Traditional Bharat – Modern India
Are India’s domestic social structures and political institutions
fit for a global governance role?
Herbert Wulf*
Paper presented at the 8th Pan – European Conference on International Relations
Warsaw, 18th – 21st September 2013
*Senior Expert Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research,
University of Duisburg/Essen (e-mail: [email protected])
Abstract
India is an emerging power. Is the society prepared for the new global role the
Government of India aspires? The economy is growing but India’s political, social and
economic development has neither been coherent nor smooth and millions of Indians
still suffer from inequalities and poverty. The paper analyses how domestic factors
influence India’s foreign policy ambitions. Section two offers three socio-cultural and
political explanations to facilitate an understanding of the basis of the globally oriented
new foreign policy outlook of the Indian government: (1) the capacity of the society to
integrate tradition and modernity, resulting in the creation of resilient institutions; (2)
the amorphous character of the society that has a distinctive aptitude for vagueness and
improvisation to make things work and (3) the competition and cooperation between
political actors at the national and federal level that has led to establishing a
functioning federalism but also to intensified and partly contradictory developments in
the central and state governments’ relations.
Key terms: foreign policy ambitions, domestic social structures, hybridity, resilient
institutions, improvisation, functioning federalism.
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[Herbert Wulf]
Glossary: a few Hindi terms
babus
bureaucrats
Bharat
India
dalits
underprivileged tribals and low castes
danda
coercive authority
dharma
common good
dharna
sitting and fasting at the doorstep of an offender
gherao
encirclement of politicians
hindutva
Hindu nationalist ideology
jugaad
quick fix, a work-around
license raj
bureaucratic licensing system
Naxalite
Maoists, originated as peasant revolt in the village of Naxalbari
netas
politicians
satyagraha
non-violent resistance
swadeshi
autarchy
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 3
“The broker came here to procure the necessary certificates for these men, in exchange
for the necessary sums of money. With a smile and a hundred-rupee note, he invented
legitimate occupations and respectable business offices for his clients; conjured wives
for unmarried men, and husbands and children for single women. The real-estate
broker was a master of fiction.”
Aravind Adiga, The Last Man in Tower, 2011
“No power on Earth can stop an idea whose time has come. I suggest to
this august House that the emergence of India as a major economic
power in the world happens to be one such idea.”
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India1
1. Introduction: Role Model versus Role Behaviour
India’s foreign policy rested for several decades on two primary and irrefutable
concepts: non-alignment in political and self-reliance and—as far as possible—autarchy
(swadeshi) in economic terms (Nehru 1961, 24). Although these ideals were never fully
achieved, nonetheless various Indian governments, particularly during the Nehru years
until his death in 1964, upheld these principles despite the complex situation with
underdevelopment, a great heterogeneity of the society and the separation of Pakistan
after the end of colonial rule in 1947.
Both the foreign policy concept of non-alliance and economic self-reliance or autarchy
have been given up during the last two decades. The government of India initiated and
implemented a drastic policy transformation. With the changes in international politics
the concept of non-alignment seemed outdated (Thakur 1992, Mazumdar 2011, Ganguly
and Pardesi 2009). And with the dramatic shift towards economic liberalization,
initiated at a time of a deep economic and political crisis in India during the early 1990s,
the concept of self-reliance and protectionism disappeared. At the beginning of the
1990s the inward looking economic approach was given up. Since than, all
governments, whether coalition governments led by the Congress Party or the Hindunationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), pursued the integration of the Indian economy
into the world market rather then self-reliance or autarchy.
The aspirations of the Indian government to play an intensified global role advanced
along with the extraordinary growth of the economy during the last two decades. This is
felt especially in multilateral forums, be they economic (like the WTO or the IMF) or
political (like the UN Security Council, the G20 or BRICS). But an economic success
story alone is not a solid basis for an enhanced global role. Domestic factors are a key
for formulating a foreign policy architecture as well. They can hamper or accelerate the
implementation of a new foreign policy concept. Stability at home and good relations in
the neighbourhood are a corner stone for an enhanced global role. In this paper I will
1
Budget Speech 1991 by the than Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, quoted by Baru (2013, 37).
