Issues & Studie s© 45, no. 4 (December 2009): 71-106.
Democracy with Chinese
Characteristics? A Critical Review
from a Developmental State
Perspective
YOUNG NAM CHO
This article examines both the arguments for a Chinese-style democracy and the past three decades of political reform in China from the perspective of the East Asian developmental state, in order to evaluate China's
political reforms and the prospects for political development. It will begin
by examining theories of political development and how they relate to the
East Asian developmental states. Then, the paper will analyze the main
features of the political systems of developmental states. Third, this article
will look at the debates on Chinese-style democracy and China's political
development, as well as the past three decades of political reform. From
this, it will be argued that China has followed a path of political development similar to that of the East Asian developmental states (i.e., institutionalization ahead of democratization).
K EYWORDS: Chinese politics; political reforms; Chinese-style democracy;
political development; East Asian developmental state.
YOUNG NAM CHO received his doctorate from Seoul Nationa l University in 1999 and is currently an associate professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul Nationa l
University. He is the author of Loc al People's Congresses in China: Deve lopment and
Transition (Cambridge Unive rsity Pre ss, 2009). Dr. Cho c an be reac hed at <ync ho@snu
.ac.kr>.
© Institute
of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).
December 2009
71
ISSUES & STUDIES
* * *
Some scholars argue that China's political system has shifted from
totalitarianism under Mao Zedong (毛澤東) to authoritarianism in
the reform era.1 If this is the case, in which direction is China's
authoritarian system now evolving? We can envisage three possibilities.
First, China may become a liberal democracy, following in the footsteps of
Taiwan and South Korea. Second, China may maintain its authoritarian
system even after a long period of successful economic growth, like Singapore and Malaysia. Third, China could establish a "Chinese-style democracy" (Zhongguoshi minzhu, 中國式民主 ) or "democracy with Chinese
characteristics" (Zhongguo tese minzhu, 中國特色民主), which are different from both Western democracy and Third World authoritarianism.
Of these three possibilities, foreign scholars tend to support the first.
For instance, George J. Gilboy and Benjamin L. Read predict that China
will become a democracy, given that Chinese society and the party-state
have already changed so dramatically in the reform era. 2 Meanwhile,
Bruce Gilley contends that China is likely to implement democratic reforms under the leadership of a reformist faction of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP). 3 Likewise, Henry S. Rowen asserts that China will become a
democracy after undergoing rapid economic growth, as in the case of South
Korea and Taiwan.4 In sharp contrast, Minxin Pei raises the possibility of
論
1Tang
Tsou, The Cultural Re volution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historic al Perspective
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), xv-xlv, 144-90; Robert A. Scalapino, "Current Trends and Future Prospects," J ournal of De mocracy 9, no. 1 (January 1998): 35-40;
Harry Harding, "The Halting Advance of Pluralism," ibid., 11-17; Andrew J. Nathan, "Authoritaria n Resilie nce," ibid. 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6-17; Andrew J. Nathan, "China's
Political Trajectory: What Are the Chinese Saying?" in China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, ed. Cheng Li (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2008), 25-43; and Minxin Pei, "China's Evolution toward Soft Authoritarianism," in
What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace, ed. Edward Friedman
and Barrett McCormick (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 74-98.
2George J. Gilboy and Benjamin L. Read, "Political and Social Reform in China: Alive and
Walking," The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 143-64.
3Bruce Gilley, China's Democratic Future: How It Will Happe n and Where It Will Lead (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
4Henry S. Rowen, "When Will the Chinese People Be Free? " Journal of De mocracy 18,
no. 3 (July 2007): 38-52.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
China collapsing like the former Soviet Union, chiefly due to its "governance deficit" and its regression from a "developmental" to a "predatory"
state.5
On the other hand, increasing numbers of Chinese scholars in recent
years have argued for democracy with Chinese characteristics. For example, in a special edition of People's Forum (Renmin luntan, 人民論壇)
on the "Chinese democratic model" (Zhongguode minzhu moshi, 中國的民
主模式), published in 2007, a number of distinguished Chinese scholars
contended that a Chinese democratic model already exists or is at least in
the process of evolving. 6 Other well-regarded Chinese intellectuals also
assert that China should build a "Chinese-style" democracy instead of importing the "Western-style" variety. 7 While some Chinese pundits began
the search for a Chinese-style democracy in the early 1990s, debate on the
matter has intensified since the beginning of the new millennium, especially since Joshua Cooper Ramo published The Beijing Consensus in 2004.
This article addresses two questions. First, what is democracy with
Chinese characteristics, and does Chinese-style democracy really have any
features specific to China that distinguish it from both liberal democracy
and authoritarianism? Second, what sort of political reforms has China
actually implemented over the past three decades, and do these reforms
5Minxin
Pei, China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).
6Liu Xirui, "Zhongguo de minzhu moshi yijing que li" (The Chinese democratic model is
already establishe d), People's Net (Renminwang), May 25, 2007, http://politics.people
.com.cn/GB/30178/5664377.html (accessed May 25, 2007); and Zhu Guanglei and Yang
Guangbin, "Zhongguo c huangzao minzhu xin moshi shi wanquan kenengde" (It's possible
for China to create a new democratic model), People's Net, May 25, 2007, http://www
.360doc.com/content/070508/15/142_488550.html (accessed May 25, 2007).
7Yu Keping, "Minzhu shi gongheguo de shengming" (Democ racy is the life of the republic),
People's Net, November 21, 2007, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/6555959.html
(accessed November 21, 2007); Fang Ning, "Minzhu, zou Zhongguo zijide lu" (Democracy,
going along the Chine se road), People's Net, Nove mber 20, 2007, http://politics.people.com
.cn/GB/30178/6549747.html (acce ssed November 20, 2007); Wu Jianmin, "Zhongguo
xuyao shemeyang de minzhu" (What kind of democracy does China need?), People's Net,
February 4, 2008, http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/6863843.html (accessed February 4,
2008); and Ding Gang, "Meishi minzhu nengzai shijie pujima" (Can Americ an-style democracy be promoted across the world), Xinhuawang (Xinhuawang), Februa ry 5, 2008, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/world/2008-02/05/contet_7570006.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
December 2009
73
ISSUES & STUDIES
exhibit any specifically Chinese characteristics? By addressing these questions, this article will attempt to evaluate the future prospects for political
development in China.
The paper will first examine various theories of political development
and how they relate to the East Asian developmental states. Then, it will
analyze the main features of the political systems of the developmental
states. These are preliminary steps toward forming an understanding of
Chinese-style democracy and the actual political reforms that China has
carried out. Third, on the basis of this discussion, the paper will investigate
both the arguments surrounding Chinese-style democracy and China's past
three decades of political reform.
