William Wells:
Frontier Scout and Indian Agent
Paul A. Hutton”
William Wells occupies an important place in the history of
Indian-white relations in the Old Northwest. First as a Miami
warrior and then as an army scout he participated in many of
the northwestern frontier’s great battles; later as an Indian
agent he held a critical position in the implementation of the
United States’ early Indian policy. He was what was known
along the frontier as a “white Indian,” a unique type often
found along the ever-changing border that marked the boundary of the Indian country. As such, he was the product of two
very different cultures, and throughout his forty-two years of
life he swayed back and forth between them-never sure to
which he truly belonged. Such indecision doomed him, for he
could never be fully accepted by either society. When at last he
perished in battle, it would be in defense of whites, but he
would be dressed and painted as an Indian. Such was the
strange paradox of his life.
Born near Jacob’s Creek, Pennsylvania, in 1770, Wells was
only nine when his family migrated down the Ohio River on
flatboats in company with the families of William Pope and
William Oldham to settle on the Beargrass, near what is now
Louisville, Kentucky. His older brothers, Samuel and Hayden,
had explored the region in 1775 and reported its richness to
their father, Captain Samuel Wells, Sr., late of the Revolutionmy army. No sooner had the old soldier settled his family in a
fortified enclosure called Wells Station (three and one half
miles north of present Shelbyville, Kentucky) than he was
killed in the ambush of Colonel John Floyd’s militiamen near
Louisville in 1781. His mother having died earlier, the or-
* Paul A. Hutton is assistant editor of The Western Historical Quarterly,
Utah State University, Logan.
184
Indiana Magazine of History
phaned William Wells was taken into the home of his father’s
comrade-in-arms, Colonel P0pe.l
While hunting near Pope’s homestead in March, 1784,
William and three other boys were surprised by a party of
Miami Indians and carried north to the White River Indian
villages. Although the other boys managed to make their escape, William was sent farther north to the Wea villages along
the Eel River where he was adopted into the household of a
village chief, Gaviahatte (the Porcupine). The fourteen-year-old
captive evidently found the life of a Miami warrior much to his
liking because he quickly adapted t o tribal ways. Named
Apekonit (wild carrot, on account of his red hair) by the Indians, he accompanied them on raids against the white settlements. He proved particularly adept at luring river travelers
t o their doom along the Ohio. By acting as if he were lost, he
would get them to move to shore where his comrades would
slay them.2
This auburn-haired, freckle-faced warrior came to the attention of Little Turtle, war chief of the Miami confederacy, and
Samuel Wells, Sr., was a Virginian who had fought in both the French
and Indian and Revolutionary wars, as well as Lord Dunmore’s 1774 campaign
against the Shawnee, before moving to Kentucky. He had five sons and a
daughter, of whom William was the youngest. “William Wells Genealogy,”
William Wells Collection (Chicago Historical Society); Wells Family File (Filson Club, Louisville); especially valuable is Lyman C . Draper’s interview with
Darius Heald in Lyman C. Draper Collection 23858-62 (The State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, Madison); and Lewis Collins, History of Kentucky (2 vols.,
Louisville, 1924), 11, 239, 550.
The only reliable accounts of Wells’ capture are in the Heald interview,
Draper Collection 23862-65; and Mann Butler, “An Outline of the Origin and
Settlement of Louisville, in Kentucky,” The Louisville Directory, for the Year
1832 (Louisville, 1832), 104. Almost all popular accounts of Wells’ life claim
that he was adopted by Little Turtle, but there is no evidence to support this
contention. In 1792 Wells told John Heckewelder that his adopted father was
Gaviahatte. See “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s Journey to the Wabash in
1792,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, XI1 (no. 1, 1888), 45;
and Edward Rondthaler, Life of John Heckewelder (Philadelphia, 1847), 112.
There are no dependable accounts of Wells’ early life. Sketches of him appear
i n the following works, but they must be used with caution: Calvin M. Young,
Little Turtle: The Great Chief of the Miami Indian Nation (Greenville, Ohio,
19171, 179; Otho Winger, Last of the Miamis-Little Turtle (North Manchester,
Ind., 19681, 17; Bessie Keeran Roberts, “William Wells: A Legend in the
Councils of Two Nations,” Old Fort News, XVIII (September-December, 1954),
7; Wallace A. Brice, History of Fort Wayne (Fort Wayne, 18681, 147. Somewhat
more reliable, although brief, sketches are in Walter Havighurst, The Heartland: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois (New York, 1956), 78-85; Jacob Piatt Dunn, True
Indian Stories (Indianapolis, 19091, 117; Bert J. Griswold, The Pictorial History
of Fort Wayne, Indiana (2 vols., Chicago, 19171, I, 136; and Bert J. Griswold,
ed., Fort Wayne: Gateway of the West, 1802-1813 (Indianapolis, 1927), 30-32.
For Wells’ activities along the Ohio River see John Johnston to William Eustis,
November 6, 1810, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series,
Record Group 107 (National Archives, Washington).
William Wells
185
CAPTAIN
WILLIAM
WELLS
Courtesy Indiana State Library, Indianapolis.
186
Indiana Magazine of History
they soon became close friends. In time Wells married Little
Turtle’s daughter, Sweet Breeze (Manwangopath), and over the
years they had three daughters and two sons. Wells could not
have been more fortunate than to gain the protection of this
chief. Born in 1751, Little Turtle had first battled the white
man in 1780 when he wiped out a detachment commanded by
Augustine de La Balme, a French soldier-of-fortune with his
heart set on capturing Detroit from the British. From that time
on Little Turtle led the Miamis in their conflicts with the
whites to the east and south.3
As a member of the Miami tribe, Wells was free to come
and go as he pleased, but he made no effort to return to
Kentucky. He did, however, make contact with the American
post at Vincennes, probably in the capacity of an interpreter,
and was instrumental in securing the freedom of at least one
white child held prisoner by the I n d i a n ~ The
. ~ commandant at
Vincennes, Major John Francis Hamtramck, was acquainted
with Carty Wells, William’s older brother, and informed him of
William’s whereabouts. Carty made a dangerous but futile visit
to the Eel River village but could not convince William that
they were indeed brother^.^
Samuel Wells, who had already reached manhood when
William was captured, also journeyed to Eel River to visit
his Indian brother. This time the youth recognized his relative
and agreed to return to Kentucky with him to visit the family
homestead. Samuel had reached a position of wealth and importance in Kentucky society, and he attempted to impress
William with the comforts and amenities of the white way of
life. The youth was apparently not influenced, and, much to his
family’s surprise, after a few days visit he returned to his life
with the Indians.6
3The Chicago Historical Society has a color miniature of Wells in its
collections, and Thomas Hunt, who knew Wells a t Fort Wayne, left a physical
description. Draper Collection 21857. Little Turtle’s early career is covered in
Bert Anson, The Miami Indians (Norman, 1970), 91, 104-105.
*Wells arranged the ransoming of Oliver Spencer. See Milo Milton Quaife,
ed., The Indian Captivity o f 0 . M . Spencer (New York, 19681, 58, 114. Wells is
also mentioned in another famous captivity narrative-that of Frances Slocum.
See Otho Winger, The Lost Sister Among the Miamis (Elgin, Ill., 19361, 91-92.
Carty Wells, who lived a t Coxe’s Fort near Bardstown, Kentucky, often
carried dispatches for Major John Hamtramck. See Gayle Thornbrough, ed.,
Outpost on the Wabash, 1787-1791 (Indianapolis, 1957), 22, 40, 145, 160. For
Hamtramcks part in reuniting Wells with his family see John Hamtramck to
Secretary of War, November 1, 1801, enclosed in William Wells to William
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107.
The Wells family passed down this story, and Darius Heald, the grandson
of Samuel Wells, Jr., told it to Draper in 1868 and again to Joseph Kirkland in
1892. See Draper Collection 23362-65; and Joseph Kirkland, The Chicago Massacre of 1812 (Chicago, 1893), 174-75.
William Wells
187
Wells did not contact his Kentucky relatives again for
several years, as the intermittent raids that had characterized
Indian-white relations along the Ohio River for a decade
erupted into full-scale war. To the government of the United
States the question of who owned the land north of the Ohio
River had been settled with the American victory over the
British. The northwestern Indians had sided with the British in
the Revolution and had thus been conquered. American officials
were not swayed by Joseph Brant, the cultured Mohawk chief
who led part of the Indian confederacy, when he declared that
“nine-tenths of the Indians” had never heard of the Revolution,
much less been participants in it. To chastise the recalcitrants
the government sent General Josiah Harmar at the head of
1,133 Kentucky militiamen and 320 regulars to destroy the
Miami villages at Kekionga (present Fort Wayne, Indiana), but
Harmar’s much-vaunted Kentucky frontiersmen collapsed in
panic when they came into contact with Miami warriors. The
expedition ended a dismal failure. The Indians, well-supplied
by the British, stepped up their attacks during the winter and
spring of 1791.’
Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, was
recommissioned a major general and instructed to invade the
Indian country with a force so strong as to make defeat impossible. While recruiting his army, St. Clair sent General Charles
Scott of the Kentucky militia with 750 mounted men to attack
the Wea towns on the upper Wabash. Late in May, Scott destroyed four Indian villages, killed a few warriors, and took
fifty-three Indian women and children prisoners back to Cincinnati.s
The Kentuckians next targeted the Miami town on the Eel
River for destruction and sent Colonel James Wilkinson with
’Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John
Graves Simcoe, With Allied Documents Relating to his Administration of the
Government of Upper Canada (5 vols., Toronto, 1923-19311, V, 4. The British
hoped to establish a n Indian barrier state between Canada and the United
States. See ibid., I, 323, for the position of John Graves Simcoe, and for the
operation of his policy consult Reginald Horsman, “The British Indian Department and the Resistance to General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795,” Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 19621, 269-90. General Josiah
Harmar lost 183 men killed and thirty-one wounded while inflicting no tangible damage to the Indians. Good accounts of his campaign are in James Ripley
Jacobs, The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812 (Princeton, 1947), 53-63;
and William H. Guthman, March to Massacre: A History of the First Seven
Years of the United States Army, 1784-1791 (New York, 1970), 173-97.
For differing opinions on the effectiveness of General Charles Scott’s
campaign see Jacobs, Beginning of the US.Army, 73; and Guthman, March to
Massacre, 203-204.