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[Herbert Wulf]
analyze such key domestic factors and raise the question if India’s social and political
institutions are fit for a bigger global governance role.2 Or has “the fascination with
India's growing economic clout and foreign-policy overtures … glossed over its
institutional limits, the many quirks of its political culture, and the significant economic
and social challenges it faces”, as Indian foreign policy observers claim (Ganguly
2012)? The interesting question is if the social and political institutions are robust and
adaptive enough to contribute to the Indian elite’s ambition for a bigger global role. Or
are these institutions and their capabilities a hindrance or stumbling block in the task of
coping with new challenges?
India’s new foreign policy world is not without contradictions—on the contrary: India’s
political, social and economic development has neither been coherent nor smooth.
Amartya Sen speaks of the first India that looks a lot like California and the second (and
more populous) India that is more akin to sub-Saharan Africa (quoted by Guha 2012,
11). The caste system continues to prevent a possible upward mobility for millions of
people in India. At the same time, the economic dynamic during the last two decades
has given a few dalits a chance to become entrepreneurs and accumulate wealth.3
Most explanations of India’s newly acquired status as a global player and its ambitions
discuss this within a ‘realist’ framework of international politics, assuming that states
are rational actors, pursing their own interest and prioritizing considerations of security,
power and the promotion of their influence. To understand India’s global aspirations,
which contrast so starkly with the enormous difficulties it faces at home and outside its
borders, it is necessary to look deeper than just at the phenomenal economic growth
during the last two decades and India’s ambitious military posture (Balachandran
(2012).
Income inequalities seem to grow and India is still the country with the largest number
of people living in poverty. Obviously, India was not so successful in transforming high
economic growth into poverty reduction and improvement of the livelihood of the
disadvantaged segments of the society. On the contrary, the gap between the poor and
better-off has increased. The country no longer is a basket case. But the economic
growth has not translated into an “inclusive growth” yet (Baru, 2013, 39). Political
scams, cronyism and corruption in licensing and other political-business relations have
led to apprehensions. The dry, primarily economic statistics are reflected in the state of
human development in India. Although the trend of the Human Development Index
(HDI) has increased during the last two decades in India, it is still only at the bottom of
the group of medium developed countries; the latest Human Development Report of
2011 lists India as 134th of 187 countries (United Nations Development Program, 2011)
2
In a separate paper (Wulf 2013) I have analyzed the conceptual basis of Indian foreign policies.
Dalits are underprivileged tribals and people from low caste. A few dalits who have become
millionaires have led to a debate on their chances. But the rise of a few does not appear to be
representative (Iyer, Khanna and Varshney, 2013, 58). See also Guru 2012.
3
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 5
– a rank not to be proud of, given the global ambitions. Obviously there is still a glaring
gap between role model and role behaviour.
India has got a number of security concerns in the neighbourhood since the South Asia
region is abound with conflicts and several of India’s neighbouring countries are
considered failed states. India has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan and stagnating
political relations; the relations with several of the smaller neighbouring countries are
intricate and several conflicts about Indian diasporas, river-water sharing and border
issues exist. And, of course, several problems remain unsettled between India and
China, like territorial claims and China’s invasion of Tibet; the relations between the
two countries are competitive.4 One of the serious challenges for the Indian government
in the immediate neighbourhood is development in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of
the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (Pattanaik 2012). The conflictive
situation requires significant Indian economic and political investment.
But India has not only security concerns abroad. It faces also a few pressing security
challenges at home: (1) Left-wing insurgencies of the Naxalites are considered the most
serious internal threat facing the nation.5 (2) Islamist extremisms and terrorism (partly
connected to Pakistan). Especially the 2008 attack in Mumbai created an “atmosphere
of insecurity in the country, particularly among its vocal urban middle classes, who
abruptly saw themselves at great risk” (Sahni 2012, 3). (3) Ethnically and religiously
based political fundamentalism and militancy (Kumar and Kumar 2010, 17). On the
right of the political spectrum religious fundamentalists, working within the democratic
process, demand a Hindu theocratic state in India, based on hindutva (Hindu familiy).
The political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and some of its sister organizations
fight against the secular, modern, multi-cultural notion of the society and pursue Hindu
chauvinist attitudes.