Two arguments will be put forward. First, although the ideal type of
political development involves the simultaneous accomplishment of political democratization and institutionalization, a country may prefer to
put political institutionalization ahead of democratization, as Samuel P.
Huntington put it.8 This is the path taken by the East Asian developmental
states. Second, it will be argued that China has also followed this path.
Crucially, what in China has been termed "Chinese-style democracy" does
not exhibit any specifically Chinese characteristics. Instead, it is the sort
of authoritarianism that the East Asian states have already experienced.
China's past political reforms also suggest that it has pursued the political
development path of institutionalization ahead of democratization, as did
the East Asian states.
Political Development and the East Asian Developmental States
Previous studies note that the East Asian developmental states have
been characterized by "soft" authoritarian or "quasi-authoritarian" political
8Sa mue l
P. Huntington, Politic al Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Pre ss, 1968), 4-5; and Samuel P. Huntington and Jorge I. Dominguez, "Political
De velopment," in Handbook of Politic al Science: Macropolitical Theory, e d. Fred I.
Gre enstein a nd Nelson W. Polsby (Rea ding, Ma ss.: Addison-We sley, 1975), 14.
74
De cembe r 2009
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
structures. 9 However, these studies do not pay much attention to how authoritarian political structures are related to political development. The
East Asian states have not simply adhered to authoritarianism; instead, they
have pursued their own political development path (i.e., political institutionalization), and authoritarian political systems have been the result.
Scholars define political development in different ways. 10 The most
representative understandings of political development are "democratization" and "institutionalization." These two perspectives are not mutually
exclusive, but the difference between them depends on which aspects of
political development are emphasized. Of course, the ideal type of political
development would combine democratization with institutionalization.
Therefore, Gordon White suggests an integrated perspective, arguing that
political development refers to the process of achieving both political democratization and institutionalization. 11
Viewing political development as democratization is a mainstream
perspective in political science, and it has gained more supporters since
the "third wave" of democratization started in the mid-1970s. From this
perspective, political development starts with the introduction of democratic institutions. According to a procedural definition, a democracy is a
political system in which there are regular free and competitive elections
for major leadership positions (i.e., electoral democracy), or a political system in which, along with free and competitive elections, universal political
9Chalmers
Johnson, "The Nonsocialist NICs: East Asia," International Organization 4, no.
2 (Spring 1986): 559; T. J. Pempel, "The Developmental Regime in a Changing World
Economy," in The Deve lopmental State, ed. Meredith Woo-Cumings (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Unive rsity Press, 1999), 160; Steve Chan, Cal Clark, and Danny Lam, "Looking beyond
the Developmental State," in Beyond the Developmental State: East Asia's Political Ec onomies Rec onsidered, ed. Steve Chan, Cal Clark, and Danny Lam (London: Macmillan,
1998), 2; Chung-in Moon and Rashemi Prasad, "Networks, Politics, and Institutions," ibid.,
9-24; Meredith Woo-Cumings, "The 'New Authoritarianism' in Ea st Asia," Curre nt History
93, no. 587 (Dece mber 1994): 413-16; and Ziya Onis, "The Logic of the Developmental
State," Comparative Politics 24, no. 1 (October 1991): 114.
10Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Understanding Politic al Development, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press,
1987), 3-32; and Huntington and Dominguez, "Political Development," 1-11.
11Gordon White, "Constructing a Democratic Developmental State," in The Democratic Developmental State: Political and Institutional Design, ed. M ark Robinson and Gordon
White (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21.
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
participation and citizens' political rights are also guaranteed (i.e., liberal
democracy).1 2 Viewed in this way, the primary measure of political development is the introduction of free and competitive elections.
For many Third World countries, however, political development is
not limited to democratization in general and the introduction of Westernstyle democracy in particular. Other sociopolitical objectives, such as state
integration, establishing state authority and capacity, maintaining law and
order, and an equitable distribution of socioeconomic values, may be more
urgent than the introduction of liberal democracy. 13 With this in mind, an
increasing number of scholars are paying attention to the importance of the
rule of law and good governance rather than electoral democracy alone.
Empirical justification for this is provided by the "democratic recession"
that has taken place since the mid-1990s, whereby "illiberal democracy,"
"delegative democracy," and "authoritarian democracy" have spread, and
competitive elections have resulted in political disturbance rather than
social stability and economic prosperity. 14
Meanwhile, if political development is viewed as a process of institutionalization, it would mean a political system's cultivation of its capacity
to carry out political tasks. For example, Samuel P. Huntington defines
political development as the institutionalization of political organizations
and procedures. According to this definition, institutions consist of stable,
valuable, and repeated patterns of behavior, while institutionalization refers
to the attainment of values and stability on the part of organizations and
12Larry
Diamond and Ramon H. Myers, "Introduction: Ele ctions and Democracy in Greater
China," in Elections and Democracy in Greater China, ed. Larry Diamond a nd Ramon H.
Myers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2-3; and Larry Diamond, Developing
Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Ba ltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999),
9-10.
13Young Nam Cho, Local People's Congresses in China: Development and Transition (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170.
14Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (November/
December 1997): 22-43; Thoma s Carothe rs, "The Rule of Law Revival," ibid. 77, no. 2
(March/April 1998): 95-106; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy," Journal of
Democracy 5, no. 1 (January 1994): 55-69; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the
Long Haul," in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, ed.
Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tie n (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Unive rsity Press, 1997), 3-13.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
procedures. 15 This perspective on political development puts political
stability above democratization or the enlargement of popular political
participation. From this point of view, modernization inevitably delivers
greater political participation, and disorder and instability will result unless there are effective political institutions which can accommodate the
participation of unstable political elements. Thus, political institutionalization should be accomplished before political democratization in order to
maintain political order and social stability.1 6
Of these two paths of political development, the East Asian developmental states have deliberately adopted the second. That is, they have
pursued political institutionalization instead of democratization, as will be
detailed below. And after achieving socioeconomic development, a few
countries, like South Korea and Taiwan, successfully transformed into
liberal democracies in the late 1980s, while Malaysia and Singapore still
retain their authoritarian political structures. Furthermore, the experiences
of the East Asian countries (especially Taiwan and South Korea) illustrate
that this path, rather than the blind pursuit of electoral democracy, may be
more successful in achieving social stability, economic growth, and even,
in the long run, political democratization.