188
Indiana Magazine of History
five hundred militiamen to accomplish the mission. Wilkinson
reached the Eel River village undetected on August 8, 1791,
just hours after the Porcupine, his adopted son, William Wells,
and all but eight warriors left for Kekionga to draw ammunition. With impressive military precision Wilkinson’s men killed
six of the eight defending warriors, as well as a number of
women and children, took thirty-four women and children prisoners, and burned the village with the loss of only two killed
and one wounded. Among the prisoners were Wells’ Indian wife
and mother. Fearful lest he meet with some real resistance that
might tarnish his triumph, Wilkinson destroyed some crops in
the area and hurried back to K e n t ~ c k y . ~
Far from humbling the Indians, these raids only added
vengeance to the redmen’s reasons for warring on the Americans. They would not have to wait long to extract payment in
full from the whites. In September, 1791, St. Clair led his army
of nearly two thousand into the wilderness. On November 4,
1791, the expedition, reduced to around 1,400 men by desertions, camped near the east bank of the upper Wabash (present Mercer County, Ohio), still fifty miles from Kekionga. The
Indians, however, had left that place seven days before and lay
in concealment all around the white camp. Just as the troops
settled down to breakfast, Little Turtle’s one thousand warriors
attacked. To Winthrop Sargent, secretary of the Northwest
Territory, the Indian war whoops sounded like the ringing of a
thousand horsebells, while to John McCasland of the Kentucky
militia it resembled more the desolate howls of wolves. For over
six hundred of St. Clair’s men it was the last sound they ever
heard.1°
If the army was to be saved, the artillery would have to do
it, for the militia were instantly panicked. Little Turtle, however, had made special plans to silence the eight cannons.
Wells, with three hundred warriors, was positioned directly in
front of the guns and ordered to pick off the artillerists. Within
minutes the ordnance, around which lay all but one artillery
officer and two thirds of the gunners, was in the possession of
James Wilkinson’s report is in American State Papers: Indian Affairs (2
vols., Washington, 1832-18341, I, 133-35. For the capture of Wells’ wife see
Draper Collection 85180 and 11YY11; “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s Journey,’’ 45; and [C. H. More], “Engineer Recalls Romance of Captain and Princess,” Wells Family File.
Draper Collection 85128-29; Jacobs, Beginning of the U S . Army, 85-123;
Guthman, March to Massacre, 220-44; Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the
Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (New York,
1969), 22-27.
William Wells
I89
the warriors.l’ There was no choice for St. Clair but to retreat
or face complete annihilation. The general therefore ordered his
bleeding army back to Fort Jefferson, twenty-nine miles to the
south. It is conceivable that had the Indians pursued not a man
would have escaped, but Little Turtle sent out runners to call
in his warriors, declaring that “they must be satisfied . . . having killed enough.”12
As the remnants of the American army hobbled back to
Cincinnati, the warriors of the Indian confederacy dispersed,
returning to their villages in triumph. Although the Miami
homeland was temporarily secure, young Wells was far from
content because his family was still in the hands of the enemy.
In March, 1792, he and the Porcupine accompanied a delegation of Eel River and Wea chiefs who visited Hamtramck at
Vincennes to sign articles of friendship with the government in
hopes of securing the release of their women and ~hi1dren.l~
The prisoners, however, were held at Cincinnati, and Hamtramck was not empowered to order their release. The Indians
would have to wait for the arrival of General Rufas Putnam
who was being sent by the government to conclude a peace
treaty with the Wabash tribes. While at Vincennes, Wells was
again pressured by Hamtramck to return to his own race, and
Samuel Wells soon arrived to second the argument. Determined
to secure the release of his wife, Wells agreed to accompany
Samuel to Louisville to await the arrival of Putnam.14
At some point during the month that he remained with
Samuel in Louisville, William Wells decided to give up his
Indian life. Many factors undoubtedly played a part in the
decision, not the least of which may have been that Samuel had
l1 Wells gave his account of the battle to Gerard T. Hopkins when the
Quaker visited Fort Wayne in 1804. Martha Tyson, A Mission to the Indians,
From the Indian Committee of Baltimore Yearly Meeting, to Fort Wayne, in
1804. Written at the time, by Gerard T . Hopkins. With an Appendix, compiled in
1862 (Philadelphia, 1862), 65-66. Also see Henry Brown, The History of Illinois
from its First Discovery and Settlement to the Present Time (New York, 1844),
309; Elmore Barce, The Land o f the Miamis (Fowler, Ind., 1922), 203; and
Johnston to Eustis, November 6, 1810, Letters Received by the Secretary of
War, registered series, Record Group 107. Ironically, among those slain beside
the artillery was Colonel William Oldham, a close friend of Samuel Wells, Sr.,
who had accompanied the Wells family to Kentucky in 1779.
12Tyson, Mission to the Indians, 133-34.
13Clarence Edwin Carter, comp. and ed., The Territorial Papers of the
United States: The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 1787-1803 (2 vols.,
Washington, 19341, I, 374-75, 380-83.
l4 Hamtramck to Secretary of War, November 1, 1801, enclosed in Wells to
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107; Draper Collection 85180; “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s Journey,” 45.
190
Indiana Magazine of History
commanded a company of militia under St. Clair and thus
might have been slain by his Indian brother. In a n interview
granted a few years later, Wells rationalized that he was impressed by the comforts and security of the whites a t the very
time that he was depressed over the insecurity of Indian life.
Although he had been happy with the Miamis, Wells had been
unable to “forget scenes and pleasures” of his white upbringing.
Now he could find no comfort with a people who lived “almost
wholly to the present” and gave “little or no remembrance to
the past, and hope[d] nothing for the future.” He wanted more
for his wife than the harsh existence of a Miami squaw, who he
felt was little better than a “beast of burthen.” For his children
he desired the order of white society instead of the “wild and
lawless democracy” of the Indian that was so often punctuated
by wars which he felt resulted from “a thirst of blood and of
motion, common to wild men and wild beasts.” White society
offered him the chance to “get a comfortable living for the
present . . . lay up something for old age . . . establish a farm,
[and] bring up children, who, when we are worn out with age,
will close our eyes.”15
When Putnam finally arrived at Cincinnati, he needed a n
interpreter, and Wells was quick to offer his services for one
dollar per day. Reaching Fort Washington (near Cincinnati) on
July 13, 1792, Wells was immediately reunited with his family
amid “many tears.”16 The new interpreter soon proved to be a n
invaluable employee for Putnam, who felt him “to be a young
man of good natural abilities and of a n agreable disposition.”
Wells informed the general of the hiding place of St. Clair’s
captured cannons and also urged Putnam to open negotiations
15The quotations are from a n interview in 1798 with the French philosopher Constantin FranGois Volney in which Wells discussed his reasons for
leaving the Indians. C. F. Volney, A View of the Soil and Climate of the United
States of America (New York, 19681, 363, 372-74, 378-79. The Wells family
contended that William Wells and Little Turtle hoped to bring peace between
the races and that it was agreed between them that Wells would join the
Americans and work for peace while Little Turtle tried to sway the tribes in
that direction. This story is supported by the continuing friendship of the two
and by the fact that they both advocated peace after 1792. H. W. Compton,
“The Battle of Fallen Timbers,” in Addresses, Memorials and Sketches. Published by the Maumee Valley Pioneer Association to be delivered at the Reunion
at Delta, Ohio, Wednesday, August 30, 1899 (Toledo, 18991, 19-20; Dunn, True
Indian Stories, 116-17.
l 6 Hamtramck to Secretary of War, November 1, 1801, enclosed in Wells to
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107; Draper Collection 85180, 11YY11; Rowena Buell,
comp., The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence (Boston, 19031, 296, 381; “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s Journey,”
45.
William Wells
191
quickly with the Miamis because he was convinced that Little
Turtle favored peace. Putnam decided to travel to Vincennes,
release the prisoners, and open peace talks. On August 16,
Wells, with the Indian captives and an escort of sixty men,
started down the Ohio River. They were followed two days later
by a barge containing Putnam and his assistant, the Moravian
missionary John He~kewe1der.l~
Heckewelder was fascinated by Wells, who still retained
many of the customs and habits of the Miamis. Constantly
engaged in hunting during the trip, Wells on one occasion
wounded a large bear. The animal cried in agony, and as
Heckewelder watched in astonishment, Wells went up to the
wounded beast and in “great earnestness, addressed him in the
Wabash language, now and then giving him a slight stroke on
the nose with his ram-rod.’’ When Heckewelder inquired what
Wells was doing, the young guide replied that he had upbraided the bear “for acting the part of a coward; I told him
that he knew the fortune of war, that one or the other of us
must have fallen; that it was his fate to be conquered, and he
ought to die like a man, like a hero, and not like an old
woman; that if the case had been reversed, and I had fallen
into the power of my enemy, I would not have disgraced my
nation as he did, but would have died with firmness and courage, as becomes a true warrior.”18
Upon reaching Vincennes, Putnam released his prisoners
to a delegation from the Miamis. Joined by the Kaskaskias and
some Potawatomies, the Eel River Miamis then signed a peace
treaty with the whites, although they made it clear that they
would never agree t o white settlement north of the Ohio
River.l9 Loaded with presents, the Indians then returned to
their villages to join in the fall hunt and, later, to join the
warriors opposing the white army.
Putnam was anxious to return t o Pennsylvania, but he had
one more mission for Wells. Convinced that his Vincennes
council had neutralized some of the Miami and Potawatomie
bands, Putnam sent his guide-interpreter to negotiate with the
Kekionga Miamis and the Delawares in the hope that they
would also join him in council. This was a risky business, for
l7 Buell, Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, 296, 308-309; “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s Journey,” 45, 49-54.
l 8 John Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations
Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States (New York,
1971), 256.
l9 This treaty was never ratified. American State Papers: Indian Affairs, I,
338.
192
Indiana Magazine of History
three envoys had already been murdered. While in Indian
country Wells was also to ascertain the strength and mood of
the tribes and then report to Putnam at Marietta. Although
dangerous, the mission would prove profitable for the former
Indian captive, who was to be paid three hundred dollars with
a two hundred dollar bonus if he could induce the hostiles to
negotiate.20 Wells had previously worked for the Americans
only to secure his family’s freedom; now he clearly became the
agent of the expansionists.
Wells headed into the Indiana forests on October 7, and
Putnam and Heckewelder returned to Marietta. Weeks turned
into months, and nothing was heard from the envoy or the
Indians. Putnam, although earlier convinced that peace was
possible, now felt sure that Wells had been murdered. The
general wrote Anthony Wayne, the new commander of the
western army, that he was going to Philadelphia to convince
“all the advocates for Treaties that nothing but a Sevear whiping will bring these proud Savages to a Sence of there
interests.”21
Although Wells had not been killed by the Indians, his
mission had not been successful. The tribesmen had not been at
Kekionga but had assembled at the confluence of the Maumee
and Auglaize rivers, and Wells had presented Putnam’s message in early January, 1793. Much to the satisfaction of the
British, the Indians rejected the peace offer. Nor was Wells able
to recruit any chiefs to return with him to Vincennes.22
When Wells finally reported to Hamtramck at Vincennes,
the major recruited him for another important assignment.
