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1NC................................................................................................................................................2
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2NC/1NR — Blocks .........................................................................................................................6
They Say: “Xi Credibility Low Now”....................................................................................................... 7
They Say: “Dialogue Doesn’t Cause Anti-Americanism” ....................................................................... 9
They Say: “Xi Spending Capital on Military Reforms” ......................................................................... 12
They Say: “Our Plan is Positive Engagement”/“Plan Has the US Give In” .......................................... 13
They Say: “Capital Doesn’t Generate Reforms” .................................................................................. 15
They Say: “Reforms Fail Now” ............................................................................................................ 16
They Say: “No Regime Collapse” ......................................................................................................... 17
They Say: “PC Theory Not True” ......................................................................................................... 18
They Say: “Popularity Not Key to Xi” .................................................................................................. 19
They Say: “Instability Turn”................................................................................................................. 21
They Say: “Economic Return Turn” ..................................................................................................... 23
2NC/1NR — Link Cards & Extensions ............................................................................................. 24
“Xi Maintains Power By Opposing the US” ......................................................................................... 25
“Now’s the Key Time for Xi”................................................................................................................ 26
Engagement Links ............................................................................................................................... 27
TPP Link ............................................................................................................................................... 32
2NC/1NR — Impact Extensions ..................................................................................................... 36
Neg Block: Turn Shield ........................................................................................................................ 37
Neg Block Impact: Reforms ................................................................................................................. 38
Neg Block Impact: Nationalism ........................................................................................................... 40
Neg Block Impact: Hardliners .............................................................................................................. 41
Neg Block Impact: Regime Legitimacy ................................................................................................ 42
Neg Block Impact: Relations ............................................................................................................... 44
Neg Block Impact: Trade ..................................................................................................................... 45
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A. Uniqueness. Xi has power to force reform now, but it’s based on opposition to the
US — perception of outside influence tanks his agenda.
Whitehead 16 (Adam, twenty-five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management,
in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth
funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to
setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese
Political Rift,” May 9th 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-politicalrift?page=2#)
President Xi's
position of control over the Finance Ministry has been bolstered by the latest reshuffling at the
top. Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao has been promoted to a senior position in the Communist Party's elite
financial and economic panel led by President Xi Jinping himself. In his new Party role, he will serve as a deputy director of the general
office of the Central Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs. Since his ministerial role involves him interfacing and coordinating with
G20, his new
role allows the President to directly control this interface function through the Party.
Premier Li's attempts to finance training and entrepreneurship after the mass layoffs in his reforms will therefore be
circumscribed by President Xi's effective control of the Finance Ministry and the Policy Banks. Once again it appears to be
a conflict between Li's economic reforms and Xi's redistribution of wealth. President Xi controls the finances
and occupies the populist moral high ground. Premier Li is the bad guy following a foreign agenda.
B. LINKS (CHOOSE A LINK CARD FROM PAGES 24-35 & INSERT IT HERE. THE LINK CARD
SHOULD BE SPECIFIC TO THE CASE THE AFF IS RUNNING. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE AFF IS
RUNNING TPP, CHOOSE A LINK CARD FROM PAGES 32-35).
Xi’s political capital is key to economic reforms that save the Chinese economy —
perception of strength is essential.
Lieberthal 13 (Kenneth Lieberthal, 3/14, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior
fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development on PBS News Hour, interview with Judy
Woodruff, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june13/china_03-14.html)
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he's already tried to change the style by being much more of a kind of lively politician than his predecessor was.
But I think Gordon is right. We
have to look to see whether he can forge the kind of consensus to make deep
structural reforms in China that the country deeply needs if it's going to move forward. JUDY WOODRUFF: For example?
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and investment-focused
economy to one that's much more focused on domestic consumption as a driver of economic development, which requires
expanding the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth. That runs against huge vested interests in China. So the
question is whether he's going to be able to really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the
services sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects and reduce dependence on exports. JUDY WOODRUFF: So,
looking at him, Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks different, do you think? GORDON CHANG: I think the one
thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he's been in power for only a few months, since last November, when he became
general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese, because the Chinese claim
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sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China's foreign policy on this issue, and
if so, we're in trouble, because this is a very troubled area. JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that's a primary priority
of his? KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his
real priority is domestic. What he needs is stability abroad in order to
undertake reform domestically. But his big problem is that he -- that the Communist Party has really nurtured very
ardent nationalism domestically, and he can't allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he
won't have the political capital to carry out reforms. So he's trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be
seen as strong in international affairs . But I don't think he's looking for trouble internationally. He'd rather avoid if it if he can.
C. IMPACTS - Economic collapse causes CCP regime collapse and multiple nuclear
wars.
Yee & Storey 2 (Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong
Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002 (The China
Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, Routledge Curzon, pg 5)
political and economic collapse in the PRC,
resulting in territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees pouring into neighbouring countries.
Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a profoundly negative impact on regional stability . Today the
The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of
Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage
of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems
are
putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a
Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an
unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited
resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear
weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords. ' From this perspective, a
disintegrating China would also pose a threat to its neighbours and the world.
[Optional] Finally, perceived compliance with American power angers the Chinese
public and fuels support for militarism and nationalism, causing a US-China war.
Gries 7 (Peter, is the Harold J- & Ruth Newman Chair in U.S.-China Issues and Director of the Institute
for U.S. China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, Harmony, Hegemony, & U.S.-China Relations, World
Literature Today,
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1298949661&SrchMode=1&sid=6&Fmt=3&VInst=PRO
D&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1183689575&clientId=31549, 7/6/07)
Chinese Occidentalism has thus involved a discourse of similarity to the United States; it also includes a vital discourse of
difference. And it is this discourse that is ascendant. Chinese nationalist texts today are full of references to
Western and American "selfishness," "materialism," "conflict/discord," and "impersonal coldness" that seek to construct an Eastern
and Chinese "beneficence," "spiritualism," "harmony," and "warmheartedness." This discourse of difference has arisen at a time when more
and more Chinese have expressed anxiety about the rise of materialism and conflict in a rapidly modernizing China that has now experienced
almost thirty years of "reform and opening." Unwanted traits
like selfishness and aggressiveness have been thrust
upon the Western Other to reassert traditional Chinese values like beneficence and harmony. This process is reminiscent of the way
eighteenth-century European liberals projected their fears about their own passions and society ("the mob") onto the "Orient," seeking to
construct the Enlightenment vision of themselves as rational individuals. Indeed, twenty-first-century Chinese Occidentalism replicates many of
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the same dichotomies and epistemologies long central to Western Orientalism. As noted above, "U.S.
hegemonism" is a
particularly important marker of difference vital to Chinese constructions of a "harmonious" China. In English-at
least in international-relations theory-"hegemony" is an objective and largely value-free description of a particular balance of power. The
Chinese "hegemony" (badao), by contrast, has a decidedly normative overtone: it is a judgment about an aggressive
American character. The concept actually has over three millennia of history in China: it was during the ancient Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1045256 B.C.) that Chinese political philosophers first juxtaposed the "Way of the King" against the "Way of the Hegemon." And this is what strikes
me as new, and potentially dangerous, about Chinese Occidentalism today. The dialectic of similarity to and difference from the U.S. has swung
decidedly in favor of difference. Unlike China's earlier "peaceful rise" and "peaceful development" discourse, which clearly had a status quo
orientation, focusing on China's development within the existing world system, the
new discourse of "civilization modes" and
"harmonious worlds" appears more revisionist, pointing to a distinctly Chinese and different regional order. It
evokes a hierarchical, China-at-the-center vision of East Asian politics. Furthermore, the new Chinese
Occidentalism depicts Americans as an aggressive, militaristic, and threatening people. It certainly does not
help that the current Bush administration's embrace of military and unilateral means to resolve international disputes in Iraq and elsewhere has
provided ample fodder for Chinese nationalist arguments. The danger is that heightened
Chinese perceptions of U.S. threat
could promote the emergence of an acute "security dilemma" in U.S.-China relations. Feeling threatened by
a "hegemonic" U.S., Chinese could decide to step up their military modernization for defensive reasons.
Americans would likely respond to increased Chinese arms acquisitions with heightened threat perception of their own, leading the U.S. to
embrace its own defensive arms buildup. The unintended result: a possible U.S.-China arms race in East Asia. Absent
feelings of mutual trust, and given the deep animosities that have led to the recent deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the always
volatile situation in the Taiwan Strait, there
is a real possibility that the United States will get drawn into yet another
conflict with China in the first decades of the twenty-first century.
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They Say: “Xi Credibility Low Now”
Xi is consolidating Politburo control, but needs grassroots support for further reform
Callick 16 (Rowan, staff @ The Australian, “Xi Xinping quietly seeds culture of Mao’s revolution,” May
14th, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/xi-xinping-quietly-seeds-culture-of-maosrevolution/news-story/9114e0d1834150db2652248c863f2cde)
Xi has been frustrated in implementing some of his plans for China, which retains theoretically a collective leadership via
the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee. He has thus formed 11 commissions which he chairs and has the
decisive voice on issues such as security and the economy. He is also, said Qiao, seeking support from the
grassroots, -appealing over the top of officials not fully on message, including through his anti--corruption campaign. Mao
too “used the people to rebel on his behalf”. “Xi’s style is quite different, he talks less and does more.”
Xi has capital now to implement reforms
Pei 16 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, “Two ways to break Beijing's
political stalemate,” May 6th, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Twoways-to-break-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)
Unfortunately, these embittered officials may have either underestimated Xi's resolve or failed to appreciate his
political dilemma. Unlike his predecessors, Xi harbors a visceral revulsion toward corruption inside the CCP and believes that only a selfdisciplined one-party regime can survive in a modern society. At the same time, fighting
corruption has earned Xi a huge
amount of political capital and given him a potent weapon against his rivals. Giving it up equals unilateral
disarmament. Finally, having staked so much of his credibility on purging the rot from the party, Xi risks losing it
altogether if he allows the anti-corruption campaign to fizzle out. As he said in his January 2016 speech to the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's powerful anti-corruption arm, "If corruption is revived and returns, it will not only worsen our
political environment, but also damage the morale of our party and the people. As someone has said, if corruption bounces back, our people
will lose hope."
Xi is consolidating power ahead of the next Politburo Standing Committee meeting –
He’s winning now
Manila Times 16 (Philippines news, “Faction-fighting in China’s ruling party,” April 30th,
http://www.manilatimes.net/faction-fighting-in-chinas-ruling-party/259233/)
Allies of Chinese President Xi Jinping are moving against a Communist organization that is the power base of
Premier Li Keqiang, in what analysts say may be a sign of faction-fighting at the top of the ruling party. The
Communist Youth League (CYL) has long been a proving ground for young up-and-comers to demonstrate
their political talent, particularly those who—unlike Xi— are not party “princelings” with the advantage of highranking parents. It has produced some of the country’s top leaders, including Xi’s presidential predecessor Hu Jintao as well as Li, and its alumni
are seen as a leading faction within the Communist party. But as
Xi moves to consolidate power, the group has come
under sustained attack, including direct reprimands from the president himself. The party’s internal corruption watchdog, the Central
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), this week took the group to task for losing sight of its core mission to guide young people’s
ideological development. On its website, the CCDI published an extensive self-criticism by the CYL’s central committee, acknowledging that it
must have a greater “sense of responsibility and mission” to the party leadership and the country’s young people. The declaration came after
an investigation into the CYL found evidence of embezzlement and influence-peddling, according to the Global Times newspaper, which is close
to the ruling party. The CCDI is headed by Wang Qishan, widely considered to be Xi’s top lieutenant. Analysts say that the
charges,
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although likely legitimate, may also be
a convenient cover for the CCDI’s real goal: helping Xi jockey for position
ahead of next year’s 19th Party Congress, which will decide the new line-up for the Communist Party’s
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), the top organ of political power in China. “To investigate the CYL is a highly
political endeavor,” said Jean-Pierre Cabestan of Hong Kong Baptist University. “This operation will certainly contribute to
consolidating Xi’s position.” Five of the current seven PSC members are expected to retire at the Congress, and many experts believe
Xi and Li are locked in a struggle to fill the vacancies with their own supporters, not to mention protect their own
positions. “All indications are that Xi Jinping is trying to reduce the influence of the Youth League” ahead of the
event, China expert Willy Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong told Agence France-Presse.
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They Say: “Dialogue Doesn’t Cause Anti-Americanism”
Chinese hardliners interpret the plan the worst way possible; perception is key
Mead 12 (Walter Russell Mead, “High Noon in Beijing,” American Interest Blog, April 30,
http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/04/30/high-noon-in-beijing/)
What we all seem to be learning in Asia is that events have a logic and a pace of their own. America can
set a policy in motion,
but we can’t control or fine tune the consequences of our policies as they ripple out across the world. Many
conversations with US officials in this and in prior administrations have left me convinced that the US is not trying to contain China the way we
once contained the Soviet Union. While virtually all Americans at senior levels believe that over time economic progress will lead to political
change in China, this is because most Americans are hardwired to think in those terms and this whiggish faith in the historical process is not a
Leading Americans in both parties generally hope for a peaceful and gradual reform
process rather than violent conflict in China; they do not want to dismember or impoverish China and
they would not welcome its disintegration. Nor do Americans see the evolution of a future Asian security order in zero-sum
terms. The United States wants to prevent Chinese domination of Asia but we do not want to dominate the region ourselves. Many
statement of policy or intent.
Chinese , I have found on my visits there, have a much darker view of our intentions, and see the US and China
entangled in a zero sum battle for dominance which only one side can win. For now, it appears that the US,
surprisingly to some Chinese analysts, is winning that contest. We should not expect Chinese hard liners to accept
that situation with calm and resignation, even if their present options are limited.
