Continuities and Discontinuities:
Language Paradigms in Kazakhstan
University of Cambridge
Eun Joo Koo
Introduction
The social changes related to the specific forms of expansion and transformation of capitalism
brought rapid globalisation in Kazakhstan in the 1990s. This directly led to unprecedented migration
flows in the major cities of Kazakhstan. While it is true that social mobility in capitalist society is
becoming less dependent on class of origin, family background, sex and race, it seems to be becoming
more influenced by individual ability, social demarcation keeping its hierarchical order still in place and
deeply embedded in all aspects of life. It has been argued that off late modern society has become
significantly affected by language functions that play out at all levels of socio-political activity. The
commoditisation of language and identity has also become the main feature of the current economy in the
stage of development of organic capitalism.
Issues of language choice and practice are an integral part of the social, economic and political
stability of multicultural societies, of which Kazakhstan is one. As linguistic capital, in Bourdieu terms, has
unevenly distributed itself to individual as any other form of resources, it closely intertwines with the
construction of social difference and the relation of inequality. Indeed, the language competence that an
individual possesses directly influences the distribution of material wealth in the modern state especially
in the tertiary sector. Unlike primary and secondary sectors, tertiary sector requires a high level of
communication skills, because language plays the central role not only as the work process, but also as the
result of work (Heller, 2011). Thus the different level of language skills often limits or allows people the
access to labour market, in turn individual experiences the different degree of social mobility in society.
As part of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had to adopt the use of Russian language in all matters of
administrative, educational and social use. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of
newly independent states in early 1990s gave room for the rise of nationalism which requires strong
national identity and integrity. In particular, the declaration of indigenous language as a state language
has a great symbolic implication in the revival and revitalisation of Kazakh identity. The provision of the
new language law brought significant changes in public life, and the number of Kazakh-speaking schools
has sharply increased as well as that of youths who speak primarily in Kazakh language in the last twenty
years. Media channels have increased the share of Kazakh language programmes as well making it socially
more accessible. Currently, those who work in the government sector must have at least a basic level of
knowledge in the state language, Kazakh.
The promotion of the national language might have brought positive changes in the status of Kazakh
language, but has not fundamentally changed the social structure that has been long dominated by
Russian language. Despite the fact that the government made a lot of effort to dramatically enhance the
use of Kazakh language, the new language policy brought considerable discontentment among the multiethnic population and resulted in large scale outmigration of non-Kazakhs in the 1990s. The Kazakhs who
mainly speak in Russian language also faced difficulties in learning the titular language. The level of
knowledge of Kazakh language varies from region to region, particularly in the urban area, where people
barely speak in Kazakh language not only in the work place but also at home. At the same time, Kazakh
language is widely spoken in rural area where the majority of the residents are ethnic Kazakh. Urban
Kazakhs perceive Russian language as more useful to access resources, while Kazakh language is seen as
backward, useless and old-fashioned.
The different perception of language between rural and urban Kazakhs brings in to question the
importance of the choice of language, and in turn, creates social categorisation among the same ethnic
groups. The education system that divides Kazakh-speaking group and Russian-speaking group1 has also
contributed to the acceleration of social demarcation based on language. As the urban Kazakhs see the
rural migrants as unfit members of urban society, they tend to situate themselves at a distance from the
rural cultural paradigm and open up limited socio-economic space to the rural Kazakhs.
Today, Kazakhstan is the most urbanised country among the Central Asian states with 59 percent of
its population living in urban cities. Although the oil industry is playing the leading role in Kazakhstan's
economic development, it employs less than 1 percent of the total labour force (Najman et al., 2008). By
contrast, the service sector employs 62.3 percent of the active population and accounts for 56.9 percent of
the total GDP (CIA Factbook, 2012). The development of urban tertiary sector emphasises the important
role of language, as it requires a wide range of social interaction based on communication skills. In other
words, language became one of the key factors that influence one’s social mobility and social status in
modern society.
It has been argued that there are other factors such as skills and educational background, and social
networks that determine individual social mobility. In the Kazakh case, however, the gap between people
with skills and the relevant educational background is not distinct, as the population was provided with
similar education provision in the Soviet period. As the social mobility under capitalism is highly
dependent on individual ability, social network cannot fully explain the differences in social position of
individuals. Social network in itself is a rigid and external factor that can be inherited through family and
is in principle independent of the will and effort of the individual. On the other hand, extra language
acquisition is an intrinsic factor that can enhance or restrict one’s social mobility. Since language can
expand the spectrum of one’s opportunity, it must be examined as the central part of research to
understand the social mobility in Kazakhstan. Above all, the current segmentation between the policy that
encourages Kazakh language practice and the labour market dominated by Russian language requires
analysis for the sustainable use of the current language policy.
