Iran: Revolutionary History and Political Evolution
Karl Casteel Schroeder
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Summer 2009
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satisfactory in scope and quality for the degree of Master of Arts in Diplomacy and
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2
Table of Contents
Introduction
p. 3
Chapter 1: The Islamic Revolution and its Legacy
p. 6
Chapter 2: The Iran-Iraq War; Revolutionary Consolidation and Destruction
p. 40
Chapter 3: Iran’s Nuclear Program Past and Future
p. 57
Chapter 4: Iran’s Post-Revolutionary Political Development
p. 95
Conclusion
p.127
3
Introduction
Diplomatic relations with Iran after the Islamic Revolution have proved to be one
of the most difficult tasks for the international community and especially the United
States of America. A lack of understanding of Iran’s recent history and political
developments within Iran has led many policymakers to take a rigid and unyielding
approach to Iran; an approach based on rhetoric and threats. This kind of rigid approach
is ineffective because Iran has undergone a tremendous amount of change social and
political since the revolution and has caused many missed opportunities for better
relations with Iran. Under the leadership of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and
to a greater extent President Seyed Mohammad Khatami Iran was ready to engage in
productive international relations, but this was largely ignored by American
policymakers. To a certain extent many American policymakers have a frozen view of
Iran which fails to recognize political and social change in Iran and is conditioned by the
Islamic Revolution and more specifically the hostage crisis. Understanding the Islamic
Revolution is paramount to understanding modern Iran, but one must also look past the
revolution and recognize developing social and political trends in Iran.
The Iran-Iraq War is another important event in the development of modern Iran.
While the war has all but been forgotten in the Western world it still has a tremendous
affect on Iranian society and especially Iran’s international relations; it breed a great
distrust of the international community. The Iran-Iraq War helped consolidate Iran under
clerical rule by giving the clerical elite an opportunity to consolidate their power while
the nation was focused on the war, but also threatened the revolutionary government as it
4
dragged on. The war grew increasingly unpopular as the casualties piled up and the war
was locked in a brutal deadlock. The Iranian public and policymakers were very
surprised by the international communities’ response, or in the case of the use of
chemical weapons lack of to response to the Iran-Iraq War. The human and economic
losses of the war were immense and Iran is still dealing with them as the war is still fresh
in most peoples’ memory. At least 300,000 Iranians died in the war and over 500,000
1
were injured. The economic damage to Iran was also massive as it is roughly estimated
that Iran incurred 500 billion dollars in war damages including lost oil income and
2
damage to Iran’s oil fields. Iran’s government through propaganda also makes sure that
the war is not forgotten. In order to understand Iran’s reluctance to engage the
international community one must comprehend the Iran-Iraq War and its legacy.
Iran’s developing nuclear program is one of the international communities’ most
pressing concerns. The potential of the Islamic Republic having nuclear weapons is
terrifying to many. In order to understand the nuclear issue one must look at the history
of Iran’s nuclear program including the international communities’ initial support for
Iran’s nuclear program and the debates of the necessity of the nuclear program in Iran.
Iran’s perceived need for a nuclear program which is not universal within Iran and
especially nuclear weapons need to be addressed. Rather than simply condemning Iran’s
nuclear development and issuing threats a constructive diplomatic approach must be
taken. Iran becoming a member of the nuclear club is not a forgone conclusion and there
is still possibility of halting its development or safely managing Iran’s nuclear
1
Staff Writer, Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) Global Security Military section
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm
2
Hunter (1992), p. 55
5
development. Iran has a lot of economic problems and outside threats; constructive
diplomacy can steer Iran’s nuclear development.
Many American policymakers have viewed Iran as a monolithic evil (ignoring
shifting political and social trends) that must be constrained, but there is a tremendous
amount of internal dissent in Iran. Iran is a politically competitive society and factions
are constantly fighting for influence it is certainly not monolithic. Iran’s elected officials
since the revolution have shown that Iran continues to modernize and progress. While
the clerical elite have blocked many of the elected officials’ reforms there have still been
many missed opportunities to constructively engage Iran. The struggle between the
clerical elite and reformers shows that there is dissent and clerical victory will not always
be a foregone conclusion. Iranian leaders have had difficulty reaching out to the
international community and especially the US because of static views of Iran.
Constructive diplomacy with Iran is only possible if there is an understanding of the
political trends in Iran. Iran is an extremely complex nation given its history and internal
political dissent and an understanding of its history must be combined with current
developments. Reconciling Iran’s history with its current developments will go a long
way in improving relations with Iran. It is necessary to examine histories’ affect on the
politics of Iran and recognize that improved relations with Iran have been possible and
will continue to be possible in the future.
6
Chapter 1: The Islamic Revolution and its Legacy
The Islamic Revolution is still the most important development in modern Iran
and still defines the nation internally and in the international community. The Islamic
Revolution not only profoundly changed Iran and its government, but also changed how
Iran was dealt with by the rest of the world. The revolution was seen as a great threat to
stability in the Middle East and in the early years of the revolution Iran sought to export
the revolution throughout the Middle East, that is encourage other nations to follow its
example. Exporting the revolution has been largely unsuccessful, but the Islamic
Republic has had a profound affect on the world. Western nations and especially the US
were not prepared for the revolution and it was a great shook to the international
community. Much of the revolutionary spirit in Iran has died and many in the younger
generation have no memory of the revolution, as it took place before they were born or
when they were very young. Despite the decline in revolutionary spirit the legacy of the
revolution still is paramount in understanding Iranian politics and culture and it is still the
most important development in modern Iran. The election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as
Iranian president has shown that the legacy of the revolution is still strong as he has tried
to revive the spirit of the revolution.
Prior to the Islamic Revolution Iran was a constitutional monarchy, although
almost all power was in the hands of the Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. During World
War II the Allies feared the Reza Shah’s close ties to Nazi Germany. This caused the
occupation of western Iran by the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, following this
occupation, in September 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate his throne and his son
7
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi became Shah and would remain in power until the revolution.
Under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Iran was a close ally of the US and was seen as a
stable nation in a turbulent region. Prior to the revolution most Western observers of the
Iranian political scene attributed the Shah’s stability to the power of the Imperial Armed
Forces and their allegiance to the Pahlavi monarchy. Even two months before the
revolution Western military analysts expressed confidence in the Imperial military’s
3
unmitigated loyalty to the Shah. There were some warning signs to the instability of the
Shah’s control over the nation such as growing clerical opposition to the Shah but it was
a tremendous surprise to most of the world. The revolution’s effectiveness is a reflection
of Iranian politics, factional and prone to sudden changes.
Another organization that helped repress political dissent in pre-revolutionary Iran
was the SAVAK which is a contraction of Farsi words for security and information
organization. The SAVAK was an intelligence agency that was formed in 1957 with the
help of the CIA and Israeli intelligence agency. The SAVAK was originally formed to
monitor the Tudeh party, a communist group as there was fear of the group’s communist
influence on the nation, but it expanded its activities to gathering intelligence and
crushing the regimes’ opponents. There is almost no documented evidence of the
SAVAK’s activities, but it is estimated that they executed thousands. The SAVAK
operated with impunity and even had its own prison in Tehran and suspected prisons
throughout the country to house the thousands that were deemed a threat to the regime.
SAVAK agents were even stationed in the US to monitor Iranian students studying
abroad. The SAVAK was feared by the Iranian public and increasingly became a symbol
3
Parvin (1988), p. 15
8
of the Shah’s repression. The SAVAK was effective at keeping the Iranian public
terrified and crushing opposition to the Shah. After the revolution members of the
SAVAK suffered reprisals for their brutal repression and many were purged and
executed.
Ruhollah Khomeini was one of the most vocal critics of the Shah and his ties with
the US. In 1963 riots erupted in several cities over Khomeini’s arrest, who had
previously been an unremarkable religious jurist. Khomeini had been critical of
immunity laws which exempted US military from prosecution in Iran. These laws
reminded nationalists of capitulation under the Qajar’s Reza Shah when Iranian leaders
would sell parts of the nation in order to fatten their own pockets. Khomeini captured
people’s concern and anger in this statement; ―They have sold our independence reduced
us to the level of a colony, and made the Muslim nation of Iran appear more backward
than savages in the eyes of the world‖. Khomeini was able to combine nationalism which
was always a strong force and Islam and show that Iran’s national interest and Islam were
under attack by the Shah and the US. All of the national exposure that Khomeini got as a
result of his criticisms and arrest in 1963 catapulted him into the upper echelon of clerics,
and he was portrayed as a religious and political leader.
Adding to Khomeini’s claim that the Shah was selling the nation was the fact that
the US offered Iran a 200 million dollar loan on the same day that the military immunity
4
law was ratified. This gave the impression that the Shah was selling the US military
immunity for a 200 million dollar loan. On November 4, 1964 Khomeini was sent into
exile. The US embassy considered the Khomeini’s exile ill-timed and feared that it
4
Ansari (2006), p. 53
9
5
would give more currency to nationalist propaganda. Khomeini was exiled to Iraq, but
was able to still be an influential cleric. Khomeini was later exiled to France in 1978
from Iraq in an effort to better Iran-Iraq relations. While Khomeini was in exile in both
Iraq and France he sent pamphlets and cassettes back to Iran and kept up communications
through telephone. Even though Khomeini was in exile he remained the most vocal critic
of the Shah and his relations with the US and Israel. While in France Khomeini got a lot
of media coverage which allowed his message to be heard by the world and damaged the
Shah’s reputation in the international community.
Iranians were in search of an identity at the time and a nationalist Islamic
movement was appealing to a wide section of Iran’s public. Khomeini was also the first
cleric to actively rally student support for his movement. Throughout the 1960s and
1970s Iran’s economic growth and the Shah’s suppression of dissent through the use of
the SAVAK was effective at covering the emerging cracks in his power base. After the
economic oil boom in the 1970s it was clear that the economic development did not
benefit a large portion of Iran’s population. The Shah spent much of Iran’s newly
acquired wealth on top of the line American military equipment and grand projects to
show Iran’s economic development to the rest of the world, but little money was actually
reinvested into Iran’s economy. The Shah was spending most of Iran’s oil proceeds on
foreign products channeling the money away from the Iran’s economy. The Shah was
damaging the Iranian economy and thwarting Iran’s potential for economic growth that
should have been coming from the oil boom. In an attempt to stop the Shah’s greedy
spending bank and oil workers went on strike and the economy plummeted, the oil strike
5
Ansari (2006) p.55
10
having cut the barreling of oil from 6 million a day to 1.1 million a day.
6
The Shah was
also increasingly being seen as an agent of America and Khomeini’s anti-American
message was becoming more appealing to a large portion of Iran’s population.
Khomeini was an innovative leader and was very in tune with the political
environment in Iran. In many ways Khomeini was progressive he took a proactive
approach to politics and rallying support for his beliefs, many clerics believed that clerics
should not get involved in politics. Khomeini was influenced by leftist politics even
Marxism. Khomeini believed that it was the duty of clerics to get involved with politics
and protect the public from corrupt politicians when Islam was being threatened.
Khomeini was disdainful of popular will in that he believed in a strict interpretation of
Islam where clerics were religious and political leaders; yet he was able to unite a wide
array of factions and get what he needed out of them with his proactive approach to
politics and his charisma. Khomeini was very politically astute and understood
developing trends in Iranian society. Islam is a huge part of Iranian society, but the Shah
was encouraging a more secular society. The Shah was anti-religious and was leading
Iran towards westernization where religion was separate from politics. The Iranian
public had also had a history of distrusting foreign involvement from the hatred of
England and Russia and their influence. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Iran was
becoming more connected to the US; with increased cooperation with the US including
Richard Nixon and the Shah’s close relationship and cooperation with the US in
developing Iran’s nuclear program. There were also more Americans in Iran (over
40,000 prior to the revolution) which was also a concern of many Iranians.
6
Fischer (1980), p. 200
11
Khomeini was a hard-line cleric he believed in a strict interpretation of Islam, but
would also discard tenets of Islam when they did not fit his means. Khomeini would
borrow from secular philosophy and was able to integrate Islamic principles, Persian
7
nationalist themes and leftist concepts into a seamless narrative. Khomeini also took
some more modern views which made his ideology appealing to the younger generation,
including stating that Islam was not against the advance of technology. By utilizing a
wide variety of influences and interpreting Islam to his own means Khomeini was able to
gain the support of sections of society that would not usually support an Islamic
government. Few could probably envision the repressive government that would result
from the revolution. Khomeini’s use of new ideas and interpretations were in line with
the tradition of Shia Islam to allow Ayatollahs a great deal of independent reasoning in
their views. Khomeini was also able to transform Islam into an anti-Western and
especially anti-American ideology, through the use of sacred symbols and Iran’s history
8
of struggle with foreign infidels. Khomeini was able to frame the West and especially
the US as an enemy of Islam; Islam and its values were under attack from westernization
and the Shah dictating that people needed to defend Islam. Iran had certainly had a
history of anti-Western thought, but this was merely a reaction to Western intervention in
Iran’s affairs. Khomeini was able to transform Islam into an anti-Western religion, which
makes constructive dialogue and diplomacy much more difficult.
Khomeini also transformed Islam into a more activist religion. Prior to
Khomeini’s teachings many Muslim clerics and Muslims believed that everything was
7
8
Takeyh (2006), p. 15
Takeyh (2006), p. 18
12
predestined and part of a grand plan that they could not and should not try to affect.
Khomeini provided legitimization for the idea that it was permitted for man to facilitate
his own fate and champion the cause of Islam on the international scene. Khomeini
applied this principle to all society, not only did Muslims have the right to facilitate their
9
own fate, but they had a duty as Muslims to do so. This principle was further
bastardized and used as an excuse to utilize terrorism as a tool to further the objectives of
Iran and Islam; as seen by the way Khomeini supported and prolonged the hostage crisis
and Iran’s initial efforts to export the revolution (both to be discussed later in this chapter
and chapter 4). This kind of Islamic mission absolves those who are supposedly acting in
the interest of Islam from any blame for there actions, as they are simply performing their
duty as Muslims. This tremendous departure from traditional Islam can certainly be seen
today in radical Islamic groups, and is another of the legacies of Khomeini that will be
difficult to overcome.
Third world politics were also commanding more attention on the international
stage during this time; that is the cause and affect of international development and
reasons behind the struggles of underdeveloped nations. There was a great deal of antiimperial sentiment developing, as the affects of imperialism were studied more and Iran’s
history of foreign intervention fed into this developing trend. Khomeini was acutely
aware of these developing trends and was able to capitalize on them with his brand of
politicized Islam. Khomeini even studied and utilized Marxist and communist ideology
as this was also gaining prominence. Khomeini paid lip service to a wide array of
political thought even though he believed in a strict Islamic government controlled by
9
Shay (2005), p. 18
13
clerics. Few other Iranian clerics at the time were as politically minded as Khomeini and
his approach seemed fresh to a wide array of the Iranian public. Khomeini was a
charismatic leader that was in tune with emerging political and social trends and emerged
on the scene at the right time.
By the time of the revolution almost all power was in the hands of the Shah as he
continued consolidating his power and attempting to modernize Iran following Western
models. The political system was nothing like the system envisioned by the 1906
Constitution. There was a lack of real political debate in Iran which helped unit a wide
10
array of opposition forces.
There was also a lot of economic problems which helped
facilitate the revolution; there was waste of the tremendous influx of oil wealth,
ineffective industrialization (lack of heavy industry), neglect of rural areas and regional
11
disparities and income gaps and social inequalities.
The Shah was spending a
tremendous amount of money on weapons and grand projects which benefited few. Prior
to the revolution the Shah had been able to balance competing factions within Iran by
playing them against each other. This had allowed the Shah to maintain power even
though there was factional dissent. The Shah’s web of competing factions was becoming
increasingly complex and difficult to maintain and eventually collapsed under its own
weight.
12
The Shah had also attempted an ambitious program to modernize Iran which was
dubbed the White Revolution; this program was encouraged by the US to keep Iran from
10
11
12
Hunter (1992), p. 30
Hunter (1992), p. 45
Anderson (2000), p. 34
14
succumbing to communism. The White Revolution was a wide sweeping set of
programs; the most important was land reform which sought to end feudalism. Land was
redistributed from feudal lords to peasants. Part of the goal of the land reform was to
woo peasants support away from clerics to the Shah. Other parts of the White Revolution
included; nationalizing forests and pasturelands, privatizing government owned
enterprises, profit sharing for industrial workers, extending the right to vote to women,
creating literacy, health, reconstruction and development corps, creating the House of
Equity and arbitration councils, (to settle local disputes) nationalizing water supplies,
promoting reconstruction and modernization, education and administrative reforms,
giving workers the right to purchase shares in industrial complexes, price stabilization,
free compulsory education and free meals at school and for needy mothers and children,
rent controls and fighting government corruption. The White Revolution was an
extremely ambitious and far sweeping program that sought to overhaul Iranian society.
Although some benefited from the reforms many did not it also alienated powerful
sections of society including clerics and feudal lords that lost their land and many of the
programs were plagued with corruption. Clerics were angered at the unabashedly secular
design of the reforms and were particularly upset about granting women the right to vote.
Given Iran’s tremendous economic growth the White Revolution should have
been more successful. Even after the enormous influx of oil money Iran was never able
to build a viable industrial base. This lack of industrial base still plagues Iran as oil
profits make up a vast majority of the Iran’s economy. The enormous amount of cash
that entered the economy causes rapid inflation as the economic growth was not managed
in a realistic manner. Many Iranians were alienated by the Shah’s attempt to follow
15
Western models of development ignoring Iran’s Islamic heritage and much of the money
was not wisely spent. The fact that the reforms of the White Revolution supposedly
received 99% of the voting publics’ vote also made the reforms seem less legitimate. The
Shah clearly had a grand scheme for Iran’s development, but he was overly ambitious
and ignored the strong Islamic tradition of Iran and even tried to eliminate it. In 1976 he
replaced the Islamic calendar with an ―imperial‖ calendar which began with the
foundation of the Persian Empire more than 25 centuries earlier.
The Shah also tried to utilize Iranian nationalism to promote his agenda, but it
was a distorted nationalism based on the Shah not the nation. The Shah tried to frame
himself as one of the Persians’ exalted leaders like Cyrus. The Iranian public was not
responsive to the Shah nationalist ploys and he was increasingly viewed as an agent of
American interests. The Shah’s ego grew along with the Iranian oil profits and his
increasing extravagant lifestyle (including opulent celebrations) did not sit well with
average Iranians, many of whom did not see any benefit from Iran’s economic growth.
The Shah also made the fatal mistake of seeming anti-Islamic; the fact that the Shah had
good relations with Israel only bolstered Muslims’ concerns.
13
In order to pursue his
goals the Shah had to step up his repression of dissent. The SAVAK and their brutal
repression of dissent became a symbol of the Shah and his reign. Also by calling his
program of modernization the White Revolution this made the possibility of revolution
seem more possible to the Iranian public.
13
The Shah and Israel enjoyed cordial relations although the Shah was careful to keep these relations low
key. Iran did not formerly recognize Israel but Israel had a permanent delegation in Tehran which served
as a de facto embassy. Israel and Iran also had numerous business dealings that were not officially
recognized.
16
America’s image in Iran was damaged by the1953 coup that with American and
British aid removed Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq from power. Mosaddeq had
planned to nationalize Iran’s oil industry which was under British control. The British
began to lobby the US for aid in overthrowing Mosaddeq; initially the US was opposed to
a coup. Iran’s original demands were modest; they wanted 50-50 profit sharing and
improved working conditions. At the time the US was offering similar deals to Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela.
14
British officials were accustomed to the pre-WWII model when
they could dictate their terms with impunity and oblivious to developing nationalist
ideology in the developing world. The British failed to recognize the changing times; a
15
more imaginative policy could have prevented the coup.
Mosaddeq began to intensify
his socialist and anti-imperialist rhetoric which made the US nervous of Iran turning to
communism. As Eisenhower took office he took a more hard-line Cold War strategy and
agreed to aid the British in the coup.
The coup was a success and was even used by the CIA as a model of how to
overthrow a government.
16
Mosaddeq was a national hero who’s fiery speeches had
ignited the hope of a democratic Iran. Mosaddeq was revered by all secular democratic
Iranians and admired by many supporters of the Shah and Khomeini. Before the coup
America had little involvement in Iran (had not meddled in Iranian politics to a great
extent) and was viewed as a benevolent outsider. As time passed after the 1953 coup
Mosaddeq’s legend grew and he became a symbol of Iran’s constant struggle against
14
15
16
Takeyh (2006), p. 65
Takeyh (2006), p.67
Lesch (2003), p. 17
17
foreign intervention. Prior to the coup the US had a positive image in Iran, America was
seen in a good light especially compared to the British and Russians who had Iran
divided in spheres of influence. The coup damaged America’s and the Shah’s image and
would later provide ammunition for the Islamic Revolution In the 1950’s it was also
imprudently revealed that Western powers had no intention of defending Iran against a
17
Soviet invasion beyond the Zagros line, in other words, beyond the oil fields.
The coup was the turning point in Iranian perceptions of America and their
motives in the region, but it did not damage the relationship beyond repair and
throughout 1960s and 1970s cooperation between the US and Iran increased; as America
had become Iran’s most important trade partner and America viewed Iran as a vital ally
in the region. Nixon and the Shah developed a close relationship, even a friendship and
their personalities guided the nations’ to increased cooperation. Iran was experiencing a
great deal of economic growth throughout the 1960s and 1970s and it appeared that the
Shah’s cooperation with America had paid off. Although America and Iran increased
their cooperation it was a reflection of the Shah and Nixon’s relationship and antiAmerican sentiment grew from this point on. There was concern amongst some
American legislatures of America’s increasing arms sales to Iran, but Nixon believed that
Iran should be able to obtain any military equipment short of nuclear weapons. There
was also more anti-American sentiment developing in Iran as American presence
increased. Negative stereotypes of Americans were emerging in Iran as more Americans
were doing business in Iran. Americans were characterized as overpaid and blamed for
17
Ansari (2006), p.60
18
problems such as rising prices. Iranians also complained about Americans poor driving
and lack of cultural sensitivity.
18
The developing relationship between the Shah and Nixon is exemplified in this
toast that Nixon made to the Shah on a visit to Tehran in 1972: ―Since ancient times, this
country has been one that has been known for its splendid hospitality, and we, of course,
tonight have had a good chance to see why that reputation has become worldwide. It is
always a great privilege to visit here, but I feel especially privileged to be here in this
period in which you are celebrating what you have referred to, the 2,500th year of your
country’s history. I think of the fact that the United States of America in just 4 years will
be celebrating its 200th anniversary, and then I compare our two countries, we owe so
much to you. As you have spoken so generously of what you may owe us, we owe so
much to you not only for 2,500 years, but for a history that goes back even 6,000 years.‖
Thirty years later George W. Bush referred to Iran as part of the ―axis of evil‖ in his
infamous state of the union, showing how greatly relations have deteriorated. As Nixon
and the Shah developed their extremely close relationship both the Iranian and American
public were going in opposite directions and had an increasingly negative image of each
other.
Many in Iran believed with economic development that foreign presence in Iran
would lessen, but foreign presence seemed to be increasing. Increased American
presence was a concern to many Iranians. Some in Iran feared that American TV was a
means of colonizing Iran (weapon of culture) and believed that the majority of Americans
18
Ansari (2006), p. 62
19
in Iran were members of the CIA.
19
The Vietnam War was also covered extensively in
Iran and was extremely unpopular. The Iranian public was also influenced by the
American anti-establishment movement and the political and social unrest of the time.
Americans were highly critical of their government at the time and Iranians that were fed
up with foreign influence and the Shah’s iron grip on power and could relate. When
America pulled out of Vietnam it showed the Iranian public that popular will could
triumph over incompetent leaders. While there was growing anti-American sentiment
and factions were opposed to the Shah’s grip on power, all of this was overshadowed by
the huge increase in oil revenues. The Shah was extremely proud of Iran’s development
and embarked on a program to increase Iran’s international visibility. Iran and the Shah
were receiving more international recognition in the 1970s as was the Shah’s plan, but
with this increased attention came the unwanted attention of human rights groups and
other nongovernmental organizations.