The plan incites a brand of anti-Americanism that stokes nationalism.
Stivachtis 7 (Yannis, Director, International Studies Program Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,
“UNDERSTANDING ANTI‐AMERICANISM,” http://rieas.gr/images/rieas109.pdf)
Sovereign‐nationalists focus on two values: the importance of not losing control over state territory and the inherent
importance and value of collective national identities. These identities often embody values that are at
odds with the American ones. State sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted U.S. interference .
Sovereign‐nationalist anti‐Americanism resonates well in political communities that have strong state traditions, like
China. Encroachments on state sovereignty are particularly resented when a great power has the capacity and a
tradition of interfering in the domestic affairs of other states. Anti‐Americanism of this kind is very powerful since it
stirs nationalist passions. There are three types of sovereign‐nationalist attitudes. First, emphasis can be on nationalism. National
identity is one of the most important political values in contemporary world politics. Such identities create the potential for anti‐Americanism,
both when they are strong (since they provide positive counter‐values) and when they are weak (since anti‐ Americanism can become a
substitute for the absence of positive values). Second, sovereign nationalists can emphasize sovereignty. In many parts of the world, like in
some parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, where state sovereignty was achieved only after wars of national liberation, sovereignty is an
essential good that is to be defended, while in Latin America with its very different history, the preeminence of the U.S. has reinforced the
perceived value of sovereignty. A third variant of sovereign‐national
anti‐Americanism appears where people see
their states as potential great powers. Such societies may define their own situations partly in opposition to dominant states.
China provides the best example of this kind of anti‐Americanism since all three elements of sovereign‐nationalist
attitudes are present there. The Chinese elites and public are highly nationalistic and very sensitive to threats
to Chinese sovereignty. In addition, China is already a great power, and has aspirations to become even more powerful. The superior
military capacity of the United States, however, and its expressed willingness to use that capacity (for instance, in the case of an attack by China
on Taiwan) create latent anti‐ Americanism. Incidents, like U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the episode of the EC‐
3 spy plane in 2001, contribute to the quick rise of anti‐Americanism. The problem
with sovereign‐nationalist anti‐
Americanism is that the efforts of great powers, like the U.S., to establish and maintain order in an
anarchical international system often leads to policies that undermine the sovereignty of smaller states or sacrifice the
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national aspirations of some political communities. Therefore, sovereign‐nationalist
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anti‐Americanism is very difficult to
be eradicated.
Popular nationalism in China is built on a mistrust of foreign powers no matter what
the intent. The plan will provoke Anti-Xi reactions.
Johnson 9 (KENNETH D. JOHNSON is a colonel in the United States Army, Colonel Johnson is a member
of the U.S. Army War College Class of 2009. “CHINA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE: A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE
UNITED STATES, Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Papers Series, June 17, 2009,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=924)
The crucial national narrative of the “Century of Humiliation” at the hands of imperialist and hegemonic
powers is central to Chinese nationalism today.39 The weight of the past, it seems, is particularly heavy in
China—it is evident that these historical events drastically shaped the strategic culture of the Chinese people.
As General Li Jijun of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) said in an address at the U.S Army War College in 1997: Before 1949, when the
People’s Republic of China was established, more than 1000 treaties and agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were forced
upon China by the Western powers. As many as 1.8 million square kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of
humiliation that the Chinese can never forget. This is why the
people of China show such strong emotions in matters
concerning our national independence , unity, integrity of territory and sovereignty . This is also why the Chinese are
so determined
to safeguard them under any circumstances and at all costs. Chinese suspicion of
foreign intentions becomes easy to understand and to place in context. Even after its immediate establishment, the fledging PRC
was faced with isolation and containment by the world community, along with uncertain intentions by U.S. military forces along its borders in
Korea, and later Vietnam. Ironically, the PRC itself was the product of a movement with strong nationalist credentials; it was hardly distinctively
communist in its early years. Today, Chinese nationalism in its basic form encompasses the pride of being Chinese, the collective memory of the
humiliations of the past, and the aspiration for a return to greatness. China’s
rise as an economic, political, and military power has been
accompanied by an outburst of nationalism among its population.
China is torn between openness & stability. Stability is winning out now, but the plan
incites Anti-Xi sentiments that erodes party & social stability.
Lautz 16 (Terry, Moynihan Research Fellow at Syracuse University and former vice president of the
Luce Foundation, “Of Two Minds On China,” May 14th, http://www.eurasiareview.com/14052016-oftwo-minds-on-china-analysis/)
Today’s China is
something like this impossible animal with two heads facing in opposite directions. One
looks toward openness and reform – freedom of expression, unfettered access to the internet and an independent legal system. It
thinks that China’s continued development depends on wider acceptance of liberal values and norms. The other head believes, to the
contrary, that China’s paramount need is unity and stability, guided by the Communist Party. The leadership
must do whatever it takes to avoid the fate of the former Soviet Union or, for that matter, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. To
maintain its internal sovereignty and external security, Beijing must be assertive in guarding its interests.
China is pushed and pulled in both directions, but now appears to be moving on a perplexing path of more
control than reform. If the continued success of its economy depends on greater creativity and innovation, isn’t it counterproductive to
restrict its citizens’ access to ideas and information? If China needs to maintain smooth relations with the rest of the world for the sake of its
growth and development, why run the risk of antagonizing other nations with aggressive behavior? There are multiple theories for China’s
more authoritarian domestic policy and assertive foreign policy: Some observers blame Xi Jinping’s rise to power. Since assuming command as
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president and general secretary of the Communist Party in 2012, he has
purged rivals through an unprecedented anticorruption campaign and has accumulated more influence than any leader since Deng Xiaoping. He is ruthlessly
eliminating opposition in the party, state, and military. The official media have cultivated a personality cult depicting him as strong, decisive and
affable. While he is widely admired in China, critics view him as a dictator who rejects consensus and substitutes repression for moderation.
Fear that the Chinese Communist Party might collapse is offered as another explanation. According to this line
of thinking, the perpetuation of party rule is the only viable alternative to a descent into chaos . If the leadership
were to accept constitutional democracy and allow a robust civil society, it would undercut the party’s authority. Discipline must be imposed,
which accounts for censorship of the media; arrests of dissidents; and restrictions on minorities, religious groups, and non-governmental
organizations. Opponents say that the party’s suppression of dissent and attacks on liberal values are evidence of its inherent weakness.
Nationalism is also cited as a reason for China’s hardline direction. It is argued that nationalism is the one idea that holds China together,
despite efforts to revive allegiance to socialism or cultivate Confucian traditional values like loyalty and harmony. Building and fortifying remote
islands in the South China Sea reinforce China’s territorial claims, even if it is produces a backlash. Such actions provide a justification for
military expenditures and deflect attention from serious internal problems. Since China now has the strength to do as it pleases, it can afford to
abandon Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of keeping a low international profile.
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They Say: “Xi Spending Capital on Military Reforms”
Xi is focused on the economy and has the credibility to implement reforms now.
Wang 16 (Xiangwei, staff @ South China Morning Post, “Xi Jinping’s supply-side plan now the genuine article of
th
economic reform for China,” May 16 , http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xijinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article)
Who is in charge of the Chinese economy? If there were still any lingering doubts over this key question among
overseas investors, they should have been removed after the publication of two significant long pieces in People’s
Daily last week. On Monday, the mouthpiece controlled by the Communist Party’s Central Committee carried a long
question and answer “interview” with an unnamed “authoritative” source, repudiating the country’s debtfueled growth policies. On Tuesday, it published the text of a long speech by President Xi Jinping expounding his
hallmark economic policy which focused on supply-side structural reforms – 20,000 words in all that occupied
two pages in the newspaper. Xi gave the speech to top Chinese officials back in January, but the timing of the publication sent an unmistakable
message. Taken together, the
articles signal that Xi has decided to take the driver’s seat to steer China’s economy at
a time when there are intense internal debates among officials over its overall direction – namely whether to continue to resort
to the old ways of deploying massive stimulus resulting in overproduction and high debt levels, or to undertake painful restructuring to reduce
overcapacity and close down “zombie” enterprises.
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They Say: “Our Plan is Positive Engagement”/“Plan Has the US Give In”
Regardless of intentions, US engagement is spun by Chinese hardliners as an attempt
to isolate and contain China.
Rudd 15 — Kevin Rudd, Former Australian Prime Minister, director of the Asia Society Public Policy Institute,
member of the Berggruen Institute’s 21st Century Council delegation that met Chinese President Xi Jinping in
November 2013 in Beijing, 2015 (“How to Break the ‘Mutually Assured Misperception’ Between the U.S. and
th
China,” Huffington Post, June 20 , Available Online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/us-chinarelations-kevin-rudd-report_b_7096784.html, Accessed 08-19-2016)
Americans offer their own variations on the same theme concerning Chinese mirror imaging. Nonetheless, the report argues that Chinese
leaders have begun to form a worrying consensus on what they believe to be the core elements of
U.S. strategy towards China, despite Washington’s protestations to the contrary. These are reflected in the
following five-point consensus circulated among the Chinese leadership during 2014, summarizing
internal conclusions
about U.S. strategic intentions: To isolate China;, To contain China; To diminish China; To internally
divide China; and To sabotage China’s leadership.
While these
conclusions sound strange to a Western audience, they nonetheless derive from a Chinese
conclusion that the United States has not, and never will, accept the fundamental political legitimacy
of the Chinese administration because it is not a liberal democracy. They are also based on a deeply held, deeply
“realist” Chinese conclusion that the U.S. will never willingly concede its status as the pre-eminent
regional and global power, and will do everything within its power to retain that position. In Beijing, this assumption
permeates perceptions of nearly all aspects of U.S. policy , from campaigns on human rights, political activism in Hong
Kong, arms sales to Taiwan, and America’s failure to condemn terrorist attacks by Xinjiang separatists, to support for Falungong and the Dalai
Lama.
As a result, senior
Chinese interlocutors conclude that the U.S. is effectively engaged in a dual strategy of
undermining China from within, while also containing China from without. American arguments that
U.S. policy toward China bears no comparison with the Cold War-era containment of the Soviet Union are
dismissed by Chinese analysts . China points to the U.S. strategic decision to “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia as unequivocal evidence
of this. Beijing also points to Washington’s de facto support for Japanese territorial claims in the East China Sea, and its alleged abandonment of
neutrality on competing territorial claims in the South China Sea in support of the Philippines, Vietnam and other South-East Asian states at the
expense of China, as further evidence of containment.
Finally, China adds the most recent examples of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which excludes China)
and failed American efforts to dissuade its allies from joining the AIIB. All the above, as seen from
Beijing, are designed to deny international space to China in policy domains ranging from hard security,
to economics and trade diplomacy. The report notes that the U.S. disputes each of the above, and
instead argues that Chinese foreign policy appears geared for an attempt to push the United States
strategically out of Asia.
It is against this unhappy background that, in 2013, Xi Jinping elevated the concept of “a new type of great power relationship” as a centerpiece
of his diplomacy towards the U.S. Xi argued it was time to liberate the bilateral relationship from “a cold war mentality” (lengzhan siwei 冷战思
维) and the politics of “a zero sum game” (linghe youxi 零和游戏). While disagreements inevitably arose over the definition of Chinese and
American “core interests” (hexin liyi 核心利益). the U.S. administration initially welcomed the proposal. But this concept soon fell victim to a
deeply partisan debate within the United States on the administration “conceding strategic and moral parity to China” and has since
disappeared from the public language of the administration. The report argues that mutual
strategic misperceptions between
the U.S. and China, informed both by history and recent experience, are likely to endure.
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The perception of containment makes domestic acceptance massively politically
contentious
Backer 14 (Larry Cata, W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, 2012-13
Chair, University Faculty Senate, The Pennsylvania State, “THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE EMERGING
SHAPE OF A NEW WORLD TRADE REGULATORY ORDER,” 13 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 49, p. lexis)
In either case, China
is particularly sensitive to any action or policy that can be understood as fostering
Chinese containment. To that end, China is seeking to resist policies that might produce containment to the
advantage of its trade competitors. More importantly, China is also seeking to avoid containment through its
own trade strategies. These include expanding FTA-type relations within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") group,
strengthening trade with Canada, and aggressively pursuing FTA agreements with Japan and Korea. Chinese military arrangements are also
growing through the Shanghai Cooperation Group and similar strategies. This may be a harder policy to operationalize now as China begins its
transition to status as a developed state, and with it a substantially higher cost of labor and a switch in the mix of industrial production. The
shift - illustrated in weakened foreign investment in China - has pluses and minuses for an economy key to global growth. Beijing wants to shift
to higher-value production and to see incomes rise. But a de-emphasis on manufacturing puts pressure on leaders to make sure jobs are
created in other sectors to keep the world's No. 2 economy humming. But that may matter less as investment increasingly becomes internally
generated in China. Concern over China's growing military power may also drive its neighbors to establish alliances with the United States, as
demonstrated by Vietnam. But the issues run much deeper than economic policy for China. The
fear of encirclement runs deep
in Chinese strategic thinking, whether that encirclement is military, economic, or related to
governance. Official Chinese media sources speak to these fears: On a strategic level, Washington wants Southeast
Asia to form the center of an "Asian strategic alliance" that includes Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and India. On a political level, the US
continues to export "democracy" and Western values to Southeast Asian countries. On the economic level, the US has close ties with Southeast
Asia in terms of trade, finance and investment and considers the latter an important overseas market, resource supplier and investment
destination. At a military and security level, the US wants to set up more military bases and positively interfere in security affairs in the AsiaPacific region. The
need to avoid American encirclement is particularly acute for the Chinese when it
comes to the building of a governance web through rules of global engagement. The latter point was brought
home in Hu Jintao's Report to the Eighteenth Chinese Communist Party Congress in November 2012. He highlighted a Chinese policy objective
of projecting power beyond economics to the fields of international regulatory development and made it clear that China intends to have a
greater say in what global rules are going to be: We will actively participate in multilateral affairs, support the United Nations, G20, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS and other multilateral organizations in playing an active role in international affairs, and work to
make the international order and system more just and equitable. We will take solid steps to promote public diplomacy as well as people-topeople and cultural exchanges, and protect China's legitimate rights and interests overseas.