The paper will begin with the theoretical framework. It will explain the sociolinguistic approach that
focuses on the role of language in identity formation, power relations, social mobility and social
stratification. Next, it will describe the purpose and the process of the Soviet language planning, and argue
that the Soviet Union created the distorted image of Kazakh language and culture, and it led people to be
less interested in preserving their own linguistic asset. Subsequently, it will focus on the post-independent
language policy which is based on strong nationalism. It will provide the purpose and the process of the
new language policy that emphasises the broad use of Kazakh language and its controversial practice. In
particular, it will delve into the contemporary language issues in the urban area. Finally, it will summarise
the main points.
Theoretical Framework: Sociolinguistic Approach
There are more than 6000 languages, except dialects, within 187 sovereign states, and less than 5
percent of the states are monolingual in the world (Larrivee, 2003). Thus many parts of the world have
been struggling between the attempts to maintain linguistic diversity and the linguistic standardisation.
Modern state formation and the subsequent language discourses in many newly formed sovereign states
1
In this paper, ‘Kazakh-speaking group’ and ‘Russian-speaking group’ indicate only the Kazakh ethnic group
who mainly speak in Kazakh or Russian.
have increased awareness of the link between language and its socio-political and socio-economic roles.
As group identity and power relations are strongly tied in with the native languages, language itself has
become inseparable to the central concerns in political economic development.
Before the development of the Sociolinguistic approach, language was seen as “the natural
consequence of spiritual or even biological differences between collectivities of speakers, rather than the
consequence of social action” by the mid-nineteenth century (Irvine & Gal, 2000). August Schleicher
(1821-1868), for instance, has promoted a Darwinian model of linguistic evolution, and argued some
languages and cultures are more developed and fit for current conditions than others (Heller, 2011). He
has noted that “languages are organisms of nature; they have never been directed by the will of man”
(Irvine & Gal, 2000). In early scholarship language was crucially unaffected by individual intention, or the
particularities of social life.
However, in the first half of the 20th century Saussure's ideas had a major impact on the development
of linguistic theory. Saussure saw the languages as “collective products of social interaction, essential
instruments through which human beings constitute and articulate their world” (Harris, 1988). Based on
Saussure’s research, sociolinguistic approach has become the central discourse following the end of new
imperialism and the emergence of modern nation-state as well as marking the changes in political
economy and structures of society. Furthermore, the power relations between strata, classes and nations
in history have provided the backdrop for the development of sociolinguistics that sees discussions
emerging across social sciences through the lens of language discourse.
Many scholars in the fields of dialectology to sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology and
linguistics have been struggling to find a way out of social inequality by understanding socially situated
languages. In particular, linguistic anthropologists have focused on micro-analysis “such as phonetic
transcription, complexities of verb morphology, ethnographic detailing of specific speech events, and
sequencing of talk within a conversation strip” with an understanding of how the patterns might be
related to political-economic macro-processes (Kroskrity, 2000). Scholars such as Berstein (1975),
Gumperz (1962), Hymes (1980) and Labov (1972) have provided fruitful findings on linguistic inequality,
forms of linguistic stratification and the class-based reproduction of communicative code. As a result,
language has gained more recognition for its role in the socio-politics and socio-economic spheres, and is
seen as a socially constructed product and an index of speakers’ social identities. Also, scholars have
begun to see the role of language as it operates in processes of inclusion and exclusion, manifests social
rank, creates social distinction and involves the process of organising unequal power relations.
In addition, post-structuralists like Bourdieu (1977, 1991) and Foucault (1972, 1980) have
influenced many social theories with concepts of “symbolic domination” and “linguistic markets”. In
particular, Pierre Bourdieu has provided a rich analysis of the complex ways in which language produces
and reproduces social classes. Bourdieu criticises previous research on language that failed to fully
examine the specific social and political conditions of language formation and its use. In order to provide
comprehensive understanding, Bouridieu employs the concepts of habitus and field. A habitus is a set of
dispositions which provides individuals with a sense of how to act and respond in certain ways.
Dispositions, which can be acquired throughout the gradual process of childhood education and
experiences, influence the individual practices, perceptions and attitudes which they unconsciously
coordinated (Bourdieu, 1991). A field (or a market) is a structured space that distributes different kinds
of resources or ‘capital’. One of the most important characters of field is that it allows one form of capital
to be converted into another.
