The multidimensionality of citizens’ national identity and support
for the European Union
Julian Aichholzer, Sylvia Kritzinger and Carolina Plescia *
Department of Government, University of Vienna
Draft Version: 12.05.2017
Paper prepared for presentation at the Workshop Rejected Europe. Beloved Europe. Cleavage
Europe? European University Institute, Florence, Italy, May 18-19, 2017
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long recognized that identity-related factors are among the strongest predictors
of citizens’ attitudes toward the European Union (EU). Yet, the underlying mechanism
between one’s national identity and EU support has remained underdeveloped. Pinning down
what exactly makes someone truly attached to her nation is tricky, mainly because national
identity is a nebulous mix of values, language, history, culture and citizenship. This paper
aims to disentangle this mix and then test the ways in which the different dimensions of
national identity influence support for the EU. In particular, we focus on the exclusive and
inclusive motivations underlying national identity, identifying a chauvinistic and a patriotist
dimension alongside opposing concepts of citizenship that define national identity. The paper
shows that national identity is a multidimensional construct with identity-related factors
exerting both positive and negative influences on EU support. The findings also indicate that
these distinct feelings of national identity co-exist and support one another leading us to the
conclusion that national identity may be the major cause of ambivalent attitudes toward the
EU. We also uncover important distinctions between new and older member states.
*
Corresponding author: Sylvia Kritzinger, Department of Government, University of Vienna. Email:
[email protected] .
1
1
Introduction
A deep and long-lasting economic crisis and now the so called “refugee crisis” have brought
issues of identity, tolerance, solidarity and cooperation to the forefront of political, popular
and academic debates virtually in all European countries. One of the consequences of these
crises is the surge in what one ambassador calls “the politics of nostalgia” and the growing
success of populist parties across the ideological spectrum that especially target the European
Union (EU) for the malaises of their countries. 1 There are clearly tensions nowadays
between, on the one hand, a burgeoning monist populist attitude whose main goal is to defend
the national identity and, on the other hand, the pluralist essence of Europe where
nationalities with different stories and socio-cultural backgrounds are asked to cooperate and
help each other. In this conflictual climate the EU as a political project is increasingly
challenged.
Scholars have long recognized that identity-related factors are among the strongest
predictors of citizens’ attitudes toward the EU. Strong support has been found for the
proposition that the intensity of feelings toward one’s country (Blank et al. 2001), the level of
attachment to the nation in relation to other territorial entities (Carey 2002; Christin and
Trechsel 2002), and the fear of other identities and cultures threatening the dominant culture
of the nation (McLaren 2002; Azrout et al. 2011; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017), all relate
negatively to support for the European project (Hooghe and Marks 2005, 2009). Hence, the
understanding of “the people” in the national context has played a major role in explaining
support for the EU (Hobolt and de Vries 2016).
Yet, the underlying mechanism between conceptions of one’s national identity and
EU-support has remained rather underdeveloped. This is mainly due to the fact that the
literature on citizen support for the EU has usually treated national-identity as a onedimensional concept. This conceptualization, however, fails to adequately capture the
multidimensional nature and structure of national identity (e.g., Schatz et al. 1999; Hermann
et al. 2009). Pinning down what exactly makes someone truly a national is tricky, mainly
because national identity is a nebulous mix of values, language, history, culture and
citizenship. National identity does in fact reflect different aspects of an individual’s
1
For instance, Golden Dawn and Syriza in Greece, UKIP in Great Britain, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV)
and the Socialist Party in the Netherlands, Front National (FN) in France, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria,
Podemos in Spain, the Five Stars Movement (M5S) in Italy and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in
Germany).
2
relationship toward her nation and, most importantly, these different facets may have varying
effects on citizens’ feelings and behaviors (see Davidov 2009 for a review), and could hence
also have different impacts on EU support. As of today, very little is known about how these
different dimensions of national identity influence support for the EU. Yet, the move from
cooperative to contested, even conflictual Europe that we are witnessing right now requires a
deeper understanding of how the different facets of national identity are associated with
support for European integration.
Located at the intersection between political science and social-psychology, this paper
focuses on the ways in which the different dimensions of national identity influence support
for the EU. While a strong national identity has been commonly found to be negatively
related to EU support, we examine whether certain identity related factors can also exert a
positive influence. To do so, throughout the paper we study different national identity
dimensions distinguishing between “negative” and “positive” or “exclusive” and “inclusive”
identity aspects or motivations (e.g., Calhoun 1993); whereas the former (negative or
exclusive) appeals to more or less aggressive superiority feelings toward other nationalities
and cultural markers of a nation, the latter (positive or inclusive) appeals to encompassing
and not negotiable universal values, such as freedom and equality. We use structural equation
modelling to look more closely at the major dimensions of national identity and their impact
on EU support. Furthermore, we explore whether the different dimensions of national identity
vary in their degree and how their interplay impacts EU support.