The Main Features of the East Asian Developmental States
In his seminal work, Chalmers Johnson provides four fundamental
features of the Japanese developmental state model: an efficient economic
bureaucracy, stable rule by politicians and bureaucrats, market-conforming
economic policies (i.e., industrial policy), and pilot agencies. 17 Yu-Shan
Wu, meanwhile, lists four characteristics of the developmental state: state
autonomy from society, an elite consensus on developmentalism, bureau-
15Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies, 12-24.
People's Congresses in China, 170-71.
17Cha lmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle : The Growth of Industrial Policy,
1925-1975 (Sta nford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982), 315-20.
16Cho, Local
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
cratic penetration of society, and a world market-conforming industrial
policy.18 Finally, according to Adrian Leftwich, developmental states can
be more concretely defined as "states whose politics have concentrated sufficient power, autonomy, and capacity at the center to shape, pursue, and
encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives, whether
by establishing and promoting the conditions and direction of economic
growth, or by organizing it directly, or a varying combination of both."19
This article argues that the East Asian developmental states are characterized by the following three features: (1) the supremacy of economic
development as a national policy and associated varieties of nationalism;
(2) "soft" authoritarian or "quasi-authoritarian" political systems with a
"strong state" and "concentration of power" devoted to economic development; and (3) a cooperative relationship between state and society under
the leadership of and to the benefit of the state. Finally, we also need to pay
attention to the fact that all of the East Asian developmental states, with
the exception of Japan, exploited a special ideology that was designed to
legitimatize economic developmentalism and political authoritarianism.
The first feature of the East Asian developmental states is that these
countries have pursued economic development as the top national priority,
and that various forms of nationalism (e.g., "economic nationalism" and
"revolutionary nationalism") have played a vital supporting role. The East
Asian states have desperately strived for rapid economic growth in order
to ensure their national survival and development, either by (in the case of
Japan) catching up with the advanced Western societies or (in the case of
Taiwan and South Korea) surpassing neighboring enemy states. In Japan,
for example, economic development, including rapid economic growth,
enhanced productivity, and strengthened international competitiveness,
was the top national goal for fifty years from 1925.20 Similarly, economic
18Yu-Shan
Wu, "Taiwan's Developme ntal State: After the Economic and Political Turmoil,"
Asian Survey 47, no. 6 (Dece mber 2007): 980.
19Adrian Leftwich, "Bring Politics Back In: Towards a Model of the Developmental State,"
The Journal of Development Studies 31, no. 3 (February 1995): 401.
20Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 305.
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De cembe r 2009
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
development was the top priority for Taiwan from the time of the establishment of the Kuomintang (KMT) government in 1949 until the late 1980s
and for South Korea from the early 1960s, under Park Chung Hee, until the
late 1980s. This was not simply the result of government propaganda and
enforced implementation. Instead, most ordinary people, as well as intellectuals who witnessed the widespread poverty and escalating regional
competition at that time, tended to accept and support the necessity of
growth-first policies.
One factor that enabled the East Asian countries to garner wide popular support for their single-minded pursuit of economic growth was the
emergence of various types of nationalism. 21 Pre-World War II militaristic
nationalism and post-war economic nationalism in Japan, and strong anticommunist and irredentist nationalism in South Korea and Taiwan under
the external threat from North Korea and China respectively, are cases in
point. For example, according to Chalmers Johnson, Japan's economic activities were chiefly motivated by a desire to gain independence from, and
leverage over, potential adversaries, rather than to achieve greater levels of
consumption or to accumulate private wealth. 22
Generally speaking, nationalism has played two important functions.
On the one hand, it has supported incumbent regimes by legitimatizing
economic developmentalism and associated political authoritarianism
while suppressing popular demands for democratization. On the other
hand, it has mobilized people to participate in economic development. In
fact, a developmental state and nationalism are two sides of the same
coin. In this sense, the developmental states could not exist without the
support of nationalism, and the Latin American countries are an illustration
of this. 23
21Johnson, MITI and the J apanese Miracle, 24-26; Woo-Cumings, "Introduction,"
in The Developmental State, 4-10; W. G. Huff, "Turning the Corner in Singapore's Developmental
State? " Asian Survey 39, 2 (March/April 1999): 220; and Onis, "The Logic of the Deve lopmental State," 116.
22Chalmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? (New York: Norton, 1995), 105-6.
23Ben Ross Schneider, "The Desarrollista State in Brazil and Mexico," in Woo-Cumings,
The Developmental State, 276-305.
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
The second feature of the East Asian developmental states is that they
have maintained "soft" authoritarian or "quasi-authoritarian" political systems on the pretext of, or as an actual requirement for, economic development. There are two aspects of this. First, the developmental states are
"strong states" where elite bureaucrats and technocrats, with strong support
from political leaders (e.g., Park Chung Hee of South Korea and Chiang
Kai-shek of Taiwan), or in partnership with authoritarian politicians and
military leaders, enjoy a disproportionately high degree of power and have
a variety of tools at their disposal to enforce their will.24 For example, as
Chalmers Johnson explains, the existence of small and capable economic
bureaucracies and competent pilot agencies such as the Ministry of Trade
and Industry (MITI) were fundamental features of the Japanese developmental state model. This feature was also apparent in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia during the developmental state period. 25
Second, at the top of the "strong state" led by the bureaucracy, the
East Asian developmental states maintained a "system of power concentration" in which a small number of people or ruling elites such as military
leaders and leading members of the dominant political party held a nearmonopoly on political power. Furthermore, under the power concentration
arrangement, these countries tended to be run by the executive branch,
while the legislative and judicial branches functioned as political appendices. The precise methods of control differed among the countries: a de
facto one-party system led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was
24Pempel, "The Deve lopmental
Regime," 160; Woo-Cumings, "Introduction"; Chan, Clark,
and Lam, "Looking beyond the Developme ntal Sta te"; Sean O. Riain, "The Flexible De velopmental State: Globalization, Information Tec hnology, a nd the 'Celtic Tiger'," Politics
and Society 28, no. 2 (June 2000): 157-93; and Linda We iss, "De velopmenta l States in
Transition: Adapting, Disma ntling, Innovating, Not 'Normalizing'," Pacific Revie w 13,
no. 1 (March 2000): 21-55.
