1
NASSP Issue Brief Series:
Key Issues and Dilemmas for
Brunei and Malaysia in the South
China Sea Dispute
Elina Noor & Thomas Daniel
National Asian Security Studies Program Issue Brief
No. 2.1 December 2016
2
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Author:
Elina Noor
Thomas Daniel
Title:
ISSN:
ISBN:
ISBN Title:
Series:
NASSP Issue Brief Series [electronic resource] / Issue 1, No. 2.1 (2016)
ISSN 2207-0923 (NASSP Issue Brief Series)
978-0-9954240-3-6 (ebook : pdf)
Key Issues and Dilemmas for Brunei and Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute
NASSP Issue Brief Series: 1 (Online)
Other Authors/Contributors:
Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University
of Wollongong, AUS
Carnegie India
Center for a New American Security
Center for Strategic and International Studies, NW, Washington, DC, USA
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Indonesia
Griffith University, Nathan, QLD, AUS
Hult International Business School, CA, USA
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo
Monash University, Melbourne, AUS
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Queen Mary University of London, UK
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
University of Queensland, Brisbane, AUS
University of the Philippines
Subjects:
Dewey Number:
Format:
URL: File upload:
Pub category:
Editors:
National Security–International Relations– China–Maritime disputes—South China
Sea–International law of the Sea—Asia–ASEAN–National security--Australia-Military planning
327.16 International conflict
Electronic online/digital
https://www.nla.gov.au/sites/default/files/webform/david_jay_greenj
_the_economic_context_for_regional_conflict_and_cooperation.pdf
Government
Dr Christopher Roberts, Tran Truong Thuy, and Tetsuo Kotani
E: [email protected]
P: +61 2 62688868
National Asian Security Studies Program (NASSP)
UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy
PO Box 7916 Canberra BC ACT 2610
Australia, Canberra ACT 2610
Published and distributed by:
National Asian Security Studies Program (NASSP)
UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy
E: [email protected]
Website: https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/NASSP
3
Special Inaugural Edition
The South China Sea in the Broader Maritime Security of the Indo-Pacific
Maritime issues have emerged as one of the most important security issues in the Indo-Pacific, driving
major powers to strategically adjust their policies towards the region. During the past decade,
maritime disputes have escalated to the point where the regional order is being affected and the risk
of subsequent armed conflict cannot be entirely ruled out.
The South China Sea (SCS) is at the centre of maritime disputes in the Indo-Pacific region. Many states
have significant maritime security interests in the SCS including, inter alia, freedom of navigation and
overflight, peace and security in the region, and respect for international laws and norms. While
governmental talks have not yet brought about significant progress to solve the disputes, Track II
dialogues such as this have the potential to provide open and frank analysis and discussions leading
to recommendations that can more effectively manage the situation.
With these considerations in mind, UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA),
the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV), and the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)
hosted a conference and two associated workshops, termed ‘The South China Sea in the broader
maritime security of the Indo-Pacific’, from 28 to 30 September 2016 in Canberra at the Australian
Defence Force Academy. This special December 2017 edition of NASSP Issue Briefs are a result of the
conference, workshops, and institutional partnership.
The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV)
The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam is an educational and research institution affiliated to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam. It was established in 1959 and focuses on conducting
strategic research in international affairs and foreign policies; teaching students and post-graduates
in the areas of international relations, law, economics, journalism and foreign languages; and
training mid-career professionals from central and local government agencies on international
affairs and diplomatic skills.
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), founded in 1959, is a private, nonpartisan policy
think-tank focused on foreign affairs and security issues. In addition to a wide range of research
projects, the institute promotes dialogues and joint studies with other institutions and experts at
home and abroad, examines Japanese foreign policy and makes proposals to the government, and
disseminates information on international relations to the public. The institute, together with a large
network of affiliated scholars, aims to serve as an indispensable resource on international affairs in a
complex world.