The paper is structured as follows. Next, we briefly review the extensive literature on
EU support focusing especially on identity-related factors. Drawing from both the socialpsychology and the political science literature, we then discuss the different dimensions of
identity and the link between them, and put forward the expectations over the link between
national identity and its different facets and EU support. In the next sections, we present the
data and the results based on a cross-national analysis of survey data from the International
Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity III (2013) module. Finally, we conclude by
discussing the implications of our findings and future avenues of research.
2
Foundations of EU support
David Easton’s (1975) classic theoretical framework remains the most influential typology of
support for political systems in general and for EU support specifically. Easton explains that
support exists in two distinct modes: specific and diffuse. Specific support refers to a person’s
3
attitudes toward an object based on the object’s performance such that stronger levels of
support are associated with the fulfillment of citizens’ expectations over policy and action. If
European citizens are instrumental in their preferences, they will engage in a rational and
careful evaluation of alternatives, and only support the EU when they perceive that the EU
membership benefits their individual pocket and/or the country as a whole (e.g., Anderson
and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Tucker et al. 2002).
Diffuse support is a more abstract concept reflecting an attitude toward what the
object is and represents rather than what it does. This type of support expresses itself as trust
in and validity of the regime and identity with the political community. It has been shown
that citizens care about the procedural manners of decision-making and political efficacy
explains EU support (Rohrschneider 2002; McEvoy 2016). The notion of national identity
represents the other key predictors of diffuse support for the EU (Kritzinger 2003).
The identity-related approach has become increasingly important within the literature
in conjunction with the evolution of the EU from an international organization primarily
concerned with trade liberalization to an economic and political union with wide-ranging
competences (Carey 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2009; McLaren 2002, 2006). The focus within
this strand of the literature is on the individual’s attachment to their national identity. In this
regard, European integration may be seen as a force eroding national self-determination and
blurring the boundaries between national communities. While the identification with the EU
is considered an important factor for its stability and democratic legitimacy (see Deutsch
1953), a strong national identity seems to hamper EU support, and in the long-run, to
undermine its democratic legitimacy (Kriesi and Lachat 2004).
The existing literature within the identity-related approach has commonly treated
national identity as one-dimensional concept and investigated its fundamental dimensions in
isolation from one another. For instance, McLaren (2002, 2006) shows that those people who
are fearful of the process of European integration, leading to their language being used less,
or their national identity and culture becoming less distinct, hold a more negative view of the
EU. Another strand of the literature focuses on anti-immigration attitudes finding that
negative bias toward outgroup members or an exclusionary social identity have a negative
impact on EU support (e.g., De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; Hobolt et al. 2011; Kuhn
2011; Azrout and Wojcieszak 2017; Kentmen-Cin and Erisen 2017).
This one-dimensional approach, however, fails to adequately take into account the
multidimensional structure of national identity. Both the social psychology and the political
science literature have systematically shown that national identity is better conceptualized in
4
its multidimensionality of values, language, history, culture and citizenship. Yet, except for
the few works discussed below, scholarly research has devoted surprisingly little attention to
the mechanisms by which conceptions of national identity influence EU support. We build on
different conceptions of identity and put forward a model that captures in greater details how
the varying dimensions of an individual’s identification with a nation relate to citizens’
support for the EU.
3
The relation between dimensions of national identity and EU support
The social-psychology and the political science literature have conceptualized the dimensions
of national identity rather differently yet both strands of the literature have put attention to a
negative and a positive aspect motivating the strength of attachment toward the nation.
3.1
The dimensions of national identity
National identity is considered a central concept of group attachment in the modern world. In
general terms, national identity describes the intensity of feelings and closeness toward one’s
own nation (Blank et al. 2001). Although global and regional identities such as the EU are
becoming increasingly relevant, nations are still the core of individual social identities
(Hjerm 2001; Mansfield and Mutz 2009). 2 National identity is hence a generic concept that
reflects different aspects of an individual’s relationship with or attachment toward her nation.