The Shah mismanaged the huge influx of oil money through massive military
expenditure and unrestrained spending and continued to try to accelerate Iran’s economic
growth. Economic planners warned the Shah that Iran’s growth should be brought under
control and that cash should be set aside for the future. The Shah chose to ignore their
warnings and accelerate Iran’s drive for growth; choosing state over market driven
growth. The Shah was determined that Iran could break through the frontier of his
20
utopian Great Civilization within his lifetime.
As he proclaimed in an interview with
Al Ahram, ―In ten years, Iran’s population will be equal to that of France and Britain
19
20
Ansari (2006), p.68
Ansari (2006), p. 63
20
today. Iran’s population, in other words, will be not less than 45 million, but I can see
Iran twenty-five years from now and we hope to be better off (economically) than France
and Britain. Iran will have an income that will probably be more than Britain’s‖. The
tremendous increase in oil revenue caused the Shah to be overconfident and he continued
to spend money at a reckless rate. There was money to spend and the Shah intended to
exercise his newfound commercial might by buying shares in Western companies,
including Mercedes and Krupp in West Germany.
21
These investments further tied the
Shah and the West, which was the Shah’s plan but was a concern to many Iranians with a
history of distrusting foreign influence.
The American perception of Iran and the Shah was also becoming increasingly
negative in the early 1970s as cooperation between the two nations, reached an all time
high. In 1973 the Yom Kippur War erupted between the Arab states and Israel,
accompanied by an oil boycott intended to punish the West for their support of Israel.
This was the first time that balance of power had shifted from the consumers to the
producers, and Western economies felt vulnerable.
22
At first the Shah argued that oil
should not be used as a weapon, but he eventually seized the opportunity to greatly
increase Iran’s oil revenues. In December 1973, at a press conference in Tehran the Shah
announced his decision to quadruple oil prices. Western economies and especially
America were still trying to deal with the recent rise in oil prices to $3 a barrel and now
had to deal with the prospect of oil prices of nearly $11 a barrel.
21
22
Ansari (2006), p. 63
Ansari (2006), p. 61
21
Prior to this tremendous rise in oil prices the average American had little reason to
have any knowledge of Iran or the Shah, but it was now clear what a tremendous effect
that Iran could have on the American economy. Public opinion would now have an effect
on America’s dealings with Iran. The Shah was also becoming increasingly arrogant
with Iran’s tremendous economic growth, as shown by his unrealistic claims that Iran
would surpass England and France economically. The Shah’s growing ego and
disconnect with reality is evident in this quote from 1974 after the price of oil was
quadrupled; referring to the changing relationship between oil producing countries and
oil consuming countries. ―As far as the industrial world is concerned… the era of
extraordinary progress and income-and an even more extraordinary income-based on
cheap oil has ended. They should find new energy resources and gradually tighten their
belts, and eventually all the children of wealthy families who have plenty to eat, who
have cars and who act almost like terrorists, planting bombs here and there, or choosing
other ways will have to reconsider these aspects of this developed industrial world. They
will have to work harder.‖
The Islamic Revolution has been framed by American and Iranian policymakers
as a sudden and unpredictable event, but there was some concern about the Shah’s hold
on power. As early as 1961 State Department documents warned that Iranians had a
tendency to blindly follow a person who they believed to be right. The documents also
warned of the increased dislike of the ruling class and Westerners and Western influence.
British intelligence also warned that the Shah would have to effectively deal with a
growing intellectual movement in Iran that could threaten his reign. One foreign official
even floated the possibility that the massive military that America and other Western
22
powers were providing Iran could be in the hands of a revolutionary government. In
1978 military purchase commitments from American manufactures was over 12 billion
23
dollars.
Despite these astute warnings from a minority of foreign officials it seemed
that Iran’s tremendous economic growth and the Shah’s effective repression apparatus
would be able to deal with factional dissent.
Even with the building dissent within Iran few foreign officials had any clue as to
what would transpire. America’s strong ties with the Shah blinded American officials to
the emerging problems in Iran; US officials believed that the Shah could deal with
internal dissent. The overly optimistic nature of American officials was exemplified by
Jimmy Carter when on New Years Eve 1977 he toasted the Shah and called Iran ―an
island of stability‖. By the next year all 40,000 American citizens in Iran were urged to
leave. Even when rioting intensified and it became clear that the Shah would not be able
to maintain power, it was thought that there could still be a smooth transition of power.
Riots were not uncommon in Iran during the 1960s and 1970s and the severity of the
situation was not appreciated.
As Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 it was a turning point in US-Iranian
relations. The Shah preferred Republican leadership, evidenced by the close relationship
that had developed between Nixon and the Shah. Carter’s presidency ushered in more
focus on human rights which was troubling to the Shah and his repressive regime.
Although Carter focused much more on human rights than Nixon, he did not take a hard
line on Iran’s human rights abuses. Carter put a minimal amount of pressure on the Shah
to deal with human rights abuses and the Shah did release some prisoners. Even with
23
Fatemi (1980), p.1
23
Carter and the Shah’s good relations the international attention opened the Shah up to
criticism from a wide range of human rights groups and opponents of his reign. When
the Shah visited Washington on an official state visit in November 1977 tear gas was
used to disperse demonstrators protesting human rights conditions in Iran and Carter and
24
the Imperial guests were shown wiping away tears.
Although there was growing international attention paid to the Shah’s human
rights abuses Carter still gave the Shah his full support. Even though Carter was soft on
the Shah and his record of human rights violations it was clear that the international
community would no longer give the Shah a free pass to stomp out dissent. The Shah
wanted increased international prestige and visibility, but was not prepared for criticism
of his human rights abuses. Some officials especially from the Republican party have
blamed Carter’s focus on human rights as one of the main reasons for the revolution, but
this was certainly only apart of a wealth of factors that led to the revolution. Others have
pointed to Nixon’s over the top support of the Shah as a key element to causing the
revolution. Regardless of which political party was responsible for the ―loss of Iran‖
American officials still remained optimistic that productive relations could continue with
the Islamic government. The US did not severe relations with Iran until nearly a year
after the overthrow of the Shah. Iran was a key economic and strategic partner in the
region and American officials hoped to carefully manage the transition of power to keep
from completely losing Iran.
In 1978 riots and demonstrations became more commonplace and increased in
intensity. Martial law was declared in many cities on September 8th. Later that month,
24
Ansari (2006), p. 74
24
industrial action by thousands of Iranian workers culminated in a mass strike by
employees in the oil industry. The strike sparked riots and rallies across the country in
support of the Ayatollah.
25
The Shah appointed a new military government in early
November, but it failed to stem the rising tide of support for the Ayatollah. Many outside
of Iran criticized his inaction and believed that an intensified suppression effort could
have stopped the revolution. The Shah did show himself to be weaker than many
international observers anticipated and did not take a firm stand. Although the Shah
choose to not intensify his suppression efforts, the situation was spiraling out of control
and it is unlikely he could have turned the tides at this point.
In January 1979 the Shah appointed Shapur Bahktiar as the new Iranian prime
minister; later in January Bahktiar persuaded the Shah that it was time to leave Iran. On
January 16 1979 the Shah was forced into exile; officially it was stated that the Shah was
on ―vacation‖ to receive medical treatment but he would never return to Iran. The Shah
and his wife, Empress Farah, left Tehran and flew to Aswan in Egypt; the couple's three
youngest children were flown to the United States.
26
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to
Iran on February 1st after 14 years exile in Iraq and France. Khomeini threw out Bahktiar
(who went into exile in France) and his government on February 11th and, after a
referendum, declared an Islamic Republic on April 1st. This development was shocking
to the world as it seemed to happen overnight. The Islamic Revolution was the first
televised revolution and established the first Islamic government.
25
-Staff Writer, Timeline Iran: A Chronology of Key Events BBC News September 22, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/806268.stm
26
-Staff Writer, Timeline Iran: A Chronology of Key Events BBC News September 22, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/806268.stm
25
Although Khomeini was the undisputed leader of the Islamic Revolution there
were many different factions (including proponents of a democratic Iran) involved in
revolution. It was not clear after the revolution how these factions would cooperate or
fight for power. Khomeini paid lip service to a wide array of political interests, but he
clearly wanted a strict Islamic government that was above the opinions of the masses.
Khomeini was extremely popular but his absolute grip on power was not a forgone
conclusion. Khomeini’s organization through the mosque network, the start of the IranIraq War, the hostage crisis and fear of American subversion of the revolution helped
Khomeini consolidate his power. Once the common dislike of the Shah was gone the
fundamental differences in the groups began to appear.
27
Khomeini would have to
utilize his superior organization of support which was cultivated during his exile and
organized through the mosque network; which was the only highly organized national
network in Iran at the time. Khomeini also benefited from several events which
happened quickly after he came to power and helped him consolidate his power, the IranIraq War (which will be discussed later), the hostage crisis and the fear that America
would attempt another coup.
On October 22 1979 the deposed Shah entered the US for medical treatment, he
was suffering from cancer. This may have been the humane thing to do, but was not a
prudent move, England had denied the Shah admittance. The US had been warned that
admitting the Shah would inflame Iranian passions and suspicions and would endanger
Americans in Iran.
27
28
28
Iranians feared that this would signal US involvement in the
Anderson (2000), p. 50
Anderson (2000), p. 61
26
revolution. US officials did not have any plans of trying to overthrow Khomeini and had
refused numerous requests from opponents of the revolution for assistance in
destabilizing the revolution. The US instead preferred to productively handle the
transition of power so as to not lose US interests in Iran, most importantly access to
Iranian oil and the complete loss of Iran as a trading and strategic partner. This quote
from a US official showed the American strategy at the time: ―It would be contrary to US
policy to interfere in Iranian affairs… in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate foreign
adventures simply would not be tolerated by the American people‖.
29
Many US business
men continued to work in Iran or returned to Iran; while there was increased incidents of
harassment of Americans many thought that the dust had settling and that and that a
stable government was gradually being restored.
30
Even though American officials said that they had no plans of trying to destabilize
the revolution, it did not convince Iranians. The Shah was a close ally of the US and with
American involvement in the 1953 coup many feared that the US would attempt another
coup to put the Shah back in power. Some including Jimmy Carter’s national security
adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski criticized American inaction to the revolution, but it is
doubtful that this would have been effective and the American public would not have
been supportive of such an effort. Khomeini had made anti-American sentiment one of
the pillars of his ideology and it was not beyond the realm of possibility that the US
would try and topple his regime. With anti-American sentiment at an all time high
(America was increasing referred to as the Great Satan) no Iranians were going to trust
29
30
Ansari (2006), p. 85
Ansari (2006), p. 85
27
any claims from US officials. The threat of an American orchestrated coup helped
cement Khomeini’s grip on power even through the threat was nonexistent. American
officials saw that attempting to stop the revolution would have been unpopular and most
likely unsuccessful, but did not see the danger of admitting the Shah. Admitting the Shah
into the US was the main catalyst for the hostage crisis.
On November 4, 1979 Iranian militants stormed the American embassy in Tehran
and took 53 hostages. The hostage crisis lasted 444 days and was the main reason that
Carter lost his bid for reelection. It is still not clear who perpetrated the hostage taking or
who was behind the planning of it. The seizure of the embassy was supposedly carried
out by students without Khomeini’s knowledge. The students apparently acted on their
own and were not sure if Khomeini would approve of their actions. While most accounts
claim that it was students acting on their own (this is the Iranian position) some American
officials believe that it was perpetrated by the Revolutionary Guard and was planned and
executed under official guidance. The fact that Khomeini didn’t demand the release of the
hostages and was quick to capitalize on Iranian popular support of the hostage crisis gave
credence to these claims. Regardless of who perpetrated the seizure of the embassy it
marked a turning point in American-Iranian relations.
The hostage crisis was all over American television and crystallized American
hostility towards Iran and the Islamic government. Each night on TV Walter Cronkite
would end the news with the tally of how many days the hostage crisis had lasted and the
images of blindfolded Americans being led by armed Iranians were terrifying to
American audiences. To many Iranians the embassy seizure was pay back for American
intervention in Iranian affairs, especially the 1953 coup and signaled the start of a new
28
era by severing ties with America.
31
Khomeini also made sure that the hostage crisis
would be prolonged with his unreasonable demands; return of the Shah and his assets, the
32
end of US influence in Iranian affairs and a US apology for previous misdeeds.
To
Americans the hostage crisis was proof of the hostile and fanatical nature of the Islamic
government. When the hostage crisis first started it was optimistically thought that it
would end fairly quickly. This was not the first time that Iranians had taken Western
hostages and the hostages were usually released fairly quickly.
The hostage crisis was nightmare for Jimmy Carter and he concentrated most of
his efforts to secure the hostages release. Carter didn’t have a viable option to quickly
end the hostage crisis. The American military wanted punitive strikes on Iranian military
and economic targets, but that could lead to the worst case scenario of the hostages being
killed. There was also the option of a Naval blockade but that could led to the loss of
American and Iranian lives and would not necessarily bring about a peaceful resolution to
the crisis.
33
In the absence of viable options the US fell back on its customary default
position, economic sanctions. Washington imposed a ban on further purchases of Iranian
oil and on all trade, with the exception of food and medicine. The Carter administration
also froze Iran’s assets which amounted to about $12 billion.
34
These weak and
predictable actions were not going to persuade the Iranian government to release the
hostages. Tehran had already announced its refusal to sell oil to America. Economic
31
32
33
34
Takeyh (2006), p. 112
Takeyh (2006), p.114
Takeyh (2006), p. 98
Takeyh (2006), p. 98
29
pressure was not going to dissuade the highly idealistic Iranian government and Iran was
planning to severe ties with the US not reestablish them.
To Khomeini and many Iranians the hostage crisis was a great victory for Iran.
The new Iranian government had brought America to its knees, exemplified by the
famous Khomeini quote ―America cannot do a damn thing‖. As the hostage crisis
dragged on Carter became increasingly desperate to end the crisis and Operation Eagle
Claw, a rescue attempt was put into affect. The plan was overly ambitious and extremely
complicated. Using helicopters, a crew of 118 men would fly into Iran, refuel in the
central dessert and proceed to a location close to Iran. At this time, using pre-positioned
trucks, they would head towards the embassy and assault the compound.
35
A desert
storm caused damage to one of the helicopters and it crashed, killing eight Americans.
The mission was a humiliating failure and showed that Khomeini could successfully take
on America the great world power. The failed mission was also a shot to Carter and his
administration.
The hostage crisis was a great victory for Khomeini and his fledgling government
and was instrumental in gaining popular support and consolidating his power. It seemed
that all of Khomeini’s anti-American rhetoric was more than just talk and Iran was
asserting itself on the international stage against all odds. While the hostage crisis helped
consolidate Khomeini’s grip on power at the time, it also made sure that Iran and the
Islamic government would have to endure American hostility. No American president
since the hostage crisis has had productive relations with Iran and American pressure has
certainly hurt Iran economically and diplomatically. To Khomeini and many Iranians the
35
Takeyh (2006), p. 100
30
hostage crisis was a natural occurrence that signaled a new era in Iran, one without ties to
America. This view, in the eyes of many Iranians, has absolved Iran from any
accountability for the hostage crisis. The hostage crisis will continue to be the defining
moment to Americans of the nature of the Islamic government and its legacy must be
dealt with before Iran and America can move forward in their relations. Just as the 1953
coup defined Iranian attitudes towards America the hostage crisis cemented American
views of Iran.
Even after the revolution there was hope for a moderate and balanced Iran as there
were many diverse supporters of the revolution. The revolution signaled a departure
from the past and assuring that Islam would have a large role in the government but
clerical rule was not a foregone conclusion. The original draft of the Iran’s post
revolutionary constitution showed the influence that leftist thought and was very
democratic in nature. The original constitution did not grant a monopoly of power to the
clerics, it was Khomeini’s action after the revolution that assured that the ultimate power
in Iran would be the clerics and the Supreme Leader. The first appointed leader of
revolutionary Iran was Mehdi Bazargan a moderate and democratic leader.
36
This
showed hope that Iran would take a pragmatic approach even after the revolution. It was
clear relations between the US and Iran would be different, but it still seemed possible
that normal relations could be established. Bazargan and his Foreign Minister Ibrahim
Yazdi met with Carter’s National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski in Algiers on
36
Bazargan was a trained as an engineer in France and while studying volunteered for the French army
and fought in World War II against the Nazis. Bazargan also participated in the reform movement in the
1960s aimed at democratizing the Shia clerical establishment. He was jailed several times in the 1960s and
1970s for his opposition to the Shah. ―Bazargan cofounded the Liberation Movement of Iran in 1961 and
the Iranian Human Rights Movement in 1977‖. –Staff Writer, Historical Personalities: Mehdi Bazargan
Iran Chamber Society http://www.iranchamber.com/about_us/about_us.php
31
November 1st 1979 and stated that Iran sought to assert its sovereign rights, but without
provoking animosity of the Western powers.
37
Unfortunately Bazargan was hampered
by the Revolutionary Council which was headed by Khomeini and they made it difficult
for Bazargan be an effective leader. The Revolutionary Council was comprised of
clerical supporters of Khomeini and was supposed to help usher in the new government
after the revolution. The Revolutionary Council had the power to pass laws which in
essence created a parallel government with the power to override the prime minister.
Khomeini through the Revolutionary Council restricted the elected officials’ power and
increased the clerical elites’ control of the government.
38
Bazargan was frustrated by his
lack of power and tended his resignation several before it was accepted by the
Revolutionary Council.
39
Khomeini and the clerical leadership were slowly
consolidating their control over Iran.
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was elected president in May 1980, Bani-Sadr was another
moderate leader and his election showed the democratic influence in the revolution.
Bani-Sadr was educated in France and was a supporter of Khomeini but not a cleric.
37
Takeyh (2006), p. 97
38
After Bazargan’s resignation all power was placed in the hands of the Revolutionary Council which had
been operating as a parallel government since Feb. 1979. In Nov. 1979 the constitution of the Islamic
Republic was approved the country would be governed by the president, a cabinet and a parliament. In
addition there were ―Islamic‖ institutions the Revolutionary Guards and Council of Experts which could
veto legislation if necessary and a vali faqih who nominated candidates for high offices and had the option
of taking control of the government. All legislation had to correspond to Islamic law. Article 112 of the
constitution states… Upon the order of the Leader, the Nation's Exigency Council shall meet at any time
the Guardian Council judges a proposed bill of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to be against the
principles of Shariah or the Constitution, and the Assembly is 'unable to meet the expectations of the
Guardian Council. Also, the Council shall meet for consideration on any issue forwarded to it by the Leader
and shall carry out any other responsibility as mentioned in this Constitution. The permanent and
changeable members of the Council shall be appointed by the Leader. The rules for the Council shall be
formulated and approved by the Council members subject to the confirmation by the Leader.
39
Anderson (2000), p. 94
32
Bani-Sadr was gradually striped of his authority as Khomeini continued to consolidate his
power. Khomeini first took away Bani-Sadr’s role as commander of the armed forces
40
and dismissed him as president on June 21 1981.
The common cause of overthrowing
the Shah was gone now and there was a rise in violence between the political factions as
they competed for power. The culmination of the violence was an explosion at the
Islamic Republic’s headquarters in Tehran which killed 74 people including Chief Justice
Ayatollah Beheshti, several cabinet ministers and sub ministers 20 members of the Majlis
and other party leaders.
41
There was also a plot orchestrated by the Iranian Air Force to
assassinate Khomeini by bombing his house in Qom, but it was exposed and the
perpetrators were executed. There was still a great deal of dissent in Iran after the
revolution, but Khomeini made sure that those opposed to clerical rule would not have
any real political power.
Khomeini and the clerical elite not only took control of the government but also
attempted make other parts of society Islamic. During and after the revolution
universities in Iran were closed for over two years in order to rewrite the curriculum to
―Islamicize‖ and ―Revolutionize‖ every subject from literature to science.
42
Rewriting
the curriculum was intended to purge foreign influence in all fields even medicine.
43
Khomeini and the clerical elite also utilized Islamic symbols from the past in order to
40
41
42
Anderson (2000), p. 100
Anderson (2000), p. 102
Molavi (2002), p. 73
43
One study by Hossain A. Ronaghy and Harold J. Simon examined the affects of the revolution on Shiraz
University School of Medicine. There are no official records of how many academics were forced to leave
or choose to flee the country, but at Shiraz University between 1978 and 1983 63 percent of the medical
faculty of 173 school left with 47 percent of leaving the country. In an interview the president of the
Iranian Medical Association stated that 2500 physicians left Iran since the revolution. The exodus of
physicians has left Iran with a shortage and efforts to get Iranian physicians to return have been ineffective.
33
justify their rule; Khomeini and his piers sought to compare themselves to the leadership
during the time of Mohammad even though the two bore little comparison.
44
The
symbolism of martyrdom was also utilized as causalities of the Iran-Iraq War continued
to pile up.
While Khomeini and the clerical elite were effective at consolidating power and
promoting revolutionary zeal they were far less effective at political leadership after the
revolution. Few of the clerics had any governmental experience and many displayed a
disdain for political organization and the daily workings of government. Khomeini and
his disciples relied on vague ideological notions rather than a pragmatic approach to
government. Being a religious and political leader is very different political leaders must
compromise and take a more practical approach, whereas religious leaders can remain
committed to ideology. This kind of approach assured that Iran would have few allies in
the rest of the world. A hard-line Islamic government is threatening to much of the world
and difficult to compromise with especially for democratic nations that attempt to
separate church and state, making constructive diplomacy an uphill battle. The defective
power structure that Khomeini and his disciples created is a lasting legacy of the
revolution. There have been moderate democratic elected officials after the revolution,
but their agendas have been blocked by the clerical elite (Bazargan and Bani-Sadr were
slowly stripped of their power and later Khatami was stifled). The structure of Iran’s
government makes it possible that another violent government overthrow could take
place in the future. The popular will of the Iranian people is not represented and it is
44
Molavi (2002), p. 73
34
difficult for the Iranian public to redress their concerns. Even when progressive and
moderate leaders have been elected their efforts have been hampered by the clerical elite.
Although the Islamic Republic may fall in the future it has shown itself to be very
resilient. After the death of Khomeini in 1989 many thought that the Islamic Republic
would fall, but it has shown no signs of crumbling and some believe that it has proved its
credibility. Others believed that the effectiveness of political reforms during Khatami’s
two terms as president would determine if there would be gradual or revolutionary
change in Iran. The future of the Islamic Republic is uncertain but its legacy is still the
most important aspect of modern Iran. One of the reasons that the Islamic Revolution has
proved to be very resilient is that it is based on Islam, which is inextricable from
everyday life in Muslim countries. Unlike other revolutions the Islamic Revolution was
not based on economic or political beliefs, but on religious beliefs; while being an excommunist is a sign of intellectual development being an ex-Muslim is much more
difficult in Muslim countries. While many clerics oppose Islam being politicized it has
been and it would be very difficult to untangle Islam from politics. The Islamic
Republic has been very resilient to internal and external dissent but there is a tremendous
amount of pressure for change and the demographic shift in Iran will intensify this
pressure.
The recent hostage incident with the British Royal Navy where 15 hostages were
taken on March 25th 2007 for apparently entering Iranian waters threatened to show a
return to a more revolutionary and confrontational Iran. Ahmadinejad’s election showed
a return to revolutionary politics, although voter turnout was low and many of the
candidates were not allowed to run. It seemed possible that Ahmadinejad would use the
35
British hostages like Khomeini used the American hostages. The British have shown a
more pragmatic approach to Iran than America and Iran threatened to further alienate
itself from the international community and possibly provoke an invasion. The decision
to capture and release the prisoners shows that the revolutionary zeal in Iran is not dead,
but it is also a very different time than that of the revolution. The political realities of the
times exert a great deal of pressure on Iran.