National Asian Security Studies Program (NASSP)
UNSW Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy
The new National Asian Security Studies Program builds on the Executive Education Program
developed in 2014. Aside from conferences, workshops and publications to enhance the policy
community’s understanding of the Indo-Pacific, the Program is specifically designed to develop
leading scholar-practitioners. Through the Program, graduates will be better networked with
regional and global partners who will have strengthened their capacity to formulate best practice
policy responses to contemporary security challenges.
4
2.1
Key Issues and Dilemmas for Brunei
and Malaysia in the South China Sea
Dispute
Elina Noor & Thomas Daniel
Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia
Overview and focus
In the wake of the tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the South China Sea dispute, there has been an
increased – and some would argue more critical – focus on the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its four member states that are claimants in the dispute.1
Their statements and responses have been the subject of much speculation, scrutiny,
criticism and praise – with the latter two depending on which side of the fence one sits.
The response of ASEAN in particular has received criticism as the organisation was
unable to develop a seemingly strong and unified position on a dispute that not only
impacted several of its member states, but a dispute that appears to be entering into a
new paradigm – that of a clash between major powers and stakeholders alongside that
between claimant and littoral states.
At the recent back-to-back ASEAN Summits held in Vientiane, the South China Sea was
again high on the agenda. Some observers repeated earlier reproaches for the
organisation not taking a critical stand against China in the dispute, and on failing to
mention the Tribunal’s decision.2 Nevertheless, examination of the Chairman’s statement
indicates that the South China Sea did feature prominently and strongly relative to a
number of framing issues and disagreements that preceded the final statement in
previous ASEAN Summits; the realities and limitations faced by the regional organisation;
and, in particular, the pressure and expectations on Laos, its current chair. The eight
paragraphs referring to the South China Sea dispute expressed “serious concern over
recent and on-going developments”, and took note of concerns expressed by some
member states regarding the land reclamations and escalation of activities. The
statement further called for the peaceful resolution of the dispute, “in accordance with
international law”.3
Of the four ASEAN claimant states, Brunei and Malaysia present – and are faced – with
their own unique and interesting challenges. Both, like all other ASEAN claimants, are in
dispute not only with China, but also with each other. Unlike other claimants, however,
Prashanth Parameswaran, “Assessing ASEAN’s South China Sea Position in its Post-Ruling Statement”, The
Diplomat, 25 July 2016, Available from: <http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/assessing-aseans-south-china-sea-positionin-its-post-ruling-statement/>
2 Al-Jazeera English, “South China Sea row tops ASEAN summit agenda”, 9 September 2016, Available from:
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/south-china-sea-row-tops-asean-summit-agenda-160908052213165.html>
3 ASEAN, “Chairman’s Statement of the 28 th & 29th ASEAN Summits”, 6-7 September, p.23, Available from:
<https://www.asean2016.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/Chairman%27s%20Statement%20of%20the%2028th%20and%2029t
h%20ASEAN%20Summits_FINAL.pdf>
1
5
both are located at the southernmost portion of China’s Nine-Dash Line or U-shaped
claim. Both – especially Malaysia – have only recently begun to deal with the increased
Chinese presence in their waters and exclusive economic zones, something that Vietnam
and the Philippines have long experienced. The aim of this short paper is to highlight
significant issues and dilemmas for Brunei and Malaysia concerning their response and
management of the South China Sea dispute. In highlighting and understanding these
issues and dilemmas, it is also imperative to understand why the South China Sea is of
importance to both of these countries.
Critical issues and dilemmas for Brunei
Brunei is considered a relatively low-profile claimant in the South China Sea dispute,
especially in recent years, during which tensions have increased significantly. 4 The
country has consistently advocated its “two-step approach” to resolving the dispute.5
This entails not merely that claimants seek to resolve the dispute through peaceful
negotiation in accordance with international law, but also the need for all parties –
including ASEAN and China – to ensure a peaceful and conducive environment in which
the negotiations take place. Statements from Brunei have been relatively measured over
the years, with little information being offered or stated regarding increased Chinese
activities in the southernmost portions of its Nine-Dash Line claim.