General Wayne, now encamped near Cincinnati with his new
Legion of the United States, was ordered to halt offensive operations until a peace commission could meet with the Indians at
Sandusky, Ohio. This irked the impatient general, who realized
that the campaign must begin by midsummer to take advantage of good forage and dry terrain. Wayne thus requested that
Hamtramck hire an agent to attend the conference and report
its results to him so that he could quickly move his troops
forward. Although Wells was worried that his mission for Put2ORufus Putnam’s instructions to Wells are in Buell, Memoirs of Rufus
Putnam, 368-71. Also see ibid., 381; and “Narrative of John Heckewelder’s
Journey,” 173.
21 Buell, Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, 375-77.
22For a British account of Wells’ mission see Alexander McKee to John
Graves Simcoe, January 30, 1793, in Cruikshank, Correspondence of John
Graves Simcoe, I, 282-83.
William Wells
193
nam had undercut his position with the Miamis, he agreed to
go.23
The council, meeting in August, 1793, proved unproductive,
with the Indians demanding a n Ohio River boundary and the
commissioners demanding adherence to t h e Fort H a r m a r
agreement of 1789. Neither side was in a mood to compromise,
and the disgusted commissioners returned to Philadelphia convinced that war was the only recourse. The order then went out
for Wayne t o advance.24
Wells, reporting directly to Wayne on September 11, 1793,
warned that the Legion would face a t least 1,600 Indians,
mostly Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis, fully armed and
supplied by the British. Wells was convinced that “nothing
prevented a peace taking place but the advice and influence of
the British” and that war might soon erupt along the western
border from Pennsylvania to Georgia. Wayne would have to
strike the northern tribes quickly or face a “General Confederacy . . . among the Indian nations against America . . . that was
ultimately determined . . . [to] destroy the whole of the frontier
inhabitant^."^^
Impressed by the report, Wayne asked Wells to command a
company of scouts in the upcoming campaign, and, after seeing
his wife and children safely to his brother’s home, the former
Miami warrior agreed. His company, which varied in number
as the campaign progressed, usually consisted of twenty wellchosen men and was to report to and take orders only from
Wayne. Each member of t h e company was picked for his
knowledge of the Indian and for his prowess in war. Among the
elite contingent were William May, who had seen service as a
spy for Wilkinson; Nicholas Miller and William Polke, both
captured as youths and raised by t h e Indians; and Robert
McClellan, a young giant from the Pennsylvania backcountry
who served a Wells’ lieutenant and astonished the entire com23 Hamtramck to Secretary of War, November 1, 1801, enclosed in Wells to
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107; Hamtramck to Anthony Wayne, July 16, 1793,
Anthony Wayne Papers (State Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia).
24The official records of the American commissioners are in American
State Papers: Indian Affairs, I, 340-61.
25 Wells’ report to Wayne is in Dwight L. Smith, ed., “William Wells and
the Indian Council of 1793,” Indiana Magazine of History, LVI (September,
1960), 217-26. Also see Wayne to Henry Knox, September 17, 1793, in Richard
C. Knopf, ed., Anthony Wayne: A Name in Arms (Pittsburgh, 1960), 272-73.
194
Indiana Magazine of History
mand with remarkable feats of strength. As the Legion moved
north, this little group, dressed and painted as Indians, took
the point.26
Wishing to avoid a winter campaign, Wayne marched his
army only as far as the southwest branch of the Maumee River
where he built Fort Greeneville. He also had a series of forts
constructed at twenty-five-mile intervals from Fort Washington
to Fort Greeneville, some ninety-eight miles inside Indian
country. One of these outposts, Fort Recovery, was built on the
site of St. Clair’s defeat and was fortified with some of St.
Clair’s cannons, recovered by Wells from where the Indians had
concealed them.27
Still hoping to avoid bloodshed, Wells released a squaw he
had taken prisoner and sent her to the Indian chiefs with
assurances that negotiations were still possible. As a result, the
son of t h e Delaware chief Buckongahelas arrived at Fort
Greeneville on January 13, 1794, to meet with Wayne. Although the audacious general was displeased t h a t his war
might end ingloriously, he agreed to a thirty-day truce SO that
26 For Wells’ appointment as captain see Wayne to Wells, October 22, 1793,
Wayne Papers. The best source of information on Wells’ scouts is J o h n
McDonald, Biographical Sketches of General Nathaniel Massie, General Duncan
McArthur, Captain William Wells, and General Simon Kenton, Who Were Early
Settlers in the Western Country (Cincinnati, 1838), 183-96. McDonald participated in the campaign as a member of Ephraim Kibby’s detachment of scouts,
and his account is fairly reliable. All other accounts derive from McDonald’s,
but further original information is in the Draper Collection. Material on Wells
from the Draper Collection must always be used with caution, however, for the
interviews, held many years after the events, often contain errors. Wells was
authorized to raise a force of sixty scouts, and although a number of detachments took orders from him, the following men formed the core of his detachment: Robert McClellan, Nicholas Miller, Christopher Miller, Paschal
Hickman, Dodson Thorp, William Ramsey, Tabor Washburn, Joseph Young,
William May, David Thomson, William England, Thomas Stratton, Fielding
Pilcher, David Reed, Benjamin Davis, George Casterson, Chatin Dogged, James
Elliot, and Charles Evans. “A List of the Mens Names of Capt. Wells Company
of Spies,” and “Pay Roll of the Spies selected by William Wells . . . ,” Muster
Rolls of Volunteer Organizations: War With Northwest Indians, 1790-95, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives).
2 7 David Simmons, “Anthony Wayne’s Forts,” Old Fort News (Winter,
1973), 1-12. The details of Wayne’s campaign are given in Jacobs, Beginning of
the US.Army, 124-88. There were several journals kept during the campaign.
Two of the best are Dwight L. Smith, ed., From Greene Ville to Fallen Timbers:
A Journal of the Wayne Campaign, July 28-September 14, 1794 (Indianapolis
1952); and [Reginald McGrane, ed.], “William Clark’s Journal of General
Wayne’s Campaign,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I (December, 19141,
418-44.
William Wells
195
the Indians might consider his demand for the return of all
prisoners before negotiations could begin.28
At the end of thirty days the impatient Wayne had heard
nothing from the Indians, but no depredations had occurred
either. Fearing that the Indians hoped to delay his advance
until the spring thaw made movement more difficult, Wayne
sent Wells out to take a prisoner. From a Delaware warrior and
his wife, captured by Wells near Grand Glaize, it was learned
that the Indians had met in council and had decided to comply
with Wayne’s demands but needed more time t o collect all the
white prisoners. Wayne was unconvinced and again sent Wells
out to gather i n t e l l i g e n ~ e . ~ ~
Taking McClellan and Nicholas Miller with him, Wells
scouted north along the Auglaize River. On March 13, seeing a
telltale wisp of smoke, they dismounted and crept up on a trio
of Indians. Wells and Miller shot two of the warriors while
McClellan subdued the third. To their amazement the prisoner
turned out to be Nicholas Miller’s younger brother, Christopher, who had willingly remained with his Shawnee captors.
Interviewed by Wayne, Christopher declared that the Indians
had decided to make peace; but before the prisoners could be
gathered in, the British agents Matthew Elliott and Simon
Girty had arrived at the council from Detroit with pledges of
arms, ammunition, and provisions. Furthermore, as a show of
their support, the British were to construct a fort at the
Maumee rapids. Various chiefs had then gone to Detroit to
confer with British Indian agent Alexander McKee and returned “determined to prosecute the war with the utmost
vigor.” At the solicitation of Wells the general set Christopher
Miller at liberty, and he was added to Wells’ detachment of
scouts.30
28 “Extract of a Letter from a n Officer in the Western Army . . . ,” in
Cruikshank, Correspondence of John Graves Simcoe, 11, 132-33;Wayne’s
harshly toned letter to the Indian confederacy is in ibid., 131; also see Knopf,
Anthony Wayne, 300.
29Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 308-309.The Indians had met in council and
decided to surrender all prisoners to Wayne; however, they had reached this
decision during British Indian agent Alexander McKee’s absence. See Cruikshank, Correspondence of John Graves Simcoe, 11, 139, 141, 174.
30 Draper Collection 33820, 16U126; Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 311. Christopher and Nicholas Miller had been captured by the Shawnees in 1782 near
Blue Licks, Kentucky. After the Indian war Christopher Miller settled in
Hardin County, Kentucky, and eventually won election to the state legislature.
In 1820 Congress voted him a pension for his service with Wells. Draper
Collection 168163;Collins, History of Kentucky, 11, 309-10;and US.,Annals of
Congress, 16 Cong., 1 Sess. (1819-18201,pp. 898, 2140.
196
Indiana Magazine of History
Although the rejection of his offer to negotiate came as no
surprise to Wayne, he was still not ready to advance further
into Indian country because of delays in the receipt of supplies.
Instead he sent out occasional raiding parties of friendly Chickasaws as well as constantly employing Wells and his band. By
May, 1794, Wells’ depredations had become so damaging that
the Delawares, Shawnees, and Miamis petitioned McKee to do
something about them.31
By June, 1794, Little Turtle had two thousand warriors
assembled at the Glaize awaiting the Americans, and, with
hunger dissipating his forces, he decided to move south to
attack Wayne’s supply lines. Accompanied by Girty and Elliott,
the Indians marched toward Fort Recovery in twelve open files.
American scouting parties noted this movement, and a squad
commanded by Wells clashed with a part of one file, killing five
Miamis. Wells also provided Wayne with a talkative prisoner
who declared that the Indians hoped to isolate the advanced
forts from supply convoys. The general ordered Hamtramck to
send a large convoy from Cincinnati to Fort Recovery before
the Indians could cut off the outpost. The convoy safely deposited supplies on June 29, but as it left the fort on the following
day, Little Turtle’s warriors struck from ambush, pillaging the
convoy and overwhelming a relief column from the fort. Overjoyed by this initial success, the warriors disregarded Little
Turtle’s advice and attacked the stockade, only to have the
cannons that Wells had recovered blast them apart. After two
days of costly, futile assaults the disheartened Indians gathered
their dead and returned north.32
McKee was enraged that the Indians had so easily thrown
away a possible victory, and the only good news he could send
his superiors was that Wells and May had been killed in the
battle. Even this he had to retract a few days later. The Indians, victorious for so long, were thrown into depression. Little
Turtle journeyed to Detroit and demanded to know how much
assistance from the British could be relied on. Colonel Richard
G. England, the British commandant, made some grand prom31 Alexander Gibson to Wayne, April 24, 1794, Wayne Papers; “The Three
Nations at the Glaize to Colonel McKee,” in Cruikshank, Correspondence of
John Graves Simcoe, 11, 230.