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They Say: “Capital Doesn’t Generate Reforms”
Political capital is key to implementing economic reforms
Pesek 13 (William Pesek is a Bloomberg View columnist, “China’s Worst Nightmare Is Turning
Japanese,” Bloomberg View, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-08/china-s-worst-nightmareis-turning-japanese.html)
The problem is one of politics over economics. Around China, dozens of local leaders are vying to put their cities
on the global map and become the toast of the Communist Party. That means more than delivering rapid
GDP. It also means building huge skyscrapers, international airports, six-lane highways, five-star hotel chains, sports stadiums,
universities, giant cultural centers and swanky shopping arcades punctuated with Prada and Hermes shops -- all financed with fresh
debt. If several of these metropolises go bust, Detroit’s $18 billion bankruptcy will look like small change by comparison.¶ A continued
infrastructure boom promises ever-greater riches for vested interests both locally and in Beijing. (CNGDPYOY) There are ways Xi and
Li could defuse the debt time bomb: greater oversight, expanding the municipal bond market, letting localities refinance with
direct bond sales, increased transparency. China could borrow a page from the 1980s U.S. savings-and-loan crisis and set up Resolution Trust
Corp.-like entities to dispose of bad debts.¶ But
to do any of this, Chinese leaders must be willing to spend political
capital at levels that are at least commensurate with the epic flow of ill-gotten gains heading back to the nation’s
capital. It will take some serious mettle to avoid a Japan-like funk, and it’s unclear if Xi and Li have it.
Political capital is key to reforms – overcoming opposition from local cadres and
vested interests
Lieberthal 12 (Kenneth is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Xi Jinping’s Challenge,” China-US
Focus, November 9, http://www.chinausfocus.com/political-social-development/xi-jinpings-challenge/)
Beijing's economic strategy must be drastically overhauled. The Hu/Wen leadership, recognizing the danger, in March 2011
formally adopted a new development strategy that stresses increasing household consumption, reducing reliance on exports, expanding
services, and moving to more innovative, less resource-intensive manufacturing. A study released this February by the World Bank in
conjunction with the State Council Development Research Center, one of China's top government think tanks, confirmed the importance of this
new strategy. But little serious reform has happened to date.¶ A
key obstacle is that the old way of doing business is now
built into the DNA of the leaders of the roughly 40,000 political jurisdictions outside of Beijing, from the province to the
city to the county to the township level. These officials, rewarded primarily on the basis of producing rapid GDP
growth while keeping a lid on social unrest, have used their political power to nurture infrastructure building and other
capital-intensive projects. This in turn has generated short-term GDP growth and employment, along with massive flows of bank
loans and other funds from which they can skim.¶ The results have been clear: breakneck growth, huge infrastructure and manufacturing
development, enormous corruption, massive environmental devastation, growing inequality of wealth, and rising social tensions. If
they
wish to change the behavior of these local leaders, Xi and his colleagues must expend enormous political
capital to do so.¶ And local officials are hardly the only impediments to reform. Beijing has fostered
"national champions" -- state-owned corporate behemoths, many of which are seen as key to the party’s
grip on power and are closely tied to elite political families. This marriage of wealth and political power presents
major obstacles to effective changes in economic strategy.
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They Say: “Reforms Fail Now”
Reforms will succeed — short term costs mean Xi must spend capital to retain control.
Wang 16 (Xiangwei, staff @ South China Morning Post, “Xi Jinping’s supply-side plan now the genuine article of
th
economic reform for China,” May 16 , http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1945530/xijinpings-supply-side-plan-now-genuine-article)
The Monday interview seems to suggest Xi is not worried, as the “authoritative source” said the economy would not plunge
even without stimulus as it still enjoyed huge potential, was highly resilient and had ample leeway. But it also means that he is
prepared to accept lower growth in exchange for notable progress in restructuring, even if the risk of social
instability rises significantly. Despite the staggering odds, Xi’s strong leadership style displayed in his unprecedented anticorruption campaign and rapid consolidation of power means he stands a good chance of succeeding.
Most recent news confirms reform is on track
Beng 16 (Kor Kian, staff @ Straits Times, “Economic reforms: Xi Jinping makes sure everyone's on same
page,” May 12th, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/economic-reforms-xi-jinping-makes-sureeveryones-on-same-page)
Two authoritative pieces on China's economic policy in the People's Daily this week could be a new
push by President Xi Jinping for his reform efforts despite slowing growth and resistance among officials, say
analysts. On Tuesday, the Communist Party mouthpiece ran over nearly two pages a 20,000-word speech by Mr Xi, in which he expounded on
his view of China's economy and also his policy of supply-side structural reforms. Speaking to provincial and ministerial-level officials in January,
Mr Xi said he felt the need to explain his signature policy, which he had outlined last December, again as officials did not understand its goal. He
said his concept of supply-side structural reform - which involves cutting red tape, lowering tax and improving innovation -was not the same as
supply-side economics in the West. "Our supply-side reform, to say it in a complete way, is supply-side structural reform, and that's my original
wording used at the central economic work conference. The word 'structural' is very important," he said. What has piqued the curiosity of
analysts is that the speech was published a day after an interview with an "authoritative person" on China's economy and the most suitable
growth strategies. The People's Daily ran the interview, done in a question- and-answer format, on its front page and the entire second page.
The interviewee warned against being over-optimistic about China's economic trend - that "it would be L-shaped, rather than U-shaped, not to
mention V-shaped" - and relying on credit expansion to boost growth. The remarks are seen to be an indirect criticism of policies by the State
Council this year that led to a record jump in credit, which helped stabilise the economy but also prompted concerns that China could be
returning to the old ways of stimulating growth through investment and leverage. While senior officials have expressed optimism about the
economy, whose 6.7 per cent first-quarter growth met government targets and market forecasts, the interviewee struck a contrasting tone.
Analysts reckon that the interviewee has to be someone very senior, possibly Mr Xi or his top economic adviser Liu He. Hong Kong-based
economists Wang Tao and Zhang Ning of UBS, in a note on Monday, said the
interview shows "different views in the
government about current policies and the senior leadership has signalled the desire to correct the
impression that the government has scaled down reform in exchange for more leverage to support growth". University
of International Business and Economics analyst Ding Zhijie told The Straits Times he does not think there is a
divergence of views over China's economic direction. "But there are officials who remain unclear over
the priorities of the top leaders... The articles aim to increase their understanding." OCBC's economist Tommy
Xie said the divergent views could be a source of worry over their impact on the implementation of reforms. "But the two articles have
helped send calming signals to the market that China's leaders remain committed to long-term
reforms despite short-term pain in slowing growth," he told The Straits Times.
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They Say: “No Regime Collapse”
Challenging anti-Americanism threatens regime legitimacy
Wen 16 (Philip, China correspondent Fairfax Media, “China's Great Leap Backwards: Xi Jinping and the
cult of Mao,” May 15th, www.smh.com.au/world/chinas-great-leap-backwards-xi-jinping-and-the-cultof-mao-20160512-gotfiz.html#ixzz48lxo5q00)
Paranoid about the infiltration of Western influence and the ability for the internet and social media to disseminate
unfiltered information at warp speed, Xi
has doubled-down on the government's control of its people, coming down
harder on dissent than any of his recent predecessors. "The problem is connected with the threat to the
political regime," says Mao Yushi, an internationally renowned veteran economist, who at 87, remains a prominent liberal intellectual.
"China's rapid economic growth since reforming and opening up has protected the Communist Party's political
legitimacy, now that there is no high growth, what can Xi depend on?" Lawyers, intellectuals, activists, journalists and, most
recently, foreign NGOs have come under pressure in a pervasive crackdown.
Foreign criticism , whether of China's island-building
program in the South China Sea, the government's chequered human rights record, or controversial ethnic minority policies in Xinjiang and
Tibet, are
all cast as a plot by a cabal of Western "hostile foreign forces" designed to undermine China
and perpetuate US hegemony .
Factional infighting leading will collapse the country
Li 9 (Cheng, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center. “China’s Team of Rivals.” Foreign
Policy. February 16, 2009. http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03_china_li.aspx)
But China’s
new game of elite politics may fail. What will happen, for instance, if economic conditions
continue to worsen? Factionalism at the top might grow out of control, perhaps even leading to
deadlock or outright feuding. Different outlooks over many issues—including how to redistribute resources, establish
a public healthcare system, reform the financial sector, achieve energy security, maintain political order, and handle domestic ethnic tensions—
are already so contentious that the leadership might find it increasingly difficult to build the kind of
consensus necessary to govern effectively.
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They Say: “PC Theory Not True”
Our theory of political capital is true in the context of Chinese politics
Yongnian & Gang 9 (Zheng Yongnian is Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute, National
University of Singapore, and Chen Gang, Research Fellow, “Xi Jinping's Rise and Political Implications,”
China: An International Journal, Volume 7, Number 1, March 2009,
https://webspace.utexas.edu/hl4958/contemporary-chinese-history/Zheng%20and%20Chen%20%20Xi%20Jinping.pdf)
The political capital of the central leadership figure in Chinese politics since the founding of the PRC in 1949 has
been diminishing with each generation.20 Mao ruled like a God, and Deng Xiaoping, while nowhere near as autocratic as Mao, drew on
a long history as a revolutionary and had massive credibility in the Party and with the public.21 Conversely, Jiang Zemin took years to be taken
seriously, while Hu Jintao is the weakest compared with Mao, Deng or Jiang.22 The
farewell to the strong-man politics has
pushed forward China’s leadership structure in an increasingly power-sharing direction that facilitates
intra-party consultations, bargaining or even polls in secret behind closed doors. The weaker the top leader is,
the more he will rely on “collective decision-making” (jiti juece) when appointing successors and enacting national
strategies. Certain informal rules and institutions based on balance of power among different factions and
restriction of top leaders’ power have come into being in China’s elite politics, ensuring that candidateship of future successors
is not solely the reflection of the incumbent top leader’s own will, but an outcome of compromises among different groups and
one step further, the result of polls in a limited range. This way of producing future leadership guarantees policy continuation and stability
while forestalls individual dictatorship. As the Party chooses rather than the public, future
leaders, no matter who they are, will be
committed to preserving the CPC power and represent the extensive interest of different groups inside
the Party instead of one faction.
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They Say: “Popularity Not Key to Xi”
Anti-U.S. nationalism is central to popular support for Xi
Project Syndicate 16 (Nepal Republic Media, “Mao’s heir,” May 16th,
http://myrepublica.com/opinion/story/42445/mao-s-heir.html)
The savagery required to assert absolute power over the population is one lesson of the Cultural Revolution to which Xi seems indifferent. He
is concerned only about the "absolute power" part. And in his effort to obtain it, the survivors of the Cultural
Revolution—people who know what it means to be intimidated into choosing politics over the personal—have become Xi's most
reliable political capital. Xi knows that he can succeed only by reinforcing the Party's authority, and his position as its leader. So he has
presented the narrative that there is a grave threat to China from within—a threat posed by treacherous and corrupt leaders—and has
declared Party loyalty to be of paramount importance. There are only two types of people: Those who support the Party and those who do not.
Like Mao in 1966, Xi believes that his power hinges on making all Chinese—government officials and ordinary citizens alike—loyal and obedient
through any means possible. Power is founded on the repression of opponents, such as Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiaobo and the tens of
thousands of other jailed authors and scholars. But Xi
is not counting on fear alone to cement his rule. He is also
attempting to win popular support with a new unifying ideology , based on the so-called China Dream, a set of
socialist values and goals that are supposed to bring about the "great renewal of the Chinese nation." This has been accompanied by a
galvanizing form of nationalism that portrays the world, particularly the U nited S tates, as seeking to keep
China back from assuming its rightful place atop the international order. And he has nurtured a personality cult of
a kind not seen since Mao.
Policy disagreements cause popular discontent
DeLisle 11 (Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and the Stephen A. Cozen Professor of
Law and Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Politics and Governance in the
People’s Republic of China,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, Vol.16, No.7, August,
https://www.fpri.org/articles/2011/08/politics-and-governance-peoples-republic-china-revolution-notdinner-party-get-rich)
This rising inequality, and discontent
about some of the policies and practices that have produced it, have been among
the key sources of China’s mounting problems of social unrest. The number of “mass incidents”—a term with no clear or
official meaning but that is generally thought to refer to protests of a relatively substantial scale or disruptive effect (and perhaps triggering a
response from public security units)—has climbed sharply in recent years. It is now estimated at well over 100,000 annually. Less dramatically,
millions of aggrieved
citizens file petitions with the government and courts and the like (sometimes through special
“letters and visits” offices at government and judicial organs) to register their complaints and to seek redress. Their grievances focus
primarily on abuses at the hands of authorities or the authorities’ inadequate fulfillment of their roles, including
protection of citizens’ rights and safety. Pervasive problems and, especially, dramatic incidents fuel media storms
(often crossing the platforms of an increasingly free traditional media, harder-to-control nontraditional web-based media, and a burgeoning
universe of web-postings) that reflect, and sometimes stoke, popular discontent with how China is governed (or not
governed). Concern about these developments and what they portend—and the need to respond—underpinned the defining slogan of the Hu
Jintao years: the quest for a “harmonious society.”