The reasons for internal unrest are manifold: Among them is the poor role of the state in
providing basic services, protracted and brutal suppression of violence and human rights
abuses and the counter strategies of the state (Khilnani et al 2012, 43-49). Some of the
security threats are closely connected to the contradictory political and economic
developments in the society that have created the “two Indias” of rich and poor,
developed and underdeveloped which act as destabilizers, producing enormous friction
and conflict and resistance by opposing groups (Sahni 2012, 2).
But the various threats and challenges to the security have not led to a breakup of the
country or to a general escalation into violent conflict. On the contrary, the social and
political setting has shown a high degree of resilience. But these threats to the security
and to the cohesion of the nation are by no means minor.
4
5
These issues are addressed in a separate paper by the author (Wulf 2013).
Chadha 2012, 93, quoting a speech of the Prime Minister from 2006.
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[Herbert Wulf]
2. Socio-cultural Explanations: Disorderly but Resilient
Structures
It is widely accepted that foreign policy is strongly influenced by domestic factors.
Decision makers need to consider domestic pressures, challenges and opportunities in
the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The domestic and the
international environment are closely linked. The root causes for the newly discovered
self-esteem and confidence of the Indian elite lie deeper than high economic growth
rates. To understand what the basis of India’s explicitly globally oriented new foreign
policy is, to appreciate its diplomatic efforts towards transcultural cooperation and its
external engagements after decades of insular views, it is necessary to grasp the
political, social, cultural and economic background and the history of the society. In this
section I look at three facets of this society that contribute to and influence the newly
found buoyancy in foreign policy: First, the capacity of the Indian society to integrate
tradition and modernity and forming resilient institutions; second, the amorphous tenet
of the society that has many forms and orientations but a distinctive aptitude for
vagueness and improvisation to make things work; and third, the competition and
cooperation between political actors at the national and federal level that has led to
establishing a functioning federalism with checks and balances and the partly
contradictory forces shaping the relations between the central and states’ governments.
I. Hybridization: Integrating tradition and modernity – Yoga and Wi-Fi
Despite unfavourable conditions as mass poverty, poor chances for the sustainability of
democracy and often voiced worst-case scenarios the Indian Union and the nation state
survived and scenarios for the near to medium future overwhelmingly consider India
now to be a rising power.6
Indian politics comes across to the unfamiliar observer as strange, peculiar, and
sometimes archaic, yet familiar with its democratic processes and institutions. India’s
elite has had a tendency to emphasize the uniqueness of its policy approach. What might
look seemingly similar is yet unexpectedly different (Bilgin 2008). This is the result of
the capability of the Indian society to integrate foreign influence into existing structures
over centuries. Politics in India follows rules and regulations that combine modern and
traditional strands of this complex society. The political elite, mainly political parties
but also art and business, has blended well-established traditions of society with modern
political institutions (of the Westminster-type), inherited by the British (Mitra 2012).
The political elite formed a system that is characterized, to the surprise of many
Western observers, by extraordinary resilient political institutions (Guha 2012, 6).
India’s institutions have proved to be robust, although they have increasingly come
under pressure by personal greed, bribery, nepotism and corruption on a large scale.7
6
7
This section was inspired by Mitra (2012).
Examples on corruption in The Economist (2012), Power Shifts, 29 September,
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 7
Clientelism, patrimonial networks and voting manipulation are an expression of the
deeply ingrained pattern of group privileges in Indian society. Despite this endemic
negative behaviour of politicians and the civil services, democracy is alive and popular;
the majority of citizens take part in democratic elections and the image of a multicultural and secular society is upheld and celebrated (Banerji 2012, 45).
India’s political institutions and conceptual basis are strongly influenced through British
colonial rule. But there are other important roots of current relevance as well. The
Arthashastra, written by Kautily nearly two and a half millennia ago, is a treatise
compared in India often with Machiavielli’s Il Principe. It “distilled all of traditional
Indian thought on the question of good governance, maintained that it was essential for
the king to have coercive authority (Danda), and elaborated in great detail on how this
was to be established with the help of the army, police, and secret service. But it also
stated that the god king had to devote himself to the interests of the people, and that
Danda had to be exercised not arbitrarily but in accordance with laws codified to ensure
fairness, and promote governance for the common good (Dharma)” (Mundle,
Chakraborty, Chowdhury and Sikdar 2012, 42). Kautilya’s theory dealt with influence
and interests of states. This political thinker sanctioned the use of physical force with
the aim of establishing political order; these thoughts are thus “often evoked as an
ancient precursor of contemporary realism” (Shahi 2013, 51).
