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ARMS ACQUISITIONS, DEFENCE SPENDING AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN EAST ASIA
Increasing military capabilities may be a normal and rational activity as states maintain their
position relative to their neighbours and as new technology is developed, or it may presage
something more serious. In considering these issues, attention will be drawn to the fact that
the current regional security environment is generating an increasing degree of concern.
Much has certainly been made of the increases in defence spending and the number and
types of weapons platforms and systems which regional states are acquiring.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies has highlighted the acceleration in the rate of
real defence spending increases in Asia after 2010. These rose by 2% in 2011, 4.5% in 2012
and 4.7% in 2013. In real terms, therefore, defence spending in Asia in 2013 was 9.4% greater
than in 2011. For East Asia, real defence spending went from US$165.7bn in 2010 to
US$205.4bn in 2013 (a rise of 13.2%) and in South-East Asia over the same period real
defence spending was almost 20% greater making it “the fastest sub-regional rise across
Asia”.i
Not all of the increased expenditure has been on arms acquisitions: much of it has been
directed towards the less headline grabbing areas of the pay and conditions of military
personnel. However, it has obviously provided the wherewithal for the region’s states to
pursue procurement programmes and it is these which have increasingly been prioritised.ii
With regard to equipment, attention has been focussed on the quantity and quality of that
which the region’s states have acquired, are planning to acquire, or are developing,
particularly in terms of air and maritime capabilities. Examples include:
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China’s launch of three new Type-05D destroyers in 2013, flight tests of two J-20 next
generation combat aircraft, commencing the production of a second naval aviation
platform, and the introduction of nuclear-powered hunter killer submarines;iii
Japan’s launch in August 2013 of the first of two 27,000 tonne helicopter carriers, the
Izumo, due to be commissioned in 2015iv and the acquisition of Soryu-class
submarines and new Aegis destroyers;v
South Korea’s launch in August 2013 of the fourth Son Won-il-class submarine and the
approval of a plan to launch three more Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyers
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between 2023 and 2027 equipped with vertical-launch guided missiles;vi
Indonesia’s order for three Type-209/1200 attack submarines the first of which is due
to be delivered in 2015,vii and two Dutch SIGMA 10514 frigates expected to be
delivered in 2017;viii and
Vietnam’s order for 12 more Su-30MK2 aircraft in August 2013,ix and its acquisition of
six Kilo-class submarines.x
The various states’ focus on maritime capabilities is not surprising. As one retired US Navy
admiral has noted, the majority of security issues in the region are in the maritime domain
and thus the “military capabilities competition will be largely maritime as well”.xi In
particular, China is seeking to acquire capabilities which will force the “US and its allies [to]
operate further from its home waters.”xii
At the centre of concerns about all this actual and planned procurement, is the belief that it
will provide the region’s armed forces “with the capacity to locate and destroy targets at
longer ranges and with greater accuracy.” Additionally, regional states are increasing their
abilities “to deploy more substantial forces over greater distances.” xiii In other words, they are
developing power projection capabilities which, by and large, they have not hitherto
possessed. The development of such capabilities by the major Asian powers of China, India
and Japan “would change the peaceful nature of the region and cause greater suspicion,
political competition, and even conflict”, especially if it occurs in conjunction with “more
active unilateral military diplomacy”. xiv
What label then should we attach to these arms acquisitions? Over the past 18 months or so
it has been apparent that it is still popular to use that of an ‘arms race’. No less a person than
Indonesia’s armed forces chief, Gen. Moeldoko, has said that: “We are definitely worried
because there is a trend happening in the region right now and that is an arms race, between
ASEAN … countries themselves and between major powers.”xv
It is useful here to introduce Colin Gray’s classic definition of an arms race. For him, the
“minimal condition” for one to exist is “that there should be two or more parties perceiving
themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their
armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general
attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other
parties.”xvi
Under this specific definition it would be difficult to assert that what is currently occurring in
East Asia is an arms ‘race’. Part of the utility of the term is that it is meant to help distinguish
between what is normal and what is an abnormal pattern of behaviour in terms of arms
acquisitions. An arms race constitutes abnormal behaviour whilst the maintenance of the
military status quo is normal. In effect, therefore, there is a spectrum of behaviour with the
possibility of movement along it. Buzan and Herring argue that it is “the direction of change
[which] may be a more appropriate guide to events than any attempt to locate a given case on
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one side or the other of some strict but arbitrary dividing line.”xvii
The direction of change in East Asia has undoubtedly been from the maintenance of the status
quo end of the spectrum and towards the arms racing one. Moreover, this change has been
occurring at an increasing rate. Thus, it would not seem unreasonable to contend that the
mid-point of ‘arms competition’ has already been reached or, if not, then it soon will be.xviii
Whatever label we choose to attach to regional arms acquisitions and military developments,
it is readily apparent that they are heightening the security dilemma.
