November 2015
FORCED MIGRATION FLOWS AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN EUROPE:
POSITION PAPER OF THE INSTITUTE FOR MIGRATION AND ETHNIC
STUDIES
Today’s number of more than sixty million displaced persons worldwide far
surpasses the number of persons who were displaced in global terms during and
immediately subsequent to World War II. Faced with the current mass arrival of forced
migrants coming from the world’s crisis spots, the European states have been unprepared
in their reception of hundreds of thousands of people, looking for a more secure and better
life for themselves and their families. The EU bodies are endeavouring to find the most
efficacious solutions possible for the newly emergent humanitarian crisis. The Republic of
Croatia, which more than 330 000 forced migrants have entered between September 16
and November 5, 20151 is facing numerous challenges connected with matters of reception
and rendering assistance to these forced migrants, and in management of the crisis
situations so as to enable their further transit toward their desired destinations.
Recognising the diverse aspects of that issue, the purpose of these strategic points is to
describe and analyse: a) the context and causes of the emergence of the current
humanitarian crisis; b) the development to date of the refugee and irregular flows of forced
migration towards the European region; and, c) to propose recommendations as feasible
contributions to the solutions of the current humanitarian crisis on the level of Croatia and
the entire European Union.2
THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT DISPLACEMENT CRISES WORLDWIDE
Recent international migration flows have been a response primarily to the
situation of extreme global inequality between the departure and destination locations.3
These have been increasingly frequently mixed migration flows that encompass diverse
categories of voluntary and involuntary (compelled and forced) migrants, refugees,
asylum-seekers, human trafficking victims, trans-border and internally displaced persons,
stateless displaced persons and, in general, all migrants prompted to move by a series of
economic, political and/or environmental factors. Despite the diversified nature of the
migratory flows by which ‘people on the move’ arrive from devastated areas of war,
1
According to the official data of the Ministry of the Interior, www.mup.hr/219671.aspx (accessed on
November 5, 2015).
2 The document “Forced Migration Flows and the Humanitarian Crisis in Europe: Position Paper of the
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies” was written by Drago Župarić-Iljić together with Snježana
Gregurović, Simona Kuti, Margareta Gregurović, Sonja Podgorelec, Sanja Klempić Bogadi and Dubravka
Mlinarić. This document is written in keeping with the most recent scientific perceptions on the refugee issue,
and in accordance with analysis of recent national and European policy decisions related to the humanitarian
crisis, and of insights into the situation in the field related to reception and accommodation of forced migrants
in Croatia, and the further procedures related to them. (The field insights included visits to the CroatianSerbian border at Tovarnik and Šid from September 18 to 20, and to Tovarnik, Bapska and the camp in
Opatovac [in Eastern Croatia] from October 6 to 10 as well as to Ključ Brdovečki on the Croatian-Slovenian
border from 24 to 25 October). Due to the possible dynamic in any of these spheres, augmentation of this
position paper may well be expected. Transmission, copying or distribution of the information contained in
this document shall be possible with precise quotation of the reference: Župarić-Iljić, Drago; Gregurović,
Snježana; Kuti, Simona; Gregurović, Margareta; Podgorelec, Sonja; Klempić Bogadi, Sanja and Mlinarić,
Dubravka (2015), “Forced Migration Flows and the Humanitarian Crisis in Europe: Position Paper of the
Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies”, Zagreb: Institut za migracije i narodnosti, downloaded from:
http://www.imin.hr/en/strateska-polazista (date of access).
3 See: P. Collier (2013), Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1
marked by political and economic instability; it is more correct and more precise to call
them refugees rather than migrants. However, they are primarily involuntary,
compelled and most frequently – forced migrants. Forced migrants include, among others,
people seeking protection and shelter (asylum), that is, refugees in the sociological sense,4
just as those arriving from crisis spots throughout the world certainly are – for example,
those from Central Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East.5 Today’s situation should be
regarded as one that will be a prolonged rather than a short-term crisis; however, since
‘crisis’ largely entails emergency and urgent measures of crisis management (such as are
being implemented at this moment) with clear humanitarian implications, it should be
seen as and more appropriately termed – a humanitarian crisis.