Ahmadinejad showed by releasing the British sailors that he was unwilling to take
as hard-line as Khomeini even though his rhetoric is similar. While the revolutionary
legacy in Iran is still alive it has taken a more pragmatic approach. The British dealt with
Iran much differently than the US is 1979, but the incident was still a chance for
Ahmadinejad to seize the world’s attention and take a stand against one of the great
Western powers and he chose to take a pragmatic approach. The failure of the revolution
to establish an economic base that is not almost completely reliant on oil has weakened
the ability of hard-liners and the clerical elite to take an ideological approach to
international relations. Ahmadinejad also showed restraint in his address to the UN in
September 2006, when it was expected that Ahmadinejad would use the international
stage to blast the Western powers and especially the Bush administration. While
Ahmadinejad took some shots at the distribution of power in the international community
he was surprisingly subdued in his address. The spotlight was stolen by Venezuelan
leader Hugo Chavez when he called Bush the devil and delivered a fiery blast at the
international community and especially the US.
The legacy of the revolution is complex and varied, much of the zeal of the
revolution is gone, but the intense nationalism that the revolution helped create is still
36
present in Iran. While many within Iran are opposed to clerical rule they are still very
nationalistic and wary of foreign influence. Nationalism is stronger than revolutionary
zeal in modern Iran. The political structure that Khomeini and his disciples created is
also a lasting legacy of the revolution. Transition of power will always be a problem
with Iran’s political structure. The outpouring of grief after the death of Khomeini
showed that his revolutionary government would not die with him. When Khomeini died
it was not clear who would succeed him; Khomeini had a son but he was not chosen. In
many ways Ali Khamenei was an unusual choice, he was not very charismatic and was
not of the highest clerical rank unlike Khomeini but he has shown to be a competent
leader. When Khamenei took over as Supreme Leader in 1989 the constitution had to be
amended to allow the post to be held by a lower ranking theologian; three months prior to
his death Khomeini assigned a team to revise the constitution so that Khamenei could be
Supreme Leader as Khomeini was not satisfied with the other candidates.
45
The
revolution was unable to establish a guideline or specific model of an Islamic state and its
governing principles.
46
Another legacy of the revolution is the diverse and factional
nature of Iran’s political dissent. Khomeini was able to unite a diverse opposition to the
Shah, but the wide array of factions that he paid lip service to allowed very diverse
interpretations of his teachings. Very different groups can refer to enough of Khomeini’s
45
Khamenei studied under Khomeini and the most prominent Shia scholars. Khamenei was active in
protests against the Shah and was imprisoned several times. When Khomeini took power after the
revolution he immediately appointed Khamenei to the Revolution Council after the council was dissolved
he was made deputy minister of defense and was Khomeini’s personal representative on the Supreme
Defense Council. Khamenei also served two terms as president from 1981-1989. Despite Khamenei’s
impressive credentials it was still surprising that he was elevated to Supreme Leader since he was not of the
highest clerical rank and not a charismatic leader like Khomeini.
46
Moslem (2002), p. 13
37
views to claim that they are continuing his legacy. There is also secular dissent that
wishes to abandon revolutionary politics in favor of a more free and democratic Iran.
The economic problems that Iran has are also partially due to the legacy of the
revolution. Khomeini viewed economics as unimportant as compared to Iran’s
revolutionary and Islamic pedigrees which were considered far more important than
economics. Khomeini was more concerned with exporting the revolution than
restructuring the economy. The economy was based on capitalism with a social
conscience.
47
This has led to an ineffective economic structure that is in need of change;
the economic structure is unable to support social welfare. Subsidies make up a
disproportionate amount of Iran’s total spending. To make economic progress Iran needs
to cut some of its subsidies, but this would be difficult and unpopular and would probably
risk a politician’s chance of reelection. Intolerance of the clerical elite to ideas labeled
―un-Islamic‖ or ―counterrevolutionary‖ has also narrowed the range of permissible
discourse.
48
As is the case in most nations where the power is concentrated in a small
section of society the leaders look out more for themselves than the general public. The
clerical elite are one of the few segments of society that benefits from Iran’s economic
structure.
Another legacy of the revolution is the efforts to export the revolution which has
earned Iran the reputation as the most active nation in sponsoring terrorism. In the early
1980s Iran had some success exporting the revolution. There were demonstrations in
Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in the early 1980s, but the message was only attractive
47
48
Hunter (1992), p. 75
Keddie (2003), p. 47
38
to a narrow segment of the minority Shiite community.
49
The demonstrations were more
a sign of Shiite frustration over the economic and living conditions than an effort to
emulate the Iranian Revolution. Iran’s support of groups such as the al Dawa party and
Hezbollah have tied Iran to terrorism and assured that they will have little support in the
international community. Iran helps finance these groups by transferring funds from the
Revolutionary Guard and the foreign ministry through embassies and through semigovernmental entities such as charitable foundations established under government
50
supervision.
Iran has preferred to work through proxies so they can maintain
deniability. Although Iran’s support of Hezbollah and the al Dawa party is officially
sanctioned Iran has tried to avoid direct evidence that they have any control over the
groups despite the fact that Iranian government officials have formally sat on Hezbollah’s
directing body for many years.
51
Since the beginning of the revolution Iran has curtailed
much of its support of terrorism, but it continued funding of groups labeled as terrorists
ensure that Iran will be an international target.
52
Clerical rule is very controversial in modern Iran; executions of leading writers
and former government officials turned many against clerical rule. Social restrictions and
49
50
Takeyh (2006), p.80
Shay (2005), p. 65
51
Staff Writer, Foreign Interference Rand Corporation Monographs 2006
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs_reports/MR1021/MR1021.chp4.pdf
52
Khomeini believed that he could be a leader of the Muslim world not only Iran. This was not well
received by the Sunni leaders of the Middle East who were threatened by him and saw him as a Shia leader.
This caused Sunni leaders in the Arab world (especially Saudi Arabia) to attempt to highlight and sharpen
the differences between Shiites and Sunnis, which resulted in a Sunni ideology that was less tolerant of
Shiites. This phenomenon can be seen by the fact that all Sunni leaders of the region supported Iraq in the
war against Iran, despite Saddam Hussein’s aggressive and brutal regime. The heightened split between
Shiite and Sunnis helped make Khomeini’s vision of transforming the region impossible and as a result
efforts at exporting the revolution (considered terrorist activities) were curtailed as they proved to be
unsuccessful.
39
the prolonged war with Iraq also soured many to clerical rule, but the greatest concern to
most average Iranians is the economy. Many of the same people that supported the
revolution now hate the clerics. Clerics have difficultly hailing cabs in Iranian cities and
are commonly blamed for Iran’s economic problems. The Shah has also come off in a
better light as time as passed. Books about the Shah are popular and many in Iran believe
that he was a good leader. The Shah’s economic reforms may have not been very
successful, but he at least had a plan to develop Iran’s economy. The Shah can be viewed
as victim of his relationship with the US, as Iranians at the time were scared of too much
American influence and the Shah was strengthening ties with the US. The success he did
have makes the resurrection of old economic and foreign policies legitimate and possible.
Like most issues in Iran the revolution and its legacy is very complex. Many in Iran
respect both the Shah and Khomeini. The revolution has many legacies, but the most
pronounced legacy of the revolution is that the Islamic Republic is a resilient nation that
has weathered a great deal of internal and external pressure.
40
Chapter 2: The Iran-Iraq War; Revolutionary Consolidation and Destruction
One of the most influential events in modern day Iran is the war with Iraq which
lasted from 1980 to 1988; with massive casualties on both sides and devastated the
economic base of Iran and Iraq for years to come. Since Iran has one of the youngest
populations in the world many Iranians do not have any memories of the Islamic
Revolution, but with the Iran-Iraq war lasting into the late 1980s the war is still fresh in
almost everyone’s memories. As with much of Iranian history the war has developed
into a living enterprise that continues to influence society and has developed a life of its
own which keeps it apart of peoples’ conscience. The Iran-Iraq war was also
instrumental in consolidating the religious fundamentalists control over post
revolutionary Iran. While Khomeini and his followers were the most vocal proponents of
the revolution they were by no means the only actors. After the revolution the new
government was struggling with leftist and Marxist guerrilla opposition for influence and
power.
53
Iran and Iraq have a history of contentious relations going back the 16th century
and the geopolitical rivalry over Iraq between the Ottomans and the Persians. Although
relations between Iran and Iraq have been shaky they had managed to avoid major
confrontation until the Iran-Iraq War. One of the major turning points in Iran-Iraq
54
relations was when the Ba’athist party returned to power in Iraq in July, 1968.
The
Ba’athist party believed that the Shah was attempting to dominate regional politics and
was part of a conspiracy with Iran, US and Israel to weaken Iraq. This was when Iran
53
54
Molavi (2002), p. 301
Abdulghano (1984), p. 27
41
was still a strong ally of the US and was considered a crucial force of stability in the
region. Former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger characterized Iran as ―the eastern
anchor of our Middle East policy‖ and a ―pillar of stability in a turbulent and vital
region‖.
55
In the early 1970s the Gulf was polarized into conservative monarchical
power that wished to preserve the status quo (Saudi Arabia, Iran and small Gulf
sheikdoms) versus radical and ideological regimes such as Iraq.
56
In the early 1970s Iran was thought to be the strongest military in the Gulf. US
policy was to build Iran into a viable military power; this was in line with the Nixon
Doctrine and part of the cold war strategy at the time. This caused the perception both
inside and outside of Iran that Iran was a tool of American imperialism. From 1972 to
1976 Iran was the largest single purchaser of US arms with 10.4 billion dollars in sales
during that period.
57
Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger justified US arms sales
to Iran as an attempt to prevent Iraq ―from achieving hegemony in the region‖ as Iran was
58
a closer ally at the time.
Massive arms sales to Iran was also a way of getting back oil
dollars as the price of oil rose. The cooperation between Iran and the US was a cause of
concern for Iraq and also allowed those in Iran to criticize the Shah as a tool of the US.
Prior to the Islamic revolution the US sold Iran a massive amount of arms, but during the
Iran-Iraq War the US sided squarely with Iraq and provided Saddam with weapons and a
variety of aid.
55
56
57
58
Abdulghano (1984), p. 54
Abdulghano (1984), p. 72
Ansari (2006), p. 66
Abdulghano (1984), p. 118
42
There were many issues that led to the deterioration of relations between Iran and
Iraq, including rivalry for power in the Gulf region. Iraq was very wary of Iranian
expansion, believing that Iran wanted to expand its influence and territory at the expense
of Iraq. In 1971 when the British announced that they were leaving the Gulf Iran tried to
reassert its claim to Bahrain, although UN findings led to declaration of Bahrain’s
independence it intensified suspicions of Iran and their motives in the region.
59
Iran also
made an effort in the early 1970s to form a regional defense organization with Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, clearly excluding Iraq. Another incident that pointed to further
Iranian expansion was the occupation of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs (three Arab
islands). Iran used military force to seize the islands 1971. This pointed to Iranian
expansionist ambitions, after this incident Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with Iran
and Britain, as the British were responsible for the defense of the islands, which led the
60
Iraqis to believe that it was collusion.
The Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute is often cited as the most significant cause of
the Iran-Iraq War.
61
While it was certainly a major issue leading to the war it is only one
59
Bahrain was occupied by Iran at various times and the Shah argued that Iran had a more legitimate
claim to Bahrain than the Al Khalifa (the ruling family of Bahrain) because Iran had occupied Bahrain prior
to the Al Khalifa’s arrival in the 18th century. The UN considered the issue of Bahrain and decided against
Iran’s claim to the island and to allow Bahrain to form an independent state. Backed by the UN decision
Bahrain declared its independence on August 15, 1971
60
Abdulghano (1984), p. 177
61
The Shatt al-Arab is a river in Southwest Asia the second half of its course has served as a boundary for
Iran and Iraq. The waterway flows from the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Iraq to the
Persian Gulf in Iran. The area surrounding the Shatt al-Arab is mostly alluvial lands and swamps.
Sediments from the river’s tributaries are deposited at the mouth of the Persian Gulf over time the deposits
have caused the gulf to recede. As a result the Iranian city of Abadan though on the Persian Gulf 1,000
years ago now lies 30 miles inland on an island in the Shatt al-Arab. Besides Abadan, major ports on the
river include Al Başrah in Iraq and Khorramshahr in Iran. The Shatt al Arab is a vital strategic waterway, as
it constitutes Iraq’s only access to the sea and provides a transportation corridor for oil exports and
commodity imports for both Iran and Iraq. Due to its economic and strategic significance, control of the
river has long been contested.
43
of many issues that led to the conflict. The Shatt al-Arab waterway had been an issue for
centuries in the Gulf. The first recorded treaty that involved the Shatt al-Arab waterway
was The Peace Treaty of 1639 between the Persian and Ottoman empires. This treaty
established a border lacking in detail and conforming in large part to tribal loyalties.
62
The treaty was sufficient in most areas, but not in the Shatt al-Arab region. In the 1800s
there were outbreaks of hostilities that eventually led to The Second Erzerum Treaty of
1847 this treaty was also unclear in the Shatt al-Arab region and left the dispute
unresolved. By 1969 the situation in the region had changed considerably as Iran was the
vastly superior military, the Ba’athist party had just assumed power and was still busy
consolidating their power. Iraq in their weakened position was forced to accept The
Algiers Agreement of March 1975 which set the border at mid-river. This border was
later rejected by Iraq in 1980. For Iraq the Shatt al-Arab waterway was its only route to
the Gulf and the only route for petroleum exports from southern Iraq.
63
Iraq wanted to
regain the entire waterway as it was a crucial economic waterway for Iraq.
Iran and Iraq were also both concerned about efforts to support Kurdish rebellions
inside both nations’ borders. Both Iran and Iraq had problems with their Kurdish
populations and both sides saw supporting Kurdish rebellions as a way to destabilize each
other. Opposition groups such as the al-Dawa party conducted violent campaigns against
64
Ba’athist targets and officials with Iran’s aid.
Saddam would retaliate with relentless
reprisals against the Shiite community, executing some of the most venerable clerics.
62
Brad Martsching, Trade and Environment Conflict Studies: Iran-Iraq War and Waterway Claims
ICE Case Studies May 1998 www.american.edu/TED/ice/iraniraq.htm
63
64
Anderson (2000), p. 289
Takeyh (2006), p. 232
44
This became even more of a concern for Iraq following the Islamic Revolution in Iran as
the new government seemed set on exporting the revolution throughout the region. The
new leadership in both nations escalated tensions of relations that were already on a
downward spiral.
The revolution in Iran had many affects propelling Iran and Iraq towards war.
The revolution heightened the tension between the Ba’athist party which was Sunni and
Iran’s post revolution government which was Shiite. Iraq also had a majority Shiite
population and they feared, rightly so, that Iran would try and inflame the Shiite
population in Iraq to rebellion. The revolution also made Iran an expansionist nation
believing that they could change not only their country but transform the region and
spread the Islamic form of government. The revolution also changed American relations
in the region, where as Iran was once the pillar of America’s Gulf policy the new
revolutionary government was seen as a threat to regional stability and American
interests. The Iranian Revolution also made Saddam Hussein believe that he had an
opportunity to capitalize on Iran’s weakness. Following the revolution Saddam believed
that Iran would be weak trying to consolidate the revolution and deal with domestic
issues. It was also clear that Iran would not receive support from the US anymore,
especially following the hostage crisis. Saddam made a poor calculation believing that a
war with Iran would be a quick and relatively painless operation. The goal was
collapsing Iran’s new regime and consolidating Iraq’s regional power.
September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iran, Saddam had many other options other than
invading Iran it was a calculated risk attempting to capitalize on the current situation.
Although Saddam had other options it was clear that his fear of the new Iranian
45
government was justified. At the beginning of the war Iraq had some success and
penetrated Iranian territory. Six Iraqi army divisions entered Iran on three fronts in an
initially successful surprise attack, where they drove as far as eight kilometers inland and
occupied 1,000 square kilometers of Iranian territory.
65
This early success gave the Iraqi
military confidence that the invasion of Iran was a good move. Saddam and the Ba’athist
leadership underestimated Iran’s resilience, as the war took on the spirit of the revolution
and Iran took the war with Iraq as a spiritual mission. By 1982 the Iranian military had
evicted Iraqis from their territory. Iraq was willing to negotiate a cease fire at this time
seeing that war with Iran would not be an easy prospect, but Khomeini refused the cease
fire believing that Iran could defeat Iraq and remove Saddam and the Ba’athist leadership
from power.
The war had developed into a deadlock with both sides employing brutal
strategies. Iran utilized its human wave attacks which sent thousands of young Iranians
to their graves; the human wave strategy was also not very affective showing that
Khomeini would have a high tolerance for casualties even when little was being
accomplished. Both sides also bombed each others civilian population from the air in the
―war of the cities‖. This was an especially brutal tactic as it was done to terrorize the
opponent’s civilian population. This tactic also resulted in a mass exodus from the cities,
especially in Iran. Both sides also attempted to disrupt trade in the Gulf and hurt the
others economic interests. This strategy was called the ―war of the tankers‖ as Iran and
Iraq both attacked oil tankers and merchant ships in a strategy that resulted in billions of
dollars of lost oil income The attacks on tankers was one of the reasons for increased
65
Staff Writer, Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) Global Security Military section
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm
46
international participation. After numerous attacks on their vessels Kuwait lobbied for
outside protection of their tankers and the US and USSR both stepped in to prevent
disruption in the flow of oil.
to Iran.
67
66
This international intervention was a major disadvantage
There was also Iraq’s systematic use of chemical weapons on Iranians and
Iraqis.
Both countries’ leaders hold much of the blame for the lengthy and bloody nature
of the Iran-Iraq War as Saddam showed his brutal nature and Khomeini was idealistic and
unrealistic about Iran’s military capabilities. Both leaders also had personal issues with
the other nation, Saddam wanted to reverse previous humiliations at the hand of the Shah
particularly the Algiers Agreement of 1975. By 1982 the war had settled into a pattern of
bloody deadlock with little accomplished by either side. Khomeini was to rely on Iran’s
Shia culture of martyrdom and sacrifice to wage the war.
68
Iran had the considerably
larger population, but did not posses the military capacity of Iraq or the ability to acquire
the arms that it needed on the international market. As a result Iran would use human
wave attacks and get mowed down by the better equipped Iraq military. In 1983 Iraq
began the use of chemical weapons with the targets gradually expanding, Iraqi military
66
Roger Hardy, The Iran-Iraq War 25 Years On BBC News September 21, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4260420.stm
67
United States involvement was sealed by the May 17, 1987, Iraqi missile attack on the USS Stark, in
which thirty-seven crew members were killed. Baghdad apologized and claimed that the attack was a
mistake. Ironically, Washington used the Stark incident to blame Iran for escalating the war and sent its
own ships to the Gulf to escort eleven Kuwaiti tankers that were "reflagged" with the American flag and
had American crews. Iran refrained from attacking the United States naval force directly, but it used
various forms of harassment, including mines, hit-and-run attacks by small patrol boats, and periodic stopand-search operations. On several occasions, Tehran fired its Chinese-made Silkworm missiles on Kuwait
from Al Faw Peninsula. When Iranian forces hit the reflagged tanker Sea Isle City in October 1987,
Washington retaliated by destroying an oil platform in the Rostam field and by using the United States
Navy's Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) commandos to blow up a second one nearby.
68
Takeyh (2006), p. 199
47
commanders boasted of using ―insecticide‖ to ―exterminate the swarms of
69
mosquitoes‖.
During the war tremendous damage was done to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure
which had been developing prior to the start of the war. Iraq bombed the Bushehr
nuclear reactor site six times during the war (in March 1984, February 1985, March 1985,
July 1986 and twice in November 1987) this bombing campaign destroyed the entire core
area of both reactors.
70
International support for Iran’s nuclear development had
dwindled after the Islamic Revolution, but Iran had already acquired a substantial nuclear
infrastructure At the time of the Islamic Revolution the Bushehr-1 reactor was 90%
complete and 60% of the equipment had been installed, while the Bushehr-2 reactor was
50% complete.
71
The bombing of the Bushehr reactor sites was a considerable setback
to Iran’s nuclear development and an additional cost that Iran suffered in the war.
Although there was considerable damage to the nuclear reactors none of the main
equipment was installed yet and two of the steam generators were stored in Italy and the
pressure vessel for Bushehr-1 was stored in Germany. Iran’s nuclear development has
since become one of the most controversial issues in the international community.
An interesting episode in the war was that in 1981 Israel carried out an air strike
against Iraqi nuclear facilities in Osirak. The cooperation between Iran and Israel was
brief as Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 bringing Israel in direct conflict with the Shiites
in southern Lebanon, which were believed to be supported by Iran. It is not entirely clear
69
70
71
Takeyh (2006), p. 211
Sahimi (2003), part I p.5
Sahimi (2003), part I p.5
48
that Iran was still supporting the Shiites in southern Lebanon, but Iranian involvement in
the area went back to the Shah. It is hard to imagine Iran and Israel on the same side of
anything (although the cooperation was merely strategic for Iran and Israel) even if only
for a brief time. Khomeini had made opposition to Israel one of the cornerstones of his
ideology. The Israeli air strike of Iraq’s nuclear facilities was highly successful and
effectively eliminated Iraq’s hopes of developing a nuclear program. It is possible that
the same path will be pursued with Iran when their nuclear development has gone too far,
although Iraq’s nuclear facilities were concentrated in one area and Iran’s facilities are
scattered across the country. Israel may in fact bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities in the
future, but destroying them will be more difficult than it was in Iraq.
Saddam’s systematic use of chemical weapons against Iranians and his own
citizens went largely ignored by the international community. This was a clear sign of
how most of the Middle East and the Western world wanted the war to turn out. The war
was financed by oil money on both sides. Arab neighbor states contributed to Iraq, with
few exceptions the states of the region incurred financial deficits after registering
72
surpluses in the early 1980s, financing of the war was the main cause for these deficits.
Arab states supported Iraq because of the threat that Shiite Iran posed to the Sunni leaders
of the region who did not want to see other nations follow Iran’s lead in revolution. The
US and most of Europe said that they were neutral in the war, but it was clear through
arms sales and turning a blind eye to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons that this neutrality
was strongly tilted to Iraq. One State Department official explained in 1983 ―we don’t
give a damn as long as the Iran-Iraq carnage does not affect our allies in the region or
72
Haseet (1998), p. 13
49
alter the balance of power‖.
73
It was clear that the US supported Iraq over Iran, but the
outcome of the war was similar to what the State Department official described. In the
1981 Algiers Accord the US agreed to not interfere with internal affairs of Iran and
release ten billion in frozen Iranian assets, this formally ended relations with Iran,
although there was disagreement to the extent of the assets and the US never ratified the
accord.
74
In 1984 Donald Rumsfeld visited Iraq and restored diplomatic relations as part
of escalating support of Iraq.
75
The Iranian government estimates that 34,000 people died as a result of Iraq’s
chemical weapon attacks. These weapons were utilized by Saddam as a weapon of terror
with the purpose of frightening and demoralizing the populace.
76
The use of chemical
weapons by Iraq was effective because Iranian support for the war was waning in the late
stages of the war. Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and international complacency to their
use is one of the enduring legacies of the Iran-Iraq War. It is clear that Iranian officials
blame not only Iraq for using chemical weapons, but also the international community for
supplying Iraq with the materials and for quietly standing by while Iraq used what are
now referred to as weapons of mass destruction.
The US assisted Iraq in a number of ways including access to economic resources,
support in relevant international forums, most significantly real time satellite imagery
including Iranian troop movements and of course the blind eye that was turned on Iraq’s
73
Larry Everest, Fueling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter Z Magazine September 5, 2002
www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/ShalomIranIraq.html
74
75
76
Hadar (2005), p. 97
Hadar (2005), p. 123
Takeyh (2006), p. 142
50
development of biological and chemical weapons experimented on Iranian soldiers. This
complacency to the use of what is now labeled weapons of mass destruction was
shocking to Iran and added to their continual mistrust of the international community. By
1987 the US had effectively entered the war on the Iraqi side and responded to Iranian
attacks real or imagined.
77
In 1987 US implemented Operation Staunch a plan intended
to prevent Iranian victory this not only included sharing of satellite intelligence but also
included protection of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil tankers and brief naval confrontations with
Iranian ships in the Persian Gulf.
