of the politics of the Democrats under Clinton and
Labour under Blair. The Third Way stems from the need for parties of the left to react to the
changing economic times; the Keynesianism that social democrats had favoured during the
1970s no longer worked, and it had been replaced by a neo-liberal, ‘new right’ agenda, that
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focused on individualism, privatisation and the advancement of the free market (Heffernan,
2000, p. 20). Proponents of the Third Way argued that society had fundamentally changed,
and that it could not return to old social democratic ways. Yet they rejected the idea that this
meant taking on a right-wing ideological position, and instead aimed to construct an approach
based upon ‘new dividing lines’ (Gould, 1998, p. 235). As well as the need to be pragmatic,
both the Democrats and Labour aimed to adapt traditional values to modern society, and this
had implications for the type of policies that they developed. White (2001, p. 4) notes that the
values of opportunity, responsibility and community were emphasised by the New
Democrats, and frequently featured in Bill Clinton’s speeches. Such themes were later picked
up on by Labour.
The form of opportunity advocated within the Third Way is one based around the
concept of an inclusive society, in which all individuals are given the chance to succeed,
whilst having a permanent responsibility for their actions. This involves ensuring
responsibility in the realms of childcare, education and taxation so that ‘adequate
opportunities and public goods for all’ can be created (White, 2001, p. 5). This notion led to
the popular New Labour statement expressed by Giddens (1998, p. 65) that there would be
‘no rights without responsibilities’. Continuing the thought process of the new-right
governments of Reagan and Thatcher, Clinton and Blair no longer saw society as
fundamentally defined by classes. They developed a politics that focused on the individual’s
responsibility to the community as a whole (White, 2001, p. 49). In contrast to neo-liberals,
the community is important to proponents of the Third Way, signified by the emphasis on
civic responsibilities as a means of maintaining the unity of society. However, the Third Way
sees globalisation as an inescapable feature of modernity. In the market driven world
economy, centre-left parties have tried to cooperate with big businesses in order to create the
best possible conditions for economic growth (Wood, 2001, p. 49).
Whilst both the Democrats and Labour subscribed to the Third Way, its emergence
can be attributed to the success of the New Democrats’ notion of ‘Triangulation’, developed
by party strategist Dick Morris (Wring, 2005, p. 173). Triangulation was instrumental in the
success of the Democrats; it aimed to move the party beyond Left and Right by dealing with
issues that the Republicans were ordinarily considered to be stronger on, such as welfare and
minimising state intervention. The idea was to bridge the most effective elements of the left
and of the right, or at least to be seen by the public to be doing so. This way the Democrats
could hope to achieve more support among Republican voters. Morris explains this when he
argues ‘the essence of triangulation is to use your party's solutions to solve the other side's
problems. Use your tools to fix their car’ (Morris, 2003, p.91). Later, the Labour Party aimed
to develop a form of politics that moved beyond ‘old left and new right’ (Wring, 2005, p.
152) and the academic rhetoric behind the Third Way as an ideology began to develop in
Britain, as seen in the writings of Anthony Giddens (1998). It is evident that the style of the
Third Way developed in the United States was reiterated by New Labour. Driver and Martell
(1998, p. 24) point out that prior to his victory in 1992, Clinton committed himself to
supporting free trade, tax cuts and welfare reform. He ‘projected a populist
communitarianism of rights and responsibilities, civic duties and family values. And he also
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promised to be tough on crime’ (Driver and Martell, 1998, p. 24). All of these messages were
utilised by New Labour in the run-up to 1997. Additionally, the same authors note in a later
study how Labour was influenced by welfare reform under Bill Clinton, using the Democrats’
idea of ‘work-first’ that was at odds with Labour’s previous commitments to social justice
(Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 186).
However, despite the influence of the Democrats on Labour’s adoption of the Third
Way, New Labour developed in a manner related to the specific political climate in Britain,
as a response to eighteen years of Conservative rule. The doctrine of Thatcherism in the UK
was to have a very particular influence on Labour in a way that the New Democrats could
not. The Democrats also had to respond to Reagan, who like Thatcher, had developed a rightwing Neo-Liberal agenda that had reshaped American politics. However, the Democrats did
not have to abandon any fundamental principles in order to accept change, whilst Labour had
to make the bold decision to favour pragmatism over principle, and to risk losing grass-roots
support in order to once again be accepted by the electorate as whole.