In Bourdieu’s terminology, capital does not necessarily mean only economic capital, but also cultural
capital, symbolic capital and linguistic capital. Just as any other capital, linguistic capital is a product from
particular market exchanges, and some products have greater value while others are less valued.
Moreover, linguistic capital is distributed to individuals unequally, just as any other capital, and the
distribution of linguistic capital is related in “specific ways to the distribution of other forms of capital
(economic capital, cultural capital, etc.) which define the location of an individual within the social space”
(Bourdieu, 1991:18). Stratification occurs through the struggles over who controls the possession of
various forms of capital. Consequently, people who possess more linguistic capital have more access to
certain advantages in markets, and these unequal relations contribute to produce and reproduce social
distinction. Recently, scholars like Heller (2011) and Goldstein (1997) have provided useful research on
the linkage between the role of language ideologies and the labour market in a multilingual community
within the neo-liberalism and modernised nationalism frameworks. Both researchers aimed to examine
how the use of a certain language creates social inequalities among different ethnic groups and how
ethno-linguistic categorisation has constructed class relations.
Likewise, language is a complex social fact that can be examined from many angles. Language is more
than just an individual skill or talent, rather a socially shaped product that often situated in social,
political and historical contexts (Blackledge, 2005). Historically language was often used to justify the
activities of colonisers by mission civilisatrice, which brought superior languages and culture into lessdeveloped states (Irvine and Gal, 2000). Language has a strong symbolic meaning that legitimises the
nation-state, creates uniformed identity and standardises cultures and people within the state boundaries
(cf., e.g., Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Bourdieu1977). There are many other aspects of language that
influence not only identity, nationalism, social cohesion, hegemony and power relations, but also access to
opportunities closely engaged with economic gain. Because of this complexity, the linguistic interaction
among the members of society brings unequal distribution of power and wealth and creates a range of
social inequalities and stratifications. Social stratification has been seen everywhere from the simplest to
the most complex forms of human societies since the rise of bourgeoisie, the emergence of national
markets where privileged groups control the production, circulation and distribution of resources (Heller,
2011). As Heller (2011:36) has noted, stratification is all about “struggles over who controls the
production and distribution of those resources, who controls the value attributed to them, and how those
relations of power are legitimised”. In this process, language allows individual access to or limits him in
the market where the stratification is constructed, and furthermore enhances or reduces the individual's
opportunity for social mobility.
The Language Policy in Kazakhstan
The Soviet Experience: Russification
Historically, governing such various ethnic groups and vast territories was unprecedented prior to
the Soviet Union. Before Russian conquest, the identities of Central Asian people were at the religious and
local community levels based on their kinship network. Islam in particular, played an important role not
only as a religious ideology, but also as a national identity of nearly 20 million Muslims in the region
(Hunter, 2004). However, the language issue became an object of central planning under the Soviet
regime as the authorities focused on the symbolic function of language.
In order to rule over the diverse ethnic groups without any struggle, and to achieve the essential goal
of creating a uniform Soviet citizenry, Moscow required loyalty from the local intelligentsias who
represented their regional societies. The only way to embrace the native elites and blend them into
socialist communities was to build a homogeneous national identity for different ethnic groups (Lowe,
2003). In this respect, nation-building was considered a fundamental process for sovietisation.
Furthermore, it was believed that replacing old lifestyles and traditional social units with modernisation
and collectivisation would stabilise the socialist society (Simon, 1991). In other words, imposing the new
national identity was expected to not only reduce opposition movements, but also remove the cultural
backwardness from indigenous people (Martin, 2001).
To achieve the Sovietisation mission in Central Asia during the early age of the Soviet Union, the
government was required to push ahead with several policies, which involved fundamental changes in the
social structures among ethnic groups as well as their perception of themselves. The process such as
national-territorial delimitation and the imposition of new histories were inevitably coincided with
ethno-genesis and linguistic policies to establish the ‘one ethnic group in one territory’ goal (Roy, 2007).
The Soviet Union believed that the strongest and most distinctive ethnic symbols could be the native
language. Thus, the central authority was forced to determine a single national language, which could
represent the national identity. To promote the national languages, the Soviet government encouraged
the Central Asian people to publish dictionaries and reference books due to the spread of written
language as well as standardized language form (Simon, 1991). These processes were necessary to
eliminate illiteracy and educate the people in order to create loyal Soviet citizens.