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This erodes the perception of Xi as a leader & hurts political capital, independently
undermining stability
Jia 13 (Mark Jia, Open Democracy, “Xi Jinping: a new kind of politician?,” January 15,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/mark-jia/xi-jinping-new-kind-of-politician)
But Xi’s innovation is not his charisma per se – refreshing though it is after years of Hu’s stoicism. Rather, Xi Jinping is
distinctive in that he is the first Chinese Party head to truly understand that authoritarian politicians have something to learn from their
democratic counterparts. Western politicians may get flak for perceptions of pandering or placing electoral viability ahead of common interest,
but one thing at which democratic politicians unquestionably do better is connecting and empathizing with ordinary people.¶ Xi gets it.
Whether it’s Corey Booker’s masterful use of Twitter or Bill Clinton’s moving performance during the ‘92 debates, it is clear that the best
politicians are the ones who can speak at the level of their audience, and in doing so humanize themselves as individuals who understand the
struggles of ordinary citizens. In one sense, Xi has already proven himself to be a better student of this than Mitt Romney, whose comment
antagonizing 47% of the country would have gone down just as badly in China as it did in the United States.¶ This is all the more important
because of the age Xi lives in. The country he inherits is a place where vigilant netizens can shelter criminal defendants, oust adulterous
officials, and even help abolish unconstitutional regulations. This level of scrutiny is unprecedented, particularly for a new leader whose vision
and humanity are still unknown quantities. In a country where the previous cohort of sovereigns have appeared ever more distant while public
outrage towards graft and inequality have only grown fiercer, Xi’s
projection of himself as an authentic and upright leader
could set him apart as an entirely new breed of politician.¶ Crafting an empathetic public image can enhance sound
leadership. This is true for any polity, but particularly for non-democratic societies where leaders lack the
legitimacy-conferring authority of popular election. President Obama had more than a year to sell himself on the campaign
trail before setting foot into an office he had won. Xi, in comparison, had his stilted official biography rolled out via state news organs, but
lacked the autonomy to personally introduce himself to the Chinese people until he actually assumed the reins of power. His 'presidential
China’s challenges are severe, and as
they worsen, frustrated citizens will need to know they have an empathetic leader on high. In China, there remains
campaign' is only just beginning.¶ If he succeeds, it will be a boon to him in two ways. First,
a longstanding belief that the emperor, under the mandate of heaven, is fundamentally just. As long as instances of local abuse are brought to
his attention, all will be remedied. This is what still brings countless aggrieved petitioners into Beijing every year with letters addressed to
China’s highest authorities. But
if trust in top leadership is eroded, and Xi is perceived to have lost his
'mandate' – whether heavenly or not – a loss of faith in existing arrangements can contribute to serious social
instability.
Popularity is critical to regime legitimacy, hardliner support, & capital for Xi’s reforms
Jia 13 (Mark Jia, Open Democracy, “Xi Jinping: a new kind of politician?,” January 15,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/mark-jia/xi-jinping-new-kind-of-politician)
Second, public
support – even under autocracy – can translate into real political capital. In the consensusbased decision-making model of the Politburo Standing Committee – where Xi is but first among
seven peers, it is crucial that his (mostly conservative) colleagues see him as wielding a popular mandate.
Naturally, Xi fans won’t be writing constituent letters to their elected representatives to support his agenda, but modern Chinese
authoritarianism bases much of its legitimacy, and indeed its own conception of “democracy,” upon its ability to be
responsive to public opinion. Rival peers will be slower to challenge Xi’s authority if he is seen to
command the will of the Chinese people. ¶ Of course it remains to be seen whether Xi will be able to
capitalize on his favourable persona. It will require more than popular support to defeat the many
entrenched interests that stand in the way of genuine reform. But Xi the politician is off to a promising start,
and if he succeeds, he may be only the first of a new generation of Chinese leaders who can speak directly – and compassionately – to the
people they govern.
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They Say: “Instability Turn”
TPP wont ruin China’s economy
Ni 15 (Yueju, 12/11, researcher at Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,
“TPP poses challenges for China,” http://epaper.chinadailyasia.com/asia-weekly/article-7202.html)
Of course, neither
can we overestimate the impact of the TPP on China’s economy, since zero tariffs will be
sensitive products carry a transition period of more
than 16 years. Also, free trade of more than 80 percent of the products has been implemented
bilaterally by multiple free trade agreements. Moreover, many TPP member countries have already
signed free trade agreements with China bilaterally or at the regional level.
implemented on only around 90 percent of the products. Some
TPP wont sink the Chinese economy
Du 15 (Ming, Reader in Law, Lancaster University Law School, “TPP Agreement-China′s Tripartite
Strategy,” J Int Economic Law (2015) 18 (2): 407, p. lexis)
Third, assuming that China will not join the TPP, the simulation results
show that the resulting trade diversion under the
TPP will indeed hurt China, especially after Japan decided to join the TPP negotiations. But the negative trade effects are
relatively modest, and so will not have a drastic impact on China. It seems that China is so deeply embedded
in global supply chain trade that it is difficult to marginalize China or throw China out of the international production
networks. At the same time, numerous researches have shown that it is economically unwise to exclude China from the TPP. If China joins the
TPP, all TPP member countries will reap substantial economic benefits and the TPP as a regional economic institution will become more
important and influential.
No major economic impact on China
Yuan 12 (Wen Jin, fellow @ Center for Strategic & Int’l Studies, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership and
China’s Corresponding Strategies,” http://csis.org/files/publication/120620_Freeman_Brief.pdf)
Though some Chinese scholars regard the TPP as a severe threat to China’s exports in the future, its economic impact
over China could be marginal. Some TPP member countries, such as Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, are on a
very different economic development stage from China. While China specializes in producing low-end
manufactured goods, the aforementioned member countries are developed nations that specialize in producing
high-tech products and intermediary goods. In light of this difference, these countries will not forge a competitive
trade relationship with China. Moreover, Malaysia and Vietnam, the only two member countries that might form a
competitive trade relationship with China, have an exceptionally small overall volume of trade compared to that of China,
and therefore will only have a marginal negative impact on China if they become more competitive in trading with the US
after joining the TPP.
Impacts are small
Li & Whalley 12 (Chungding, Institute of World Economics and Politics Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, John, Department of Economics Social Science Centre University of Western Ontario, “CHINA
AND THE TPP: A NUMERICAL SIMULATION ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS INVOLVED,”
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18090.pdf)
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For China, production, welfare, import and revenue all will be negatively affected, but exports and the trade imbalance
increase. Under whole trade costs elimination, these effects are stronger than only under import tariff
elimination. When all trade costs are removed, China’s welfare will decrease -0.056%, production will
decrease -0.042%, imports will decrease -0.171% and revenues will decrease about -0.172%; meanwhile, exports and the
trade imbalance will separately increase 0.132% and 2.439%. But when only import tariffs are removed, China’s welfare, production, import
and revenue separately decline by -0.011%, -0.009%, -0.035% and -0.035%; and exports and the trade imbalance improve separately by 0.04%
and 0.609%. This
suggests that TPP initiatives could have negative effects on China but the impacts are
not severe.
TPP has no large negative impacts on China
Chunding & Whalley 16 (Jan/Feb, Li, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences, John, Department of Economics, Western University, “Possible Chinese Strategic
Responses to the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” China Economist 11.1, 23-46, proquest)
Some of our previous research (Li and Whalley (2014)) uses an 11-country numerical Armington-type global general equilibrium model to
explore the impacts of the TPP on China. The model captures trade costs and uses a monetary structure of inside money so as to both
endogenously determine trade imbalance effects from the trade initiative and also allow calibration to a base case capturing China's large trade
surplus. We capture endogenously determined trade imbalances by incorporating both current consumption and expected future incremental
consumption from saving into the model using an analytical structure. We calibrate the model to 2011 data and use counterfactual simulations
to explore TPP effects. Table 1 shows the main effects of the TPP on China and some other large countries. Simulation results show that
China's welfare will be adversely affected by the TPP. Under a 50% non-tariff barrier elimination case, China's welfare will
decrease 0.1758%. China's production will increase because of an increase in exports and a decrease in imports; the trade imbalance will
increase. The effects are different for different countries and different non-tariff elimination cases. Under the 50% non-tariff barrier (NTB)
elimination case, some countries' welfare will increase, including the US, Japan and Canada, but some countries' welfare will decrease,
including the EU and South Korea. Almost all countries' production will increase except for the EU. Most countries' exports and imports will
increase with the exception of South Korea. Most countries' trade imbalance will increase except for the EU and Japan. Our simulation results
unsurprisingly show that the TPP initiative will have a negative impact on China, but the
effects are relatively small given the
present TPP arrangement, and China's exports and total production will increase given the increase in
external demand. A decline in consumption induced by increased exports and decreased imports will lead to China's
welfare loss. Most TPP member countries will gain in nearly all aspects including welfare, production and trade. Other non-TPP member
countries will experience declines in welfare as well, but some of these countries' will see an increase in production. From the view of
the global value chain, it is actually impossible to truly leave China out of the world's biggest trade deal. Given
China's investment in many TPP member countries such as Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, and Vietnam, China can and will
design, develop and produce products that will make their way into the US market via TPP
intermediaries.
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They Say: “Economic Return Turn”
Gradual Chinese reforms solve now without joining TPP
Du 15 (Ming, Reader in Law, Lancaster University Law School, “TPP Agreement-China′s Tripartite
Strategy,” J Int Economic Law (2015) 18 (2): 407, p. lexis)
To readers not familiar with China′s approach to international norms, China′s corresponding strategy
toward the TPP may
present an internal dilemma: on the one hand, China recognizes that structural reforms are necessary to
achieve China′s long-term economic prosperity; on the other hand, extensive structural reforms that the TPP entails is
put forth in the debate as a major reason why China should not join the TPP. Behind this apparent
contradiction lies China′s deeply-rooted ′adaptive selection′ approach to international norms.
Selective adaptation is a coping strategy for balancing local regulatory imperatives with requirements of
compliance with foreign norms largely derived from the regimes of liberal democratic capitalism. The TPP is not just a
matter of economics and commerce. At root it is a fundamental challenge of politics and governance. Without a full
grasp of the political and economic implications of joining the TPP, China would not apply for admission to its membership. At the same time,
China has taken bold steps to initiate new reforms, some reform measures even emulating the emerging TPP rules. This
gradual, experimental, and ′learning by doing′ approach protects the national regulatory autonomy while embracing
the emerging rules for global trade and investment in the 21st century.
Pushing quick reforms undermines China’s economy – They’re pursuing gradual
reform now
Burkhart 13 (Ryan, 11/1, staff @ The Diplomatic Courier, “The U.S., China, and the Trans Pacific
Partnership,” http://www.diplomaticourier.com/the-u-s-china-and-the-trans-pacific-partnership/)
After the disastrous effects of “shock therapy” economic policies in the former Soviet Union (FSU) states, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)
decided that slow and gradual reform economic reform was the best path for China. Once again, the
TPP will be a high standard FTA. TPP negotiated issues such as regulatory coherence, state-owned
enterprises, labor issues, and intellectual property would have a huge effect on the economy. Further, lowering
trade barriers will expose nascent Chinese industries to global competition. However, these standards should be
an economic goal for Chinese leadership.
TPP hurts SOE’s which are key to China’s economy
Ramasamy 16 (Bala, Professor of Economics, China Europe International Business School, “Why China
could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” April 13th, http://theconversation.com/why-chinacould-never-sign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361)
The TPP requires
that no subsidies should be provided to an SOE for its international business expansion. The goal: to
China’s
150,000 SOEs form the bedrock of the Chinese economy and therefore have certain privileges. About a thousand SOEs are
ensure competition between an SOE and a private enterprise takes place on a level playing field inside the host country. But
listed in the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, indicating they are commercial in nature. More than 150 of these are managed by the
central SASAC, and the list includes some of the largest companies in the world. The
Chinese government assists these SOEs
in various ways, including preferential interest rates. Although there have been exceptions under the TPP (for
example New Zealand was able to get exemptions for its powerful cooperative Fonterra), it would have been an uphill battle for
China to negotiate exemptions for so many of its SOEs engaged in various international operations within TPP member
countries.
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2NC/1NR — Link Cards & Extensions
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“Xi Maintains Power By Opposing the US”
Xi is solidifying power through anti-Westernism now. The plan reverses that, causing
the public to turn against Xi.
Browne 16 (Andrew, staff @ Wall St. Jnl, “China Rolls Up Welcome Mat,” May 3rd,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rolls-up-welcome-mat-1462251879)
China’s anti-foreign turn is driven by several related trends. First, President Xi Jinping has a much lower tolerance
than Deng for
the unwelcome intrusion of foreign ideas about democracy, press freedom and individual rights that come
along with trade and investment—what Deng called “flies and mosquitoes.” The other day, Mr. Xi was railing against
“Western capitalist values ” invading the Communist Party’s own training schools. Second, Mr. Xi is pushing ideology
harder than any leader in decades. Increasingly, China sees itself in ideological confrontation with the West. In
addition to stressing Marxism, Mr. Xi’s administration is seeking to revive traditional Chinese culture to counter
Western ideas —thus, the hostility to crosses. And Mr. Xi is promoting a strident form of nationalism. One aspect of
this is much greater Chinese assertiveness in territorial disputes with neighbors, including Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Another is an
explicit set of government policies aimed at helping Chinese firms replace their foreign rivals in the domestic market.