In its most simplistic form, the term ‘security dilemma’ is synonymous with ‘security problem’.
This is too broad and conceptually meaningless. Narrowly defined, a security dilemma exists
when a state’s military preparations “create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of
another as to whether these preparations are for ‘defensive’ purposes only (to enhance its
security in an uncertain world) or … for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its
advantage)”.xix Practically, of course, it is almost impossible for states to differentiate
“between measures other states take to defend themselves and measures they may be taking
to increase their capability for aggression.” The effects of getting it wrong are so serious,
however, that “the dictates of prudence pressure each state to adjust its military measures in
response to a worst-case view of the measures taken by others.” Thus, as each move is
regarded as being a potential threat, “even a system in which all states seek only their own
defence will tend to produce competitive accumulations of military strength.”xx
It has also been argued that in an international system characterised by anarchy and
uncertainty, the existence of “mistrust between two or more potential adversaries can lead
each side to take precautionary and defensively motivated measures that are perceived as
offensive threats.” This may cause reciprocal counter-responses which lead to increased
regional tensions, diminished security and “self-fulfilling prophecies about the danger of one’s
security environment.”xxi As a consequence, one could expect to see the emergence of spirals
of tension. For Christensen, when looking at East Asia, there are many variables which make
the development of a security dilemma likely. “Not only could dramatic and unpredictable
changes in the distribution of capabilities … increase uncertainty and mistrust, … the
importance of sea-lanes and secure energy supplies to almost all regional actors could
encourage a destabilising competition to develop power projection capabilities on the seas
and in the skies.” Power projection capabilities are usually seen as “offensive threats” and
“are more likely to spark spirals of tension than weapons that can defend only a nation’s
homeland.”xxii
If we look at East Asia today, it is not hard to see a China-Japan and a China-US security
dilemma functioning. China’s military modernisation has certainly led to the US increasing its
support for Japan as well as bolstering its own military presence in the region. Under the
‘rebalance’, US forces are projected to increase steadily to reach the target of having 60% of
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air and naval assets deployed in the Pacific by 2020. Many of these assets will be the most
advanced in the US’ arsenal.xxiii This, in turn, is causing China to seek to further its military
capabilities leading to increased mistrust, heightened threat perceptions, and further counterresponses. These all aggravate the prevailing security dilemma and cause tensions to spiral
further.
The effects of the absence of a collective security system in East Asia, and the problems
associated with those existing sub-regional mechanisms, have given rise to a rather distinct
form of the security dilemma as it pertains to China and the US. This is one “in which each
country has selfishly acted in its own interests and thereby inflicted greater insecurity on the
region. Specifically, … [it] has manifested itself in two distinguishable ways: one in conflicts of
interest in the Sino-US relationship, and the other in the relationship between these two big
nations and other smaller countries.”xxiv
Mistrust; spirals of tension; conflicts of interest between China and the US; and matters
surrounding Sino-US relationships with smaller regional states, are all manifest in, and
affected by, maritime territorial disputes and issues over freedom of navigation and overflight.
Such disputes and issues have included the standoff between China and the Philippines over
Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea; clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese
vessels in waters near the Paracel Islands after a Chinese oil drilling rig was moved there;
repeated intrusions by Chinese aircraft and vessels into Japanese airspace and Japaneseadministered waters around the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu by China); and the
near collision between a Chinese J-11 fighter and a US P-8 Poseidon ASW and surveillance
aircraft close to Hainan Island.
Such ‘incidents at sea’ have been increasing in number. The concern has been that there is a
heightened risk of conflict eventuating from either accidents or miscalculations, or from the
need to be seen to be enforcing one’s position. Indeed, it has apparently become ever more
difficult for states to back down. In the wake of the P-8 incident it was reported that the
Chinese had called for the US to cut back (and eventually stop) such surveillance flights; flights
which China has long been unhappy with. The US has clearly stated, however, that it has no
intention of so doing saying that such flights are justified because of the lack of transparency
surrounding the military build-up by China. The upshot of all this is that the prevailing
security dilemma is made more acute.
