What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power
Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro
Source: Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 515-534
Published by: American Political Science Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446501 .
Accessed: 16/05/2011 13:50
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=apsa. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Perspectives on Politics.
http://www.jstor.org
Articies
What
China
Intentions
Will Want:
of a Rising
The
Future
Power
W Legro
Jeffrey
butwhat China will do with itsnewfoundcapabilitiesremainsan issueof contentious
China's nationalpower isgrowingrapidly,
At theheartof theproblem is thedifficulty
ofdiviningfutureintentions.
Two arguments
debateamong scholarsand policymakers.
The otherhighlights
China's growinginter
have dominated thedebate.One focuseson power and likelyChinese revisionism.
Both areproblematicin termsof logicand evidence.They offerlinearprojectionsthat
dependenceand likelyfuturesatisfaction.
of foreign
policy ideasand events.Relative
ignoretheway thatChina's futureislikelytobe contingent-especiallyon theinteraction
are importantbut theirimpact ismediated throughthedoctrinesleadersuse to justifyaction and
power and interdependence
establishauthority:thoseideasareprone to change in regular
ways-and with themChina's intentions.If thisargumentis right,
withChina need tobe
policyprescriptionsthatadvocatecontaining,engaging,or somemix of thetwo (i.e.,hedging) in relations
reconfigured.
"rising
China" problemisnot justaboutpower,
stressed
thatits
butpurpose.China has consistently
as amajor powerwill be peacefuland
development
non-obtrusive.
Yet in theUnited States thereis,as one
of anx
U.S. DeputySecretary
ofStateput it,a "cauldron
Expert testimony
beforethe
iety"overChina's future.1
U.S.-China Economic and SecurityReviewCommis
sion,a body thatmonitorsand reportstoCongresson
over
has focused
heavilyon uncertainty
bilateralrelations,
In February2007, Vice President
China's intentions.2
test
Cheney cautionedthatChina's recentanti-satellite
with
militarybuild-upwere "notconsistent
and general
of
rise."'3The stomachs
China'sstatedgoalof a 'peaceful
arechurning.
strategists
policyissueconnectssodirectly
It israre
when a pressing
literature.
Such is thecase
toa critical
gap in thescholarly
with the impactof theriseofChina on world politics.
Will growingpower lead Beijing to challenge inter
generat
nationalnorms,rules,and institutions-possibly
in
Asia if
East
amongmajorpowers
ingdangerousconflict
in
inter
the
not elsewhere?
Or mightChina's integration
increas
its
middle
class,
and
nationaleconomy, growing
ininternational
andexchanges
institutions
ingparticipation
The
lead toenduringsatisfaction
in theexistinginternational
order?
Today
China
appears
to be
a "status
quo"
power.4
Will itremainso?
Existinganswersto thisquestionlack theverything
ofcontingent
changein the
needed:a generalexplanation
intentions
ofChina.5The problemisnot simplyan issue
or repression
of freeexpression
sincethe
ofChina'ssecrecy
applies to democraciesas
problemof futureintentions
Even ifwe had accessto theinner
well as dictatorships.6
workingsof theChinesegovernment
today,it isunlikely
aims.Even if
thatinformation
would tellus about future
worldhegemony
or
China todayhas somesecretplan for
world harmony,thoseaimswill be subjectto changeby
China'sverygrowthand theprocessbywhich itunfolds.
Ironically
evenChina's top leaders,
despitetheirconcen
what
tratedpoliticalpower,cannotknowwith certainty
theircountry
willwant.
thedebate
Indeed,thatiswhat thetwoviewsdominating
inevitable
on China argue,althoughtheysee different
onChina'spowerand claimsthat
The first
futures.
focuses
China's desireforrevision
will growas China's relative
capabilitiesincrease
despitewhatBeijing thinkstoday.In
thisviewothercountries
mustdo all theycan tocontaina
rising
China becauseat somepointChina willwield its
new-found
powerto challengeglobalorder.The second
andargues
W LegroisProfessor
Woodrow
viewhighlights
China'sgrowinginterdependence
and Chair in the
Jejfrey
of the
thatsuchconflict
can be avoidedbycontinuingtoengage
ofPoliticsand Co-Director
WilsonDepartment
inChina that
at the
Miller
Governing
Americaina GlobalAgeProgram
China,whichwill builddomesticinterests
favorpoliticalliberalization
and accommodationto the
University
ofVirginia(legro@
CenterofPublicAJfairs,
rulesof theprevailing
international
system.
Both answers
RobertRoss,TangShip
virginia.edu).
Theauthorthanks
comments tap intodeep-seatedforcesshapingChina, but both are
ing,
Womack,andZhu Fengforhelpful
Brantly
assistance.
flaweddue to theirlinearprojectionof the futureof
research
andDaniel AaronWeirforexcellent
DOI:
10.1017/Si537592707071526
September
2007
Vol.
1
5/No.
3
515
Art'icles
IWhat China Will Want
Chinesepolicytowards
international
vis theirdomesticcritics.Likewise,
order-be itthecon
whenChina displays
or theharmo
flictual
revision
expectedbypowertheorists
consistentrevisionist
tendencies,such ideas should be
niousintegration
predicted
by interdependence
advocates.7 penalized-but onlywhen influential
oppositiongroups
China'sdiplomaticfuture,
are promoting
more attractive
alternativeideas.Other
however,is likelytobemore
contingent
thaneitherthepoweror interdependence
posi
wise,nomatterhow loathsome
anyparticular
approach,if
tionsallow.To highlight
thealternative
isevenlessdesirable,
contingency
requiresthatsome
dramaticpressurefor
thingbe saidaboutwhat thefuture
dependson-no small rapidchange isproblematic.
Therefore,itbehoovesthe
problemwith a countrylikeChina thatisauthoritarian international
community
tobe proactive(notjustreactive
onmany issues.
What policymakers tobehavior)bynurturing
and non-transparent
groupsand ideasinChina that
havefounddifficult
tostudy.8
most need,scholars
Clearly offermore benign replacementsto the less desirable
in thecaseofChina both itsrelative
powerand itseco
alternatives.
The issue
nomic interdependence
affectitsforeign
policy.
Naturallyin all theseareas,thepotentialforoutside
of courseishow thetwowill do so overtime.9
influence
on a country
ofChina's sizeand regimetypehas
I arguethattheirinfluence
dependson a third
limits.
meshing significant
Yetwe knowfromtheSovietexperience
gear-national ideasabouthow toachieveforeign
states,slowpatientefforts
to
policy thateven in authoritarian
goals. Such ideasperformthreecriticalfunctions:they supportreformers
can have an impact.'2The futureof
empowercertaindomesticinterests
groupsoverothers, Chinawill notbe decidedby theactionsofothers,
but the
is actionsofoutsidepartieshave influenced
theygenerateexpectations
againstwhich performance
China'sorienta
or impedethepossibil
tion in thepast (e.g.,Nixon and theopeningofChina)
assessed,and theyeitherfacilitate
to emerge.Specifically,
whenChi
ityfora new strategy
andmay do so again in thefuture.
in the
neseexpectations
I approachtheproblemof theriseofChina fromthe
about thebenefits
of integrating
extantinternational
with nega
orderaredefiedbyevents
of international
perspective
relations
not as an area
theory,
tiveconsequences,
anopportunity
existsfordomesticcrit
Thus I will emphasizehow developmentsin
specialist.
ics to challengethatorthodoxy.
Whether changeactually China relatetoa generalpatternseeninothergreatpow
on thedistribution
of replace
occursdepends,however,
ersin theirattempts
to revise,
join,or separatefrom
global
whethercriticscan coordinate
ment ideasthataffects
on a
order.
The goal is topointout theproblemsin thecurrent
worldview.
feasiblealternative
debate,offeran alternative
view,and exploreitscontem
some twists
on familiar
A good starting
This approachoffers
thinking. poraryrelevance.
what
point is todefine
viewofChina, themost
Contraryto thepower-centric
intentions"
meansand tooutlinethenature
exactly
"future
of current
Chinese intentions.
dangerousscenarioin thefutureisnot the"rise"ofChina,
The articlethenexplores
inChina'seconomicgrowth.
but ruptures
Opposed to the how power and interdependence
argumentsdeal with
economic interdependence
economic
intentions,
offers
an
explanationforchangeand continu
position,
engage
mentneednot leadtoharmony.
Countriesthatundertake ity,
and explorestheimplications
forthefuture
ofChina's
havegenerated
con
rapidintegration
intentions.
considerable
systemic
flict.'0China itselfhas displayedwide variationin its
or separateitself
approach,be itcooperate
with,challenge,
frominternational
societyover thepast twocenturies. China and Contemporary
The point isnot thatpoweror economicliberalization
is International Order
but ratherthatthosefactorsinteract
with
Intentions
refers
towhatChina plans todo. Here I focus
unimportant,
dominantideasinparticular
on plansfordealing
with theinternational
specifically
order.
ways toshapeenduring
pat
terns
In generalterms,statesdealwith international
of nationalbehavior.
order in
In termsof policy thismeans thatneithera contain
threeidealways: integration,
and separation.
The
revision,
mentnorengagement
policyisa reliable
consistent
choice. first,integration,
refers
to nationalstrategies
thataccept
Indeed, thedominantview todayamongpolicymakers thedominantprinciples,
rules,andnormsofwhatHedley
13Typicallysuchstates
a "hedging"strategy
acceptsthisadvicebyadvocating
that Bull called"international
society."
with theparticular areseenas "status
pursuesbothoptionssimultaneously
or "conservative"
quo," "satisfied,"
pow
ersbasedon theirdesiretoworkwithin theinternational
mix of strategy
vs. cooperative)
(conflictual
dependenton
A secondcategoryincludesthosestatesthatana
Chinesebehavior.'I
system.
The argument
hereoffers
a somewhat
andmore
toas "dissatisfied"
or "revisionist,"
different
but themean
lystsrefer
China
proactiveview: it suggeststhatmanaginga rising
ingisthesame:theyinvolve
efforts
tofundamentally
revise
will dependnot on behaviorper sebut on thenatureof
the international
breeds
system.Such revisiontypically
thedominantideas.
When China espousesideasandaction conflictsinceothercountriesare prone to defendthat
itmakes sensetodo as
thatfavorcooperativeintegration,
same order.14
A thirdapproach is seen in statesthat
much as possibleto ensurethattheirinternal
fromtheorbit
supporters attemptto removeor separatethemselves
gainpositivefeedback
and "I toldyou so" leverage
normsand practices,
much as
vis-ai of prevailinginternational
51 6
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 1
China's outlook on international order
Dominant Orthodoxy
Qing (1800-1860)
Separatist
Republican (1896-1939)
Integrationist
Era Mao (1949-1976)
Deng (1978 -
Revisionist
)
Integrationist
cen
TokugawaJapanattemptedtodo in thenineteenth
in
or
has
done
the
contemporary
period.
Myanmar
tury,
withaimsor
isa termthatisoftenassociated
Intentions
It is useful,however,to distinguish
goals or interests.
and theideasthatstatesadopt toattain
betweeninterests
showrelatively
Broad interests
littlevaria
theirinterests.
tionbothwithin and among states.Stateshave always
and especiallyin the
fromexternalthreats
soughtsecurity
has also emerged
economicprosperity
twentieth
century,
As JiangZemin
of government.'5
as a core responsibility
declaredin 1997,China seeks"thegoalof beingprosper
ous and strong"-anaim sharedbyChinese leaders(and
theages.China'sdesiretobe a
othernations)throughout
and to"enrichthepeople"dates
"richand strong
country"
back toat leastthelatenineteenth
TodayChina
century.16
national
on increasing
its"comprehensive
iscertainly
intent
power."
17
constantover
Ifsuchfundamental
goalsseemrelatively
those
about
how
to
achieve
of
ideas
longperiods time,
goals arenot.They have rangedfromtheviolentover
of international
orderto thedesireto remainaloof
throw
within it.As seen in fig
fromit,to an urge to integrate
ure 1,China's own historyover thepast twocenturies
showsvariationamongthesepositions.
aremostly
China'scurrentintentions
By thistypology,
China is joiningandworkingwithin the
integrationist.
