Team # 4
Docket No. 13-1234
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
_______
JOE PUBLIC AND JANE PRIVATE,
Petitioners,
v.
RADTV AND ENTERTAINMENT TABLOID, INC.,
Respondents.
_______
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Radnor
_______
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENTS
_______
Team #4
Counselors for Respondents,
RADTV and Entertainment Tabloid, Inc.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Authorities.........................................................................................................................ii
Questions Presented........................................................................................................................vi
Statement of Jurisdiction................................................................................................................vi
Statement of Facts............................................................................................................................1
Summary of the Argument...............................................................................................................4
Argument.........................................................................................................................................5
I. The Constitution Guarantees the Right to a Trial by Jury in State Civil Cases...........................5
A. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Trial by Jury was Incorporated Against the States
With the Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause..............................6
1. This Court has Never had an Opportunity to Analyze the Seventh Amendment
Right to a Trial by Jury Under the Court's Current Incorporation Framework.......6
2. The Right to a Civil Trial by Jury is Fundamental to Our Scheme of Ordered
Liberty......................................................................................................................7
B. The Right to a Trial by Jury was Incorporated Against the States With the Passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privilege or Immunities Clause..........................................10
1. The Privileges or Immunities Clause Incorporated the First Eight Amendments
to the Constitution Against the States....................................................................10
2. The Court's Decision in the Slaughter-House Cases Must be Overruled..........12
II. A Trial Court's Striking of a Cause of Action From a Complaint Does Not Violate the First
Amendment's Petition Clause Where a Litigant has the Opportunity to File an Amended
Complaint.......................................................................................................................................13
A. The Trial Court Appropriately Exercised Its Discretion to Dismiss Public's Cause of
i
Action, and Therefore Did Not Violate The First Amendment's Petition Clause.............13
1. The Petition Clause Only Requires a Court to Hear a Grievance, and does not
Demand a Specific Form of Relief........................................................................14
2. This Court's Petition Clause Precedent Does Not Require More Than Mere
Access to the Courts Under the Clause..................................................................16
3. Denial of a Cause of Action Does Not Violate the First Amendment Simply
Because the Denial Fails to Conform With State Procedural Laws......................18
4. Public Still May Seek Relief From the Court by Filing an Amended
Complaint...............................................................................................................18
5. Public's Proposed View of the Petition Clause Would Call Into Question Nearly
All
Trial
Court
Decisions
Aimed
at
Regulating
the
Court's
Docket....................................................................................................................19
B. Public's Claim for Declaratory Judgment was Baseless in Law...................................21
1. Baseless Claims Are Categorically Not Protected by the First Amendment's
Petition Clause.......................................................................................................21
2. Public's Burden Shifting Scheme Would Violate the Constitution, and
Therefore is Baseless in Law.................................................................................22
Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................23
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).......................................................................................7
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ...............................................................................................7
Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) ................................16
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) ......................................16, 21, 22
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)......................................................13
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).................................16
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990) .....................................................................................8
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) ....................................................................................20
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) ..........................................................................................5
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ........................................................................14
E. R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).....................17
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) .........................................................................22
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ...................................................................................7
McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) ................................................... passim
Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) ...................................................6, 7
Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) ...............................14, 17
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ..................................................................22
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996).............................................................................. iv
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) .....................................................................................7
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ...............................................18
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) ..............................................22, 23
iii
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S.
49 (1993) .......................................................................................................................................21
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)........................................................................................15
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) ...............................................................................................12
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991)....................................................................... iv
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)......................................................................20
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) ...................................................................................12
Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) .........................17
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) .......................................................................................5
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898) ........................................................................................8
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) ............................................................................6
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS CASES
Huggins v. Safeway, Inc., 210 F. App'x 819 (10th Cir. 2007) .......................................................19
Shurick v. Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114 (11th Cir. 2010) ................................................................20
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASES
Okonkwo v. Murguia, 2010 WL 276754 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2010) ................................................19
United States ex rel. Williams v. McVicar, 918 F. Supp. 1226 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ...........................18
INTERNATIONAL CASES
Case of the Seven Bishops, 12 How. St. Tr. 183 (K.B.) (1688).....................................................15
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
US Const. Amend. I ............................................................................................................... passim
U.S. Const. amend. VII.......................................................................................................... passim
U.S. Const. amend. XIV ....................................................................................................... passim
iv
MISCELLANEOUS SOURCES
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries ............................................................................................8
Akhil Reed Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 601 (2001) .........12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)..................................................................................................................21
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)(1) ............................................................................................................20, 21
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866)...........................................................................11
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2538 (1866)...........................................................................11
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866)...........................................................................11
House of Representatives Journal (Aug. 1789) reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, The Bill
of Rights: A Documentary History (1971). ...................................................................................14
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States ...........................................8
Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (3d ed. 2000) ................................................7, 9
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 1789, in 7 The Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905)........................................................................................9
Magna Carta Jun. 15, 1215 ..............................................................................................................8
Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the Neglected, but
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153 (1986) ............................................15
Sources of English Constitutional History (C. Stephenson & F.G. Markham eds. 1937).............15
Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England's Civil War and
America's Bill of Rights, 20 QLR 193 (2000)................................................................................15
Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When
the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in
American History and Tradition?, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 7 (2008) ..........................................................9
Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After Mcdonald v. Chicago, 88
Notre Dame L. Rev. 159 (2012) ......................................................................................................9
The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).....................................8
v
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.
