DIVIDED CITIES: SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION OF
THE IMMIGRANT YOUTHS IN CASE OF NETHERLANDS/DEVENTER*
Özlem GÜZEY ([email protected]), Nevin GÜLTEKİN ( [email protected]),
Ogan KIRSAÇLIOĞLU ([email protected]),
Erman AKSOY ([email protected]), Ela ATAÇ ([email protected]),
Aysu UĞURLAR ([email protected])
Gazi University, Faculty of Enginnering and Architecture, Department of City and Regional
Planning, Ankara-Turkey
Abstract
‘Undivided city’ is one of the basic objectives of current development strategies and state policies with
the aim of integrating minority groups to the majority of population sometimes by destroying the
ethnic identities in favour of social cohesion. Ethnic identities and especially the identity formations of
second and third generation immigrants and new young immigrant flows are claimed to be the
potential threats to social and community cohesion. For this reason, social exclusion and the youth are
one of the major topics in the 21st century characterised by important demographic changes. These
changes are affected by a number of economic, social and cultural factors and policies in turn having
impact on a wide set of policy domains. Migration, technological developments, globalisation of
economies and societal transformation processes have led to increasing cultural exchange within
Europe and with other parts of the world and to a different perception of values and beliefs. From this
point of view this paper will address the causes of social exclusion in case of Netherlands/Deventer,
giving emphasis to the immigrant youths (second and third generations), its effects and likely future
impacts on quality of life, values and attitudes, as well as their implications for Dutch and EU policies
in Deventer, where is one of the well-known migration cities that has a considerable number of
Turkish youth. The main objective is to achieve a comprehensive and integrated approach and provide
policy recommendations to dealing effectively with the social exclusion of young immigrants live in
Deventer in terms of causes, processes, changes and prospects. Hence, this research in this context will
examine trends in the social exclusion of the immigrant youth in Deventer and will address issues such
as their opportunities, prospects and needs, housing, economic and social representation and means of
formal and informal participation, and empowerment and adaptation policies contrary to the
integration and/or social cohesion policies. Related questions of poverty, inequality, deprivation,
discrimination, gender, migration and insecurity of various kinds facing young immigrants will also be
considered in this paper by combining the quantitative and qualitative social research methods and
using the grounded theory to analyze the relationship between social exclusion and residential
segregation/concentration and to study the effect of integration policies developed in Deventer on the
segregationist tendencies of the immigrants. Quantitative method consists of questionnaires with
survey analysis which will be utilized with the purpose of supporting the qualitative data, whereas the
qualitative method includes in-depth interviews, participant observations and media analysis.
Keywords: Undivided Cities, Social Exclusion, Immigrant Youths, Segregation/Concentration,
Deventer/Netherlands
This paper has been prepared according to the initial findings, dated January 2008, of the TÜBİTAK – The
Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey – sponsored research project, titled “Identity Points
in Divided Cities: Spatial Segregation and Concentration shaped with Social Solidarity and Adaptation
Attitudes of the Turks Living in Holland” (SOBAG-107K099).
1
1. Introduction: Divided City and Identity Points
Spatial segregation in the city has been defined through social solidarity and social solidarity
through race and ethnicity. Ethnic structuring and identity are foregrounded as a reaction to
the modernization process or a criterion through which individuals can define themselves
differently, and mostly as a tool of solidarity. As such, ethnic groups are also spatially
segregated from society’s other strata in the urban space, and this strengthens alienation.
Spatial segregation and spatial concentration, on the one hand, reflect that people living in
these areas are offered limited choices in the housing market, and, on the other hand, prevent
these people from fully participating in the wider society. Lying at the root of this problem is
multiculturalism. However, multiculturalism is regarded today not as ‘multiculturalism of
rights,’ but as ‘multiculturalism of fear.’ Hence, the approach towards ethnic differences,
which should be protected and respected within the framework of human rights, has changed
in the 21st century, and social solidarity and the resulting ethnic concentration have been
regarded as problems to be overcome through ‘integration,’ used as a synonym for the ethnic
groups’ and/or immigrants’ unification with the larger society.