While Brunei is the smallest claimant state with the smallest claim, geographic and
economic realities make the dispute and its outcome of great importance to the
Sultanate.6 The country’s entire coastline of 161km straddles the South China Sea. It is
also a country that relies overwhelmingly on oil and gas exports – which contributes as
much as 90 per cent of government revenue and 60 per cent of its GDP.7 The vast majority
of these hydrocarbon resources are concentrated offshore in its exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) in the South China Sea – much of which lies close to or falls within China’s NineDash Line claim.8 Its economic lifeblood – and great wealth – is tied to the South China
Sea and the future trajectories of the dispute.
The state’s dependency on hydrocarbons could also lead to another crisis – the falling
prices of oil and gas and dwindling reserves means that its finances have been
increasingly strained and its future prospects as a wealthy, tax-free and subsidised state
look increasingly dim.9 Attempts to diversify its economic base have yet to show any
promising results. Amidst these developments, China has emerged as a significant
partner to Brunei. Aside from being a major customer of its hydrocarbon exports, in
World Politics Review, “Brunei Maintains a Low Profile in Pressing Its South China Sea Claims”, 28 January
2016, Available from: <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/17799/brunei-maintains-a-low-profile-inpressing-its-south-china-sea-claims>
5 Borneo Bulletin, “Brunei’s two-step approach to South China Sea issue”, 9 September 2016, Available from:
<http://borneobulletin.com.bn/bruneis-two-step-approach-south-china-sea-issue-2/>
6 Brunei’s only claimed feature in the South China Sea appears to be Terumbu Semarang Barat Kecil (Louise
Reef). While Malaysia disputed this ownership in the past, both countries have come to an agreement, with
Malaysia rescinding its claim in 2009.
7 Oxford Business Group, “Brunei Darussalam Year in Review 2015”, 19 January 2016, Available from:
<http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/brunei-darussalam-year-review-2015>
8 Daniel L. Shields, “Working with Brunei to Get the Rebalance Right”, Ambassadors Review, March 2014, p.21,
Available from: <https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/26165/uploads>
9 Matthew Prusak, “Brunei’s Economy Running on Empty”, The Diplomat, 17 February 2016, Available from:
<http://thediplomat.com//2016/02/bruneis-economy-running-on-empty/>
4
6
recent years China has committed at least USD500 million in investment to develop
strategic industries and facilities in Brunei.10 China has also reached out to offer its
assistance in deep-sea drilling.
As with several other ASEAN member states, this apparent increased dependence on
China has raised the question of China using its increased influence to stymie any
pushback from ASEAN or efforts to unify its member states to take a more critical stance
over Chinese actions in the South China Sea dispute. This perception of greater Chinese
influence was given greater weight in light of China’s four-point “consensus” on the South
China Sea with Brunei, Cambodia, and Laos.11 In its aftermath, as criticism and questions
were directed to the nature, implication and even validity of the apparent consensus, it
was worth noting that Brunei chooses to remain silent on the issue. There was no rebuttal
or clarification offered publicly on the nature of its role in this consensus.
Last but not least, despite its vast wealth from hydrocarbon exports, Brunei maintains a
relatively small naval and air force with limited capability for sustained patrols and active
military operations. At present, its inventory includes around four blue-water-capable
offshore patrol vessels and several transport planes that can be used for maritime
surveillance. Brunei has yet to secure the type of combat-capable naval and air assets that
other claimants possess and deploy in the disputed region. To counterbalance this, it
maintains good defence relations with the United Kingdom, the United States and, to an
extent, Singapore. Additionally, Brunei is also the only claimant not to maintain an
outpost of any kind on the South China Sea.12
Given Brunei’s historical and ongoing constraints and dilemmas, it is unsurprising that
the Sultanate chooses to conduct a low-key approach when it comes to managing and
responding to South China Sea claims and the wider dispute. One can imagine that the
question of how Brunei manages these issues in the future, especially in terms of its
relationship with China, is not only keeping the policy thinkers in Bandar Seri Begawan
awake at night, but also those from several other ASEAN capitals.