Whether the elimination of the right to a trial by jury in all civil cases, a right that
is enshrined in the Seventh Amendment and has been recognized since the
nation's founding, violates the Fourteenth Amendment?
II.
Whether a trial court's order to a litigant to file an amended complaint, in
furtherance of the court's broad discretion to manage its docket and authority to
dismiss baseless claims, violates the First Amendment's Petition Clause?
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case comes to this Court on appeal after a decision from the Circuit Court of
the State of Radnor and a denial of discretionary review from the Supreme Court of the
State of Radnor. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). The
decisions made below are legal conclusion reviewable by this Court de novo. Salve
Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 697 (1996). .
vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Radnor's Elimination of the Right to a Civil Trial by Jury
Radnor is a state of the United States. (R. at 1.) The Supreme Court of Radnor is the
highest and only constitutional court in the State. (R. at 1.) All cases, civil and criminal, begin in
the Radnor Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction. (R. at 1.) Decades of governmental
overspending and corruption have rendered the coffers of Radnor nearly empty. (R. at 1.) In a
last attempt to prevent Radnor from defaulting on its financial obligations, the state legislature
presented its citizens a package of reforms and budgetary cuts known as the "Radnor Fiscal
Emergency Plan." (R. at 1.) The plan proposed eliminating the state's grand jury proceedings,
reducing by half the number of Circuit Court judges in the state, and establishing discretionaryonly jurisdiction for the Supreme Court of Radnor in civil matters. (R. at 1.) Furthermore, and
most relevant to the instant case, the plan proposed removal of the right to a jury trial in all civil
cases. (R. at 1-2.) The plan was passed by a majority vote. (R. at 1-2.)
II. Parties and Procedural History
Gossip Show is a daily entertainment television news program broadcasted on Channel 5
in Radnor and produced by Entertainment Tabloid, Inc. (ETI). (R. at 2.) Channel 5 is owned by
Radnor corporation RADTV. (R. at 2.) Joe Public is a citizen of Radnor and a well-known actor,
most recognized for his role in the Radnor soap opera "Wild Flowers." (R. at 2.) Jane Private,
Public's wife, is also a citizen of Radnor. (R. at 2.)
On May 23rd, Gossip Show broadcasted a segment about Public and Private during
which one of the show's hosts made a number of statements about Public and Private. (R. at 2.)
These statements included comments that Public had begun a sexual relationship with Private
when she was a minor and that the two married because Private was two months pregnant. (R. at
1
2-3.) The segment ended with a plea to have Public come to Gossip Show for an exclusive
interview. (R. at 3.) On May 27th, Public appeared on Tabloid Zone, another Radnor television
program. (R. at 3.) During Public's interview on Tabloid Zone, he told the show how he met and
started dating his wife, that Private was not pregnant, and that he never had sexual relations with
Private while she was a minor. (R. at 3.)
On December 2nd, Public filed a lawsuit against RADTV and ETI in the Radnor Circuit
Court. (R. at 3.) The suit alleged that ETI's May 23rd broadcast was defamatory and slanderous
under Radnor law. (R. at 3-4.) Public further requested a declaratory judgment that the burden of
proof in the case be shifted to ETI and RADTV. (R. at 4.) Public argued that RADTV and ETI be
forced to affirmatively show that the remarks they made were true or reasonably investigated. (R.
at 4.) Public recognized that this standard is contrary to typical defamation suits, where the
plaintiff is ordinarily the party that bears the burden of proving the alleged defamatory
statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. (R.
at 4.) However, Public argued he was entitled to heightened protection from defamation under
the Radnor Constitution, which places an emphasis on privacy. (R. at 4.)
ETI and RADTV denied the request for declaratory judgment, and filed a counter request
for declaratory judgment. (R. at 4.) ETI and RADTV, in their request for declaratory judgment,
challenged the constitutionality of the section of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan that
eliminated civil jury trials. (R. at 4.) ETI and RADTV argued that Radnor cannot abridge their
right to trial by jury in civil cases under the Seventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, even by popular vote. (R. at 4.) ETI and
RADTV further argued that the burden-shifting scheme proposed by Public was contrary to
clearly established First Amendment precedent, and therefore unlawful. (R. at 4.)