Research indicates, however, that in integration, the disadvantages of ethnic groups’
differences and of spatial solidarity, as well as the advantages and the social capital
hypothesis are overlooked. It is especially claimed that participation in ethnic unions is
effective in the creation of social trust and tolerance, which, in turn, provides the basis for
political participation. For this reason, each group’s distinctive characteristics are significantly
determinative. Despite the fact that the Turks living in Holland, who are the subject of this
research, are a group that cannot be partially integrated either socially or culturally, they are
known to have the strongest capacity for social solidarity networks and organization.
Nevertheless housing policies applied along with cultural and social integration in Holland
aim to bring different groups together in the same space, without any studies on identity
structures, and especially, on demographic structure. In this respect, it is crucial to analyze the
Turks’ adaptation problems and results, which run parallel to their efforts to retain their ethnic
and cultural identities that feed off of their social solidarity networks, in relation to their
spatial solidarity. This point will be investigated in this research in relation to the Turkish
young immigrants through incorporating the sustainability of cultural identity into integration,
which is advocated in the literature, and the necessity of social solidarity in both processes.
They will be considered in this paper by combining the quantitative and qualitative social
research methods to analyze the relationship between social exclusion and residential
segregation/concentration and to study the effect of integration policies developed in
Deventer on the segregationist tendencies of the immigrants. In this handling, the quantitative
method consists of questionnaires with survey analysis which will be utilized with the
purpose of supporting the qualitative data, whereas the qualitative method includes in-depth
interviews and participant observations.
2. Spatial Solidarity / Concentration on an Urban Scale
The undivided city is regarded today as one of the basic aims of global economic restructuring processes and of developmental dynamics such as welfare state differences
(Musterd, et al, 1999). Yet the ‘fragmentation of the city’ is an ongoing concept. Studies in
this field date back to the end of the 1980s and comprises concepts of the ‘dual city, polarized
city and fragmented city’ (Fainstein, et al, 1992; Moenkopf and Castells, 1991; Van Kempen
and Marcuse, 1997, qtd. in Musterd et al, 1999), as well as bringing into discussion
definitions of ‘urban space desintegration, spatial concentration, urban lower class and ghetto’
2
in relation to spatial formations. As such, social exclusion is grounded on spatial exclusion,
and spatial exclusion(Musterd et al, 1999) is grounded principally on race and ethnicity
focused housing inequalities (Karn, 1997, qtd. in Ratcliffe, 1999; Özüekren and Van Kempen,
2002; Musterd, 2005; Bolt and Van Kempen, 2002).
2.1. Spatial Characteristics of Social Solidarity
Spatial exclusion is observed when some groups within a wider society spatially desintegrate
(Musterd, et al, 1999). As the definition indicates, spatial exclusion, which is defined in
relation to social exclusion, brings along spatial concentration as well (Ratcliffe, 1998;
Kogan, 2004; Musterd, 2005). Territorialization, which comes along with social exclusion, is
widespread in almost all countries’ cities and is increasing. Six theses have been devised in
comprehending this development and/or social exclusion (Ratcliffe, 1998; Ratcliffe, 1999;
Kogan, 2004; Bolt and Van Kempen, 2002).
1. Stable social location, structurally differing from the larger society (excluded
neighborhoods),
2. The desire for detachment on an individual basis, rejection of general values,
3. The inefficiency of general values in reflecting the social and cultural needs of individuals
from minority groups, as a result of which they are regarded as ‘others,’ endemically
defined through racism, and victimized in racist assaults due to spatial segregation,
4. On a smaller scale (in the workplace, education, acquirement of housing, political rights),
the demonstration of unitary group characteristics by segregation and the segregated (age,
sex, race, ethnicity, health conditions, and the like) and the perception of segregation
through existent and nonexistent characteristics,
5. In relation to housing (though it is regarded in its simplest sense as homelessness), the
problem of access to basic social urban rights
6. In the discourse of exclusion, the adoption of ‘integration,’ which is regarded as the
opposite of exclusion, and using integration, not inclusion, as exclusion’s opposite, in line
with the European Union’s acceptance of the term. This change is caused by the change of
approach in the 21st century towards ethnic identities (Levitas, 1996).