78
Partly as a legacy of the hostage crisis the US began a pattern of blaming Iran for
a number of incidents when they were not involved or it was certainly not clear that Iran
was to blame. In 1983 there was a suicide attack on the US embassy and the barrack in
Beirut. This incident scattered confidence in the region and led to the withdrawal of
peacekeeping forces from Lebanon (Reagan’s first foreign policy crisis). This incident
was blamed on Hezbollah and by extension Iran, but there was not much evidence to
79
back this claim.
There were also the Iraqi gas attacks that wiped out towns of Kurdish
citizens the worst taking place in Halabja on March 16, 1988; this was not ever
mentioned by the international community until Iraq invaded Kuwait. One US Defense
Department official attempted to blame Halabja on Iran, certainly not a high point for the
Defense Department.
80
There was also the USS Stark incident; the USS Stark became a
target of an Iraqi launched missile that resulted in the death of 37 US sailors on March
77
78
79
80
Hadar (2005), p. 166
Molavi (2002), p. 278
Hadar (2005), p. 202
Hadar (2005), p. 146
51
17, 1987. Reagan blamed the tragedy on Iran and described Iranians as ―barbaric‖ and
―the real villains‖, these reckless comments reverberated through Iran. This event
seemed to signal a shift in American attitudes the Islamic Republic was not just the
problem the people were now barbaric and evil, this was a dangerous generalization that
further alienated Iran from the international community.
81
Khomeini had refused numerous cease fire opportunities with Iraq and by 1985
82
there were open demonstrations against the war in Tehran and other major cities.
By
1988 Iran was exhausted and war weary, the steady stream of volunteers had been
reduced to a tickle compelling the regime to impose Draconian conscription measures
and more pragmatic officials such as Rafsanjani began to implore Khomeini that it was
time to end the war. The war had been useful in consolidating the revolutionary
governments’ power, but now it was threatening to undermine their regime as popular
disenchantment grew with demoralized youth and military grumblings.
83
The final event
that convinced Khomeini to end the war was the accidental shooting down of an Iran
Airbus by the USS Vincennes, it was a commercial flight and at first the US tried to deny
responsibility.
81
82
83
84
As a result of extreme negligence in the accident 290 people died.
Hadar (2005), p. 185
Molavi (2002), p. 133
Takeyh (2006), p. 209
84
The USS Vincennes was an American naval warship that was patrolling the Persian Gulf. The crew of
the USS Vincennes believed that the Iranian passenger jet, which was making a routine flight from Bandar
Abbas, Iran to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, was an F-14 fighter jet. The USS Vincennes was involved in
a skirmish with Iranian gunboats prior to shooting down the Iran Airbus. After the incident the US
government misrepresented an array of facts surrounding the incident attempting to absolve Captain
William Rogers and his crew from responsibility; including claiming that the jet was flying off course that
it was lowering its altitude that it was giving off improper signals that made it seem to be a F-14 fighter and
that the incident took place in international waters and that the USS Vincennes was acting in self defense.
Official inquiry by the US attributed the mistake to human error. Four years after the incident it was
52
Even though it was an embarrassment for the US and a tragedy for the civilians that were
killed, President Reagan awarded the captain of the USS Vincennes with a medal of
distinguished service.
85
This event caused many within Iran that had not been part of the
revolution to believe that the US was indeed the ―Great Satan‖. The US later apologized
for the incident (although not until 1996) and offered compensation to the victims
families, but it signaled to leadership in Iran that the US would escalate its involvement
86
in the war and attempt to dislodge the Islamic regime.
Finally in July 1988 Iran was forced to accept a UN mandated cease fire.
87
The
war was starting to threaten the revolutionary governments power as public support of the
war had been steadily declining. The Iranian leadership was forced to take a more realist
approach to their foreign policy as it became clear that toppling Saddam and the Ba’athist
regime was not possible. Iran had many disadvantages in the war which it could not
overcome; including the absence of allies, inability to obtain a steady source of weapons
88
and international isolation.
Most in the West believed that Iran lost the war, but to
many Iranians they had emerged with a sense of accomplishment as they did not lose
territory in the conflict. The odds were also stacked against Iran because of lack of
international support, this was productive in increasing national unity and also signaled
officially admitted that the USS Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters. In February 1996 the US
agreed to pay Iran 61.8 million dollars for the 248 Iranians that lost their life, 40 million dollars had already
been paid to other countries whose nationals were killed.
85
86
Ansari (2006), p. 168
Takeyh (2006), p. 221
87
Four major battles were fought from April to August 1988 in which the Iraqis routed or defeated the
Iranians. In the last major engagement before the August 1988 cease fire Iraqi forces penetrated deep into
Iranian territory and captured a huge amount of armor and artillery. The war ended when Iran accepted
United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 598, leading to a 20 August 1988 cease-fire.
88
Takeyh (2006), p. 197
53
the beginning of a less idealistic approach to international relations and ushered in a more
pragmatic approach.
89
Iran had once again shown its resilience as a nation and people.
The lack of support during the war also served to even further distance Iran from the rest
of the international community and increased the already pervasive distrust of the
international community.
There are not reliable figures available, but there were at least between one
million and a million and a half casualties in the Iran-Iraq War, with Iran losing probably
losing twice as many people as Iraq. There was also tremendous economic damage done
to both Iran and Iraq as hundreds of billions were lost financing the war and in lost oil
income (destroyed oil and tankers and damage to oil fields). Damage to Iran’s economy
was massive it is roughly estimated that Iran incurred 500 billion dollars in war damages,
including lost oil income and damage to oil fields.
90
Many of the economic conditions
that the war helped create have still not been dealt with. Iraq was also economically
devastated by the war (also accumulating close to 500 billion in war damages) and
effectively stopping Saddam’s ambitious economic development. The war was
unnecessarily protracted and bloody and little change actually resulted from it. Virtually
none of the issues that led to the outbreak of the war were resolved the conditions that
existed prior to the war were largely unchanged. The UN cease fire merely stopped the
fighting and Iran and Iraq emerged as isolated states that would continue there arms race.
Although the leadership from Iran and Iraq are largely to blame for the long and bloody
nature of the war it was actually effective in consolidating both regimes’ power. For
89
90
Ansari (2006), p. 160
Hunter (1992), p. 55
54
Saddam Hussein and nations that supported him preventing Iran from gaining influence
in the region was the main goal.
International involvement in the Iran-Iraq War had a tremendous effect on the
outcome. The US, France and West Germany and others funneled arms to both sides, but
for the most part support was given to Iraq.
91
While the international community
supported Iraq for the most part, by selling arms to both sides the international
community contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This war was important
to the international community because the region controls over half of the world’s oil
reserves. US support of Iraq as proved to be very shortsighted as the US as since waged
two wars against Iraq and Saddam’s regime. The international community ignored Iraq’s
use of chemical weapons on Iranians and Iraqis during the war, Iraq was sold chemicals
that had dual uses, but it was clear that these chemicals would be used for weapons not
fertilizer. Complacency about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and international support
of Iraq further isolated Iran from the international community and deepened Iran’s
distrust of the international community.
The Iran-Iraq War has an enduring legacy in Iran beyond deepening distrust for
the international community. During the war martyrdom and sacrifice became the
themes of Iran’s national policy and effective tools of propaganda. The war took on the
spirit of the Islamic Revolution (Iran defending itself and Islam from attack) and helped
consolidate the revolutionary government’s power. Even today it is rare to find a family
in Iran that has not been affected by the war.
91
92
92
Flights on Iran Air sometimes still have
Molavi (2002), p. 278
Takeyh (2006), p. 201
55
prayers to remember martyrs of the ―sacred defense‖.
93
The war has taken over for the
revolution as the most influential event to the younger generation in Iran in shaping their
world view. The affect of this as been that the younger generation is not as antiAmerican as those of the revolution generation. In the Islamic Revolution America was
the ―Great Satan‖ and resistance to American hegemony was a cornerstone of the
ideology. The war generation is more dismissive of the US believing that Iran can simply
avoid interaction with the US. The US is not seen in a positive light, but resistance to the
US is not seen as a key component of foreign policy. By utilizing other centers of power
the need to engage the US can be eliminated although this strategy may not be very
realistic. Many within Iran believe that through the rapidly developing relations between
Iran and other centers of power especially China and Russia that Iran can avoid the need
to engage the US.
The human and economic costs of the Iran-Iraq War were enormous. Many in
Iran and Iraq are still affected by loses during the war and the economic conditions that
the war helped create have still not been dealt with. The heavy costs of the war were
largely futile as little was accomplished by either side. It was clear that the war was also
much longer than it should have been as the leadership of both Iran and Iraq contributed
to the protracted nature of the conflict. For Iran the war initially served to consolidate the
revolutionary government’s power, but as the war dragged on it threatened to undermine
the government’s power. The war also increased Iran’s distrust of the international
community and further alienated Iran from the rest of the world. Iran also emerged
weary of war and has not been involved in a major military conflict since. The war also
93
Molavi (2002), p. 295
56
changed Iran’s course in foreign policy. After the revolution Iran attempted to pursue an
expansionist foreign policy; whereby Iran would transform the region and influence
revolutions in other countries. After the war Iran was much more pragmatic in their
foreign policy as it became clear that exporting the revolution had been largely
ineffective. The state of the economy also forced Iran to pursue a more pragmatic
approach as Iran was increasingly isolated from international markets.
57
Chapter 3: Iran’s Nuclear Program Past and Future
Iran’s developing nuclear program is currently one of the most controversial
issues in the international community. The US has led the charge of nations attempting
to prevent Iran from enriching uranium which the US believes is being done to develop
nuclear weapons. Iran has denied these allegations and claim that their nuclear
development is only for civilian not military application. Iran’s nuclear program is a
complicated issue, it enjoyed wide international support prior to the Islamic Revolution
and since Iran is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a
signature to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which gives Iran the right to develop their
nuclear program and enrich uranium. Prior to the Islamic Revolution in the early 1970s
the US, West Germany, France and South Africa assisted in construction of the
infrastructure for nuclear power plants, but after the revolution and hostage crisis Iran
was no longer an ally of the US, which not only stopped US cooperation with Iran’s
nuclear program the US also sought to halt other nations’ aid in Iran’s nuclear
development. It was widely suspected that the Shah had ambitions of developing nuclear
weapons or at least obtaining the technology that would allow Iran to quickly cross the
nuclear threshold.
The Iran-Iraq War slowed Iran’s nuclear development, but in the
1990s Iran once again pursued development of its nuclear program. The nuclear program
is also controversial within Iran as those in favor of nuclear proliferation believe that Iran
needs a nuclear weapon as a deterrent those opposed to nuclear proliferation believe that
Iran’s developing nuclear program is actually harmful to Iranian interests.
58
Iran began developing a nuclear program in the 1950s under the Shah. The initial
progress was slow until the late 1960s when the US-supplied 5MW thermal nuclear
reactor went online at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.
94
In 1968 Iran signed the
NPT in an effort to speed up its negotiations for nuclear agreements, particularly with the
US in 1970 Iran ratified the NPT and its obligations went into force. In 1973 the Shah
embarked on an ambitious goal of modernizing the country and improving the nation’s
image abroad. The Shah pursued this goal by shifting the nation’s resources toward the
military and the newly established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), this
program was spurred by the tremendous increase in oil revenues. The nuclear program
was started with the assistance of West Germany, France and South Africa with
construction of the infrastructure of nuclear plants and about forty billion dollars were
earmarked for an ambitious project with the purpose of constructions of at least twenty
95
reactors.
Iran completed contracts for the construction of nuclear plants and the supply of
nuclear fuel; with the US in 1974; Germany in 1976; and France in 1977. In 1974 the US
signed a ten-year agreement to supply Iran with enriched uranium, while in the same year
Iran announced its intention to order five nuclear power plants from France. Canada
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran and British aided in training of Iran’s
nuclear scientists. In 1976 Iran also purchased a stake in the RTZ uranium mine in
Rossing, Namibia also in 1976 the government signed a 700 million dollar contract to
purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa and send Iranian technicians abroad for
94
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Takeyh (2006), p.94
59
training in nuclear science.
96
The fact that most of these agreements were not honored
after the Islamic Revolution has convinced some that Iran needs to enrich uranium on its
own soil. Contracts and agreements with other nations can not be relied on, especially
with the US applying pressure on nations to not cooperate with Iran’s nuclear
development. Prior to the revolution the international community was for the most part
supportive of Iran’s developing nuclear program and few questions where raised about
Iran’s need for nuclear energy even through Iran was an oil rich nation. This question is
often raised today in reference to Iran’s need for nuclear energy and used as evidence of
Iran’s goal of developing nuclear weapons.
While the international community was largely quiet about the development of
Iran’s nuclear program there was still a great deal of suspicion that the Shah had
ambitions of developing nuclear weapons. It seems clear now that the Shah did want to
develop nuclear weapons or at least give Iran the capability of quickly developing nuclear
weapons. The Shah’s former foreign minister Ardeshir Zahedi said, ―The Iranian
strategy at the time was aimed at creating what is known as surge capacity, that is to say
to have the know-how, the infrastructure and the personnel needed to develop a nuclear
military capacity within a short period of time without actually doing so‖.
97
The
assumption within the policy making elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop
and test a nuclear device within eighteen months.
98
European states (such as Germany
and France) that are now calling for Iran to suspend enrichment were busy selling Iran
96
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98
Takeyh (2006), p. 110
Takeyh (2006), p. 110
60
technology that could easy be used for military purposes.
99
The states that helped
establish Iran’s nuclear program prior to the revolution are now calling for its suspension.
These kind of belated concerns add to Tehran’s claims of hypocrisy of the great powers;
only certain nations should have nuclear capabilities, the support of Iran’s nuclear
100
program prior to the revolution and the iniquitous nature of the NPT and IAEA.
Under the Shah the international community was supportive of Iran’s nuclear
development, but following the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis Iran has had to
work harder to obtain the needed technology and equipment for developing their nuclear
program. During the Shah’s rule the international community supported Iran’s nuclear
development because if Iran had nuclear power it would free up more oil to be traded on
the international market and it was profitable to sell Iran nuclear equipment.
During the first decade of the Islamic Revolution the revolutionary government
was not able to aggressively pursue its nuclear program because it was too busy
consolidating power and with the war with Iraq. The war also slowed Iran’s nuclear
development because Iran’s reactors where bombed several times during the war. For
Khomeini and other members of the clerical elite there was debate whether nuclear
weapons were in line with Islam, the indiscriminate nature of nuclear weapons was seen
by some as inconsistent with Islamic canons of war.
101
Nuclear weapons were
controversial among clerics, but Iran had a lot of external threats and its experience in the
Iran-Iraq War heightened Iranian distrust of the international community. Iran also had
99
Dueck and Takeyh (2007), p. 3
100
101
Takeyh (2006), p. 119
Takeyh (2006), p. 130
61
to turn to other nations to obtain nuclear technology as relations with the West and
especially the US were not good. Pakistan in 1987 and China in 1990 signed nuclear
cooperation agreements with Iran. Iran also started negotiating with Russia even though
Russia had been an ally of Iraq. A greater focus was put on nuclear infrastructure
beginning during Rafsanjani’s presidency in the early 1990s and was continued by
Khatami’s Reformist government.
Successive US administrations regardless of political affiliation have attempted to
thwart Iran’s nuclear ambitions and stop or delay Iran’s nuclear development. Although
Iran has made advances in its nuclear program Washington has scored impressive gains
and managed to delay and frustrate Iran’s quest for nuclear technology. The Reagan
administration succeeded in obtaining Europe’s agreement to rigorous export controls on
dual use technologies and getting Germany to abandon its cooperation with Iran’s nascent
nuclear program.
102
The US had been successful in slowing Iran’s nuclear development,
but there were always emerging sources of nuclear technology and equipment that Iran
could pursue. In 1990 Iran began negotiations with Russia over the completion of the
Bushehr reactors and the supply of additional nuclear plants. In 1995 Russia formally
announced that it would complete the construction of the Bushehr reactors and signed an
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agreement that it would complete construction of three additional reactors at the site.
George H. Bush and Bill Clinton both attempted to deter Russia from aiding in Iran’s
nuclear development with selective sanctions and the promise of expanded economic ties.
A number of accords were negotiated most notably the December 1995 accord hammered
102
Takeyh (2006), p. 137
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out by Al Gore and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in which Russia agreed to limit
its cooperation with Iran to work on one unit of the Bushehr plant, Russia in essence
agreed to not provide additional reactors or fuel-cycle assistance to Iran. By 2000 the
agreement had fallen apart as the lure of profits and strategic cooperation between Tehran
and Moscow began to dissuade Vladimir Putin from more robust cooperation with the
104
US.
Despite continuous diplomatic pressure and lobbying by the US the international
community was largely complacent in the development of Iran’s nuclear program. Many
in the international community believed that Iran’s nuclear development had slowed due
to US pressure and Iran’s economic problems. In the international community
development of the nuclear program in Iran was overshadowed by Iran’s other
controversial behavior including supporting of terrorism, opposition to the IsraelPalestine peace process and quest for missile technology and chemical weapons. The
complacent attitude towards Iran’s nuclear program was forced to change in August 2002
as a series of revelations forced Washington to revise its intelligence assessments and
Iran’s nuclear program proved to be further along than it was previously believed to be.
First the opposition group the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed
extensive facilities for uranium enrichment in Natanz about 200 miles south of Tehran
(the NCRI will be discussed later). The Natanz facility contained 160 centrifuges which
are needed for uranium enrichment with another 1000 centrifuges under construction
Iran’s plan was to reach 50,000 centrifuges completed within two years, which would
104
Takeyh (2006), p.149
63
give Iran the capability to produce several bombs a year.
105
It also appeared that Iran
had been active in the development of the plutonium route to nuclear capabilities; the
heavy water facilities in Esfahan and nearly completed plants in Arak pointed to the fact
that Iran’s plutonium enrichment capabilities were more advanced than previously
anticipated.
106
An even more distressing sign was that it appeared that the nuclear program was
reaching a point of self-sufficiency and no longer need other nations’ aid or equipment
and will be able to produce their own weapons grade uranium.
This is problematic
because it makes traditional counter proliferation measures ineffective, such as more
rigorous export controls and curtailment of external assistance. The elimination of outside
assistance will not be effective in slowing Iran’s nuclear development. On March 25th
2004 President Rafsanjani stated ―that we are on the verge of a nuclear breakout is true‖,
Ali Akbar Salehi former representative to the IAEA confirmed later that same month
Iran’s nuclear progress in stating ―We have found the way and we do not have any
scientific problems‖. In April 2006 president Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had
assembled 164 centrifuges and was actually enriching uranium. This made it clear that
Iran was aggressively moving forward in its nuclear program and that they had overcome
107
many technological hurdles.
Although Iran is further along in the development of
their nuclear program than the international community had previously anticipated it is
still difficult to predict how close they are to developing nuclear weapon capabilities and
105
A centrifuge a piece of equipment that rotates around a fixed axis when used for nuclear purposes it
separates isotopes which is necessary for enriching uranium. To produce enough enriched uranium for
nuclear weapons thousands of centrifuges are needed.
106
107
Takeyh (2006), p. 141
Takeyh (2006), p. 147
64
intelligence on Iran’s level of development has been questioned. The intelligence that
Iran’s nuclear program is nearing the point of self-sufficiency can certainly be questioned
as it was provided by Israeli intelligence and could be politically motivated. Israeli
Intelligence Maj. Gen. Aharon Ze'evi (Farkash) announced on TV Channel 1 in midAugust 2003: "We think that next summer, if Iran is not stopped, it will reach selfsufficiency and this is the point of no return. After this self-capability, it will take them
some two years to make a nuclear bomb".
108
If these initial predictions were correct Iran
would have or could have acquired a nuclear weapon by 2005. Most European and
American estimates have Iran five to ten years from gaining the technology to make
nuclear weapons; although some in Israel have claimed that Iran is only two years away
nuclear weapon capabilities.
It is impossible to judge if Iran is approaching a turning point, but it is reasonable
to suppose at some point in the future there will be a crisis (regarding Iran’s nuclear
development) and the regime will either survive or disappear and the relationship with
the US will either sharply deteriorate or will see a thawing of the ice that has held the two
109
nations apart since the revolution.
Political power is always tenuous in Iran, but Iran
has proven to be a very resilient nation the post revolutionary government is not likely to
topple in the near future. Relations between Iran and the US seem to be deteriorating in
the past few years, but the relations have never reached a crisis point and both nations
have shown a degree of restraint. The US would be best served to attempt to negotiate
with the current Iranian government rather than calling for regime changes or forcing
108
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Howard (2004), p.12
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concessions before negotiations take place. More powerful than reforms and improved
international relations is the demographic shift accruing in Iran. Iranian young peoples’
values and attitudes are profoundly different from those in power as the younger
generation has no memories of the revolution.
110
Many Iranian youths are fascinated
with Western culture and vacation in Western rather than Eastern locations. Iranian
youth float the Islamic regime even if it is by wearing prohibited cloths or watching
satellite TV, which is also illegal but widely viewed. The younger generation in Iran is
profoundly different from the revolutionary generation, but repairing US-Iranian relations
will be an uphill battle, given the history of rocky relations.
Iran and the US have both made many missteps in their relations and have failed
to capitalize on chances to improve relations. One of the US’s greatest problems in
dealing with Iran has been a reliance on threats of force not diplomacy and the American
government has tried to deal with Iran with a blueprint theory as opposed to practical
approach that is focused on specific issues and not history.
111
America deals with Iran
and others with a moral confidence and has a tendency to view the world in black and
white terms; good versus evil taking a simplistic view of complex issues forcing an all or
nothing approach. Reagan referred to the USSR has the ―evil empire‖ and George W.
Bush with his ―axis of evil‖ comment. This kind of approach vastly over simplifies
112
complex issues.
Iranian and American leaders have a lot in common with a grand
vision of the world and view their nation as morally superior to others. In the case of
110
111
112
Howard (2004), p.18
Howard (2004), p.35
Howard (2004), p.50
66
Iran, American lawmakers and the media often characterize the entire nation as evil when
there is a tremendous amount of dissent within the nation. Portraying the Iranian nation
as evil or mad only hardens the Iranian publics’ resolve against the US and reinforces
Iran’s perceived need for a nuclear deterrent.
The revelations by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) of Iran’s
nuclear development were a wake up call to the international community, but there is
some doubt to their credibility. The NCRI was traditionally recognized as the political
wing of the Mojahideen-e Khalq Organization (MKO/MEK), which had been banned as
a terrorist organization by the United States and several European countries. The MKO
was deeply involved in the overthrow of the Shah, but found themselves at odds with the
religious wing of the revolution and there was a widespread suppression of the
movement. The MKO leadership first fled to France and somewhat imprudently
relocated to Iraq in1986. There in the words of one historian is when the organization
113
completed its transformation from a political organization to a cult.
Even further
alienating the group from the Iranian public the group accepted aid from Saddam during
the Iran-Iraq War.
It is surprising that United States officials would be so quick to except
information from an organization that is classified as a terrorist group.
114
Despite the
MKO’s classification as a terrorist organization and the NCRI association with them the
113
Ansari (2006), p. 198
114
The MKO has targeted Iranian government officials and government facilities in Iran and abroad. In
the early 1970s the MKO, due to America’s support of the Shah, killed several American soldiers and
civilians working on defense projects in Iran and the group also supported the holding of American
hostages during the hostage crisis. The MKO is linked to a list of terrorist attacks and the death of several
Iranian government officials although the MKO’s involvement in terrorism has decreased since 2001
Staff Writer, Military: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) Global Security
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm.
67
NCRI has enjoyed good access to a number of lawmakers in the US and Europe. The
NCRI has lobbied lawmakers to take the MKO off of the list of terrorist organizations
and recognize the NCRI as an official opposition to the Islamic Republic. This is an
ironic position given anti-American pedigree of the organization (it began as an Islamic
Marxist movement deeply antithetical to American imperialism) and its alleged
involvement in the assassination of US personnel in Iran during the 1970’s.
115
There
have also been questions to how the NCRI obtained the information of Iran’s secret
nuclear development.
