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ECPR General Conference
Université de Montréal 26 - 29 August 2015.
Montesquieu on Totalitarianism: Hannah Arendt's Ideology and
Terror
Luka Ribarević1
Abstract
In order to conceptualize totalitarianism, in the final chapter of The Origins of
Totalitarianism Arendt applies Montesquieu's categories of political analysis to
Nazism and Stalinism. Arendt argues that totalitarianism cannot be identified with
any of Montesquieu's types of government. Montesquieu encountered an analogous
problem while discussing the English constitution whose nature and guiding principle
were unprecedented. However, unlike Montesquieu’s England that represents state as
a modern form of political order, totalitarianism accomplished a complete break with
the tradition. Totalitarianism makes Montesquieu's categories altogether useless –
both the nature of government and its principle are of no avail when trying to get to
terms with it. Therefore, instead of defining totalitarianism simply as a new form of
government, one should conclude that it is not a government at all. Rather, it is a
negative mirror image of English constitution, an unheard-of structureless movement
aimed at utter destruction of human freedom through terror.
Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Montesquieu, totalitarianism, state
Hannah Arendt's concept of totalitarianism is based on a fundamental
conviction that what we have before us is an unheard of form of government. This
becomes clear as we move towards the end of the third tome of her Origins of
Totalitarianism, and is explicitly stated in the final chapter of the book, Ideology and
Terror. In this chapter, which replaced earlier Concluding Remarks, Arendt abandons
the methodological approach that structured the rest of her book. She is no longer
deploying complex historical, political and sociological analysis of the totalitarian
1
Luka Ribarević, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political and Social Theory, Faculty of
Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia, [email protected].
1
phenomenon and its origins.2 Her aim is to provide a positive definition of totalitarian
government. This definition should, on a higher level of theoretical abstraction, prove
what previous analysis already indicated: that the essence of totalitarian government
is completely novel.
At the outset of Origins Arendt defined her work on totalitarianism as “an
attempt at understanding what at first and even second glance appeared simply
outrageous” (Arendt, 2004: 7). The closure of the book still bears the sign of complete
astonishment produced by the totalitarian abyss. Her research has led her to believe
that totalitarianism operates “according to a system of values so radically different
from all others that none of our traditional legal, moral, or common sense utilitarian
categories could any longer help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict their
course of action” (ibid: 593).
The question that still lingers unanswered relates to our traditional political
categories – of what help, if any, can they be in facing the totalitarian Behemoth?
In this short paper I would like to answer that question by following Hannah
Arendt's argument in the final chapter of Origins of Totalitarianism. In order to define
totalitarian government, Arendt turns to Montesquieu. It is by using his categories of
political analysis that she hopes to isolate the defining characteristics of every
totalitarian rule, irrespective of “the specifically national tradition or the particular
spiritual source of its ideology” (ibid: 593). That is why her argument loses
transparency and its ultimate implications remain hidden without taking into
consideration Montesquieu's categorical apparatus.
If so, it is necessary to start with a brief overview of Montesquieu's famous
typology of governments as it is expounded in L'Esprit des Lois. In the next step I will
try to show that Arendt closely follows Montesquieu's analysis in order to determine
what kind of government totalitarianism is. Finally, I will indicate the consequences
of this theoretical procedure for Arendt's understanding of totalitarianism.
I.
2
Her preceding analysis of totalitarianism has convincingly shown that “totalitarianism differs
essentially from other forms of political oppression” known from history, such as one-party
dictatorship, authoritarian rule, tyranny or despotism (Arendt, 2004: 593).
