A Study of House of Lords Reform
Is reform needed and how should the House of Lords be reformed?
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Parliament separated into two houses during the 14th century, and until the 19th century
its upper house, the House of Lords, was the more powerful of the two. However, after the
Reform Act of 18321, the status and power of the House of Lords declined until, by beginning of
the 20th century, the Commons became the more powerful chamber. The 1911 Parliament Act
further curtailed the Lords’ power so that they could merely delay, not reject, legislation. This was
originally designed to be a temporary measure, but successive governments failed to pursue Lords
reform with conviction and 20th century attempts at reform were not comprehensive enough to
fashion a satisfactory second chamber.
Recently, reform of the House of Lords has once again become a pressing issue, with
Tony Blair’s 1997 election manifesto heralding a resolution to the problem of Lords reform;
however, attempts at reform have since stalled and the problem is yet to be resolved.
The Need for a Second Chamber
The British parliamentary system relies on a delicate system of checks and balances;
unlike a presidential republic, the executive body (Government) relies on Parliament for its power
and thus there is no total separation of executive and legislative bodies. Separation of the three
strands of power (executive, legislative and judicial) prevents totalitarian government; however,
our Parliamentary system does not allow total separation because Parliament (the legislature) is
the basis of the executive’s power (unlike in a republic). A second chamber is therefore vital for
our democratic system: it provides a check on the Government (that normally dominates the
Lower House), while balancing its power and ensuring that Parliament’s power cannot be abused.
The role of the House of Lords balances accountability of the executive with efficiency extremely
well, allowing laws to be passed (it has no veto) but being able to force reconsideration through its
power to delay bills.
Indeed, the checks and balances that the Lords provide our legislative process have
proved important on many occasions recently. Evidence includes the Lords’ rejections of the
March 2007 Fraud Bill (which threatened the fundamental concept of the right to a trial by jury) and
the May 2006 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (which would have introduced euthanasia):
these rejections forced governments to reconsider, reflect and compromise. The power to do this
will always be necessary in order to preserve principles sometimes taken for granted unless
thorough, level-headed debate prevails over knee-jerk legislation. Such principles include the right
of Habeas Corpus which could be thought of as having been compromised by the government’s
1
The Lords opposed the Act that reformed the electoral system, eliminating rotten boroughs, creating new seats in
the new cities that had seen enormous growth during the industrial revolution and increasing the size of the
recent anti-terrorism legislation: the Terrorism Act 2006 increased the period for which the police
could imprison terror suspects without charge to 28 days. Although the Blair government was in
fact thwarted in its attempt to introduce a 90-day detention period by the Commons, the Lords
would also have rejected a 90-day detention period2; indeed, there is an acknowledgement among
legislators and MPs that proposed laws will have to be toned down before being put to the
Commons, because amendments are sure to be proposed by the Lords. This indirectly encourages
governments to compromise and, simultaneously, increases efficiency by freeing up Parliament’s
time to debate other issues. Thereby, the Lords provide an extra check on government policy even
before it is debated. Another example of vital legislative contributions from the Lords is the
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; this Act set out to allow the Home Secretary to opt out from
applying basic Human Rights laws through ‘control orders’ on terror suspects. Serious control
orders, ‘derogating’ control orders that infringe the European Convention of Human Rights3, are
actually legal in Britain so long as the country is in state of “public emergency”4; however, the
Lords proved an invaluable check on government policy when considering the Act, ensuring only
the judiciary be allowed to place such orders on suspects, not the Government, as had been
proposed. Furthermore, they amended the Bill to include a ‘sunset clause’ (whereby the law is
dismissed after a period of time unless it is backed up by further legislation) and other moderating
clauses such as rejecting a ‘balance of probabilities’ method of charging suspects in favour of the
accustomed ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ method.
Sir John A. Macdonald, the first Canadian Prime Minister5, advocated a chamber of
“sober second thought”6; as has been shown, the House of Lords continues to provide such a
legislative service, while maintaining the balance of power within our political system.
Unquestionably, therefore, we still need a Second Chamber.
The Need for Reform
The two dimensions to reform of the House of Lords are, firstly, altering its power and,
secondly, reforming its composition and the method of its members’ selection. The Lords’ power
comes from its ability to delay bills and force reconsideration in the Commons, set out in the 1911
and 19497 Parliament Acts. Limiting the Lords’ power would probably mean another amendment
to the Parliament Acts. Originally, these were meant only as substitutes for reform that could not
electorate by around 70%. However, because of public and political pressure, King William IV was forced to flood
the House of Lords with pro-reform peers to push the Act through.