2
After Public filed suit, Gossip Show aired an interview with a young woman who
claimed Public had sexual encounters with her while he was dating one of his Wild Flowers
costars. (R. at 5.) After Private heard the report, her then two-month pregnancy suddenly
terminated, causing her to be hospitalized. (R. at 5.) Public requested and was granted leave from
the court to file an Amended Complaint to include new causes of action relating to the second
broadcast. (R. at 5.) Public also filed a motion to dismiss ETI and RADTV's request for
declaratory judgment on their Seventh and Fourteenth Amendment claim. (R. at 5.) ETI and
RADTV answered Public's motion, arguing that the right to civil jury trials is both deeply rooted
in our nation's history and fundamental to the American scheme of ordered liberties. (R. at 5.)
The matter was submitted to the Radnor Circuit Court. (R. at 5.) The presiding judge,
without being moved by any party, ordered Public's Amended Complaint be stricken from the
record. (R. at 5.) The judge returned the Amended Complaint and ordered Public to re-file the
Amended Complaint without the declaratory judgment request to shift the burden of proof. (R. at
6.) The judge also affirmed the section of the Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan that abolished jury
trials in civil cases. (R. at 6.)
Public and Private filed for reconsideration of their claims, in which they argued that the
court's actions violated their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. (R. at 6.) ETI and RADTV also sought reconsideration, and argued that the Circuit
Court was bound by the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize their Seventh Amendment civil
jury trial right. (R. at 6.) The Circuit Court denied both requests for reconsideration without
opinion. (R. at 6.)
Both parties sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Radnor. (R. at 7.)
The Supreme Court of Radnor denied both requests for discretionary review and affirmed the
3
Circuit Court's decision. (R. at 6.) Both parties filed separate Certiorari petitions to this Court.
(R. at 6.) This Court consolidated and granted both petitions, but granted review of ETI and
RADTV's claims only under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments. (R. at 7.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The Constitution guarantees the right to a trial by jury in state civil cases. The right to a
civil trial by jury is preserved in the Seventh Amendment, and was incorporated against the
states with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State of Radnor has taken the
extraordinary step of removing this right by enacting The Radnor Fiscal Emergency Plan. This
enactment represents unconstitutional state action incompatible with the commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has never had the opportunity to review the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial under its modern incorporation analysis. When it does, it is clear
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the right to a civil jury
against the states. Alternatively, the civil jury right is incorporated against the states because it is
one of the Privileges or Immunities preserved by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although this
Court has not previously used the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorporate the first eight
amendments against the states, the text and history of the clause clearly support incorporation of
the right to a civil jury.
II.
A trial court's striking of a cause of action from a complaint does not violate the First
Amendment's Petition Clause where the party has the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
The Petition Clause has a limited application to court proceedings. The Clause only requires that
a court hear a grievance, but does not guarantee a specific form of relief. The trial court in this
case appropriately exercised its discretion to dismiss Public's cause of action, and therefore did
not violate the Petition Clause. Furthermore, any violation of the Petition Clause is remedied by
4
the fact that Public has an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Moreover, the substance of
Public's claim is baseless in law, and is therefore categorically unprotected by the First
Amendment. Specifically, the claim brought by Public asked the trial court to require RADTV
and ETI to bare the burden of proving that the remarks it made were true or were reasonably
investigated before broadcast. This Court has specifically found this type of burden-shifting
scheme in defamation cases unconstitutional, because of the chilling effect such a rule would
have a speech. For this reason, Public's claim was baseless in law and therefore forfeits any
protection otherwise afforded by the Petition Clause.
ARGUMENT
I. The Constitution Guarantees the Right to a Trial by Jury in State Civil Cases.
The American jury acts as a "guard against the exercise of arbitrary power." Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). For this reason, the right to a trial by jury in both civil and
criminal cases has been zealously protected since the nation's founding. See Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance
and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the
right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care."). The Seventh Amendment
guarantees that in all "[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . ." U.S. Const. amend. VII. Although the
Seventh Amendment originally applied only against the Federal Government, see Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833), the right was incorporated against the states through the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. More specifically, the right to a
civil jury trial was incorporated against the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and is also one of the Privileges or Immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
5
Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1. Radnor's denial of a civil jury trial therefore violates
ETI and RADTV's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Trial by Jury was Incorporated Against the States
With the Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
In determining whether one of the first eight amendments to the Constitution applies
against the states, the Court must determine whether the right at issue "is fundamental to our
scheme of ordered liberty." McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010); see
also id. (question is whether the right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition")
(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721(1997)). The right to a civil trial by jury is
unquestionably such a right, and is therefore applicable against the states under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.
1. This Court has Never had an Opportunity to Analyze the Seventh Amendment Right to
a Trial by Jury Under the Court's Current Incorporation Framework.