In social psychology, national identity has generally been conceptualized as a twodimensional construct with an “exclusive” and an “inclusive” aspect (e.g., Schatz et al. 1999;
Davidov 2009). The exclusive aspect of national identity has been labeled “chauvinism” or
“blind patriotism”, referring to feelings of superiority or hostility toward others (Blank and
Schmidt 2003; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). 3 From this point of view, national identity is
characterized by idealization of the nation, a feeling of national superiority, an uncritical
acceptance of national, state, and political authorities, a suppression of ambivalent attitudes
toward the nation and derogation of groups not considered to be part of the nation (Blank and
Schmidt 2003). The inclusive aspect of national identity has been labeled “constructive
2
The more an individual identifies with a group, such as a nation, the more willing she is to sacrifice individual
utility for the benefit of the group. This is not out of pure altruism, but because in-groups fulfill fundamental
needs for self-esteem, group belongingness and cooperation (Brewer 1991; Spears et al. 2001).
3
Chauvinism was found to be empirically and conceptually associated with authoritarian attitudes, which
actually express an exclusionary social identity (e.g., Blank 2003; Dunn 2015).
5
patriotism”, “positive patriotism” (Schatz et al. 1999) or “constitutional patriotism”
(Habermas 1996). It refers to positive feelings toward the home country that are associated
with civic or political national pride based on being proud of the country’s political
institutions, culture and social welfare system (Hjerm 1998). Hence, it represents a positive
identification with a nation’s social, economic and political achievements and does not reflect
critically upon out-groups (Blank and Schmidt 2003; Brown 2000).
The literature in political science has usually put attention to the citizenship
dimension of national identity distinguishing between a “civic” and an “ethnic”
conceptualization of nationhood (Kohn 1944). 4 There is a difference between nations that are
based primarily on some joint experience of cultural heritage and nations that are based
primarily on the unifying force of a common political history and constitution (Meinecke
1970). Civic citizenship is based on a form of social contract that in principle is open to all
who wish to adhere to it while ethnic citizenship is described as an ethnic community in
which inclusion is based on descent. In other words, while ethnic citizenship refers mostly to
having national ancestry, for civic citizenship the most important criterion seems to be to
obey national laws. Other authors define this ethnic conception as culturalism, which is the
belief that the boundaries of the nation are defined by cultural markers (Hermann et al. 2009).
In sum, ethnic citizenship conceptions stress the importance of national identity as being
defined by cultural similarity and ethnic belongingness and can hence be considered
“exclusive” as well, while civic citizenship contains a more “inclusive” element of belonging
as long as rules of the nation are followed.
There is quite also some discussion in the literature on whether the two main
dimensions of national identity are independent or connected to each other (e.g., Miller 2000;
Brubaker 2004). Regarding chauvinism and constructive patriotism, Kosterman and Feshbach
(1989) explain that the two constructs may actually be independent from one another.
Specifically, even if those who score high on chauvinism may also score high in positive
affect for their country, the one does not necessarily follow from the other. Similarly, those
who are patriotist will not necessarily feel hostile toward other nations or more generally,
positive ingroup identity does not necessarily imply outgroup hostility (Calhoun 1993). So,
even though it is often empirically found that chauvinism and constructive patriotism are
positively associated (Davidov 2009), in many respects the two dimensions appear to be
4
Kohn’s distinction had its roots in Meineke’s (1970[1907]) distinction between “Staatsnation” (state nation)
and “Kulturnation” (culture nation).
6
theoretically different. When it comes to the relationship between the ethnic and the civic
dimensions, Reeskens and Hooghe’s (2010) analysis suggests that the two concepts are
correlated and they tend to reinforce each other, however, the authors explain that there
remain important elements of the ethnic citizenship that are incompatible with the civic
conceptualization.
Independently of whether the exclusive and the inclusive dimension of national
identity are connected or independent to each other, they nonetheless refer to different
objects. As Easton (1975) already pointed out, support (including identification) can be
directed toward different objects. Regimes including rules, norms and role allocations
represent one type of identification object, political communities referring to all (national)
members of a political system are another type. 5 The dimensions of national identity
including ethic and civic citizenship have as objects of identification rules and joint
experience falling hence in the regime-type identification. This seems to be different for
chauvinism and constructive patriotism where identification is directed toward the inclusion
or exclusion of members of other (political) communities. Hence, the question arises whether
or not there is a hierarchical order between the dimensions of national identity depending on
their object of identification. Against a baseline view in which no hierarchical order is
assumed, one could speculate that citizens have first to identify with rules and norms before
they can develop a strong community identification. This would mean that support for regime
(ethic and civic citizenship) influences support for the political community (chauvinism and
constructive patriotism). However, also the opposite hierarchical order is conceivable with
support for the political community affecting support for regime. The issue of the presence or
absence of a hierarchical order between the dimensions of national identity remains an (open)
empirical question that we are also going to examine in this paper. The main research
question of this paper is, however, to investigate the relationship between the dimensions of
national identity and EU support as discussed next.