2
However, Gordon Brown continues to advocate the same 90-day detention period, which as well as
compromising Habeas Corpus, would grant almost unconstrained executive power (the definition of terrorism relied
upon by the Terrorism Act 2006 (found in Chapter 11, Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000) is broad and open to
interpretation and abuse). This is a cause for concern and a challenge the Lords must be strong enough to resist (or
at least to thoroughly examine and consider in a meticulous and thorough manner, without bowing to populism or
party political pressures).
3
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Chapter 2, subsection 11:8 (a)
4
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Chapter 2, subsection 5:9 (b)
5
MacDonald was knighted for his role in forming the modern Canadian Federation, in which the Senate is the
Upper House.
6
Parliamentary Debates on Confederation of British North American Provinces [Quebec 1867, Ottawa, 1951], pp. 35
“immediately be brought into operation”8; by reducing the House’s power and significance the
Government can avoid the more fundamental issue of the composition of the House, which needs
reform (as discussed below). Moreover, the Lords have acted well as a balance to the Commons
since 1949 and continue to do so, as partly demonstrated above by recent examples; therefore, any
reform of the House’s power is not needed.
However, reform of the composition of the House, and how those members are selected,
is needed. Historically, members of the House of Lords have been the richest and most important
landowners in the country, who would pass their peerages down through their family; in my
opinion, it is a sad statement that after more than 700 years, remnants of this bias towards the
wealthy still endure: today, there are 92 hereditary peers9 from a total of 735. Another remnant of
bygone eras is the membership of 26 ‘Spiritual Peers’. These are senior clergymen of the Church
of England and have the same powers as ordinary peers. While the presence of spiritual leaders in
the House of Lords is not fundamentally a bad thing, only the established Church is represented.
This is disproportionate to the actual involvement of the Church of England in modern Britain.
Furthermore, we live in a society that encompasses many different cultures and faiths, more than
one section of which deserve to be represented. Meanwhile, the official, ceremonial nature of the
position, ‘Lord Spiritual’, only serves to alienate, and is more relevant to a society when people
could be locked up for not following established doctrine.10
The major problem facing the House of Lords is that of general disillusionment among
the public: a recent YouGov poll showed that 58% of the public thought the Lords worked “not
very well” or “not at all well”; only 5% thought the House worked “very well”11. Peers are often
regarded as out-of-touch12 ‘toffs’, who do not deserve their important positions. This sentiment is
easily justified: historically, the Lords have often voted in clear contrast to the opinion of the
country at large. For example, the 1909 People’s Budget was supported by the vast majority of the
population13. A more recent example is the public’s support for the foxhunting ban of 200414: the
Lords fiercely opposed the Bill and the Parliament Act was invoked. Meanwhile, appointed life
peers15 are associated with corruption as a result of the recent ‘cash for honours’ scandal. Cases
like these (as well as the problems discussed above and the fact that Lords are not actually given
7
The Parliament Act 1949 amended the Act of 1911, reducing the period for which the Lords could delay reform.
Preamble to the Parliament Act 1911
9
Although the 1999 House of Lords Act removed the right to inherit peerages, putting an end to hereditary peers,
92 hereditary peers were allowed to remain members of the House until the reform process was complete.
However, reform has stalled since 1999.
10
Arguing to disestablish the Church of England, I think, would leave this less an essay than a book, and this
unfavourable aspect of the Lords can be reformed without irreparably compromising the status of the Church of
England!
11
YouGov survey for the Hansard Society, 17th­19th October, 2006
12
Lords themselves have admitted this on the record in the House (for example, in column 1002 of the Lords
Hansard text for November 2006, Baroness Goudie says, “if the House resists… modernisations, the British people
will have their suspicions confirmed; that the House of Lords is out of touch with reality.”
13
The Lords’ opposition to this reform caused the Parliament Act to be passed (as above).
14
A YouGov Poll from the time showed 57% of the public asserted that “Hunting with dogs is never acceptable”,
while a MORI poll (also from 2004) showed 47% in favour of the ban with only 26% opposing it.
15
Life Peers, created under the Life Peerages Act 1958, are Lords whose peerages are kept for life, but cannot be
inherited.
8
any mandate to represent particular group) have contributed to the accusation that the Upper
House is not a democratic organisation; to a certain extent this is true16, and warrants reform.