This Court has on only one other occasion considered whether the right to a civil trial by
jury extends to state suits. Over ninety years ago, in Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241
U.S. 211 (1916), the Court considered Minnesota's rule permitting a non-unanimous verdict in
civil jury trials. Id. at 216. The Court determined the Seventh Amendment was not applicable in
state proceedings, and therefore the non-unanimous nature of the verdict was not subject to
Constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 217.
The Court's holding in Bombolis should not control here. Bombolis predates this Court's
modern-day incorporation analysis. Indeed, in the entirety of the Bombolis opinion, the Court not
once mentions the term due process, nor the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Bombolis
Court analyzed the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to state proceedings under its pre-
6
incorporation framework, stating "the first ten Amendments, including, of course, the [seventh],
are not concerned with state action, and deal only with Federal action." Id. at 217.
The holding that the first ten amendments only apply to federal action is a view that has
long since been rejected by this Court. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036
(2010). Instead, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause incorporated nearly all of the
protections located in the first ten amendments against the states. Id. This view has led this Court
to overrule prior decisions that refused to incorporate one of the first ten amendments. See, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)
and finding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel is applicable against the states); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and
holding the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment applies in state proceedings). In
fact, this Court recognized that the Bombolis analysis is antiquated in its most recent
incorporation case concerning the Second Amendment, noting "[o]ur governing decision[]
regarding . . . the Seventh Amendment's civil jury requirement long predate[s] the era of
selective incorporation." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13.
The instant case provides the Court an opportunity to apply its current incorporation
framework to the Seventh Amendment. When it does, it is clear the right to a civil trial by jury
"is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty." McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. Therefore, the
right is incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. U.S.
Const. amend. XIV § 1.
2. The Right to a Civil Trial by Jury is Fundamental to Our Scheme of Ordered Liberty.
The civil jury was of critical importance to the Framers because of the protections it
offered against tyranny. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 616-17 (3d ed. 2000).
7
It was a right they specifically sought to import from English common law when drafting the
Constitution as a protection against arbitrary uses of power. Id.
The right to a civil trial by jury was a fundamental aspect of English common law, and
was specifically preserved in the Magna Carta. Magna Carta Jun. 15, 1215, cl. 39 ("No freemen
shall be taken or imprisoned or diseased [property seized] or exiled or in any way destroyed . . .
except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."). As William Blackstone
remarked the trial by jury is "the best criterion, for investigating the truth of facts, that was ever
established in any country." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *385. Indeed, this Court has
noted, "[t]hose who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great
privilege 'as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had
fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the approaches of arbitrary power.'"
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States § 1779) (overruled on other grounds by Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37 (1990)). Although the Court in Thompson was referring to the jury right in criminal
cases, it is clear that early Americans additionally imported the right to a civil trial by jury from
English common law.
As Justice Story remarked in his commentaries, the enumeration of the right to a trial by
jury in the Seventh Amendment, "places upon the high ground of constitutional right the
inestimable privilege of a trial by jury in civil cases, a privilege scarcely inferior to that in
criminal cases." Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1768, at
541 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873). This is further evidenced by the fact that one of the
chief objections to ratification of the original Constitution was its failure to include a right to a
civil jury trial. See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
8
("The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and
perhaps in several of the other States, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for
the trial by jury in civil cases."). For this reason, the right to a civil trial by jury has been a
consistent aspect of American law since the founding.
The civil trial by jury additionally protects access to other rights in our Constitutional
system. The jury ensures the preservation of the fundamental rights contained in the
Constitution by securing the opportunity for citizens to litigate their claims before their peers.
Again, for this reason, several objectors to the original Constitution refused to support it without
a specific enumeration of the right to a civil jury— because they recognized that only with the
right to a civil jury trial would they be able to secure the other rights preserved in the Bill of
Rights. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 616-17 (3d ed. 2000) (recognizing
the importance of the civil jury to the framers and noting that the right "played a central role
historically in the creation of the entire Bill of Rights."). As Thomas Jefferson stated, "trial by
jury as the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held to the
principles of its constitution." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 1789, in 7 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 408 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905).
Because of its importance to the administration of justice, nearly all state governments
have preserved the right to a civil trial by jury throughout the nation's history. Eleven of the first
fourteen states granted a right to civil jury trials. Suja A. Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of
Rights After Mcdonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 159, 192 (2012). In 1868—the year
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted—thirty-six out of thirty-seven states guaranteed the
right to a civil jury trial. Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply
9
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 7, 77 (2008). The only exception
was Louisiana, which maintained a civil law system that traditionally did not rely on juries. Id.
The State of Radnor likewise recognized the importance of a civil trial by jury during the
first decades of its statehood. (R. at 1.) Although the right was not named in the state's
constitution, the first state legislature established by statute the right to trial by jury in most civil
cases. (R. at 1.) It was only recently that the state took the extraordinary step of eliminating the
trial by jury for all civil cases. (R. at 1.) In doing so, the state eradicated an important right
"fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty." McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3036 (2010). Thus, the state has violated one of the guarantees afforded to all citizens by
the Due Process Clause.