The contrast to such political notions is Mahatma Gandhi’s concept of satygraha, of
non-violent resistance. Gandhi “sought to assimilate the best of tradition and modernity”
(Prabhu 2012, 139). Mahatma Gandhi’s satyagraha was based on traditional practices
that he used for fighting and succeeding against modern British institutions such as the
colonial administration and the colonial army.
The mixing and merging of culture-specific strands in society is termed hybridization.
The conflation of modernity and tradition is not a recent socio-cultural phenomenon in
India. This hybridization neither began with the modernization of the economy in recent
years, nor with the introduction of socialist (Soviet style) economic planning
mechanisms during the first decades of Indian independence. On the contrary: Mitra
(2012, 140) argues that fusion of art and culture, architecture and politics has occurred
between Islam and Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism already under the rule of the Great
Mughals (16th to 18th century) who had invaded India from Persia. The Indian society
was able to integrate and assimilate the Mughals’ rule into the traditional way of life
without giving up its own identity. The British colonists, masters in divide and rule,
made use of traditional symbols and processes but inserted also new institutions.8
British colonial rule and Indian resistance against it created hybrid institutions based on
www.economist.com/node/21563423/print. Indian newspapers are full of reports on corrupt politicians
or bureaucrats; see for example the reports on the scandal called “Coalgate” (Vaishnav 2012).
Transparency International lists India to be 95th highest in the world of 182
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results/
8 Dalrymple (2003) argues that the British colonists have been more affected in the early period of
colonization by Indian society than vice versa.
8
[Herbert Wulf]
“traditional norms in modern garb” (Mitra 2012, 139). Special forms of Indian politics
(hunger strikes and gherao, the encirclement of politicians, dharna, sitting and fasting at
the doorstep of an offender until the demand is granted) are some of the familiar typical
Indian forms of protest that are combined with modern political methods (election
campaigns, parliamentary debates and hearings, lobbying, judiciary rulings etc.).
The concept of Indian politics is not mimicking the West or catching up with other
countries (although such perceptions do exist in India) but it is primarily a genuine
endogenous process of politics trying to blend the home-grown and the foreign. In
contrast to western concepts Hindu culture tolerates differences, contrasts and
contradictory developments. It “does not require the suppression of difference” (Tickner
2003, 304) and it does not strive for egalitarianism as socialist concepts do. That is, in
short, the basis of Hinduism’s hierarchical caste system with social inequalities, that
emphasizes differences and not social equality or classlessness. Yet at the same time,
since independence, the founders of the nation stressed the need to overcome inequality
and discrimination. Diversity is one of the assets of Indian society. “[I]nstead of
deploring our lack of homogeneity”, writes historian Dharma Kumar, “we should glory
in it. Instead of regarding India as a failed or deformed nation-state we should see it as a
new political form, perhaps even as a forerunner of the future” (quoted by Guha 2012,
15).
The outcome of these complex socio-cultural processes and structures are enduring and
resilient institutions, institutions that are old but that do change at the same time. It is
an “indigenous evolution and resilience of the political and social system,” … the
“cutting edge of the process of self-assertion of Indian society” (Mitra 2012, 141) that
creates the space for its action in foreign affairs. The complex and partly contradictory
developments of anti-colonialism, Indian independence, nation-building, economic
experiments (from Soviet style planning to neo-liberal deregulation), democratic
processes and governance (with rampant corruption), current economic developments
(with high-tech information technology and feudal agricultural structures) and social
differences and divergences (amended by contrasting constitutional norms and
countered by largely rhetorical policies) produced vital hybrid institutions and political
rules and regulations that function—although not always effectively. India is in parts a
third world society and in other parts it has first world institutions (Mitra 2012, 137).