Critical issues and dilemmas for Malaysia
As with Brunei, Malaysia’s interest and stake in its claims in the South China Sea are often
tied to the region’s economic value to the Malaysian economy and government. A
significant portion of Malaysia’s oil and gas revenues are derived from the region, and its
estimated reserves are among the highest when compared to other claimants.13 However,
the estimates of hydrocarbon and marine resources in the seabed and water columns
comprise only one aspect of the country’s stake and interest in the dispute. Of
Gary Sands, “Brunei, Silent Claimant in the South China Sea”, Foreign Policy Association, 28 April 2016,
Available from: <http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2016/04/28/brunei-silent-claimant-south-china-sea/>
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Talks about China's Four-Point
Consensus on South China Sea Issue with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos”, 23 April 2016, Available from:
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1358478.shtml>
12 Ronald O'Rourke, “Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Issues
for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 31 May 2016, p.28, Available from:
<https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf>
13 Ralph Jennings, “Why Malaysia stays quiet about its claims in the South China Sea”, Forbes, 2 June 2016,
Available at:
10
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=http://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2016/06/02/why-malaysiastays-quiet-about-its-claims-in-the-disputed-south-china-sea/&refURL=&referrer=#5ff707701beb
7
foundational concern is how the Malaysian nation is cleaved – geographically and
demographically – by the South China Sea.
Malaysia’s two landmasses on either side of this body of water are known as “Peninsular
or West Malaysia” and “East Malaysia” on the island of Borneo. The distance between
them can only be covered by flight or sea, which places pressures not only on the
country’s military and coast guard assets but also on intra-national market access due to
the existing cabotage policy between East and West. Social integration and nationbuilding across waters is also an abiding challenge. Additionally, the two large East
Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak are politically crucial and afford the long-standing
ruling coalition an electoral bulwark.
These challenges are inherently fundamental to the defence of the country’s interest in
the South China Sea and are reflected in official policy. Malaysia’s national defence policy
states that any threat or disruption to the sea routes and air space between peninsula
Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak could detrimentally affect the integrity of those territories.
Despite this imperative, Malaysia’s seriousness in standing up for its claims, especially in
the face of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea, has been questioned. In particular,
the country has come under criticism of varying shades for how it has dealt with China
on the issue.
Malaysia’s tempered approach to China has been attributed to, among other things, a
“special relationship” dating back to 1974 when the then-Prime Minister, Abdul Razak
Hussein, and father of the current Prime Minister, Najib Abdul Razak, established
diplomatic ties with Premier Zhou En Lai during a difficult time in the region. Whether or
not the relationship remains a special one is open to contention. However, in recent times
trade and investment ties have burgeoned between the two countries.
Over the past year, in particular, Chinese investment has flowed fast and hard into
Malaysia. China’s investment of USD10 billion in the Malacca Gateway project, launched
in February 2015, is expected to transform the ancient entrepôt of Melaka into Southeast
Asia’s largest private marina by 2025, complete with a deep-sea port and ocean park in
support of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.14 In November 2015, 1MDB, the Malaysian
government’s controversial strategic investment company disposed of EDRA Global
Energy Berhad to China General Nuclear Power Corporation for USD2 billion in a bid to
cut its total debt of USD11 billion. This was followed in the subsequent month by another
sale of 1MDB’s controlling stake in Bandar Malaysia, a huge development project that will
host the Malaysian terminal station for the high-speed rail (HSR) connection between
Malaysia and Singapore. In a tie-up with a local Malaysian partner, China Railway
Engineering Corporation (CREC) purchased the equity stake for nearly USD2 billion.15
CREC is a contender for the HSR project, and in anticipation of winning the tender has
committed to invest USD2 billion in Bandar Malaysia for its regional centre.16 This year
in June the Malaysia–China Kuantan Industrial Park, part of the East Coast Economic
14
RSN Murali, “Gateway a boost to Malaysia, says Liow”, The Star, 8 November 2015, Available from:
<http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2015/11/08/china-to-spur-growth-of-ports-rm43bil-investment-in-malaccagateway-a-boost-to-malaysia-says-liow/>
15
Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Malaysia's 1MDB in $1.7 bln asset sale, PM says debt mostly gone”, 31 December 2015,
Available from: <http://www.reuters.com/article/malaysia-1mdb-idUSL3N14K11920151231>
16
Sheridan M Ali, “China Railway Group to invest US$2bil in Bandar Malaysia”, The Star, 21 March 2016,
Available from: < http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2016/03/21/china-railway-group-to-investus$2bil-in-bandar-malaysia/
8
Region Special Economic Zone (ECER SEZ), drew USD395 million in investment, USD145
million of which will derive from Guangxi Investment Group Co Ltd.17
These, along with warmer political ties between the Malaysian and Chinese leadership,
provide a useful but insufficient backdrop to interactions surrounding the South China
Sea. The Malaysian government, after all, has always viewed the country’s territorial
claims in the Spratlys seriously. Its official, declaratory policy is premised upon the
following.18 First, Malaysia maintains complete rejection of China’s Nine-Dash Line claim
because of the assertion’s incompatibility with international law, including UNCLOS.