2
Before turning to Montesquieu's analysis of various forms of government, one
preliminary question needs to be addressed. Why did Arendt choose Montesquieu for
her privileged interlocutor? Alongside Machiavelli and Tocqueville, Montesquieu is
one of Arendt's heroes of Western political thought, representing the best of its
tradition (cf. Canovan, 1992: 206). According to Arendt, that tradition, having its
roots in Plato's political philosophy, was rather hostile to the genuine political
experience of acting in concert. However, on rare occasions it allowed theorising the
idea of public spirit. For Arendt, the main subject of Montesquieu's masterpiece is
nothing less than the constitution of political freedom (Arendt, 1963: 150). “The
enormous influence of Montesquieu on the course of American revolution” (ibid:
301), which, unlike its French counterpart, succeeded in establishing a lasting
republic, can be traced to his “passionate concern for public freedom” (ibid: 118).
Montesquieu's conviction that “power and freedom belonged together” (ibid: 150)
made him Arendt's ally in her endeavour to reclaim the dignity of political action.3
There is, however, one further reason why Arendt chose Montesquieu for this
task. It was his sense of the decay that was “slowly eating away the foundations on
which political structures rested in the West” (ibid: 116). Montesquieu clearly
predicted “the incredible ease with which governments would be overthrown” (ibid:
117) once the people “no longer felt at home politically, no longer trusted the laws
under which they lived, and no longer believed in the authority of those who ruled
them” and were left with nothing more than customs to guide their actions (ibid: 116;
cf. Arendt, 1994: 314-15, 408; 2005: 40-41). Therefore, Montesquieu represents for
Arendt someone who, although standing within the tradition, already feels its
inevitable end that will be irrevocably confirmed by the rise of totalitarianism. Arendt
saw Montesquieu as an innovative thinker who belonged to a long tradition of
political thought which he set to revise (Arendt, 2005: 63-69) and whose theoretical
sensitivity was somewhat close to her republican outlook. That is why he was chosen
to act as a spokesman for that tradition regarding its capabilities to comprehend the
totalitarian phenomenon.
3
Montesquieu differs in yet another sense from the tradition to which he uneasily belongs. His
understanding of the law as a rapport de convenance is heterodox from the traditional standpoint which
defined laws as standards and commands imposing boundaries and limitations. In Montesquieu's
understanding of law as a relation between men Arendt finds a possible foundation for her own concept
of power as a potential that materialises between men whenever they act together and disappears as
soon as their relationship becomes one of obedience and command (Arendt, 1958: 191; 1963: 302).
3
If Arendt intended Ideology and Terror to be read as an additional book of
L'Esprit des Lois, it is necessary to briefly outline the main traits of Montesquieu's
analysis of forms of government in order to fully comprehend her argument.
In L'Esprit des Lois Montesquieu proposed a new typology of all historical
and contemporary governments. Although Montesquieu's typology is innovative, at
the same time it is heavily indebted to tradition. 4 There are three forms of
government: republican, monarchical and despotic (EDL, 2.1). This distinction is
based on two fundamental criteria. The first is the nature of government, “that by
which it is constituted”, and the second is the principle of government, “human
passions which set it in motion” (EDL, 3.1). The nature of government, bearing upon
its “particular structure”, describes government as a static entity (EDL, 3.1). In that
respect, the form of government is defined by the number of people wielding
sovereign power as well as by the manner in which that power is wielded. Sovereign
power is either submitted to law, as in moderate governments, or it reigns free from
any legal impediments. In a republic, power is exercised in accordance with laws
either by the whole of the people, and then it is democratic, or by one part of it, and
then it is aristocratic. In monarchy, one rules respecting the laws. And in despotism,
one rules submitting to one's passions only.
In Montesquieu's opinion, each of these forms of government is inseparably
linked to a certain principle. It is a passion that is responsible for the dynamic aspect
of government, inspiring actions of rulers and ruled alike. In democracy it is virtue, in
aristocracy moderation, in monarchy honour, and in despotism fear. We get the
complete idea of each form of government only when its nature is supplemented with
its appropriate principle. In Althusser's words, there is an “absolute interdependence
of nature and principle in the moving but vivid totality of the state” (Althusser, 1959:
53). Moreover, Montesquieu lays emphasis on the dynamic rather than the static
aspect of government, making the principle the predominant criterion in his analysis.