Specifically, non-Western reforms are critical to structural stability
Zhou 15 (Xin, 12/14, staff @ South China Morning Post, “Reviving China: can ‘Xiconomics’ help
mainland’s economy the way ‘Reaganomics’ boosted US?,”
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1891061/reviving-china-can-xiconomics-helpmainlands-economy-way)
“China’s previous growth model has become unsustainable, with rising debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratios, falling
capital productivity and persistent producer-price deflation,” Michael Taylor, a managing director at rating agency Moody’s Investors Service,
told a recent conference in Beijing. As it struggled between short-term growth stability and long-term rebalancing, China also risked
“disorderly de-leveraging” in the future, he said. It’s like two sides of a coin – in the past, China has put too much
emphasis on the demand side of things, but now the focus is moving towards the supply side. Xi has listed the
four big battles of the coming year as addressing overcapacity, cutting financing costs, reducing property inventory and preventing financial
risks, China Business News reported. This is in addition to moving the country towards becoming a “comprehensive, well-off society” by 2021,
when the Communist Party marks its 100th anniversary. “A
breakthrough in economic theories is needed since the
textbooks can no longer solve today’s problems,” said Jia Kang, a government researcher and a
member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. After retiring from his research position at the Ministry of Finance, Jia
founded the China Academy of New Supply-side Economics in 2013, pulling together a group of economists from
both public and private sectors to study the approach. “The leadership’s emphasis on supply-side reform is a new
approach for connecting theory with reality.” But China’s supply-side economics would be different from its
approaches found in old
Western version to reflect China’s reality. In essence, Jia said, it was a systematic summary of what the country needed to do to restart
its economic engine. Jia has made a series of policy proposals under the banner of supply-side economics, including encouraging innovation,
upgrading industry and reducing government controls. Many of the ideas he has touted have already been adopted, such as boosting
investment in other developing countries and ending the one-child policy.
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“Now’s the Key Time for Xi”
Political stability is on the brink now – It’s an inopportune time to unsettle China
Whitehead 16 (Adam, twenty-five years’ experience in capital markets and investment management,
in a career that has involved proprietary trading desks, commodity trading advisors, sovereign wealth
funds and private offices. During this time he has had trading book P&L responsibility, in addition to
setting up and managing offices of regulated global financial entities in the UAE, “The Great Chinese
Political Rift,” May 9th 2016, http://seekingalpha.com/article/3973072-great-chinese-politicalrift?page=2#)
As the previous analysis shows, China is both developed ("market economy status") and developing (planned economy) in
nature based on the classification of the current conflict between the urbanized and rural demographic. When negotiating, China therefore
emphasizes either of these two faces, in order to extract pecuniary advantage from its trade partners. The
developed face should
be associated with Premier Li and the developing face with President Xi. Given that these two faces are
currently in conflict with each other, it would be advisable for China's trade partners to see who wins, and
therefore which smiling face to deal with in the future. Given that the election cycle is just beginning in the developed world,
where populism and xenophobia are in fashion, it may also pay to put further negotiations with China
about its real economic status on hold too. Thus far, China has been able to scare western policy makers and central bankers into
thinking that it will drag the global economy into recession if it is not given the concessions that it needs. Western policy makers
may therefore need to think out of the box about China, just as they must think out of the box about their own domestic
issues. President Obama waited until his lame duck phase to lambaste "free riders" in the Middle East. This would
now be an opportune time for him to similarly reflect on his "pivot."
Now is the key time – leadership transition is shaping up; that’s key to legitimacy
Callick 16 (Rowan, staff @ The Australian, “Treating Cultural Revolution as a secret threatens China’s
future,” May 16th, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/columnists/rowan-callick/treatingcultural-revolution-as-a-secret-threatens-chinas-future/newsstory/6939098f748088e9d440069a399ae350)
The stakes are getting higher. The
next five-yearly Communist Party congress is approaching in about 16 months.
This is where — barring some freakish turn towards political reform, or towards entrenchment of one-person rule — the generation of
leadership beyond Xi must emerge. Will it be another forceful, ideologically driven single leader from an
unimpeachably “red” family heritage, such as Xi, or a return to the more familiar post-Mao technocratic group leadership pattern? And
who is wheeling and dealing to get into position, or to broker others’ rise? Soon enough the speculation must begin, but there
has been precious so far. The legitimacy of China’s ruling party has two legs: its victory by force of arms over the
Nationalists in 1949 and the ensuing prevention, to this day, of the capacity to organise any rival, plus the rise in living
standards, linked with that in the country’s international standing. But does this provide security enough? The continuing repercussions of the
Cultural Revolution point to lines of fracture where the
party remains vulnerable. The revolution undercut, on many
levels, the trust on which societies rely. Trust in traditional Chinese values, including those systematised by Confucius, was
deliberately attacked by Mao, while the horrors of the Cultural Revolution itself eroded most people’s trust in communist values.
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Engagement Links
It's politically dangerous for Xi to engage with the US.
Liu 15 — Melinda Liu, reported in China for more than two decades, and has been based in the
Chinese capital since 1998 as Newsweek's Beijing Bureau Chief, 2015 (“Xi Jinping and the Real ‘Asia
Pivot’- Why the United States and China are entering a new ice age,”’ Politico, September 23rd, Available
Online at http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/xi-jinping-and-the-real-asia-pivot-213178)
Much has changed since then, and not necessarily for the better. For one thing Xi, who became president in March 2013, has
quickly
proven to be a much different sort of Chinese leader: “bolder, more ambitious, more risk tolerant, seen
as more nationalistic,” says Beijing-based senior analyst Yanmei Xie of the International Crisis Group,
“More able to go big and go fast.” But go where? The United States and China appear to be entering a
new era of icier relations—including what sometimes seems to be an undeclared cyberwar—that makes it dangerous for
either leader to seem too chummy with the other. In Obama’s case that’s especially true during a
presidential election season; and in Xi’s it is hard to smile too much at the Americans when jingoistic
sentiment in China is strong, some of it ignited by Communist Party “patriotic” propaganda. On the first leg of his
journey, Xi stopped in Seattle to stress his brand of “people-to-people diplomacy”—not to mention a desire to do deals with Boeing. With
glamorous first lady Peng Liyuan at his side, Xi dropped references to “Sleepless in Seattle,” hobnobbed with CEO’s from the IT world, and
toured Microsoft’s Redmond campus. Raising hopes of a deal on cybersecurity after he arrives in the nation’s capital, he promised to
strengthen cooperation with the U.S. to battle the “criminal” cybertheft of commercial secrets and hacking attacks. Despite China’s slowing
economic growth and recent stock market meltdown, Xi brushed off jitters about Beijing’s economic and political stability, claiming his intense
anti-corruption campaign has “nothing to do with power struggle … This is no ‘House of Cards.’” Yet the sense of something quietly collapsing
dogs Xi’s American tour. In
Washington, the bipartisan consensus that’s prevailed since President Richard Nixon’s
groundbreaking 1972 trip to China—agreement that Washington must constructively engage China—
now seems to be wobbling. Over the past year, some American Sinologists have found it fashionable to declare that they were once
Sinophilic “panda-huggers” (even if some really weren’t) but now they’ve been transformed into “panda bears,” newly skeptical that
engagement with Beijing can work after all. “The
sands are fundamentally shifting in the relationship,” wrote veteran
Sinologist David Shambaugh of The George Washington University in the South China Morning Post, “the ‘engagement coalition’ is
crumbling and the ‘competition coalition’ is rising
Xi needs to criticize the US to score points at home. The plan reverses that by
having the US reach out.
Campbell 16 — Kurt M. Campbell, Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, 2016 (“Xi Jinping on the Global Stage: Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed
Leader,” Council on Foreign Relations Special report, February, No. 74, Available Online at
http://www.cfr.org/china/xi-jinping-global-stage/p37569)
The U.S.-China bilateral relationship is the most important in the world. No other two countries under foreseeable circumstances could disrupt
the international system. Thus, Xi Jinping’s rise, his dominance of China’s policymaking process, and the increasing influence of his domestic
political concerns will have crucial consequences for the United States and for American policies in Asia and beyond. Although
China’s
relationship with the United States has long been a priority for Chinese leaders, Xi has increasingly
been willing to test it and it occupies less of his attention than it did of his predecessors’. He has not only
criticized U.S. alliances, questioned the role of nonAsian powers in Asian affairs, and built alternative institutional structures excluding the
United States, but has also continued China’s rapid military modernization even as the Chinese economy slows. As
China asserts its
vital national interests, one of which is limiting the U.S. role in Asian affairs and related power
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projection capabilities, Beijing’s positions on matters ranging from the U.S. alliance system in Asia, to
freedom of navigation, to human rights, to the territorial integrity of Japan, to the rise of India, to the
future of Taiwan will come into sustained tension with U.S. national interests, policies, commitments,
and values. Nevertheless, China’s growing geopolitical ambitions are tempered by the reality of its economic relationship with the
United States and a variety of shared international interests between the two countries. China will continue to seek to expand
its influence and in some instances will compete directly with the United States, and Xi may criticize
Washington to score points at home , but bilateral economic interdependence will, in most cases, provide
a floor for the relationship. This is, of course, different from the longtime U.S. objective of constraining and ultimately moderating
Chinese behavior by broadly integrating China into the international system, a strategy that appears not to have substantially shaped China’s
more assertive external policies. In sum, Xi does not want to trigger a confrontation with the United States, especially during a period of
economic uncertainty in China. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers will likely face a growing challenge in Xi, particularly
because he can coordinate a variety of different instruments of statecraft in service of enduring Chinese strategic objectives and to bolster his
nationalist credentials. By contrast, U.S. policymakers are burdened by a slower, more divided, and more public interagency process. Xi
will
exploit the relative opacity and speed of his system to keep U.S. officials off balance with new initiatives or
provocations. These Chinese advantages are serious, but they are not necessarily decisive, especially if the United
States remains resolved, strengthens its alliances, and forges a bipartisan domestic consensus on Asia policy. To deal with Xi’s more
assertive foreign and defense policies, the United States should devise a grand strategy for Asia at least as coherent and coordinated as the one
that has been formulated in Beijing, which appears designed to maximize China’s power while challenging the long-standing role of the United
States in the region.49 What we have in mind is not containment, which in any case is a U.S.-Soviet concept that has
no relevant application in East Asia today. Instead, the United States should use a variety of instruments of statecraft to incentivize China to
commit to a rules-based order but impose costs that are in excess of the gains Beijing would reap if it fails to do so. This American grand
strategy should account for the fact that the decades-long endeavor to integrate China into the global order has not significantly tempered
China’s strategic objective to become the most powerful and influential country in Asia. This being the case, the United States needs a longterm approach that demonstrates U.S. internal
strength, external resolve, and steadiness of policy.
Xi uses opposition to the west to pass his agenda at home — it insulates him
from domestic criticism.
Kissinger 16 — Henry A. Kissenger, Senior Fellow for USFP at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2016
(“China's Strategy for Asia: Maximize Power, Replace America,” The National Interest, May 26th,
Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-strategy-asia-maximize-power-replaceamerica-16359)
Diplomacy After the Downturn Economic
growth and nationalism have for decades been the two founts of
legitimacy for the Communist Party, and as the former wanes, Xi will likely rely increasingly on the latter. As a
powerful but exposed leader, Xi will tap into this potent nationalist vein through foreign policy,
burnishing his nationalist credentials and securing his domestic position from elite and popular
criticism, all while pursuing various Chinese national interests. In the future, Xi could become more hostile
to the West, using it as a foil to boost his approval ratings the way Putin has in Russia. Already, major
Chinese newspapers are running articles blaming the country’s economic slump on efforts undertaken
by insidious “foreign forces” that seek to sabotage the country’s rise. On territorial matters, Xi will be unwilling or
unable to make concessions that could harm his domestic position, and may even seek to escalate territorial disputes against Japan or South
China Sea claimants as a way of redirecting domestic attention away from the economic situation and burnishing his nationalist record.
Globally, in order to demonstrate at home that China is taken seriously abroad, Xi will maintain a
proactive and assertive Chinese foreign policy that involves institution-building and occasional
provocation, while remaining firm in the face of external pressure on the South and East China Seas,
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human rights, conditions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and diplomatic visits by the Dalai Lama. Finally, Xi’s
resistance to Western culture and values may intensify. Because China’s economy is now slowing, Xi’s
fear of political instability may push him to adopt even sterner measures, and new violations of
human rights and the emerging challenges that Western NGOs and businesses face will likely cause
renewed friction in China’s relationships with the West.
Xi is consolidating power by opposing Western values — the plan reduces his
ability to portray the US as evil.
Denyer 15 — Simon Denyer, journalist for the Washington Post, 2015 ("How Xi Jinping’s presidency
was shaped by traumas of Mao and Gorbachev," The Guardian, March 6th, Available Online at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/06/xi-jinping-china-reform-gorbachev-mao)
Gorbachev and Mao both struggled against opposition and factionalism within their own parties,
although they pursued far different remedies. Xi is determined to consolidate power and eliminate rivals. He has
experienced firsthand the chaos that ensues when the party disintegrates, and that helps explain his desire to reinvigorate the Chinese
Communist party and reassert its primacy. One
of his major themes is a war on “western values”, including a free
press, democracy and the constitutional separation of powers, all of which he believes pose an
insidious threat to one-party rule. In this and in the growing ideological controls on sectors ranging from the news media to the
military, Xi is resisting forces that he thinks brought the Soviet regime to its knees. Paradoxically, though, he also
has seen the dangers of international isolation and an inward focus, factors that helped weaken Mao’s China and the Soviet Union. That
paradox, between “reform and opening” on the one hand and excluding western values on the other,
has created an unresolved tension in his presidency.