Given the dubious nature of the NCRI and the questionable reliability of the
information there have been a lot of doubts about current intelligence on Iran’s nuclear
program. Adding to these doubts is faulty American intelligence used as an excuse to
invade Iraq. Even with the NCRI’s association to terrorism they have a highly effective
public relations campaign, which has been able to give them an image of a legitimate
opposition group in the American media. Providing the world with the information of
Iran’s nuclear development has enhanced the NCRI’s international credibility. Despite
the MKO’s and NCRI’s effective international public relations campaign the organization
has little support within Iran.
Some American (including Republican Congressman Tom Toncredo of Colorado,
Democratic Congressman Bob Filner of California, Republican Senator Kit Bond of
Missouri and former Attorney General John Ashcroft) and European lawmakers and
Iranians living outside of Iran have attempted to legitimize the MKO as a realistic
opposition to the Islamic regime in Iran, but this organization will never get widespread
115
Ansari (2006), p. 198
68
support within Iran. In 2007 the MKO was taken off the UK’s list of terrorist groups and
numerous members of the US congress have signed letters several times supporting
removing MKO from the list of terrorist groups. Almost no Iranian citizen, even if they
are opposed to the Islamic regime is going to be willing to support an organization that
received aid from Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Western Diplomats such as
former Swiss ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann have criticized American and European
legislators support of the MKO and NCRI and argue that any positive developments from
the association will be far outweighed by negative results.
116
It is clear that the US can
be labeled as a hypocrite for their support of the NCRI; the US claims to be the leader in
the war against terrorism, but support a group that is classified by the American
government as a terrorist organization. This also makes American claims that Iran is the
number one sponsor of terrorism internationally seem politically motivated.
The information provided by the NCRI was treated in the American media has
evidence (although the reliability of the information is questionable) that Iran had for
decades been secretly developing their nuclear program, but this is simply not true. The
information simply suggested that Iran was further along in their nuclear program than
previously thought and this information did not contain hard evidence to these claims. It
was well known that Iran had a nuclear program as the US had aided in early
development of Iran’s nuclear program. It was a matter of common knowledge that Iran
had discovered uranium deposits estimated to exceed 5000 tons in 1985.
117
Iranian
officials also claimed that they had done nothing wrong because their actions were in line
116
117
Ansari (2006), p. 199
Ansari (2006), p. 200
69
with safeguards of the NPT which stated that Iran only had to notify the IAEA when they
intended to begin enriching uranium. The revealed nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak
were only engaged in preparations to enrich uranium. The secrecy of the preparations
Iranian officials argued was due to nuclear powers not fulfilling their obligations under
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the NPT by facilitating Iran’s development of its civil nuclear program.
Iranian officials are quick to point to the double standards applied to Iran’s
nuclear development and some question the benefits of being involved in the NPT and
IAEA. Israel, and more recently, India and Pakistan had gone nuclear. None of these
nations were signatories to the NPT, but it still seemed Iran was being treated unfairly.
This also enhanced the hard-liner argument that Iran should simply pull out of the NPT as
they are not receiving any benefits for their membership and are targets of uneven
application of the treaty. Neither India nor Pakistan suffered greatly from their decisions
to develop nuclear weapons (in 1998) and this development probably encouraged Iran to
accelerate their program.
119
The tremendous pressure that Iran has come under due to
their nuclear development has strengthened hard-line arguments that Iran should take the
path of a rogue nation in its nuclear development. International pressure on Iran has also
backfired in the Iranian public as Iranians are tired of their perceived unfair treatment in
the development of Iran’s nuclear program and the program threatens to become a
nationalist symbol.
Iran has had a long a turbulent history of involvement in the NPT and IAEA. The
US has used the IAEA as a means of slowing Iran’s nuclear development and claims that
118
119
Ansari (2006), p. 201
Ansari (2006), p. 201
70
Iran is secretly developing nuclear weapons capabilities. Iranian officials believe that the
NPT and IAEA are being used for political means by the US to trifle their nuclear
development and point to Israel’s development of nuclear weapons, which went along
without any interference from the IAEA as evidence of the political nature of the agency.
After the NCRI revealed the secret nuclear facilities the IAEA began to require more
stringent inspections of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA in August 2003 provided
evidence of technical violations of the NPT by revealing that in the 1990s Iran carried out
113 uranium conversion experiments. During the IAEA inspection in June 2003,
environmental samples taken from chemical traps of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at
120
Nantanz revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium.
Iran was criticized by the
IAEA Director-General Mohamed El-Baradei for not being transparent in the
construction of its nuclear facilities and the import of nuclear material, but the IAEA
stopped short of declaring Iran in violation of the NPT. In June 2004 the IAEA board
voted to reprimand Iran for not providing the agency with more timely and
121
comprehensive support.
Iran has had some violations of the NPT, but for the most part has been
cooperative with the IAEA and has attempted to engage in constructive diplomacy with
the agency. On October 21, 2003 Iran announced that it would cooperate with the IAEA
with full transparency and disclosure, sign the Additional Protocol and commence its
ratification procedures and suspend all enrichment and reprocessing procedures for an
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interim period. On December 18, 2003 Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT
122
which allowed for snap inspections of its nuclear facilities by IAEA experts.
Iran has
had a contentious relationship with the IAEA, but they have not pursued the path of a
rogue nation and have been receptive to diplomacy. Some US and IAEA officials have
continued to claim that Iran is developing an underground nuclear weapons program, but
there has been little proof of these allegations. Given Iran’s history of deceit regarding
their nuclear program they will not be given any leeway by the IAEA.
On November 29, 2004 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
putting into effect the NPT Safeguards Agreement which forced Iran to suspend all
nuclear related activities until an investigation takes place. The Iranian government
voluntarily agreed to the resolution, but stressed that Iran had no intention of abandoning
their nuclear program and that the agreement was temporary. On November 2, 2004
IAEA inspectors sought access to two secret Iranian military sites where the NCRI
claimed that nuclear activities had taken place: Parchin and Lavizan II.
123
In March
2005 Iran refused IAEA inspectors request for a second visit of Parchin, which Iranian
officials said was unnecessary. On August 1, 2005 Iran notified the IAEA of its decision
124
to resume enriching uranium.
This decision to resume enrichment of uranium has
caused an international uproar as it is seen as a breach of previous agreements. Iran has
repeatedly pointed to its membership in the NPT which offers Iran the inalienable right of
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enriching uranium as long as it is used for peaceful purposes. Article IV of the NPT
states nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the
Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty. Iranian officials are correct that uranium enrichment is a right granted in the
NPT, but the decision to resume enrichment of uranium has hardened international
resolve against Iran’s nuclear program. US officials such as Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice have also claimed that Iran has given up their right to enrich uranium
because they are secretly developing nuclear weapons.
The IAEA resolution passed on September 24, 2005 leaving the door open for
future referral to the UN Security Council, repeated negotiations and threats were
ineffective and the resolution was adopted on February 4, 2006 to refer Iran to the
Security Council. The resolution was passed with 27 votes of approval, 5 abstentions and
3 opposing votes; this was the first time that China and Russia agreed to go alone with
the US against Iran.
125
The fact that China and Russia voted in line with the US was a
tremendous disappointment to Iran as Iran had hoped to marginalize US power by
cooperating with China and Russia. This made it clear that Russia and China were not
willing to go against America in Iran as the US is a much greater international power and
holds the threat of economic sanctions for states that cooperate with the development of
Iran’s nuclear program. Referral to the UN Security Council is a serious step and could
signal a more aggressive international effort to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Many in and
125
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73
out of Iran fear that referral to the Security Council is the first step towards a military
confrontation with Iran.
Since Iran has been referred to the Security Council the council has made three
demands; first that Iran freeze its enrichment of uranium, second that Iran stop building
heavy water facilities and third that Iran fully comply with the IAEA. The Security
Council is now considering further sanctions against Iran including mandatory travel
bans on people listed by the UN, subject more companies to sanctions and ban the trade
of more items, bans on export guarantees to Iran and expansion of nuclear embargo to an
arms embargo.
126
On March 3, 2008 the Security Council tightened UN sanctions on
Iran 14 of the 15 members of the council voted in favor of Resolution 1803 which was
the third time in 15 months that economic and trade sanctions were leveled against
Iran.
127
Iran has been largely defiant to the new threats from the UN and still insists on
its right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program. President Ahmadinejad has blasted
the referral to the Security Council and threatened to drop out of the NPT. Referral to the
Security Council has caused hard-liners to take a more defiant stance, but it has caused
some in Iran to call for restraint and engagement with the international community.
Supreme Leader Khamenei has even criticized the aggressive stance that president
Ahmadinejad has taken.
128
This was seen has a big development because Khamenei has
126
Staff Writer, UN Threatens New Sanctions on Iran CNN News February 23, 2007
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/23/iran.nuclear.ap/
127
The latest set of sanctions include an outright ban on travel by officials involved in Iran’s nuclear and
missile programs and broadens the list of individuals subject to an assets freeze. It also calls for more
inspections of shipments to and from Iran and greater scrutiny of banks’ activities in Iran.
128
On certain occasions, he has indirectly or diplomatically criticized Ahmadinejad for his rhetoric, for
some of his choices, etc. Other individuals close to Ayatollah Khamenei have criticized Ahmadinejad for
his actions. For example, in July 2008 when Ahmadinejad was introducing three new ministers for his
74
previously supported Ahmadinejad and his belligerent tactics. Ahmadinejad’s power
base was further damaged by the most recent elections of the Assembly of Experts and
municipal councils as Ahmadinejad’s conservatives did poorly and there was a clear shift
in support to former president Rafsanjani and his party (to be discussed further in the next
chapter).
When Iran signed the Additional Protocol it was seen as a diplomatic
breakthrough.
129
The success was short lived as the US and Iranian hard-liners made the
negotiations a painful and ultimately doomed process. Iranian diplomats worked hard
with their European counterparts to hammer out a deal, but there were continued threats
by Iranian hard-liners that Iran would not stop its nuclear development. American
officials were content to let the Europeans do the negotiating, but would periodically
intervene and sabotage the process.
130
Iranian officials came to the conclusion that no
Cabinet, he tried to get approval from the Iranian Parliament by saying that these folks had the blessing of
the Supreme Leader. Then an editor of a conservative newspaper that is very close to Ayatollah Khamenei
came out and criticized the president publicly and said, ―You have misconstrued what the Supreme Leader
told you in private.‖ That’s the type of thing you see—a number of people who speak for the Supreme
Leader in that type of a context. But I think by and large, on the main issues—i.e., on the nuclear
confrontation—he has been supportive of the president, but for example, when it came to questioning and
politicizing the Holocaust, Khamenei did not necessarily come to Ahmadinejad’s defense and was quite
silent on the issue. Boroujerdi p.1
129
On 18 December 2003, Ambassador Salehi of Iran and the Director General of the IAEA signed an
Additional Protocol to Iran's NPT safeguards agreement, granting Agency inspectors greater authority in
verifying the country's nuclear program. Iran has stated that it is acting in accordance with the Protocol's
provisions, pending the Protocol's formal entry into force. The Additional Protocol requires States to
provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities and grants the Agency broader rights of access
to sites in the country -Staff Report, Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards International
Atomic Energy Agency December 18, 2003 www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html.
130
In 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a number of resolutions on the implementation of
safeguards in Iran. The resolution adopted without a vote in November 2004 mainly welcomed Iran’s
voluntary decision ―to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities,‖ and requests that the Director-General continue verifying the maintenance of the suspension of
Iran’s voluntary decision to suspend its enrichment activities. Although the United States attempted to
include stronger words with the goal to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for possible economic
sanctions, the resolution was addressed in a relatively milder tone. The EU 3 (France, Germany and the
United Kingdom) initiated negotiations with Iran during the fall of 2004 and reached an agreement under
75
agreement with Europe would be worth the paper it was signed on unless America was
involved to guarantee it.
131
American and Iranian compromise went against the basic
tenets of Iranian hard-liners and American hawks seemed to doubt the effectiveness of
IAEA, NPT and the diplomatic process. Great efforts were made by European and
Iranian diplomats, but they were unable to overcome the contentious atmosphere created
by Iranian and American hard-liners. America finally came on board with the Europeans
and supported the initiative which would provide Iran with spare parts from American
civilian airliners and remove America’s veto to Iran joining the World Trade
Organization. This was a fairly innovative offer, but Iranian officials were too proud to
accept America’s leftovers; also negotiations for Iran to enter the World Trade
Organization would have taken years to finalize.
132
Although the negotiations fell
through it showed that Iranian diplomats were competent and willing to compromise.
One of the greatest hurdles in effective nuclear diplomacy with Iran has been a
lack of trust from both the US and Iran. The US has taken the most hard-line stance
against Iran’s nuclear development with the EU and European diplomats taking a more
balanced and legalistic approach to diplomacy. When Iran agreed to sign the Additional
Protocol it was seen as a big diplomatic step in dealing with Iran’s nuclear development,
which Iran pledged to temporarily suspend all enrichment–related activities, and to allow the IAEA to
verify this suspension. At the March 2005 Board of Governors meeting, the United States again tried to
refer Iran to the UN Security Council. While Dr. ElBaradei emphasized that full cooperation and full
openness from Iran is essential to come to a conclusion and provide assurance, he also underlined that
IAEA inspectors are making good progress in verifying Iran’s nuclear program. However, concerns remain
over Iranian statements that imply that it would resume enriching uranium. At the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, the United States accused Iran of being in non-compliance with its NPT obligations, stating
that ―Iran has made clear its determination to retain the nuclear infrastructure it secretly built in violation of
its NPT safeguards obligations…‖ -Staff Writer, NTI Tutorial Iran Nuclear Threat Initiative 2007
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_iran.html
131
132
Ansari (2006), p.223
Ansari (2006), p. 224
76
but the Additional Protocol was in many ways showpiece event. US pressure was
mounting and many Iranian officials believed that Iran needed to come to some kind of
agreement to constrain American aggression. Signing the Additional Protocol was only a
temporary solution as nothing was done to deal with the underlying problem of lack of
trust. Whereas the Additional Protocol was only briefly successful it showed that Iran
was at least receptive diplomatic dialogue. American diplomacy was going in the
opposite direction and was resorting to a more confrontational approach. The Additional
Protocol was also doomed to failure because Iranian and European diplomats had
different understandings of the agreement. European diplomats thought that the
Additional Protocol was the completion of the negotiations, whereas Iranian diplomats
believed negotiations were a work in progress that must be worked on further, showing
that productive nuclear diplomacy will be difficult but not impossible.
Another obstacle to productive nuclear diplomacy came after the Parliamentary
elections in 2004. It was clear that there was blatant electoral fraud in the elections as
thousands of candidates were barred from running by the Guardian Council, many were
Reformist candidates. Hard-liners correctly predicted that the international community
would remain silent to the fraudulent elections. Many within Iran did not believe that the
elections would be allowed to stand or at least Supreme Leader Khamenei would
intervene and urge the Guardian Council to show more balance.
133
This election was a
great blow to the recent democratic development in Iran and would certainly make
diplomacy with Iran more difficult. Western politicians were largely quite about the
rigged election and some even used it saying that it was proof that Iran was opposed to
133
Ansari (2006), p. 210
77
reform. Far from condemning the rigged election, the West seemed to prefer the
conservatives. In the words of one somewhat naïve Western diplomat ―These are issues
that we have to deal with security people-in other words the conservatives…. The
reformists have never been in the loop on these kinds of things. Having conservatives
running everything may not be a reflection of the will of the Iranian public, but it will
probably make our job as diplomats trying to deal with the people that matter much
easier‖.
134
These kinds of attitudes showed by the Western diplomat are not only
counterproductive, but dangerous. It is clear that since hard-liners took power that
diplomacy with Iran has been much more difficult. The inaction of Western powers to
the election seemed to show that Western powers didn’t believe that the Iran was ready
for democracy. The West was supposedly supporting democracy in the Middle East in
Iraq (although no one believes this to be the goal) but was unwilling to do anything to
promote democracy in Iran. This also showed that Western diplomats had no concern for
the Iranian public and only were concerned with self interest. It is doubtful that Western
diplomats could have had any effect on the elections, but the results should have at least
been protested, this would have at least shown that the West was concerned with the
promotion of democracy.
There was some mild Western criticism of the elections EU spokesman, Diego de
Ojeda, told reporters it was clear that the elections had not been held according to
international standards and UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said the "flawed" polls
134
Ansari (2006), p.215
78
would have an impact on EU trade talks with Iran.
135
No action was taken to protest the
election because it is unlikely that they would be effective and Western diplomats
preferred to attempt to attempt to deal with the new government rather than protest them
which could have further alienated Iran from the diplomatic process. The new Parliament
136
was stacked with hard-liners and had no intention of ratifying the Additional Protocol.
The new Parliament also had to attempt to rally support since the election was not a
reflection of the Iranian publics’ will. The Iranian government would take a more
nationalist approach and attempt to rally support around an issue to blind the public to the
election fraud. Iran’s nuclear program would become the issue that hard-liners could
rally support for.
Within Iran development of the nuclear program is controversial, although
momentum is swinging towards nuclear proliferation. Development of a nuclear program
and nuclear weapons can offer a great deal of international prestige as it is an exclusive
club of states that posse nuclear capabilities. To Iranians it also seems like Israel and the
US are never satisfied with the endless inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities and that
the NPT and IAEA are applied in an uneven manner and with political motives. Iran also
faces a lot of external pressures and has few allies; this condition leads some to believe
that Iran needs nuclear weapons as a deterrent. There are also those in Iran that believe
pursuing a nuclear program against the international communities’ wishes is
counterproductive to Iranian interests and that Iran should pursue greater involvement
with the international community. Ex-president Rafsanjani urged prudence from both
135
Staff Writer, EU Criticizes Iranian Elections BBC News February 23, 2004
http.//.news.bbc.co.uk/2/middle_east/3512985.stm
136
Ansari (2006), p. 216
79
sides on the nuclear issue, and ex-president Khatami said that enriching uranium is not in
the national interest and that it threatens to lose benefits of past 16 years, Iran should
suspend uranium enrichment in order to foster international trust and cooperate with
international oversight.
137
Iranian proponents of nuclear restraint argue that it is not in Iran’s strategic
interest to pursue nuclear capabilities; if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold Gulf states and
newly independent Iraq are likely to gravitate further towards the US with the purpose of
containing and isolating Iran.
138
While there are those that believe that nuclear restraint
is in Iran’s best interest it seems that nuclear proliferation has gained momentum in Iran.
The nuclear program threatens to become part of Iran’s national identity and a symbol of
Iran’s defiance of the international community. Iranian college students and professors
have supported nuclear proliferation and have protested when Iran has bowed to
international pressure and allowed further inspections of nuclear facilities.
139
This is an
ominous sign as college students in Iran are often an indication of the future of political
thought in the nation.
137
138
139
140
Although nuclear proliferation has gained momentum there is
Takeyh (2006), p. 152
Takeyh (2006), p. 154
Takehy (2006), p. 155
140
The common belief of US intelligence agencies is that the Iranian public overwhelmingly supports Iran
continued nuclear development. This common opinion has been boosted by a well-orchestrated publicity
campaign initiated by the Iranian regime to garner domestic support for the nuclear program and to
demonstrate that support to the outside world. This campaign has greatly expanded since Ahmadinejad
assumed the presidency. The regime has organized a propaganda arsenal of supportive demonstrations
(busing around schoolchildren and other members of the public), slogans (using television, radio, posters,
and even sporting events), and opinion polls. The most recent poll, which was conducted in late January
2006 by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) and published by the Iranian News Agency (IRNA),
indicated 85.4 percent public support for the continuation of Iran’s nuclear activities. The regime’s slogan,
―Nuclear energy is our indisputable right,‖ has come to dominate the public landscape (Herzog p. 1). Only
the official state news agency is allowed to discuss the nuclear program so debate on the nuclear issue has
been severely restricted. Although most Iranians believe that Iran should be allowed to develop their
80
still hope that Iran can be prevented from joining the nuclear club. The economy is the
greatest concern for the younger generation of Iran as there is double digit unemployment
and not enough jobs to accommodate the large number of college graduates each year.
An economic incentive package could be productive in curbing the momentum towards
proliferation.
In the American media it has been assumed that Iran was trying to develop
nuclear weapons, but there are some including Mohammad Sahimi Professor & Chairman
of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California that
argue Iran has a genuine need for nuclear energy. Iran is an oil rich nation, but this does
not mean that they could not benefit from nuclear power. Oil is a nonrenewable resource
and Iran is quickly relying more on oil as their nation continues to develop. Iran has
many economic problems with one of the main problems being that they rely far too
much on oil with oil making up 80 percent of Iran’s foreign income. Iran also needs a lot
of repair on their oil fields and have been unable to increase oil output to prerevolutionary levels. Iran also must think of the future as its oil reserves will not last
forever and they attempt to transition into exploiting their natural gas reserves. Iran has
been experiencing a need for more electricity, Iran has also seen a tremendous increase in
nuclear program the distinction between a civilian and military nuclear program is never mentioned in the
polls. It appears that when this distinction is made support for a military nuclear program declines greatly.
A public opinion survey in Iran conducted by the Tarrance Group in May–June 2005 for the Iran Institute
for Democracy discovered that: ―A plurality of adults, 42 percent, says that the Islamic Republic’s access to
nuclear weapons would add to their anxiety and discomfort. Only 37 percent of adults indicated that this
would not. . . . Anxiety over nuclear weapons in the hands of the Islamic Republic increases among young
adults, going from 34 percent among 50+ adults to 50 percent among 16–24 year olds‖ (Herzog p.4). So
while most Iranians support Iran’s nuclear development this support seems to dwindle significantly when
the distinction is made between a civilian nuclear program and a military program. Iranians are aware of
the risks of developing a nuclear weapons program and support of the program is not a given. It is unclear
how much of Iran’s protests supporting the nuclear program are staged propaganda and also if these
protests are aimed at continued civilian nuclear development or nuclear weapons.
81
air pollution in the past couple of decades. Iran has a lot of economic problems and
nuclear development could employ a lot and position Iran for economic growth in the
future. All of these factors could point to the fact that Iran may actually have a need for
nuclear energy not nuclear weapons.
People like Mohammad Sahimi who believe that Iran needs nuclear energy are
also suspicious of American motives towards Iran’s nuclear program. It is clear that the
US wants a halt to Iran’s development of nuclear capabilities that could be used for
weapons, but many believe that the US will only be satisfied when Iran’s entire nuclear
infrastructure is eliminated.
The US is using the NPT and IAEA has a means of
dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Development of nuclear power could benefit
Iran even if they never acquire nuclear weapons. The purpose of the NPT and IAEA
were to promote peaceful development of nuclear power, a right that is guaranteed by
signing the NPT, but these treaties and agencies are being used to thwart Iran’s nuclear
development. Iran has made an effort to cooperate with the international community, but
US backed pressure has made this cooperation one-sided and unfair. Iran has the right to
peacefully develop its nuclear program, but this right may not be realized if US pressure
is able to sway the NPT and the IAEA.
Rather than simply condemning its development it is important to understand why
Iranian officials believe they need a nuclear deterrent. Iran has had a long history of
foreign involvement from when the British and Russians had it broken up into spheres of
influence, to the Iran-Iraq War, to modern times where Iran is surrounded by US military.
Iran has a deep seeded mistrust of the international community due to its history. Iran
also does not have very many allies in the international community. Iran has further
82
developed its international economic ties, but under US pressure few nations will be
willing to side with Iran. Iran also has a lot of threats to their security; the George W.
Bush administration has routinely called for a change of regime in Tehran. The US is
considered Iran’s greatest threat, but there are many potential problems for Iran in the
international community. Israel remains Iran’s greatest regional threat and Israel’s strong
ties to the US ensure that Iran will always have Israel and the US hovering over them.
Iraq has diminished as a threat to Iran since the overthrow of Saddam’s regime, but Iraq
could still be a threat to Iran’s security. Pakistan is also another regional threat to Iran’s
security; their relations have improved since 9/11 after Pakistan completely abandoned its
support of the Taliban. Afghanistan has been another threat to Iran, but relations have
also improved.
Post 9/11 developments have had a paradoxical impact on Iran. Two of Iran’s
most formidable regional foes have been overthrown by the US.