32 The Indian march to and attack on Fort Recovery is described in “Diary
of an Officer in the Indian Country,” in Cruikshank, Correspondence of John
Graves Simcoe, V , 90-94. For Wells’ vital role in the affair see Hamtramck to
Secretary of War, November 1, 1801, enclosed in Wells to Eustis, June 25,
1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group
107; Draper Collection 335232.
William Wells
197
ises, but the chief remained skeptical.33 Upon his return to the
Indian camp Little Turtle urged conciliation with the United
States. He was rebuked for his counsel by his fellow chiefs and
lost his preeminent position among the tribes to Blue Jacket
and Turkey
It was a t this time of Indian disunion that Wayne led his
Legion, augmented by 1,600 mounted Kentuckians under General Scott, forward. Instead of marching toward Kekionga as
had the other American armies, Wayne drove straight for the
Indian camps below the newly constructed British Fort Miami.
At the Glaize he paused long enough to construct Fort Defiance
on the former site of many Indian councils.
Wayne called on Wells to scout Fort Miami and bring back a
prisoner for interrogation. On August 11 Wells, with Christopher Miller, McClellan, May, and Dodson Thorp, all dressed
and painted as Indians, inspected the British fort and nearby
Indian camps. After surveying the post and its environs for a
day, they captured a Shawnee warrior and his wife and headed
back to Fort Defiance. About twenty miles from the American
post they came upon a small camp of Delawares, and Wells
decided to inspect it. Taking May and McClellan with him,
Wells rode boldly into the camp and dismounted before the fire.
The Indians, suspecting nothing, talked at length with the
disguised Americans about their plans. However, one of the
warriors recognized May and whispered his suspicions to a
companion. Overhearing this, Wells ordered his men to shoot,
and each killed a nearby Indian. Drawing their tomahawks,
they fought their way to their horses and galloped away from
the surprised Indians, but not before McClellan was shot in the
shoulder and Wells in the left wrist. As soon as they outdistanced any pursuit, Christopher Miller hurried to Fort Defiance
for aid, and Wayne dispatched a company of dragoons to bring
in the wounded
From Wells’ Shawnee prisoners it was learned that the
Indians, about 1,500 strong, were camped at McKee’s trading
Correspondence of John Graves Simcoe, 11, 305, 334, 341.
Brice, History of Fort Wayne, 148-49.
35 William Clark was impressed with this remarkable adventure and the
“enterprising young man” who led it. [McGrane], “William Clark’s Journal,”
424-25. The escapade is also noted in Smith, From Greene Ville to Fallen
Timbers, 276; McDonald, Biographical Sketches, 192-95; and Draper Collection
9BB56, 9BB64, 95211, 38172, 14U132-33. A British account is in Cruikshank,
Correspondence of John Graves Simcoe, 11, 371; and John Bricknell, “John
Bricknell’s Captivity Among the Delaware Indians,” American Pioneer, I (February, 18421, 52.
33 Cruikshank,
34
198
Indiana Magazine of History
house about a mile from Fort Miami. McKee had gone to Detroit to gather more British militiamen to aid the Indians, who
planned to fight at the Maumee rapids. Wayne decided on one
final overture of peace and on August 13 sent Christopher
Miller forward with a message offering to open negotiations
and warning the Indians not to be “deceived or led astray by
the false promises and language of the bad White Men at the
foot of the Rapids . . . .” On August 16 Miller returned with the
Indians’ reply that they desired ten days to consider the offer.
Realizing that the tribesmen were stalling in order to gather
more warriors, Wayne advanced to within five miles of Fort
Miami, burning abandoned Indian camps and crops along the
way.36
Between the Legion and the British fort lay a n eerie forest
where some ancient tornado had tossed about the trees, leaving
a tangled mass of twisted limbs. Here the warriors of the
confederacy gathered to meet the American army. On August
17 Wayne sent May forward to inspect the fallen timbers, but
the scout fell in with a party of Indians and was captured.
Overjoyed a t taking one of the hated scouts, the Indians tied
May to a tree near Fort Miami, placed a mark on his chest, and
riddled him with over fifty bullets.37
This act of provocation did not stampede Wayne into action. He now played a waiting game with the Indians, delaying
his advance for two days. On the third day a heavy rain fell,
and Wells, realizing that the warriors had been fasting before
battle, urged Wayne to attack while the Indians took advantage of the storm to slip back to their camps for food. As soon
as the rain abated, Wayne sent his Legion forward, and it
quickly shattered the ranks of the remaining Indians. While
the infantry put those who stood their ground to the bayonet,
the cavalry chased retreating warriors almost to the British
fort. The Indians who managed to reach Fort Miami found the
gates closed and the faithless British deaf to their pleas for
help.38 The battle was not particularly costly for either side,
with Indian losses numbering less than a hundred and Wayne’s
36 Quotation from Philadelphia Gazette of the United States, October 2,
1794; and Cruikshank, Correspondence of John Graves Simcoe, 11, 372, 387; see
also [McGrane], “William Clark’s Journal,” 425-26.
37 Draper Collection 9BB56, 95212; Bricknell, “John Bricknell’s Captivity
Among the Delaware,” 52; and Milo M. Quaife, ed., “General James Wilkinson’s
Narrative of .the Fallen Timbers Campaign,” Mississippi
_ _ Valley Historical Reuiew, XVI (June, 19291, 83.
38 For Wells’ advice to Wavne see Draoer Collection 5U124. Details of the
battle are in Jacobs, Beginning of the U.S. Army, 174-76.
-
I
William Wells
199
losses under fifty, but it destroyed Indian confidence in their
own military power, proved British promises worthless, and
secured peace on the frontier until 1811.
To hold the newly won territory Wayne ordered a fort
constructed at the vital Maumee portage, near the great Miami
town of Kekionga. By the fall of 1794 the post was completed
and named in honor of the general. Leaving a detachment at
Fort Wayne the general returned the bulk of his army to Fort
Greeneville while Wells, Christopher Miller, and other messengers went out to call the chiefs to a great council in the summer of 1795.39
By June, 1,100 chiefs and warriors had assembled a t
Greeneville, and with Wells acting as chief interpreter Wayne
negotiated with the Indians for nearly a month. On August 3,
1795, a treaty was completed by which the tribesmen transferred to the United States twenty-five thousand square miles
of territory in return for $20,000 in goods and an annuity of
$9,500 in trade goods to be divided among twelve tribes. The
bargain price averaged out to less than one sixth of a cent per
acre.4o
After the treaty settlement Wells’ scouts, who had been
employed since Fallen Timbers with the disagreeable duty of
hunting army deserters, were disbanded. Wells remained with
the army as an interpreter, accompanying Hamtramck to Detroit in July, 1796, to take possession of that place from the
British. Arriving at Detroit in August, Wayne dispatched Wells
and Christopher Miller with a delegation of Indian chiefs, including Little Turtle, to the capital at Philadelphia. At the
same time he wrote Secretary of War James McHenry in praise
of Wells and urged that on account of the scout’s “very essential services” and disabled arm a liberal pension should be
awarded him. Upon Wells’ arrival at the capital in November,
1796, a pension of twenty dollars per month was given him.41
39 Wayne to Wells, March 19, 1795, Wayne Papers; and Griswold, Fort
Wayne: Gateway of the West, 14-15.
40The minutes of the treaty proceedings are in American State Papers:
Indian Affairs, I, 566-78. A British account is in Cruikshank, Correspondence of
John Graves Simcoe, IV, 71-72.
41 Wayne to Wells, November 20, 1795, Wayne Papers. The government
rewarded Wells liberally. Between September, 1793, and August, 1795, he was
paid nearly two thousand dollars i n wages and subsistence, an enormous
amount of cash on the frontier. “The United States Account with William
Wells,”’and “Subsistence account of William Wells from 13 Sept. 93 to 30 June
1794,” Northwest Territory Collection (Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis).
For Wayne’s pension recommendation see Knopf, Anthony Wayne, 532-33; and
Draper Collection 4U145, 11YY11. In 1808 Congress granted Wells a preemption of 320 acres of land near Fort Wayne. Valley of the Upper Maumee River ( 2
vols., Madison, 1889), I, 199.
Reproduced from Dwight L. Smith, Wayne’s Peace with the Indians ofthe Old Northwest,
1795 (Fort Wayne, n.d.1, 10.11.
1.
5.
4.
2.
3.
Anthony Wayne
Little Turtle
William Wells
William Henry Harrison
William Clark
10.
6.
7.
8.
9.
THE
Meriwether Lewis
Isaac Zane
Tarhe. T h e Crane
Blur Jacket
Black Hoof
LINEDRAWING
OF
Buckongehelas
Lcatherlips
Bad Bird
White Pigeon
TheSun
THE
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
David Jones
Henry De Butts
J o h n Mills
T h e Treaty of G n e n e Ville
Greene Ville Treatv Calumet
PAINTING
Reproduced from Dwight L. Smith, Wayne's Peace with the Indians of t k Old Northwest,
1795 (Fort Wayne, n.d.1, 12.
14.
15.
12.
13.
11.
PRINCIPAL
FIGURES
IN
N
N
0
William Wells
203
On November 29 Wells and Little Turtle met with President George Washington, who presented the chief with several
gifts, including a ceremonial sword, as tangible proof of his
“esteem and friendship.” Little Turtle quickly became a celebrity in the Quaker City. He sat for a portrait by Gilbert Stuart,
was inoculated for smallpox by Benjamin Rush, and met with
the Polish patriot Thaddeus Kosciusko, who presented him with
a brace of pistols and the belated advice t o use them against
“the first man who ever comes to subjugate
While in Philadelphia, Wells pressed Secretary of War
McHenry for a n appointment in the Indian department, and
upon his return to Fort Wayne he wrote Hamtramck that he
“was encouraged and hopeful” of obtaining a position. In the
winter of 1797 Wells and Little Turtle returned t o the capital
to meet with President John Adams, who found the chief to be
“a remarkable man” and sought to make him “happy here and
contented after his return” home. One of the means employed
to insure the chief’s contentment was the appointment of Wells
as interpreter and deputy Indian agent at a salary of three
hundred dollars per year. His future seemingly secure, Wells
returned with his Indian benefactor to Fort Wayne, stopping
first at Louisville t o obtain a half dozen slaves from his
brother. At Fort Wayne he established his family across the
river from the post and began raising hogs, planting corn, and
laying out orchards on the large acreage he owned in conjunction with H a r n t r a m ~ k . ~ ~
Wells’ appointment as agent came under the 1793 trade
and intercourse act which authorized the president to appoint
“temporary agents, to reside among the Indians.” With the
establishment of the Indiana Territory in 1800 Wells temporarily lost his position until reappointed by President Thomas
Jefferson as of January 1, 1802, a t a salary of six hundred
dollars a year, plus rations. As agent for the Miamis, Dela4 2 John Alexander Carroll and Mary Wells Ashworth, George Washington:
First in Peace (New York, 1957), 420; George W. Corner, ed., The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush (Princeton, 19481, 240; Young, Little Turtle, 147.