Later, since Stalin concentrated on establishing Soviet identity, he undertook the process of the
“merger of nations” policy. The Russian language became a compulsory subject in primary schools (Simon,
1991). As a consequence, indigenous languages in the Central Asian Republics began to diminish starting
in the late 1930s. Since Stalin focused on united nationalism and Sovietization in the 1930s, the policies
toward Central Asia were changed. The government strengthened its authoritarian regime, pushed
indigenous people harder to work in collective farms, and regulated religious activities. Furthermore, all
of the religious schools were closed from 1917 till 1940 under Soviet anti-religion or atheism policies. For
instance, during the period between 1932 and 1938, the majority of Mosques and Madrasahs were forced
to close (Wheeler, 1960). Through the process, the Central Asian region gradually was incorporated into
the Soviet Union without strong resistance. Before and during World War II (1939-1945), as the ethnic
composition in the region had become more diversified due to the Stalin’s forced deportation, Russian
language had gained greater emphasis as an inter-ethnic language. Although the minority languages in
subsequent years were continuously spoken by around 130 multiethnic groups in the USSR, in practice a
hierarchy was endorsed in which some nationalities and languages were given special roles while leaving
out other languages.
After Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Communist Party in the late 1950s, there was a
significant process of replacing non-Russian schools with Russian ones. The demographic changes caused
by the gradual influx of other ethnic groups have significantly affected the language practice in
Kazakhstan. Particularly in the 1950s, the Virgin Lands programme brought additional Slavic groups,
mainly Russian, into the territory. Consequently, Russians accounted for 42.7 percents of the total
population in Kazakhstan, whilst the share of Kazakhs dropped to only 30 percents in 1959 (Dave, 2003).
The increase in Russian population has contributed to the spread of Russian-based education, while
Kazakh language was spoken by less than 15 percent of the people in the urban areas during the late
Soviet era (Fierman, 2006). Many Kazakhs attended Russian schools, spoke exclusively in Russian, and
were hardly able to read or write in the Kazakh language (Fierman, 1998). By the end of the Soviet regime,
Russian schools accounted for 72.2 percent of total schools in urban areas and Kazakh schools only
comprised around 10 percent in the most of oblasts (Fierman, 2006).
While officially all languages were treated equally in almost all Soviet republics, the
Russian/local bilingualism was seen as asymmetric. In particular, many Kazakhs tended to become
linguistically russified since they adopted Russian not merely as a second language, but as their mother
tongue. The imposition on the use of Russian language brought the gradual elimination of titular
traditions, which in turn contributed to the creation of the new ‘Soviet man’ as well as the stable social
integration. As a result, over 90 percent of Kazakhstan’s urban population became literate in Russian, and
less than 10-15 percent was able to speak the Kazakh language by the end of the Soviet era (Fierman,
1998).
During the Soviet era, the linguistic distinction put pressure on the local people, but at the same time
offered a great motivation to learn the Russian language. Russian language was seen as a guarantor of
social mobility and a professional career for the non-Russian population. Indeed, the capability to speak
in Russian provided a greater opportunity to Kazakhs for entering higher strata, as the workplace, like the
communist party or government sector, required a high level of Russian fluency. Furthermore, all of the
infrastructure and social services were provided in Russian language including education and medical
care. Social and cultural spheres were also designed to use Russian not only in the urban areas, but also in
the rural areas. Newspapers, magazines, movies, television programmes and books were distributed
mainly in Russian. At the same time, the Kazakh language was barely spoken in urban area, where only
one or two Kazakh schools were located. (Fierman, 2005). Eventually, the broad use of the Russian
language created a biased image of Russian as a superior language, being more advanced and useful than
Kazakh which was viewed as inferior and primitive. Thus, people who were unable to speak in Russian
were easily excluded from the economic fields as well as the social spheres. Moreover, urban Kazakhs
who were more russified had minimal interest in learning the Kazakh language. Especially young and
middle generation highly undervalued the culture and language of the rural Kazakhs, and made a little
effort to preserve own linguistic asset. As the result of the negative image created by the Soviet Union
combined with the practical reasons for achieving social mobility, the case for preserving the Kazakh
language held little import.
Post-Independence: Kazakhisation
In order to fill a large ideological hole, Central Asian states focused on nation-building and
formulating a national identity, which could enhance their sovereignty as independent states. Kazakhstan
has promptly undertaken nation-building policies as part of an effort to redefine the national identity
taking advantage of the euphoric atmosphere prevalent after independence. State-building is a
formidable task, thus the government invested resources on promoting the national symbols and anthem,
and most importantly, processed linguistic and cultural “Kazakhisation”. As language has great symbolic
meaning in shaping identity, the choice of language was seen as the choice of identity (Kellner-Heinkele &
Landau, 2012). According to the Declaration of Independence issued in 1991, “one of the most important
obligations of the state is the rebirth and development of culture, traditions, and language […] of the
Kazakh nation and of representatives of other nationalities living in Kazakhstan” (quoted in Fierman,
1998:176).