The current situation in Syria is key to understanding the phenomenon of the
humanitarian crisis. The conflict in Syria developed from January 2012 and the so-called
Arab Spring. That had been preceded by decades of political unrest in the Middle Eastern
region and in Central Asia, from as far back as the beginning of the war in Afghanistan in
1973 and the war in Iraq in 2003. In Syria, which had had eighteen million inhabitants in
2014, protests against the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, and the entire Government
led to civil war between the supporters of the regime (the regular Syrian Army) and the
insurgents (the Free Syrian Army). The conflict situation was additionally complicated by
the clashes between the Kurdish Army in the north of Syria and Iraq, following continuous,
although obscured, protests and conflicts with Government forces that had been ongoing
since 2004. During 2014, the army of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL/ISIS) became involved in the war and very quickly conquered large swaths of the
western territory of Iraq and of eastern and central Syria, controlling a territory today in
which ten million people live.6 During the hostilities in Syria, more than 300 000 people
have been killed, there are numerous wounded and missing, while some two thirds of the
total population have been forcedly displaced. Of the latter, more than four million Syrian
citizens have left Syrian territory, while there are some 7.6 million of them internally
displaced within Syria’s borders.7 Due to uncertainty about the end of the conflict it is
questionable in what way military intervention on the part of foreign actors could prevent
further suffering of the population and not intensify the formation of new refugee flows
from that region.8
4 Terminological definitions are important, both for research, theoretical and analytical reasons and those of
political and policy nature, since it often happens that terms (pre)define the articulation of strategy, politics
and measures towards the people who are immigrating or in transit (along with influencing public attitudes
towards them), so it is essential to differentiate the terms in question, which are frequently used as synonyms
or are distorted in media portrayals and political declarations.
5 The global displacement situation shows that refugeeism is not a momentary phenomenon, but is rather of
long-term duration and is increasingly widespread, that is, it is also progressing in the sense of growth in
internal displacement and the rise in the number of asylum-seekers and refugees throughout the world. The
number of 59.5 million displaced persons in 2014 is definitely being surpassed in 2015. In 2014, the countries
of origin of the highest number of refugees were Syria (3.88 million), Afghanistan (2.59 million) and Somalia
(1.11 million). During that time, Turkey took in a higher number of refugees than Pakistan and became the
most significant receiving country. More than four million people have fled from Syria, of whom the majority
went to Turkey (2.1million), to Lebanon (1.1 million), Jordan (633 000), Iraq (250 000) and Egypt (132 000)
– consequently, the neighbouring countries have accepted 95% of Syrian refugees. On the southern border
of Turkey alone, that is, in the region bordering with Syria, there are 24 refugee camps that hosted 217 000
Syrian refugees in 2014. See: UNHCR (2015), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014. Geneva: United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
6 R. Erlich (2014), Inside Syria: The Backstory of Their Civil War and What the World Can Expect. New York:
Prometheus Books.
7 See: IDMC (2015), Syria IDP Figures Analysis. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.
http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/figures-analysis.
8 EU policy in response to the migration flows in the wake of the commenced Arab Spring placed the emphasis
on supervision and protection of external borders of the Union towards the coasts of North Africa and the
2
It is important to emphasise that 86% of the refugees have remained in
neighbouring countries, largely in border regions. Because of expensive and dangerous
journeys along smuggling routes, the majority of them cannot migrate further to Europe or
anywhere else. Therefore, the largest and most crowded refugee camps in the world are
found in the region of Africa and Asia. Those are places that do not offer either efficacious
or long-term solutions for refugees, while in some of them, under conditions of prolonged
displacement, a third generations of refugees is already being born. While Africa
participates in the total distribution of refugees with 45% and Africa with 30%, Europe
and Northern America participate with only 4%.9
THE EUROPEAN UNION, CROATIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH-EASTERN
EUROPE: DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT AND SITUATION
Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, that is, the Syrian Civil War, Europe has
accepted only something less than 5% of the total number of Syrian refugees. Frontex data
shows that 710 000 irregular migrants10 arrived in Europe in the first nine months of 2015.
According to UNHCR figures (up until November 5, 2015), 752 066 forced migrants11
arrived in Europe by sea, crossing the Mediterranean, and through South-eastern Europe.
Certain demographic indicators:
Country of entry into the EU
Country of origin
Other
1%
Italy
18%
Iraq, 6%
Eritrea, 5%
Greece
(through
Turkey)
81%
Other*
18%
Afghanistan
19%
Syria
52%
*Largely Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia,
Sudan, Gambia and Bangladesh.