43 Charles Robert Poinsatte, “A History of Fort Wayne, Indiana, from 1716
to 1829: A Study of its Early Development as a Frontier Village” (M.A. thesis,
Department of History, Notre Dame University, 1951),68; James Wilkinson to
James McHenry, November 27, 1810, Letters Received by the Secretary of War,
registered series, Record Group 107; McHenry to Wells, November 28, 1810,
James McHenry File (Chicago Historical Society). By 1812 Wells owned eleven
slaves. “An Inventory and appraisement of the slaves and personal estate of
William Wells . . . ,” Jefferson County Inventory and Settlements, Book 3
(March, 1812-May, 18151, pp. 31-33, Jefferson County Courthouse, Louisville,
Kentucky.
204
Indiana Magazine of History
wares, Weas, Eel Rivers, and some Potawatomies, Wells was
responsible for distributing annuities, granting trade licenses,
holding councils, promoting civilization, and ensuring harmonious relations between the Indians and the government. He was
responsible to both the governor sf the territory and the secretary of war. To complicate jurisdictional matters further, as of
July, 1802, he had to share authority with the manager, or
factor, of an Indian trading house who could also grant trading
licenses, distribute goods, and conduct trade with the Indians.44
Wells had hoped to secure the lucrative position of factor
for himself, and his relationship with John Johnston, an Irish
immigrant with political connections who had failed as a
storekeeper and law clerk before obtaining the appointment as
factor, was frigid from its inception. Johnston had little use for
a crude frontiersman like Wells. His conviction that an illeducated, uncouth squaw-man could not honestly rise to a position of wealth and power such as Wells possessed preyed on
his mind until it became an obsession. Wells, who resented any
interference with “his” people, returned Johnston’s hatred measure for measure. Their corrosive relationship dominated the
operation of Indian affairs in northern Indiana until 1812.45
With William Henry Harrison, the young governor of Indiana Territory, Wells could hope for a warmer relationship.
They had become close friends during the Indian war when
Harrison had served as Wayne’s adjutant, and after Fallen
Timbers Harrison had helped to educate Wells in the customs
and manners of white people. In 1801 Harrison had described
Wells to the secretary of war as “a sober, active and faithful
public Servant [whose] knowledge of the Indian language and
manners, is much greater than that of any other person.” At
the same time he had secured Wells a profitable appointment
as justice of the peace.46
44 Gayle Thornbrough, ed., Letter Book of the Indian Agency at Fort Wayne,
1809-1815 (Indianapolis, 19611, 10-11. The mechanics of federal Indian policy
are described in Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative
Years: The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, 19621,
41-101, while the intellectual background is discussed in Bernard Sheehan,
Seeds of Extinction: Jeffersonian Philanthropy and the American Indian
(Chapel Hill, 1973).
4 5 A highly favorable biography of Johnston is Leonard U. Hill, John
Johnston and the Indians in the Land of the Three Miamis (Piqua, Ohio, 1957).
46 Moses Dawson, A Historical Narrative of the Civil and Military Services
of Major-General William H . Harrison . . . (Cincinnati, 1824), 467; William
Henry Harrison to Henry Dearborn, September 1, 1801, enclosed in Wells to
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107; William Wesley Woollen, Daniel Wait Howe, and
Jacob Piatt Dunn, Executive Journal of Indiana Territory, 1800-181 6 (Indiana
Historical Society Publications, Vol. 111, No. 3; Indianapolis, 1900), 103.
William Wells
205
The Harrison-Wells friendship would falter, however, when
Harrison’s ambitions clashed with Wells’ allegiance to the Miamis. Harrison was, above all else, an ambitious man. A political gadfly, he had been appointed to office by the Federalists
but after the election of Thomas Jefferson had diligently labored to convince the new president of his loyalty. Jefferson
was convinced that the salvation of the Indians rested upon
their adaptation to agricultural pursuits, and to secure this end
he felt it essential to deprive them of the lands that allowed the
continuation of their hunter-gatherer economy. Harrison promised to do everything in his power to “contribute toward the
success of [the] administration by my humble exertions to place
upon a better footing the affairs of the wretched Indians.” Toward this end he negotiated six treaties between 1803 and 1805
which secured for the United States millions of acres of valuable land.47These treaties, however, also contributed to the rise
of Tecumseh and the collapse of Indian relations prior to the
War of 1812.
Wells’ concern over Harrison’s machinations led to his first
severe clash with the government. Wells, working closely with
Little Turtle, was committed to retaining as much land as
possible by presenting a united Indian front in all negotiations
with the whites. Retention of Miami lands was a point of honor
for Wells, for he had transmitted a government promise to the
Miamis that whites would never settle north of the White
River, and he intended to keep that pledge.48
Although Harrison had successfully acquired title to over a
million acres of land around Vincennes through the Treaty of
Fort Wayne on June 7, 1803, he was plagued by the opposition
of Little Turtle and surprised by the reluctance of Wells to be
of help. When Harrison negotiated a treaty with the Delawares
and the Piankashaws in August, 1804, for land which the
Miamis claimed was jointly owned, Wells’ opposition became
obvious. Enraged, Harrison asked Secretary of W a r Henry
Dearborn to reprimand the agent, complaining that “Wells has
certainly not exerted himself to pacify the Indians who have
taken offence at the late Treaties . . . .” The territorial governor
felt that Wells was lying about the depth of Indian dissatisfaction and warned Dearborn that “when Wells speaks of the
47For a defense of Harrison’s actions see Dorothy Burne Goebel, William
Henry Harrison: A Political Biography (Zndiana Historical Collections, Vol.
XIV; Indianapolis, 19261, 89-127. Quotation is from ibid., 930.
48 Dawson, Historical Narrative, 26.
206
Indiana Magazine of History
Miami Nation being of this or that opinion he must be understood as meaning no more than the Turtle and himself.” Harrison was perplexed as to why his friend had turned on him and,
unable to comprehend Wells’ loyalty to the Miamis, could only
imagine that Wells was jealous of his position.49
Harrison decided to visit Fort Wayne and confront Wells,
but before he could leave Vincennes, he received two letters
from the agent relaying messages from the Delawares expressing dissatisfaction with the Vincennes treaty. The governor
now began to see a grand conspiracy forming, with Wells at its
center. “This man,” he warned Dearborn, “will not rest until he
has persuaded the Indians that their very existence depends
upon rescinding the Treaty with the Delawares and Piankeshaws. My knowledge of his character induces me to believe
that he will go any length and use any means to carry a
favorite point and much mischief may ensue from his knowledge of the Indians, his cunning and his perserverance.” Fearing that his appearance a t Fort Wayne might give Wells and
the Indians a n exaggerated sense of their importance, Harrison
sent his secretary, John Gibson, and Colonel Francis Vigo as
his e m i s ~ a r i e s . ~ ~
Gibson and Vigo found the Indians divided between factions supporting the Vincennes treaty and factions following
Little Turtle-with most of the young warriors opposed to the
treaty. From what evidence they could gather the emissaries
became convinced that Wells was allied with Little Turtle, that
he had urged the Miamis to unite and protect their rights, and
that he obviously was “more attached to the Indians than to
the people of the United States.” After a frigid meeting with
Wells, the two men met with a number of local Indians and
then returned to Vincennes to report to Harrison.51
Frustrated in his hope of using Wells as a tool to dispossess
the Indians, the governor now decided to destroy the agent’s
reputation by accusing him of dishonesty. Wells, Harrison
wrote Dearborn, made more money than any man in the territory, and he quoted Johnston as saying that Wells had cleared
over six thousand dollars in 1804. Harrison, without evidence,
accused Wells of making this money by defrauding the Indians
49 Anson, Miami Indians, 146-48; Harrison to Dearborn, March 3, 1803, in
Logan Esarey, ed., Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison (2 vols.,
Indiana Historical Collections, Vols. I, 11; Indianapolis, 19221, I, 76-84. This
letter is misdated in Esarey; it was actually written in 1805.
5 0 Harrison to Dearborn, April 26, May 27, 1805, in Esarey, Messages and
Letters, I, 125, 133.
5 1 John Gibson and Francis Vigo to Harrison, July 6, 1805, ibid., 141-46.
William Wells
207
of their annuities and by giving favorable government contracts
to friends. If Wells could not be brought into line, Harrison
wanted him removed, not only from ofice but from the territory as well.52
Wells and Little Turtle realized t h a t if they hoped t o
thwart Harrison they would need powerful allies and so sought
the aid of Wilkinson. Little Turtle, through Wells, wrote to
Wilkinson and accused Harrison of contradicting the benevolent policy of Jefferson. Harrison, the chief declared, was creating new chiefs and investing Indians with land titles in order
to facilitate the acquisition of the same lands. Little Turtle had
hoped that the Indians could hold onto their lands until a time
when they could get a better price for them, but their future
welfare had been sacrificed so that Harrison could “make himself a great man at the expense of the Indians.” If only Wilkinson would convey these facts to the president, Little Turtle felt
certain that Jefferson would rectify the injustices. Wells added
that he was “certain that the Indians would wish a war with
the United States rather than sell the lands” if they could
secure foreign aid.53
By including a threat of war Wells overplayed his hand
because the government knew the Indians did not then possess
the resources for an uprising. Although Dearborn agreed to
give the Delawares “a small sum to quit their pretended right
& Title,” he would not budge on the Miami claim, warning
Wells that the government would “not be driven by threats into
any measures of accomadation.” He further warned the agent to
confine his correspondence to the War Department and Harrison and added that if Wells’ attitude did not change he would
be removed.54
Pressure from Harrison’s office was forcing many of the
Indians to comply with the Delaware-Piankashaw treaty of
1804 so that Wells and Little Turtle became increasingly isolated. It was also clear that Jefferson’s sympathy with the
Indians did not run as deep as they had supposed. These facts,
combined with the danger of Wells losing his job, led the agent
and Little Turtle to meet with Harrison at Vincennes in August, 1805, and to assist him in negotiating a treaty by which
Harrison to Dearborn, July 10, 1805,ibid., 147-49.
to Wilkinson, October 6, 1804,enclosed in Wilkinson to Dearborn,
December 13,1804,Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series,
Record Group 107.
s4 Indian Office Letter Book B, pp. 22, 35,438,Records of the Office of the
Secretary of War, microfilm (Indiana State Library, Indianapolis).
s2
s3 Wells
208
Indiana Magazine of History
most of southeastern Indiana was ceded to the government.