Along with the aforementioned process, there was a rising perception on “Kazakhstani-ness” that
claims the “eventual assimilation into the nation dominated by Kazakh group” (Fierman, 2005:396).
Nationalists regarded ethnic minorities of Kazakhstan as guests who must comply with the rules of the
Kazakh. The Kazakh language was seen as “an additional factor of the consolidation of all citizens of
Kazakhstan” (Olcott, 2002:180). The promotion of titular language was not only for ‘linguistic
independence’, but was also used as a weapon that could eradicate the Russian elites as well as the
Russian-speaking Kazakh elites. As Kolsto (2003:4) puts it:
Russians in Kazakhstan who did not speak Kazakh were often perceived as somehow understandable
and excusable, at least for the time being. Russian-speaking ethnic Kazakhs, on the other hand, were
regarded as traitors to the national cause.
The Kazakh elites who had little or no knowledge of the national language were highly criticised by
the nationalists, and were accused of being rootless and without true identity. As Sucru (2002) and
Matuszkiewicz(2010) point out, this perspective is due to the Soviet legacy that previously discriminated
the titular groups, and is reflected in the current policy as the ‘compensatory’ or even ‘pay-back' purpose.
In other words, titular elites put forth an effort to remove ‘the legacy of Soviet linguistic imperialism’
(Kellner-Heinkele & Landau, 2012).
The first discussion on improving Kazakh language has initiated, even before the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, for the Kazakh children those who previously studied in the Russian-speaking schools.
Given the fact that the share of Kazakh group only account for 39.7 percent of the total population in 1989,
the government soft-pedalled on language policy for the potential instability. Throughout the initial
declaration of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1993, a new language law was actively
discussed among the officials in the capital and oblast centres (Fierman, 1998). Two years later, Kazakh
language was declared as the state language in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Along with the adoption of a
Concept of Language Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which aims to identify the priority directions of
language development, Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages was finalised in 1997. Article 4
clearly indicates that “
The state language of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the Kazakh language. […] The duty of each
citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be mastering of the state language, being the major factor in
consolidating the people of Kazakhstan.
Article 8 states that
The languages for work and office work in state bodies, organisations and local self-government bodies
of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be the Kazakh language, the Russian language being officially used
on a par with the Kazakh language.
In accordance with the new language law, the people who want to work in the government,
ministries and department as well as local representative and executive organs must have a certain level
of knowledge of the state language. In particular, presidential candidates are required to be competent in
Kazakh. It secures the status of the Kazakh ethnic group by narrowing the entrance for the other ethnic
groups to gain the power. By virtue of the law that favours titular group, the officials in the Cabinet of
Ministers and the presidential apparatus were comprised of 22.9 percent of Slavs, 74.3 percent of
Kazakhs and 3.1 percent of the other ethnic groups in 1994. Considering that these three groups
accounted for 43 percent, 44.3 percent, and 12.7 percent of the total population respectively, it is obvious
that the language law has attempted to make Kazakh population as the dominant group in the state.
Moreover, civil servants who are not Kazakhs receive an incentive if they are able to speak Kazakh, and
the official documents in international firms and the state apparatus are available in both Russian and
Kazakh languages. It is widely considered as unnecessary tasks, but it has significant effects on
encouraging the use of Kazakh in the work place (O’Callaghan, 2005). As Fierman(2005) has noted,
starting from Qyzylorda Oblast in 2002, many oblasts began to shift all office work to Kazakh. Despite the
fact that Kazakh language is only using partially, it is a meaningful change that illustrates the rise of the
status of Kazakh language in the public sphere.
Education has also played a significant role in increasing the number of Kazakh speakers. Given the
fact that over 90 percent of the total population was fluent in Russian in the late 1980s, it is not surprising
that the share of Russian (72.7 percent) and Kazakh (11.3 percent) schools showed a marked difference
particularly in urban areas in 1989 (Fierman, 2006). For instance, there were only two Kazakh schools in
Almaty, the former capital city with a high share of Kazakhstan's population. Although there was
relatively a much higher share of Kazakh schools in rural areas, Russian schools still dominated in every
oblast. However, the rate of Kazakh ethnic enrolment in Kazakh school sharply increased from 30.2
percent to 56 percent between 1988 and 2004, as the result of the language policy. Especially, the share
of urban enrolment dramatically increased from 16.9 percent in 1990 to 46.4 percent in 2004. At the
same time, the share of rural enrolment in Kazakh classes also increased from 46.6 percent to 66.8
percent. Fierman explains that the main reason of the increasing tendency of Kazakh classes was the
demographical changes such as the growing share of Kazakhs and the increasing number of out-migrants
of other ethnic groups. Indeed, Kazakh population grew from 40.1 percent to 57.2 percent, while the
share of Russian population decreased from 37.4 percent in 1989 to 27.2 percent in 2004. It also reflects
the individual perception of Kazakh language has gradually become positive compared to Soviet times
due to the Kazakh government's language policy after 1991.