Children
20%
Adult females
Adult males
15%
65%
Source: UNHCR DATA (2015)
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php
Eastern Mediterranean, on pressure, incentives and even bribery of individual governments to retain the
migrants either at their source in the countries of origin or to retain them in the transit countries with
provision of humanitarian assistance. See: R. Andrijasevic (2010), Deported: The Right to Asylum at EU’s
External Border of Italy and Libya, International Migration, 48 (1): 148–174; G. Noutcheva (2015),
Institutional Governance of European Neighbourhood Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring, Journal of
European Integration, 37 (1): 19–36.
9 UNHCR (2015), Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
10 http://frontex.europa.eu/news/710-000-migrants-entered-eu-in-first-nine-months-of-2015-NUiBkk
11 http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=70
3
At the same time, more than 3 100 refugees lost their lives or disappeared in their
efforts to cross the Mediterranean Sea.12 Many cases of unaccompanied children travelling
without a parent or guardian and/or cases of families being separated have been
registered, the latter often being encountered in the refugee camps.13 Despite the danger
and insecurity of these journeys, it is evident that the refugee flows into Europe, based on
the current dynamic of arrival by the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan routes, will not be
coming to an end in the near future.
The reasons for the rerouting of the forced migration flows, which had until
recently largely gone across the Mediterranean, from North Africa by way of Lampedusa to
Malta and Italy and intensified on the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan route in 2015,
should be sought primarily in the consequences of European Union policies. For many
years now, they have concentrated primarily on reinforcing the security aspects of
protecting external borders from irregular migration. A host of experts have warned
about the domination of the security dimension by which the protection system has
been given precedence and externalised even outside European borders.14 Thereby,
considerable financial and logistic means are invested in protection and control of the
external borders of the Union, rather than, for example, in measures enabling access to the
territory, access to the asylum system and integration instruments for citizens of third
countries. In recent years, despite all the border security undertakings, the number of
forced migrants arriving in the EU by way of irregular methods across the Mediterranean
from Libya, Tunisia and Egypt has continued to grow, just as the number of lives lost on
those smuggling routes has also continued to increase.15
The Mare nostrum operation conducted by the Italian Coast Guard from October
2013 to October 2014 saved some 150 000 refugees on the Mediterranean Sea, assisting
them in safe disembarkation and reception in European harbours. From 2014, the coastal
forces of the Agency European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) took over supervision
of the continuing operations at sea in its actions Poseidon and Triton. Their primary
objective is to patrol and control the diverting of those small boats to their territory of
departure – the North African coast. That resulted in increased insecurity of passage and
the possibility of major tragedies, an increase in the price of smuggling (because of the
higher risk of interception)16 and gradual abandonment, that is, reduction in the migration
flows on the Central Mediterranean route, which was, in any case, extremely dangerous
(for example, eight hundred migrants drowned in one day in April 2015). This led to
rerouting through geographically and shorter, although perhaps not less dangerous,
journeys on the Eastern Mediterranean route, from Turkey to the Greek islands in the
Aegean Sea and further by land on the so-called Balkan route to the states encompassed by
the Schengen system.
12
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php# (on 20 October 2015)
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=85 (on November 5 2015)
14 See: C. Boswell (2003), The »External Dimension« of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy, International
Affairs, 79 (3): 619–638; G. Papagianni (2013), EU Migration Policy, in: A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas
(eds.); European Immigration: A Sourcebook (2nd ed.). Ashgate: Aldershot; A. Triandafyllidou and A.
Dimitriadi (2014), Governing Irregular Migration and Asylum at the Borders of Europe: Between Efficiency and
Protection. Roma: Istituto affari internazionali, www.iai.it/sites/default/files/ImaginingEurope_06.pdf.
15 Frontex (2015), Annual Risk Analysis 2015. Warsaw: European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.
16 Smuggling and human trafficking are becoming the fastest growing trans-national criminal activities in the
world. See: L. Shelley (2014), Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe: A Comparative Perspective.
Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
13
4
Movement directions of refugees and other forced migrants by the Eastern
Mediterranean and Balkan route
Compiled by D. Spevec (for depiction of remaining migration routes in the Euro-Mediterranean region, see:
http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/migratory-routes-map/)
All that notwithstanding, despite those measures of protection of the external land
and sea borders of the EU, the number of applications for asylum in the EU increased from
336 000 submitted applications in 2012, to 431 000 in 2013, and to 626 000 in 2014, and
in only the first six months of 2015, 399 000 people applied for asylum protection.17 It is
estimated that, due to the newly emerging situation and the increased number of arrivals
in the second part of the year, that number will rise to one million applications for the
entire 2015 year.18 However, the uneven distribution of the number of asylum-seekers
places some members of the EU on an unequal footing with the remainder since four
countries – Germany, Sweden, Italy and France (and recently, Hungary) receive the
majority of requests for asylum in the EU.