25Ste phan Haggard, Pathways from the Pe riphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); Robert Wa de ,
Governing the Market: Ec onomy Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Pre ss, 1990); Alice H. Amsden,
Asia's Ne xt Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989); and Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
maintained in Japan, whereas strong systems of personal rule were sustained in South Korea and Taiwan. In Japan, for example, the country was
run by bureaucrats, while the LDP kept a stranglehold on political power;
the Diet and the courts merely acted as safety valves through which people's complaints could be heard and resolved.26
The relationship between authoritarianism and economic development in the developmental states is still contentious. Some scholars argue
that authoritarianism has only contributed to economic development in a
few countries, such as those of East Asia, whereas in most cases democracy
can keep pace with economic development.27 However, some scholars
argue that authoritarianism, rather than democracy, is the appropriate political model for underdeveloped countries that wish to pursue rapid economic growth, as it not only facilitates the mobilization of capital and labor
but also enables the execution of long-term economic plans by suppressing
demands from social groups for redistribution.28 Most proponents of the
East Asian developmental state, including Chalmers Johnson, Meredith
Woo-Cumings, Stephan Haggard, and Robert Wade, state the case for a
relationship between authoritarianism and economic development. 29
The third feature of the East Asian developmental state is that it has
fashioned the kind of cooperative state-society relations necessary for promoting rapid economic growth.30 These countries differ from their Western
capitalist counterparts in that state and society are so intimately connected
that they are frequently indistinguishable from each other. 31 For instance,
26Johnson,
MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 315-16.
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World
Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997): 167-69.
28Cary Zou, "Transition towards Democracy in Compara tive Perspective," Asian Perspective
5, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1991): 99-121.
29Chalmers Johnson, "The Developmental State: Odyssey of a Concept," in Woo-Cumings,
The Developmental State, 52-53; Woo-Cumings, "Introduction," 416; Haggard, Pathways
from the Periphery, 261-62; and Wade, Governing the Marke t, 27-28, 38.
30Moon and Prasad, "Networks, Politics, and Institutions," 9; Cha n, Clark, and Lam, "Looking be yond the Developmental Sta te," 2; and Onis, "The Logic of the Developmental
State," 115.
31Pempel, "The Deve lopmental Regime," 160.
27Adam
December 2009
81
ISSUES & STUDIES
during the period of rapid economic growth in Japan, the economic bureaucracy and big business worked closely together. 32 In South Korea and
Taiwan, there was "embedded autonomy" involving the state and society,
whereby the state wielded autonomous authority independent from society
but also closely cooperated with big business.3 3 Meanwhile, in state-labor
relations, the developmental states made unlimited efforts to constrain
workers' efforts to gain socioeconomic rights, and consequently a "managed or controlled" state-society relationship emerged. 34 For this reason,
some scholars regard the state-society relationship in the developmental
states as state corporatism.35
Finally, the East Asian developmental states attempted to exploit a
new ideology that could legitimatize economic developmentalism and political authoritarianism. As already noted, all of the East Asian developmental states had "soft" authoritarian or "quasi-authoritarian" political
structures. For this reason, they were occasionally confronted by demands
for democratization from intellectuals and the general population at home,
and pressure to respect human rights from international society. Faced with
these challenges, the East Asian states began to allow competitive elections and to increase popular participation in politics, but only to the extent that these measures did not threaten the rulers' grip on power. In South
Korea, for example, opposition parties were allowed to take part in general
and presidential elections even during the Park Chung Hee military dictatorship, and in Taiwan, competitive local elections were held although
opposition parties were still illegal.
The East Asian developmental states coped with pressure for democratization by exploiting an ideology that legitimatized the primacy of economic development and the authoritarian political system. For example, in
32Johnson, MITI and
the Japanese Miracle, 311.
Embedded Autonomy, 58-59.
34Woo-Cumings, "The 'New Authoritarianism' in East Asia ," 414.
35Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in an East
Asian Context," in China after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia?
ed. Barrett McCormick and Jonathan Unger (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 95-129.
33Evans,
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
Taiwan, Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People was the national
ideology used by the KMT under martial law to legitimatize its one-party
rule. In a similar way, Park Chung Hee employed "Korean-style democracy" (Hanguksik minju) as the rationale for his military dictatorship and
to fix anti-communism as the basic national policy.
"Asian values" and "Asian-style democracy" are an extension of this
effort, the latest and most sophisticated method adopted by the East Asian
states to legitimatize their authoritarianism. Since the early 1990s, some
Asian politicians and scholars, especially in Singapore and Malaysia, have
contended that Asian values, such as the importance of family; concerns
over virtue and ethics; the primacy of the group over the individual; emphasis on unity, harmony and order, hard work, frugality, and the importance of education, could stand in opposition to Western values. They have
also argued that Asian-style democracy, based on Asian values, is superior
to the Western-style variety in achieving economic prosperity, social
stability, and national unity. However, in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian
financial crisis and criticism from other Asian politicians and scholars, the
argument for Asian values lost its relevance in the late 1990s. 36
In sum, the East Asian developmental states pursued economic development as their ultimate national objective, and maintained authoritarian political structures and cooperative state-society relations on the
excuse that these were essential for economic development. Furthermore,
varieties of nationalism functioned as ruling ideologies used to legitimatize
economic developmentalism and political authoritarianism, and to mobilize people for economic development. Where political development was
concerned, the East Asian states favored political institutionalization over
democratization as a means of establishing the stable political system
necessary for facilitating economic development.
36Young
Nam Cho and Jongho Jeong, "China's Soft Power: Discussions, Resources, and Prospects, Asian Survey 48, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 470; and Mark R. Thompson, "Whatever
Happened to 'Asian Values'?" J ournal of Democrac y 12, no. 4 (October 2001): 154-65.
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
"Democracy with Chinese Characteristics" and
Debates on China's Political Reform
An increasing number of scholars argue that China should have been
classified as a developmental state since the late 1980s,37 although some
still claim that in economic terms China does not fit the definition of the developmental state. 38 However, ever-greater numbers of Chinese scholars
stress that China's development model is independent and distinct from the
East Asian model, and this has especially been the case since the publication in 2004 of Joshua Cooper Ramo's The Beijing Consensus. Some of
these Chinese scholars argue that in contrast to Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a major role in China's
economic development, and in order to mobilize capital, China has made
greater use of FDI and stock markets, unlike South Korea and Taiwan
which depended on foreign credit, bank loans, and private financing. Furthermore, in contrast to the protectionist trade policies of Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan, China has opted for market liberalization, culminating
in its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001.39
Although China's economic development experience has differed
from that of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it is not appropriate to judge
China's status as a developmental state solely in economic terms. This is
because the developmental state model, as analyzed above, also includes
political and social elements. In short, we need a more comprehensive
view. Furthermore, as T. J. Pempel notes, the economies of Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan were hugely different from each other, in terms of their
37Johnson,
"The Nonsocialist NICs," 557-65; White, "Constructing a Democratic Developmental State," 17-51; Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in China"; Leftwich, "Bring Politics
Back In," 400-427; M ing Xia, The Dual Developmental State: Developmental Strategy and
Institutional Arrangements for China's Transition (Brookfield: Ashgate, 2000); and SeungWook Baek, "Does China Follow 'the East Asian Development Model'?" J ournal of Contemporary Asia 35, no. 4 (2005): 485-98.