The wellspringof thisstatus
rulesof theextantsystem.
quo approachisfoundinDeng Xiaoping'sascentto lead
ershipin 1978. Since thattime,China has not sought
norhas itaspiredtooverturn
separationfromthesystem
This
it.Insteadithas increasingly
opted forinvolvement.
in
increases
orientation
hasmanifesteditselfinsignificant
international
institutional
membershipas well as more
with theexisting
informal
behavior
cooperative
powers.'8
This integrative
was cautiousin theearly
orientation
yearshas pickedup
Deng period,but in thepast fifteen
considerable
momentum.There is room to debate the
whether it is shallowor
depthof Chinese integration
enmeshed-butthetrendisclear.'9China has leftbehind
of
"worldrevolution"
and "three
worlds theory"
rhetoric
revisionism
and giveslessemphasisto itsself-proclaimed
role as "leaderof theThirdWorld."20 InsteadChina
great
todayshowsmost of themarkersof a conservative
of theexistinginter
poweracceptingthebasicprinciples
nationalorder.21
China joined the
World TradeOrgani
zation,has cooperated
more fully
with theUnited States
inG-8
sincethe9/11 attacks,and regularly
participates
meetings.China's continuedpromotionof "theFive
Principles
of PeacefulCoexistence"or thecall fora "new
politicaland economicorder that is fairand rational"
seemvague.22China's commitmentto revisingthesys
temtobenefitdevelopingcountriesseemsmost relevant
when it involves
measuresrelatedtoChina'sown growth
of sovereignty
or toconcerns
relatedto itsownhistoryas
a target
of imperialism.23
To suggestthatChina acceptsthebasic principlesof
no
orderisnot to saythatitprefers
today'sinternational
changeinworld politics.CertainlyChina is dissatisfied
with someaspects.Three important
ones areU.S. domi
nance, the statusof Taiwan, and externalpressureto
democratize.
and "democratiza
China favors"multipolarization"
tion"in international
relations-i.e.,thatall states(orat
leastgreatpowers)haveamore equal sayand theUnited
States"hegemonism"
country)
(oranyotherpredominant
in terms
of theU.S. abilityto
lessinfluence-especially
in thedomes
use forcetoachieveitsgoalsor to intervene
That sentiment,
ticpoliticsofothercountries.24
however,
ishardlyunusualand is sharedbymostmajor powers,
America'sEuropeanallies.China has a special
including
in suchmattersdue to the linkbetweenits
sensitivity
colonialpast, subsequentindependence,
and the legiti
macyof theCommunistregime(whichbases itsauthority
inparton successfully
restoring
China'sautonomy).
The second,and related,issueisTaiwan.China favors
Taiwan
and rejects
anymove thatenhances
reunification
Since 1979 ithas advocatedpeaceful
ese independence.
mil
over"liberation"
reunification
(buthasalsodeveloped
China in
itarycapabilitiessuitedtoTaiwan as a target).
thisissue,aswithTibet or otherdisputedterritories,
por
Unification
with
asdefender
of theextantrules.
traysitself
Taiwan inChina'sview isa "domesticissue"overwhich a
statemustmake itsown internal
decisions.As
sovereign
in
to
States
Mao proclaimed theUnited
1970, "Youhave
occupiedourTaiwan Island,but I have neveroccupied
yourLong Island."25
of a desireforautonomyand reuni
The combination
what is also anomalous
with Taiwan is fueling
fication
forgreatpowers(withtheexception
of theUnitedStates)
in thecontemporary
system-a relatively
rapiddefense
to fathomexactnumbers
buildup.Althoughit isdifficult
and levelsof spendingdue toChina's secrecyon these
issues,ithas bumped itsmilitaryspendingsome 15 per
centa yearfrom1990-2005with a 17.8 percentincrease
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
517
Articles
IWhat China Will Want
announcedfor2007. The overalllevel-withestimates
rangingfrom$45-100 billion isstill,however,
a fraction
of est.U.S. militaryspendingof $440 billion (fy2007,
excluding the $50 billion supplementfor Iraq and
Afghanistan).26
China hasmade significant
progressin itscapabilities
air
(includinginballisticand cruise
missiles,submarines,
and amphibiousoperations)thataremostlyrelated
craft,
with regardto scenarios
to regionalchallenges,
especially
involving
Taiwan.AssumingthattheChinese economy
triples
by2025,Chinesemilitaryspendingisexpectedto
climbtosomewhere
between$185 billionto$400 billion
(i.e., lessthanthecurrent
U.S. defensebudget).The Chi
nese continueto facesignificant
geopoliticalchallenges
from
suchas India,Russia,Japan,
and the
United
neighbors
States,not tomention internal
challengesand demands
on publicspending.
Given thisoutlook,itisunlikelythat
thecurrent
scaleofChina'smilitary
modernization
signals
more thana desireto protectitsversionof autonomy,
which problematically
includes
Taiwan and raisesissues
overotherdisputedareas in theEast and SouthChina
Seas.27
aspiresto greaterdemocraticreforms,
the"mostimpor
tantand fundamental
principlefordevelopingsocialist
politicaldemocracy
inChina" istheleadership
of theCom
munistParty.30
In short,
israre,
politicalcompetition
pop
of thecountryis
ularpoliticalchoice forthe leadership
notpermitted,
thepressistightly
managed,theinternet
is
filtered
and blockedwith amazingsophistication,
religion
iscontrolled
by thegovernment,
andhumanrights
accords
areverbally
butnot fullyimplemented.31
acknowledged
Despite thisstanding,it isnotable thatChina isnot
advocatingthatstatesadoptsimilar
politicalsystems
to its
normsareillegitimate.32
own,or thathumanrights
Instead
Beijingemphasizesthatprinciples
suchas sovereignty,
sta
and territorial
shouldtrumpsuchconsid
bility,
integrity
initsfuture,
erations.33
China doesnot ruleoutdemocracy
itjustinsists
thatitwill followitsownpath,style
ofdemoc
racy,and timing.For the timebeing, the international
norm seemsto emphasizedemocratization
(i.e.,moving
in a liberaldirection)not theend stateof democracy(a
somewhat
undefined
goal).China'sstatements
andactions
fitthatprofile-asdiscussedlater,itisslowlyliberalizing
albeitat a slowpace andwith reversals.
Overall,despite
thetension
overhumanrights
anddemocratization,
China's
current
outlook ismostlyintegrationist.
Finally,China may havemost of theattributes
of a
in
normalmajor power theinternational
but it is
system,
distinctfromothercontemporary
greatpowers in one
important
way: it is theonlynon-democracy.
This trait The Limits of Power and
suggeststensions
and disagreement
with emergent
norms Interdependence
of international
human and political
societyregarding
The debateoverChina isnot aboutwhat China wants
In its international
relations,
China isquick to
rights.28
The riseof
today,butwhat itmightwant tomorrow.
makehayoutof relations
withcountries,
thatbya democ
China could lead to a fundamental
reorientation
ofChi
racy standard,may be stigmatizedor less desirable
nese thinking
and perhapsa challengetoworld order,as
China has
partners-as seen in thestrongrelationship
those
who focuson powerpredict.
Or China could increas
beenbuilding
with Iran,
NorthKorea, theSudan,Myan
inglyenmeshitselfin and supporttheexistingrulesof
mar,andRussia.
international
evenundergoing
society,
politicaldemocra
To theextentdemocracy
becomesa definingfeature
of
tization,asmostwho emphasizeChina's growinginter
international
society-and countries
are forcedtochoose
Both offeran important
dependenceforesee.
vision,but
betweendemocracies
andnon-democracies-China
might
both arehalfblind in ignoringthecontingent
natureof
indeedbecome a revisionist
power.Indeed,some have
China's futureintentions.
a
argued(andChina has not disagreed)thatChina offers
model ofdevelopment-"the
different
Beijingconsensus"
Power
thatchallengestheU.S.-dominated"Washington
consen
sus."29That view featuresstronggovernment-directedPower theories
expecta clearshiftin a revisionist
direc
of sovereignty,
and thedevel
tion.As RobertGilpin onceput it,"As itsrelative
protection
growth,rigorous
power
a risingstateattemptstochangetherulesgov
opmentof asymmetric
forms
of defensetocombatother increases,
more powerfulcountries(e.g., theUnited States). In
John
Mearsheimerconcludesthat
erningthesystem."34
extreme
circumstances
China'sgrowingcapabilities
(perhapsa globaleconomicmelt
willmean it"wouldnotbe a
a
vision
a
statedeterminedto
down), such
might become rallying
point for statusquo power,but an aggressive
resistance
to thesocietythatnow exists.
achieveregionalhegemony."35
Denny Roy expectsthat
At thepresenttime,China's notionof democracyis
"China'sgrowthfrom
aweak,developing
statetoa stronger,
"thedemocracy
of dictatorship"
or onewherepeople are more prosperousstateshould resultin a more assertive
the"master
of thestate"-Kafkaesquetermsthatreferto
foreignpolicy ... bolder,more demanding,and less
inclinedtocooperate
with theothermajor powersin the
under
somethingthatisnot democracyas it isgenerally
region."36
The basic thrust
of theseanalysesis thatrising
stood.Insteadpowerresidesin thehandsof theCommu
geopolitical
appetiteand a likely
nistPartyand all otherpoliticalentities
must followits powerleadstoa growing
lead or pay a blood price. Indeed even todaywhen China
changetowardrevisionism.
518
Perspectives on Politics
This view of China has twovariations,the "patient
The problem
with thisargument
howeveristhatpower
hegemon"and the "innocentgiant." In the firstview, isnotdestiny.
There areanalyticand empiricalanomalies
China is likeGermanyin the
Weimar period,patiently thatconfoundsucha spareview.
We might,forexample,
biding itstimeuntil it is strongenough to reconfigure assumethatstatesareconcernedfirst
and foremost
with
an oppressiveinternational
order.Hans Von Seeckt,the power,but thattellsus nothingabout how theythink
headof theoutlawed(shadow)Germanyarmyis reputed theycan bestachievepower-by challengingtheworld,
to have declaredin the 1920s, "Firstwe'll get strong, cooperating
with it,or ignoringit.Because international
thenwe'll takebackwhatwe lost."37
Deng supposedly relations
arecomplexand roadtesting
grandstrategies
is
advised,"Observecalmly;secureourposition;copewith
statesshow laggedresponses
at best to external
difficult,
affairs
calmly;hide our capacitiesand bide our time;be
conditions.
The possibility
ofeffective
adjustment
tointer
good atmaintaininga lowprofile;and neverclaim lead
nationaldemandsisfurther
impededby thefactthat"the
The implication,
of course,is thatafterpower state"isnot a singleactorbut an aggregation
ership."38
of leaders
isachieveddifferent
will
follow.
policies
Lieutenant
Gen
with different
constituencies,
eachwith varyingpercep
eralMi Zhenyu,Vice Commandantof theAcademyof
tionsandpreferences.45
thosepreferences
into
Aggregating
a coherent
MilitarySciences,put itmorebluntly:"[AsfortheUnited
collective
choicefacesa variety
In
ofhurdles.46
States,]fora relatively
isfiltered
long time itwill be absolutely short,
grandstrategy
domesticpolitics.
through
necessary thatwe quietly nurse our sense of ven
Empirically,
statesdo not alwaysexpandtheirforeign
geance.... We must concealour abilitiesand bide our
policyas power increases(nordo theylimitit as power
time."39
Historicalanomaliesarecommon.47In theFirst
declines).
A secondviewofChina isas an "innocentgiant"that WorldWar,Americaemergedas thedominantpowerin
may not be revisionist
rightnow,but is likelyto shiftin
international
relations,
but itsinvolvement
and goalsdid
thatdirectionas it gainspower.China may genuinely notexpand,but contractedin theinterwar
period.China
believe its risewill be peaceful,but once it has gained
in theQing eradid notalteritsisolationist
ideastodeal
it is likelytowantmore and bewilling with theencroaching
enoughresources,
and threatening
Europeanpowers
to concede lessand henceput upwith lessof thestatus even thoughthe securitysituationindicated
mounting
suchshifts
notbyChina,
quo. Sometimes
will beprovoked,
And in terms
of powertrajectories,
dangers.