Furthermore, the general lack of prospects and the poverty in the midst of war in
the countries of origin of refugees is deepening, the cost of living for refugees in the
neighbouring countries is growing, while the financial aid to the refugee camps is being
reduced and is, in general, insufficient for humanitarian needs.19 Under those
circumstances, some of the refugees directly abandon their country of origin, while some
in the form of secondary movements leave their former refugee camps and other places of
sojourn in Turkey and Lebanon, not anticipating an end to the war or the possibility of
17
See: Eurostat (2015), Asylum Statistics. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/
Asylum_Statistics and Eurostat Newsrelease (2015). Asylum in the EU. 163/2015 – 18 September 2015.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6996925/3-18092015-BP-EN.pdf/b0377f79-f06d4263-aa5b-cc9b4f6a838f
18 OECD (2015), Is this humanitarian migration crisis different? Migration Policy Debates No. 7. September
2015. http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf.
19 See: UNHCR (2015), Syrian refugees: Inter-agency regional update, September 2015. http://data.unhcr.org
/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9617.
5
return to their homes. All of them, together with the forced migrants from other regions in
Africa and Asia, meet on the territory of Turkey, frequently establishing links and
organising themselves in trying by land and sea to enter Greece and continue their journey
by way of the Balkan route. Research has confirmed that numerous forced migrants spend
a considerable, but temporary, part of their refugee exodus in Greece, trying to consolidate
their own strength and resources and earning some money in order to finance the next
stage of transit towards Western Europe by way of the smuggling routes.20
THE RESPONSE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE CURRENT FORCED MIGRATION
FLOWS AND THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS (STRATEGY, POLICY AND MEASURES)
Without entering into extensive analysis of the overall European asylum system, it
is sufficient to state that the so-called Common European Asylum System – CEAS stipulates
the common standards of refugee protection that have to be adhered to equally by all
members of the Union, irrespective of in which Member State a person seeks protection.
Subsequent to the adoption of the Ten point action plan on migration21 in April 2015, in
which the security dimension of migration again prevailed, the European Agenda on
Migration was set in May 2015. This is a strategic EU document in the field of migration
and asylum, with a series of urgent, that is, short-term, as well as long-term policies and
measures related primarily to managing irregular and asylum migration in the EuroMediterranean region.
The majority of the measures put forward did not include proposals that would have
enabled more secure and easy arrival of refugees on European soil – whether those
measures encompassed the establishment of safe corridors of arrival and entry, a
humanitarian visa system, liberalisation of the ‘classical’ visa system, facilitated family
reunion, use of ex-territorial determination of refugee status followed by relocation on the
territory of the EU, measures of status legalisation (regularisation) in the Member States
or other possible measures that would have de-criminalised and regularised the arrival
and the sojourn of forced migrants. In the first resettlement scheme that was proposed on
July 20 2015,22 the EU Commissioners suggested a number of 40 000 Syrian refugees who
would be relocated from Turkey, which is only about 1% of the Syrian refugees in Turkey,
but that proposal, too, encountered resistance and obstruction from certain Member
States.
20
See: B. Coleridge (2013), From Back Door to Front Door: Forced migration routes through Macedonia to
Croatia. Brussels: Jesuit Refugee Service Europe; M. Valenta, D. Župarić-Iljić and T. Vidović (2015), The
Reluctant Asylum-Seekers: Migrants at the Southeastern Frontiers of the European Migration System.
Refugee Survey Quarterly, 34 (3): 95–113.