38Keun Lee, Donghoon Han, a nd Justin Lin, "Is China Following the Ea st Asian Model?
A 'Comparative Institutional Analysis' Perspective," China Review 2, no. 1 (Spring 2002):
85-120.
39Cho and Jeong, "China's Soft Power," 464-65.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
size, structure, capital mobilization, and industrial policies.40 However,
they are considered to be representative examples of the developmental
state model because they all possessed the same core elements. China, in
the reform era, also fits the criteria of a developmental state at least from
a political perspective. To demonstrate this we need to analyze the arguments surrounding democracy with Chinese characteristics and debates on
the political reform in China.
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics
Debates in China and abroad on the Beijing Consensus and a Chinese
development model mainly focus on economic development. For example,
although Joshua Cooper Ramo argues, in The Beijing Consensus, that his
propositions include more than economic development, he rarely mentions
China's political system and democracy. 41 Chinese scholars' discussions on
the Beijing Consensus are similar. 42 Therefore, we need to investigate
official Chinese documents in order to understand what "democracy with
Chinese characteristics" means.
First, Chinese-style democracy emphasizes both the universality and
peculiarity of democracy. According to a white paper on Chinese politics
entitled The Construction of Chinese Democratic Politics (Zhongguo de
minzhu zhengzhi jianshe, 中國的民主政治建設), which was released by
the State Council in 2005, democracy is not exclusive to Western society,
but an "achievement of the development of human political civilization"
and "the universal demand of people all over the world."43 Emphasis on
the universality of democracy can also be found in Premier Wen Jiabao's
(溫家寶) remarks that "socialist institutions and democratic politics are
40Pempel, "The
Deve lopmental Regime," 149-51.
Cooper Ramo, The Beijing Consensus (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004), 5.
42Huang Ping et al., e ds., Zhongguo yu quanqiuhua (China and globalization) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005); and Yu Keping et al., eds., Zhongguo moshi "Beijing
gongshi" (The Chinese model: the "Beijing Consensus") (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian
chubanshe, 2006).
43Information Office of the State Council, Zhongguode minzhu zhengzhi jianshe (Construction of Chinese democratic politics) (White paper) (2005).
41Joshua
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ISSUES & STUDIES
not mutually exclusive, and higher-level democracy and perfect rule of law
are an intrinsic demand of, and an important symbol for, mature socialist
institutions."44 Yu Keping (俞可平) also mentions the universal value of
democracy and says that "democracy is a good thing."45 This suggests that
the concept of democracy in China has begun to depart from Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平) instrumental definition, according to which democracy is
regarded as a tool for mobilizing people to carry out economic construction
by allowing them a limited range of political participation.
Chinese-style democracy in The Construction of Chinese Democratic
Politics, however, champions the peculiarity of democracy by emphasizing
that a country's democracy develops only through its own efforts under
specific historical and social circumstances, and therefore democracy cannot be transplanted by outside forces. In other words, there cannot be a
single democratic model that can be applied universally to all countries.
Both Premier Wen Jiabao's speech and Yu's article stress this point. The
simultaneous emphasis on both the universality and peculiarity of democracy is repeated in another white paper on Chinese politics, The Chinese
Political Party System (Zhongguo de zhengdang zhidu, 中國的政黨制度),
made public by the State Council in 2007.
The above-mentioned white papers explain the main elements of
democracy with Chinese characteristics in slightly different ways. The
Construction of Chinese Democratic Politics argues that there are four features of "Chinese socialist democratic politics." They are that Chinese
democracy is people's democracy under the leadership of the CCP; it is a
democracy in which the people are the masters; it is a democracy based on,
and guaranteed by, the people's democratic dictatorship; and it is a democracy in which democratic centralism is an organizational principle and a
44Wen
Jiabao, "Guanyu she hui zhuyi chuji jieduande lishi renwu he woguo duiwai zhengce
de jige wenti" (On the historic mission of the primary stage of socialism and some issues
in our country's foreign policy), People's Net, Februa ry 27, 2007, http://politics.people
.com.cn/GB/1024/5418093.html (accessed February 27, 2007).
45Yan Jian, ed., Minzhu shi ge hao dongxi: Yu Keping fangtan lu (Democracy is a good thing:
a record of interviews with Yu Keping) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006),
1-5.
86
De cembe r 2009
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
basic way of operation. Additionally, this white paper argues that these
fundamental features can be realized through China's basic political institutions, such as people's congresses, the system of multiparty cooperation
and political consultation under the leadership of the CCP, the self-government system for ethnic minorities, grassroots democracy in rural and urban
areas, and respect for and guarantees of human rights. This was reiterated
in Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) political report to the Seventeenth Party Congress
in 2007, which stated that the CCP, with a view to achieving socialist
democracy with Chinese characteristics, would maintain an organic combination of the party's leadership, the people as masters of the country, and
ruling the country according to law (yifa zhiguo, 依法治國), and would
continue to develop China's basic political institutions.
Meanwhile, The Chinese Political Party System explains Chinesestyle democracy in more detail, stating that one of its major features is that
it is a combination of electoral democracy and consultative democracy.
This seems to reflect the reality that since the 1980s, China has implemented semi-competitive elections at grassroots level (e.g., for village
committees) and a system of political consultation between the CCP and
the eight "democratic parties." This is an attempt to provide a new democratic model for China. In fact, some Chinese scholars have advocated
various mixed democratic models. For example, He Zengke (何 增科)
suggests a "mixed democracy" composed of "electoral, consultative, and
liberal democracy" as the preferred democratic model for China. 46 Li Junru
(李君如) also divides democracy into three categories: "electoral, deliberative, and consultative," and argues that Chinese-style democracy is an organic combination of the three. 47
These discussions confirm that there is nothing fundamentally new
about Chinese-style democracy. Instead, it consists of the same socialist
authoritarian political institutions that the CCP has advocated since the
46He
Zengke et al., eds., Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige yanjiu (Study on the reform of Chine se political syste m) (Beijing: Zhongguo bianyi chubanshe , 2004), 26.
47Li Junru, Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zouxiang (Trends in contemporary Chinese politics)
(Fuzhou: Fuzhou renmin chubanshe, 2007), 143-46.
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ISSUES & STUDIES
early 1980s. In recent years arguments have been put forward in favor of
a mixed democratic model in China, reflecting the democratic measures
that have already been implemented there, such as the semi-competitive
elections at grassroots level and the system of consultation between the
CCP and the satellite parties. However, these new democratic measures
or a mixed democratic model under the rule of the CCP can only act as
window dressing for Chinese authoritarianism; they do not change the
fundamental nature of the political system.