An elected Upper House
There are two widely supported and realistic formulae for Lords reform17. The first, and
possibly most popular option is an elected Upper House; this would involve some or all members
of the House being voted into their positions by the public. Propositions include those put to the
House of Commons on the 7th March 2007; votes were cast on a range of varying proportions of
elected peers (0, 50 60, 80 and 100 percent), with MPs clearly backing an 80 or 100 percent elected
chamber. Other such proposals include a new ‘Senate’ (devised by the Conservative Party in 2002)
which would be 80 percent elected using the ‘first past the post’ system. Another was the 2005
proposal by a cross-party group including Kenneth Clarke and (the late) Robin Cook, advocating
a House 70 percent elected by ‘single transferable vote’ (a method ensuring proportional
representation where the voter can vote for a number of candidates in order of preference). The
Government, in March 2007, supported “a partially open regional list system”18 of electing Lords,
which is also based on proportional representation. Two main advantages of moving to an elected
house are increased legitimacy and widespread public support: elections would give The Lords’
composition democratic validity, while the 2006 YouGov poll11 showed an 82 percent majority in
favour of elections for the House of Lords.
However, there is a strong argument that an elected House would weaken, not strengthen
the democratic process: our democracy is modelled neither on arguably flimsy and corruptible
proportional representation19 nor on a system whereby the public have complete or direct control
over every aspect of Parliament (resulting in weak governments and inefficiency). On the
contrary, this country’s democratic system is envied for its robustness in the face of populism
(more acute than ever as a result of the media revolution and a steady economy20, which both
encourage headline grabbing, quick fix legislation), and this must be reinforced, not undermined.
An elected House would also threaten the intrinsic worth of the Lords to act as a moderating
check on governments: the whipping system of party control would be likely to operate just as
16
Although the Lords as an isolated institution is not at all democratic, I say “to a certain extent” because it fulfils a
role (as discussed) that strengthens our democratic system as a whole.
17
Of course, other blueprints for reform have been proposed; for example, getting rid of the House of Lords
altogether (which I have shown to be imprudent). However, none of these is both widely supported and viable. For
example, Jack Straw’s paper, The House of Lords: Reform (which is much more detailed than this essay) only
considers an elected or partially elected House and an appointed one.
18
Commons Hansard Text, 6th March 2007, Column 1402
19
As has caused chaos in the Scottish Parliament, where the SNP are the largest party, but have no overall majority
and govern as a minority administration. They were unable to negotiate a coalition, which, anyway, would be
hypocritical and unlikely (to be successful at least) because no other party supports their major aim of Scottish
independence. The downfall of Weimar Germany is another example of the weakness of this system. And although
it would only be one House using proportional representation, this would only serve to reduce the strength of our
system as a whole, while also upsetting the delicate parliamentary balance of power.
20
It could be argued that a reason for much of the controlling, ‘nanny-state’ legislation of recent years is economic
stability. During a period of growth, governments have no need to implement many new macroeconomic policies.
One of the ways governments attempt to secure public confidence is by creating, announcing and executing new
fiercely as it does in the Commons and the decisions of the second chamber would then simply
mirror the first. Thereby, parliamentary balance of power would be lost. Moreover, public
elections for the House of Lords would bring with it the sort of sanitised showcasing of
personalities, so synonymous with spin, which has often caused the validity of the current Labour
government’s legislative programme to be called into question. Thus, an elected Upper House
would sacrifice the Lords’ qualities: the expertise and experience of its members would be
compromised, while the chamber’s ability to act as a check against knee-jerk or unconstitutional
legislation21 and populism22 would be lost. Even a House with a minority of elected members
carries the problems of election, while small numbers of elected members could not hope to fairly
represent the views of 60 million people.
An appointed Upper House
Instead, therefore, a fairer second chamber must be achieved with the current advantages
of the House of Lords reinforced, not destroyed. After the possibility of having any proportion of
elected members (which I have shown to be inadvisable) is discarded, a fully appointed House is
the only remaining viable option for Lords reform. In The Republic, Plato discussed a society
governed by “Philosopher Kings”, people born with an aptitude for government, or who become
wise and experienced during life; likewise, the positive quality of our Upper House that enables it
to provide valuable checks on government policy is the experience and different fields of expertise
(political and otherwise) of peers. Plato’s idea certainly still holds water today and is roughly the
essence of appointed peers.
Currently, apolitical Lords can be appointed by the House of Lords Appointments
Commission, while party political recommendations are nominated by the Prime Minister either
personally or through recommendations from other party leaders. Proponents of a House
completely appointed by this Commission include the Lords themselves, who voted in favour of
such a system by three to one23. The same option also has some support in the Commons: more
than a third of MPs supported such a system in March 2007. The main benefit of a fully appointed
House is that the Lords’ composition would contrast that of the Commons, enabling
complementary decision making processes in Parliament. However, critics of a fully appointed
House cite that this would “bring little to meet the expectation… that in a modern Parliament, the
policies; the government therefore has introduced more trivial, but more visible, supposedly altruistic policies in
order to still be seen as taking positive action.