21 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4813_en.htm
22 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/jha/2015/07/st11097_en15_pdf/
6
Measures of the European Agenda on Migration
LONG-TERM MEASURES
SHORT-TERM (URGENT) MEASURES
SECURING BORDERS
• higher financial allocations for the Triton and
Poseidon operations at sea (also later for the
Sophia Operation)
• activating the urgent management system for
increased security of the external borders of the
Member States of the EU, particularly within the
hotspots in the regions of first mass entry to the
EU (Greece, Italy)
• joint defence and security policies aimed at
destroying the smuggling and criminal networks
• conducting a system of registration and
coordinated return and re-admission of migrants
EXTERNALISATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN THE
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND OF TRANSIT
• financial investment in the regional programmes
of development and protection in North Africa
and the Horn of Africa
• sending European migration personnel to the
transit countries (orientated to the attempt to
retain migrants in those territories)
PREVENTING THE CAUSES OF IRREGULAR
MIGRATION
•
influencing the initial causes/driving force of
migration in the countries of origin
•
unmasking the smuggling networks and the
human trafficking networks
•
stimulating return
SAVING LIVES AT EXTERNAL BORDERS
•
improved external border management
•
solidarity with countries at external borders
•
improving the efficacy of border crossings
STRENGTHENING COMMON ASYLUM POLICY
•
solidarity between the Member States
•
systematic
movements
of
refugee
APPLICATION OF NEW POLICIES TOWARDS
LEGAL MIGRATIONS
•
attracting desirable worker profiles to
occupations with a shortfall in personnel
•
easing migrant entry and qualifications
recognition
•
revision of the Blue Card Directive
• opening centres with several practical purposes
(also including detention or even turning aside
migrants) in the countries of Central Africa (one
is planned in Nigeria), in co-operation with IOM
and UNHCR
A QUOTA SYSTEM FOR RESETTLING AND RELOCATING
PROTECTION SEEKERS AND MIGRANTS BETWEEN THE
MEMBER STATES
monitoring
• implementing the resettlement and relocation
scheme
Source: European Agenda on Migration23 (adaption by the author).
The development of the situation in the field from May to September 2015 severely
worsened the likelihood of any possibility for timely and valid reactions on the part of the
Union to the increasingly significant forced migration flows arriving in the EU and
neighbouring countries. EU Member States reacted in different ways to the growing arrival
of forced migrants, some opening their ‘borders’, others building wire barriers. When
Hungary completed the construction of a barbed wire fence on September 15 and closed
the international border crossing with Serbia, the route of refugees and other forced
migrants turned towards Croatia.
On September 9 2015, the European Commission adopted the EU Council’s proposal
for further relocation of a total of 120 000 applicants who could be assumed to have a clear
23
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/backgroundinformation/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
7
need for international protection;24 this time, the foreseen relocation from Hungary into
other Member States of the EU was to cover 54 000 persons, 50 400 from Greece and
15 600 from Italy. Relocation was guaranteed for those third country citizens whose
percentage of asylum granting in the EU stood at 75%, and that pertained only to citizens
of Syria, Iraq and Eritrea. In keeping with that proposal and the relocation scheme, the
Republic of Croatia was to accept a quota of 1 064 asylum seekers and refugees from
Hungary, Greece and Italy (in addition to the 550 persons from Italy and Greece, as had
been agreed in May 2015). However, by November 5, EU relocated only 116 persons.25
The European Commission further proposed to the European Parliament and the
Council of Europe on September 23 2015 the operating plan Managing the refugee crisis:
immediate operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on
Migration,26 which was set out based on the principles of the European Migration Agenda
of May 2015.
The priority operational measures for the coming period encompass:
•
establishing a civil defence mechanism or border police units for swift action
→ help in teams, equipment, expertise and medicinal supplies
→ sending interventional border support teams, which will be logistically
supported by Frontex
•
assisting personnel and experts of Frontex, EASO, Europol (the EU police) and
Eurojust national bodies in identifying and registering migrants entering the EU
and preparing and organising return for persons who will not be eligible to stay
on humanitarian grounds.
The main objectives of these activities shall be:
→ ensuring a higher degree of border control and supervision
→ normalisation of the Schengen area, shaken by the exceptional and
temporary introduction of internal border controls between individual
Member States.
By diplomatic methods, the EU shall continue its close co-operation with third
countries, that is, the countries of origin and transit, as well as with international
organisations such as the UNHCR, IOM, the International Red Cross and the United Nations
Development Programme, with the objective of seeking out solutions to the refugee crisis
on the global level.