This can be clearly inferred from the fact that the change of government begins by
corruption of its principle. In other words, there cannot be democracy without virtue,
aristocracy without moderation, monarchy without honour, or despotism without fear
(EL, 8.1-2, 11.3; cf. Althusser, 1959: 54-55).
4
See Goyard-Fabre, 1979: 127-189; Althusser, 1959: 65-97.
4
II.
In Ideology and Terror Arendt, as it were, makes Montesquieu discuss
totalitarianism by putting his analytical categories to work. When it comes to the
nature of totalitarianism, there is no doubt about the answer to the question regarding
the wielder of power. Totalitarian government is ruled by one. However, turning to
the question of legality, the second defining element of the nature of government,
Arendt faces a complication. The question that needs to be addressed is whether
totalitarianism is a monarchical kind of moderate, lawful government or a despotic
rule of one, unfettered by the chains of law. On the one hand, it is perfectly clear that
totalitarianism despises positive law, and frees political power from any kind of legal
restraint. On the other, it declares as its goal the direct application of those higher
laws that have always been the source of every positive law (Arendt, 2004: 595). A
totalitarian ruler does not pretend to do anything but interpret the immutable laws of
historical development and help them run freely through mankind. Totalitarianism is
therefore a completely arbitrary government which is, at least in self-understanding,
paradoxically considered to be an instrument of the direct rule of justice on Earth.
That is why totalitarian government eludes Montesquieu's differentiation between
moderate and despotic governments, making it wholly inoperable (ibid: 594).5
Therefore it can be concluded that Montesquieu's categorical apparatus does
not allow a meaningful answer to the question of the nature of totalitarian
government. As we have seen, Montesquieu defines the nature of government as its
structural determination. What kind of structure can there be in a government which
is, strictly speaking, a shapeless disorder whose incessant motion knows only the
direction in which it “is being propelled with increasing speed” (ibid: 517)?
Arendt, therefore, departs from Montesquieu's categories and speaks not about
the nature of totalitarian government, but about its essence. What sets totalitarianism
apart from all other forms of government is motion (ibid: 601). More precisely,
instead of lawfulness and arbitrariness, distinctive characteristics of moderate and
5
According to Arendt, this is the result of the specific totalitarian understanding of law. In totalitarian
acception, law is not an instrument that stabilizes human action. Rather it is movement itself. The laws
enforced by totalitarian government are the laws of historical change. Totalitarianism strives to
transform every man into “a walking embodiment of the law”. Since everyone is equally and
relentlessly submitted to such a law, totalitarianism erases the space between men and in place of their
plurality erects a perfectly united mankind whose behaviour is entirely conditioned by that law (ibid:
596).
5
despotic governments, Arendt introduces terror as the instrument which enables
totalitarian government to accelerate the historical process to an unprecedented scale.
In order to submit everyone's fate to the reign of historical or natural laws, it is
necessary to eradicate freedom as spontaneity, human ability to start something new.
“Terror is the realization of the law of movement: its chief aim is to make it possible
for the force of nature or history to race freely through mankind, unhindered by any
spontaneous human action” (ibid: 599). What takes place in concentration camps is
only that which would eventually and inevitably come to pass anyway. Nature and
history have already pronounced death sentences to those unfit for life, and terror
simply provides for their faster execution. The essence of totalitarian government is
total terror (ibid: 600).
When we turn to the second, dynamic criterion of Montesquieu's typology, the
principle of government, we face further problems. Total domination upon everyone
is conceivable exclusively under conditions of absolute rule of total terror in a global
concentration camp in which “no principle of action separate from its essence would
be needed”. However, in its unfinished form totalitarianism still needs something
which seemingly resembles a principle of action. That is, totalitarianism needs some
kind of internal coercion that will guide human behaviour, thus supplementing the
still incomplete external rule of terror (ibid: 602).