The Influence of Thatcherism: No Going Back
The dramatic changes to British society that took place under the Thatcher
government of 1979 – 1990, and were continued by Major until 1997 reshaped the British
political scene. Acting as a response to the failures of social democracy and Keynesian
economics, the Conservatives advanced a ‘New Right’ agenda that married neo-liberalism’s
belief in individualism, laissez-faire economics and minimal state intervention, with neoconservatism’s commitment to a strong government, the nation and hierarchy (Heffernan,
2000, p. 29). The politics of Thatcherism (considered by Heffernan, (2000, p. 18) as ‘an
ideological project’, with the goal of changing the prevailing national attitude) not only
impacted on the values and ideology of the Conservative party, but also forced its opponents
to change. Thus, the society of the 1990s and early twenty-first century was characterised by
the values of the New Right, in which the major parties abandoned any commitment to
collectivism. Instead, ‘a broadly defined neo-liberal ideological disposition [informed] the
political ideas which form part of a belief system eventually translated into public policy’
(Heffernan, 2000, p. 1). Whilst the Conservative party in Britain was to gradually lose its
dominance, the political ideas that it advocated outlived the government, and the re-making
of the Labour party took place ‘against the backdrop’ of the neo-liberal agenda, in which the
party had no choice but to accept the new era of privatisation, trade union reform and the
power of the free-market (Heffernan, 2000, p. 3). Labour felt that it had to transform due to
its acceptance that ‘the great ideological contest of the twentieth century’ had ended, in which
free-market capitalism had won, and socialism had lost (Heffernan, 2000, p. 20). This offers
some explanation for why Labour was so marginalised during the 1980s; its political outlook
and policies were considered to be obsolete. It had to update itself to a new political and
economic era within Britain, or risk becoming further outdated. In the words of Tony Blair,
the party had to ‘modernise or die’ (Driver and Martell, 1998, p. 7).
Labour’s shift to the right involved undertaking a ‘politics of catch up’, in which it
had to accept that traditional social democracy had been replaced by a neo-liberal agenda
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concerned with inflation and globalisation, and opposed to progressive taxation and the
expansion of the public sector (Heffernan, 2000, p. 170). As leader of the party, Blair
accepted the expanding power of business and, at a speech in 1997 declared ‘the deal is this:
we leave intact the main changes of the 1980s in industrial relations and enterprise. And now,
together, we address a new agenda for the twenty-first century’ (Heffernan, 2000, p. 23). In
examining some of the policy initiatives of the New Labour government, Driver and Martell
(1998, p. 164) argue that in pursuing neo-liberalism as part of its economic and social policy,
Labour’s values, as well as its means have changed. As well as embracing the market
economy over the mixed economy, Labour’s social policies aimed at providing skilled
workers access to the labour market have sought to perpetuate capitalism rather than oppose
it. The party has envisaged that health, education and social security should be provided by a
diverse number of organisations rather than by the state. The welfare policy that it followed
in the 1990s was based on the condition of citizens fulfilling responsibilities, whilst the
Labour party of old would have advocated welfare as a basic right for those who need it
(Driver and Martell, 1998, p. 164). All of these are indicators that Labour had to adapt its
policies in the wake of Thatcherism, and to some extent continued the Conservative agenda.
Yet, it is not enough to consider New Labour to be a simple reconfiguration of Thatcherism;
it is in fact a reaction to it, as Driver and Martell (1998, p. 161) note when they claim ‘Labour
has shifted to the Right. But some of their emphasis and policies remain more recognisably of
the Left.’ Indeed if Labour is entirely Thatcherite then what are we to make of the social
democratic elements that reside within the Third Way? Unlike the Democrats in the United
States, the Labour Party’s history is deeply founded in socialism. This is not something that
should be overlooked, and there is a degree of evidence that demonstrates that Labour
politicians and thinkers did not wholly abandon Labour’s roots but genuinely attempted to
update some aspects of socialism for the twenty-first century. Socialism can thus be seen as a
significant influence on New Labour’s ideology and policy formation techniques.