B. The Right to a Trial by Jury was Incorporated Against the States With the Passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.
As noted above, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause provides sufficient
basis to incorporate the Seventh Amendment's right to a civil trial by jury against the states.
However, should this Court determine that the Due Process Clause did not incorporate the right
against the states, this Court should hold that the right to a civil trial by jury is one of the
Privileges or Immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend.
XIV § 1.
1. The Privileges or Immunities Clause Incorporated the First Eight Amendments to the
Constitution Against the States.
The incorporation analysis of the right to a civil jury is similar under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause when compared to the Due Process Clause analysis described above. Like
incorporation under the Due Process Clause, incorporation under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning and purpose.
10
The Congress that adopted the Fourteenth Amendment clearly understood the Privileges
or Immunities Clause to apply the first eight amendments of the Constitution against the states.
Senator Howard, who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate, stated explicitly,
"[t]o these privileges and immunities . . . should be added the personal rights guarantied [sic] and
secured by the first eight amendments of the Constitution." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765 (1866). Indeed, the entire purpose of the clause was to restrict states from denying citizens
fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution. As Senator Howard further stated, "[t]he
great object of the first section of this amendment is . . . to restrain the power of the States and
compel them at all times to respect these great fundamental guarantees." Id. at 2765-66.
Similarly, Representative Thaddeus Stevens who introduced the Fourteenth Amendment in the
House, made clear the amendment was intended to apply the strictures of the Constitution
against the states, remarking "the Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a
limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect …" Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2459 (1866); see also id. at 586 (statement of Congressman Donnelly) (remarking that "all
the guarantees of the Constitution" should be enforced against the states because a contrary rule
would permit "the old reign of terror revive in the South").
Opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment also understood the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to have a broad effect against the states. Representative Rogers, an opponent of the
Amendment, stated in the House, "all the rights we have under the laws of the country are
embraced under the definition of privileges and immunities." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2538 (1866). He went on to conclude, "I hold if that ever becomes a part of the fundamental law
of the land it will prevent any State from refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced under
this term of privileges and immunities." Id.
11
This history leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protects those rights enumerated in the first eight amendments, and applies those rights to state
level action. Therefore, it is clear that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil trial by jury was
incorporated against the states with the passage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and may
not be denied by the State of Radnor.
2. The Court's Decision in the Slaughter-House Cases Must be Overruled.
Four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court was first asked to
interpret the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1872). The Court took a narrow view of the clause, finding that it protected only those
rights "which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws" and not those rights "the State governments were created to establish
and secure." Id. at 76-79. This interpretation gave little meaning to the clause, and foreclosed the
view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporated the first eight amendments against
the states.
As the history of the Fourteenth Amendment recounted above makes clear, this narrow
view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was not the original understanding or intent of the
clause. For this reason, the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases has been repeatedly criticized
both by members of this Court as well as constitutional scholars. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3086 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (specifically rejecting the
holding in the Slaughter-House Cases); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has contributed in no
small part to the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence"); Akhil Reed
Amar, Substance and Method in the Year 2000, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 601, 632 n.178 (2001)
12
("Virtually no serious modern scholar-left, right, and center-thinks that [the Slaughter-House
Cases represent] a plausible reading of the Amendment.").
This Court should not continue to accept the narrow view of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as outlined in the Slaughter-House Cases. Rather, the Court should find that the original
understanding of the clause clearly incorporates the first eight amendments to the Constitution
against the states. Such a holding would incorporate the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury,
and necessarily require the Court to find Radnor's actions in this case unconstitutional.
II. A Trial Court's Striking of a Cause of Action From a Complaint Does Not Violate the
First Amendment's Petition Clause Where a Litigant has the Opportunity to File an
Amended Complaint.
Public erroneously argues that the trial court's striking of their request for declaratory
judgment violated the First Amendment's Petition Clause, and incorrectly claims that the trial
court was required to respond to their lawsuit in a particular manner. The trial court's dismissal
of Public's request for declaratory judgment was a response to Public's petition to the court. That
is all the First Amendment requires. Public is attempting to rely on the Petition Clause to get the
specific legal relief they seek. However, the Petition Clause places no requirement on the quality
of a court's response once a petition has been received. Public's version of the Clause would
greatly expand its reach, and require a particular level of response from any court seeking to
dismiss a claim. Such a view of the Petition Clause has never been accepted by this Court, and
should not be accepted now.
A. The Trial Court Appropriately Exercised Its Discretion to Dismiss Public's Cause of
Action, and Therefore Did Not Violate The First Amendment's Petition Clause.