Britainand
but by theinsecure
actionsof thedeclininghegemon,in
theUnitedStatesdid notgo towarwith eachotherat the
thiscase theUnited States.40
turnof thetwentieth
evenas theUnited States
century,
Not only isrevisionism
Britainas thedominantinternational
likely
accordingtopowertheo
surpassed
power.48
rists,
but so too isconflict.
Powertransitions
areviewedas National strategy
can rarely
be understood
to
by reference
a quintessential
sourceofwar in theinternational
arena.41 external
conditionsalone.
Nor have ideasfollowedthebalanceof powerin lock
This isespeciallythecasewhen nationshavehistoriesthat
leavethemaggrieved.
Thus thereisconcernthatChina,
weaker thanthedom
step.China has been consistently
likeothercountriesthatfeeltheyhavehistorically
gotten inantpowersof world politics since at least the late
theshortendof thestick,areparticularly
pronetoattempt nineteenth
century,
yet itsideashavevariedbetweensep
to revisetheinternational
inRepublicanand
arationinQing China to integration
system.42
These powerarguments
correctly
identify
keyelements contemporary
China to revisionism
Mao (see fig
during
rela
ure 2). We might viewChina's power trajectory,
not
shapingChinese foreignpolicy and international
tions.Chinese leaderspay closeattentionto powerand
staticpositionas beingmost important,
but thattrajec
toryhas been rising(withfitsand starts)sincethecom
Indeed,to theextentthatChina is inter
geopolitics.43
ested in joininginternational
society,it should,by the munists seizedcontrolof themainland.China's ideas,
inbalance however,have made shiftsbetween revisionismand
of thesystem,
havean interest
veryprinciples
on increas integration.
ofpowerpolitics.
AndChina iscertainly
focused
And contraryto the"rising
China" thesis-i.e., that
ing itsown powerand balancingU.S. power inAsia.44
There arealsogood reasonstobelievethatChinese aims
foreignpolicy ambitionsgrowwith relativepower
will growinsomerespects
asChina'spower Chinawasmost revisionist
and influence
when itwas atone of itsweak
estpointsin terms
grows.Itwould be a trueanomalyifsomeportionof
of relative
Mao came
power-i.e., after
China'snew-found
wealthwerenot directedto increased topower.
andmoremodernmilitarycapabilities.
Scholarshaveattemptedtomodifythepowerview to
Likewisepowertransition
theorists
point to the take intoconsideration
such anomalies.One notion is
rightly
when power thatstatesare shapednot justby rawpower,but also by
higherprobability
of international
tensions
transitions
occur.It iseasyto imaginethatamorepower
Powertransition
scholars
have longnoted
"intentions."50
inwaysthatraisehackles that"nationalsatisfaction
fulChinamightuse itscapabilities
with thestatusquo" isas impor
Inbothinstances
of those(e.g.,theUnitedStates)used tocallingtheshots tantas transitions.
thesefactors
areviewed
inAsiawithoutsuchconstraints.
as distinctfrom,
andnot reducibleto,power.
They clearly
September 2007
IVol. 5/No. 3
519
ArticIes
iWhat China Will Want
Figure 2
Relative power (CINC) of China, the United States, and Russia
0.45
C
-
0.4
~0.35
Z-
0.3
0.25
0.
-
02
0
Cooooom
Ajcrl scJsSsa:a
0
o
o
co0 c\J 00
0)
(o ~O(O C a- oo
COco Coco
0O
0
01t
o. c\
CD0 C\j CO
a) 0
C '\j CO CO '
0
CO0 C) 0') 0)C) 0)
0') 0)
0Y) 0)
0
(O
LO cO
0)
0)
C\j CO 't 0
(O
0O 0c
0
(O 0)
(O 0),- 0Y)
0)
0)
C\J co
0)
)
0)
0)
Year
|
-
- China CINOC
0US
what states
and predict
implythat
we cannotunderstand
will dowithoutknowinghow theythinkaboutappropri
Yet theydo notaddressthekeyissueofwhen
ateaction.51
is likelytochange-or not.
such thinking
Interdependence
A different
responsetoChinesepowercomesfromthose
and social
who believethatChina'smaterialimprovement
with theworld give
evolutionthroughinterdependence
and
risetodomesticpoliticalforcesthatfavorintegration
This will occur througha
supporttheexistingsystem.
officialsthat
numberofmechanisms.First,government
over
diplomacy
andnegotiations
takepartininternational
inwaysmore consis
timecome todefinetheirinterests
tent
with thesystem.52
in theworld
participation
Second,China's increasing
economyis expectedto give riseto domesticeconomic
thatpressforevengreaterliberaliza
andpoliticalinterests
For example,asChinamodernizes,itsmiddleclass
tion.53
and its resources grow (see figure 3) 54-a
trend that has
CINC -R
ussia
CINOC
China iseconomically
more that
and socially
Overall,the
withother
majorpowers(e.g.,theUnitedStates)
entwined
and themore it
themore itgainsfromtheoverallsystem
or engaginginmajor
has to lose inchangingthesystem
We mightalsoanticipatethatasChina partici
conflict.57
pates in thesystemitwill also changeit,inconsultation
more to itsliking.
withothercountries,
and agreement
cer
thatsupportengagement
These relatedarguments
on Beijing'sthink
tainlycapturean important
influence
by theeconomic
ingtoday.
China has becomecaptivated
growththathas accruedfromitsopennessto the inter
has generated
more
nationaleconomy.Such interaction
thatfavor
opening.
significant
domesticpoliticalinterests
While thegrowthof theChinesemiddle class is still
wealth
nascent,thereissomeevidencetosuggestincreasing
The People'sRepub
may affect
foreign
policyopinions.58
stateyetChinese
licofChina remainsan authoritarian
citizens
will also attestto thefactthattheirpoliticalsitu
ation today is vastlymore liberal and open than itwas in
more so.59
And finally
thepre-reform
periodandbecoming
China
realizes that it does have much at stake in the cur
tobecomemore engaged.60
rentsystem-withincentives
pointsus to thefactthat
world
usefully
This explanation
Finally as China opens, the increase in travel and edu
domesticpoliticsandwhathap
cationabroad (see figure
4),55 thespreadof freespeech politicsisenactedthrough
can affectthosepolitics,
relations
(seefigure
and ideason theinternet
5),56and experiments pens inChina's foreign
overtime.
changingthemdramatically
votingand choiceareexpectedto inspire potentially
withevenlimited
argumentsis
The problem
with theseinterdependence
a tasteforlibertythatfeedsdemocratizing
impulsesthat
liketheir
debatingopponents,are
power-centric
standards. thatthey,
willmorehappilyalignChinawith international
historically
been a forceforpoliticaldemocratization.
52!O
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 3
Disposable
income of Chinese city dwellers
Figure 4
Chinese students studying abroad
800
140000
700
120000
600/
a
100000
.
CD 500/
g
80000
2 400
0
U
I 300
X
t 200
E
Z
8
60000
40000
20000
100
0
LO-'
cm co)''- ' 1O
O O O a ?8
'
c' 0' )
8
X E X0
8
D 0) O
N M O
O O ? N ?NO NO cmN
}
Year
-
PerCapitaDisposable Income(Indexedto1978)]
-Urban
-,.,,,,,,
LO
z ,C,
crn0 11......Co...o
ocL
o|) ?)9crnoc'3
CY)
C c
CY
) ,C,,,
o)
a)
a) roc'a88
0 b 0a)
a)eorn9
) 0 o)
a)) cy)a)8co
o) a) a) cotoN
AbroadStudentsstudying
-RetumedStudeents]s
They assumethatonceChina has
overlydeterministic.61
systemthereis little
beenhookedup to theinternational
fac
Internationalist
chanceitwill everchangedirections.
areexpected
or learningfromintegration
tionsprofiting
in thatdirec
to snowball,pushingthecountryfurther
tion.This view,however,also runsintoanalyticaltraps
anomalies.
and historical
timeaccountingforhow
ithas a difficult
Analytically,
within societies"add up" to nationalpolicy
interests
users
choices.62For example,what numberof internet
democ
intoa freespeechsocietythatprefers
translates
racy?Right now theChinese governmentismatching
with itsown control
of expression
stridestowardfreedom
todeter
and press.Likewiseit isdifficult
of theinternet
middle classor expansioninChina's
mine how a growing
will fitwith politicalliberalization
sectors
international
Those who have
society.
with international
compatible
most fromChina's opennessare eitherin,or
benefited
China andpro
linkedto,theCommunistpartythatrules
investment.63
thatattractsinternational
videsforstability
China-one where
Indeed,itmay be thata democratic
groupshave a
ruralpeasantsand otherdisenfranchised
opposed to thetypeof integra
say-would be distinctly
tionnow occurring.64
isa precarious
Democratization
process-democratizing
of
under thepressures
statesareoftenprone to conflict
expecta
new-foundnationalismstokedby exaggerated
institutions.
Contempo
tionsunrestrained
by fledgling
Mr. Hyde to
tobe the
Chinesenationalismthreatens
rary
of the"reform
and opening"policy that
theDr. Jekyll
Economic
may be a
interdependence
Deng initiated.65
it
is
not
a
but
failsafe-as
worksagainstconflict,
forcethat
of theearly1900s inEurope
seenin theinterdependence
thatended in theGreatWar.
Figure 5
Chinese Internetusers
Figure 6
Chinese economic
E
10.00%
0.8
9.00%
0.7
8.00%
o
7.00%
I
V
6.00%
o
5.00%
0.6
0.5
0.4
XOI
4.00%
4.00%
c! 3.00%/
&
0.3
0.2
2.00%
0.1
1.00%
0.00%
interdependence
1997
.
1998
.
1999
2000
2001
2002
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
0
...........................
i
g8
N z sco
8 >SN g@
O 8X
8
September 2007
8 8O
jVol. 5/No. 3
N C%JC'J
521
0
Articles
IWhat China WillWant
Nor doesglobalization-theshrinking
of theglobeand
economicpressures)
and tomake senseofhow they
might
increased
densityof contacts
within international
society conjointlycause outcomes-i.e., how powerand inter
due to technological
Chinese inte
advances-guarantee
with ideasthrough
dependenceinteract
mech
predictable
gration.The potentialinterdependence
ofChina in the anismsto causeoutcomes.The centralemphasisinwhat
system-interms
of thedecliningcostsof transportation followsison theroleof ideas(simply
becauseitistheleast
andcommunication
and therelative
opennessof the
world
understood)but the importance
of powerand transna
tradeorder-has been occurringfordecades.Whether
tionalpressures
will also be clear.
China tookadvantage
of thepotential
gainsof interdepen
dencewas at leastin part a Chinese policychoice that
ForeignPolicy Ideas and Intentions
needstobe explained.66
Forexample,as seeninfigure
6,67
broad concepts-almostopera
Chinese interdependence
has not beendrivensimplyby Statestendto formulate
tional
philosophies-that
orienttheirinternational
behav
themarch of technology,
but insteadbyChinese ideas
ior.
As
large
societies,
nations
require
ideas
that
signify
to
(and thoseof others)abouthowmuch China shouldbe
their
members
what
as
they
stand
for;
largeorganizations
engaged in theworld.Thus, Chinese interdependence
they
to
require
ideas
in
guide
them
their
in
interactions
theriseofMao's revisionism
declinedfollowing
andwhen
the
I
international
arena.
as
use
the
term
"Ideas,"
are
here,
China began to recalibrate
afterthedisastrous
Cultural
notmentalconstructs
of individuals,
but insteadthecol
Revolution,interdependence
after
begantorise-especially
lective
beliefs
of
societies
and
organizations
abouthow to
1978.
act.
Examples
of
beliefs
about
"good
policies"
fromthe
The historyof nationaleconomicmodernizationvia
foreign
policies
of
major
powers
include:
engagement
with the international
arena is filledwith
stories
of countries
undertaking
and thenlater
integration
* "non-entanglement"
in European politics (United
moving in theoppositedirection.