141
On the one hand
these are very fortuitous developments for Iran; two of its enemies were eliminated
without Iran getting involved. The negative impact for Iran is that American military
presence in the region has never been greater. Toppling Saddam in Iraq and the Taliban
in Afghanistan are good for Iran, but the last thing that Iran wants is a sustained
American military presence in the region. Bush clearly has a grand vision of changing
the Middle East and it seems that Iran is the next step in American conquest in the region.
Each time that someone in the Bush administration mentions regime change in Iran they
are strengthening Iranian hard-liners claims that the only route to security is nuclear
141
Takeyh (2006), p. 145
83
deterrence. After 9/11 Iran has emerged as a stronger regional power, but at the cost of
increased US military presence in the region.
American involvement in Iraq has turned into a quagmire with no end in sight.
This fact may embolden Iranian officials as they believe that the US military is
overextended and will not be able to take action against Iran. An alarming part of
America’s involvement in Iraq for Iran is how easily America toppled Saddam’s regime.
It took only twenty-one days for Saddam’s regime to be overthrown. Even through Iraq
has since turned into a nightmare Iranian leadership must look at how quickly Saddam
was toppled. The anticipation of chemical weapons in Iraq didn’t stop the US military
from invading and the invasion was highly successful at toppling Saddam’s regime.
Repeated American calls for regime change in Iran add to Iranian fears of an American
invasion. Iranian leadership always has a tenuous grasp on power and American
involvement in Iraq has shown that quickly toppling a regime is well within American
military capabilities.
The primary supporters of nuclear breakout within Iran are hard-line elements
associated with the Supreme Leader Khamenei. Through command of key institutions
such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Guardian Council, Iran’s reactionary clerics
have enormous influence on national security planning.
142
The hard-liners (including
leadership of the Revolutionary Guards and the Guardian Council and conservative
politicians such as the current president Ahmadinejad) believe that Iran is in constant
danger from external forces and that the only way to prepare for this danger is military
self-reliance. The international community cannot be trusted and Iran can only rely on its
142
Takeyh (2006), p. 147
84
self for national security. To the hard-liners it is pointless to engage the international
community Iran can only hope to better protect itself. This paranoid and isolationist
theme is voiced in Jomhuri-ye Islami the conservative newspaper and mouthpiece of
Khamenei. ―The core problem is the fact that our officials’ outlook on the nuclear
dossier of Iran is faulty and they are on the wrong track. It seems they have failed to
appreciate that America is after our destruction and the nuclear issue is merely an excuse
for them‖.
143
This defiant isolationist stance is partially a legacy of the Islamic
Revolution when Iran sought to defy and change the world.
The greatest fear of Iran’s development of nuclear weapons is that they would
transfer weapons or technology to terrorist organizations. A terrorist organization
possessing a nuclear weapon is a terrifying prospect that must be guarded against at all
costs. Although this prospect must always be guarded against it is unlikely that Iran
would transfer nuclear weapons or technology to a terrorist organization. Iran has long
possessed chemical weapons and has not transferred them to its terrorist allies.
144
Iran
must be very careful with its dealings with terrorist organizations, especially in the post
9/11 world. Any perceived Iranian involvement in transferring nuclear weapons or
technology to terrorist organizations would result in an immediate invasion. Constant
143
Takeyh (2006), p. 148
144
Iran signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively). Under the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Iran was obligated to eliminate its chemical program over a period
of years. Iran did not meet the declaration timetable specified by the Convention. Iran's initial declaration
was considered incomplete by the OPCW Verification Division, and Tehran subsequently filed an amended
declaration. In 1999, Iran informed the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) it
could be added to a list of countries previously possessing CW. Tehran claimed that it's CW stockpile was
destroyed before it became a state party to the CWC, and thus not verifiable by the OPCW. Iran did
declare two former CW production facilities. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
verified that at least one of the Iran's CW production facilities had been eliminated. The Chemical Weapons
Production Facilities declared by Iran had been fully inactivated and verified by OPCW inspectors
-Staff Writer, Chemical Weapons Global Security www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/cw.htm.
85
pressure and threats from the US and Israel leave it obvious to Iranian officials that
prospect of regime change and invasion are always present.
It should also be noted that Iran’s perceived need for nuclear weapons does not
stem from irrational ideological postulations, but from a judicious attempt to craft a
145
viable deterrent posture against a range of threats.
Iran is not trying to develop an
Islamic bomb to impose its will on the world, but is attempting to craft a viable nuclear
deterrence to the many threats that Iran faces in the world. American media has framed
Iran’s quest for nuclear technology as madmen’s quest for the bomb (Khamenei,
Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners), but it is clear that Iran does face a great deal of
external threats. Whenever Iran’s nuclear development is mentioned in the American
media it is accompanied by Ahmadinejad’s comments that Israel should be wiped off the
face of the earth and Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism, implying that Iran is attempting to
develop nuclear weapons to destroy Israel or to aid terrorism. It is never mentioned that
Iran faces many external threats or that Iran may in fact be developing nuclear technology
for civilian applications. Iran remains distrustful of the international community, but a
point of engagement in the nuclear debate could be security guarantees. If Iran’s external
threats are diminished its nuclear momentum would slow. Understanding why Iranian
officials perceive the need for nuclear deterrence is an important first step to nuclear
diplomacy.
Iranian officials must also note North Korea and its nuclear development as a sign
of the power of the nuclear threat. Iran and North Korea are in much different positions,
but the way that North Korea as been dealt with may provide more incentive for Iran’s
145
Takeyh (2006), p. 142
86
nuclear proliferation. The fates of Iraq and North Korea provide an example of the affect
that the nuclear threat can have on diplomacy. Whereas Iraq was invaded without much
international discussion, North Korea’s presumed nuclear threat has eliminated the option
of a preemptive strike. North Korea has not only managed to prevent an invasion, but
may also obtain security and economic benefits due to their presumed nuclear threat.
Iranian officials may believe that the nuclear threat could put Iran in a better position to
negotiate security and economic arrangements. It is unlikely that the US and the
international community would take such a hard-line against Iran if they possessed the
nuclear threat. Economic concessions to halt Iran’s nuclear development could also
provide a boost to the economy which is in dire need of repair.
The election of Ahmadinejad to the presidency was a great blow to nuclear
diplomacy. It seemed that Iran’s leadership and public were becoming more
confrontational and that reformists had failed at changing the political atmosphere in Iran.
In many ways the election of Ahmadinejad was a response to the failure of Khatami’s
reforms although part of the reason that Khatami’s reforms were ineffective was that
hard-liners sabotaged his efforts. The Iranian public was frustrated by the ineffectiveness
of the Reformists, but Ahmadinejad’s power base was small and fragile and has
continued to erode. Voter turnout for the election was small showing the Iranian public’s
frustration with the government. Ahmadinejad received five million votes (there were
forty-two million possible votes to be cast) as compared to the twenty-two million votes
received by Khatami in his first of two terms as president. There was also evidence of
ballot rigging which caused six candidates to threaten to withdraw from the election.
146
146
Ansari (2006), p. 227
87
Ahmadinejad’s greatest competition in the election was former president Rafsanjani, but
the public was fed up with Rafsanjani because he is a career politician that had been in
some sort of political office for decades. Rafsanjani also tried to present himself as a
reformer even though he had helped scrap some of Khatami’s economic reforms.
The election of Ahmadinejad was unfortunate, but in many ways is similar to the
reelection of Bush. The political trends in Iran and America are comparable. Both
leaders were diplomatic hard-liners, religious, had grand visions for their presidency and
nation and both were generally disliked by the rest of the world. The leadership of Bush
and Ahmadinejad assured that diplomacy between Iran and America would be extremely
difficult and filled with unproductive threats and rhetoric. Fortunately both leaders have
147
lost popularity within their nations and have limited time left on their terms.
The
mess in Iraq has eroded Bush’s support and in the most recent elections in Iran showed an
anti-hard-liner sentiment in the Iranian public. In 2007 Rafsanjani was elected to the
Council of Experts and the municipal elections saw the hard-liners losing seats
throughout the nation. Political shifts in both America and Iran will effect their relations
and trends in both nations are pointing to a more balanced approach in the future. New
leadership in both nations will increase the chance of productive nuclear diplomacy.
It is clear that nuclear diplomacy with Iran will be difficult, but it is not a forgone
conclusion that Iran will join the nuclear club. The hard-liners are starting to lose
popularity in Iran and there have been more calls within Iran for nuclear restraint.
Threats from both the US and Iran are not productive in resolving the nuclear issue and
only harden each others’ resolve. Iran is one of the world’s youngest populations and
147
Although US diplomacy towards Iran after the revolution has been hard-line regardless of political
party the possible election of Barak Obama could signal a less hard-line approach.
88
economic opportunities are this generation’s greatest concern. Iran has made a number of
blockbuster natural gas and oil deals with China, Russia and others, but these deals are in
the preliminary stages and will probably not be realized without considerable Western
investment or at least Western consent. Western powers could apply enough diplomatic
pressure on Russia and China to prevent the deals from reaching fruition. Economic
incentives could be an effective means of constraining Iran’s nuclear development. Real
economic opportunity for Iranian youth would be more important than the development
of nuclear weapons and it is likely that the Iranian public would be willing to abandon
their nuclear program if it stood in the way of economic opportunity.
Iran also has a lot of external threats which lead some to believe that Iran needs a
nuclear deterrent. Iran’s number one threat is the US and repeated American calls for
regime change only intensify the fear of an American invasion. An American invasion of
Iran would be a disaster, especially with the current situation in Iraq, yet American
politicians have refused to take the option of military intervention off the table. Hard-line
tactics from both sides only empower the hard-line factions in America and Iran and led
to a circle of ineffective threats and rhetoric. If Iran saw their international threats
diminish nuclear proliferation could lose momentum. Security guarantees could also be
used to curb Iran’s nuclear development. Economic incentives packaged with security
guarantees would put a great deal of pressure on Iran’s regime to engage in productive
nuclear diplomacy. Iranian youth are educated, more materialistic, and have a more
realist view of the world than previous generations. Security guarantees and economic
incentives would pressure Iranian hard-liners to engage in the diplomatic process as their
grip on power is tenuous.
89
One approach to better relations could be a reduction of American military
presence in the region. America is Iran’s number one security threat and a reduction of
American military presence in the region would increase Iran’s security and lessen their
external threats. US’s unparalleled military dominance in the region is at an all time high
and it is questionable if it serves American interests at this point or if it is just a symbol of
US hegemony and an underlying problem in promoting better international relations.
148
American involvement in the region is becoming more costly and it maybe time start
pursuing a different path. A reduced American military presence in the region would be
beneficial for both America and Iran and could be a start to better relations.
It could be argued that the costs of intervention in the Middle East could be
justified in the context of the Cold War, but that there is no reason after the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall that America should continue to sustain
such heavy costs. In the 1990s the US attempted to establish hegemony in the Middle
East and this goal was perceived to be relatively cost free during the administrations of
149
George H. Bush and Bill Clinton.
While the US was establishing hegemony in the
region there was blowback which was not recognized as this was propelling the rise of
radical Islamic terrorism and adding in the birth of organizations such as Al Qaeda.
Under George W. Bush the undertaking of a hegemonic project in the Middle East has
proved to be costly; measured in the rising casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, a rise in
anti-American terrorism worldwide, raising costs of defense and homeland security
148
149
Howard (2004), p. 157
Hadar (2005), p. 7
90
150
leading to a ballooning budget and account deficits.
America’s policies in the Middle
East have also helped ignite anti-American sentiment in the majority of the European
public, which severely hampers international diplomacy with the Middle East. While it is
too late for America to correct past wrongs in the region a gradual disengagement from
the region would be beneficial to America and the Middle East.
The EU has had a better diplomatic strategy in the Middle East than the US in
recent years and an increased reliance on the EU in dealing with Iran and the Middle East
will be more productive than increased American presence. During George H. Bush and
Clinton there was no competing global power in the world and America had no choice
but to bear the costs in the region, and until 9/11 including the Gulf War the costs seemed
manageable.
151
The EU has continued to emerge has a global power and America has
seen a great increase in the costs of maintaining hegemony in the region including a
terrorist attack on American soil. The costs of maintaining a hegemonic presence in the
Middle East has become greater than it was during the Cold War, proving that there are
no free empires. George H Bush and Clinton both supported a large American presence
in the region, but succeeded in maintaining a sense of partnership with the Europeans.
As George W. Bush took office it gradually became clear that he had a far different
approach than even his father; he pulled out of treaty to form International Criminal
Court and the Kyoto Treaty on global warming and delivered the infamous ―axis of evil‖
150
151
Hadar (2005), p. 13
Hadar (2005), p. 27
91
speech.
152
Bush’s unilateral approach to international relations alienated America from
European nations that had supported America prior to Bush’s presidency.
If nuclear proliferation gains too much momentum in Iran and the program gains
self sufficiency a nuclear Iran may have to be dealt with. An invasion of Iran would be a
weighty proposition and probably unrealistic with America’s current involvement in Iraq
and Afghanistan. A possibility would be for Western nations to cooperate with Iran’s
nuclear development as long as it is for civilian use. Western cooperation in the
development of Iran’s nuclear program could allow Western nations to have greater
oversight of the nuclear program and could eliminate some of the unknowns and
speculations. The possibility of a nuclear Iran must be dealt with and America must be
willing to engage in productive diplomacy with Iran.
Some Western diplomats (who always choose to remain anonymous) argue that
the present combination of European dialogue and the harsher American stance is
probably the best approach with the current Iranian regime.
153
This good cop bad cop
strategy will keep Iran on their toes and force them to proceed with caution. This
approach is productive in alerting Iranian officials to the threat that the US poses to their
security but is not effective in building better diplomatic relations. American and Iranian
interests have coincided in recent years with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Iranian and many American officials (those opposed to continuing war in Iraq) want a
reduced American military presence in the region. The reconstruction of Iraq offers an
opportunity for an improvement in American-Iranian relations. A stable Iraq is in the
152
153
Hadar (2005), p. 30
Howard (2004), p.155
92
interest of the US and Iran and will allow for a reduction of American military forces.
The reconstruction of Iraq could also be a stumbling block for American-Iranian
relations. Recent American accusations of Iranian funded efforts to destabilize Iraq and
promote sectarian violence threaten to cause a crisis between the two nations.
154
Iranian
leaders are certainly aware of the dangers of interfering with Iraq’s stabilization and will
have to be very careful about their role. US and Iranian goals coincide to a great extent
in Iraq both nations want the US out as soon as possible and both (to a certain extent)
want to promote democracy in Iraq. It is also likely that Iran’s influence in Iraq will fade
as Iraq asserts its nationhood and Arab-Persian differences reemerge.
Another approach to constraining Iran’s nuclear proliferation could be better
directed economic sanctions. These sanctions should not target Iran as a whole but
should target the extensive overseas investments that many of the regime’s leaders are
154
With a conventional military and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat from Saddam Hussein’s
regime removed, Iran seeks to ensure that Iraq can never again become a threat to Iran, either with or
without U.S. forces present in Iraq. By supporting armed Shiite factions, Iran’s influence in Iraq has at
times hindered U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq, and has heightened the U.S. threat perception of Iran.
However, Iran faces difficult choices in Iraq now that its protege Shiite factions, formerly united,
are competing and often fighting each other -Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq
CRS Report for Congress October 21, 2008 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/middleeast/RS22323.pdf. During
2003-2005, it Iran calculated that it suited its interests to support the entry of Iraqi Shiite Islamist factions
into the U.S.-led election process, because the number of Shiites in Iraq (about 60% of the population)
virtually ensured Shiite dominance of an elected government. To this extent, Iran’s goals did not conflict
with the U.S. objective of establishing democracy. Iran helped assemble a Shiite Islamist bloc (―United
Iraqi Alliance‖), encompassing the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Da’wa (Islamic Call) party,
and the faction of the 34-year-old cleric Moqtada Al Sadr — the bloc won 128 of the 275 seats in the
December 15, 2005, election for a full term parliament. Dawa senior leader Nuri alMaliki was selected as Prime Minister; several ISCI figures took other leadership positions -Kenneth
Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq CRS Report for Congress October 21, 2008
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/middleeast/RS22323.pdf.
Iran’s efforts to promote Shiite solidarity began to unravel in 2007 as Maliki and ISCI recognized they
needed to cooperate with the U.S. ―troop surge‖ by permitting US military pressure against the Jaysh alMahdi (JAM). As a result, Sadr broke with Maliki, pulling his five ministers out of the cabinet and
withdrawing his faction from the UIA bloc during 2007. As the rift widened, JAM fighters battled Badrdominated Iraqi forces, and U.S., and British forces for control of such Shiite cities as Diwaniyah, Karbala,
Hilla, Nassiryah,Basra, Kut, and Amarah -Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq CRS
Report for Congress October 21, 2008 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/middleeast/RS22323.pdf.
The situation in Iraq is complicated it offers an opportunity for Iran and the US to improve relations but
could also prove to be a stumbling block that could bring all of Iran’s activities under greater scrutiny.
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known to hold.
Targeting the regimes’ economic interests is an innovative approach,
but it is not clear how much longer economic sanctions will be effective in slowing Iran’s
nuclear development. The lack of trust and belligerent approach that American and
Iranian officials have taken in their relations is the underlying problem in productive
nuclear diplomacy and economic sanctions do nothing to address this core problem.
Economic sanctions can be effective in slowing nuclear development, but eventually will
be ineffective once the nuclear program reaches a certain point of development.
Innovative diplomacy needs to be used to deal with Iran’s nuclear development.
The US will have to take a more pragmatic approach to Iran’s nuclear development;
threats and rhetoric will not be effective in constraining Iran’s nuclear program and will
only provided credence to Iran’s hard-liners. Diplomacy must also deal with Iran’s
perceived need for nuclear weapons; less external threats will reduce Iran’s need for
nuclear weapons. Western nations and especially the US need to deal with Iran’s nuclear
development on an incremental basis; there should not be pre-conditions to talks and
diplomacy should be allowed to take its course. America can not rely on the EU to
conduct nuclear diplomacy as America is Iran’s greatest threat to stability. America
needs to be involved in nuclear diplomacy and can not rely on threats to constrain Iran’s
nuclear development. Economic opportunity is the greatest concern for the younger
generation in Iran so economic incentives could be effective in halting Iran’s nuclear
development. If nuclear development were to stand in the way of economic growth there
would be less support for nuclear development. Finally the possibility of a nuclear Iran
155
Howard (2004), p.157
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needs to be accepted and cooperation with Iran’s nuclear development maybe the best
way to safely monitor its development.
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Chapter 4: Iran’s Post-Revolutionary Political Development
It is easy to portray Iran as a monolithic evil and assume that Iran is destined for
conflict with the US, but Iran’s future is uncertain. Around two-thirds of Iran’s
population is under 30, most of these people have no memory of the revolution and have
profoundly different values than the older generation and especially the clerical elite.
The Islamic Republic has proven to be very resilient and the clerical elite still hold a firm
grip on power, but Iran appeared to be stable prior to the Islamic Revolution and few
could have predicted its outcome. Iran has had a long history of political protest and is a
society that is experienced in revolution and prone to sudden change. Iran’s youth will
go a long way in determining Iran’s future. Iranian college students have always been a
good predictor to future political thought in Iran and it is clear that many young people
want change.
One of the problems that face Iran’s youth is political apathy. After Khatami’s
reforms failed many of the younger generation lost all hope in the political system and its
ability to affect change. Today many young Iranians do not care about politics and
believe that their votes are irrelevant. There have even been political movements to
discourage young people from voting as a protest of the system. By not voting the people
believe that they are not lending credibility to a system that is corrupt. It is true that
Iran’s elections have been plagued by corruption and that candidates are often times
disqualified and not even allowed a chance to run. Young voters have simply not seen
results from their votes and hope to change the system through nonparticipation. This is
an interesting approach, but it will probably not be very successful. Low voter turnout
favors the clerical elite and was a key in the election of Ahmadinejad. While the Iranian
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elections have been plagued with corruption and the system itself is flawed Iran’s youth
are still best served by voting for the best politicians available.
Many of Iran’s youth choose to protest the Islamic government by disregarding its
social restrictions. Women where their scarves pushed back or do not wear them at all
even though it is prohibited; nose jobs and make up are also common. Men and women
walk hand in hand and have sex before marriage which is also prohibited. Iran’s youth
have many restrictions but are able to get away with a certain level of rebellion. Rules
against drinking and listening to music are also ignored at the risk of being beaten.
Khomeini warned that an Islamic Iran would be a joyless place and many of Iran’s youth
are not prepared to accept this. Many Iranian youth are similar to Western youth and are
concerned about themselves, fashion and social events. Even under hard-line president
Ahmadinejad Iranian youth have continued to flout the social restrictions. While some
Iranian youth are happy to just have some fun and break the rules others are concerned
that social restrictions are allowed to be a little more relaxed as a way of preventing
important political reforms. If the youth are happy to just break a few restrictions they
will remain politically apathetic and not push for reforms.
Many of Iran’s best and brightest see no future for themselves in Iran and leave.
This has caused a brain drain from Iran that hurts Iran and its future development.
Unemployment rates in recent years in Iran have been listed at around 12%, but it is clear
that the actual numbers are much higher. A high percentage of the unemployed are
young and educated which makes for a dangerous combination if the problem continues
to get worse. There are currently around 1.5 million college students in Iran and many of
them face a very bleak future. The demographic transition combined with the lack of
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employment opportunities for Iran’ youth could be the catalyst for drastic change.
Regardless of the viability of revolutionary change in Iran employment opportunities and
the brain drain continue to plague Iran and need to be dealt with. It is unlikely that Iran’s
youth will continued to be satiated by relaxing of social restrictions.
Iran also has emerging social problems that will force it to further engage the
international community. Drug addiction in Iran has been on the rise in recent years and
could develop into a serious problem. Heroin is readily available in Iran and the number
of addicts continues to grow. Heroin is available for less cost than a pack of cigarettes
and with many young people unemployed and disillusioned there are a wealth of
potential addicts. Iran has the highest proportion of heroin addicts in the world with more
than 2 million estimated addicts.
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AIDS has also been on the rise in recent years
partially because of the growth in the use of heroin. AIDS is a very touchy subject in
Iran and the government has been reluctant to address it or even acknowledge that it
exists. Prostitution is also very common in Iran and will increase the spread of AIDS.
When one reporter photographed prostitutes in Tehran she was deported and it was stated
that she was misrepresenting Iran because Iran does not have prostitutes.
With the internet and satellite television many of Iran’s youth are exposed to a
wide array of influences and have a platform to voice their dissent. The internet is full of
political dissent and protests of the Islamic government most from Iranians that no longer
live in Iran. Los Angeles has a large Iranian population that is very active in protesting
the Islamic Republic. Satellite TV is illegal in Iran but is common, satellite TV provides
entertainment and fuels more longing for material goods and social freedoms. The US
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Sam Bagnall, Iran’s Battle with Heroin BBC News June 7, 2002
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/3791889.stm
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also funds a radio station that is broadcast into Iran called Radio Farda. Radio Farda
receives about $7 million funding and pushing for more as the US expands its push for
democracy in Iran.
157
The station is broadcast in Northern Virginia and plays mostly
music such as Madonna; in an average hour of broadcasting Radio Farda uses about 16
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and a half minutes of programming devoted to news.
The idea of this strategy is to
attempt to best connect with the Iranian youth and music has been deemed the best way
to connect with the youth.
It is probably best that Radio Farda does not try to cram political thought down
the Iranian youths’ throats. While many Iranian youth see the benefit to increased ties
with the US many are still wary of foreign influence and America’s motives in Iran. It is
questionable how much America will be able to affect political change in Iran. American
politicians’ calls for regime change in Iran are not productive and help prove Iranian
hard-liners of American intentions in Iran. While rock music may not cause a revolution
in Iran it is more productive than calling for regime change and making threats. Pressure
for regime change will have to come from within Iran and be a product of the peoples’
frustration, not orchestrated from the US.