Wells and Little Turtle managed to secure all the annuities
from this sale for the Miamis in exchange for agreeing to the
disputed Delaware-Piankashaw treaty. An elated Harrison
wrote Dearborn that he and Wells had “agreed to a general
amnesty and act of oblivion for the past” and that the friendly
disposition of the agent was now assured. Dearborn was not yet
convinced that Wells could be trusted but found Harrison’s
report of a rapprochement “not ~ n i n t e r e s t i n g . ” ~ ~
Wells’ troubles with his employers, however, were far from
over. He and Little Turtle had long been convinced that Indian
survival depended upon their adoption of an agricultural way of
life. When they had visited the capital in the winter of 1801,
Little Turtle had asked that “ploughs and other necessary
tools” be placed in Wells’ hands so that he might teach the
Indians “to reap the advantage of cultivating the Earth.” During the same trip they met with Quaker delegations i n
Philadelphia and Baltimore to request aid in teaching the Miamis to farm.56 As a result, a delegation of Baltimore Quakers
visited Fort Wayne in 1804 and left a young volunteer, Philip
Dennis, to spend the summer with the Indians teaching them
to farm. Dennis found the Indians fascinated by his labors but
unwilling to share in them. Every day groups of warriors would
find seats along the fence or in the trees around Dennis’ farm
and watch him plow and hoe, but they steadfastly refused to
help. In the autumn the frustrated philanthropist harvested his
crops, turned them over to the chiefs, and returned to Maryland.57
Little Turtle realized that his proud people would never
accept the teachings of white strangers; thus, he devised a plan
by which the Miamis would set aside a portion of their annuities for a civilization project if the government would also
contribute funds. Before this plan could be put into operation,
the Baltimore Quakers sent out another such project under
William Kirk, who also received a six-thousand-dollar grant
55Harrison to Dearborn, August 10, 26, 1805, in Esarey, Messages and
Letters, I, 161-63; Dearborn to Harrison, October 11, 1805, ibid., 169-70; Anson,
Miami Indians, 147-48. It is interesting to note that Wells’ counterpart in the
British Indian service, Matthew Elliott, was also distrusted by his superiors
because of his marriage to an Indian and sympathies for the Indian’s plight.
See Reginald Horsman, “British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV (June, 1958), 60-61.
56Hill, John Johnston, 17. For Little Turtle’s views on agriculture see
Volney, View of the Soil, 384-85.
57Tyson, Mission to the Indians, 75-76, 182.
William Wells
209
from the government. Although Wells was displeased at not
being entrusted with the project, he called a council in May,
1807, and attempted to reconcile the Indians to Kirk. It was
useless, however, for Little Turtle and the friendly chiefs were
convinced that Kirk, who had visited Fort Wayne in 1806 and
had learned of Little Turtle’s plan, had presented the project t o
the Quakers as originating with himself. Not only had Kirk
stolen their project from under them, but he had spent over
half the allocated funds before reaching Fort Wayne.58
Those Indians not near Fort Wayne, and especially those
who were falling under the spell of the Shawnee Prophet’s call
for a rejection of white culture, were adamant in their dislike of
Kirk. “We do not need anyone to teach us how to work,” a
Delaware warrior declared. “If we want to work we know how
to do it according to our own way and as it pleases us.”59In the
face of such opposition Wells urged Kirk to delay his plans to
set up model farms at various villages, but the Quaker refused
to listen. Since he could not set up operations at Fort Wayne,
Kirk set out for Five Medals’ Potawatomie village on the Elkhart River. Kirk, with a number of wagons, had proceeded
about sixty miles when he was surrounded by warriors and
forced to return to Fort Wayne. The warriors demanded of
Wells that no more wagons traverse their lands, declaring them
to be symbols of Indian slavery to the white man. Wells was
greatly relieved when Kirk, soon after his abortive wagon expedition, moved his project to the relative safety of the Shawnee villages in Ohio where he hoped to meet with more succemG0
Kirk, before moving, sent a blistering attack on Wells to
the secretary of war and was backed up by Johnston, who now
saw an opportunity to destroy his old enemy. In a private letter
to Dearborn, who was a personal friend, Johnston claimed that
“the civilizing plan has been a source of much profit to Mr.
Wells.” He also asserted that the agent had sabotaged Kirk’s
58Clarence Edwin Carter, comp. and ed., The Territorial Papers of the
United States: The Territory of Indiana, 1800-1810 (Washington, 19391, 469-70.
For an overview of the civilization projects see Paul Woehrmann, A t the Headwaters of the Maumee: A History of the Forts of Fort Wayne (Indianapolis,
1971), 105-41; and Joseph A. Parsons, Jr., “Civilizing the Indians of the Old
Northwest, 1800-1810,” Indiana Magazine of History, LVI (September, 1960),
195-216.
59 Quoted in Lawrence Henry Gipson, ed., The Morauian Indian Mission on
White River: Diaries and Letters, May 5, 1799, to November 12, 1806 (Indianapolis, 19381, 450.
6 o Draper Collection l l Y Y 2 2 ; Woehrmann, A t the Headwaters of the
Maumee, 127.
210
Indiana Magazine of History
work in order to secure those funds for himself. Johnston wrote
to Harrison at the same time, pointing to the Kirk affair as
further evidence that Wells had “so long travelled in the
crooked, miry paths of intrigue and deception, that he never
could . . . pursue a straight, fair, and honorable course . . . .”61
Johnston’s accusations found a receptive audience in Dearborn who rudely brushed aside Wells’ explanation of the affair,
warning the agent that “no subterfuge [would] be admitted to
extenuate the evident impropriety of your conduct . . . At all
events, one or two things must be a fact, either that you
possess no kind of useful influence with the chiefs in your
agency or that you make improper use of what you possess. In
either case you cannott be considered as well qualified for the
place you hold’.’62
While it seems evident that Wells did not overly exert
himself to promote Kirk among the Indians, it is also clear that
he had good reason for his action other than his usual jealousy
of anyone who interfered with his agency. From the first he
doubted Kirk’s honesty, and indeed Kirk was dismissed by
Dearborn in 1808 for misuse of funds. More important, however, was the precarious state of Indian affairs resulting from
the rising influence of the Shawnee Prophet and his brother
Tecumseh. Kirk’s activities only agitated an already sensitive
situation, for by April, 1807, the brothers had assembled over
four hundred Indians at Greeneville, Ohio, causing considerable
consternation along the frontier. Wells’ demand that the Indians disperse was met by Tecumseh‘s haughty reply that he
would have no dealings with a man of such low rank as Wells.
The agent’s requests for instructions from the War Department
were dismissed by Dearborn, whose judgment was so distorted
by his dislike of Wells that he could perceive no danger from
Tec~mseh.”~
61 Johnston to Dearborn, May 31, 1807, Letters Received by the Secretary
of War, registered series, Record Group 107; Johnston to Harrison, June 24,
1810, in Esarey, Messages and Letters, I, 432. For Wells’ defense see Wells to
Eustis, June 25, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered
series, Record Group 107. In a letter to historian Benjamin Drake in 1840,
Johnston agrees entirely with Wells that Kirk failed because of Indian hostility
engendered by the Prophet. Draper Collection llYY22.
62 Dearborn to Wells, August 5 , 1807, Indian Office Letter Book B, p. 326,
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
63Benjamin Drake, Life of Tecumseh, and of his Brother The Prophet
(Cincinnati, 1841), 91-93; Dearborn to Wells, May 15, 1807, Indian Office
Letter Book B, p. 313, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War; Wells to
Dearborn, July 14, 1807, in Carter, Territorial Papers: Indiana Territory,
1800-1810, p. 465.
William Wells
211
Getting no satisfaction from Dearborn, Wells turned to
Harrison, warning the governor that “something must be done
[and] it cannot be done too soon for the Indians are certainly
forming an improper combination . . . .” Even some of the
Miamis were being won over, and Wells reported that “we are
all allarmed at this place [Fort Wayne] my self excepted as I
can see no danger as yet at our doors.” Harrison, in complete
agreement with Wells, went before the territorial assembly to
warn that “at no very distant period we shall be involved in
hostilities with some of the Indian tribes.”64
The Shawnee brothers, however, had no plans to attack the
whites in 1807 because they needed time to gather strength.
Along with the Prophet’s call for cultural purity, Tecumseh
added a more ambitious plan for tribal unity. In order to
achieve this Indian confederation the brothers and their followers used rhetoric, strong-arm tactics, and assassination to quell
Indian opposition. For over a decade the British in Canada had
attempted to disrupt Indian relations to the south, and Tecumseh, who had not forgotten Fallen Timbers, now allied himself
with them. He allowed the British to believe that they had him
under control while he milked them for weapons and supplies.
Both Wells and Harrison were as duped as the British, for they
both underrated Tecumseh’s independence and considered the
British at the bottom of Indian dissati~faction.~~
The crisis ended abruptly in the fall of 1807 when most of
Tecumseh‘s followers returned to their agencies to gather government annuities and spend the winter. Wells, through the
careful manipulation of friendly chiefs, encouraged the Indians
to desert Tecumseh. Thus, by the spring of 1808, when the
Shawnee brothers moved from Greeneville to a camp on the
Tippecanoe River, their following had dwindled to less than one
hundred. The winter of 1807-1808 was hard on the tribes since
so many of the warriors had spent the summer with Tecumseh
instead of hunting, but when Wells requested extra supplies for
them, he was reprimanded by Dearborn. The secretary felt that
64 Wells to Harrison, August 20, 1807, in Esarey, Messages and Letters, I,
239-43, 247-48; Gayle Thornbrough and Dorothy Riker, eds., Journals of the
General Assembly of Indiana Territory, 1805-1815 (Indiana Historical Collections, Vol. XXXII; Indianapolis, 19501, 151.
65 For British policy in this period see Horsman, “British Indian Policy,”
53-59. Wells, Harrison, and the Chicago agent Charles Jouett were convinced of
British complicity. See Wells to Dearborn, August 14, December 31, 1807,
Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107;
and Jouett to Dearborn, December 1, 1807, in Carter, Territorial Papers: Zndiana Territory, 1800-1810, pp. 496-97.
212
Indiana Magazine of History
if the Indians had been idle “they ought to suffer” for it, and to
insure that Wells did not feed them he instructed t5e agent to
consult with Johnston on all agency matters. Dearborn cautioned Johnston t o supervise Wells closely for he had lost
‘Y2onfidence in his Integrity” and now feared that the agent
calculated “on making money by supplying the Indians.”66
Wells had no choice but to comply with Dearborn’s wishes,
although he reminded the secretary that only
liberal treatment” would keep the Indians friendly to the United States.
Realizing that his position was becoming untenable, Wells
asked for permission to bring a number of important chiefs to
Washington. He hoped to be able to clear up matters with
Dearborn and at the same time t o impress the chiefs with the
power of the government. Wells also requested a few months’
leave to visit with his daughters in Kentucky, where they had
been living with Samuel Wells since the death of Sweet Breeze.