II. Amorphous practices of the “middle way”: Rhetoric and improvisation
India is not only a polymorphous and diverse society (Heinemann-Grüder 2011), the
way the country is run and the way things function is often nebulous, unstructured, and
amorphous. Indians themselves have often mentioned how good they are in planning
but criticized the poor implementation of plans and projects. Gurcharam Das (2006, 4),
an author and political commentator, writing about ‘The India Model’ and the causes of
many failings remarks: [T]he truth is that a mundane inability to implement policy—
reflecting a bias for thought and against action—may have been even more damaging”
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 9
than the underlying ideology. Improvisation to make things work is more advanced,
almost to perfection, than effective implementation; muddling through to solve
problems is a preferred conceptual approach. “[A]s much as formal guarantees
embodied in the constitution and in legislation, it is informal mechanisms of working
together” (Khilnani et al. 2012, 45) that makes the political system functional.
The fluid and amorphous character of society is also reflected in the way the state or the
economy is run. Land reform is a typical example. It has been on the agenda since
independence and is intended to overcome the feudal structures in agriculture. However,
until today it is mostly rhetoric, “making little headway in terms of actual
implementation, but instead direct poverty reduction measures (food programs) to do
something about poverty and not to antagonize the land lords” (Mitra 2012, 142).
Similarly, poverty reduction programs like the National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (NREGA) aim at enhancing the livelihood security of people in rural areas. 9 But the
reality of rural India is that the majority of people in the villages have gained very little
throughout the period of economic liberalization.
Indian politicians and economic planners have an inclination for the “third” or the
“middle way”. This fitted well with the non-alignment policy of not committing to any
of the two opposing systems. The introduction of the economic Five Year Plans,
executed and monitored by the Planning Commission, has a long tradition. The
economic planners merged features of Soviet-style planning but at the same time
capitalist methods of the private sector. The founding fathers of the Indian Union felt,
the economy had to develop in a “third way”, neither socialist nor capitalist. Although
the economic model of industrialization has now been completely changed from the
planned, import substitution oriented outlook to a neo-liberal deregulated economy, the
idea of the Five Year Plans continues to exist and to guide the Indian government in its
economic policy. The Twelfth Five-Year-Plan for the years 2012-17 is currently
underway.
The Indian bureaucracy is another example. The recent series of essays of the British
weekly The Economist summarizes the situation: “The core of the internal problem is
often summed up as ‘governance’. That means, first, politicians (netas) who do not
rule…” Second “babus, bureaucrats working in an ossified system bequeathed by
Britain. Their dead hand explains much of what does not happen day-to-day. The
‘licence raj’ of old may have gone, but much too much of the commanding heights of
the economy are still run—or rather, held back—by officials…Babus have been a
problem since Mughal days, but things have got worse… ‘No civil servant is remotely
interested in pushing something along. There are three years’ worth of pipeline projects
stuck,’ lamented a senior planning official earlier this year.”10 India’s bureaucracy is a
hindrance for economic development. Economic progress in the form of growth is
obvious. But the omnipresent bureaucracy, challenged by the neo-liberal economic
9
http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/home.aspx
The Economist (2012), Aim Higher, 29. September http://www.economist.com/node/21563414.
10
10
[Herbert Wulf]
model, and the inertia shown by the elite towards empowerment of the poor are barriers
to implementing efficient poverty reduction policies.
According to Sanchez (2012, 51) “[i]n the current Indian parliament, of the 543 elected
representatives of the lower house, 158 (29 percent) are currently charged with a
criminal offence.” The renowned constitutional lawyer Palkhivala (1998) remarked: "It
is my firm conviction that it is not the Constitution which has failed the people but it is
our chosen representatives who have failed the Constitution.” Sagar (2009, 812) offers
an interesting socio-cultural explanation for the way the society functions: “India’s
political elites lazily circumvent the norms advocated by the very same systems. In this
case, their behaviour is akin to that of ordinary Indians who bemoan the chaos of India’s
streets, even as they ignore traffic signals themselves.”
The gap between plans and implementation is not new, it is an often-occurring feature
in Indian politics. “The socialist dream of the Nehruvian era was high on optimism but
failed to fulfill and satisfy the hopes and expectations of ordinary people. State
institutions do advocate people-centric development but the control and interest of the
dominant classes and castes hardly allowed it to happen” (Wankhede 2012, 40).