Second, Malaysia believes in the peaceful management and resolution of the dispute
through negotiations, dialogue, and consultation among all claimant parties in
accordance with the DOC, pending completion of a substantive and meaningful COC.
Third, any resolution must be within the framework of international law, including
UNCLOS. Malaysia also remains open to legal mechanisms of third-party dispute
resolution as provided for by UNCLOS, although the country seems less inclined to pursue
this option at present.
Until recently, Malaysia never needed to respond urgently to developments at sea. With
the construction of artificial islands taking place in the Parcels rather than the Spratlys,
Malaysia could afford simply to cast a watchful and wary eye on developments. For its
part, the Malaysian government avoided inflaming tensions both at home and abroad. It
refrained from erecting new installations on the features it occupied, even though others
were doing exactly that, in flagrant violation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
in the South China Sea (DOC).19 Malaysia also confined discussions on the South China
Sea dispute to the policy and bureaucratic elite. This encouraged candour among involved
and knowledgeable interlocutors, but it also averted the growth of public nationalist
sentiment. For a while Malaysia resisted broadening discussion of the dispute to nonclaimant parties, believing that internationalising the issue beyond the confined
ASEAN/ASEAN–China framework would import even greater and unhelpful major power
rivalry into the issue.
However, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), and
swarms of Chinese fishing vessels, have frequently sailed – and even anchored – in
Malaysia’s EEZ. Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Shahidan Kassim, reported
to Parliament that PLAN vessels had encroached on Malaysia’s maritime zone in the
South China Sea nearly once a year since 2011.20 These incursions increased in 2013
around Beting Serupai, Beting Patinggi Ali (South Luconia Shoal), and Beting Raja Jarom
17
Melissa Goh, “Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park seals US$395m worth of deals”, Channel News Asia,
31 May 2016, Available from: <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/malaysia-chinakuantan/2831490.html>; Media release, “Investors from China visit Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park
(MCKIP) and Kuantan Port”, East Coast Economic Region Development Council, 1 June 2016, Available from:
<http://www.ecerdc.com.my/en/media_releases/investors-from-china-visit-malaysia-china-kuantan-industrial-park-mckipand-kuantan-port-piling-works-for-rm5-6-billion-production-facility-for-alliance-steel-kicks-off/>
18
Deputy Foreign Minister Reezal Merican, “Hansard”, Parliament of Malaysia (House of Representatives),
D.R.19.05.2016, 19 May 2016, p.10
19
These five features are Terumbu Mantanani (Mariveles Reef), Terumbu Ubi (Ardasier Reef), Terumbu Siput
(Erica Reef), Terumbu Peninjau (Investigator Reef), and Pulau Layang-Layang (Swallow Reef).