Xi needs an anti-western platform to boost political support — engagement with the
US devastates that that position.
Su 15 — Joycelyn Su, Program Director at the US-Asia Institute and Deputy Director of the Duke-UNC
China Leadership Summit, 2015 (“The Battlefield of Ideology,” China Hands Magazine, December 8th,
Available Online at https://chinahandsmagazine.org/2015/12/08/the-battlefield-of-ideology-2/,
Accessed 08-19-2016)
This summer, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the sweeping National Security Law. The scope of the
new legislation is broad, addressing not only traditional security concerns but also including threats to “cultural security.” According to the new
law, the country must
defend against malignant culture by “deepening the education of socialist ideology
and increasing propaganda efforts.” Passage of the new national security law contributes to a broader ideological
campaign President Xi Jinping launched upon taking office in 2012 and also raises questions among American
government officials, business leaders, and China scholars about rising anti-Western sentiments in
China . Xi Jinping’s concern with the nation’s ideological climate first attracted Western media’s
attention when an internal Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) document, commonly known as Document 9, was
leaked to the public in April 2013. In it, the Party identifies seven problematic ideological trends and activities
that warrant greater attention, including advocating for Western democracy, rule of law, civil
society, and freedom of press. The document urged Party members to be vigilant in identifying these
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threats and to maintain full control over the direction of China’s ideological development. While control of
ideology is not necessarily new to the Chinese public, warnings against Western values have certainly surged under Xi
Jinping. At an education conference in March 2011 before Xi took power, Education Minister Yuan Guiren dismissed any concerns with
importing Western education materials. He argued that since Chinese abroad are not influenced in capitalist countries, they therefore would be
influenced by Western ideals in their homeland. Shortly after his statement, however, the Party and the State Council issued a joint document
urging universities to strengthen propaganda thought work. Minister Yuan shifted his attitude in response to the new document and warned
against allowing education materials that propagate Western ideology into Chinese classrooms. In this past year alone, Chinese civil society,
identified in Document 9 as a problematic ideological trend, has endured harsh crackdowns. The detainment of five women’s rights activists in
March, the interrogation of dozens of human rights lawyers this summer, and the arrests of Chinese Christians who refused to take down
church crosses have all drawn condemnation from international watchdogs. The 2015 Human Rights Watch report on China noted the
ideological campaign, stating that the authorities have cracked down on civil society “with a ferocity unseen in recent years.” Tim Cheek, a
historian on Chinese intellectual life, in an interview with The Guardian, noted that in Chinese academia, liberal scholars are “going into
campaign mode, which is to keep your head down, keep out of the way, don’t let stuff get into writing.” These
concerning
developments contrast starkly with the government’s official rhetoric. Two weeks prior to the passage of the new
national security law, at this year’s annual China-US High-Level Consultation on People-to-People Exchange in Washington, Chinese Vice
Premier Liu Yandong encouraged more American students to study abroad in China. Chinese state media lauded cultural ties that bind the
United States and China and hoped “the tree of people-to-people exchanges between our two countries will grow bigger and bear even larger
fruits.” People-to-people exchanges certainly serve as a more effective instrument to influence ideology than education materials. Beijing’s
continued call for greater people-to-people exchange at a time of tightening ideological control
mirrors its inconsistent attitude toward American and a greater Western influence. The ideological
campaign, however, is not aimed to be an anti-Western effort but a defensive measure to help the Party
maintain political stability. Buttressed by its promise of economic welfare, the CCP is increasingly at risk for losing its legitimacy as
China’s economy undergoes tumultuous times. The influence of foreign ideas—or any idea that seeks to change the society’s status quo—is a
potent political threat at a time when the population is restless and discontent. Thus, controlling the direction of Chinese ideological
development helps the Party identify early signs of cracks in the system. In a speech that Xi Jinping gave on his trip to the southern China in
2013, he asked, “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? An important reason was that their
ideals and beliefs had been shaken.” Given this understanding of the Soviet dissolution, Xi
has made great efforts in correcting
the nation’s ideological climate to avoid becoming China’s Gorbachev. On the offensive front in the
battle of ideology, Xi Jinping engenders nationalism and cultural identity among the people as a
mechanism to garner greater political support . Instead of simply aligning Chinese ideology with Marxist-Leninist thought, Xi
uses national pride as a counterforce strategy to counter the influence of foreign ideology . It is evident in
Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the idea of the “ Chinese Dream ” since he rose to power in 2012, a term that has spread like wildfire over Party
documents. It refers to prosperity and improvement in people’s livelihood but places greater emphasis on national rejuvenation. This
rhetoric has both been successful in contributing to the rising nationalist sentiments within China and
helping Xi gain popularity among the Chinese people. A 2014 Harvard polling report reflects the effectiveness of this
strategy: Chinese respondents rated Xi Jinping a nine out of ten on his performance, more favorable than the rating other domestic
constituents gave their heads of states. By elucidating what needs to be protected, the National Security Law is yet another step to define state
sovereignty and strengthen nationalism at home. It
is not surprising, then, to find Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream,
“realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” embedded in the first clause as one of the
many goals of the new legislation.
Xi can’t be friendly with the US if he wants to pass his agenda.
Lieberthal 13 — Kenneth Lieberthal, senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the
Brookings Institution, served as the National Security Council’s senior director for Asia during U.S.
President Bill Clinton's administration, 2013 (“Examining U.S. Concerns on Trade, Security as China
Welcomes New President,” PBS, March 14th, Available Online at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia-jan-june13-china_03-14/, Accessed 08-19-2016)
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GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he’s been in power for only a few months, since last
November, when he became general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese,
because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.
People say that Xi
area.
Jinping is actually leading China’s foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we’re in trouble, because this is a very troubled
JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that’s a primary priority of his?
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his real priority is domestic. What
he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform
domestically. But his big problem is that he — that the Communist Party has really nurtured very
ardent nationalism domestically, and he can’t allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he
won’t have the political capital to carry out reforms . So he’s trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be
seen as strong in international affairs. But I don’t think he’s looking for trouble internationally. He’d
rather avoid if it if he can .
Engagement with the US hurts Xi’s domestic reform agenda.
Economy 14 — Elizabeth C. Economy, Senior Fellow and Director for Asia Studies at the Council on
Foreign Relations, 2014 (“China’s Imperial President,” Foreign Affairs, June 20th, Available Online at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-10-20/chinas-imperial-president, Accessed 08-192016)
Chinese President
Xi Jinping has articulated a simple but powerful vision: the rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation. It is a patriotic call to arms, drawing inspiration from the glories of China’s imperial past and
the ideals of its socialist present to promote political unity at home and influence abroad. After just two
years in office, Xi has advanced himself as a transformative leader, adopting an agenda that proposes to reform , if not
revolutionize, political and economic relations not only within China but also with the rest of the world. Underlying Xi’s vision is a
growing sense of urgency. Xi assumed power at a moment when China, despite its economic success, was politically adrift. The Chinese
Communist Party, plagued by corruption and lacking a compelling ideology, had lost credibility among the public, and social unrest was on the
rise. The Chinese economy, still growing at an impressive clip, had begun to show signs of strain and uncertainty. And on the international front,
despite its position as a global economic power, China was punching well below its weight. Beijing had failed to respond effectively to the crises
in Libya and Syria and had stood by as political change rocked two of its closest partners, Myanmar (also known as Burma) and North Korea. To
many observers, it appeared as though China had no overarching foreign policy strategy. Xi
has reacted to this sense of malaise
with a power grab -- for himself, for the Communist Party, and for China. He has rejected the communist tradition of collective
leadership, instead establishing himself as the paramount leader within a tightly centralized political system. At home, his proposed
economic reforms will bolster the role of the market but nonetheless allow the state to retain
significant control. Abroad, Xi has sought to elevate China by expanding trade and investment, creating new international institutions,
and strengthening the military. His vision contains an implicit fear: that an open door to Western political and
economic ideas will undermine the power of the Chinese state. If successful, Xi’s reforms could yield a
corruption-free, politically cohesive, and economically powerful one-party state with global reach: a
Singapore on steroids . But there is no guarantee that the reforms will be as transformative as Xi hopes. His policies have created deep
pockets of domestic discontent and provoked an international backlash. To silence dissent, Xi has launched a political crackdown, alienating
many of the talented and resourceful Chinese citizens his reforms are intended to encourage. His tentative economic steps have raised
questions about the country’s prospects for continued growth. And his winner-take-all mentality has undermined his efforts to become a global
leader. The United States and the rest of the world cannot afford to wait and see how his reforms play out. The United States should be ready
to embrace some of Xi’s initiatives as opportunities for international collaboration while treating others as worrisome trends that must be
stopped before they are solidified.
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TPP Link
Inclusion in TPP is perceived as American encirclement
Backer 14 (Larry Cata, W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, 2012-13
Chair, University Faculty Senate, The Pennsylvania State, “THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE EMERGING
SHAPE OF A NEW WORLD TRADE REGULATORY ORDER,” 13 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 49, p. lexis)
Indeed, Wen Jin Yuan notes
the sense among Chinese academic and policy circles that "the main reason behind
the US's desire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain
the Obama Administration's support for the TPP agenda is
China's rise." Wen notes, for example, reports published in the People's Daily, the official organ of the Chinese Communist Party, that refer to
TPP as "superficially an economic agreement but containing an obvious political purpose to constrain China's rise." More importantly, a
successfully negotiated TPP would result, according to other Chinese scholars, in trade diversion to the detriment of Chinese economic
interests. Yet, according
to Wen's research, United States officials insist that the ultimate goal of the United States
was not containment, but incorporation . The "U.S.'s ultimate goal is to integrate China into this regional trade system, rather than
keeping China out, and the TPP initiative is actually similar to the strategy led by several U.S. agencies to incorporate China into the WTO
incorporation can be understood from the Chinese side as a nother form of containment .
Rather than have China lead a new effort at refining the rules and culture of trade in the Pacific, it would be forced to
participate as a junior partner in a regulatory exercise directed by the United States and its principal ally, Japan. For
system." Yet
the Chinese, the substantial effect might well be understood as containment, though that view/perception is
lost on the United States.
Inviting China to join is seen as containment through incorporation
Backer 14 (Larry Cata, W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, 2012-13
Chair, University Faculty Senate, The Pennsylvania State, “THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE EMERGING
SHAPE OF A NEW WORLD TRADE REGULATORY ORDER,” 13 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 49, p. lexis)
Third, the
short run ends when China is itself invited to join TPP. As such, Chinese policy circles
misunderstand one threat of TPP. Chinese analysts correctly perceive the threat of TPP in terms of its ability to change the balance
of influence from China to Japan through its American alliance. But it is a mistake to think that this change of balance will be effectuated
through Japanese inclusion and Chinese exclusion from TPP. Instead, the United States will
seek to contain China through
inclusion in the disciplinary procedures and structures of the TPP rather than by excluding it. Perhaps
President Obama put it best when he remarked in his 2011 meeting with the Trans-Pacific Partnership: In a larger sense, the TPP has the
potential to be a model not only for the Asia Pacific but for future trade agreements. It addresses a whole range of issues not covered by past
agreements, including market regulations and how we can make them more compatible, creating opportunities for small and medium-sized
businesses in the growing global marketplace. It will include high standards to protect workers' rights and the environment. The
stakes for
control might be significant, especially for China. Some commentators in the United States see the TPP as a
means of managing the ability of states, principally China, to blend state and private power through stateowned enterprises.
Incorporation is an even greater risk of encirclement
Backer 14 (Larry Cata, W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International Affairs, 2012-13
Chair, University Faculty Senate, The Pennsylvania State, “THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: JAPAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND THE EMERGING
SHAPE OF A NEW WORLD TRADE REGULATORY ORDER,” 13 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 49, p. lexis)
Japan remains steadily fixed between the United States and China. With the election of Prime Minister Abe, Japan has chosen a middle course,
but one that pushes it further into the complex entanglements between the United States and China. Japan's decision to participate in TPP
negotiations drives Japan more closely to the center of current efforts to define and control the regulatory structures of trade in the Pacific
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basin. By extension, TPP
may also control the shape of legitimate government and government policy among
TPP states and those who trade with them. This represents a closer alignment of Japan with the United States. But it represents a
threat to the People's Republic of China as well. That threat is direct - representing to the Chinese what may
appear as another piece of the U.S. strategy to encircle China militarily and economically and to isolate
it from the center of current efforts to develop transnational regulatory structures. To that extent, Japan's commitment
to the TPP represents a direct threat to emerging Chinese interests, a threat that China will respond to against the United States and Japan.
[*81] Ironically the greater threat is indirect - to the extent that Japan and the United States join together under the TPP umbrella and invite
China to participate as well, China will find itself constrained by the development of group norms with respect to
which it will be able to participate, but not dominate. For Japan, this may represent containment that protects its sizeable investment in China,
at least temporarily. TPP may also permit Japan to leverage its power to influence global trade rules. But it also reaffirms that Japan stands
uncomfortably close to the fissure that separates the United States from Chinese interests, and must continue to rely on the
internationalization of rulemaking to protect its own interests. An independent path for Japan is unlikely to be an option worth considering. To
a large extent, Zaki Laidi's recent suggestion resonates well here: "Since the end of the cold war, Europeans have believed deeply in the
existence of a global commons - and the declining importance of national sovereignty. The conduct of both the US and emerging countries
suggests the opposite. Power politics is back. Multilateralism is dying."