Actions and practices are often fuzzy, out of focus, indistinct and vague. Sagar (2009,
812) concludes: [T]here is an undeniable sense in which the operative mentality in
general has been that of jugaad, a colloquial Indian term that roughly translates as ‘a
quick fix’ or ‘a work-around’. This mentality can be traced to India’s uneven encounter
with modernity: the forms and institutions have been imported or grafted on, but the
spirit of modernity, an innate appreciation of rational thinking, has not taken root.” As
argued in the section above, new institutions have been conflated with traditional
existing structures. This is both the strength of the society but at the same time a burden
for an economy that competes in the global market.
Addressing the adverse consequences of failures in governance is a challenge both to
India’s future economic development as well as its foreign policy. High economic
growth rates alone cannot be a guarantee for an enhanced global role. The conclusion
that Dahiya and Behuria (2012, 220) draw regarding India’s role in the region can also
be applied more generally: “India lacks the capabilities to deliver timely on promises
made at highest levels ... A lot of this had to do with sorry state of coordination within
the country. India will need to improve its project management skills, coordination
mechanisms, and delivery capabilities to establish its credibility.”
III. Functioning political institutions: Federalism balancing centralism
1. Keeping the Union, building a nation state
From the days before its independence India has been faced with threats of separatism
and the breakup of the subcontinent into different states. Aspirations for cultural and
linguistic homogeneity and for economic autonomy have led to the breakup of old and
the creation of new federal states within the Indian Union. But the establishment of new
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 11
states and the partition of old ones have not resulted into ‘balkanization’ of India (Beck,
Destradi and Neff 2010). Regionally based parties and politicians continue to voice their
aspirations for more autonomy or further partition of states. Despite serious threats of
separation on the left and by sectarians of Hindu nationalism on the right, the country
has remained one nation and is not likely to break up or to become a Hindu state.
Already before independence the Constituent Assembly reached a general consensus
towards building India as a nation and, despite differences on the issue of centralization
versus federalism, ultimately “a healthy compromise was arrived at, to ensure a balance
of power between the Centre and States and the Constitution described India as a 'Union
of States' implying that its unity is indestructible” (Singh and Misra 2012, 2). A
vigorous system of checks and balances and countervailing forces between centre and
regions was established (Mitra 2012, 138; Sahni 2012, 23).
The constitution prescribes institutional arrangements for a balance of power between
the centre and the federal states, as for example the position of the Governor of the state,
who is authorized by the central government and who has extraordinary powers at times
of crisis. Also the Supreme Court “enjoys considerable esteem and broad-based
competence in the examination of constitutional correctness” (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2012, 8). Heinemann-Grüder (2012, 142) analyses the federal conflict management of
India and concludes: “In general, its federal system proved to be adaptive, pragmatic
and innovative; trust in the federal institutions is high.”
Foreign policy has always been and still remains the prerogative of the centre, or more
precisely, the privilege of the executive. Parliament plays a marginal role in foreign
affairs. The complex, continent-sized democracy is often self-absorbed with its internal
politics and quarrels among the many political parties. Foreign affairs are rarely a factor
in domestic politics (except for differences with China and Pakistan) and they play
hardly a role in the electoral politics of India (Ghosh 1994, 816). In the 28 Indian
federal states and the additional autonomous regions domestic, provincial and even local
factors usually determine the outcome of elections, but at the same time can these local
factors affect foreign policy decisions.
Globalization has added new challenges to the finely tuned centre-state relations also
with regard to foreign policy. Social movements contest the legitimacy of the nationstate governance system in many countries of the world and other non-state actors
(industry, trade and finance organizations) pursue their own business interests abroad,
usually with the consent and support of governments. NGOs act as guardians of civil
and minority rights, as promoters of ecological concerns and force their governments to
consider their requests. Indian foreign investments abroad have increased substantially
during the last two decades and often the flag followed trade.11
11
This aspect is not dealt with in this paper. Suffice it to say that many of the Indian NGOs are poorly
institutionalized and often fragmented. There are however also NGOs who’s voices are recognized by
the government. Indian economic engagements of the private sector led to strengthening the diplomatic
12
[Herbert Wulf]
Two other challenges call the well-established centre-state balance into question: (1) the
strong domestic trend of emphasizing local, regional and cultural particularities that led
to engagement of federal states in international relations issues and (2) related to
globalization and particularly a result of the economic liberalization program of the
1990s: the transformation of power equations between the centre and the state
governments in India due to economic changes (Mazumdar 2011, 175). These
tendencies encompass both centrifugal and centripetal forces.