Here we might think
States,1776-1941)
ofWeimarGermany'sshiftunderHitler or Japan'sshift
* territorial
expansionon the continent(Germany
fromTaish6 democracyto theShowa era or even the
1890-1945)
retreat
of theUnited Statesin theinterwar
period.China
* isolationfromextensiveforeigninteraction
or pres
itselfreversed
directionsinmoving from
Qing China to
ence (Japan1640-1868)
NationalistChina and thenreversed
again in thetransi
* integration
as a normalpower(SovietUnion/Russia
tiontoCommunistChina.
1986-present)
In sum,both power and economic interdependence
inparticular
maypush strategy
directions
but suchmoves They areembeddednot only in somehumanbrains,but
havealsobeen reversed
evenwhen powerand interdepen most importantly
inthecollective
nationalsym
memories,
denceconditionsremainfairly
constant.Similarly,
some
bols,government
educations
procedures,
and rhet
systems,
timesstates
may stickto theirplansevenas conditionsof
oricof statecraft.69
altersignificantly.
powerand interdependence
Suchviewsmatterbecausetheyarea guide tonational
Why?
actionand can shapewhat stateswant to achieveover
time.
Naturallystateleadersstrategically
plan theiractions
The Meshing Gear: Collective Ideas
but theyoftendo so againsta backdropof certaindomi
Neitherpowernor interdependence
directly
shapedChi
nantnationalideasaboutwhat generalbehaviorisappro
nese grand strategy
because such systemicfactorsare priate.
These ideas
maybe contested
bysomegroups
within
enactedthrough
domesticpoliticsand decisionmaking. societies
butstillserveas a guideforthecollective
"nation."
There areof coursemany typesof domestictheories
of
Promotedby thosewho benefitand nurturedby habit,
politics.Here, however,I want to concentrate
on the theygrowroots.
As organizationtheorists
pointout,par
central(andmisunderstood)roleof enduringforeign
pol
when groupshave intangible
ticularly
goalssuchas "secu
icy ideas in domesticpoliticsand subsequentnational rity"or "wealth"stateswill focus theirefforts
around
behavior.
doctrinesof action ratherthanactualgoals.Put differ
There is a largeand veryinsightful
literature
on how
ently,ideasbecome intentions.70
In foreign
such
affairs,
collectiveideas (e.g.,beliefs,norms,discourses,culture, ideas arewhat ErnestMay has called "axiomatic"
etc.) "matter"in foreign
What isusually
missing formulations
policy.68
derivedfromhistorythatbecomeaccepted
in theseargumentsishow ideasmatterin their
own trans assumptions
of policy.71
The literature
formation.
isverygood on how collective
National ideasabout international
orderaredifficult
to
ideasmightkeep intentions
fixed,but lessclearon how
changefora numberof reasons.First,theyhaveconstit
theyaffect
change.To suggestthatideasplaya rolein their uenciesthatbenefitfromthemand thusareenergizedto
own transformation
is not to argue thatoutcomesare promoteand defendthem.Second,suchdominantideas
It isusefultodistinguish
caused
ideas.
theimpact becomeingrained
wholly
inpublicrhetoric
by
andbureaucratic
pro
of ideasfrom
otherfactors
(e.g.,strategic
circumstances
or
ceduresthat
make themresilient
likeall traditions
thatare
522
Perspectives on Politics
Figure 7
Collapse
Desirable Results
Ideas on
WorldOrder
Events Contradict
EventsConfirm-*
<1
-
UndesirableResults-*
Continuity
Continuity
Collapse
change
(potential
see Consolidation)
institutionally
entrenched.
Third, becauseof thiseffect triesthenuse thosebaselinesto assess-and supportor
When
they
becomenormalized
not justasmeans toachieveends, critique-existingpolicies,dependingon events.
eventscontradictcollectiveexpectations
and theconse
but also as a standardofwhat thenationshoulddo, or
evenwhat it is (i.e., identity).
quencesarestarkly
changeismore likely.
Such
undesirable,
situationsfacilitate
TokugawaJapancame to be definedby itspolicyof
changeby givingammunitionto the
opponentsof thecurrentorthodoxy,
allowingthemto
excludingforeigners
and itsleadersappealed to thattra
of thecurrent
theUnitedStates rallysupportto theirsidewhile supporters
ditiontosustaintheir
position.Similarly,
with the orthodoxy
areputon thedefensive.
For example,thesep
to"getentangled"
was distinguished
by itsrefusal
150 years aratistapproachof theQing Empirewas finally
disrupted
suspecttraditional
powersofEurope in thefirst
victoryin theSino-Japanese
War.
of itsexistence
and presidents
paid homageto thatnorm by the1895 Japanese
in
That
event
set
a
race
among
outsiders
to
control
China
off
pop
(e.g.,Harding in the1920s) ordertobolstertheir
China in thenineteenth
and encouragedforces
withinChina to challengetradi
centuryin thefaceof
ularity.72
incursions
tion,includingin foreign
attemptedtohew toa traditional
Qing
policy.74
foreign
Inmost othercircumstances,
continuityis likely.
For
Middle Kingdommentalitydespiteitswaningauthority.
thatcontinuity
isthenorm example,
canbe expected
whendeviations
from
It istherefore
not surprising
continuity
in foreign
ideasleadtoundesired
outcomes.
When the
policyideas.Thosewhowant tochallengetra
United
existing
in
hurdles.It isoftenhardforindivid Statesintervened
WorldWar I itviolateditslongstand
ditionfacesignificant
inEurope'spolitics.
uals toknow ifothersdesirechangeand iftheydo, how
ingtabooagainstentanglement
The
will riskactingon suchpreferences.
Lacking results
ofWorldWar I brought
widespreaddisillusion
much they
such information,
theycannotbe sureiftheirowndesire ment in theUnited Statesand theAmericansembraced
inEurope. In
forchange(shouldtheyexist)will have any anew theirtradition
of "no-entanglement"
and efforts
suchsituations,
defenders
of theold ideas(as theAmeri
effect.
Theymustmount a case for
why theold ideaswere
whichcan involve
considerable
andbecause can isolationists
did) will be able tomake politicalhay
effort,
defunct,
itthreatens
tradition,
invites
socialand politicalcriticism. by claiming"toldyou so,we shouldneverhave strayed
ofnew
fromour triedand truetradition."
in
Likewisetheformation
and institutionalization
Intervention
World
ori War I, theyargued,had been a disastrous
ideasbreedsstrife
and uncertainty
becauseparticular
mistake.
Likewisecontinuity
isevenlikely
whendominantideas
entationsofferdiffering
costsand benefitsto domestic
are ignored
occur.It ishard togather
overwhich, ifany,new direc
yetdesirableresults
groupsthatcan stalemate
is a potent momentumtochangecollectiveideaswhen outcomesare
tion ismore desirable.
Continuity,therefore,
policy agreeable.
force.
Yet asMay pointsout, entrenchedforeign
Consider,forexample,thedearthof investiga
tionsof largestock
vulnerableto transformation
"as
marketincreases
thatno one expected
conceptsarenonetheless
andcountries
"seethepastina new light."73 versusthespecialcommissionsthatalwaysseem to form
history
grows"
to examineunexpectedstockmarket crashes.
The interesting
When
questionsarewhen and how?
momen
outcomesaredesirable,it isdifficult
togenerate
Disintegrates
VWhen
Orthodoxy
tum to reorient
bureaucracies
and altertraditions.
The
of an extantorthodoxy
eventsthat
Implicitin theabovediscussionis thefactthatchangeis delegitimation
requires
not a singlephenomenonbut involvestwo stagesthat both contradictits logic and have undesiredconse
individuals
will bemore
must be explained:collapseof theold ideasand consoli
quences.In suchcircumstances,
dationof thenew.Both stages,I argue,are affected
by motivatedandmore likelytochallengethoseideas,believe
for
othersareof a likemind, and hence thepossibilities
ideas.
pre-existing
how lead
In thecollapsestage,pre-existing
ideasaffect
changearemore significant.
ersjustify
policyand seta baselineof socialexpectations
Figure7 depictsthebranchinglogicof collapseinvolv
ofwhat should result.Politicalopponentswithincoun
of ideasand consequences.
ingthisinteraction
September 2007
iVol. 5/No. 3
523
Articles
IWhat China Will Want
Figure 8
Consolidation
Replacement
Ideas
None orMany -*
One
Undesirable Feedback
-*
Desirable Feedback
* Consolidation
ConditionsofNew Orthodoxy
Evenwhen dominantideasare delegitimated,
however,
change is not automatic.Consolidation, like collapse,
faceshurdlesthatfeedinertia.Individuals
may agreethat
theold viewhas to go butmay not be able to agreeor
coordinateonwhat neworthodoxyshouldbe theguide.
Such a dynamichas been chartedin thestudyof revolu
tion,but it also existsin foreignpolicydisputesand
debates.75The consolidationof a new foreignpolicy
approachdependsnot only on thecollapseof theold
ideas,but also on thedistribution
of replacement
ideas,
especiallytheexistence
of a prominent
When
alternative.
thereare no developedalternatives
or when thereare
many equallystrongalternatives,
the resultcould be a
returnto theold thinking
due todefaultin thefirst
case
and deadlockamong factionsin thesecond.For exam
ple, inQing China in thenineteenth
century,
Sinocen
tricseparation
fromtheencroaching
international
society
was so dominantthatthere
were virtually
no groupsof
with developedreplacement
any import
ideas to guide
China's foreign
policy.76
The sustainability
of a neworthodoxy(whena promi
nent replacement
does exist)overa longerperiodoften
hingeson somedemonstration
of itsefficacy.
Ideas that
enduredo so because theyappear to generatedesirable
results.
When thosenotionsdo not,revanchists
oftenfind
fertile
groundtoarguefora returnto theold ideas.This
was thecase inWeimarGermany
when theresults
ofVer
saillesunderminedtheliberalinternational
policyof the
SocialDemocraticgovernment.
fledgling
Versaillesalso
spawnedthe
May Fourth
Movement inChina thathelped
discreditfledgling
liberaldemocracy
notions.77
Figure8 depictstheway thatthedistribution
of replace
ment ideasand their
demonstrated
efficacy
foster
or inhibit
change.
This argumentfeaturesideasas a meshinggear-one
thatinteracts
with otherfactors
and indoing so has its
own influence.
National strategies
therefore
area product
ofmulti-causalinfluence.
Prior ideasplay a rolebut of
coursedo not unilaterally
determineall aspectsof new
orthodoxies.
Consider,forexample,theroleof therelative
whichoftenshapesnegativeandpositive
powerof actors,
toprevailing
feedback
ideas.
Dominantconceptsthatignore
524
Perspectives on Politics
Continuity(ofoldideas)
Continuity
(change)
relative
powercan lead todisappointing
resultsthatcon
tributeto theirdelegitimation.
Consider thedeclineof
theQing-era tributesystemand sinocentrism
under the
weightof superiorEuropean and Japanesecapabilities
thatexposedtheirfragility
in thelatenineteenth
century.
Likewise,thenumberand natureof replacement
ideasso
centraltoconsolidationisshapedby thepoliticalactivity
and resources
of interest
groupsand individuals
thatpro
mote them.Economic interdependence
and thepromises
of growthinherentin itcan indeedstrengthen
thosein
favorof such ideas.78
Long-termefforts
thatencourage
international
exchangecan facilitatethe riseof replace
ment ideas in particularsocieties.79
Thus thesuccessof
ideascanalsobe shapedby thedegreea countryisinvolved
in theinternational
economy.
Overall,then,theaccountof foreign
policychange(and
continuity)
here iscontingent.
offered
Itdependson the
interaction
of thedominantforeign
policy ideasof states
with theresults
encountered,
aswell as thedistribution
of
replacement
ideasin a particularsocietyand theirinitial
success,ifany.To stress
isnot to forgoexpla
contingency
nation.80
We canposit thatfutureintentions
will depend
on thedegreetowhich theexpectations
ofparticular
dom
inantideasare defiedby events,negativeconsequences
result,
and somesociallyviablereplacement
ideaexists.