The plan will be seen in China as kowtowing to US demands; that’s a domestic political
problem
Jie & Dogra 13 (Woo Jun & Suvi, Research and Liaison Officer, Geo-economics and Strategy
Programme, Int’l Inst of Strategic Studies, 6/1-, “Suvi Dogra: Pacific trade pact: worth it for China?,”
http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/blogsections/iiss-voices-2013-1e35/june-2013-e750/tpp-harmchina-84e1)
Nonetheless, China also has
good reason not to join the trade partnership. Being a member would mean
having to accept America's leading role. American leadership and dominance is likely to be cemented
should the partnership emerge as the dominant trade order for the Asia-Pacific. This would not only pose threats to China's
regional role, but would also not go down well at home.
No flexibility on existing terms of the TPP ensures that the plan causes domestic
backlash in China
Elms 13 (Deborah Kay, fellow @ Asian Dev’t Bank, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Looking Ahead to
the Next Steps,” http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/156307/adbi-wp447.pdf)
However, a lack of flexibility collides with one important political reality going forward . The TPP would be
substantially strengthened if the PRC—currently with the world’s second largest economy—enters. One of the most important factors driving
this megaregional trade agreement is the opportunity to knit together global value chains in a seamless trade agreement that contains not just
tariff reductions but also substantial behind-the-border provisions. Since many of the presumptive second tranche members like the PRC; the
Republic of Korea; Hong Kong, China; and Taipei, China are deeply enmeshed in value chains in the Asia-Pacific region, getting them into the
TPP would provide significant economic benefits (Wignaraja 2013; Baldwin and Kawai 2013; Petri, Plummer, and Zhai 2012). For
the PRC in
the existing TPP without the opportunity to discuss any of the existing provisions may
present political difficulties at the domestic level. This suggests that current TPP members would be wise to think carefully
particular, joining
about a mechanism that would apply specifically to new entrants in the next tranche of negotiations. To write into the agreement that
accession terms are to be negotiated later with each new entrant will be unacceptable to many. Some sort of clarity
is therefore needed
as to what sort of accession provisions will be required of new aspirants.
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High standards generate political pushback in China
Devadason 14 (Evelyn, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of
Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Journal of Contemporary China, 2014 Vol. 23, No. 87, 462–479,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.843890, ebsco)
From the Chinese perspective, the major problem lies in the so-called ‘platinum’ (not gold) standards the US is
pushing for in the TPP. These include stronger intellectual property rights (IPRs) and tighter labour and
environmental standards and regulatory discipline of state-owned enterprises. These standards are
inconsistent with China’s principles of international relations, which is non-interference in other nation’s domestic
affairs. Further, there are some concerns on US proposals in the TPP, which go beyond the WTO rules. These include the imposition of
restrictions on pre-grant patent oppositions, the increase in the term of the patents to more than 20 years, and the addition of patents for
plants, animals, diagnostics and therapeutic surgical methods for the treatment of humans.39 It would thus be more difficult for China and
other developing countries to join this deal once these stringent standards are enforced.40 Problems related to accession to the TPP will be
further compounded if the agreement includes exemptions and exclusions. This would mean that accession of future members will have to be
negotiated separately with each TPP member, undeniably leaving the veto power with the original signatories. In this respect, instead of the
TPP being inclusive in terms of its membership, it may in fact do the reverse. If the TPP is not enlargement-friendly, the path towards an FTAAP
would pose risks to the region both economically and politically.41 It may lead to the rise of a politically-driven divergent dual-track: China
taking the lead through the Asian (EAFTA and indirectly through its influence via the RCEP) track and the US taking the lead through the TPP
track. For China, the ultimate decision to join the TPP is more of a political than an economic question. Following
from the above discussion, the decision to join at a later stage will not provide the opportunity for China to push for changes that will promote
trans-Pacific integration but instead be reduced to one of compliance to the established terms. Thus, the recent turn of events with the
unexpected invitation extended to China by the US to join the TPP, and China’s declared interest
in the arrangement, is a
clear indication that China wants to be engaged in shaping the rules of the TPP.
ISDS would be massively controversial in China
Ramasamy 16 (Bala, Professor of Economics, China Europe International Business School, “Why China
could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” April 13th, http://theconversation.com/why-chinacould-never-sign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361)
While it has its critics, the
ISDS – a system under which an investing company can seek compensation from a host country if its property
been included in several FTAs recently. This is because it offers an assurance to multinational
corporations that expropriation by host governments is only a remote possibility. Over the last 15 years China has been signing
agreements containing the ISDS clause as it has been effective in protecting the country’s investments
abroad. However the World Justice Project, which ranks countries on the rule of law – and regulatory enforcement in particular –
shows that China fares miserably when compared with other TPP countries. Only Mexico is marginally below it.
It’s very likely the ISDS would have been a heated issue for China, and it is possible that like Australia, Mexico, Peru and
rights are violated – has
Vietnam, China would have fought for many exemptions.
Labor is a core sovereignty issue in China – TPP provisions are controversial
Ramasamy 4/13 (Bala, Professor of Economics, China Europe International Business School, “Why
China could never sign on to the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” http://theconversation.com/why-chinacould-never-sign-on-to-the-trans-pacific-partnership-56361)
The inclusion of labour issues in an FTA is rare since labour rights are considered “domestic issues” and
interference by external parties jeopardises the sovereignty of individual members. In this regard, the TPP can
be considered bold. The chapter on labour would have been a contentious issue between China and the
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US. For example China’s labour laws, while allowing freedom of association, require all trade unions to be affiliated with the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions, which is an agency of the Chinese Communist Party. The agreement, meanwhile, requires TPP
partners to adopt a legal framework that upholds fundamental labour rights as recognised by the International
Labour Organization.
Labor & environmental standards are politically impossible in China
Terada 13 (Takashi, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University, Karasuma-Higashi-iru, Imadegawadori,
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, “The US Struggles in APEC's Trade Politics: Coalition-Building and Regional
Integration in the Asia-Pacific,” International Negotiation, 18, 49-66, DOI: 10.1163/15718069-12341245,
p. 63, ebsco)
It was the American push for the TPP that encouraged Japan to announce its potential participation, and Mexico and Canada were influenced
by Japan's lead and decided to join, proving the success of the American coalition-building.'' In fact, Japan's entry would greatly enhance the
prospects that TPP will lead more quickly to the establishment of a region-wide FTA, consequently urging China to accelerate the pace toward
an alternative regional FTA in which China can set its own standards for economic integration with its preferred pace and members. This means
the progress
in TPP negotiations with more participants is a worry to China. Some in China view the American
commitment to the TPP as motivated by checking China's growing influence on regional economic integration. The TPP is generally
considered a high-standard trade arrangement suitable to the American template for FTAs, which, for
instance, aims to have no exceptions to tariff elimination (Solis 2011). This is an approach that China cannot accept, given
high tariffs imposed on some key products such as automobiles (25%). What also makes it politically impossible for China to
join the TPP are provisions relating to labor standards and the environment, which potentially require members
to abide by standards set by the International Labor Organization, including freedom of association and collective bargaining {Nikkei, 1 January
2012). Even
the prohibition on forced and child labor would not be acceptable to China, since these
"gold-standard" items have not been included in any of China's FTAs.
IP is a hot button domestic issue for China; the perception of external meddling would
be unpopular
Armstrong 11 (Shiro, research fellow at the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian
National University, 12/11, “China’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,”
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/12/11/china-participation-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/)
The US has been pushing for more regulatory discipline for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the negotiations
around the TPP and, in particular, competitive neutrality between SOEs and private enterprises in member economies. Vietnam and Malaysia
are the two economies currently involved in the TPP negotiations in which SOEs are prominent or dominant. Reform of SOEs and the
privatisation process is a deeply domestic issue that will not be resolved quickly in China. The WTO
accession experience shows that locking China into reforms can only occur, especially now given its size, when it is committed to using external
institutions as tools in its own interest to open up and reform its domestic economy. A
TPP agenda and negotiations in which
the US effectively declares itself the gatekeeper is likely to make it extremely difficult for China to
commit to the TPP and join.
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2NC/1NR — Impact Extensions
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Neg Block: Turn Shield
No risk of a war with China unless there’s political instability – The disad controls the
case impact
Sutter 7 (Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to
Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?,” Carnegie Debates, April 20,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)
To answer the question, I follow a pattern used in my long professional career of providing information and analysis about China and Asia to
congressional and executive branch policy makers. The pattern has involved providing relevant historical context and using balance in assessing
contemporary developments. A major goal is to provide perspective that will moderate US excitement about China—either positive or negative.
In my opinion, history seems clear about the lessons of US excitement about
China—it leads to exaggeration about the
opportunities or dangers posed by China, which in turn provides a poor basis for US policy and often leads to policy that is not well
aligned with US interests. In sum, section 1 of this paper looks at relevant patterns and behavior of the United States and China in Asia since the
start of the cold war. They show that the
United States tends to exaggerate recent threats to its leadership in Asia,
and that China remains determined to resist and reduce great power involvement along China’s
periphery. Section 2 provides an assessment of Chinese leaders’ current intentions toward the United States in Asia, and argues that US
policy makers would be prudent if they remained attentive for possible changes in the current comparatively
moderate Chinese approach to the United States in Asia in favor of a more assertive Chinese stance. Section
3 foresees continued effective checks on a possibly more assertive or coercive Chinese approach to Asia. Those
checks are based on the twin forces of effective US security and economic power in Asia and by pervasive
hedging of independent-minded Asian governments.
Domestic priorities trump foreign policy – Relations won’t turn the disad
Sutter 12 (Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George
Washington University, “China in 2012: Foreign Affairs a Secondary Priority but Salient Challenges
Ahead,” Jamestown China Brief, January 20,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38913&tx_ttnews%5Bbac
kPid%5D=589)
Chinese leaders are preoccupied for now with domestic issues headed by a massive leadership transition
and thus appear more likely to adhere to current foreign policies than to change course despite important
challenges in the Asian region and self-serving economic policies that act as a drag on China’s international stature. Nevertheless, the
past three years have featured a muddled picture of repeated Chinese statements of reassurance accompanied by firm actions by Chinese
military, border security forces and diplomats to protect Chinese claims in disputed territories and to protect Chinese interests in international
forums. As a result, analysts
will want to determine as well as possible how dynamic and conflicted foreign policy
decision making actually is within the secret deliberations of the Chinese leadership. Observers also should be
watching closely for signs that Chinese leaders may decide that the recent U.S. reengagement in Asia
accompanied by frictions between China and many of its neighbors requires a new Chinese approach regarding regional disputes. At
present, a markedly more forceful or more accommodating approach each has significant negative implications for China. But the current
trajectory can be viewed as costing China dearly through loss of territorial
claims and growing challenges posed by other
powers along China’s sensitive periphery. Such issues head the list of concerns of nationalistic Chinese leaders who presumably would
favor responses with more forceful Chinese policies. Meanwhile, China needs to determine the appropriate mix of incentives and pressures to
continue Taiwan’s movement toward closer integration with China. The dynastic succession arrangements in Pyongyang head the list of
immediate and possibly perilous concerns that could impact China’s foreign policy and practice in ways that may be hard to predict. Observers
also will be on the look out for indicators of changing Chinese economic policies that would be more supportive of international common goods
and take more account of the perceived negative consequences of China’s economic practices on others.
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Neg Block Impact: Reforms
Domestic opposition prevents reforms that are key to the economy
Lam 12 (Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation and Professor of China
studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, “Will
Shanghai's Bright Lights Dim in 2012?,” Jamestown China Brief, January 20,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38911)
Apart from formulating more market-oriented policies, the
CCP administration needs to reform China’s tradition-bound and
unwieldy government
structure. The conventional wisdom that one-party authoritarian rule makes for efficient policymaking does not
seem to apply to China—or at least not oversight of policy implementation. Take monetary and fiscal policy. Decision-making
powers in this crucial area are split among at least the following departments: the CCP’s Leading Group on Finance and Economics, the
premier’s office, the National Development and Reform Commission, the People’s Bank of China, the Finance Ministry, and the China Banking
Regulatory Commission. Moreover, despite well-established top-down command-and-control mechanisms, central
authorities often
have a hard time monitoring the finances of sub-national administrations. This accounts for the fact that theoretically illegal
underground banking institutions have cobbled together a credit market worth 10 trillion yuan ($1.6 trillion). Additionally, local governments
along with 6,587 government-related investment and financial companies have run up debts totaling an estimated 14 trillion yuan ($2.2 trillion)
(Bloomberg News, December 19 2011; Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2011). It is significant that, immediately upon being promoted to
Executive Vice Premier in March 2008, Li helped Wen formulate a master plan to restructure government departments with a view to
centralizing authorities in a number of “super-ministries” (See “Beijing Unveils Plans for Super Ministries,” China Brief, February 4, 2008). One
proposal entertained at the time was the establishment of a Super-Ministry of Finance to take charge of monetary and fiscal policies. The
creation of a Super-Ministry of Transport also was proposed to unify and coordinate policymaking affecting railways, highways, aviation and
marine transport. Owing
to opposition from vested interests, however, most of Wen and Li’s plans failed to
materialize (China Daily, March 11. 2008; China.org.cn, March 5, 2008). Nonetheless, the National Energy Commission, which was set up in
2010, was an effort to unify decision-making on energy-related matters under one roof. Whether premier-in-waiting Li would soon give another
big push to restructuring the central-government bureaucracy merits careful attention. The near-universal condemnation of the Ministry of
Railways in the wake of the July 23, 2011 high-speed train disaster in Wenzhou has given institutional reformers within the State Council a Godsent pretext to revive the old agenda of setting up a Super-Ministry of Transport. Vice Premier Wang Qishan, who is in line to become Executive
Vice Premier after his expected induction into the PBSC at the 18th Party Congress, is known to favor the creation of a Super-Ministry to handle
monetary policy. It is thus possible that Li and Wang soon join forces to lay the groundwork for a thorough restructuring of central government
units in the near to medium term. As Premier Wen has reiterated, “without
reform of the political structure,
achievements attained in economic reform could suffer a serious setback” (Chinanews.com.cn, September 14,
2011; China.com.cn, August 23, 2010). Factors key to the rationalization and reform of the Chinese economy, such as boosting
the private sector and allowing ordinary citizens to enjoy a bigger share of the economic pie, hinge upon whether the CCP
leadership is willing and able to resuscitate political and structural reform. However, given the apparent
consensus among disparate factions that political liberalization would jeopardize the CCP’s “perennial ruling party status,” the possibilities for
resolute steps in this direction may not be high this year.