New Labour and Ethical Socialism
Proponents of New Labour during its rise to power argued that they were using ‘new
means to deliver old ends’ (Driver and Martell, 1998, p. 27), claiming that in a changing
world, the Labour party had to adapt to new ways of achieving its traditional values. It has
become apparent that this notion is somewhat untrue, as the party very clearly did take a
Right turn in the wake of Thatcherism and the development of the Third Way. Nevertheless,
some of the themes of the agenda followed under Blair during the 1990s and into the twentyfirst century indicate a continuation of socialism, an influence founded in the traditions of the
party itself. Themes such as ‘community’ and dealing with ‘social exclusion’ were
characteristic of the rhetoric of the Blair years (Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 221), and
policies such as the minimum wage and the New Deal for jobseekers offer evidence that the
party meant to deal with such issues. Furthermore, New Labour has at times pursued a
specifically ‘British’ agenda set around notions of what ‘New Britain’ could be like (Driver
and Martell, 2002, p. 114). New Labour has pursued a form of identity politics, in the hope of
being inclusive towards an increasingly diverse nation, based around concepts of ‘creative
Britain’; the hard-working family Britain; and the socially just Britain supported by the
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welfare state’ (Driver and Martell, 2002, p. 154). It has also recognised the importance of
regional autonomy, signified by the devolution acts to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
in 1997.
Blair was influenced by the communitarian philosophy of John Macmurray, in which
individuals are created through their attachments to others and are thus advanced through
society. This contrasts with the neo-liberal predominant focus on individualism. New
Labour’s advocating of ‘rights and responsibilities’ was aimed to ensure that Britain as a
community could be bound together, with each person contributing their share (Driver and
Martell, 1998, p. 28). This was also intended to extend beyond the class boundary,
incorporating the notion of the ‘one nation’ community. New Labour’s commitment to social
justice, in that government should be responsible for increasing individual opportunities
through means such as the welfare state, also has continuity with the value of equality.
However, it is clear that the type of equality that New Labour espouses is that of equality of
opportunity rather than outcome, and under Blair the party moved away from commitments
to redistribution of wealth, focusing instead on policies of ‘inclusiveness’ (Driver and
Martell, 1998, p. 30). Nevertheless, Shaw (2007, p. 176) argues that ethical socialism sought
a fairer division of income and wealth, the equalising of life chances and the remoulding of
social relations. On this basis, New Labour has been true to these ideals, as policies such as
the attempts to reduce child poverty, the Sure Start programme (which aimed to give support
to the disadvantaged), as well as numerous efforts to enhance public education and skills
demonstrate (Shaw, 2007, p. 201). It is clear, however, that Labour no longer remains a
committed socialist party. New Labour politicians and strategists have argued that their
politics transcends both old style social democracy and neo-liberalism in a new era of ‘life
politics’ (Giddens, 1998, p. 26), whilst others have claimed that Labour in fact is a
combination of left and right, an attempt to balance the seemingly conflicting values of
Thatcherite neo-liberalism and the remains of social democracy (Driver and Martell, 1998, p.
178). However, the important point to take from the above discussion is that the party
retained the influence of elements of its socialist past whilst in the modernisation process and
demonstrated this through the implementation of some of its policies.
4. Conclusion
The election of the Labour Party to government in 1997 and its success into the early
twenty-first century was a testament to the infinite changes that had to be made in order to
revitalise a political party that seemed to be becoming obsolete. The Labour party
increasingly utilised political marketing techniques in order to prove to the British public that
it was once again trustworthy and electable. The successful election campaign of Bill Clinton
and the Democrats in 1992 gave Labour hope that a leftist party could be rebranded and
repositioned in the minds of the electorate, following nearly two decades of right-wing
Conservative government. What has been argued here is that the marketing techniques that
were employed by the Labour Party during the 1990s and continued into the early twentyfirst century developed as part of a constant dialogue with the Democrats, in which
everything from the layout of the campaign rooms to the strategic professionals working on
the campaigns were shared. The way in which Labour finally branded itself as ‘New’,
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
20
Daniel Frosh
advertised itself to the middle classes and was depicted as a party of the future, in contrast to
the obsolete Conservatives, all involved campaigning methods ‘borrowed’ from America.