20
The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) defines Malaysia’s maritime zone as the “waters,
territorial sea, continental shelf, exclusive economic zones and fisheries of Malaysia and includes the airspace
over the Zone”. Official website of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA):
<https://www.mmea.gov.my/eng/index.php/en/citizens-and-public/36-malaysian-maritime-zone>
9
(North Luconia Shoal), all within Malaysia’s EEZ. Even though there were no openly
publicised protests, Malaysian senior officials recognised that Malaysia could no longer
remain inactive since the stakes were “indeed very high”.21 The Malaysian Maritime
Enforcement Agency (MMEA) and Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) now constantly monitor
the Beting Patinggi Ali area, and from 2014 to 2015, increased the frequency of their
patrols by nearly 30 per cent.22
One of the most striking signs of growing frustration with these incursions has been the
apparent change in tone by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. Although the
government had been quietly lodging almost weekly diplomatic notes to protest, manage,
and resolve the repeated intrusions of waters around Beting Patinggi Ali, at the end of
March 2015 the ministry publicly confirmed the presence of a large number of foreign
vessels in Malaysia’s maritime areas and “called in” the Chinese ambassador to Malaysia,
Huang Huikang “to seek clarification as well as to register Malaysia’s concerns over the
matter”.23
However, when the Arbitral Tribunal issued its award, the Ministry resumed diplomatic
restraint. It simply noted the decision and recalled past and continuing ASEAN
commitments, including full and effective implementation of the DOC in its entirety, early
conclusion of the COC, self-restraint, and full respect for diplomatic and legal processes.24
This careful and watchful positioning encapsulates Malaysia’s approach towards the
South China Sea dispute. While the government has repeatedly stressed that the defence
of territory is non-negotiable, it is also cognisant that as a small country with limited
resources it will have to be firm, pragmatic and discerning in protecting its sovereignty
in the immediate to middle-term. Importantly, it will have to achieve this without
undermining the preservation of longer-term national and regional peace, prosperity and
stability. As such, Malaysia will have to balance a range of considerations – political,
economic, and defence – domestically and externally in managing South China Sea
complexities.
Those studying the nuances of Malaysia’s approach will recognise the subtle changes in
the government’s perception and articulation of, as well as response to, the evolving
Mohamed Thajudeen Abdul Wahab, “Opening Remarks at the Colloquium on the South China Sea: Inssues,
Challenges and Strategic Options for Malaysia”, National Security Council, Prime Minister’s Department, 28
December 2011.
22 In 2014, both MMEA and RMN operated in those areas for 269 days. In 2015, operations were conducted
345 days of the year. Minister Shahidan Kassim, “Hansard”, Parliament of Malaysia (Senate), D.N.14.12.2015,
p.52; Deputy Foreign Minister Reezal Merican, “Hansard”, Parliament of Malaysia (Senate), D.N.25.04.2016, 25
April 2016, p.8.
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, “Press Release: Recent Development in Malaysia’s Maritime Areas in the South
China Sea”, 31 March 2016, Available from: <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/press-release/21
/asset_publisher/t3pS/content/press-release-:-recent-development-in-malaysia%E2%80%99s-maritime-areas-in-thesouth-china-sea?redirect=%2Fweb%2Fguest%2Fpressrelease%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_t3pS%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p
_p_col_id%3Dcolumn2%26p_p_col_count%3D1%26_101_INSTANCE_t3pS_delta%3D10%26_101_INSTANCE_t3pS_keywords%3D%26_101_INST
ANCE_t3pS_advancedSearch%3Dfalse%26_101_INSTANCE_t3pS_andOperator%3Dtrue%26_101_INSTANCE_t3pS_cur%3D
14>
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia, “Press Release Following the Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China
Sea: Statement by Malaysia”, 12 July 2016, Available from: <http://www.kln.gov.my/web/guest/press-release//asset_publisher/t3pS/content/press-release-following-the-decision-of-the-arbitral-tribunal-on-the-south-china-seaissue?redirect=%2Fweb%2Fguest%2Fpress-release>
10
strategic environment. The country’s quiet and unassuming South China Sea policy has
worked well enough for it, so far. However, whether it will continue to do so remains to
be seen.