3.2
The relationship between conceptions of national identity and EU support
What is the effect of the different dimensions of national identity on EU support? On the one
hand, as the EU project challenges the idea of nation states and the very definition of who we
are and where we come from (Habermas 1999; Kinnvall 2004), it undermines the nation state
and forces nations into a homogenizing process, and it increases immigration of
5
A third object definition captures authorities that is however not relevant for this paper (see Easton 1976).
7
heterogeneous people from a cultural point of view (e.g., De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005;
Hobolt et al. 2011), we expect the exclusive dimensions, i.e., chauvinism and ethnic
citizenship, to be negatively associated with support for the EU.
On the other hand, the inclusive dimensions are expected to be positively related to
support for the EU since the founding idea of the EU project is integrating people into a
supranational political entity based on common democratic values, enlarging welfare and
political right among countries in which the same rules apply (see also Christin and Trechsel
2002). We thus put forward the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Feelings of chauvinism and an ethnic citizenship conception influence
support for the EU negatively.
Hypothesis 2: Constructive patriotism and the civic citizenship conception influence
support for the EU positively.
Finally, the dimensions of national identity capturing different latent structures might
be particular relevant in the European context in the distinction between Western and Eastern
Europe, i.e., older and new member states, respectively. In fact, Kohn’s (1970) basic
argument was that in Western Europe the borders of the state where settled prior to the rise of
nationalism, which created a strong focus on the civic dimension of nationhood. In contrast,
the borders in Eastern Europe were settled after the rise of nationalism, which created a
strong focus on the ethnic/cultural dimension of nationhood.
Despite critiques of the conceptual demarcation between the Western-civic and
Eastern-ethnic (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008), the civic–ethnic framework reflects an
important distinction between Western and Eastern Europe, namely one in which in Eastern
Europe there are stronger relations between national identification and the ethnic component
(Ariely 2013). Hence, we expect the civic dimension to be more important in explaining
support for the EU in Western Europe compared to Eastern Europe where we instead expect
the ethnic dimension to stand out more clearly.
Hypothesis 3: The civic dimension explains positive support for the EU better in
Western Europe compared to Eastern Europe; the ethnic dimension explains negative
support for the EU better in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe.
8
4
Data and Methods
Individual-level data for this paper are drawn from the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP) National Identity III (2013). 6 The ISSP is a continuing cross-national collaboration
that explores different social and political issues annually (Haller et al. 2009). 7 The Module
2013 includes data from 18 European countries: Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Unfortunately questions on EU
attitudes have not been asked in Germany, Slovakia and Sweden so we must exclude these
three countries from subsequent analyses. The overall sample consisted of just a little more
than 15,000 respondents. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only cross-national survey
that includes simultaneously questions on public support for the EU, national identity and its
different conceptions as well as questions needed to measure important control variables. 8
4.1
Methods: structural equation modeling
To study the relationship between the different dimensions of national identity and EU
support we use structural equation modeling (SEM). 9 Given the interconnection between the
different variables as discussed in the previous sections, we need a setup that also allows us
investigating potential direct and indirect effects among the different variables. In particular,
SEM allows examining such a set-up by also imposing a priori restrictions on presumed
structural patterns between the variables in our model, which are then tested against the data.
In addition, it allows taking into account typical measurement errors in survey questions, i.e.,
structural relationships between latent constructs are said to be corrected for the measures’
unreliability.
4.2
Measurements of the dependent and independent variables
Our dependent variable is citizen support for the EU. In the existing literature EU support has
been operationalized in a number of different ways (e.g., Anderson 1998; Carey 2002;
Eichenberg and Dalton 1993) and, both conceptually and empirically, scholars have had
difficulty fully accounting for the multidimensionality of EU support (Boomgaarden et al.
6
ISSP: National Identity III, 2013. Distributor: GESIS Cologne, Germany ZA 5950.
7
Details of data collection, sampling, and response rates can be found on the ISSP website: http://www.issp.org.
8
To learn more about the data’s overall limitations see Sinnott (2006).
9
In our analyses we use linear SEM and the Satorra-Bentler Maximum Likelihood estimator (SB, also called
MLM) throughout, given that this is more suitable for (slightly) non-normal and ordered categorical data.
9
2011). The approach we take to measure EU support is to use the two available items in the
ISSP survey meant to capture both utilitarian and nationalistic elements of EU support as
listed in Table 1.
In Table 1, we also summarize our main independent variables. To select the items to
measure chauvinism and constructive patriotism we followed Davidov’s work (2009), while
we capture ethnic and civic citizenship conceptions using Reeskens and Hooghe’s analysis
(2010). Notwithstanding, we have also tested the validity of the measurements of these
theoretical key constructs, using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). This is an important
step to ensure that, on the one hand, the selected items provide sufficient discriminant validity
for apparently related constructs and on the other, that they are equally well measured across
contexts (Eastern and Western Europe).