In this regard, it is interesting that some Chinese scholars have suggested that consultative (xieshang, 協商) or deliberative (shenyi, 審議)
democracy is the main feature of Chinese-style democracy. These scholars
have probably been influenced by Western studies that suggest using
deliberative democracy to overcome the limitations of representative
democracy, especially those studies that apply consultative or deliberative
democracy to China. 48 However, given that consultative democracy cannot
become an alternative to liberal democracy even in advanced Western
democracies,49 it is doubtful that it has any substantive meaning in China,
where electoral democracy does not yet exist. Instead, deliberative or consultative democracy probably plays a cosmetic function, legitimizing oneparty rule in the name of Chinese-style democracy.
In conclusion, democracy with Chinese characteristics is closely
connected to the political system that has existed in China for the past few
decades. In other words, Chinese-style democracy is a form of authoritarianism, somewhere between totalitarianism and democracy. In this sense,
China's search for Chinese-style democracy has so far been unsuccessful.
Debates on China's Political Reform
Various political reform ideas have been put forward in China since
the end of the 1990s. These include "socialist democracy" (shehui zhuyi
48Zhenghuan
Zhou, Liberal Rights and Political Culture: Envisioning Democracy in China
(London: Roultedge, 2005); and Ethan J. Leib a nd Baogang He, eds., The Search for Delibe rative Democracy in China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
49Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Prince ton University Press,
2003), 10-34.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
minzhu, 社會主義民主), based on Deng Xiaoping's ideas on political reform and advocated by Gao Fang (高放) and Wang Guixiu (王貴秀);50
"gradual democratic development" (jianjinshi minzhu fazhan, 漸進式民主
發展), suggested by Huang Weiping (黃衛平), Yu Keping, He Zengke,
Zhou Tianyong (周天勇), and Li Junru, which argues that China should
develop a form of authoritarianism based on the experiences of the East
Asian developmental states;51 "consultative rule of law" (zixunxing fazhi,
諮詢型法治 ), proposed by Pan Wei (潘維), which suggests that China
can emulate the political systems of Singapore and Hong Kong;5 2 and
"liberal democracy" (ziyou minzhu, 自由民主), advocated by Xu Youyu
(徐友漁), 53 Liu Junning (劉軍寧),5 4 and Cao Siyuan (曹思源). 55 Of these,
"socialist democracy" and "gradual democratic development" have dominated mainstream debates.
The idea of "socialist democracy" contains a critique of both liberal
democracy and neo-authoritarianism and is based on Marxist-Leninism
and China's socialist revolutionary experiences. At the same time, it suggests that China should do away with the over-concentration of political
50Gao
Fang, Zhengzhixue yu zhengzhi tizhi gaige (Political science and political reform) (Beijing: Zhongguo shuji chubanshe, 2002); and Wang Guixiu, Zhongguo zhengzhi tizhi gaige
zhi lu (The roa d of China's political reform) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 2004).
51Huang Weiping, Zhongguo zhe ngzhi tizhi gaige conghengtan (On the re form of Chinese
politic al system) (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe , 1998); Yu Keping, Zengliang
minzhu yu shanzhi (Incremental democ ra cy and good governanc e) (Beijing: Shehui kexue
wenxian chubanshe, 2003); He, Zhongguo zhe ngzhi tizhi gaige yanjiu; Zhou Tianyong et
al., eds., Gongjian: Shiqida hou Zhongguo zhe ngzhi tizhi gaige yanjiu baogao (Storm
fortifica tions: A study on China's political reform since the 17th Party Congress) (Wujiazhangshi: Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan chubanshe, 2007); and Li, Dangdai Zhongguo zhengzhi zouxiang.
52Pan Wei, Fazhi yu minzhu mixin (Rule of law and superstition of de mocracy) (Hong Kong:
Xianggang she hui kexue chubanshe, 2003).
53Xu Youyu, "Ziyouzhuyi yu dangdai Zhongguo" (Libera lism and c onte mporary China),
in Zhishifenzi lichang: Ziyouzhuy i zhi zheng yu Zhongguo sixiang de fenhua (Intellectuals'
position: Debate of liberalism and the diversification of Chine se thought), ed. Li Shitao
(Be ijing: Shidai wenyi chuba nshe, 2000), 413-30.
54Liu Junning, "Chanquan baohu yu youxian zhengfu" (Protection of property rights and
limited gove rnment), in Zhongguo zhengzhi (Chinese politics), ed. Dong Yuyu and Shi
Binhai (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998), 40-48.
55Cao Siyuan, Zhengzhi we nming ABC (Political civilization ABC) (New York: Cozy House,
2003).
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
power at the Party center, the small leadership group, and ultimately the top
leader, as these are considered to constitute the most serious problem in
China's political system. Instead, it is argued, China must advance to a true
socialist democracy, incorporating democracy within the CCP, the democracy of people's congresses and political consultation, the democracy of
multiparty cooperation under the leadership of the CCP, and grassroots
democracy. 56 This explanation indicates that "socialist democracy" is
identical to the official position on Chinese-style democracy. In fact, since
the mid-1980s Gao Fang has enthusiastically campaigned for the so-called
three democracies— i.e., intra-party democracy within the CCP (dangnei
minzhu, 黨內民主), people's democracy (renmin minzhu, 人民民主), and
inter-party democracy among the CCP and the eight satellite parties
(dangjian minzhu, 黨間民主)— and the CCP has adopted some of these
reforms since the 1990s. Since Hu Jintao came to power in 2002, for example, the CCP has implemented a policy of increasing people's democracy
through the enhancement of intra-party democracy.
The idea of "gradual democratic development" is quite similar to the
neo-authoritarianism of the late 1980s. First, it advocates phased political
development (i.e., gradualism) rather than radical change. It holds that a
country should move gradually from totalitarianism to authoritarianism
and then from authoritarianism to democracy. Skipping these stages is
neither possible nor desirable, because democracy requires certain preconditions, including the development of a market economy and a middle
class, an enhanced popular democratic consciousness, and the formation of
civil society; hasty democratization in the absence of these conditions will
bring political turmoil and social instability. Second, it takes the view that
China, as a state in rapid transition from a planned to a market economy,
needs strong political leadership which is indispensable for social reform
and economic development, and only an authoritarian political system can
provide this leadership. Third, it concedes that China should ultimately establish a democratic political system, but it should be a "Chinese-style"
56Gao,
90
Zhengzhixue yu zhengzhi tizhi gaige, 760.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
system that suits the specific circumstances of China.