The First Amendment's Petition Clause protects the people's right "to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. Amend. I. Among the forms of petition the
Clause protects is "the right of individuals to appeal to courts and other forums established by the
13
government for resolution of legal disputes." Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct.
2488, 2494 (2011). The Petition Clause makes no mention of a court's response once a petition
has been received. Instead, the Clause simply guarantees the right of the people to petition the
government. U.S. Const. Amend. I.
1. The Petition Clause Only Requires a Court to Hear a Grievance, and Does Not Demand
a Specific Form of Relief.
The historical background and original public understanding of the First Amendment
both indicate that the Petition Clause only protects an individual's right to petition the
government, and does not grant a right to a particular form of relief. See Minnesota State Bd. for
Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) ("Nothing in the First Amendment or in this
Court's case law interpreting it suggests that the right[] to . . . petition require[s] government
policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues."). As James
Madison, the principle author of the Petition Clause, stated, "the people may therefore publicly
address their representatives, may privately advise them, or declare their sentiment by petition to
the whole body; in all these ways they may communicate their will." House of Representatives
Journal (Aug. 1789) reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History
1096 (1971). Noticeably absent from Madison's statement is any indication of the amount of
government response required to answer a citizen's grievance, or any suggestion that the
government is obligated to provide a response in the form requested by the citizen. Such was
never the intention or understanding of the Petition Clause. Instead, the Clause is properly
understood to provide protection against reprisal for citizens who make requests to the
government, and not an affirmative obligation on the government to grant the requests of its
citizens.
The proper meaning of the Petition Clause is informed by its English predecessor, the
14
English Declaration of Rights. Cf. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 593 (2008)
(looking to the English Declaration of Rights to determine meaning of the Second Amendment);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) (reviewing language in the English Declaration of
Rights to interpret the Eighth Amendment). The Declaration of Rights provided "that it is the
right of the subjects to petition the king, and all commitments and prosecutions for such
petitioning is illegal." Sources of English Constitutional History 601 (C. Stephenson & F.G.
Markham eds. 1937). The clear intent of the Declaration of Rights was to prevent the King from
punishing individuals who did nothing more than make requests to the government. See Norman
B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute,
Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153, 1162 (1986) (recounting events leading to the
adopting of the English Declaration of Rights). In particular, the convention that adopted the
Declaration of Rights did so in response to the infamous Case of the Seven Bishops—wherein
members of the clergy were punished for petitioning the king. Case of the Seven Bishops, 12
How. St. Tr. 183 (K.B.) (1688). The Declaration of Rights was specifically intended to reverse
the holding in the Case of the Seven Bishops, and ensure English subjects did not fear reprisal
when petitioning the king. Steve Bachmann, Starting Again with the Mayflower . . . England's
Civil War and America's Bill of Rights, 20 QLR 193, 226 (2000).
The Framers of the Constitution were acutely aware of the English Declaration of Rights
and its history, including its adoption as a response to the holding in the Case of the Seven
Bishops. Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law Abridging...": An Analysis of the Neglected, but
Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1153, 1181-83 (1986). They sought to give
American citizens substantially the same right to petition, and freedom from reprisal for
exercising the right. Id. However, no evidence suggests that the Framers purpose in enacting the
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Petition Clause was to create a new right to petition the government, or a right to receive a
particular form of relief in response to a petition. Public's claim that the Petition Clause contains
such a right would expand the Clause beyond its original meaning, and make it unrecognizable to
the drafters of the First Amendment.
2. This Court's Petition Clause Precedent Does Not Require More Than Mere Access to the
Courts Under the Clause.
Public's interpretation of the Petition Clause additionally falls outside this Court's
precedent. This Court has never found a court's refusal to consider a cause of action to be a
violation of the Petition Clause. Instead, the Court has only found violations of the Clause where
a particular government action has had the effect of inhibiting a litigant from filing a lawsuit.
For example, in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filed an unfair labor practice charge against an
employer in response to the employer's filing a lawsuit against his employees. Id. at 735-36. This
Court reversed the unfair labor practice charge, determining that the employer could not be
retaliated against by a government agency for filing the suit. Id. at 743. Such a holding falls
squarely in line with the original understanding of the Petition Clause. The Clause was plainly
intended to prevent government reprisal against individuals who did nothing more than speak to
their government.
Similarly, in Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964),
the Court confronted Virginia's attempt to enjoin a union from assisting workers in filing legal
claims. Id. at 1. The Court properly found that the injunction violated the First Amendment,
because it directly prevented individuals from obtaining legal assistance and filing legal claims.