Table 1. Measures of the dependent and key independent variables
Variable
EU support
Chauvinism (or
blind patriotism)
Constructive
patriotism
Ethnic citizenship
conception
Civic citizenship
conception
Question wordings
(V66) Generally speaking, would you say that [COUNTRY]
benefits or does not benefit from being a member of the
European Union?
(V67) How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following
statement? [COUNTRY] should follow [European Union]
decisions, even if it does not agree with them.
(V19) The world would be a better place if people from other
countries were more like the [Country Nationality of
Respondent]
(V20) Generally speaking, [Respondent’s Country] is a better
country than most other countries.
(V25) How proud are you of [Respondent's Country] in the way
democracy works?
(V28) How proud are you of [Respondent's Country] in its social
security system?
(V34) How proud are you of [Respondent's Country] in its fair
and equal treatment of all groups in society?
Some people say that the following things are important for
being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not
important. How important do you think each of the following
is...
(V9) to have been born in [COUNTRY]
(V13) to be a religion of the [COUNTRY]
(V16) to have [COUNTRY] ancestry.
Some people say that the following things are important for
being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not
important. How important do you think each of the following
is...
(V12) to be able to speak the [COUNTRY] language
(V14) to respect [COUNTRY] political institutions and laws
(V15) to feel [COUNTRY]
10
Scale
5-point scale: “not at
all” to “greatly
benefits”
5-point scale:
“disagree strongly” to
“agree strongly”
5 point scale: “disagree
strongly” to “agree
strongly”
4 point scale: “not
proud at all” to “very
proud”
4 point scale: “not
important at all” to
“very important”
4 point scale: “not
important at all” to
“very important”
Table 2 presents the results of the factor loading structure. 10 According to the results
of commonly used fit measures in the context of SEM (i.e., the indices CFI, RMSEA, and
SRMR), this model fits the data rather adequately (see, for instance, Marsh et al. 2004). 11
Furthermore, we are able to distinguish between the different constructs by using the items at
hand. According to the criteria proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981), the items provide
sufficient discriminant validity: even though some of the construct correlations are relatively
high, the squared correlations (r2) are still lower than the average variance extracted (AVE)
by the latent factors, i.e., the strength of the indicators-construct relationships.
Table 2. Confirmatory factor analysis for national identity items and EU support
Items
Chauvinism
Constructive
patriotism
Civic
citizenship
Ethnic
citizenship
EU Support
V19
.69 ***
V20
.76 ***
V25
.73 ***
V28
.66 ***
V34
.63 ***
V14
.26 ***
.43 ***
V12
.56 ***
V15
.69 ***
V9
.69 ***
V13
.53 ***
V16
.82 ***
V66
.80 ***
V67
.51 ***
AVE
.53
.41
.36
.48
.45
Chauv
1
ConPat
.51 ***
1
Civic
.31 ***
.19 ***
1
***
Ethnic
.42
-.02 (n.s.)
.52 ***
1
***
EUSupp -.01 (n.s.)
.39
-.03 *
-.16 ***
1
Note: AVE = Average variance extracted (see Fornell and Larcker 1981).
Entries indicate standardized factor loadings or latent variable correlations.
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Total sample size n = 13,426;
SB-χ2(54) = 2,131; CFI = .939; RMSEA = .054; SRMR = .036.
In sum, the CFA indicates that the four theoretical dimensions of national identity can
be adequately separated empirically and that measures correspond with the theoretical
constructs proposed. The bottom second half of Table 2 indicates a rather strong positive
10
After inspecting modification indices, we further allowed for a cross-loading of the item “important to respect
[COUNTRY] political institutions and laws” (V14) as it is arguably a potential measure of constructive
patriotism as well.
11
In line with the existing literature, we consider a model to fit the data very well when CFI > .95, RMSEA <
.05 and SRMR < .05. Adequate fit is achieved when at least CFI > .90, RMSEA < .08 and SRMR < .08.
11
correlation between all the four constructs except for the relation between the two citizenship
constructs and constructive patriotism: in fact, the relation between civic citizenship and
constructive patriotism is positive but rather weak whereas the correlation between ethnic
citizenship and constructive patriotism is not significant (p > .05). The bottom half of the
table also shows that EU support is only substantially correlated with constructive patriotism
and ethnic citizenship albeit the first relationship is positive while the second is negative.