In short, both "socialist democracy" and "gradual democratic development" represent a path of political development similar to that of the
East Asian developmental states (i.e., political institutionalization ahead of
democratization). On the surface, the idea of "socialist democracy" seems
to exclude authoritarian measures other than socialist political institutions.
However, the core elements of this idea closely resemble the authoritarianism of the East Asian developmental states. For example, if China implements both democracy within the CCP and democracy between the CCP
and the eight satellite parties in accordance with the "socialist democracy"
model,5 7 the CCP will become a hegemonic party while the eight parties
will change into weak opposition parties in an authoritarian political system. Likewise, if China faithfully implements other measures that Gao
advocates, such as a thorough division of party and government, bicameralism, the direct election of legislative deputies at all levels, and competitive elections for premier, the Chinese political system may develop into a
"soft" authoritarianism. As for "gradual democratic development," since it
is nothing more than a replica of the political development path followed
by the East Asian developmental states, no further explanation is required.
China's Past Political Reforms:
Features and Major Components
The political reforms that China has implemented over the past three
decades, together with the arguments surrounding democracy with Chinese
characteristics and the debates on China's political reform, confirm that
China has followed a similar path of political development to the East
Asian developmental states.
Two main trends are evident in the past three decades of political reform in China. First, political reform has been carried out on the precondi-
57Ibid.,
772-75, 778-82.
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ISSUES & STUDIES
tion that it should not challenge the political power of the CCP and the
maintenance of the socialist authoritarian political system. This is the
fundamental principle that has penetrated into all areas of reform over this
period. Second, political reform in China has been mainly implemented as
a way of promoting economic development rather than for its own sake.
For this reason, measures that directly contribute to economic development, such as the building of efficient and effective administrative systems,
and reforms of the personnel and cadre management systems aimed at
recruiting more able bureaucrats, have been at the top of the political reform agenda. In contrast, liberal reforms, such as the holding of direct
elections and the granting of greater civil and political rights, have been
marginalized.
The political reforms that China has implemented can be divided into
five specific categories: (1) those that legitimatize the position of economic
development as the top national policy by revising socialist ideology and
encouraging nationalism; (2) those that strengthen efficient and effective
political structures by restructuring the state apparatus and increasing state
capacity; (3) those that strengthen the ruling capacity of the CCP; (4) those
that establish looser and more cooperative state-society relations by
shifting away from totalitarianism; and (5) those that enhance grass-roots
democracy through direct elections at village level. These political reforms
have shaped Chinese socialist authoritarianism, the main features of which
are the same as those of the East Asian developmental states.
As explained above, a variety of nationalism played a vital role in
legitimatizing the supremacy of economic development in the developmental states and their authoritarian political structures. In a similar manner, China has legitimatized the pursuit of growth-first economic policies
and the CCP's one-party rule by revising the established socialist ideology
and employing nationalism (i.e., "socialist patriotism," according to the official phraseology). After the political chaos of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76), the Chinese political leadership, as well as intellectuals and ordinary people, experienced a serious sense of crisis and arrived at a consensus that the party-state could not survive without reforming the socialist
system. As a consequence, the Deng Xiaoping-led reformist faction came
92
De cembe r 2009
Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
to power and from 1978 began introducing a series of reform policies. At
the same time, the CCP has had to develop a theory to rationalize the shift
in the Party line from class struggle to economic growth. In short, it either
had to revise its existing socialist ideology or employ a new ideology
altogether.
The CCP has repeatedly revised its ideology to legitimatize policy
changes, especially the adoption of an economic-growth-first policy. The
Party adopted the slogan "reform and opening-up" to replace "continuous
revolution through class struggle" at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP's
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, then the theory of the
"primary stage of socialism" was adopted at the Thirteenth Party Congress
in 1987. This was followed by "socialist market theory" at the Fourteenth
Congress in 1992, "the three represents" theory at the Sixteenth Congress
in 2002, and the "scientific concept of development" and the "harmonious
society" at the Seventeenth Congress in 2007.5 8 These revisions have taken
Chinese socialism from being an ideology of socialist revolution that aims
to realize a classless society to an ideology of economic development that
supports and legitimatizes the economic-growth-first policy.
In addition, since the 1990s, especially after the experience of the
1989 Tiananmen (天安門) incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, China has exploited "socialist patriotism" as a new ruling ideology,
under the slogan of "restoring the great Chinese nation." Increasing numbers of Chinese intellectuals and the younger generation among the public
have gone along with this. 59 Nationalism has played a dual role, as an
58David
Shambaugh, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Washington, D.C.:
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008); Bo Zhiyue, China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Powe r Balancing (Singapore: World Sc ientific, 2007); Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and
Yongnian Zheng, eds., The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London: Routledge,
2006); and Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Yongnian Zheng, eds., Bringing the Party Bac k In:
How China Is Gov erned (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004).
59Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (London: Routledge, 2006);
Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley:
Unive rsity of California Press, 2004); Suisheng Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction:
Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
2004); and Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization,
Identity, and International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
December 2009
93
ISSUES & STUDIES
ideology of mobilization that encourages people to support and participate
in economic development by toeing the Party line, and as an ideology of regime support that legitimatizes the one-party rule of the CCP, which was
redefined as "the vanguard both of the Chinese working class and of the
Chinese people and the Chinese nation" which encompasses all Chinese
ethnicities at home and abroad,60 and which can realize the Chinese dream
of a rich state and a strong military power (fuguo qiangbing, 富國強兵).
The restructuring of the state apparatus and the enhancement of state
governing capacity are key political reforms that China has striven to
achieve over the past thirty years. These reforms are essential for the promotion of rapid economic growth. For example, China could not introduce
a market economy without changing those parts of the state structure that
served the planned economy. And the focus of reforms has now shifted
from "hardware" measures, such as state restructuring, to "software" measures, such as changing the behavior of government agencies and officials.
Specifically, political reforms to restructure the state apparatus and
increase state capacity fall into four categories. The first category consists
of administrative reforms, composed of government restructuring and the
improvement of personnel management systems; the second is promotion
of the concept of ruling the country according to the law, which aims to
regulate the behavior of government agencies and officials; the third is the
strengthening of state regulatory institutions, which entails the reform of
the fiscal and tax systems, improving banks, stock markets, and stateowned property management systems, and tightening up audits, the collection of statistics, and customs regulations; and the fourth consists of a readjustment of central-local relations.6 1 These reforms have enabled China
60Constitution
of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2001), 3.