Although the agent had kept his two sons with him, one had
been killed in an accident in March, which fact made Wells all
the more anxious to leave Fort Wayne for a while.67
Dearborn agreed to the request, and in September, 1808,
Wells traveled to Washington with his son, William Wayne
Wells, and seven chiefs-Little Turtle and Richardville of the
Miamis, Marpock and Raven of the Potawatomies, Black Hoof
of the Shawnees, Beaver of the Delawares, and Captain Hendrick of the Stockbridges-whom he considered “the commanding trumps of this country.”68 The delegation spent most of
December in the capital visiting with officials and philanthropists. The Indians received no satisfaction from the government regarding their complaints of white encroachment
upon their lands. Jefferson sanctimoniously declared that he
had “always believed it an act of friendship to our red brethren
whenever they wished to sell a portion of their lands, to be
ready to buy whether we wanted them or not . . . .” He warned
66 Dearborn to Wells, March 10, 1808, Indian Office Letter Book B, p. 362,
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War; and Dearborn to Johnston, March
10, 1808, ibid., 361. Wells had been reprimanded before for providing too
generously for the Indians. See Arthur St. Clair to Wells, August 13, 1800,
Northwest Territory Collection; and Dearborn to Wells, March 7, 1803, Indian
Office Letter Book A, p. 334, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
67 Wells to Dearborn, April 2, 20, 1808, in Carter, Territorial Papers:
Indiana Territory, 1800-1810, pp. 540, 555-58; Wells to Dearborn, June 5, 30,
1808, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group
107.
68 Wells to Dearborn, September 30, November 19, 1808, Letters Received
by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107.
William Wells
213
the chiefs to avoid war, gave them a few presents to insure
their loyalty, and sent them on their way.69
Although the trip proved unfruitful for the Indians, Wells
was hopeful that he had convinced Dearborn to continue him as
agent. He had also pointed out to the secretary the many extra
services he had rendered the department without pay. With his
affairs thus seemingly in order he proceeded homeward with
the chiefs. The trip was not an easy one for Marpock who was
constantly drunk and who on one occasion attempted to kill
and eat his wife. To make matters worse the Delaware chief,
Beaver, fell behind the party. The behavior of Marpock made it
impossible for Wells to wait on the Beaver, and he hurried the
delegation back to Fort Wayne.70
The Beaver had purposely lagged behind. He was soon
back in Washington complaining to Dearborn that Wells had
often defaulted on the Delawares’ annuities and that during the
visit he had repeatedly refused to translate complaints about
his agency to officials. Although most of the Beaver’s complaints related to money withheld by order of the government
for horses stolen in 1796, his accusations were the final straw
for Dearborn. As one of his last acts as secretary of war he
discharged Wells and replaced him with Johnston.71
Wells did not receive his letter of discharge until April 12,
1809, as he had visited Kentucky to see his family and renew
his courtship of Mary Geiger, the daughter of an illustrious
family. The two were married on March 7 and soon journeyed
to Fort Wayne, accompanied by Wells’ son and three daughters.
Upon their arrival at the fort, Johnston, who must have relished the occasion, gave Wells his letter of dismissal.72
Even after the dismissal Johnston kept up a steady barrage
of criticism of Wells in letters to his superiors. He proclaimed
the surrounding Indians happy with Wells’ discharge and more
peaceful than ever. Rumors of Indian hostilities, he told the
new secretary of war, William Eustis, were falsely planted by
Wells in order to promote his importance in the territory. He
69Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jeffrson (20 vols.,
Washington, 1907), XVI, 441, 443.
Wells to Dearborn, December 24, 1808, January 16, 1809, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107.
71 Tyson, Mission to the Indians, 192-93; Dearborn to Johnston, January 27,
1809, Indian Office Letter Book B, p. 428-29, Records of the Offce of the
Secretary of War; Dearborn to Wells, ibid.
72 “Jefferson County, Va.-Ky. Early Marriages Book I, 1781-July 1826,” p.
70, typescript (Filson Club); Wells to Eustis, April 29, 1809, Letters Received
by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107.
214
Indiana Magazine of History
gave as his source for this startling information none other
than the Prophet himself. Johnston warned the new secretary
not to believe any endorsements of Wells by “officers taking
sides with him against their government,” for “there does not
exist a worse man.” As the hostile intentions of the Prophet
soon became obvious, and as Wells received endorsements from
Harrison, Wilkinson, and Fort Wayne commandant Nathan
Heald, Johnston’s statements quickly became a source of embarrassment to him.73
Wells was determined to regain his agency and conspired
with various chiefs to discredit Johnston and counteract the
measures adopted by the new agent. This sorry state of affairs,
whereby the two most influential men with the Indians in
northern Indiana attempted to vilify each other before the natives, could not have happened at a worse time. Increased
pressure from white settlement, Harrison’s treaties, and a depressed fur trade had aided the plans of Tecumseh and his
one-eyed brother, and by the spring of 1810 they had collected
a sizable force at their Tippecanoe village. The Wells-Johnston
feud compromised the vital Fort Wayne agency just when a
display of governmental strength and competence was essential. For the first time a large number of Miamis allied themselves with the brothers. They were particularly unhappy with
the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne which forced them to share
payment for land in western Indiana with several other tribes
although the Miamis claimed sole ownership. They were also
displeased to learn that land they had sold one year for two
cents an acre was being sold by the government the next year
for two dollars an acre. By June, 1810, Harrison was convinced
that Indian “envy and jealousy” had ripened into hatred and
that war was possible at any time.74
In his effort to regain his agency Wells had made it a point
to secure the support of Harrison and had rendered the governor “essential services” during the negotiation of the Treaty of
Fort Wayne. As a result, he received an appointment as government interpreter at $365 a year. In securing the job for
Wells, Harrison warned Eustis that “if he is not employed and
73 Johnston to Eustis, July 1, 1809, November 6, 1810, Letters Received by
the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107. Endorsements for
Wells can be found enclosed in Wells to Eustis, June 25, 1809, and in Wilkinson to Eustis, November 27, 1810, ibid. Harrison was surprised by the dismissal and urged Eustis to give Wells a hearing. Harrison to Eustis, October 3,
1809, William Henry Harrison Collection (Chicago Historical Society).
74 Esarey, Messages and Letters, I, 434-35. For the proceedings of the 1809
Fort Wayne treaty see ibid., I, 362-78.
William Wells
215
remains where he is every measure of the Government will be
opposed and thwarted by himself and the Turtle.,’ Wells also
had powerful friends in Kentucky, most notably Senator John
Pope, who applied pressure on Eustis and Harrison. An exasperated Eustis finally turned the whole matter of Wells’ reinstatement over to Harrison.75
In April, 1811, Harrison brought a libel suit against an
Indian trader, William McIntosh, who had accused him of defrauding the Indians. Wells’ testimony in Harrison’s behalf was
instrumental in securing the governor four thousand dollars in
damages. This put Wells securely in Harrison’s good graces,
and the governor immediately informed Eustis that Wells’ “activity and talents need not be doubted” and that he could now
be trusted to resume the Fort Wayne agency. As one politician
to another, Harrison candidly informed Eustis that “Wells has
a number of respectable connections in Kentucky whom I am
anxious to oblige & Mr. Pope and others of the Delegates from
that State to Congress have also interseded themselves warmly
in his favorI’ When a frustrated Johnston resigned the agency
in September, 1811, Harrison appointed Wells as subagent for
the Miami and Eel River tribes along with Johnston’s former
assistant, John Shaw, as subagent for the P o t a w a t ~ m i e s . ~ ~
Wells had little opportunity to reflect on his triumph. The
influence of Tecumseh was creating havoc among the tribes,
with the Miamis evenly divided between the followers of Little
Turtle and the Shawnees. The dissident Miamis, under the Wea
chief Lapoussier, threatened to kill Little Turtle if he continued
to accept American annuities. The old chief, although quite ill,
faced his enemies in a council near Fort Wayne. “Kill me as
soon as you please,” he declared, “I can’t calculate on living
many winters more; but rest assured, kill me when you will, I
75 Harrison to Eustis, October 3, 1809, Harrison Collection; Harrison to
Eustis, December 3, 1809, William Henry Harrison Miscellaneous Collection
(Indiana Historical Society); and Carter, Territorial Papers: Indiana Territory,
1800-1810,p. 708. For Senator John Pope’s role in securing Wells’ appointment
see John Pope to Eustis, January 21, 1811, 623W1811, Letters Received, 18051889, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 94 (National
Archives); and Eustis to Harrison, February 12, 1811, Indian Office Letter
Book C, p. 62, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
76For the McIntosh trial see Cincinnati Western Spy, May 4, 1811; Dawson, Historical Narrative, 175-76; and Harrison to Eustis, April 23, 1811, Harrison Miscellaneous Collection. Also see Harrison to Eustis, January 21, 1811,
623W1811, Letters Received, 1805-1889, Records of the Adjutant General’s
Ofice, Record Group 94; and Eustis to Harrison, September 23, 1811, Indian
Office Letter Book C, p. 99, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War.
William Wells
217
will not die alone.” The dissidents then withdrew to Malden
where they received arms and ammunition from the British.77
It was now evident to Wells that war was inevitable. In
April, 1811, he and John Conner had traveled to the Prophet’s
town on the Tippecanoe to secure evidence concerning murders
on the Missouri River. Tecumseh denied any part in the killings but made it clear to Wells that he meant to stop the white
advance. When Wells scoffed at such a dream, Tecumseh retorted that he would live to see it. Wells’ report on the affair,
and on subsequent Indian depredations, convinced Harrison
that a show of force was necessary. When he learned that
Tecumseh had gone south t o recruit allies, he decided t o
strike.78 Harrison’s army was composed largely of Kentucky
militia under the joint command of Wells’ new father-in-law,
Colonel Frederick Geiger, and his brother, Colonel Samuel
Wells. In the ensuing Battle of Tippecanoe on November 7,
1811, the Indians were driven from the field and their village
destroyed, but the whites suffered heavy casualties. Although
the Prophet’s prestige was damaged, the strength of the Indians
was not materially diminished, and frontier raids increased as
a result of the battle.79
Wells found Harrison’s claim of victory to be ludicrous. He
knew that the governor’s thousand men had faced no more than
350 Indians instead of the seven hundred claimed by Harrison.
When Tecumseh returned from the South in January, he declared his intentions to be peaceful, but Wells correctly foresaw
that the chief was “determined to raise all the Indians he can,
immediately, with an intention, no doubt, to attack our frontiers.”80
In the midst of this crisis Little Turtle died of the gout at
Wells’ home, silencing the most powerful voice of moderation
among the tribes. The chief‘s death cut an important bond
holding Wells to Fort Wayne. He decided to resign the appointment he had worked so hard to obtain and return with his
77 Quotation is from Cincinnati Western Spy, September 28, 1811; see also
Esarey, Messages and Letters, I, 574.