4.3
Control variables
In our models below, we use additional variables that control for the most important aspects
that the existing literature has shown to be related to EU support. We control for education as
studies have consistently shown that socioeconomic factors influence public support, and
recent work even suggests that it has become a more important determinant of EU support
over time, as the less educated are becoming less supportive of the integration project (see
Hakhverdian et al. 2013). Education is measured by the age of respondents when they
stopped full-time education, assuming a positive effect of education on support for the EU.
To measure the impact of social status and/or income situation we coded two dichotomous
variables: a variable “Professional Manager” that takes a value of 1 when the respondent is
professional (self-employed or employed), general manager, or business proprietor and the
variable “Manual Worker” that takes a value of 1 when the respondent is a skilled or
unskilled manual worker, or non-desk employee (e.g., salesman, driver) (see also Hooghe and
Marks 2004), assuming a positive effect on EU support for the former and a negative effect
for the latter variable, respectively. Beside gender (1 = male) and age in years we control for
the only available measure of political knowledge in the ISSP data, which asks respondents:
“How much have you heard or read about [the European Union]?” Answers range from “not
at all” to “a lot” (4 point scale). We expect a positive effect of political knowledge on EU
support (Karp et al. 2003). All latent constructs in the full model are regressed on these
control variables (full SEM).
5
Results
We present the empirical results in three steps. In a first step, we use SEM to examine
whether or not a hierarchical order exists between the dimensions of national identity
depending on their object of identification; in other words, whether it is more reasonable to
assume that the dimensions of citizenship impact EU support via chauvinism and constructive
12
patriotism or the other way round. In a second step, we use the best performing model to
explain EU support using the different dimensions of national identity. This allows us to test
Hypotheses 1 and 2. In a third and final step, we examine Hypothesis 3, by running the initial
model separately for Western and Eastern Europe to detect key differences.
5.1
Explaining EU support: comparison of competing models
Figure 1 displays the results of a baseline model in which we test the impact of the four key
dimensions of national identity on EU support without specifying an a priori structure among
the underlying dimensions of national identity (= “Baseline Model”).
The fit criteria presented in Figure 1 (bottom of each panel) suggest that the baseline
SEM model fit the data appropriately (i.e., identical to the CFA presented above). It is
possible to compare the baseline model with two different structural models that add a
structure to the different dimensions and could provide an explanation for the correlational
patterns between the constructs listed in Table 2. We tested in particular whether it is more
reasonable to assume that ethic and civic citizenship (i.e., regime-type identification with
rules and joint experience) impact citizens’ EU support via chauvinism and constructive
patriotism (i.e., community-related identification directed toward inclusion or exclusion of
members) (Model A in Figure 1) or vice versa (Model B in Figure 1). By comparing the
models’ fit, we intend to establish which model better fits the data at hand.
The large difference in the χ2 value, alongside the worsening of several fit measures,
suggests that Model A is better suited for our data than Model B, which indicates that it is the
support for regime (ethic and civic citizenship) that influences the support for the political
community (chauvinism and constructive patriotism) and not the other way round which also
fits Easton’s assumptions. Furthermore, we find that adding the direct effects for ethic and
civic citizenship does not substantially alter the model fit, keeping in mind the fact that we
operate with very large sample sizes (n = 13,426). In particular, the information provided in
Figure 1 suggests that Model A fits the data equally well as the baseline model. Given that
however, the former imposes a presumed structure among the different national identity
dimensions and hence allows us to rely on a more comprehensive model of direct and indirect
effects of the different variables we proceed with model A as our working tool in step 2 to
test Hypotheses 1 and 2.
13
Figure 1. Models and theoretical expectations
BASELINE MODEL:
SB-χ2(54) = 2,131; CFI = .939; RMSEA = .054; SRMR = .036; n = 13,426
MODEL A:
SB-χ2(56) = 2,150; CFI = .938; RMSEA = .053; SRMR = .037; n = 13,426
MODEL B:
SB-χ2(56) = 3,026; CFI = .912; RMSEA = .063; SRMR = .052; n = 13,426
5.2
The effect of citizens’ national identity on their support for the EU
Figure 2 displays the results of our full model, showing the relationships between latent
variables defining dimensions of national identity and EU support (note that we include
control variables and use the entire sample of countries in this model). In Figure 2, total
effects are reported in squared brackets (indirect + direct effect) while direct effects are
presented next to each arrow. Several results stand out from this analysis. First, the four
different dimensions of national identity exert a rather different impact on EU support. In line
14
with Hypothesis 1, chauvinism influences support for the EU negatively (β = –.19), while in
line with Hypothesis 2 constructive patriotism has a strong positive effect on EU support (β =
.41). While there is no direct effect of ethnic citizenship on EU support, it exerts a small but
significant negative indirect effect (total β = –.09). The civic citizenship dimension has a
small direct negative effect on EU however, its total effect is weakly positive (total β = .03).