There is building social pressure within Iran for change and Iran’s youth will be
instrumental in this change. It is clear that reformers face an up hill battle, but it is
unlikely that Iran’s population will continue to support an unpopular government that is
not able to provide economic opportunity for the nation’s young people. As the younger
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David Finkel, U.S. Station Seeks Ear of Iran's Youths; Radio Farda Goes Easy on the News,
Heavy on Pop Music to Capture Vast Under-30 Audience Washington Post Jun 5, 2006
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/.../04/AR2006060400890.html
158
David Finkel, U.S. Station Seeks Ear of Iran's Youths; Radio Farda Goes Easy on the News,
Heavy on Pop Music to Capture Vast Under-30 Audience Washington Post Jun 5, 2006
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/.../04/AR2006060400890.html
99
generation moves into more positions of power it will be increasingly difficult to
maintain the status quo. The clerical elite have been able to secure their control over the
government, but this arrangement has not been beneficial to a majority of Iran’s
population. Ahmadinejad has only been president since 2005 and his hard-line platform
is already losing favor. Ahmadinejad was elected out of apathy and frustration with the
ineffectiveness of Khatami’s reforms, but it is clear that Ahmadinejad does not have the
solutions to these problems. Political factions fall in and out of favor in Iran but do not
lose their influence for long. It seems that the pendulum is swinging back to a more
pragmatic approach.
Factional politics is one of the most pronounced features of Iran’s political
system. Since before the Islamic Revolution in the days of the constitutional monarchy a
wide array of actors have competed for political power. Under the Shah the factions were
played against each other to prevent them from consolidating their power. Khomeini was
able to unite the political factions against the Shah. Since the Islamic Revolution the
political factions have waxed and waned in their influence. No factional dissent has been
strong enough to threaten the Islamic government. While political factions gain and lose
power in cycles their influence is never completely negated. This means that even
though Khatami and his reform platform was unsuccessful, and the reformers temporarily
fell out of favor with the Iranian public, that their lack of influence will only be
temporary.
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The two presidents prior to Ahmadinejad were moderate and sought to take a
more pragmatic approach to international relations.
159
Ahmadinejad’s election was a
legacy of revolutionary Iran, but it appears that this trend will be short lived. Even after
the revolution and Khomeini slowly striped the power from elected officials and
consolidated the power in the hands of the clerical elite the Iranian public has elected
moderate change minded presidents. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani served as president
from 1989 to 1997, Rafsanjani was considered a conservative pragmatist even though he
was part of the clerical establishment and one of Khomeini’s most trusted confidants.
One of Rafsanjani’s main goals was to reform Iran’s economy. Rafsanjani favored closer
ties with the Western world and the US. Rafsanjani realized that an overly belligerent
international stance was against national interests. Rafsanjani was also a key player in
accepting the UN mandated cease ending the Iran-Iraq War. Rafsanjani and his ministers
were highly educated technocrats and many had affection for the US as a country if not a
government.
160
Rafsanjani’s economic reforms were unsuccessful; on January 8, 1990 the Majlis
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approved a five year plan which included large-scale loans from foreign entities.
This
plan was controversial to many clerics who still believed that Iran could pursue a
confrontational and isolationist foreign policy. Rafsanjani also attempted to transform
Iran into more of a market economy than the heavily state centered economy of the
revolution. Rafsanjani failed to streamline the economy and borrowing money from
159
It also is important to note that the president is not the highest political office in Iran and that the
president is subject to the dictates of the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader.
160
161
Ansari (2006), p. 137
Shay (2005), p. 72
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international markets put Iran in huge debt and eroded the standard of living for the lower
and middle classes.
162
The Guardian Council were against many of Rafsanjani’s
economic performs and hampered his ability to implement them, as the Guardian Council
were among the few that benefited from Iran’s economic structure. While most of his
efforts at economic reforms were unsuccessful, the attempted reforms where in Iran’s
best interests. Even though Rafsanjani’s economic reforms were a failure he did have
some impressive accomplishments during his presidency and history will probably look
more kindly on him in the future.
Under Rafsanjani attacks on Iranian dissidents on European soil were ended as he
felt they were not worth the costs. The catalyst for this change was an incident in which
an Iranian hit squad was sent to Berlin to kill Kurdish dissidents. The hit squad sprayed a
Berlin café with gun fire. This was a tremendous shot to Iran’s relations with Germany
and it was realized that the costs of executing dissidents in Europe were too high. This
was a big step for Iran as this was one of the activities that tied Iran to international
terrorism; dissidents within Iran continued to be executed but those on European soil
were left alone. Rafsanjani also used his influence in Lebanon to help secure the release
of Western hostages in the early 1990s.
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Although Rafsanjani took a more pragmatic
approach to international relations the suppression of internal dissent was brutal during
his regime. In his two terms as president many writers and other critics of the clerical
elite simply disappeared.
162
Takeyh (2006), p. 39
163
Rafsanjani was the key player behind obtaining the release of 13 Western hostages who had been taken
by the Islamic Jihad, a radical Shiite cell that operates beneath the larger umbrella of the pro-Iranian
Hizballah. The hostages were taken at different times during the 1980s and many of them had been
detained for over five years. Rafsanjani believed that taking hostages was ineffective in promoting political
agendas and sought to improve relations with the West.
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Rafsanjani was able to affect some positive change in Iran, but was ultimately not
very affective. Critics of his regime pointed to the lack of social justice in his regime as
dissidents were still executed during his rein. Although Rafsanjani did little to stop the
human rights abuses in Iran he did opposed strict Islamic penal codes and improve
employment prospects for women. Ultimately Rafsanjani was considered too much of a
political insider. He has held almost every important office in Iran’s government and
seemed to be part of a government plagued with corruption and self interest. Rafsanjani
also seemed reluctant to stand up to the clerical elite and would fall in line with their
desires rather than challenge them. Rafsanjani did engineer a number of key
constitutional amendments including removing the office of prime minister. This
concentrated power in the hands of the president and streamlined Iran’s government
structure; having a president and a prime minister was confusing and unnecessary.
Although Rafsanjani was extremely unpopular after his two terms of president he
did not lose his influence in the political system. Entering the 2005 presidential elections
Rafsanjani was the favorite; he was still too unpopular to win and was upset by
Ahmadinejad. Since then he has chaired the powerful State Expediency Council, which
acts as a supreme arbitration body to settle disputes between the Majlis and the watchdog
Guardians Council. In 2007 Rafsanjani was elected to the Assembly of Experts, the body
which chooses and supervises the Supreme Leader. Rafsanjani soundly defeated Mesbah
Yazdi who is seen as the spiritual mentor to Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani’s continued
influence and ability to bounce back after defeat is symptomatic of Iranian politics.
Individuals and factions may temporarily lose power and influence, but the cycle of
Iranian politics will eventually bring them back to power.
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Rafsanjani has been one of the most unpopular politicians in Iran but has still
managed to remain in high power offices for decades. Rafsanjani’s tremendous wealth
and status as a political insider have caused him to take a lot of abuse in the Iranian press
but he always bounces back. While Rafsanjani was ineffective in his attempts to reform
Iran’s economy and viciously suppressed internal dissent, he is still a pragmatist and
certainly preferable to a hard-line president like Ahmadinejad. In the immediate
aftermath of Rafsanjani’s presidency he was seen as an unmitigated failure, but when
looked at on a continuum he is part of the progressive line of Iranian leadership. He was
a disciple of Khomeini, but recognized the need to abandon vague ideological principles
in the name of pragmatic leadership. His economic reforms were ineffective and plagued
with corruption, but were a step in the right direction. The fact that Rafsanjani and his
pragmatic faction are once again gaining power shows that their message has not been
lost on the Iranian public.
After Rafsanjani, Seyed Mohammad Khatami was elected to two terms as
president from 1997 to 2005. Khatami’s victory was a huge upset especially since he
received almost 70% of the vote and was a humiliating defeat for conservatives and
signaled the hope for real change in Iran. Khatami was a charismatic politician that
captured the imagination of Iran. Khatami seemed like the first legitimate threat to Iran’s
clerical leadership. Khatami had served in the military under the Shah, but was a
supporter of the revolution. Khatami studied Western philosophy and spent time
managing the Islamic Center in Hamburg.
164
Khatami represented the new Islamic
Republic man he was educated, worldly, sophisticated and able to reach out to the world.
164
Hadar (2005), p. 133
104
Khatami was not part of the Islamic thought that piety was reflected by poverty and
discarded the vulgar realism that had developed under Rafsanjani and introduced a
measure of constructivism into Iranian foreign policy.
165
Khatami’s victory in the
presidential election was a ray of hope to Iranians, but the high expectations eventually
became part of Khatami’s downfall.
Khatami would pursue a different path to international relations and had fresh
ideas that were exciting to the Iranian public and should have been capitalized on by the
rest of the world. Khatami introduced the theory of Dialogue Among Civilizations as a
response to Huntington's theory of Clash of Civilizations. After introducing the concept
of his theory in several international organizations (most importantly the UN) the theory
gained a lot of international support. Consequently the United Nations proclaimed the
year 2001 as the United Nations' Year of the Dialogue Among Civilizations as per
Khatami's suggestion. Khatami’s innovative approach seemed a departure from Iranian
leaders of the past and he energized the Iranian public.
In Khatami’s first year of presidency over 200 new magazines and newspapers
were granted licenses.
166
Information and debates that were prohibited before were in
print and it appeared that Iran’s political discourse was expanding and progressing. On
January 7th 1998 Khatami gave an exclusive interview to CNN which showed that he
intended to take a constructive and progressive approach to international relations. In the
interview Khatami categorically rejected terrorism and expressed regret for the embassy
takeover in 1979. Khatami gracefully referred to the distrust which pervaded American-
165
166
Hadar (2005), p. 134
Hadar (2005), p. 135
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Iranian relations and talked about the roots of the mistrust. He emphasized that antiAmerican slogans were not an insult to American people or sought to undermine the US’s
government but reflected a desire of Iranians to end the type of relationship that had
developed between Iran and the US. Khatami’s strategy to reconcile the relationship
shows a conciliatory tone and fresh approach: ―In his [de Tocqueville’s] view, the
significance of this [American] civilization is the fact that liberty found religion as a
cradle for its growth, and religion found the protection of liberty as its Divine calling.
Therefore in America, liberty and faith never clashed, and as we see, even today most
Americans are religious peoples. There is less war against religion in America.
Therefore, the approach to religion and liberty are consistent and compatible. We feel
that what we seek is what the founder of American civilization were also pursuing four
centuries ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the essence of American
civilization.‖
The bold interview with CNN went largely unnoticed by American policymakers
but provided hope for improvement of Iran’s international relations and especially
American-Iranian relations. Khatami provided even more hope with his handling of the
murders of several intellectuals. At least four intellectuals were brutally murdered in
quick succession in November and December 1998 in what may have been an effort to
destabilize the Khatami government. Khatami conducted an investigation, and his
government arrested a group of ultraconservative officials, headed by Deputy Director
Saeed Emami, in the Ministry of Intelligence.
167
These men were hired originally by Ali
Fallahian, the former minister of intelligence, and their arrest was widely seen as a public
167
Sick (2003), p. 6
106
rebuke to the conservatives as well as a rare case of transparency in the security services.
Before the case came up for trial, however, Emami reportedly killed himself in prison by
ingesting a toxic powder normally used for hair removal.
168
During the early years of
Khatami’s presidency the US remained skeptical and a tremendous opportunity to
reestablish American-Iranian relations was missed.
Khatami swept into office and his rhetoric made the people expect instant change,
but Khatami believed in gradual change and was unwilling to take a hard stand against
the clerical elite. Reformers also took control of the Majlis which meant besides the
Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council reformers held a monopoly of power. It
seemed possible that the reformers could enact sweeping change, but the reformers chose
to compromise. It was clear that the clerical elite were not going to allow a drastic shift
in power. There was an assassination attempt on Saeed Hajarian, who was the strategist
behind the reformers victory. When new reformer deputies drew up a liberal press law in
May of 2000 enshrining the freedom of press Ayatollah Khamenei took the
unprecedented step of intervening to prevent its ratification.
169
Khomeini had never
intervened like that; he at least maintained the fiction of an independent legislature. This
action protected conservatives’ interests but did long term damage to the credibility of the
system and showed that conservatives had established systematic repression of
reformers.
168
169
170
170
Sick (2003), p. 6
Ansari (2006), p. 162
Ansari (2006), p. 162
107
For all of the hoopla that accompanied Khatami’s first term of president little was
actually accomplished. The slow pace of Khatami’s reforms were frustrating, especially
to students who had supported him. In 1999 student protests were rocking Iranian
college campuses. The intense nature of the protests led some to believe that Iran was
heading for another revolution. On July 9, 1999 the Revolutionary Guard dispatched its
police forces to attack the dormitories of Tehran University, which was becoming the
center of agitation for reform. By morning three students were dead, and many more had
been beaten and arrested. While the students were frustrated at the slow pace of reforms
and the clerical elites’ attempts to block reforms they did not want a revolution and
remained loyal to Khatami. Khatami urged the students to calm the protests and pursue
reforms through legal means. The clerical elite once again flexed their muscle and there
were extensive arrests and brutal suppression of the student protests. Had Khatami
provided strong support for the students it would have put a tremendous amount of
pressure on the clerical elite and perhaps forced them to accept some reforms. Khatami
was weak in his support of the students and it showed that while Khatami was reform
minded that he was not willing to take a firm stand against the clerical elite.
The clerical elites’ systematic suppression of reformers and Khatami’s
unwillingness to take a strong stand against the clerics was damaging to Khatami’s image
but did not take the wind out of the sails of the reform movement. Khatami did not take a
firm stand against the clerical elite because didn’t want revolutionary change in Iran and
hoped to influence change within the framework of Iran’s government. Khatami also
received a signed letter from 24 Revolutionary Guard commanders warning Khatami that
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―our patience has run out. We cannot tolerate this situation any longer‖.
171
This warning
showed Khatami that the Revolutionary Guard was ready to take drastic action against
the students and that the students and perhaps Khatami himself were in great danger. The
regime's attack, far from stifling dissent, pushed seething resentment to a breaking point.
Students leapt into action by the thousands, overtaking streets, destroying public property
and staging sit-ins in major cities throughout Iran for several consecutive days. The
upheaval was quickly put down by the regime, but it announced the birth of a nationwide
172
opposition movement.
Opposition groups and student unions emerged in great
numbers in the wake of July 1999. They lacked leadership and differed in their degrees of
religiosity and political liberalism, but agreed on a general consensus for the future of the
Iranian nation: a separation of mosque and state, and basic civil liberties such as freedom
of the press and commingling of the sexes. United by these goals, they began demanding
for the first time the complete removal of the Islamic theocracy.
173
The escalation of reformist protests and cycle of brutal suppression put a greater
divide between the reformist and conservative factions in Iran. Most of Iranian
politicians had come from the same circles, but their differences of opinions in the future
of Iran separated them to a new degree. Many reformist and dissidents living outside of
Iran believed that Iran was headed for a revolution. Legislators in the US began to push
171
Ahmad Siddiqi, Khatami and the Search for Reform in Iran Stanford Journal of International
Relations Volume 6 Issue 1 Winter 2005 www.stanford.edu/group/sjri/6.1.04_siddiqi.html
172
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
173
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
109
for support of dissident groups and increased the mention of regime change in Iran.
While it appeared that Iran could be heading for real change, in fact, the atmosphere
inside Iran grew more stifling. The ruling clerics, maneuvering to protect their
conservative way of life, closed reformist newspapers, arrested and tortured opposition
leaders, and dispatched their young religious vigilantes, known as Bassijis, to break up
student demonstrations. The reforms Khatami seemed to represent had all but
disappeared.
174
It is this kind of suppression and lack of real political change that has led
to a great deal of political apathy in Iran’s youth. The excitement of change is always
met with disappointing results. To many it appears that in the current system political
reform is impossible. While Khatami and the reformers were unable to affect major
change they were successful in expanding the political discourse.
In June 2001 Khatami was reelected to a second term, despite his inability to
implement serious reform. Khatami’s reelection showed his tremendous popularity and
that the Iranian public was committed to political reform against all odds. The clerical
elite had deprived Khatami of most of his able lieutenants; Deputy Leader of the Tehran
City Hall Said Hajarian had been shot and crippled, revolutionary Abdullah Nuri was in
prison, and his only other minister of political note Ataollah Mohajerani the Minister of
Culture was being pursued domestically.
175
Despite the efforts of reformers and the will
of the people the reform movement was being effectively crippled by the clerical elite,
some compared it to a silent coup. Heightened tensions exploded in October 2001 when
174
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
175
Ansari (2006), p. 153
110
hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets for weeks, clamoring for
democratic freedom and engaging in violent clashes with police. The demonstrations
were significant not only for their size but also for the participation of ordinary citizens,
whose presence signaled the broadening of the opposition. Strikes by teachers, workers
and nurses, attended by thousands, throughout 2001 and 2002, further reflected that
resentment toward the regime was no longer confined to the students.
176
With continued pressure from the conservative clerical elite the reform
movement was losing steam; including the suppression of the student protests, threats
issued to Khatami by the Revolutionary Guard, the 2004 electoral fraud and the
elimination of many of Khatami’s ministers. Khatami was also losing the support of
student and other reformers who had supported him. Public criticism of the president
intensified throughout late 2001, culminating in calls for his resignation in November
2002 during several weeks of protests when the regime sentenced a pro-reform professor
to death. With its rejection of Khatami, the opposition became known as the Third Force,
an independent movement outside of the official political camps of the reformists and the
conservatives. Members of the Third Force had previously supported Khatami but were
angered by the slow pace of his reforms and his inability to challenge the conservative
clerical elite’s grip on power. The growing political crisis in Iran garnered worldwide
attention in 2003. Iranian activists inside the country spread word through the internet of
anti-regime sentiment, and exiles and Iranians abroad used radio and the web to organize
against the clerics. The harsh reprisals faced by opposition activists were highlighted by
176
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
111
the case of Zahra Kazemi, a Canadian photographer of Iranian descent who was tortured
to death in July 2003 for taking pictures of the notorious Evin prison, where political
prisoners are held.
177
Khatami was able to garner a lot of support but was unable to parley it into
political reform. His presidency expanded and energized the reform movement but also
caused the clerical elite to circle their wagons and thwart the reformers efforts. Khatami
hoped to enact political change through the existing government in Iran and not agitate a
revolution. Khatami’s efforts were commendable, but the clerical elite were not bound
by legal concerns and did not play by the same rules as Khatami. Khatami missed
another opportunity to take a stand against the clerical elite after the 2004 parliamentary
elections. The elections were a mockery of the system; thousands of candidates were
prohibited from running by the Guardian Council, including sitting deputies. Many
reformers and moderate conservatives dropped out of the election in protest and some
constituencies only had one choice to vote for. Khatami once again did not take a strong
stand against the clerical elite and the blatant voter fraud was ignored by the rest of the
world.
Khatami did not take a strong stand against the clerical elite, but it is questionable
if he would have been able to do any good. The way that the hard-line clerics
consolidated their power and blocked the reformers efforts was reminiscent of the time
following the Islamic Revolution when Khomeini and his cohorts secured their grip over
the country. Khatami’s presidency was a tremendous disappointment to the Iranian
177
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
112
people and was also a missed opportunity for the international community and especially
the US to establish better relations with Iran. In Clinton’s first term he continued to deal
with Iran as all presidents since the Islamic Revolution and the focus was put on
constraining Iran’s nuclear development and the human rights conditions within Iran. In
Clinton’s second term he recognized Khatami’s efforts and became a proponent of
exploring better relations with Iran. In March 2000 Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright made a statement showing regret for the 1953 coup and expressing the
shortsightedness of supporting Saddam in the Iran-Iraq War. Albright also announced
that some sanctions would be lifted against Iran on some traditional Iranian goods
178
including carpets and pistachios.
The lifting of the sanctions had little practical effect,
but was a step towards pursuing more productive relations; Khatami hailed it as a good
start.
Clinton continued to step up efforts to reestablish relations with Iran and
reportedly sent a letter through the Swiss embassy outlining a program to normalize
relations between America and Iran.
179
Khatami did not take decisive action and chose
to wait to take action until after the 2000 presidential election, holding out for a
Republican victory. Khatami believed that a Republican victory would hail in a more
pragmatic approach with Iran that was based on realism and oil and Iranian leaders had
traditionally preferred to deal with Republicans (Khomeini holding out for Reagan’s
victory to end hostage crisis).
178
179
180
180
Khatami was still skeptical of Clinton’s intentions and
Ansari (2006), p. 151
Ansari (2006), p. 157
Ansari (2006), p. 157
113
perhaps wasn’t willing to take decisive action especially considering how little time
Clinton had left as president. Khatami made a vital miscalculation (the George W. Bush
administration hailed in a much more hard-line approach to Iran) and he later admitted
that it was huge missed opportunity. Despite the best intentions of both Clinton and
Khatami neither president had the ability to transcend their critics at home.
181
Being soft
on Iran was a label that no American president wanted and there was still a tremendous
amount of anti-American sentiment in Iran, even though many of the Iranian public saw
the benefit of relations with the US.
Clinton realized in his second term that it was an excellent opportunity to engage
Iran, but he was too late. The clerical elite had already flexed its muscles and Khatami’s
support continued to wither away. Had Clinton recognized the opportunity earlier when
Khatami was first swept into power then possibly real gains could have been made.
Clinton eventually saw the opportunity to engage Iran, but many American legislators
saw the turmoil in Iran as an opportunity to support regime change. An American
initiated regime change is not a realistic option. There is still a tremendous amount of
distrust for America in Iran and few want an increased American presence in the area.
Dialogue needs to be opened between America and Iran at this point the lack of
diplomatic relations between Iran and America do not serve anyone’s interests. America
has maintained dialogue with nations while they were at war, it is ridiculous that America
and Iran can not be involved in productive diplomacy.
Khatami’s failure showed how difficult it is to affect change in Iran. Iran’s
governmental structure is built to constrain popular will and the ability of elected officials
181
Ansari (2006), p. 159
114
to affect change. The president in Iran is not the highest political office and is subject to
the dictates of the Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader. These unelected offices
are not bound by the structure of the elected officials and are effective at crushing dissent
and preventing change. The reform movement won the battle of ideas, but had no
182
strategy to implement the ideas.
While reformers debated strategy hard-liners had
strategy for assuming their political hegemony and deployed judiciary and security forces
to close down newspapers, imprison key reform figures on contrived charges, while the
Guardian Council systematically voided parliamentary legislation and orchestrated a
campaign of terror that targeted intellectuals, writers and activists and unleashed vigilante
groups on student gatherings and peaceful demonstrations. This was done not only to
weaken the reform movement but to demonstrate to the public the irrelevance of
183
elections.
Iran has an effective repressive apparatus but Iran is bound to change despite the
consolidation of conservative power. Iran is not a stagnant authoritarian state like North
Korea or Iraq (under Saddam), Iran is a fiercely competitive political culture.
184
Iranian
citizens enjoy more political freedoms than most other Gulf States. Iran has elections and
student protesters are usually just beaten whereas they would not be allowed to get that
far in other Gulf States. In 2002 the UN Human Rights Commission voted on General
Assembly Resolution 59/205 to remove Iran from blacklisted countries; Iran has more
press freedom than some, women have more social rights in Iran than other Gulf
182
183
184
Takeyh (2006), p. 38
Takeyh (2006), p. 39
Takeyh (2006), p. 17
115
185
States.
Khatami’s election and the rise of reformers caused an increase in political
suppression, but the clerical elite were forced to react to the changing Iranian society.
Now in many ways society sets agendas and the state must react. Arguably the clerical
regime recognized both its limitations and that it must respond to a politically
experienced, revolutionary society, but the predicament of the regime remains as much
186
institutional as ideological.
The opposition movement in Iran has proven that it is capable of loud and violent
outbursts. It has shown its commitment to defiance of the Islamic regime.
187
But it
continues to lack organization and a coherent political vision, in part because the clerical
regime has arrested many of its leaders, but also because the movement is still growing. It
remains uncertain where the future of the Third Force lays, what its relationship to
outside powers will be and whether it will become a truly revolutionary movement that
succeeds in reshaping Iran's government.
188
The failure of the reform movement under
Khatami should not be seen as a death nail to the movement. Political factions in Iran do
not disappear and there is still a lot of Iranians that support political reforms. Khatami
was unwilling to take a strong stand against the clerical elite, but future reformers maybe
willing to take a stronger stand. The fact that the clerical elite now must react to the
political climate rather than dictate it is a step in the right direction.