This generallogicseemstohavewide applicationin the
of greatpowers,and thoughtherearedifferences,
history
coversbothdemocratic
andauthoritarian
What
regimes.8'
followsis a briefillustration
of how someof thecentral
dynamicscapturedby the logicmight play out in the
ofChina's current"reform
future
and opening"viewon
international
orderdescribedabove.
The Contingent Path of China's
Future Intentions
The argumentabove highlights
particularsignpostsas
important
forunderstanding
whatChinamightdo with
itsgrowingpowerin thefuture.
Most centrally,
thelon
ofChina's integrationist
gevity
will
orthodoxy dependon
theexpectations
itgeneratesin thedomesticarenaand the
resultsthatare experienced(collapseconsiderations),
as
well as on thenatureof theideasthat
might replaceinte
gration(consolidation
factors).I addresseach in turn.
and Expectations
justifications
and promotethe
Contemporary
Chinese leadersjustify
-in
andopening"
dominantintegration
idea-i.e., "reform
twodifferent
ways.
justification
of current
andmost important,
The first,
withintheexistinginternational
policyis thatintegration
orderprovidesthebestmeans fornationaleconomicdevel
China remains
a government
runbya commu
opment.82
Yet thelegitimacy
and popularsupportof the
nistparty.
but instead
doesnot reston socialistideology,
government
not "Work
"Well-off
Society"
on economicperformance.
mantra.President
Zemin's
Jiang
ersUnite" is thenational
2002 addressto the16thPartyCongressput thisclaim
starkly:
It isessentialforthePartytogive topprioritytodevelopmentin
governingand rejuvenatingthecountryand open up new pros
of the
pects forthemodernizationdrive . . . theprogressiveness
Partyisconcreteand historical,and itmust be judgedbywhether
thePartypromotesthedevelopmentof theadvancedproductive
forces.83
The FifthPlenaryof the 16th PartyCongressof the
CPC inOctober 2005 calleddevelopment"theoverrid
allproblemsfacing
ingprincipleand thekeyto resolving
orientation
China."84The dominanceof theintegration
based
in contemporary
policy is largely
Chinese foreign
accordingto
on economicconsiderations.Integration
the reform
and openingorthodoxyservesChina's rapid
development.
within
forintegration
The secondmajor justification
the existing internationalorder is that it enhances
in termsof independence
and
sovereignty-understood
That is, integration
shouldprevent
territorial
integrity.
the typeof colonialsubordination
of thepast and the
of China by outsidepowers.A defining
infringement
pointof historyfortheCommunistParty(CPC) leader
ofhumiliation"
China enduredunder
shipis the"century
of imperialist
theinfluence
West, Japan).
powers(e.g.,the
One of theCPC's main claims to authorityis that it
Integra
liberated
China fromthatoutside influence.85
tionfacilitates
sucha goal byprovidingaccessto institu
tionalforawhereglobalpoliticsare decided thatmight
also provides
affect
China's autonomy.Such integration
thatthe
the imprint
ofmajor powerstatus,confirming
countryis no longersimplyan objectmanipulatedby
or Japan,
more powerful
Westerncountries
but an impor
itself.
tantactor
forChina
The most concrete
markerof sovereignty
todayisTaiwan.China expectsthatitsparticipationin
ofworld politics
theextantinstitutions
and conventions
will help to fulfill
a desire(seemingly
widespreadacross
thepoliticalspectrum)tounitethemainlandandTaiwan.
allowsChina to stymieefforts
Such participation
byTai
and tobuild
wan toclaimsovereign
international
standing
support.
itSown international
These twothemes,economicmodernizationand sov
may look closelylinkedto therealistfocuson
ereignty,
powerand autonomy.
The keydifference,
however,isthat
China's
Chineseleaders
justify
them
notbasedon increasing
but on betteringthelivingstandardofChinese
security,
citizens.
Likewise,
China'sobsession
withTaiwanandother
territories
ishardtounderstand
fromstrictly
a powerper
Without knowingChina'shistoryand thecen
spective.
ofTaiwan toCPC legitimacy
gains,it is impossible
trality
tounderstandtherolethisissuecan play inChinesepol
iticsand security
decision-making.
Economicdevelopment
can of course
and sovereignty
withone another,
a factthatdoesmuch
alsobe in tension
of contemporary
Chinesepoli
toexplainthecomplexity
can lead to deep inroadson issuesof
cies.86Integration
Forexample,
membershipin the
WorldTrade
sovereignty.
with ita numberof significant
Organizationbrings
impli
cationsfortheChinese socialand politicalorder,not the
leastofwhich ismajor turmoilin themassiveChinese
withinChinese
sectorandgrowinginequality
agricultural
society.87
AnticipatingEvents thatFavor Change
The durability
ofChina'sintegrationist
foreign
policy,there
will dependon how results
match socialexpectations
fore,
relatedtoeconomicgrowth
and sovereignty.
Eventsrelated
thatrepresent
setbacks
toChina's integration
significant
toeitherof thoseissues
would be occasionsforChina to
rethink
integration.
The first
where theintegrationist
orthodoxy
situation
would be vulnerableinvolvestroublesinChina's eco
From thisviewpoint(and incon
nomicmodernization.
trastto theriseofChina debate) themost likelyscenario
inwhichChinawill alteritsintegrationist
mindsetisnot
with thegrowthof Chinese powerbut, instead,
major
in thattrajectory
thatcould put thedominant
ruptures
A reasonable
viewon a slippery
case
defensive.
"openness"
ofChineseeconomicgrowth
can bemade thata leveling
as isChina's riseto supremacy.88
is as likelyin thefuture
this
current
Chineseexpectations,
would
Especially
vis-'a-vis
be a deeplydisillusioning
experienceifChina's govern
That is, in theabsenceof
ment is somehowimplicated.
downturnsthataffectall countriesor unforeseen
crises,
touse
of thecurrent
will have incentive
critics
orthodoxy
Chinese economicprospectsto rallypolitical
faltering
arounda newapproachto theinternational
sys
authority
in
will
be
the
tem.The motivatingsource sucha scenario
combination
of surprising
economicsetbackscontrasted
with optimistic
expectations
generated
by leadersseeking
legitimacy.
The declineof economicgrowth
would encourage
pre
China'srapid
viouslysilentgroupsthatopposeintegration.
development
has led todauntinggapsbetweenrichand
poor.89Social protestsand disturbances
appear to have
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
525
Articles
IWhat China WillWant
risensteadilyin recentyears,increasing
from8,700 in
1993 to 87,000 in 2005.90 Involvementin theWorld
TradeOrganization(W1TO) is puttingsignificant
pres
sureson poor farmers
and peasants
who cannotcompete.
As longas theeconomyisbooming,someof thesepeople
can transfer
toothertypes
of jobsor thegovernment
can
providesomeformof subsidy.91
Yet ifgrowthfalters
ina
way that
makes thegovernment
seemcomplicit,thissys
temlooksbrittle.
Second,eventssupported
by theinternational
commu
nitythatChina seesas neo-colonialorwhichmove Tai
wan towardsindependencecould help to undermine
China's currentintegration
orthodoxy.
For example,the
1999 bombingof theChineseembassyinBelgradefueled
nationalismand strengthened
opponentsof opening.92
Much, of course,will dependon theparticularcircum
stancesandwhetherthey
makeBeijinggovernment
seem
Taiwaneseefforts
complicit.
to establishformalindepen
dencecausedeepconcerninChina-indeed thetypethat
can setthestagefor
China to takeaggressive
efforts
on an
issueseen as priorityevenby "reformist"
governments.
Taiwaneseindependence
efforts
in2004-2005 weremet
by a strong(and self-defeating)
reactionfrom
Hu Jintao
andNationalPeople'sCongresspassinganti-secession
leg
islation
which authorized
China touse forceagainstTai
wan ifitcontinuedtopush forindependence.93
Jiangalso identified
a secondgroup
withalternative
pref
erencesforChina'sforeign
policy.
He calledit"those
with
leftist
tendencies"
(distinctfromtheoldMarxistvariety)
who critiquereform-and international
involvement
as contributing
to social injusticeand inequality.
In the
current
context,this
mightincludefarmers,
ruralcitizens,
inlandcities,andpartsof the
militaryorCommunistparty
who havenot sharedequallyinChina'sdevelopment
and
couldrightly
blamereform
andopeningorparticipation
in
theglobalorder(think
WTO) as thecause.In foreign
pol
icysuchtendencies
translate
intosocialsupportforhalting
and reversing
China's integration
in thecurrent
order.If
thecommuniquefromtheFifth
Plenary
Sessionof the16th
PartyCongressinOctober2005 isan indicator,
thechal
lengefromtheLeft-and theinequality
ofgrowth-isof
particular
concernto theleadership
ofHu Jintao
who has
emphasizedthemoreegalitarian
goalof "harmonious
soci
ety"incontrasttoJiang's
mantraof "well-off
society."97
A third
position
would comefromthose
who arecritical
ofglobalization
andwesternvalues,butarenotnecessarily
isolationist
or anti-capitalist.
These peoplemight advo
catea nationalistrealpolitik
amore con
policythatfavors
frontational
with the
strategy
West, stability
and central
athome,whilepursuinga softlineand integra
authority
tioninAsia.Thinkof thisperhaps,as theplatform
forthe
resurgence
ofamodernday"MiddleKingdom"rolewhere
China would exerciseincreasing
withinAsia
hegemony
while perhapsdistancingitselffromoverallinternational
Replacementsfor "Reform
and Opening"
order.98
If reform
and openingdoes falter,
what then?
Presumably
Absentbetterinformation,
itwould appearthatthose
some sortof alternative
path.Anticipatingsuch a new who would emphasize
withdrawal-eitherthenew Left
approach,however,
dependson a keyfactorthatisespe
or realpolitikers-would
occupytherhetorical
highground
ciallyelusivein theChinese case: thenatureanddistribu shouldfutureeventsdefythe"opening"justifications
of
tionof replacement
ideasaboutinternational
within
theChinesegovernment
society
with cleardisappointing
results.
China.94The outlinesof threereplacements
arediscern Both offer
a greater
difference
withcurrent
dominantinte
able inan admittedly
opaque view.95
grationideas(Rightists
want evenmore integration)
and
The first
was identified
byJiangZemin as a challenge would likelybe in a betterpositiontodrawoffthelan
to his own "reform
and opening"emphasisin theyears guageof nationalismtomake theircase.99Chinese strat
followingthe 1989 Tiananmen Square fiasco.96Jiang egywill of course alwaysbe a mix of thesedifferent
labeledthisthethreatfromthe"Right."For thegovern approaches;theissueisthedirection
of shift
and thedegree
those
ment,thedangerfromtheRightinvolves
whowould
towhich one orientation
dominates.
attempttopursueeconomicand politicalliberalization
at
To theextentthata factional
accountofChinesepoli
an evenmore rapidpace at theexpenseof thePartyand
tics is overdrawn(e.g., because the decisionmaking
socialstability.
In recent
yearstheCPC hasbeenespecially dynamicis one of consensus,not groupsfighting
over
focusedon thischallengeand has gone togreateffort
to
control)thenanychange in foreign
will
policythinking
luresuccessful
businessmenintothepartyandwelcome demandespecially
and could takeconsid
negativeresults
thereturn
ofChinese fromabroadwho mightotherwise erabletime,justas itdid inQing China.'00 If thereis a
be a voice formore forceful
politicalchange.Think here continuedsharedview that"isolationis themajor factor
of those
who havebenefited
most fromrapidintegration explaining
China's decline"and "openingfueledChina's
butwho arenowchafing
underCPC constraints
or believe rise,"thenshifting
significantly
away fromreformand
Chinamust takereforms
to thenextlevel(e.g.ruleof law, openingwould not happenquickly.101
Althoughnot so
education)at a faster
pace-e.g., thenewprivatebusiness dominantas theseparatist
mentality
ofQing China, inte
men or state-owned
gration todayenjoysa privilegedstatusagainstwhich
enterprise
artists
or intel
executives,
replacement
or even
ideaproponents
lectuals,coastalcityregionsand theirofficials,
may havea hard timemak
partsof thebureaucracy
thathavean interest
in integration. ingheadway.