Following the High-level Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean – Western
Balkans Route that was held in Luxembourg on October 8 2014, a Declaration27 was issued
confirming the previous conclusions and measures proposed in the European Agenda on
Migration. It was proposed that further financial, logistical and humanitarian assistance be
sent to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan aimed at support for maintaining the programme for
acceptance and accommodation of refugees. An undertaking was made for providing aid
and assistance for the transit countries such as the FYR of Macedonia and Serbia, and for
24
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposalimplementation-package/docs/proposal_for_council_decision_establishing_provisional_measures
_in_the_area_of_international_protection_for_it_gr_and_hu_en.pdf
25
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/05/europe/eu-refugee-relocation/
26
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposalimplementation-package/docs/communication_on_managing_the_refugee_crisis_en.pdf
27
http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/gunnar-bragi/15-10-06-High-level-Conference-Eastern-MedWestern-Balkans.pdf
8
the countries of origin in supporting their own internally displaced persons and preventing
the fundamental causes of further displacement. The EU also proposed co-operation with
countries at its own external borders, particularly with Turkey, with the objective of
managing borders and the struggle against organised criminal activities, smuggling and
people trafficking. The co-operative measures with countries of origin also include the
instruments on forced return and re-admission, as well as voluntary programmes of return
and re-integration. Still, those conclusions did not define the operational schedule that
would indicate the scope and timeframe for implementation of the decisions and their
influence on the humanitarian crisis in the countries of South-Eastern Europe.
In the recent communication of the European Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council of the EU of October 14 2015,28 a series of operational and
implementation points were proposed for measures that concern the priority actions
mentioned in the European Agenda on Migration. Some of the innovations relate to the
development of models of financial and logistic aid for six reception hot-spots in Italy and
five in Greece, these including help from the specialised agencies of the Union (Frontex,
EASO, Europol and Eurojust), support to measures for relocation, resettlement, return and
re-admission as well as finalisation of the Action Plan between the EU and Turkey related
to co-operation in solving the humanitarian crisis.29
EVALUATION OF THE RESPONSES TO DATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
REPUBLIC OF CROATIA TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE FORCED
MIGRATION FLOWS
With adoption of the European Agenda on Migration in May 2015, the European
Commission drew attention to the importance of managing the migration flows in Europe,
and particularly to the issue of irregular migration. The fundamental points upon which
the Agenda is based are largely orientated to increased supervision and protection of the
external borders of the EU, to preventing irregular migration by destroying smuggling
networks and to strengthening the Common European Asylum System. Although the
Agenda does put particular emphasis on saving lives and on solidarity with persons who
are seeking international protection, the European Commission does not propose any
measures and/or standards by which refugees would be ensured secure arrival and
transfer (the so-called permanent humanitarian corridors) to their desired destinations. In
practice, through diplomatic arrangements made behind closed doors, the humanitarian
corridors do, in fact, function (for example, the current arrangement between Croatia and
Slovenia on the further transfer of refugees to Austria and Germany), albeit with difficulties
because of the aggravated situation in border crossing and reception of refugees and the
relatively long delays on the Balkan route.
Efforts by the EU to solve the refugee crisis at crisis spots in countries of origin could
lead to alleviation, but not to stemming the refugee flows. In the event of increased military
activities in the countries of origin, and even solution of the conflicts by peaceful means
and maintenance of the status quo, the refugee flows would probably continue, and even
intensify. Such scenarios are more than certain if citizens in the societies of origin continue
to be destined to life with a general lack of security and economic prospects and an absence
of trust in the building of a safer and more just society, which would also include
reconstruction of the social relations shattered by the hostilities.
28
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposalimplementation-package/docs/communication_on_eam_state_of_play_20151014_en.pdf
29 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5777_en.pdf
9
The frequently mentioned solution of the refugee situation in the countries of origin,
the receiving countries that are taking in the highest number of refugees (Turkey) or in the
transit countries through which the largest number of refugees enter the EU (Greece),
indicates that the European Union still has not approached solving the refugees crisis in a
systematic and efficacious manner. This is particularly evident in Turkey, with the creation
of the so-called tampon zones for retention of the refugees in camps, in which they are left
in a situation of prolonged displacement and lack of prospects. The considerable funds
(around four billion Euros) that the EU is prepared to offer Turkey for refugee retainment
on their territory is just one in a series of ad hoc measures that defers the refugee issue,
but does not solve it.