185
186
Howard (2004), p. 50
Moslem (2002), p. 189
187
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
188
David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the Harbinger of
Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World January 2004
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
116
Khatami’s presidency was a tremendous disappointment as many thought that it
would signal drastic change in the Islamic Republic. While Khatami was unable to enact
serious reform in Iran it was more of the fault of the clerical elite than Khatami himself;
even though Khatami missed several opportunities to challenge the clerical elite.
Khatami’s presidency is viewed by most as a failure, but he was able to affect some
positive change in Iran. Khatami opened up dialogue with the European Union which
has since become an integral trading partner and has improved Iran’s economy and
diplomatic relations. Khatami also excited and energized the Iranian public, his election
to two terms of president showed how hungry for change the people of Iran are to the
international community. Khatami was also successful in expanding political discourse
in Iran. With increased press freedom and more avenues to express dissent, Iran
expanded political debates to levels that would have not been permitted before.
Since Khatami’s presidency he has remained in the public eye and continues to
be a voice of reason balancing Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. Khatami now heads the
International Center for Dialogue Among Civilizations, which is based in Tehran and
Geneva. Khatami has made bold stands against Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners (after
his presidency) and has attempted to foster productive international relations. In a wideranging interview on September 4, 2006 in New York during a UN conference, Khatami
said Iran is not intent on eliminating Israel and accepts a two-state solution that includes
both Israel and a new Palestine -- on terms acceptable to the Palestinians. He basically
contradicted the recent angry rhetoric of his hard-line successor, President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, who has denied the Holocaust and has called for Israel to be wiped off the
117
189
map.
"The practical policy of the Islamic republic has never been to eliminate or wipe
Israel off the map. And I don't believe that this policy has changed with the change of
president," Khatami said in an interview in New York, where he is attending a United
Nations conference. "You've never heard me reject the right of anyone to exist," added
190
Khatami.
Khatami’s continued political activity shows that his presidency was not a
complete failure. Khatami has visited the US and held talks with former president Carter
and the Carter Center in Atlanta. Carter lost his presidential election mostly due to the
hostage crisis but has shown that he is willing to transcend this legacy and open up talks
with Iran. Carter and Khatami have shown that there are reasonable minds on both sides
and that dialogue will be the most effective tool in bridging the gap between America and
Iran. The efforts of Khatami and Carter provide hope for the future of American-Iranian
relations even as more belligerent presidents currently rule both nations. While Khatami
was unable to affect meaningful reforms during his presidency he may still be able to be a
catalyst for change in Iran.
Just like other previous Iranian leaders history may take a kinder look on
Khatami’s presidency after the fact. His housecleaning of the Intelligence Ministry—one
of the few genuine achievements to come out of his many confrontations with the
conservative power structure—may have significantly curtailed Iran’s earlier tendency
189
Roger Wright, War Backfiring on U.S., Khatami Says Washington Post September 6, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090501198.html?referrer=emailarticle
190
Roger Wright, War Backfiring on U.S., Khatami Says Washington Post September 6, 2006
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090501198.html?referrer=emailarticle
118
toward interventionism and feckless adventurism.
191 192
When viewed at on a
continuum Khatami was a positive step for Iranian politics. Rafsanjani was unsuccessful
in his economic reforms but helped usher in a more pragmatic approach to Iran’s
international relations. Khatami took his reforms a step further and attempted to promote
social freedoms within Iran and constructively usher closer ties with the international
community and better relations with the Western world. Khatami’s efforts (even though
they were met with little success) show the development of constructive political thought
in Iran’s political elite. The clerical elite were able to block the implementation of
political reforms, but were unable to stop the growth of Iran’s political discourse.
Khatami’s continued political activity also provides hope for a reemergence of the reform
movement. The tremendous amount of political dissent in Iran has not disappeared since
Khatami’s presidency and the cyclical nature of Iranian politics ensures that reformers
will once again capture the nation’s imagination.
Many were frustrated at Khatami’s unwillingness to confront the clerical elite and
the slow pace of his reforms; but perhaps he was right and political change will need to
be gradual in Iran. Since the revolution Iran has gone through considerable political
development even though much of the development has been stifled by the clerical elite.
Immediately after the revolution Iran pursued international relations and economic
development based on vague ideological values. After the death of Khomeini and
Rafsanjani’s presidency Iran began to pursue a more pragmatic approach to international
191
Sick (2003), p. 11
192
In 1998 Khatami purged a number of people from the Intelligence Ministry, as it was revealed that
they were responsible for the murder of several dissident writers and correspondence in terrorist attacks
abroad. The purge was seen as a rare victory for reformers, although many of the purged individuals where
later relocated to other government posts created by Khamenei.
119
relations and economic development. Khatami continued the evolution of Iran’s political
thought and made a definitive break from the past. The Islamic Republic is not even
thirty years old and while it is still possible that Iran will witness another revolution it is
going to require gradual change to make this possible. The clerical elite have been able
to constrain political dissent to this point, but it is unlikely that the clerical elite will be
able to continue to stifle dissent indefinitely. Most believed prior to the revolution that
the Shah had a firm grip on power, but accumulating pressure made it impossible for the
Shah to remain in power. We maybe witnessing a similar building of pressure in modern
Iran.
The election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 showed that the Iranian people were
frustrated. The turnout for the election was extremely low and Ahmadinejad received
less than half the amount of votes that Khatami received in both of his two elections.
One of the key issues of Ahmadinejad’s campaign was ending government corruption.
Ahmadinejad as a relative political outsider (little known mayor of Tehran) seemed a
logical enough choice since Rafsanjani the ultimate political insider was his biggest
competition. Ahmadinejad’s victory was a vote for change even though he is a
conservative hard-liner, although Ahmadinejad holds a PhD in traffic and transport from
Tehran University’s of Science and Technology not from a clerical background. People
have already become frustrated with Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners are losing support.
Even with Ahmadinejad’s hard-line rhetoric he has shown a degree of restraint that was
not present at the time of the revolution. The release of the British sailors, his address to
the UN and continued debate over Iran’s nuclear program have shown that Ahmadinejad
120
is not willing to pursue confrontational international relations at the expense of Iran’s
interests.
Iran has continued to modernize after the revolution and Iran’s political
leadership has become more pragmatic and less confrontational. One of the greatest
barriers to Iran improving relations with the US and the rest of the Western world has
been Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism. The US state department has referred to Iran as the
number one sponsor of international terrorism and Iran has been linked to a wide array of
terrorist activities. In the early years of the revolution Iran sought to export revolution
and affect change in the international political arena. At this time Iran was certainly
heavily involved in terrorist activities. These include kidnappings sanctioned and
sponsored by the government itself, such as the taking of American hostages in the first
years of the revolution, and reputed Iranian support for and suspected direct involvement
in Hezbollah operations in Lebanon, including the bombings of U.S. installations and
hostage-taking throughout the 1980s.
193
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran pursued a
strategy of maritime terror, using unmarked gunboats and floating mines to attack
noncombatant shipping. Numerous assassinations of enemies abroad in the late 1980s
and 1990s were widely and persuasively attributed to Iranian official sponsorship, and
Iran was accused of sponsoring operations by other militant organizations, such as the
Argentinean bombings of 1992 and 1994 and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing,
attributed to Hezbollah organizations in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
193
194
194
Sick (2003), p. 2
Sick (2003), p. 2
121
It is this history of sponsoring terrorist activities that has conditioned the
American view of Iran as the number one sponsor of terrorism. Since the early years of
the revolution Iran has considerably changed its utilization of terrorism. Iran no longer
tries to incite revolutions in neighboring countries and has curtailed hostage taking except
for the British sailors; the quick resolution of the crisis shows a more tempted approach.
Iran also no longer executes dissidents in Europe and the use of maritime terrorism was
ended after the Iran-Iraq War, and could be considered an act of war not terrorism.
Today Iran’s use of terrorism is mostly focused on anti-Israeli groups in Palestine. Iran
takes a more pragmatic approach to the use of terrorism than the time of the revolution
just like the rest of Iran’s international relations. While supporting anti-Israeli groups is a
major concern it must also be acknowledged that Iran has curtailed much of its support of
international terrorism. American legislators have not been able to move past the legacy
of the hostage crisis and Iran’s activities immediately following the revolution.
Iran helped create Hezbollah but it is unclear how much operational control Iran
exercises over the organization, especially today as Hezbollah has expanded. Iran’s
ambassador to Syria in the early 1980s, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, provided financing and
support for the creation of Hezbollah ―Party of God‖, the Lebanese political party and
resistance movement. Hezbollah is widely believed to have been associated with the
bombings of the U.S. Marines barracks and the U.S. embassy in Lebanon in 1983,
although its leadership denies the charge, as well as the killing and hostage-taking of
Americans and others throughout the 1980s.
195
Iran continues to support Hezbollah but
has also called on the organization to use a degree of restraint. Iran was internationally
195
Sick (2003), p. 3
122
isolated and economically damaged by their involvement in terrorism following the
revolution and were forced to modify their behavior in order pursue constructive
international relations.
After the revolution Khomeini embarked on a brutal campaign of terrorism
against ―enemies of the revolution‖. Much of Iran’s reputation for international terrorism
comes from this period. Just before he died in 1989, Khomeini issued his famous fatwa
against Salman Rushdie. Khomeini regarded Rushdie’s depiction of the prophet
Muhammad and other Islamic subjects in The Satanic Verses as blasphemous, and the
fatwa in effect incited the general Muslim community to murder Rushdie.
196
It also
seemed to signal the beginning of an assassination campaign against individuals
associated with Rushdie’s book as well as other ―enemies of the revolution.‖ The rash of
killings that followed included Kurdish leader Abdol Rahman Qasemlu in Vienna in
1989, former Iranian prime minister and opposition leader Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris in
1991, four Iranian Kurds in Berlin in 1992, and several leaders of the opposition
Mujahideen-e Khalq movement. In addition, two bombings in Argentina—the Israeli
embassy in March 1992 and a Jewish community center in July 1994—were attributed to
the Lebanese Hezbollah organization, allegedly with Iranian assistance.
197
Iran has been implicated in many terrorist activities but it is hard to say how
reliable these accounts are. Many of the cases have never been solved and intelligence
has proven to be unreliable in this area. There is also a general lack of knowledge as to
how much operational control Iran has over the groups’ use of terrorism. It is different if
196
197
Sick (2003), p. 4
Sick (2003), p.4
123
Iran is involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts or if Iran provides money
to organizations that in turn utilizes terrorism under their own dictates. Iran’s divided
government also makes the situation more complicated; whereas the elected officials
maybe trying to compromise and reach out to the international community the unelected
leaders may attempt to sabotage such efforts. Iran’s history and the lack of transparency
in Iran’s government cause many to assume the worst. Iran’s past involvement in
terrorism and especially the hostage crisis will continue to affect the way that Iran is
perceived by American lawmakers. Iran has been involved in terrorism, but has curtailed
much of their terrorist activities in the name of better international relations.
Iran’s involvement in terrorism has come under greater scrutiny following 9/11.
9/11 ensured America would take a proactive approach to terrorism and Iran would be
one of the main targets. After 9/11 Iran responded with official statements of
condolences and unofficial candlelight vigils in support of the American people.
198
Iran
also constructively participated in the Bonn talks to establish an intern government in
Afghanistan, which drew praise from US officials. It seemed that Iran and the US were
on the verge of reestablishing official relations. At the Tokyo donors conference in
January 2002, Iran pledged a total of $560 million for the reconstruction of
Afghanistan—the largest donation of any developing country.
199
Despite the
encouraging signs Bush referred to Iran as one of the ―axis of evil‖ in his 2002 State of
the Union address. Bush’s remarks were highly inflammatory and put a damper on any
198
199
Sick (2003), p. 8
Sick (2003), p. 8
124
improvement in Iranian-American relations. This incident made it seem that regardless
of Iran’s actions that they would still be viewed through the lens of the hostage crisis.
The Bush administration has also accused Iran of harboring members of Al
Qaeda. Iranian officials admit that they have captured and returned members of Al
Qaeda to their countries of origin, but deny providing safe haven for the group. There
have also been intelligence reports that claimed that there is a connection between people
within Iran and Al Qaeda, perhaps through Hezbollah. These claims have not been
backed with evidence can not be considered very credible. The last thing that Iranian
officials want is an American invasion or increased presence in the region and any
connection to Al Qaeda would ensure one or both of these fates. The Bush
administration has also attempted to blame Iran for inciting unrest in Iraq. These claims
have also been backed with little evidence. Interfering in Iraq’s reconstruction would
also be a sure way to receive more pressure from America and Iranian officials would
certainly be cautious about interfering in Iraq.
Iran’s past involvement in terrorism is undeniable. It will be extremely difficult
for Iran to overcome its reputation as a sponsor of terrorism, but Iran should be given
credit for the progress that has been made. Iran has curtailed much of its terrorist
activities and now takes a much more cautious approach to international relations than
the time immediately after the revolution. Much of Iran’s recent alleged involvement in
terrorism has been backed with little evidence. Most of Iran’s current involvement in
terrorism is the support of anti-Israeli groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command. Virtually all elements of the Iranian leadership do not deny this association;
125
they actually take pride in it. Members of these and other militant organizations are
brought to Iran repeatedly for various conferences and meetings; their leaders meet
openly with Iran’s top leaders, including Khatami and his foreign minister; other Iranian
officials meet with them on trips to Lebanon and Syria; and Iran provides material
support. Iran regards this as legitimate activity in support of resistance movements
fighting against illegal occupation of their land.
200
Iran is up front about their involvement with anti-Israeli groups and views their
support of such groups as a legitimate expression of their political beliefs. The IsraelPalestine issue is very controversial and most in the Middle East are on the side of the
Palestinians. Many in the Middle East consider Israel to be the biggest sponsor of
terrorism in the region and the definition of terrorism seems to be politically motivated
since Israel is never on the list. Israel also has a much more developed lobbying
apparatus in the US then the Palestinians or their supporters. The Israel-Palestine issue is
very controversial and complicated and Iran’s involvement in it should be viewed
differently than hostage taking or assassinating dissidents in foreign countries. It is also
not clear how intimately involved Iran is with the activities of these groups; Iran does not
want an American or Israeli invasion so they are cautious about their level of
involvement with anti-Israeli groups.
Since the Islamic Revolution Iran has continued to modernize and evolve in their
international relations. The demographic transition in Iran will place more pressure on
the clerical elite to enact reforms and will be a key in the future of Iran. Economic
opportunity will be the younger generations’ greatest concern and will take precedent
200
Sick (2003), p. 11
126
over the legacy of the revolution or anti-Western thought. This demographic transition
will allow for more productive diplomacy with Iran. The Iranian public has also elected
presidents that have attempted to enact both economic and political reforms. While most
of the reforms have been unsuccessful, Iran’s political discourse has expanded and the
clerical elites’ power has been challenged. The Western world and especially the US
need to take advantage of the opportunity provided by Iran’s progressive leaders and
engage them. American lawmakers still deal with Iran under the legacy of the hostage
crisis; much has changed since then in Iran and American lawmakers must be willing to
move past this legacy. Iran’s utilization of terrorism has also changed since the
revolution. Iran continues to curtail their terrorist activities and Iran’s past acts should
not prevent constructive diplomacy. Iran continues to change, but the perceptions of Iran
in the international community have to a certain degree been frozen in time since the
revolution.
127
Conclusion
Iranian-American relations have been plagued by misunderstanding and a lack of
trust on both sides. American policymakers and especially the George W. Bush
administration have portrayed Iran in simplistic terms and been unresponsive to the
changing political and social environment in Iran. Iran is an extremely complex nation
with a long and storied history and continued political evolution; simplistic solutions will
not be effective in dealing with Iran. Iran’s layered government whereby the unelected
clerics can overrule elected officials makes it difficult to deal with Iran, but not
impossible. During Khatami’s two terms as president there was a window of opportunity
to establish constructive relations with Iran and put more pressure on the clerical elite to
recognize the changing times. This opportunity was missed, but it will not be the last.
Political factions in Iran wax and wane in popularity, but never entirely lose their
influence. Iran is not a rogue nation and is open to diplomacy; it is important that Iran is
not written off as a lost cause with the only options being confrontation or regime change.
There is still a tremendous amount of internal and external pressure for Iran to
reform. It is tempting for American policymakers to call for regime change, but this will
not be an effective strategy. The Iranian public is still very suspicious of foreign
involvement and change will have to come from within Iran. The Islamic Republic has
proved to be very resilient, but Iran is still prone to sudden change (few could predict the
Islamic Revolution). Khatami’s and the reformers’ inability to affect change in Iran
should not be seen as the end of the reform movement and should be viewed along the
continuum of Iran’s political evolution.
128
As Iran’s nuclear development takes center stage it is important that constructive
diplomacy be utilized. Threats and rhetoric only prove hard-liners point that Iran needs a
nuclear deterrent. American officials will have to take a more active participation in
nuclear talks as the US is Iran’s greatest threat to security. It is also important to
recognize why Iran feels they need a nuclear program and address these concerns. We
must also abandon the notion that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons in order to transfer
the technology to terrorists or have an ―Islamic weapon‖. Iran has legitimate security
concerns and they will need to be addressed in order to constrain Iran’s nuclear
proliferation. Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons is born out of a rational need for
deterrents to the powerful enemies that Iran has not out of irrational ideology of Muslin
extremism or to promote terrorism. It is questionable how much support the Iranian
public has for developing nuclear weapons because of the governments’ propaganda
campaign surrounding nuclear development. While most Iranians support Iran’s nuclear
development for civilian purposes the support seems to dwindle for the development of
nuclear weapons given the conflict that it would cause with the international community.
Iran also has a severe economic problems and alleviating these problems will take
precedent over developing a nuclear program. Constructive diplomacy, including
economic incentives could be effective in constraining Iran’s nuclear development.
Since the Islamic Revolution Iran and the US have had no official relations. In
order to move forward Iran and the US must reestablish relations. The US has continued
relations with nations even while at war and not having relations with Iran is
unproductive and makes sure that progress will be slow and arduous. Accepting
responsibility for each nation’s previous acts (hostage crisis and 1953 coup) would be a
129
positive first step in reestablishing relations. The current situation in Afghanistan and
Iraq offer Iran and the US a unique opportunity to cooperate. Iranian and American
interests largely coincide in Iraq and Afghanistan and both nations should capitalize on
this rare occasion. The current status of Iranian-American relations is harmful to both
parties. It is time to take a fresh and constructive approach with Iran.
130
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Journals and Magazines
-Staff Writer, Will it Make a Difference? The Economist 11/05 Vol. 375 Issue 8430
-Staff Writer, Is the President Elect as Grim as it Sounds? The Economist 2/05
Vol.376 Issue 8433
-Staff Writer, The Revolutionary Guards are Back The Economist 6/04 Vol. 371 Issue
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- Mohammad Sahimi, Iran’s Nuclear Program Part 1,2 and 3 Payvand’s Iran News
October 2, 2003
- Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, Iran’s Nuclear Challenge Political Science Quarterly
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Internet and Newspapers
-Sam Bagnall, Iran’s Battle with Heroin BBC News June 7, 2002
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/this_world/3791889.stm
- An Interview With Mehrzad Boroujerdi Conducted by Chris Chen, The Ayatollah and
Ahmadinejad The Politic Friday, November 7, 2008
http://thepolitic.org/content/view/136/ The Politic.org
- Miranda Eeles, The Vigilantes Stop Women’s Demo BBC News March 8, 2004
-Larry Everest, Fueling the Iran-Iraq Slaughter Z Magazine September 5, 2002
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-David Finkel, U.S. Station Seeks Ear of Iran's Youths; Radio Farda Goes Easy on
the News, Heavy on Pop Music to Capture Vast Under-30 Audience Washington Post
Jun 5, 2006 www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/.../04/AR2006060400890.html
-George Friedman, Iran: US Israel Rethink Their Strategies Strafor Global
Intelligence December 6, 2005 www.stratfor.com
-Roger Hardy, The Iran-Iraq War 25 Years On BBC News September 21, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4260420.stm
-Michael Herzog, Iranian Public Opinion on the Nuclear Program: A Potential Asset
for the International Community The Washington Institute Policy Focus #56 June
2006 www.washingtoninstitute.org
-Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq CRS Report for Congress
October 21, 2008 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/middleeast/RS22323.pdf
-Brad Martsching, Trade and Environment Conflict Studies: Iran-Iraq War and
Waterway Claims ICE Case Studies May 1998
www.american.edu/TED/ice/iraniraq.htm
-David Montero, The Struggle for Democracy: The Modern Past, Khatami the
Harbinger of Change, The Student Uprisings, The Third Force Frontline World
January 2004 http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran/tl03.html
-Gary Sick, Iran: Confronting Terrorism The Washington Quarterly Autumn 2003
-Ahmad Siddiqi, Khatami and the Search for Reform in Iran Stanford Journal of
International Relations Volume 6 Issue 1 Winter 2005
www.stanford.edu/group/sjri/6.1.04_siddiqi.html
- Orit Sklar, Wake up Call for Ahmadinejad Front Page Magazine December 12, 2005
www.Frontpagemag.com
-Staff Report, Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards International
Atomic Energy Agency December 18, 2003
www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html
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-Staff Writer, Can Diplomacy Prevent Iran from going Nuclear? Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs December 1, 2005 www.jcpa.org
-Staff Writer, Chemical Weapons Global Security Military section
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/cw.htm
-Staff Writer, Cicek: “CIA Head’s Visit is a Natural Outcome of Developments”
Turkish Press 12/13/05 www.turkishpress.com
-Staff Writer, EU Criticizes Iranian Elections BBC News February 23, 2004
http.//.news.bbc.co.uk/2/middle_east/3512985.stm
-Staff Writer, Foreign Interference Rand Corporation Monographs 2006
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs_reports/MR1021/MR1021.chp4.pdf
–Staff Writer, Historical Personalities: Mehdi Bazargan Iran Chamber Society
http://www.iranchamber.com/about_us/about_us.php
-Staff Writer, International Support Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council
of Resistance of Iran December 13, 2005
-Staff Writer, Iraqi defense advisor meets defense minister Islamic Republic News
Agency December 11, 2005 www.irna.ir/en/news/view.menu.htm
-Staff Writer, Iran Blasts Illegal Poll BBC News June 25, 2005
-Staff Writer, Iranian Leader Picks Hardliners BBC News August 14, 2005
-Staff Writer, Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) Global Security Military section
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm
-Staff Writer, Iran Nuclear Overview Nuclear Threat Initiative 2007
www.NTICountryOverviewIranNuclearOverview.htm
-Staff Writer, Iran-UK: No Justification to keep Iran’s main opposition in terror
Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran December 10,
2005
-Staff Writer, List of International Support of the Iranian Resistance Foreign Affairs
Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran June 13, 2005
-Staff Writer, List of terrorist attacks abroad Foreign Affairs Committee of the
National Council of Resistance of Iran June 14, 2005
-Staff Writer, Military: Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) Global
Security http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/mek.htm
-Staff Writer, NTI Tutorial Iran Nuclear Threat Initiative 2007
http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/npttutorial/chapter05_iran.html
-Staff Writer, Row Erupts Over Iran Poll Turnout BBC News February 23, 2004
-Staff Writer, Striking at the Enemy’s Heart Foreign Affairs Committee of the National
Council of Resistance of Iran June 14, 2004
-Staff Writer, Target Iran - Air Strikes - Timing Global Security Military section
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iran-strikes-timing.htm
-Staff Writer, Timeline Iran: A Chronology of Key Events BBC News September 22,
2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/806268.stm
-Staff Writer, UN Threatens New Sanctions on Iran CNN News February 23, 2007
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/02/23/iran.nuclear.ap/
- Tudeh Party, Imperialism, Globalization and the Struggle for Socialism Political
Affairs Magazine November 12 2004 www.politicalaffairs.net
134
-Roger Wright, War Backfiring on U.S., Khatami Says Washington Post September 6,
2006 www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090501198.
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video
-Frontline video Terror and Tehran PBS 2002
135