Id. at 8; see also California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11
(1972) (concluding "it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
16
groups . . . may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state
and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view . . ."). Again, this
holding is consistent with the historic understanding of the Petition Clause. A state may not take
measures to prevent an individual from filing a legal claim through retaliation. See E. R. R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961) (recognizing the
Sherman Act should not be read to forbid petitions "for the purpose of influencing the passage or
enforcement of laws"). However, none of this stands for the proposition that Public seeks to
advance in this case—that the Petition Clause not only acts as a shield from government reprisal,
but that it also places an affirmative obligation on the government to answer a complaint in a
particular manner. This view is inconsistent with both the historic understanding of the Petition
Clause and this Court's precedent.
In Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) the
Court explicitly rejected the argument that the First Amendment requires a specific response
from a government body. There a union and individual employees brought an action against the
Arkansas State Highway Commission challenging the Commission's refusal to allow the union to
file or initiate grievances on behalf of its members. Id. at 463-64. The employees argued that
their right to petition was violated by the rule prohibiting their union from filing a grievance on
their behalf. Id. The Court held that dismissing union's claim without redress did not violate the
Petition Clause, because the employee could still "associate and speak freely and petition
openly" and further held that the First Amendment "does not impose any affirmative obligation
on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the [union] and bargain
with it." Id. at 465; See also Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285
(1984) (interpreting Smith as rejecting the contention that the Petition Clause demands that
17
government officials listen to or respond to individuals' requests).
Smith defines the minimal response required from a court when petitioned. The Petition
Clause preserves the right of the people to be heard, but does not necessarily prompt action from
the government in response to this right. In this case, Public had the opportunity to petition the
government when filing their original complaint. There has been no allegation that the
government retaliated against Public for this filing, or that the government refused to hear their
request. Rather, the only claim made by Public is that they disagree with the trial court's
response. Nothing in the First Amendment or the holdings of this Court suggests that the trial
court's actions fail to conform with the Constitution.
3. Denial of a Cause of Action Does Not Violate the First Amendment Simply Because the
Denial Fails to Conform With State Procedural Laws.
Public further contends that the trial court violated the Radnor Rules of Civil Procedure
and, based on this violation, seeks redress under the First Amendment's Petition Clause. (R. at 6.)
Specifically, Public asserts that the Radnor Rules of Civil Procedure only permitted the trial
court two actions in response to a request for declaratory relief—either grant or deny the request.
(R. at 6.) Admittedly, Public may be correct as a matter of state law. However, violations of state
procedural law do not per se violate federal law. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984) ([I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state
sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to
state law."); see also United States ex rel. Williams v. McVicar, 918 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (N.D.
Ill. 1996) ("A state violating its own laws does not elevate state law into constitutional law."). If
Public wishes to seek redress for state procedural violations the proper venue is state court, not
this Court.
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4. Public Still May Seek Relief From the Court by Filing an Amended Complaint.
The Amended Complaint filed by Public was returned with an order to re-file a second
amended complaint without the request for the burden-shifting scheme. (R. at 6.) Public has not
been injured by the striking of the first Amended Complaint. On the contrary, the trial court can
be said to have aided Public by specifically instructing them on how to re-file their cause of
actions, and indicating a wiliness to hear the claims if the Complaint were filed without the
burden-shifting scheme. (R. at 6.)
As noted above, the Petition Clause provides the right to petition courts for redress. In
filing the original complaint with the court, Public was unquestionably protected by the Clause.
But when the court struck the Complaint, the right to petition the court came full circle. In no
way was Public deprived of their right to petition the court. In fact, the record suggests that
Public has been awarded more than required by the Petition Clause. In ordering Public to re-file
the Amended Complaint without the declaratory judgment request for the shifting of the burden
of proof, the court provided Public with all the tools necessary to ensure the court will adjudicate
their cause of action.
Moreover, even if there was a violation of the Petition Clause in this case, the order to
file an amended complaint would assuredly remedy that violation. In effect, the court is seeking
more petitioning from Public by encouraging them to file a second amended complaint. This
readiness by the trial court to hear further grievances from Public cannot be said to violate
Public's right to petition the government.
5. Public's Proposed View of the Petition Clause Would Call Into Question Nearly All Trial
Court Decisions Aimed at Regulating the Court's Docket.
Trial courts enjoy broad discretion in managing their dockets. This includes decisions on
whether or not to permit a cause of actions to proceed to trial. Trial courts throughout the country
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routinely dismiss claims, without being moved by either party, in order to adequately manage
their docket. See, e.g., Huggins v. Safeway, Inc., 210 F. App'x 819, 820 (10th Cir. 2007)
(affirming trial court's sua sponte dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim);
Shurick v. Boeing Co., 623 F.3d 1114, 1116 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding trial courts may sua
sponte dismiss causes of action on res judicata grounds); Okonkwo v. Murguia, 2010 WL 276754
(D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2010) (District Court sua sponte dismissed claims because the court had "an
obligation to manage the cases on its docket [and] to dispose of clearly frivolous claims at the
earliest stage of the litigation when such is feasible"). Indeed, this Court has approved the
practice of trial court's acting on their own to dismiss complaints in the context of federal habeas
proceedings. Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (holding that a court may, on its own
initiative, dismiss a habeas petition as untimely).