Although there have been suggestions made on the EU level that it will be possible
to issue so-called humanitarian visas to forced migrants who have entered the Member
States by irregular routes, such a system has not been considered seriously, and has not
started to operate in practice. If a humanitarian visa system were to start to be applied due
to changes in circumstances for their being issued, they could be converted to temporary
humanitarian sojourn status or tolerated stays, which is still the lowest status level, by
which the refugees do not attain any rights whatsoever in the receiving country. Apart from
that, there has been no activation in the EU of the temporary protection mechanism that,
in accordance with the Directive on Temporary Protection, enables recognition of
protection for those arriving at European borders from war-torn regions. Although
temporary protection offers ‘a lower standard’ of protection than asylum does, particularly
from the aspect of refugee integration, the EU adopters of the Directive have not activated
that mechanism since, it would seem, they are not completely certain who is ‘an authentic
refugee’ in this mass arrival, and who ‘an economic migrant’, the latter not being entitled
to the right to protection in keeping with the EU Directive on Temporary Protection.30
Due to the fact that there is no ban on the Member States conducting their own
particular migration policy, even when that would undermine the Common European
Asylum System, the manner of further Dublin Regulation implementation has come into
question, so that it has been temporarily suspended. While goods, services and capital
continue to ‘circulate’ freely in the EU, it is clear that that does not hold for the circulation
of people, if it ever did. However, does not the freedom of movement abrogation also
undermine the fundamental values of the EU: respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights? Therefore, the current
humanitarian crises represents a major challenge to the EU, particularly in respect of the
commonality and solidarity of all Member States in solving the refugee crisis in the spirit
of its proclaimed values, mutual trust and the application of international refugee and
humanitarian law.
Furthermore, the EU refugee quota system, from all indications, cannot equably
distribute the burden of and responsibility in the refugee situation, rather the issue of
refugee protection is being treated with asymmetrical and particular approaches on the
part of the Member States. In addition, the EU does not have clear and equalised standards
and criteria for the distribution of refugees among the Member States and it is unclear how
the Member States can prevent secondary movement of relocated and resettled refugees
and asylum seekers. Thus, it is necessary to reform the European asylum system because
disunited, inefficient and inadequate policies and measures are proving to be
unproductive. The Republic of Croatia agreed under the quota system to accept a higher
number of refugees than had been proposed (the only other country to do so being Estonia)
but, since that system is fairly lacking both in theory and in practice, its effects and
applicability remain in question. Croatian society accepted the refugee flows by expressing
30
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:212:0012:0023:EN:PDF
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largely positive attitudes and a welcome, both at the level of the Government’s
representatives and that of the public, civil organisations and initiatives. In the foregoing
period until the beginning of November, that had been contributed to largely by the ‘freeflow’ at the borders and/or the brief retention of refugees and other forced migrants on
Croatian territory (no longer than twelve hours as a rule) and their further transfer to the
north-western countries of the EU as their ultimate destination.
Subsequent to closing of the State border of the Republic of Hungary towards
Croatia on the night of October 17 2015, each further possible closing of a border/s and the
impossibility of transfer from Croatia to other countries (primarily to Slovenia) could force
the refugees to seek protection in Croatia. Since the refugee flows are not lessening, the
humanitarian crisis is deepening. Keeping forced migrants waiting on the Slovenian border
and their slowed down reception at one time directly influenced the situation in Croatia.
While the number of refugees on the border between Serbia and Croatia was growing, the
capacities of the reception camp in Opatovac in eastern Croatia were lessening, and that
additionally aggravated the transfer of refugees from there to the Slovenian border. In the
event that the borders were to be closed completely it could be expected that the flows
from Serbia would redirect towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, and from there again to Croatia.
In the newly emerged situation, Croatia should urgently adopt measures for the
reception of a mass number of refugees and ensure legal and material conditions for their
shelter and care. Therefore, on the basis of analyses to date, we would like to offer
recommendations31 to the international community and the European Union (particularly
to the Republic of Croatia) for a more efficacious solution of the current humanitarian crisis
in Europe.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
•
to identify and exert influence on the main causes of today’s mass mixed migration
flows in the world by mapping the crisis hot-points and to work on the long-term
provision of developmental assistance in the financial and logistical sense and in
expertise that can help in stopping those conflicts and in the further socio-economic
recovery and development of those regions
•
to invest in measures of financial support to the refugee camps in third countries with
the objective of improving the refugee situation and in measures for their leaving
those camps and creating permanent solutions for integration into the local
community
•
to give precedence to humanitarian operations in saving migrants over Frontex’s
security measures in destroying smuggling networks and smuggling means of
transport
•
to provide and hold continuously open and free-flowing humanitarian corridors that
would make possible the safe arrival and transit of refugees and entry into the
territory of the Member States and approach to the protection seeking system
•
to ease the legal conditions governing the arrival of third country citizens in the EU
by a more liberal system of quotas for work, education, study and family reunion
31
Certain recommendations issued by the European Council for Refugees and Exiles, Amnesty International,
Jesuit Refugee Service, Solidar Network Europe as well as the local Dobrodošli/Welcome Refugee Support
Initiative have been analysed and compared.