In spite of the positive outcomes of the new language policy, there are some concerns on the full
implementation and the applicability of the policy in practice. Firstly, the high degree of Russification in
Kazakhstan has left a very weak linguistic identity among Kazakhs, thus it was difficult to create a
Kazakhstani nation with a “Kazakh core” based primarily on the Kazakh language (Fierman, 2005:396).
As Kolsto (2003:1) has noted, “An important reason why a certain population element favours one
particular language over the alternatives, is that they master this language better than other groups in
society do”. However, in the Kazakh case, elite groups enforced “the elevation and standardisation of a
language of which they in fact have a rather poor command”. Thus the rationale of the language policy can
be explained in terms of power relations rather than a response to a natural demand. Some scholars
argue that the policy hinders social integration and makes a clear division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and
eventually discriminates against Russian speakers (Masanov et al., 2002). In the view of Russian speakers
in Kazakhstan, the policy encourages other ethnic groups to leave the country by discriminating against
them in the labour market.
Secondly, the increase in Kazakh schools was not always followed by an increase in the number of
Kazakh speakers as a whole due to practical reasons of Kazakh language education being offered. The low
quality of Kazakh education system that includes low quality of textbooks, proper teaching methods and
staff shortages made the broad use of Kazak language more difficult. Moreover, people feel that working
via the Kazakh language is less efficient compared to using Russian, since Kazakh has a limited modern
vocabulary (Matuszkiewicz, 2010). Therefore, many Russians and other ethnic groups still choose to have
education in Russian only. Kolsto and Malkova (1997) conducted a survey in 10 oblasts on the language
use in 1996 and reported that 99 percent of Russians answered that they studied in Russian, and 98.2
percent of them reported that they would send their children to Russian schools only. The other ethnic
groups also gave a similar answer with 83.1 percent answering that they studied in Russian, and 89.3
percent of them would want to send their children in Russian schools (Kolsto and Malkova, 1997). Not
only the other ethnic groups, but among the Kazakhs as well, especially those who had a low proficiency
in Kazakh language opposed the radical linguistic Kazakhisation (Matuszkiewicz, 2010). O’Callaghan
(2005) points out that even Kazakhs, particularly in cities, felt more confident and comfortable to speak
in Russian.
Thirdly, there is a division between the policy and practice. The language law demanded a certain
level of Kazakh language skill for all the officials in the government apparatus. However, the regulations
are often ignored by the people in high positions due to pervasive corruption in administration and in the
legal system (Fierman, 2005). It is difficult to assess the actual language skills since bribes are often paid
in order to achieve certain scores to pass language exams. Moreover, the law that stated the increase of
television and radio programmes in Kazakh language was not taken seriously. In practice, programmes in
Kazak language are mostly shown late at night or in the early morning, while the Russian programmes are
shown at prime time (Matuszkiewicz, 2010). According to a survey (Suleimenova & Smagulova: 2006)
conducted in 2000, Russian was more frequently used in the government, education and media sectors.
Table 1.Use of Kazakh and Russian in Public Sector
Domains
Kazakh
Russian
Government communications
25.0
75.0
Preschools (as percent of total number of preschools)
25.0
75.0
Schools (as percent of total number of students)
49.4
47.2
Universities (as percent of total number of students)
32.0
68.0
Dissertations defended (as percent of total number of dissertations)
14.0
86.0
Newspapers (as percent of single circulation)
18.1
81.9
Magazines (as percent of annual circulation)
24.2
75.8
Printed matter (as percent of total number of copies)
33.3
66.7
(Source: Suleimenova E.& Smagulova J. (2006).Kazakhstan: Language Situation, Elsevier Ltd.)
These example shows that the language practice did not follow the language policy that promoted
the broad use of Kazakh.
Lastly but most importantly, it is too early to expect positive outcomes from the current language
policy as the socio-economic domains still prefer the use of Russian. While Russian language continuously
plays dominant role in political economic space, Kazakh language plays a limited role and serves as a
means of communication among ethnic Kazakh groups. In the urban area, people barely speak in Kazakh
language, not only in the work place, but also at home among family members. At the same time, Kazakh
language is widely spoken only in rural area where the majority of the residents are ethnic Kazakhs. The
different use of language in rural and urban areas created a certain level of social categorisation between
Kazakh-speaking and the Russian-speaking groups among the Kazakh population causing further
stratification.