Once a security dilemma exists, it is very hard to escape from it unless “empathy” among the
participants can be created and effective “multilateral regimes and forums designed to
increase transparency and build confidence” can be established. xxv Whilst it does not seem
that empathy is going to be created any time soon, there do appear to be new efforts to
establish confidence-building measures (CBMs): no doubt motivated by concerns about the
heightened risk of conflict. Among these various CBMs are the resumption of talks between
China and Japan on the setting up of a ‘maritime communication mechanism’; agreement
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between China and Vietnam to seek to “address and control” maritime disputes; and the two
agreements between President Xi and President Obama at the November 2014 APEC leaders’
summit on the notification of major military exercises and on the rules of behaviour for air
and sea encounters.
Whether or not these various CBMs and efforts to reduce the risk of conflict arising from
either accident or miscalculation will actually be effective remains to be seen. That they are
unlikely to mitigate the prevailing security dilemma, given the power struggle which is
currently occurring in East Asia, seems rather more certain in light of the continued
unwillingness to compromise and make concessions.
Dr Mark G. Rolls
University of Waikato, New Zealand
Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic Studies, NZ
February 2015
i
The Military Balance 2014, p.204.
Ibid., p.205.
iii
Ibid., pp.208-09. At the time it was published The Military Balance 2014 observed that the Type-095
submarine had not yet appeared, however, in December 2013 one of the boats was reported to have passed
through the Malacca Strait on the surface en route to the Indian Ocean. “Deep Threat. China’s Submarines
Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance”, WSJ Online, 24, October 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-capability-altering-strategicbalance-undersea-1414164738 (accessed 4 November 2014).
iv
The Military Balance 2014, p.201.
v
“Japan Builds Response to Chinese Area-Denial Strategy”, Defense News, 26 October, 2014,
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG03/310260020/Japan-Builds-Response-ChineseArea-Denial-Strategy (accessed 4 November 2014).
vi
“Pacific Powers Build Capability, Warily Eye Neighbours”, Defense News, 26 October, 2014,
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20141026/DEFREG03/310260019/Pacific-Powers-Build-CapabilityWarily-Eye-Neighbor-Countries (accessed 31 October, 2014).
vii
The Military Balance 2014, p.294
viii
Ibid.
ix
Ibid.
x
“Vietnam building deterrent against China in disputed seas with submarines”, Reuters, 7 September, 2014,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/07/us-vietnam-submarines-china-insightidUSKBN0H20SF20140907 (accessed 4 November, 2014).
xi
Michael McDevitt cited in “China’s ‘Security Dilemma’ Risks Arms Race in Asia”, TIME.com, 16 May,
2012, http://nation.time.com/2012/05/16/chinas-security-dilemma-risks-arms-race-in-asia/print/ (accessed 4
January, 2013).
xii
Ibid.
xiii
The Military Balance 2012, p.205.
xiv
Dennis C. Blair, “Military Power Projection in Asia” in Ashley J. Tellis, Mercy Kuo, and Andrew Marble
(eds.), Strategic Asia 2008-09. Challenges and Choices (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian
Research, 2008), p.392.
xv
“Indonesia military worries over Asia arms race, territorial tensions”, Reuters, 3 April, 2014,
ii
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/03/us-indonesia-military-idUSBREA320GD20140403 (accessed 3
October, 2014).
xvi
Colin Gray, “The Arms Race Phenomenon”, World Politics, XXIV, 1971, p.40. Gray then breaks this
down into four “basic conditions” that “must [all] be present for there to be any valid assertion that a
particular relationship is an arms race.” See Gray, op. cit., p.41
xvii
Barry Buzan & Eric Herrring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder/London: Lynne Reiner,
1998), p.80.
xviii
The term arms ‘buildup’ could also be employed since Buzan and Herring see this as being a “near
synonym for arms competition”. Ibid., p.81.
xix
Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, “The Security Dilemma”, in John Baylis & N. J. Rengger (eds.),
Dilemmas of World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.30.
xx
Barry Buzan, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations
(London: Macmillan/International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p.78.
xxi
Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”,
International Security, Vol.23, No.4 (Spring 1999), p.49-50.
xxii
Ibid., p.50.
xxiii
See Namrata Goswami, “Power Shifts in East Asia: Balance of Power vs. Liberal Institutionalism”,
Perceptions, Spring 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 1, pp.3-31 and Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense, US,
The 13th IISS Asia Security Summit The Shangri-La Dialogue, First Plenary Session The United States’
Contribution
To Regional Stability, Saturday 31 May 2014.
xxiv
Zheng Yongnian, “China-US Relations and Asia’s Security Dilemma”, China US Focus, 22 January,
2012, http://www.chinausfocus.com/print/?id=13162 (accessed 3 October, 2014).
xxv
Christensen, op. cit., p.71.
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