Given that previous research has primarily found that national identity factors, generally
speaking, influence EU support negatively, we can conclude that existing studies have only
identified the negative (or exclusive) component of national identity. In other words, potential
positive factors like the strong and positive impact of constructive patriotism on EU support,
that even trumps chauvinism in its effect, have been neglected so far.
Second, compared to the simple correlational structure where chauvinism and civic
citizenship dimension of national identity were practically unrelated to EU support (see Table
2), we now see that chauvinism exhibits a clear negative effect (β = –.19) on EU support in
the multivariate SEM. We also see that the two dimensions of citizenship on the one hand
and the two dimensions of nationalism on the other reinforce each other quite strongly. As
expected, chauvinism and patriotism are significantly positively correlated as are the ethnic
and civic conceptions, however, one can still reveal their unique (reverse) impact, when the
common variance was controlled for in a multivariate model (see Wagner et al. 2012). That
is, even if chauvinism and patriotism share a common core (national attachment, broadly
speaking), overall their have a unique and reversed impact on EU support.
Third, the model presented in Figure 2 reveals several interesting patterns of influence
among the different dimensions of national identity. In particular, Figure 2 shows that the
different dimensions of national identity support rather than undermine each other.
Specifically, the two dimensions of inclusive identity reinforce each other with ethnic
conceptions having a strong substantial effect on chauvinism (β = .36) and civic citizenship
on constructive patriotism (β = .23), respectively. Overall these results suggest that the
different facets of national identity can coexist and impact EU support rather independently.
This confirms the intuition in both academic and public debate that national identity is a
nebulous mix of values, language, history, culture and citizenship. The findings show that
these different values are interconnected and operate rather differently when it comes to
explain EU support. Eventually on our control variables: male individuals as well as older
people and manual workers exhibit lower EU support; education and knowledge are
positively associated with EU support, as expected.
15
Figure 2. Results for the full SEM including controls (all countries)
Note: Entries indicate standardized coefficients with total effects in square brackets.
Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (n.s. = not significant or p ≥ .05). Total sample size n =
13,007; SB-χ2(102) = 2,838; CFI = .927; RMSEA = .045; SRMR = .030.
5.3
Comparing the impact of national identity in Eastern and Western Europe
Next, we turn our focus to Hypothesis 3, which assumes different patterns between Western
and Eastern Europe: for this purpose we distinguish between Western European countries
included in the dataset (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the
U.K.) and Eastern European countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovenia) for our sub-group analyses.
A prerequisite for meaningful comparisons between effect sizes across sub-groups is
the so called “metric” measurement equivalence (see Davidov 2009). 12 A common test when
using multi-group CFA is to compare the initial (unrestricted) CFA model with a model
where certain parameters (here: factor loadings on indicators) are set equal. For the data at
hand with large sample sizes, non-equivalence of measurement would be indicated by a
substantive worsening of model fit, namely a change (Δ) in fit measures for ΔCFI of ≥ -.010,
supplemented by ΔRMSEA of ≥ .015 or a ΔSRMR of ≥ .030, whereas CFI should usually be
given primary attention (Chen 2007: 501). The results of the model comparison however
provide sufficient evidence that the constructs are equally well measured in Western and
Eastern European member states (the difference between the models is ΔSB-χ2(9) = 101.72 (p
12
Note that for this step, the measurements of constructs (i.e., factor loading coefficients) have to be invariant to
ensure identical construct measurements.
16
< .001); ΔCFI = -.003; ΔRMSEA = -.002; ΔSRMR = .002), hence setting the measurement
parameters equal does not substantially deteriorate model fit. Accordingly, we maintain that a
meaningful comparison between effect sizes for Eastern versus Western Europe can be made.
Turning our focus to Hypothesis 3, recall that we expect the civic (ethnic) dimension
to explain support for the EU better (worse) in Western compared to Eastern Europe. The
results are presented in Figure 3 for both sets of countries. Starting with Western Europe, as
before, chauvinism exerts a negative impact on EU support, while the opposite holds true for
constructive patriotism. Also, ethnic citizenship has an overall negative total effect on EU
support (total β = –.10) while the civic citizenship is unrelated to EU support in absolute
terms (n.s.). Still, the civic citizenship dimension is clearly and positively related to the
strength of national attachment in terms of chauvinism and patriotism: civic ideas strongly
predict higher levels of constructive patriotism, but also higher chauvinism, albeit this second
effect is much smaller than the former. Hence, it seems that the two dimensions of inclusive
and exclusive national identity reinforce each other while maintaining a strong diverging
effect on EU support.