In recent times increased migration from rural areas into cities is slowly changing the character of
the labour market in urban spaces. The majority of the young population, particularly in the rural area,
educated in the new education system in Kazakh language during 1990s and early 2000s communicate in
Kazakh predominantly. However, the problems regarding a low demand on Kazakh fluency in labour
market coupled with deep-rooted Russian speaking experience in business and a lack of professional
vocabulary in Kazakh demarcates and divides the labour market creating limits for the rural youth
migrating into cities.
The Language Issues in the Urban Market
The rural-urban migration since 1990s has accelerated the dichotomy between the rural and urban
Kazakhs. Outmigration into cities occurred as the situation in rural areas deteriorated. This deterioration
stemmed from “the termination of state subsidies and inconsistency in economic reforms in agriculture”
and led to the severe impoverishment of villagers (Yessenova, 2005:664). Furthermore, rare cases of
successful farmers, growing bankruptcy of rural enterprises, and failure of rural residents to find
adequate employment in rural areas increased migration into cities. Despite large scales of investment in
the oil sector, the oil-producing regions in Kazakhstan have hardly experienced any sustained
employment growth. For instance, in 2002, the unemployment rate in oil regions was above the national
average, and direct employment in the oil sector was estimated to be less than 50,000 people, which is
equivalent to less than 1 percent of Kazakhstan’s active population of 7.4 million (Najman et al., 2008).
While the people in the rural area have found it increasingly difficult to find proper jobs, the cities in
the urban areas have experienced unprecedented development due to the substantial amount of foreign
and domestic investments. For instance, Almaty, where economic development is visible, has attracted
large sums of investment as the largest city in the country. Astana, the new capital city, has also attained
massive amounts of money in order to build modernised city. Western parts of the country have also
experienced the creation of new urban centres along with the development of the oil sector. The ruralurban disparities have differentiated the standards of living. For example, in 1997 GDP per capita in East
Kazakhstan and Almaty city showed the most extreme figures, $ 488 and $4,654 respectively (Olcott,
2002). Eventually, the regional differentiation in terms of economic opportunity has contributed to
accelerating rural migration. As the result of the migration, around 60 percent of the population is living
in urban cities, and 62.3 percent of the active population is working on tertiary sector where language and
communication skill play important role (CIA Factbook, 2012).
With the rapid tendency of rural-urban migration, the distinction between rural migrants and urban
residents created the new discourses in entering the practical domain of social relationships in the city.
The claims of rural/urban identity manifest unequal power relations within the nation, repeating
linguistic disparities between rural and urban residents during socialism and thereafter (Yessenova,
2005). The negative images of Kazakh language and culture created during Soviet times provided a clear
demarcation between rural and urban Kazakh. Urban Kazakhs perceived rural Kazakhs as potentially
“risky, unstable, and unfit members of urban society” (Yessenova, 2005:665). Urban Kazakhs did not
perceive a common culture, community and language with their rural brethren. Urban residents situate
themselves at a distance from the rural cultural paradigm, and portray rural Kazakhs as “trapped in
outdated ideologies, unable to experience personhood, and incapable of making independent choices”
(Yessenova, 2005:666).
As during Soviet times, Kazakh language is also seen as backward, useless and old-fashioned,
therefore the urban Kazakhs put minimal or no efforts to learn the titular language. The dichotomy
between the rural and urban Kazakhs brought further problems in the cities as they increasingly came
into contact with each other. Since the legacy of inequality allows the urban population to exercise power
over the migrants, the urban Kazakhs limited socio-economic space for the migrants. Thus migrants often
experience the limitation in entering urban society as well as the urban market. In short, the negative
image during Soviet times that viewed Kazakh language as inferior and archaic is continuously
reproduced by the urban Kazakhs, and has created duality in the forms of group identity in modern
society among ethnic Kazakhs. Also, it has brought different language choices in the rural and urban areas
into prominence leading eventually to a clear social demarcation among the Kazakhs.
The dual forms of linguistic practice in urban areas cause discrimination to yet another Kazakhspeaking group, oralmans, who have immigrated to Kazakhstan from the neighbouring states such as
China, Mongolia, and other Central Asian countries. The in-migration accelerated after the independence
due to the government policy that aimed at increasing the share of Kazakh ethnic group in the state, and
strengthen Kazakh culture and identity. After the strong nationalism policies, the state lost around 2
million of its Russian ethnic population during the early 1990s, resulting in additional gaps in the labour
force. Thus the government provided certain amount of settlement grants to those who were willing to
come back to the homeland, and focused on regaining active population. As a direct result, 651,299
people returned to Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2007 (Cerny, 2010).