526
Perspectives on Politics
Influencing Intentions
The pointhere isnot topursuewhat has come to be
isa significant
and crit
theperceived
Understanding
futureintentions
wisdom indealingwithChina'sunknown
I have
icalchallengeforboth scholarsand policymakers.
futureintentions-i.e.,a hedgingstrategy.
Such an ap
arguedthatoneway (bynomeans theonlyway) to think proachcounselsthattheothercountriespreparethem
of intentions
isas a productofchange selvesforanyeventuality
about theevolution
and respondinkind.However,
fromtwoproblems.It isoverlypassivein
and continuityin dominantideasabout foreign
policy. doingso suffers
of unmetexpecta
Situationsinvolving
thecombination
itsdependenceon simplyreactingtowhat happens in
tionsand undesiredconsequencesare likelyto facilitate China.Andmost important
itisoverlyfocused
onChina's
collapsewhile thosewhere conceptualexpectations
are behaviorand not attentive
enough to the ideasbehind
fulfilled
or desiredconsequences
occurfavorthecontinu
actionand how theyrelateto thedomesticpoliticsof
ityof orthodoxy.
Consolidationof a new foreign
policy authorityinChina. A simpleresponseto behavior
may
approach-and hence setof intentions-isenhancedby
unnecessarily
strengthen
revisionist
forcesinBeijing.
of a prominentreplacement
Ifthegoal istoincorporate
theexistence
idea thataligns
China intotheinternational
with desirableresults.
makes thesystem
systeminaway that
operateina fashion
If thisargumentis right,it impliesthatunderstanding acceptabletoall,however,
itisimportant
toreinforce
those
thefuture
of a "rising
China"means lookingbeyond,but Chineseleaders
andmovementsthathavestakedtheirlegit
notover,powerand interdependence.
The effects
ofpower
imacy
on thepositiveaspectsof integration.
A modern-day
forunder
and interdependence
are certainlyimportant
repeatof theundermining
of pro-liberalization
advocates
China'sattitudetowards
international
order.
Rel
Westernaction-as occurred
by
when theVersailles
standing
Treaty
ativepowerhas shapedChina'spast thinking
towardsthe producedtheMay FourthMovementand a reactionary
dominantrulesandnormsof theinternational
The
Thismaymeanmakinganextra
China-would bea disaster.
system.
toassurepayoffs
effort
toChina forparticularly
boldmoves
penetrating
geopoliticalreachofWesternpowerhadmuch
todowithwhyQing China had theincentive
tochangeits in terms
of integration-orin terms
of restraint
vis-a-vis
Like
Taiwan.The point isnot simplyto impedehardliners
longenduringtributary
systemand sinocentrism.
and
how
wise, theinterdependence
approachrightly
highlights
help softliners.
Indeed,doingeither
mightbe desirable
theopennessofChina and growthof international
trade depending
on theideasandexpectations
arepromoting.
they
and contacts
hashelpeddevelopconstituencies
and liberal
There isof coursea riskin supporting
Chinesedevel
forcesinChina thatotherwise
mightnot exist.But these opmentthrough
Itmay lead-throughunfore
integration.
twoconstantstructural
cannotaccountforthevari
seenevents,
ormiscalculation,
or inadequatesupport-to
forces
ationovertimeinChineseideasabouthow torelatetointer aChina thatstrengthens
buthas
enoughtobe dangerous,
wemustalsoheedthecontingent notyetchangedenoughinternally
nationalsociety.
To do that
tobe satisfied
with the
aswell as the normsof thesystem.'02
In suchcircumstances,
ways thatforeign
policyideasrelatetoevents,
whereinte
replacement
ideasthatform
withinChina.
grationist
ideasareundermined,
Chinamaywell look to
In termsof policy,thisargument
cautionsagainstthe anotherandmuch lessdesirablesetof ideastoguide its
main alternatives
in
choice thatexistsamong the three
foreign
policy.
thecurrent
U.S. policydebate:engaging,
To dealwith thisscenario,itmakes sense,then,tobe
or
containing,
hedgingagainsttheriseofChina.Anymightbe appro
proactive-topay attentionto thepotentialreplacement
inChina and theirbackers-ones that
priatedependingonwhat particular
ideascirculating
policyChina ispur
be conceptual
suingand how thatrelatesto theChinese government's may someday
kings.Forexample,itisimpor
rationaleforitsactions.To theextentBeijing leadersare
tantthatlong-term
efforts
bemade to strengthen
those
to build theirauthority
and legitimate
their Chinese groupsand individuals
who would support,in
attempting
rulebased on actionsthatchallengeinternational
order, theeventof significant
setbacksto reform
and opening,
otherstatesshouldobjecttoorpenalizesuchactions.For
replacement
ideasthataremore desirablethanan aggres
nationalist
There
sive,separatist
example,U.S. policies towardtheSovietUnion-e.g.,
approachtoforeign
policy.
theCarter and Reagan defensebuildup, the response arehistorical
influ
precedentsforsucha transformative
to theSoviet deploymentof new SS-20 Euromissiles, ence.Efforts
takenovermanyyearsbya variety
ofgroups
and the aid to theMuhjahadeen in thewake of the in theUnited States(and inBritain)after
WorldWar I
Soviet invasionofAfghanistan-helpedtoundercutthe hadmuch todo withwhy internationalism
(a fusingof
Brezhnev"correlation
of forces"
thatarguedthat geopoliticsandWilsonianism)was a coherentreplace
thinking
inAmericanstrategy
theexercise
of SovietpowerservedtheUSSR's interests. ment forisolationism
after
World
The dynamicwas not justa balancingof powerbut an War II.103LikewiseduringtheColdWar,U.S. andEuro
of ideas.Likewise,shouldChina pursue pean interaction
moreauthoritarian
withan even
andclosed
undermining
aggressive
policies thatundermineinternational
order, SovietUnion helped"newthinking"
(andnot someother
othercountriesand organizations
should sanctionand
thinking)
takeshapeas a viablereplacement
when theold
Sovietforeign
policydogmadisintegrated.'04
delegitimize
them.
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
527
Articles
IWhat China Will Want
Of course,thelimits
of outsideinfluence
on a country
ofChina's sizeand complexity,
especially
giventhepopu
larChinesedesireforautonomy
andnon-interference
from
foreigners,
are significant.
Moreover,China's authoritar
iangovernment
and lackof transparency
limittheability
tocloselyfollowand shapeinternal
developments.
China's
futurein theworldwill be largely
of itsownmaking.Yet
as seeninhistory,
outsideinfluence
has sometimes
played
a role in the evolutionof China's approach to inter
nationalsociety-fromthe
OpiumWars tothe
May Fourth
Movement to theearlyCold War period to thecurrent
integration.
Centraltothishistory-andChina'sfuture
arenot just theperilsof poweror thepromisesof inter
dependence,but also how theyrelateto theway China
thinksabout theworld.
Notes
1 Zoellick2005.
2 See, for example the hearings held from the summer
of 2006 up to now. http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/
hearingarchive.php
3 Vice President sRemarks to theAustralian-American
Leadership Dialogue, Shangri-La Hotel Sydney,
Australia, February 27, 2007. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/
20070223.html
4 Johnston 2003.
5 Friedberg 2005 offers a typology and contingent
analysis of future relations that lacks a general expla
nation to tell us whether eventswill move in one
or another.
direction
6 Copeland 2000a.
7 Friedberg 2005 documents that there is some varia
tion
in this
dichotomy?some
who
focus
on
power
do not see inevitable conflict and some liberals are
more
pessimistic.
8 For a study that explores the link between uncer
tainty
about
intentions
and
cooperative
or conflic
tual strategies, see Edelstein 2000.
9 The classic synthesis of power and interdependence
(without ideas) isKeohane and Nye, 1977.
10 See Snyder 1991 and Solingen 1998.
11 The National Security Strategy of theUnited States
of
America (March 2006) "seeks to encourage China to
make the right strategic choices for itspeople, while
we
hedge against other possibilities." http://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/. See also Carter and
Perry 2007, 16-22; Council on Foreign Relations,
U.S.-China Relations: An AffirmativeAgenda, A
Responsible Course, Independent Task Force Report
59 (April2007).
12 Thomas
13 See Bull 1995.
528
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.
htm; Hao andWang 1978, 171.
17 Pillsbury 2000.
18 See Kent 2002; Johnston 2003, 2004a.
19 Cf.Wang 2000 and Johnston 2001.
20 Such themes are common in speeches from the
1970s. See for example, the keynote speeches at the
10th(1973) and 11th(1978) PartyCongresses.In
Jiang's address to the 16thNational Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party inNovember 2002, there
was virtually no mention of this traditional role.Hu
Jintao's leadership has placed somewhat more em
phasis on it.
21 Ross 1997.
22 The five principles, which have been included in the
Chinese constitution, are 1) respect for sovereignty
2) non-aggression 3) non-interference 4) equal and
mutual benefit 5) peaceful co-existence.
23 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress
of theChinese Communist Party,November 8,
2002.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
49007.htm. Chinas recent "reassurance diplomacy"
in South East Asia suggests a mode of cooperative
not easily
equated with domination or
leadership
but
is nonetheless compatible
behavior,
balancing
with extant norms. See Medeiros and Fravel 2003;
Shambaugh 2005.
24 Wen, 2007. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
2007-03/03/content_818952.htm
25 As quoted inWestad et al. 1998, 135.
26 Yardley and Lague 2007 and Office of the Secretary
of Defense, 2006.
27 Crane et al. 2005 and Annual Report toCongress: The
Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina 2006.
28 See Foot 2000; Barkin 1998; Payne and Samhat
2004.
29 Ramos 2004.
30
"Building of Political Democracy inChina," Infor
mation Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China, October 2005, Beijing, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/
content_3645750.htm. and Kahn 2007.
31 Foot 2000, 3.
32 Chinas respect for human rights saw a downturn in
2006 as China cracked down on dissent likely in
anticipation of the 2008 Olympics. See Human
RightsWatch, World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm.
Small
2001; Evangelista 1999.
14 See Morgenthau
15 Rosecrance 1986.
16 Jiang Zemins Report at the 15* National Congress
of
theCommunist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997.
1966, 38ff;Wolters
Perspectives on Politics
1962, 81-102.
advances
are also
sometimes
made.
For
exam
ple, theHuman RightsWatch report in 2005 noted
thatChina amending its constitution inMarch
2004 to include guarantees on private property and
human rights "signals a growing acknowledgment of
human rights."Human RightsWatch, "Human
Rights Overview: China," inWorld Report 2005.
http://hrw.Org/english/docs/2005/01/13/
china9809.htm.
33 Zhang 1998, 177-193; Wen 2007.
34 Gilpin 1981, 187. See also Zakaria 1992.
35 Mearsheimer
2001, 402.
36 Roy 1994, 149-168, 159-160.
37 Geyer 1981, 107.
38 Hong Kong Jing bao, No. 172 (5 November 1991),
6 November 1991, 28-30 as
84-86, in FBIS-CHI,
cited inWhiting 1995.
inMosher 2001, ch. 1.
39 Quoted
40 See Copeland 2000b.
41 E.g., seeOrganski and Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981;
Kim and Morrow 1992; Copeland 2000b. For dif
ferent strategies ofmanaging such a situation, see
Schweller 1999.
42 Waldron
1995.
43 For an argument thatChina has a long strategic
tradition of realpolitik thought, see Johnston 1995.
44 Pillsbury
2000;Qin 2001.
45
In theChinese case see,Dittmer
46 Gilbert 1987, 185-204
1995, 1-39.
47 For a variety of examples, seeWalt 1987; Snyder
1991; Stein and Rosecrance 1993; Kupchan 1994.
48 Most power transitions occur without conflict. See
De Soysa, Oneal, and Park 1997.