Li, ed., China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Lowell Dittmer and Guoli Liu, eds., China's
Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition (Lanham, Md.: Lowman & Littlefield, 2006);
Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004); Barry Naughton and
Dali L. Yang, eds., Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the PostDeng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Yongnian Zheng, Globalization and State Transformation in China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
61Cheng
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
to rationalize its administration, recruit huge numbers of capable technocrats, bolster the lawmaking and supervisory functions of the people's
congresses, and strengthen the regulatory organs of the state. 62 As a consequence, a "strong state," a vital feature of the East Asian developmental
model, has emerged in China, in which technocrats possess enormous authority and autonomy within society, enabling them to take the initiative in
promoting rapid economic development.
The CCP has also reformed its own organizations and institutions,
thus reinforcing its capacity to lead the process of reform and to maintain
its one-party rule in a radically changing sociopolitical environment. Deng
Xiaoping championed the revamping of the Party system from the early
1980s, and implemented reform of various aspects of the Party. In particular, the CCP restructured its organizations, institutionalized its operations,
and changed its cadre management system. Since the 1990s, the CCP has
concentrated on intra-party democracy as a core task of reform, giving
ordinary Party delegates more tasks to perform between Party congress
sessions, strengthening the authority of Party committees (rather than
Party chiefs), enlarging direct elections for Party leadership positions, and
making decisions by free and secret ballots. Furthermore, anti-corruption
policies, which target higher-level Party cadres, have been in force since
the 1990s.63 In the process, the CCP has developed incrementally from a
socialist revolutionary party to an authoritarian governing party responsible for economic development and social management.
Furthermore, state-society relations have undergone remarkable
changes in the reform era. However, these changes have taken an opposite
direction to those in the East Asian developmental states, where the state
gained firm control over society once a "strong state" had been established
62Cheng
Li, China's Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield,
2001); Murray Scot Tanne r, The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions,
Processes and Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); and Cho, Local
People's Congresses in China.
63Shambaugh, China's Communist Party; Bo, China's Elite Politics; Brodsgaard and Zheng,
The Chinese Communist Party in Reform; and Brodsgaard and Zheng, Bringing the Party
Back In.
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
and cooperative state-society relations followed as a result. In China, on
the other hand, the state-society relationship has changed from a totalitarian
mode in the Mao era, when the state maintained strict control over society
through the work-unit system in urban areas and the collective farm and
household registration system in the countryside, into a freer and looser
one in the reform era, in which society, with the introduction of a market
economy and the concept of private property, has increased its influence
and autonomy. The explosive increase in the number of social organizations and their enhanced activities illustrate society's growth relative to
the state. 64
Faced with the increasing capacity and autonomy of society, the
Chinese government has employed two strategies: on the one hand, it has
improved the state's systems for managing social organizations so that they
are prevented from threatening the CCP's one-party rule. A case in point
was the enactment of the Regulation on the Registration and Management
of Social Organizations in 1998, which requires all social organizations to
comply with a two-tier registration system. On the other hand, the central
government has given social organizations much greater space in which to
operate and encouraged them to take responsibility for more functions that
were previously the realm of the state. As a consequence, state-society
relations in China take the form of state corporatism, similar to that of the
East Asian developmental states.65
Finally, China has introduced semi-competitive elections in rural
areas since the late 1980s, with a view to compensating for the "governance
deficit." Democratic elections for village committees are representative
cases. The elections actually encourage peasants to participate in politics
more widely than ever before. However, these elections have serious limitations: first, the committees are not state organs but mass self-government
organizations; second, the committees are still under close surveillance by
higher-level governments and the CCP. In addition, delegates to people's
64Cho,
Local People's Congre sses in China, 113.
65Ibid., 115-26.
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
congresses up to county level are now directly elected, and constituents
have enhanced rights to recommend candidates. Furthermore, China has
experimented with direct elections for township-level (xiangji, 鄉級) government chiefs in certain areas of the country, including Sichuan Province
(四川省) and the city of Shenzhen in Guangdong (廣東省深圳市), since
the late 1990s. These experiments indicate that China may implement
more democratic political reforms in the future. However, these reforms
have problems too: first, they have so far been implemented only in a
limited number of areas and on a limited scale; second, the CCP has not
introduced other democratic measures, including guarantees of civil and
political rights and a multi-party political system.
In short, economic growth has been China's top priority for the past
three decades. To this end, it has attempted to legitimatize economic developmentalism and political authoritarianism by revising its socialist
ideology and promoting nationalism. In addition, China has implemented
political reforms, such as government restructuring, changes to the personnel management system, and party reform, in order to establish the capable
and efficient state organs which are required for economic development.
As a result, a "strong state" ruled by technocrats has emerged in China.
Conclusion
Of the two paths of political development, the East Asian developmental states opted to put political institutionalization ahead of democratization. These states were characterized by the priority they granted to
economic development (i.e., economic developmentalism), various forms
of nationalism, "soft" or "quasi-" authoritarian political structures (i.e.,
strong states and the concentration of power), and cooperative state-society
relations.
Meanwhile, arguments about Chinese-style democracy, debates on
China's political reform, and the actual political reforms that have been implemented over the past three decades show that China has followed in the
footsteps of the East Asian developmental states. Democracy with Chinese
December 2009
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ISSUES & STUDIES
characteristics is merely a socialist authoritarian political system supplemented by a few democratic measures. In addition, the ideas of "socialist
democracy" and "gradual democratic development" either involve tacking
some democratic elements onto the existing socialist political system or
mimicking the developmental state model. In short, China is pursuing a
species of authoritarianism that is located somewhere between totalitarianism and democracy.
Furthermore, the political reforms of the past three decades highlight
the fact that China has much in common with the East Asian developmental
states. Like these countries, China has legitimatized the single-minded
pursuit of economic growth under an authoritarian political system by revising its socialist ideology and encouraging nationalism. China has also
implemented political reforms such as government restructuring in order to
establish the efficient and effective state apparatus necessary for carrying
out growth-first policies. Finally, cooperative state-society relations under
the firm control of the state have been established in China. As a consequence, China has changed from a totalitarian state into a "strong state" in
which technocrats, enjoying disproportionately high degrees of authority
and autonomy, take the initiative in accomplishing economic development.
Given the arguments about Chinese-style democracy, the main ideas
of China's political reform, and the actual political reforms that China has
executed so far, it is highly unlikely that China will launch more democratic
political reforms in the foreseeable future. Instead, China will probably
strive to maintain its present authoritarian political system (i.e., the CCP's
one-party rule) by adhering to its previous path of political development.
In this regard, of the three possibilities for China's political future
discussed in the introduction, this article predicts that the second one will
become a reality: that is, China will continue along the path of economic
developmentalism and political authoritarianism much longer than some
China watchers anticipate.
98
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Democracy with Chinese Characteristics?
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