In addition to the economic issue, linguistic and ethnic diversity as well as cultural
differences and varying historical experience have raised questions on the role of the
central government.
2. Party politics and regional assertions
The decade following the defeat of the Congress Party in the national elections in 1989
was a period of great political instability. Between 1989 and 1998 five national elections
were held and six different governments, some of them very short-lived, came to power.
The political scene had changed from the dominant party system under Nehru with
Congress in power. Instead, coalition governments had to be formed, regionally based
and state-level parties emerged, often with a regionally and caste-based program. Their
popularity gains usually came at the expense of nationally oriented parties (Mazumdar
2011, 172). The number of political parties has multiplied and their diversity and
fragmentation is a reflection of the heterogeneity of the society (Béteille 2013, 37).
Today’s multi-party system in India is fragmented and a constant struggle and
competition between centralization and more autonomy for the regions puts pressure on
the authority of the central government. Regionally based parties claim more
independence from the national government. There are only two parties with nationwide reach, Indian National Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party, despite some other
parties calling themselves ‘national’ that are, however, operating largely at a state
level.12 “States are the solution to India’s policy dilemmas, but also the problem. When
India’s central government is unwilling or unable to take action on policy reform, its
states are often heralded as the solution to gridlock or ‘policy paralysis’ because Indian
federalism gives the states considerable space for policy innovation” (Vaishnav 2012).
Many of the parties, including the Indian National Congress and the Communist Party,
have split into competing parties, a tendency that has become endemic in India. This
situation has led to frequent power transfers at both the central government and in many
states. “Floor-crossing” by parliamentarians who switch from a party in power to the
opposition, often for personal gain, has destabilized governments. In such situations,
activities of the Indian government, for example in Africa and Latin America (Destradi and Küssner,
2013).
12
The Communist Party India (CPI) is recognized by the Election Committee as a national party.
However, ideological rifts led to a split within the party and the establishment of the Communist Party
India (Marxist), CPI(M) in the 1960s. The influence of the communists varies greatly from state to
state.
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 13
when party leaders are concerned about staying in office, their power and ability to
decide in foreign affairs is severely hampered. Weak minority governments at the centre
have usually not been forthcoming in foreign affairs (Mazumdar 2011, 172).
Internal dynamics of coalition governments have had effects on important foreign
policy matters. Overall, coalition governments at the national as well as federal level
have been working successfully, with certain ups and downs; the democratic institutions
have contributed to make the largest democracy of the world a functional and vibrant
democracy, despite some serious flaws.
3. The increasing role of the federal states in foreign policy
State governments are increasingly active on issues and in areas of their concern that are
considered to be the prerogative of the central government. At the same time, the centre
engages in programs that are the genuine task and mission of the federal states. The
centre-state relations are changing; however, it is not unidirectional in favour of the
centre or the states. Apparently domestic political and economic forces are pulling in
opposite directions and it is open if there will be more or less decentralization. But it
seems clear, if the present trend continues, that the central government will have to
observe in her foreign policy approach more than before the interests of the states.
This is not entirely new. The state governments of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir
have always influenced India’s relations with Pakistan. Regional factors and interests of
states have played an important role in such conflictive events as the decolonization of
Goa to throw out the Portuguese in 1961, the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan or
the fight of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
A regional Tamil Nadu-based party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), has been
an important ally in the Congress-led government at the centre for many years. The
party has strongly influenced politics in Tamil Nadu and had once fought for an
independent Tamil state, a free ‘Tamil Eelam’, an independent Tamil homeland that was
the goal of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers were considered a terrorist
organization in India. Coalition government politics complicated the position of the
central government that wanted to contribute to a non-violent solution of the civil war in
Sri Lanka. The DMK, although loyal to the coalition government, limited the options of
the central government in its Sri Lanka policies (Mazumdar 2011, 173).