49 Relative power is given as a composite of the relative
share of absolute total global data on six categories:
energy consumption, iron& steel production, mili
tary expenditure, military personnel, total popula
tion, and urban population. See National Material
Capabilities Study (v3.01) http://www.correlatesof
war.org and Singer et al. 1972, Singer 1987.
2006.
50Walt 1987; Schweller
51 Lemke 2002. Ruggie
consider
purpose
1982 speaks to the need to
as well
as
power.
52 Johnston 2001.
53 Frieden and Rogowski, 1996.
54 The index number of 100 for real disposable income
in 1978 was equal to 343.4 RMB. See http://
chinadataonline.org/member/yearbook/default.
asp?StartYear= 1984&EndYear=2006.
55 www.chinadataonline.org. For data prior to 1985,
see China Statistical Yearbook, 633.
56 Statistical Reports on theDevelopment ofChinese
Internet,
available
index/index.htm
57 Rosecrance
at
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/en/
1986; Russett and Oneal 2000.
58 Johnston 2004b, 603-628.
59 Zhao 2000, 11-12; Johnson 2003, 551-554.
60 Building on arguments offered by scholars, Chinas
leaders such as General SecretaryHu Jintao and
PremierWen
Jaibao have argued thatChinas mod
ernization depends on peace and thatChina's "rise"
would not lead to policies that pose threats or come
at the expense of other countries. See
Suettinger
2004. (http://www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/
) andZheng 2005.
20044/rs.pdf
61 For a synthesis of the two that overcomes some of
these problems, see Copeland 2003.
62 See Garrett and Lang 1996. It also applies to social
ization arguments about China as well.
63 For an argument thatChina is unlikely to liberalize
in any foreseeable time frame seeMann 2007.
64 Waldron 2004.
65 Mansfield
2004.
and Snyder 1995; Snyder 2000. Gries
66 The Western powers of course had a say on this
outcome
as well.
U.S.
power was
policy
came
after Mao
to
largely aimed at isolating China.
67 Trade data is the total current value of imports and
exports over the total currentGDP. See http://
chinadataonline.org/member/macroy/.
68 Berman 2001; Adler 2002.
69 See Anderson 1983; Halbwachs
1992; Kertzer 1988.
70 E.g., themission statement for theUnited States
Department
of State
is "Create
a more
secure, demo
cratic, and prosperous worldfor the benefitof the
American people and the international community'?
see
http://www.state.gov/rn/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/
23503.htm. On the general organizational dynamic
see Selznick, 1949, 69-70, 250-259; Selznick 1957,
1989.
16;Wilson
71 May 1962.
72 SeeToby 1997,323-364;Adler 1957.
73 May 1962, 667.
74 Gong 1984; Zhang 1991.
75 On consolidation in the literature on revolutions,
see e.g., Goldstone 1991.
76 As the future revolutionary Sun Yatsen wrote to
an official in 1893, "the reason why we have not
achieved much (relative to other countries that had
opened up); public opinion and entrenched ideas
simplywill not allow it."Mitter 2004, 32.
77 See Hunt 1996, 77ff.
78 This is the thrust of Frieden and Rogowski 1996
and ties inwell with Copeland 2003.
79 See Keck and Sikkink 1998; Thomas 2001.
80 Friedberg 2005 rightlypoints out the difficultyof
predicting the futurewhen itdepends on events that
we cannot foresee.Nonetheless, it is
possible to
explicate the conditions and mechanisms through
which eventswill produce different futures.
81 See Legro 2005.
82 Downs and Saunders 1998/99 argue thatChina has
valued economic development ahead of nationalist
goals.
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
529
Articles
IWhat China Will Want
83 Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress of
theChinese Communist Party-,Fewsmith 2003, 3.
See too recent speeches by Hu Jintao, successor to
Jiang, that offer similar themes, e.g. "President Hu
Outlines Work Agenda for 2005," http://www.
chinaembassy.org.il/eng/xwdt/tl78046.htm.
84 Communique of the 15th CPC Central Commit
tee Plenum, October 9-11, 2005. http://www.
china.org.cn/english/features/45280.htm.
85 Lampton 2001, 25Iff.; Zhao 2004. For an example
of this view of history see Chinas October 2005
white paper "Building Political Democracy in
China," especially Section I, "A Choice Suited to
Chinas Conditions."
86 Wu2001.
87 Riskin and Khan 2000; Lardy 2002; Eckholm
2002, 1;Kahn 2004a, 2004b.
88 Goldstein and Lardy 2004. Dollar 2005, 48-58.
89 Wang et al. 2007. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/
papers/papers/PMMA-2007-07.pdf.
90 Data based on figures released by Chinas
Security
Bureau,
20061115_l.htm.
91 Lin 2007.
www.zonaeuropa.com/
See also Tanner 2004,
Public
137-156.
92 See Zhen 2000; Gries 2004.
93 Cody 2005.
94 Seasoned China specialists note the difficulty as
sessing the nature and strengthof competing coali
Adler, Selig. 1957. The Isolationist Impulse. New York:
Free
Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities:
Reflections upon theOrigin and Spread ofNationalism.
2d ed. London: Verso.
Barkin, Samuel. 1998. The evolution of the constitution
of sovereignty and the emergence of human rights
norms.Millennium 27 (2): 29-53.
Berman, Sheri. 2001. Ideas, norms, and culture in
political analysis. Comparative Politics 33 (2):
231-50.
Bull, Hedley. 1995. The Anarchical Society: a Study of
Order inWorld Politics. 2d ed. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Carter, Ashton, andWilliam Perry. 2007. China on the
march. National Interest 88 (March/April), 16-22.
T 1997. Ideas and International Political
Checkel, Jeffrey
Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and theEnd of the
Cold War. New Haven: Yale University Press.
"Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session
2005. Xinhua News Agency
Communiqu??Text."
Domestic Service, Beijing, October 11.
Christensen, Thomas. 2003. The PartyTransition: Will
it bring a new maturity inChinese security policy?
China LeadershipMonitor 5,Winter, http://www.
chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031 /tc.html,4-6.
-.
2006. Fostering stability or creating a monster?
The rise of China and U.S. policy toward East Asia.
International Security 31 (1): 81-126.
tions, e.g., Christensen 2003, 4-6.
95 On different factions, see Swaine and Tellis 2000,
Cody, Edward. 2005. "China SendsWarning toTaiwan
with Anti-Secession Law." Washington Post,March 8,
Yan
and
2001,
35;
83-86; Johnston 2003;
Deng
see
A12.
In
Dittmer
5-16.
1995,
Gray 2001,
general,
to
1-39; Nathan 1973, 33-66.
Copeland, Dale. 2000a. The constructivist challenge
A
Secu
review
at
realism:
International
structural
14*
Zemins
the
National
96 Jiang
essay.
Congress of
Report
theCommunist Party ofChina, 1992.
rity25 (2): 187-212.
-.
2000b. Origins of
97 "Chinese Communist Party Fifth Plenary Session
Major War. Ithaca: Cornell
Press.
Do
News
Xinhua
University
Agency
Communiqu??Text,"
-.
2003. Economic interdependence and the future
mestic Service, Beijing, October 11, 2005; Kahn
of
relations. In International Relations
U.S.-Chinese
Li
2006.
2005a,
2005;
the
and
Smith
Khoo
and
98 Kang 2004, 165-81;
2005,
Theory
Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry
New York: Columbia
and
Michael
Mastanduno.
196-205.
to
biases?see
the
99 E.g.,
University.
appeal
in-group/out-group
Council on Foreign Relations. 2007. U.S.-China Rela
Gries 2004.
tions:An AffirmativeAgenda, A Responsible Course.
100 Heer 2000, Li 2005a.
101 Yan 2001, 35.
Independent Task Force Report 59 (April).
102 Christensen 2006, 81-126.
Crane, Keith, Roger Cliff, Evan S. Medeiros, James C.
103 Divine 1967;Cull 1990.
Mulvenon, andWilliam H. Overholt. 2005. Modern
104 In the Soviet case, see Lynch 1987; Checkel 1997;
izing China'sMilitary: Opportunities and Constraints.
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
Richmond
2003.
1999;
Evangelista
Cull, Nicholas John. 1990. SellingWar: The British
References
Propaganda Campaign against American Neutrality in
World War II. New York: Oxford University Press.
Adler, Emanuel. 2002. Constructivism and international
relations. InHandbook of International Relations, ed.
Deng, Yong, and SherryGray. 2001. Introduction:
Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons.
Growing pains?China debates its international future.
London: Sage Publications.
Journal ofContemporary China 10 (26): 5-16.
530
Perspectives on Politics
Goldstone, JackA. 1991. Revolution and Rebellion in the
EarlyModern World. Berkeley: University of Califor
De
Soysa, Indra, John R. Oneal, and Yong-Hee Park.
1997. Testing power-transition theory using alterna
tivemeasures of national capabilities. Journal ofCon
flict Resolution 41 (4): 509-28.
Dittmer, Lowell. 1995. Chinese informal politics. China
Journal34 (July): 1-34.
Divine, Robert A. 1967. Second Chance: The Triumph of
nia
Gong, GerritW. 1984. The Standard of "Civilization" in
International Society.Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gries, Peter Hays. 2004. Chinas New Nationalism: Pride,
Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press.
Internationalism inAmerica duringWorld War II. New
York: Atheum.
1992. On CollectiveMemory. Ed.
Halbwachs, Maurice.
and trans. Lewis Coser. Chicago: University of Chi
Dollar, David. 2005. Chinas economic problems (and
ours).Milken InstituteReview 7 (3): 48-58.
Downs, Erica Strecker, and Philip C. Saunders. 1998/99.
cago
In The Cambridge History ofChina, vol. 2, ed. John
K. Fairbank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heer, Paul. 2000. A house united. Foreign Affairs 79 (4):
March
19.
2000. Managing uncertainty: Beliefs
David.
Edelstein,
about intentions and the rise of great powers. Security
18-25.
Human RightsWatch. 2005. "Human Rights Overview:
China." InWorld Report 2005 http://hrw.org/
-.
nell University Press.
Fewsmith, Joseph. 2003. The Sixteenth National Party
Congress: The succession that didn't happen. China
Quarterly 173 (3): 1-16.
1996. Genesis ofChinese Communist
New
York: Columbia University Press.
Foreign Policy.
Information Office of the State Council of the People's
Republic of China. 2005. "Building of Political
Democracy
relations: Is conflict inevitable? International Security
Documents Annual, ed. Peter R. Mood, vol. 4. Gulf
Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.
Jiang Zemins Report at the 15thNational Congress of the
Communist Party ofChina, September 12, 1997.
A., and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The
Frieden, Jeffry
on national
impact of the international economy
poli
cies: An analytical overview. In Internationalization
and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Helen
http://www.fas.org/news/china/1997/970912-prc.
V. Milner. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Garrett, Geoffrey, and Peter Lang. 1996. International
ization, institutions, and political change. In Inter
nationalization and Domestic Politics, ed. Robert O.
htm.
Jiang Zemins Report to the 16thNational Congress of
theChinese Communist Party,November 8, 2002.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm
Johnson, Ian. 2003. The death and lifeof China's civil
society.Perspectives on Politics 1 (3): 551-54.
-.
1987. Modeling collective beliefs.
-.
185-204.
73(1):
Synthese
in
War
Politics.
Robert.
and
World
1981.
Gilpin,
Change
-.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gilbert, Margaret.
Goldstein, Morris, and Nicholas Lardy. 2004. "What
Kind of Landing for theChinese Economy?" Institute
for International Economics, Policy Briefs in Inter
national Economics, PB04-7, November.
inChina." October, Beijing, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/english/2005-10/19/content_
3645750.htm.
Jiang Zemins Report at the 14thNational Congress of the
Communist Party ofChina, 1992. Reprinted inChina
30 (2): 7-45.
Weimar Germany, ed. Richard Bessel and E. J.
Feuchtwanger. London: Croom Helm.
english/docs/2005/01 /13/china9809.htm.
2007. World Report 2007. http://hrw.org/
englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11 /chinai 4867.htm.
Hunt, Michael.