78Harrison to Eustis, June 6, October 29, 1811, Harrison Miscellaneous
Collection.
79Harrison’s report on the battle is in Esarey, Messages and Letters, I,
614-15, 618-30. Also see Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 41-42.
Esarey, Messages and Letters, I, 27; Thornbrough, Letter Book, 111-12.
For once Wells and Johnston agreed. Johnston wrote Eustis that Harrison had
been “outgeneraled and that “the late battle has . . . not conveyed to the
natives any great idea of our prowess in war . . . I’Johnston to Eustis, November 28, 1811, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series,
Record Group 107.
218
Indiana Magazine of History
pregnant wife to Kentucky. When informed of this by Geiger,
Harrison requested Wells to remain at his post since he could
accomplish “more than any other person” during the crisis.s1
Agreeing to Harrison’s plea, Wells sent his children to the
relative safety of Piqua, Ohio, under the guidance of his Shawnee friend James Logan. His wife refused to leave, however,
and remained with him a t Fort Wayne. Soon after the
children’s departure Indians began to gather in force around
the fort, until by August there were over four hundred in the
vicinity. Fearful of an attack, especially after news of the declaration of war on Britain reached them, the whites moved into
the stockade for safety.s2
The nervousness of Fort Wayne’s white population was
shared by the commander of the Army of the Northwest, General William Hull. When, in late July, 1812, Indian scouts
brought Hull word of the fall of Fort Michilimackinac, the
general dispatched a runner to Fort Dearborn (Chicago) with
orders for the post commander, Captain Nathan Heald, to
abandon the fort and march to Fort Wayne or Detroit. A copy
of Hull’s order was sent to Fort Wayne, and Wells read it with
alarm. Since Heald’s wife, Rebecca, was his niece, Wells had
more than a casual interest in Fort Dearborn’s safety. “Affairs
in this quarter are rather gloomy,” Wells wrote Harrison on
August 4. The fall of Michilimackinac and the defeat of a
detachment of Hull’s troops near Detroit had greatly emboldened the Indians. Wells urged Harrison to gather as large a
force as possible and march to Detroit or the Indians would
overrun the settlements. Although he feared it was too late to
evacuate Fort Dearborn, if indeed it had not already fallen,
Wells hoped to cover the garrison’s retreat. On August 8, 1812,
Wells, with Corporal Walter K. Jordan and thirty Miamis, rode
northwest to aid Heald as best he
Arriving at the tiny post on August 13, Wells found the
situation to be critical. A number of whites had already been
murdered, and several hostile chiefs were camped with their
Esarey, Messages and Letters, 11, 33-34, 68-70. Eustis appointed Benjamin F. Stickney as Indian agent at Fort Wayne in March, 1812, and instructed
Harrison to employ Wells elsewhere. This the governor refused to do, believing
it vital for Wells to remain at Fort Wayne. Clarence Edwin Carter, comp. and
ed., The Territorial Papers of the United States: The Territory of Indiana,
1810-1816 (Washington, 1939), 171.
82Griswold,Fort Wayne: Gateway of the West, 54-55.
83 Wells to Harrison, August 3, 1812, William Wells Collection; Milo M.
Quaife, Checagou: From Indian Wigwam to Modern City, 1673-1835 (Chicago,
1933), 122; Prucha, Sword of the Republic, 104-107.
William Wells
219
warriors nearby. Tecumseh had sent runners to inform the
Indians, mostly Potawatomies, that Hull had been defeated at
Brownstown and was besieged at Detroit. From friends among
the Potawatomies Wells learned that warriors under Mad Sturgeon and Black Bird planned to attack the whites as soon as
they left the fort. At a council of officers Wells joined his old
friend, the Indian trader John Kinzie, in urging Heald to make
a stand at Fort Dearborn. But the young captain had his orders, and he would not disobey them. He would abandon the
post on August
In desperation Wells called a council with the Indians. He
and Heald promised to distribute the fort’s stores among them
in exchange for a guarantee of safe passage. The Indians, numbering over five hundred, agreed to this, and on August 14 they
received all the post goods except arms, ammunition, and
liquor, which were destroyed. Many of the warriors were enraged when they realized that the most coveted goods would be
denied them, and they met again in council that night to decide
on a course of action. At the end of the council, a friendly chief,
Black Partridge, met with Wells and Heald at the fort and
returned his government peace medal, sadly declaring that he
could not restrain his warriors from attacking the whitesa5
It was too late to attempt to hold the post even if Heald
would agree to it, and at nine in the morning on August 15 the
garrison marched out of Fort Dearborn. In the lead rode Wells,
dressed as an Indian, his rifle cradled in his arm and a tomahawk and brace of pistols in his belt. Under no illusions, he
had painted his face black as was the Miami custom when
facing certain death. Half the Miami escort rode behind him,
followed by Nathan and Rebecca Heald with the garrison, the
women and children who could walk, and the Chicago militia.
Next came a train of wagons containing baggage, provisions,
and the smaller children. Immediately behind the wagons
marched a squad of soldiers and the remaining mounted Miamis. The entire company numbered less than one hundred.a6
84Milo M. Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1673-1835 (Chicago,
1913), 217-19; and Mentor L. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort
Dearborn Massacre,”Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, XLVI (Winter, 1953), 347-49.
85 Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 219-21.
86 This account of the Fort Dearborn battle is baaed primarily on the story
Darius Heald told Draper and Kirkland. See Draper Collection 23862-65 and
Kirkland, Chicago Massacre, 31-35. Also useful are Draper’s interviews with
Alexander Robinson and Joseph Bourassa. Draper Collection 218285-87,
238194-95. The best known account of the battle is Mrs. John H. Kinzie,
220
Indiana Magazine of History
After a march of about an hour, Wells, riding in advance,
suddenly halted. On a rise of sand to his right hundreds of
Potawatomies were forming in ambush. Jerking his horse
around Wells rode furiously back toward the column, waving
his hat in a circle above his head. No sooner had Wells shouted
his warning than the Indians opened fire, killing many of
Heald’s regulars with the first volley. The soldiers then charged
in among the warriors, who scattered before them. But while
the soldiers drove the Indians from the dunes, another band
attacked the civilians around the wagons. Wells’ Miamis deserted the field, and within minutes all the militia were killed,
leaving the children in the wagons defenseless. Rebecca Heald’s
slave, Cicely, was hacked to death in a futile attempt to save
her infant, who was one of twelve children butchered.
Wells, seeing this slaughter, spurred his horse back toward
the wagons. He never made it, for an Indian bullet crashed into
his chest. Bleeding from the mouth and nose, he managed to
reach the side of his niece before another Indian volley caught
them both, wounding Rebecca and killing Wells’ horse. Pinned
underneath the animal, Wells brought down one more warrior
with his pistol before they were upon him. As Rebecca stared in
horror, one warrior chopped off Wells’ head and placed it on a
lance while another cut open his chest and removed his heart.
Hoping thus to gain the dead man’s courage the warriors divided the heart among themselves and ate it.*’
The tragedy of Wells comes not from his heroic death,
however, but rather from his inability to use his unique position to achieve peace and to implement Little Turtle’s plan to
retain Miami unity and power by the wise sale of some of their
lands. Wells’ failure resulted from factors beyond his control
for, ultimately, he was but the recalcitrant pawn of an expansionist government. During the Indian war he had been a
useful tool, and various government agents had utilized his
Wau-bun, the “Early Day” in the Northwest (Chicago, 1932), 233-87. The account of Corporal Walter K. Jordan is in John D. Barnhart, ed., “A New Letter
about the Massacre at Fort Dearborn,” Indiana Magazine of History, XLI (June,
19451, 187-99. A number of personal narratives appear in appendixes to Quaife,
Chicago and the Old Northwest, which is also the best account of the Fort
Dearborn story.
Kirkland, Chicago Massacre, 31-35. This account of Wells’ death was told
to Darius Heald by his mother, Rebecca Heald. The Kinzie family passed down
a somewhat different version of Wells’ death, but it was not based on eyewitness testimony and seems an unlikely version of what might have happened.
See Kinzie, Wau-bun, 266-67. Captain Heald surrendered what was left of his
command, and, with the help of Black Partridge, he and Rebecca eventually
reached safety.
Courtesy Indiana Historical Society Library, Indianapolis
“DEATH
OF CAPTAIN
WM.WELLS”
ORIGINAL
DRAWING
BY WILLVAWTER
N
N
222
Indiana Magazine of History
skills to implement policy and crush resistance. By 1812, however, Wells had outlived his usefulness. Although he had
adapted to the white style of living and had made a small
fortune, he could not discard his notions of honor and loyalty to
the Miami tribe. He was unable to practice the subtle deceit so
effectively employed by successful federal functionaries like
Harrison and Johnston. His reaction to problems was too
straightforward and open. When Tecumseh‘s power reached a
critical stage, Wells offered to raise a company of scouts and
give battle while Johnston offered to hire an assassin to murder
the chief.88 It is an important difference.
Wells attempted to compromise his beliefs in order to keep
his government position for, besides being profitable, it gave
him some influence over Indian policy. But the divergent goals
of Harrison and Tecumseh, either of which spelled doom for the
Miamis, undercut any hope for peace at the very time that
Wells’ position in the Indian service was in jeopardy. The government, although willing to exploit Wells’ talents, rightly perceived that he was not in tune with the ultimate goal of dispossessing the Indians and refused to follow his advice. Faced with
the dilemma of using Wells, who knew and had great influence
over the Indians but who refused to deal falsely with them, or
of appointing agents of lesser talent but more loyalty to federal
policy, the government chose the latter course. Saddled with
agents who were adversaries rather than defenders, the Miamis
soon lost their lands and were removed to the West.89
Wells had, by 1812, become a disposable asset. Harrison had
already suggested banishing the agent from the territory after
the military crisis had ended. The Potawatomies neatly solved
the government’s problem. In his death Wells displayed the
very characteristics that made him both so useful, and so
dangerous, to the government. At Fort Dearborn, dressed and
painted as a Miami brave, he was little changed from the
youngster who, in 1792, had upbraided a wounded bear for
“playing the part of a coward,” and who swore never to disgrace
his nation but to die “with firmness and courage, as becomes a
true warrior.”s0
**Johnston to Eustis, December 4, 27, 1811,Letters Received by the Secretary of War, registered series, Record Group 107.
89 For Miami removal see Grant Foreman, The Last Trek of the Indians
(Chicago, 1946), 125-32;and Anson, Miami Indians, 213-33.
Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs ofthe Indian Nations, 256.