The selection of Blair as leader made the job of party strategists easier, as campaigns could
focus directly on his charisma and likeable character, in a very similar way to how Clinton
was depicted. In a noticeably presidential manner, Blair provided the ideal face for New
Labour. King (1998, p. 201) takes note of this, stating ‘Tony Blair was the perfect leader for
the Labour party in the 1990s. He might almost have been a product of computer-aided
design.’ With regards to marketing strategies, then, it is clear that Labour emulated the
Democrats to a large extent.
At first glance it may appear that New Labour’s ideology was derivative of its
marketing plan; the party devised a strategy aimed at demonstrating that it had changed, and
was now electable. This involved an outlook that was overtly pragmatic and took place
through focus groups. It is unclear how this directly contributed to specific policies, but such
groups certainly appear to have been beneficial to the party in gaining support from previous
Conservative voters. What is also apparent is that Labour benefitted from the manner in
which the Democrats conducted focus groups for Clinton. It is evident that strategist Philip
Gould learnt a lot from American pollster Stanley Greenberg, who was clearly influential
over New Labour’s stance on the unions and taxation. It must be noted however that focus
groups were used by the Labour party before the election of Clinton, and took place
frequently during the Policy Review. Additionally, such a form of policy formulation has
been around for a long time in politics, seen during the war years in which the Conservatives
held ‘cottage coffee’ mornings in order to gain support from women voters (Wring, 2005, p.
121). Despite this, New Labour relied on the heavy usage of focus groups in a manner that
mirrored the Democrats, and directly learnt from their personnel in this area of policy
formation.
There are direct parallels that can be made between the rhetoric of both parties,
signified in the personas of Clinton and Blair, with regards to the Third Way. Both the
Democrats and New Labour advocated, among others, responsibility, inclusiveness and
community as ideological aspirations on which to base their policies (White, 2001, p. 4). The
Labour party was influenced by the concept of triangulation, developed by Democrat
strategists in order to gain support in traditional republican areas, and the thought behind the
Third Way as not just a form of marketing but as the basis of a new form of politics, emerged
from this. However, it is upon deeper examination of the ideological makeup of the two
parties that it becomes clear that New Labour did not wholly emulate the Democrats.
Importantly, there were very specific ‘British’ influences on New Labour’s ideology and
subsequent policies. It has been argued here that the Conservative government under
Margaret Thatcher and then John Major made fundamental changes to society in the pursuit
of their New Right agenda. The Labour Party could no longer rely on its past social
democratic methods, and had to play the politics of ‘catch up’ (Heffernan, 2000, p. 70) to
demonstrate that it had updated and changed. Labour had to accept the success of the free
market, the curbing of the power of the trade unions, and privatisation schemes implemented
by the previous incumbents (Heffernan, 2000, p. 3). In the wake of the Thatcher years, it had
POLIS Journal Vol.3, Winter 2010
21
Daniel Frosh
become clear that any party that wanted to form government would have to adhere to the
widespread acceptance of free-market capitalism. Such moves signified a change in Labour’s
values as well as the party’s policies.
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic to suggest that Labour entirely parted with its
socialist history, although this element was becoming less recognisable. The pursuit of
policies based on inclusion, aimed to benefit the community as a whole, stem from the values
of social democracy, and Blair’s specific belief in communitarianism emerged from ethical
socialist thought (Driver and Martell, 1998, p. 28). Although the party does not pursue
outright financial equality, distancing itself from old Left aims of widespread redistribution, it
has remained faithful to a commitment to equality of opportunity and inclusion. In line with
the requirements of ethical socialism, New Labour remained focused on decreasing poverty
and on developing a society in which life chances are fairer (Shaw, 2007, p. 176). Specific
policies such as the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 are illustrative of this
commitment, and are better linked with socialism than any other ideological framework.
It has thus been demonstrated in this dissertation that there were a number of
influences on the development of the Labour Party’s ideology and policy formation
techniques. The American Democratic Party played its part, holding a direct influence over
Labour’s political marketing strategies and also began the development of the Third Way.
However, Labour did not wholly emulate the Democrats, as becomes apparent in the realm of
ideology. It was here that the party took influence from Thatcherism and the remnants of
British socialism to construct an ideology that claimed to go beyond ‘Left and Right’,
transcend the barrier of class, and signify a new form of politics for the twenty-first century.
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