Foot, Rosemary. 2000. Rights beyondBorders: theGlobal
overHuman
Community and theStruggle
Rights in
China. New York: Oxford University Press.
Friedberg, Aaron L. 2005. The future ofU.S.-China
Keohane and Helen Milner. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
1981. Professionals and Junkers:Ger
Geyer, Michael.
man rearmament and
politics in theWeimar Repub
lic. In Social Change and Political Development in
Press.
Hao Yen-p'ing, and Erh-minWang.
1978. Changing
Chinese views ofWestern relations, 1840-1895.
Legitimacy and the limits of nationalism: China and
theDiadyu Island. InternationalSecurity23 (3): 114-46.
Eckholm, Eric. 2002. "Leaner Factories, FewerWorkers
to China." New York Times,
BringMore Labor Unrest
Studies 12 (1): 1-40.
Evangelista, Matthew. 1999. Unarmed Forces: The Trans
nationalMovement toEnd theCold War. Ithaca: Cor
Press.
Johnston,Alastair Iain. 1995. Cultural Realism: Strategic
Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Prince
ton: Princeton University Press.
2001. Treating international institutions as social
environments. International Studies Quarterly 45 (4):
487-515.
2003. Is China a status quo power? International
Security 27 (4): 5-56.
2004a. Beijing's security behavior in theAsian
Pacific: Is China a dissatisfied power? In Rethinking
Security inEast Asia: Identity,Power, and Efficiency,
ed. Allen Carlson, Peter Katzenstein, and J.J.Suh.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
September 2007
1Vol. 5/No. 3
531
Articles
-.
IWhat China WillWant
2004b. Chinese middle class attitudes towards
international affairs:Nascent liberalization? China
www.jamestown.org/china_brief/article.php?
articleid=2373275
Lynch, Allen. 1987. The Soviet Study ofInternational
Quarterly 179: 603-28.
Kahn, Joseph. 2004a. "Chinas Elite Learn to Flaunt It
While theNew Landless Weep." New York Times
December
-.
-.
-.
2004b.
25, Al.
"Chinas
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
James. 2007. The China Fantasy. New York:
Mann,
Viking.
Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democ
ratization and the danger ofwar. International Security
'Haves' Stir the 'Have-nots' to
Violence." New York Times December 31.
2005. "China Approves Plan to Ease Wealth
Gap." New York Times, October 11.
2007. "In China Talk of Democracy Is Simply
That." New York Times, April 20.
20 (1): 5-38.
May, Ernest R. 1962. The nature of foreign policy: The
calculated versus the axiomatic. Daedalus 91 (4):
653-67.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy ofGreat Power
Politics. New York: Norton.
Kang, David. 2004. Hierarchy, balancing, and empirical
puzzles inAsian international relations. International
Medeiros, Evan S. and M. Taylor Fravel. 2003. China's
new diplomacy. Foreign
Affairs 82 (6): 22-35.
Mitter, Rana. 2004. A Bitter Revolution: Chinas Struggle
Security 28 (3): 165-81.
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists
beyondBorders. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
with the
Modern World. New York: Oxford University
Kent, Ann. 2002. China's international socialization:
The role of international organizations. Global Gover
nance 8 (3): 346-64.
Press.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1966. Politics amongNations: The
Strugglefor Power and Peace. 3d ed. New York: Alfred
Keohane, Robert, and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and
Interdependence:World Politics in Transition. Boston:
A. Knopf.
Mosher, Steven. 2001. Hegemon: Chinas Plan toDomi
nate Asia and theWorld. San Francisco: Encounter
Little, Brown.
Kertzer, David. 1988. Ritual, Politics, and Power. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Khoo, Nicholas, and Michael Smith. 2005. China en
Books.
Nathan, Andrew. 1973. A factionalism model for
CCP politics. China Quarterly 53 (Jan./Mar.):
34-66.
Organski, A. F. K., and JacekKugler. 1980. The War
lector:A response toDavid Sham
baugh. International Security 30 (1): 196-205.
Kim, Woosang, and JamesD. Morrow. 1992.When do
power shifts lead towar? American Journal ofPolitical
gages Asia? Caveat
Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Payne, Rodger A., and Nayef H. Samhat. 2004.
Democratizing Global Politics; Discourse Norms, Inter
national Regimes, and Political Community. Albany:
Science 36 (4): 896-922.
Kupchan, Charles A. 1994. The Vulnerability ofEmpire.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Lampton, David. 2001. Same Bed, DifferentDreams:
Managing US-China Relations 1989-2000. Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Lardy,Nicholas R. 2002. IntegratingChina into theGlobal
Economy.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
W 2005. Rethinking theWorld: Great
Legro, Jeffrey
Power Strategies and International Order. Ithaca: Cor
nell University Press.
Lemke, Douglas. 2002. Regions ofWar and Peace. Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Li Cheng. 2005a. Hu's policy shiftand theTuanpai's
coming of age. China LeadershipMonitor, 15
Summer, http ://www.chinaleadershipmoni tor.org/
-.
-.
20053/lc.html.
2005b. The new bipartisanship within theChi
nese Communist Party. Orbis 49 (3): 387-400.
2006. China's inner-partydemocracy: Toward a
system of "one party, two factions." China Brief
6 (24), December
6, http://www.jamestown.org/
china_brief/article.php?articleid=2373247
Lin, Joseph. 2007. In a fortnight?Beijing looking after
the rural poor. China Brief 7 (5),March 8, http://
532
Perspectives on Politics
State University ofNew York Press.
Pillsbury,Michael. 2000. China Debates theFuture
SecurityEnvironment.Washington, DC: National
Defense University Press.
Qin Yaqing. 2001. A response toYong Deng: Power
-.
perception and the cultural lens.Asian Affairs:An
American Review 28 (3): 155-58.
2003. National identity, strategic culture and
security interest:Three hypotheses on the interaction
between China
1, available at
and international society. SUS Journal
http://www.siis.org.cn/english/journal/
en20031 -2/qinyaqing.htm.
Ramos, Joshua Cooper. 2004. The Beijing Consensus.
London: Foreign Policy Centre.
Richmond, Yale. 2003. Cultural Exchange and theCold
War: Raising theIron Curtain. University Park: Penn
State University Press.
Riskin, Carl, and Azizur Rahman Khan. 2000. Inequal
ityand Poverty in China in theAge ofGlobalization.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The Rise of theTrading State.
New York: Basic Books.
Ross, Robert S. 1997. Beijing as a conservative power.
Thomas, Daniel C. 2001. The Helsinki Effect: Inter
national Norms, Human Rights, and theDemise of
Communism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
76 (2): 33-44.
Foreign
Affairs
Roy, Denny. 1994. Hegemon on the horizon? China's
threat to East Asian security.International Security 19
Toby, Ronald.
(1) 149-168.
Diplomacy
Bakufu. Journal ofJapanese Studies 3 (2): 323-64.
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the
Secretary of Defense. 2006. Annual Report toCongress:
Ruggie, JohnGerard. 1982. International regimes,
transactions, and change: Embedded liberalism in the
postwar economic order. International Organization
36 (2): 379-415.
Military Power of thePeoples Republic ofChina, http://
www.dod.mil/pubs/pdfs/China%20Report%
202006.pdf.
Waldron, Arthur. 1995. Deterring China. Commentary
Russett, Bruce, and JohnOneal. 2000. Triangulating
Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International
Organizations. New York: Norton.
1999. Managing the rise of great
and
powers: History
theory. In Engaging China: The
a
Management of Rising Power, ed. Alastair Iain
Johnston and Robert Ross. New York: Routledge.
Schweller, Randall.
-.
2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints
on theBalance
ofPower. Princeton: Princeton Univer
Press.
sity
Selznick, Phillip. 1949. 7144 and theGrass Roots: A Study
ofPolitics and Organization. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
-.
1957. Leadership inAdministration: A Sociological
Interpretation.New York: Harper & Row.
Shambaugh, David. 2005. China engages Asia: Reshap
ing the regional order. International Security 29 (3):
64-99.
Singer, J.David. 1987. Reconstructing theCorrelates of
War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816
1985. International Interactions 14:115-32.
Singer, J.David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey.
1972. Capability distribution, uncertainty, and major
power war, 1820-1965. In Peace, War, and Numbers,
ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.
-.
Snyder, Jack. 1991.Myths ofEmpire. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
2000. From Voting toViolence: Democratization
and Nationalist Conflict. New York: Norton.
s
Solingen, Etel. 1998. Regional Orders at Century Dawn:
Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China,
Beijing. China Statistical Yearbook 1996. Beijing:
China Statistical Publishing House.
Stein, Arthur, and Richard Rosecrance, eds. 1993. The
Domestic Bases ofGrand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Suettinger, Robert L. 2004. The
rise and descent of
"peaceful rise." China LeadershipMonitor
12, http://
www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20044/rs.pdf
Swaine, Michael, and Ashley Tellis. 2000. Interpreting
Chinas Grand Strategy:Past, Present, and Future. Santa
Monica:
Rand Corporation.
Tanner, Murray Scot. 2004. China rethinks unrest.
Washington Quarterly 27 (3): 137-56.
1997. Reopening the question of Sakoku:
in the legitimation of theTokugawa
-.
100 (4): 17-21.
2004. How would democracy change China?
Orte 48 (2): 247-61.
Walt, Stephen. 1987. The Origins ofAlliance. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
2000. Multilateralism inChinese
In
Chinas International Relations in the
foreign policy.
21st Century: Dynamics ofParadigm
Shifts, ed.Weix
Wang, Hongying.
ingHu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha. Lanham:
University Press ofAmerica.
Wang, Sangui, et al. 2007. "Inequality and Poverty in
China during Reform." PMMA Working Paper
2007-07, March. www.l32.203.59.36:81/Group/
papers/papers/PMMA-2007-07.pdf.
Wen, Jiabao. 2007. "Our Historical Tasks at the Primary
Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning
Chinas Foreign Policy." China Daily, February 27,
http ://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2007-03/03/content_818952.htm
Westad, Odd Ame, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson,
Nguyen Vu Tung, and JamesG. Hershberg, eds.
1998. 77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign
Leaders on theWars in Indochina, 1964-1977. Wash
ington,DC: Cold War International History Project.
Whiting, Allen. 1995. Chinese nationalism and foreign
policy afterDeng. China Quarterly 142 (June):
295-316.
Wilson, JamesQ. 1989. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic
Books.
Wolfers, Arnold. 1962. Discord and Collaboration: Essays
on International Politics. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins
Press.
Wu, Xinbo. 2001. Four contradictions constraining
Chinas foreign policy behavior. Journal ofContempo
raryChina 10 (27): 293-301.
Yan, Xuetong. 2001. The rise of China inChinese eyes.
Journal ofContemporary China 10 (26): 33-39.
Yardley, Jim, and David Lague. 2007. "Beijing Acceler
ates Defense
Spending." New York Times,March 5.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1992. Realism and domestic politics: A
review essay. International Security 17 (1): 177-98.
Zhang, Yongjin. 1991. China in theInternational System,
1918-1920.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
September 2007
jVol. 5/No. 3
533
Articles
-.
-.
IWhat China WillWant
1998. China in International Society since 1949:
Alienation and Beyond. New York: St.Martin's Press.
Zhao, Suisheng. 2000. Introduction: China's democrati
zation reconsidered. In China and Democracy: Recon
a
sidering theProspectsfor Democratic China, ed.
Suisheng Zhao. New York: Routledge.
2004. A Nation State byConstruction: Dynamics
Modern
Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stan
of
fordUniversity Press.
Zhen, Yongnian. 2000. Nationalism, globalism, and
China's international relations. In Chinas Inter
534
Perspectives on Politics
national Relations in the21st Century: Dynamics of
Paradigm Shifts, ed.Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan,
and Daojiong Zha. Lanham: University Press of
America.
Zheng, Bijian. 2005. China's "Peaceful Rise" to great
power status.Foreign Affairs 84 (5): 18-24.
Zoellick, Robert B. 2005. "Whither China: From Mem
bership toResponsibility?" Remarks toNational
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York,
September 21, http://www.state.gOv/s/d/rem/
53682.htm