Failure of reforms creates internal instability and leads to expansionism.
Krawitz 10 (Howard M., “China’s trade opening and implications for regional stability” Strategic
Forum, page 3)
Ongoing debate holds that as economic power gives China the means to build military might, it will encourage military adventurism and feed
the new nationalism already on the rise in China. Recent boosts in Chinese military spending hint this may already be happening. This danger
cannot be ignored. China’s
leaders are walking a tightrope. WTO-mandated changes and reform policy failures could
engender widespread domestic discontent, nationwide strikes, riots, and other serious social disorder.
Leaders, believing themselves in danger of losing control or of being marginalized by economic forces and social
changes, might try to redirect domestic anger by rekindling Chinese xenophobic sentiments and turning to
foreign adventurism as a means of recapturing power and reestablishing primacy. The new breed of Chinese capitalist
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could become the new breed of Chinese ultranationalist, equating wealth and power with the right to erase past national
shame by establishing and enforcing a “Beijing Doctrine” in Asia. Or China might just interpret its own rise in terms of its
neighbors’ declines and simply push to see what it could get away with.
Economic collapse causes the destruction of China and war with Taiwan
Lewis 10 (Dan, Research Director of Economic Research Council, “The nightmare of a Chinese
economic collapse” World Finance,
http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html)
It has been calculated that to
keep China’s society stable – i.e. to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without
devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and
the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist
party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial
point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions
– so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of
central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a
very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine
war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to
war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.
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Neg Block Impact: Nationalism
Perceived US attempts to interfere in China’s interests will fuel Chinese nationalism
and cause war
Bandow 7 (Doug, fellow @ American Enterprise Inst., “China: Fragile Superpower, Readings in the Age
of Empire,” Foreign Follies, September 7, http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=11565)
Which naturally leads to relations with the U.S., the subject of the penultimate chapter of Shirk's book. Beijing has an incentive to maintain
good relations with the U.S. – the PRC would suffer greatly from American economic sanctions let alone military hostility, and "the best way for
China to rise peacefully is to behave like a responsible power and accommodate to the current superpower, the United States." If only life was
so simple. Warns Shirk: "on the other hand, inside China, other
leaders, the public, and the military expect Chinese
leaders to stand up to the United States. Nationalist ardor runs high, fanned by government propaganda
and the commercial media and Internet. The United States, as the dominant power in the world, is the natural target of
suspicion and resentment in China, just as it is in many other countries, particularly after the American invasion of Iraq. A
Chinese political leader who takes a principled stand against the United States always wins more points
than one who gives in to it." Where does the U.S. go from here? As is so often the case in international relations, responsible
statesmanship is necessary on both sides of the Pacific. Moreover, she adds, "only by understanding the dangers of China's
domestic fragility and incorporating this understanding into their policies can Chinese and American decision makers
avoid a catastrophic war." She advocates a series of sensible steps – focusing on Chinese international behavior, downplaying
American military power, demonstrating respect for China, working in Chinese-Taiwanese relations, and not overreacting to China's economic
rise. But that's not enough. Shirk wants to maintain "a strong military presence" in the region and opposes building up Japan as a military
power. As she notes, "Preventing war with a rising China is one of the most difficult foreign policy challenges our country faces." That being the
case, Washington should emphasize conflict avoidance, stepping back militarily while shifting defense responsibilities onto allied and friendly
states. Perhaps the most important duty for U.S. policymakers today is to distinguish between vital interests, such as defending America, and
peripheral interests, such as attempting to dictate events in East Asia in the face of a rising China. The world
in which America can
micro-manage international events is disappearing. Washington, too, must learn to accommodate. And
America's interest will best be served by stepping back from confrontation where its vital interests are not involved.
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Neg Block Impact: Hardliners
Hardliners overreact – They’re in control – Guarantees conflict ridden foreign policy
Sutter 12 (Robert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George
Washington University, “China in 2012: Foreign Affairs a Secondary Priority but Salient Challenges Ahead,”
Jamestown China Brief, January 20,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38913&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=
589)
Specialists remain unsure what exactly prompted more assertive Chinese actions since the end of the past decade regarding contested claims
along China’s periphery, perennial disputes with the United States over Taiwan and Tibet, challenges to U.S. economic policies and the leading
role of the US dollar, and other issues. Some specialists played down the assertive nature of the Chinese actions, but a more mainstream view
based on in-depth study and extensive interviews held that the
harder Chinese approach reflected a spectrum of
opinions in what is seen as “fractured” Chinese foreign decision making, ranging from Maoist leftists and a
strong nationalist wing on one side to much less influential liberal internationalist officials on the
other. Monitoring how the Chinese leadership reflects such varying views and endeavors to weave them into an approach that supports the
stated objective of harmonious foreign relations represents a major task for analysts during the coming year and beyond. The consequences of
the Chinese
assertiveness and truculence, presumably supported by strongly nationalistic leaders, have
been widely seen abroad and also by some leading commentators in China as negative for Chinese interests in preserving a stable
environment needed for smooth economic development and leadership transition. Authoritative statements by the Chinese government and
senior Chinese leaders, notably China’s top foreign policy official, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, have reaffirmed China’s longstanding
commitment to peace and development in an effort to reassure neighbors and other concerned powers. At the same time, however,
Chinese security forces confront foreign intruders as they build ever greater capabilities to secure Chinese contested
territorial claims. When Secretary Clinton at the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting joined others in expressing concerns about China’s
position regarding the South China Sea, the usually diplomatic Chinese foreign ministry reacted harshly to this perceived American “attack” on
China (“China’s Search for a Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011; Beijing Review, December 23, 2010). The mix of messages of
reassurance and signs of assertiveness put many of China’s neighbors on edge, strengthening their interest in developing closer ties with one
another and with a willing and re-engaging United States to deal with their common China problem. One
way out is for China to
show clear commitment to policies of reassurance. Unfortunately, such an approach can easily be seen in
China as appeasement that might encourage growing foreign intrusions involving China’s territorial claims and
other key interests. Moreover, China’s recent truculent behavior has alerted foreign powers that Chinese reassurances may be ephemeral. As a
result, current wariness by Chinese neighbors probably will not be easily reduced unless declarations of reassurance are accompanied by
concrete actions involving compromises of important Chinese interests and principles.
Small conflicts with China escalate to nuclear use
Fisher 11 (Max, Associate Editor at the Atlantic, Editor of the International Channel, “5 Most Likely Ways the US and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War”)
There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though
none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events
that are
the
most dangerou s. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over
bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials
feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to
actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations
for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly
leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of
the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red
lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war. But the U.S. and China have
not yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes . The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that the U.S. and
Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific powers into conflict -- unless, of course,
they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are
five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is
exactly what makes them so dangerous.
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Neg Block Impact: Regime Legitimacy
Threats to the CCP will cause a lashout against Taiwan to boost domestic support
Martin 7 (Peter B Martin, “America's Nuclear Military Dilemma with China,” American Thinker, August
20, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/08/americas_nuclear_military_dile.html)
A year from now China will be on its benevolent best conduct, two years from now that could all change. There is little to fear from China until
the Olympics are over; what follows may be a different story altogether. Just as Ancient Greeks would recess their wars during the Olympic
Games, China will keep the peace leading up to and during the games. But nationalism has
not been entirely sidelined, as it is
an essential device to preserve communist rule. China's leadership has an inherent fear of losing power;
this perpetual dread is what drives their political and strategic decisions. And Taiwan is the principal
catalyst to preserving the Beijing government. Should the political system feel threatened, nationalism
would come into play and Taiwan would be the scapegoat.
Regime collapse causes nuclear lash-out
Rexing 5 (San – Epoch Times International – August 3rd -- http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-83/30931.html)
Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human
life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The
“speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP
intends to fight all of
mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly
evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats
on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession
people, now
affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese
plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.
Regime collapse causes China-India war
Cohen 2 (Stephen, Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South
Asia: An Unknowable Future,” May,
http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf)
A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no
expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian
societies are subject to
deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged
many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in
Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an
unstable situation. A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an
aggressive policy toward India or the United States or both might become involved in a major crisis with India,
perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly
with American assistance.
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Causes nuclear use
Landay 2K (Jonathan S., National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, -2K [“Top Administration Officials
Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts,” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis)
Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But
even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even
start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the
kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five
decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast
Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with
lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool
the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch
Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea
conflict between the two could end
the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation
regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia _ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources _ indispensable to
attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a
the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to
the Commerce Department.
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Neg Block Impact: Relations
Nationalism turns U.S. relations
Sutter 7 (Robert Sutter, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, “Does China Seek to
Dominate Asia and Reduce US influence as a Regional Power?,” Carnegie Debates, April 20,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Sutter_paper.pdf)
While still seeking a multipolar world, China’s
leaders in recent years have seen their policy goals and interests best
served by muting opposition to the United States and US leadership in Asian and world affairs. In general,
China’s goals in Asia have been: · To promote stability and a “peaceful environment” conducive to domestic Chinese economic development
and political stability. · To seek advantageous economic contacts and relationships. · To reassure China’s neighbors about the implications of
China’s rise. · To isolate Taiwan. · To gain regional influence relative to other powers (e.g. Japan, India, and the United States). Over the past
decade, China’s
leaders have adjusted their policies and approach to Asia in ways that appear to accord
with changing circumstances and the costs and benefits for Chinese interests: · Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s enhanced his
leadership stature in the lead up to China’s 15th Communist Party Congress in 1997 by modifying Deng Xiaoping’s injunction for China to
maintain a low-profile in world politics. Jiang reached out to Asian and world powers seeking “strategic partnerships” that enhanced both
China’s and Jiang’s international profile at this important time in Chinese domestic politics. · China at this time also endeavored
to
reassure Asian neighbors alarmed by Chinese military actions in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis by proposing a
“New Security Concept” that promoted “good neighbor” relations with most in Asia—Taiwan and the United States were the
main exceptions. · By mid-2001, before the terrorist attack on America, China decided to reduce sharply its rhetorical and political opposition to
US “hegemony” in Asian and world affairs. The continued strong
public opposition to the United States in Asia had not been
popular with Asian governments unwilling to choose between China and the United States. It also ran the risk
of significant push back from the newly elected George W. Bush administration that had a decidedly more wary view of China’s rise than its
predecessor. · By late 2003, Chinese officials began formulating a new public approach focused on China’s “peaceful rise” in Asia that was
designed to reassure most concerned powers—Taiwan remained the main exception—that China’s rise would not be adverse to their interests.
Reassuring the United States seemed particularly important, and China remained remarkably discreet in dealing with most differences with the
United States.
Economic reform is critical to US/China cooperation
Manning & Garrett 13 (Robert A. Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International
Stability, and Banning, Strategic Foresight Senior Fellow for Global Trends Strategic Foresight Initiative,
Atlantic Council, “Does Beijing Have a Strategy? China’s Alternative Futures)
Harmonious World: In the best-case scenario, China’s
new leadership begins over the next five to six years to
strengthen the rule of law, move its financial system to a more market-based allocation of resources, and
allow the RMB to become convertible and ascend as a global currency. Consumer-driven growth sustains a 6-7 percent annual growth rate as
China decreases its reliance on exports and increases social stability through political and judicial reform to open up the political system and
enhance rule of law, transparency, and accountability. Internationally, as China and other G-20 nations push for a larger voice in rule-making,
they cooperate with Western countries to strengthen the international rules-based order even as they revise the rules. China
also finds a
new, more stable and cooperative modus vivendi in East Asia not only with the United States but also its Asian
neighbors, enhancing prospects for regional security and for cooperation on global issues. In addition, China plays a key
role in devising new rules and codes of conduct on cyber and space policies. In this “harmonious”
world, the US-China relationship is both a critical element in achieving this positive outcome for China
and also a beneficiary of China’s success in restructuring its domestic economy and pursuing a conciliatory and cooperative foreign policy.
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Neg Block Impact: Trade
Anti-Americanism flips trade – The turn outweighs
Chang 14 (Gordon, worked in Shanghai and Hong Kong for almost two decades and now write
primarily on China, Asia, and nuclear proliferation, two terms @ Cornell U as trustee, “Worse Than A
Trade War: China's Anti-Americanism Flares,”
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/06/08/worse-than-a-trade-war-chinas-antiamericanism-flares/#240004d65dd4)
And if all this were not bad enough, the
Chinese political system is finding it hard to pull back from its instinctive
anti-foreign sentiment. State enterprises have for decades been the primary beneficiaries of protectionism, and it looks like
they are now using their growing political clout to fan the anti-Americanism for their own benefit. Almost
none of the entrenched interests have a reason to help U.S. business. So some leaders in Beijing are arrogant,
others are insecure, and state enterprises are taking advantage of the situation. The result is that American business
will be the target of the Chinese political system, probably for a long time to come. U.S. companies, unfortunately,
are now facing something worse than a trade war.
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