Especially the states at the Indian borders have become more pro-active in cross-border
matters. The government of West Bengal negotiates with Bangladesh on water issues,
Tamil Nadu wants to impose economic sanctions against Sri Lanka, Jammu and
Kashmir and Punjab want to be part of the negotiations of the central government with
Pakistan on water issues (Singh and Misra 2012, 1). Foreign policy is increasingly
required to consider local, state and regional demands to satisfy the coalition partners.
Economic issues too contain push and pull factors in the centre-state relations and it is
not clear whether this leads to centralization or further federalization. The issue of
14
[Herbert Wulf]
developed states (like Punjab, Maharashtra, Karnataka and Kerala) and backward states
(like Orissa, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) has exacerbated the desire of some states to ask
for more fiscal autonomy. State governments have for example initiated negotiations
with foreign investors or even international financial institutions like the World Bank
(Kirk 2011). At the same time state governments oppose investments of foreign
companies in retail business in order to protect their domestic industry (Singh and Misra
2012, 1, Ganguly 2012). Apparently economic forces are pulling in opposite directions.
State governments insist on more fiscal authority, but at the same time the central
government engages more in social programs that are the privilege and the duty of the
state (Rath 2013, 70). State governments get more authority in some sectors and the
central government interferes in the competencies of the state in others.
3. Conclusion
The enthusiasm about India’s economic growth has pushed some of the structural
societal deficits of the society somewhat into the background. Economic growth has
been extraordinary; investments into the armed forces are staggering. But the economic
growth has benefited primarily capital and skill-intensive production; thus, the high
growth rates did not remove structural unemployment and did not bring much benefit to
the agricultural sector.
The large public sector remains bureaucratic and highly regulated and still seems not up
to the mark, although ‘fat’ has been cut in the reform process. Entrepreneurs are
confronted with “antiquated legal regimes and idiosyncratic rule-making” of the
administration (Ganguly 2012). Corruption is a serious domestic problem at various
levels; this is why India ranks high on the list of corrupt societies. Law enforcement in
India is poor and the judicial system is overburdened with legal cases but also reputed
for its lack of neutrality. Yet, civil rights are guaranteed; the press is free and antidemocratic forces are almost non-existent. The Prime Minister is aware of the
importance of the domestic situation for India’s foreign policy. “There cannot be a
disconnect between domestic capabilities, national aspirations, and external policies”
(quoted by Baru 2013, 37 and 41). Clearly, “the foundations of India’s success will …
depend on its developmental model” (Khilnani et al 2012, 7).
India has been a recognized leader of the Non-Aligned Movement but since this
movement is less relevant today, India’s reputation as a speaker of the “South” has also
changed. During Indira and Rajiv Gandhi’s premiership India lost its international
political clout and became a marginal player outside the South Asia region. What is
different today is that the country “is now widely believed to be a potential economic
superpower, a political counterweight to China, and a probable permanent member of
the UN Security Council” (Tripathi 2011, 63 - 64).
Along with the enhanced and growing international role, the Indian government is likely
to cooperate on certain global governance issues (for example on nuclear nonproliferation and on solving the internationals financial crisis) whereas other issues are
[Traditional Bharat – Modern India] 15
likely to remain contentious. The Indian government continues to articulate its
displeasure on actions affecting the sovereignty of other nations (like the NATO
intervention in Libya in 2012) and it cannot be expected that the discussion on global
climate change will be advanced by forceful Indian contributions, unless the
industrialized countries bear the share for which they are responsible in environmentally
dangerous emissions.
It seems the society is in the process of reform; economically and socially there are still
numerous problems to be tackled. What is needed is not so much a “rebranding”13 of
India but substantial structural reforms to overcome not only the image of
underdevelopment but actually achieving reduction of poverty and significant lessening
of social inequalities. India’s socio-cultural structures have proven over many centuries
to be resilient and adaptive; these social and political institutions are a good basis for an
enhanced global role. The Indian government has gained an excellent reputation in the
international political arena. Its soft power (Wagner 2010) and its civilisational message
is mainly positively received. But some domestic structures are still lagging behind the
foreign policy ambitions in today’s world. Or as a former Indian ambassador phrased it:
“The current gap between modern India and traditional Bharat will have to be bridged to
the extent possible …” (Tripathi 2011, 67).
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