Because totalitarianism requires internal terror which eliminates freedom of
thought (ibid: 610) just as external terror destroys freedom of action, Arendt is once
again forced to leave behind Montesquieu's categories. If the principle of government
is a passion that inspires actions of those living under its rule, what kind of principle
can there be in a government which tries to suppress the ability to act because it
proves that humans are capable of freedom? Even fear must be discarded as a
principle of totalitarian government. Unlike in despotism, action driven by fear under
totalitarian rule cannot save its victims since they are chosen in a perfectly objective
manner, regardless of their subjective actions (ibid.: 602). Totalitarianism does not
need a principle inspiring free action, but only its substitute which will force every
man to play the part assigned to him by the historical or natural process. That
substitute is the ideology or, more precisely, “the logicality of ideological thinking”
(ibid.: 610).
6
Arendt understands ideology as an application of logical deduction to the
historical process. Ideological thought is based on a deterministic vision of history.
From the ideological perspective, the historical process is identical with the
development of an idea which serves as axiomatic premise to a chain of logical
deductions (ibid.: 605). If history is a consistent process developing according to the
laws open to human cognition, then it is possible for ideology to account for every
historical occurrence and predict the future. The knowledge of these laws brought by
ideology prepares man to submit to that which is in any case inevitable. Ideology robs
him of capacities for thought and experience by forcing him into “the strait jacket of
logic” (ibid.: 605).
III.
What are the conclusions that can be drawn from Arendt's application of
Montesquieu's categories of political analysis to totalitarianism? First of all, by
showing that neither the nature nor the principle of government can be used to
describe totalitarianism, Arendt has proven that we are dealing with a completely
novel form of government. The uselessness of Montesquieu's categories clearly
indicates that with totalitarianism we have left the era during which traditional
political thought was relevant.
In that respect, totalitarianism resembles one particular case which
Montesquieu himself dealt with. In the famous English chapter of L'Esprit des Lois
(EL, 11.6) Montesquieu analyses the constitution of government which eludes his
categories previously forged through examination of all historical and contemporary
governments. The English government represents a peculiar aberration in terms of
both its nature and principle. The nature of the English government is defined by
separation of powers and political representation, and its principle is nothing less than
political freedom itself. That is why Montesquieu's description of the English
government can be read as an analysis of a distinct, fourth type of government.
Moreover, it has been pointed out that England represents nothing less than the state
as a completely new, modern form of political order (Lalović, 2008: 36-43, 45-46; see
also Lalović, 2006: 56-83).
If so, one could say that The Origins prove that there is another specifically
modern form of government: totalitarianism. Yet it is perfectly clear that
7
totalitarianism epitomizes a complete opposition to the state; it is a direct attack on
the idea of the state. Against the nature of the English government founded on
dispersion of political power representing plurality of sources of social power,
totalitarianism seeks to establish total domination enslaving each and every one of its
subjects. Against political freedom as the principle of the English government,
totalitarianism strives to eliminate every form of human freedom through ideology
and terror.
Furthermore, the state and totalitarianism are not equidistant from the classical
forms of government. Although the state is a new form of political order, it is still
possible to analyse it using the same categories which allowed differentiation between
republic, monarchy and despotism. Strictly speaking, totalitarianism is not a
government at all. It lacks structure which could be described as its particular nature.
Equally, there is no passion inspiring actions of its subjects which could be
characterized as its particular principle.
To conclude, in opposition to the state which develops the framework of
Western tradition of political thought and action in order to further expand the scope
of human freedom, totalitarianism represents a radical break with that tradition. If the
political is inseparable from human freedom, and the state is an institution which at
the same time is a result of political action and an instrument that maintains the
political sphere in which political action can take place, then totalitarianism is the
definitive negation of both the state and the political (cf. Lefort, 1986: 69; Abensour,
1999: 24-25). It is a kind of destructive disorder moving towards the annihilation of
human action founded on the fundamental capability of every man to create
something new (cf. Canovan, 2000: 26).
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