Moving to Eastern Europe, Figure 3 depicts a different picture for this second group
of countries. Hypothesis 3 seems not to be confirmed in so far as the ethnic dimension does
not explain support for the EU better in Eastern compared to Western Europe: in fact the total
effect of ethnic citizenship ideas was only significant in absolute terms in Western Europe,
whereas no such pattern can be found in Eastern Europe. However, it seems true that ethnic
ideas of citizenship strongly drive the common core of national attachment in Eastern Europa
(β = .58 for chauvinism and β = .42 for patriotism) and these effects are substantially stronger
in Eastern compared to Western Europe. Hence, the fact that ethnic citizenship is positively
related to both constructs suggests that the ethnic dimension of national identity has a
different meaning and relevance in Eastern compared to Western Europe: in the East, ethnic
citizenship appears not to be a distinct dimension of national identity that impact EU support
but rather an underlying construct that strongly influences all other dimensions of national
identity; in the West the ethnic citizenship instead appears a much more distinct dimension of
national identity with its own impact on EU support. In addition, Figure 3 reveals that the
different dimensions of national identity are much more strongly directly related to EU
support in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Overall, the direct impact of chauvinism
and especially patriotism is substantially larger in Eastern Europe albeit it remains in line
with our Hypotheses 1 and 2.
17
Figure 3. Results for the full SEM based on the East vs. West distinction
MODEL FOR WESTERN EUROPE (n = 7,493):
MODEL FOR EASTERN EUROPE (n = 5,514):
Note: Entries indicate standardized coefficients with total effects of variables in square brackets. Factor loadings
of the construct indicators are set equal across groups (metric invariance). Significance levels: * p < .05, ** p <
.01, *** p < .001 (n.s. = not significant or p ≥ .05). Overall model fit: SB-χ2(213) = 3,618; CFI = .906; RMSEA =
.050; SRMR = .033.
6
Conclusions
Pinning down what exactly makes someone feeling truly attached to her nation is tricky,
mainly because national identity is a nebulous mix of values, language, history, culture and
citizenship. While the existing literature has long recognized that one’s national identity
strongly influences EU support, the theoretical underpinning of this finding has remained
rather underdeveloped. Departing from current investigations, which often treat national
identity as a one-dimensional concept, this paper has tested the impact of the different
dimensions of national identity on EU support, based on the notion of exclusive and inclusive
motivations underlying national identity. This allows us to provide a fully-fledged picture of
the relationship between national identity, its dimensions and EU support.
18
There are several noteworthy findings from this paper that relate directly to theories
of support for European integration. First, national identity is a multidimensional construct
composed of several dimensions with a diverging impact on EU support. Beside an inclusive
and exclusive dimension also known as chauvinism and constructive patriotism, we have also
identified a citizenship dimension related to a civic and an ethnic conceptualization of
nationhood. While the dimensions of constructive patriotism and civic citizenship exert a
positive influence on support for the EU, chauvinism and an ethnic conception of citizenship
are negatively related to EU support. However, conceptions of citizenship are only indirectly
and, if at all, weakly related to EU support even though they are strongly related to
chauvinism and constructive patriotism. Importantly, the findings also show that the different
dimensions coexist and support one another leading us to conclude that national identity may
be the major cause of ambivalent attitudes toward the EU (Stockel 2013) where individual
national identity simultaneously possess positive and negative connotations that are likely to
be activeted by contextual events or the political elites at the national level (Hooghe and
Marks 2005). Future research should look into this ambivalence more carefully in an attempt
to disentangle exactly the conditions under which the different dimensions of national
identity get “activated” and when one is likely to trump over another.
While we uncover an important distinction between Western and Eastern Europe in
line with the ethnic-civic framework, the direction of the associations remain the same across
the two groups of countries. It will be interesting to look more carefully at geographical
differences within the not so fine-rained distinction between Western and Eastern Europe.
Still, there are also some patterns less well explained by theory which deserve further
attention. These include reversely signed effects between ethnic citizenship ideas and
constructive patriotism in Western and Eastern Europe.
Further research should also look at how the more general model presented here could
incorporate exclusive motivations regarding feelings of superiority toward specific
nationalities/ethnicities, e.g., surrounding the debate of immigration from Muslim majority
countries. Furthermore, the issue of social solidarity with people living in a country,
including welfare state benefits, as a positive/inclusive motivation and its limits (= welfare
chauvinism) as well as solidarity with other countries, e.g., in times of economic crises,
deserve further attention as this might be the basis for the idea of a common “social union” in
Europe.
19
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