11
•
to activate the existing legal protection mechanisms, such as temporary protection or
humanitarian visas to enable the arrival of refugees and recognition of refugee
protection
•
to develop adequate accommodation capacities for the reception of refugees in
Europe and to equalise the reception standards in all the Member States
•
to devise and implement a more efficacious system for distributing asylum seekers
and refugees among the Member States by way of quotas, which should be simpler,
faster and cheaper
•
in cases of relocation and resettlement, to respect migrant preferences (where
possible) and their social links with persons in the receiving country or the desired
destination
•
to set up an integrated EU coordination body that would oversee the implementation
of common standards and coordinate joint EU operations, with the possibility that
that responsibility be taken over by EASO (the European Asylum Support Office)
•
to commence complete revision or even abandonment of the Dublin Regulation
system and devise a system that would not tie refugee protection seekers to territory
with inadequate asylum systems, along with respect for common standards of
reception
•
to stimulate development and equalisation of refugee protection in all the Member
States, including advancement of the integration policies of the Member States,
together with establishment of common standards, models and approaches
•
to enable sustainable solutions of tolerated stays in the Member States in the event
of secondary movements of those who would be relocated to other Member States
according to the quota system.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
From the beginning of the current humanitarian crisis on the territory of the Republic of
Croatia, more than 200 000 forced migrants have entered and travelled through the
country up until October 20. On the basis of direct insights in the field, using participant
observation method, and based on recommendations made by professional services and
civil society organisations caring for the refugees’ rights, some of the challenges and needs
in the system of reception, accommodation and transfer of refugees on the territory of the
EU and, separately, of Croatia, can be identified. It is also possible to put forward certain
guidelines for the development of policies and measures that could be evolved in this
situation on the level of Croatia:
•
to continue with the reception of refugees in Croatia with provision of an increased
number of adequate, primarily indoor, accommodation capacities as is the one
located in Slavonski Brod
•
to provide, in case of immediate necessity and possible future hampering transfer
and reception of refugees on the part of the Slovenian and Austrian authorities,
additional capacities and professional services for the transitory accommodation in
the border region with Slovenia
•
to participate in and initiate negations with neighbouring and other European
countries on solving the current refugee crisis in the spirit of solidarity and equal
distribution of responsibility
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•
to increase material and human capacities with the objective of adequate care for the
refugees instead of spending funds on erecting physical barriers
•
to continue to adapt and improve the existing accommodation and the technical
capacities of the reception centres
•
to establish better coordination between all actors included in the measures for
reception and accommodation of refugees and other forced migrants with the aim of
achieving better communication and distribution of tasks and accountability
•
to provide a sufficient number of translators and intercultural mediators for the
needs of everyday communication between the authorised services and the forced
migrants
•
to intensify measures of timely and valid informing of the refugees on their current
situation, prospects for further transit and the possibilities of seeking asylum in
Croatia and providing other necessary information
•
to provide a sufficient number of medical and other professional persons who would
implement urgent intervention measures in offering medical assistance and
psychological support to victims of trauma and suffering
•
to take care of particularly vulnerable refugee groups (pregnant women, children,
elderly persons, unaccompanied minors, and the like) in meeting specific needs and
in giving them precedence in reception, accommodation provision and organised
continuance of their journeys
•
to develop and apply from the first day of arrival coherent, systematic and effective
measures for integration into society of the population that will be relocated and
resettled to Croatia in keeping with the systematic quota system
•
to devise and set in motion a campaign on a national level for sensibility raising and
timely and valid informing of the public about the current crisis and the needs of the
forced migrants
•
to promote a national plan and measures to counter discrimination, xenophobia and
racism and to promote tolerance, solidarity and humaneness through policies and
measures in raising the sensibility of the public towards migration and refugee issues
•
to support the drawing up of a new quota model before the EU bodies (the
Parliament, Council and Commission) that would set a formula for calculating the
reception potential of each Member State and to adopt measures in keeping
therewith for urgent relocation to second Member States in the event of the
maximum upper limits of forced migrant reception and accommodation being
reached
•
to strengthen measures of public-private-partnership in matters of alternative
protection that might involve sponsored reception and accommodation or measures
for integration of accepted persons, under the supervision and control of State
services so as to prevent possible abuse of this model.
13