This Court has additionally rejected claims that trial court determinations regulating their
own docket violate the First Amendment. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984),
the Court rejected the argument that a trial court's order prohibiting a litigant from disseminating
information obtained through discovery violated the First Amendment's Speech Clause. Id. at 29.
As the Court stated, a holding to the contrary "would impose an unwarranted restriction on the
duty and discretion of a trial court" and was not required by the First Amendment. Id.
Public's view of the Petition Clause is not only contrary to the Clause itself, but would
call into question nearly all trial court decisions aimed at regulating a court's docket. If the
Petition Clause, as Public argues, requires courts to redress the grievances of each and every
single claim brought, nearly all actions dismissing claims as invalid or non-compliant with court
rules would be unconstitutional. The effect of such a holding would severely undermine the
efficient judicial administration of courts.
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Moreover, Public's view of the Petition Clause would raise questions about a number of
civil procedure practices and rules. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)(1)
permits a court—"on its own"—to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(f)(1). Under Public's view of the Petition Clause, this rule would almost assuredly be
unconstitutional—since it permits a court to deny a defense without explanation. Id. Similarly,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(1) places restrictions on the filing of lawsuits. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b)(1). Specifically, the rule requires attorneys to certify that a filing with a court "is not
being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation." Id. If Public's view of the Petition Clause is accepted
by this Court, it would create an unfettered right to petition courts and an unconditional duty for
courts to respond. Such a view would necessarily call into question Rule 11(b)(1), and others like
it, since the rule clearly limits the ability of a litigant to file any claim they wish. The Petition
Clause was never meant to challenge these types of neutral court rules aimed at regulating the
conduct of litigation.
B. Public's Claim for Declaratory Judgment was Baseless in Law.
As noted above, this Court need not review the merits of Public's declaratory judgment
claim because the trial court's order striking the claim from the record does not implicate the
Petition Clause. However, should the Court find that the Petition Clause does regulate the
manner in which a court strikes a cause of action, Public's claim is still meritless because
baseless claims are per se unprotected by the Petition Clause.
1. Baseless Claims Are Categorically Not Protected by the First Amendment's Petition
Clause.
As this Court has repeatedly held, "baseless litigation is not immunized by the First
Amendment right to petition." Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743
21
(1983); see also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 51 (1993) (cause of action is not protect if it is "objectively baseless"). For this
reason, a litigant may not avail themselves of First Amendment protections when they file a
claim that lacks a reasonable basis in law. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, 461 U.S. at 743. Public's
claim in the instant case was baseless because it proposed a burden-shifting scheme contrary to
the requirements of the First Amendment. Therefore, because Public had no hope of succeeding
on the merits of their claim below, the Petition Clause affords them no protection in this Court.
2. Public's Burden Shifting Scheme Would Violate the Constitution, and Therefore is
Baseless in Law.
Public argued below that its defamation claim should be subject to a burden-shifting
scheme, wherein RADTV and ETI would have the burden of proving that the remarks made on
their broadcast were true or were reasonably investigated before broadcast. (R. at 4.) However,
this standard is completely contrary to this Court's precedent in defamation cases, and would
violate the commands of the First Amendment.
This Court has clearly stated "a private-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing
that the speech at issue is false before recovering damages for defamation from a media
defendant." Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). A contradictory
rule would produce "a 'chilling' effect [and] would be antithetical to the First Amendment's
protection of true speech on matters of public concern." Id. Furthermore this Court has held, "a
rule of strict liability that compels a publisher or broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy of his
factual assertions may lead to intolerable self-censorship" and would "[a]llow[] the media to
avoid liability only by proving the truth of all injurious statements" which "does not accord
adequate protection to First Amendment liberties." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
340 (1974). This precedent clearly establishes that a plaintiff seeking to pursue a cause of action
22
for defamation bares the burden of proving that the statement was false or made with reckless
disregard for the truth, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964), and that this
burden may not be constitutionally shifted to the defendant. Philadelphia Newspapers 475 U.S.
at 777.
Public's request to have the burden shifted to RADTV and ETI in this case clearly runs
contrary to the well-settled precedent from this Court in defamation cases. Public was aware of
their burden when drafting their complaint, but instead filed their complaint requesting a burdenshifting scheme contrary to law. Therefore, the claim for declaratory judgment by Public is
baseless, and is not protected by the Petition Clause.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Respondents respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Radnor and hold that Respondents have a Constitutionally
protected right to a civil trial by jury. Furthermore, Respondents request the Court to affirm the
Supreme Court of Radnor's decision to dismiss Petitioners' request for declaratory judgment.
Respectfully Submitted,
_____/s/______________
TEAM NO. 4
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
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