21
Not that we can’t change our laws; but the Lords must be strong enough to be able to influence the passing of
new laws if they disagree with them.
22
Populism seldom manifests itself in sensible and careful solutions to problems; equally, the media and even
governments themselves can manipulate the wider public into believing something is in their best interests when it
is simply an exaggerated headline story, or in any government’s own self interest (manipulation of a public fear of
terrorism would be an appropriate example, as the House of Lords have played an important part in moderating
anti-terrorism legislation (as above)). In the modern era of powerful corporations, the media (owned by these
corporations) is hardly impartial and not only exaggerates to sell more copies, but spins the news for its own
corporation’s ends! BskyB’s suspected agreement with Labour relating to their support in return for a relaxation of
media monopoly regulation is an example.
23
Lords vote 14th March, 2007 in favour of a fully appointed House by 361 votes to 121.
second chamber should have… democratic legitimacy”24. This is a fair criticism of a House
appointed completely by the Commission in its current form.
A sensible solution, therefore, would balance Plato’s ‘government by wisdom’ with the
expectations of a democratic society. This could be achieved through a fully appointed House
with a new reformed process of appointments. The Commission, which is a solid basis for reform
in that it is completely independent, could be extended to appoint all Lords, and reformed
progressively in order to enhance public faith in its representative credentials. For example, under
the current system, peerages are endowed for life; clearly, in a changing world, this can render
peers irrelevant to modern society. Instead, appointments could be reviewed regularly by the
Commission. Furthermore, the Commission at present can only appoint people who have already
been recommended either by non-governmental organisations or by the public; clearly, voluntary
recommendations are by no means the best way to ensure that those people who have the qualities
needed to sit in the Lords are all considered for peerages. Therefore, as well as potential peers
being publicly recommended, the Commission could be extended far beyond its current means (it
consists of 6 members) in order to actively seek out and approach experienced and expert citizens
(like ex- forces personnel and scientists). With the power to seek out potential new peers, the
Commission would ensure that ensure a broad spectrum of backgrounds, ethnicities and political
views are clearly represented as proportionally to the population as possible, with a mandate to
represent those groups’ views. Groups like political parties, religious organisations, public servants
and charities should also be represented. Certainly, all hereditary peers must be removed (because
their position is not in any way justified), and the title ‘Spiritual Peer’ revoked.
Conclusion
In conclusion, only reform of the House’s composition and the method of selection of its
members is needed. Reform must not sacrifice the House of Lords’ ability to fulfil its vital role in
Parliament in pursuit of total democratisation. Instead, reform should seek to enhance the
representative credentials of the Upper House through a more sensible and relevant system of
appointing Lords. Reform along the lines suggested in this essay would increase the Lords’
representational credentials, maintain the Lords’ ability to act as a check on the government and
the Commons, while not upsetting the current balance of power in Parliament. In so doing, these
reforms would go a long way to restoring popular faith in British politics as a whole, while solving
the problem of Lords reform that has plagued political debate for the last two centuries.
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2495 Words (including subtitles)
24
The Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, The House of Lords: Reform, London, The Stationery Office, February 2007, p.30
Bibliography:
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·
Plato, The Republic (Penguin, 1970)
·
Williams, Andy, UK Government and Politics (Heinemann Introductory Politics 2nd Edition, 1998)
·
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·
Rogers and Walters, How Parliament Works (Pearson 5th Edition, 2004)
·
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·
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·
Fraud (Trials without a jury) Bill 2004
·
Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004
·
House of Lords Annual Report Briefing
·
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·
Terrorism Act 2000
·
Terrorism Act 2006
·
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
·
Parliament Act 1911 (www.official-documents.co.uk)
·
Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords (Chairman: Rt Hon Lord Wakeham DL), A
House for the Future (London, The Stationery Office, January 2000)
·
The Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, The House of Lords: Reform (London, The Stationary Office, February 2007)
·
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·
Commons Hansard Text – especially the debates of 6th and 7th March 2007 on House of Lords Reform
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·
Conservative Party press release - Conservatives call for new elected Senate
(http://www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.story.page&obj_id=22814 accessed Ausgust 2007)
·
YouGov (www.YouGov.co.uk – accessed August 2007)
·
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accessed August 2007)
·
Ipsos MORI (http://www.ipsos-MORI.com/polls/2005/bbc-countryfile.shtml – accessed August 2007)
·
Parliament Information Service (http://www.parliament.uk - accessed August 2007)
·
Wikipedia (http://www.wikipedia.org)
·
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