However, most oralmans are being excluded from adequate start-up assistance, training, or
citizenship and, as foreigners, without access to credit facilities. Above all, Oralmans often face difficulty
integrating into the labour market especially with everyday communication hampered due to insufficient
level of the Russian language skills. Consequently, many oralmans remained part of the impoverished and
most marginalised segments of Kazakh society, and some of them left the country.
So far, the language policy has contributed to the dramatic enhancement of the status of Kazakh.
However, the implementation of the policy has been far more challenging as it requires state capacity,
sufficient investment, and most importantly the environment that prefers Kazakh to Russian language.
The urban labour market that does not easily open up to the Kazakh-speaking group is less favourable for
the wide use of Kazakh language. As language then directly affects one’s income, the type of occupation,
employment and social position, it cannot be overlooked in the policy space. Also, the current tendency of
the growth of Kazakh-speaking group requires more stable conditions in the labour market.
Conclusion
As the global and regional interactions have increased recently, the language skill has directly linked
to the economic gain. The linguistic ability has significant meaning in the current economic field along
with the growing importance of tertiary sector (Heller:2011). In this sense, language is not only as a work
process, but also a result of the work in urban labour market. It is also an important determinant of one’s
social mobility and status.
To briefly address the main argument, Kazakhstan has been trying to build up strong nationalism
based on the ‘Kazakhisation’ policies since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the state inherited
multiethnic population as well as the society that favours Russian language, the government aimed at
creating the new state for Kazakh ethnic groups. As the part of Kazakhisation process, Kazakh language
was declared as a state language, and Russian language has remained as a "language of interethnic
communication”. However, the policy implementation has been far from simple. Generally speaking, postcolonial states tend to declare an indigenous language as a state language since majority of population
may have mastered native language better than imposed one during the colonial era. Thus once the state
become free, native language is often revived, not only because it is a symbol of sovereignty, but also it is
widely used among people. In Kazakhstan case, considering the Soviet history and the multi-ethnic
demographics, the state language, Kazakh, cannot represent the identity of total population. Also,
Although Kazakh language is the legitimated one, people still perceive that it is less useful in economic
market. Thus, people dominantly speak in Russian, while Kazakh language is barely spoken by not only
other ethnic groups but also ethnic Kazakhs. As the rationale of the language policy was initially far from
the natural demand, the gap frequently exists between policy and practice.
As many sociolinguists argue (e.g. Bourdieu, 1991, Goldstein, 1997 Heller, 2011), dominant language
makes people more accessible to the labour market and the economic opportunities for social mobility.
The rationale of language policy in post-colonial states is mainly aimed to increase political economic
advantages for indigenous group. Thus, once titular language is declared as a state language, indigenous
people naturally become the dominant group and the others become the minority group in social space.
However, Kazakh-speaking group often faces with some level of discrimination in entering the labour
market as the market requires the competence in Russian. Especially, the rural-urban migration
accelerated by lack of economic opportunity and impoverishment in the rural regions created a large
labour pool in the urban areas. However, the labour market in the cities hardly gives limited space for
Kazakh-speaking group, in turn they often find low-paid jobs, and eventually this situation restricts their
social mobility. Moreover, the negative image on Kazakh language drawn by the Soviet Union is
reproduced by the urban Kazakh, thus there is a clear dichotomy in the choice of language between the
rural and the urban Kazakhs. In turn, the different choices of language have created dual forms of identity,
and have further widened the gap between the two groups. Eventually, Kazakh language plays limited role
in political economic space and serves only as a daily language among ethnic Kazakh group regardless of
the government support.
Overall, these factors have affected the individual choice of language that prefers Russian to Kazakh
language. The society and the market dominated by Russian language have hardly given room for the
Kazakh-speaking group. The nature of language that determines the group identity and the sense of
belonging have brought the discourses on the social segmentation and stratification. The urban market
that favours Russian language reproduces the Soviet idea on Kazakh language that is primitive and
inferior, and eventually demarcates the rural Kazakhs as an uneducated group who are not suitable
member of the cities. Currently, the significant number of young generation, who were educated under the
new language policy, is entering the labour market. Therefore, it is important to assess the current
situation of the labour market, understand the multilingual society that create the social categorisation
based on the different choice of language, find out the solution, and finally influence the policy-makers for
the future policies.
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