All six have been observed to focus on the youth, in relation to the immigrant groups and
specially to recently experienced negative movements in Europe.
2.2. Immigrants’ Urban Solidarity / Concentration
The immigrants’ dissociation and concentration in the city, on the one hand, reflect the
limited opportunities in the housing market, and on the other hand, keep them from
participating in the wider society fully. This concentration is believed to hamper the
communication network between the rich, who seek help in the informal sector (child care,
cleaning, and the like), and the poor. Consequently, immigrants living in the concentration
areas have a negative image in the society. Gradually these areas become places of shared
wretchedness, deserted by the majority of the society and isolated. This destroys the empathy
between the society and the people living in that area, not only physically but also spiritually
(Özüekren, Van Kepmen, 1998).
At the other end of the spectrum, the positive aspect of immigrants’ dissociation in urban
space is providing the desired solidarity in the strange living area through continuity in social
relations. These relation networks help people solve their problems and enter the labor force
market. As such, an environment in which the new immigrants can acquire experience and
information before they started their own business is created (Burgers; Wilson and Portes;
Saunders and Nee; Portes and Zhou; Bailey and Waldinger qtd. in Özüekren and Van
Kepmen, 1998).
3
Governments’ immigrant policies, however, are based not on decreasing the class differences
among immigrant groups, but on abolishing cultural differences (Deurloo, Musterd, 2001).
Therefore, through assimilation policies (Yalçın, 2002) that are developed, the second and
third generation are assimilated. Yet organizations which are based especially on ethnic
identity can direct the society, thereby having a significant role in creating ideas and
identities. The assimilation of these organizations is claimed to prevent excessive marginality
and isolation, and to channel discontent, thereby contributing to the development of positive
identity and character.
As a result, identity foci in space are increasingly disappearing due to social and economic
integration. In this paper, this concept is handled in relation to the effects of Holland’s
immigrant and integration policies on Turkish immigrants, especially on the young.
3. Immigration and Integration Policies in Holland and Turkish Immigrants
Over the last 50 years, Holland has experienced a transformstion from a homogeneous society
to a heterogenous one with ethnic and cultural diversity. Two different dynamics are
determinative in this process. Firstly, guest workers have been invited to fill in the labor force
deficit in the reconstruction period following the Second World War. Secondly, between 1946
and 1962 and after 1975, there has been a return from Holland’s colonies to the motherland1.
Another factor is the fact that immigrant workers from North Africa and Turkey, who were
expected to return to their native countries, chose to settle in Holland as of the 1970s, and
they have also started to bring over their families. In 2003, for example, of the 20.000 people
who came over due to marriage, 20% was from Turkey, and 16% was from Morocco. Today,
8% of the country’s population is from different ethnicities. Turks and Moroccans make up
half of the ethnic groups, and the number of Antilles-Hollanders reaches 100.000 (Bendrif,
Haney, 2004).
3.1. Immigrant and Integration Policies
The government of Holland has initiated work towards integrating the immigrants, who
arrived at the beginning of the 1970s, into the society and providing them with a comfortable
life. By means of the ‘Minority Bill’ developed in 1983, all immigrants, who created
multiculturalism and diversity in the society, were allowed to retain their own religions,
cultures, and identities. Moreover, it was believed that, through the activities of their religious
organizations, immigrants would contribute to Holland’s political order (Bendrif, Haney,
2004). Nonetheless, in the 1990s, immigrant policies have become tougher, the tolerance
towards multiculturalism (especially towards Islam) has fractured, and topics such as
migration and immigrant policies, and illegal immigrants have been discussed on a national
platform (Bendrif, Haney, 2004). As a result of terrorist activities, such as September 11
attacks, in which Muslims were involved, multiculturalism has come to be regarded as a
danger, and to what extent Dutch values and culture and Islam could be compatible started to
be questioned (Bendrif, Haney, 2004). The most significant factor in this process is the fact
that almost half of the immigrant population is Muslim.
In 1998, within the Newcomers Citizenship Law (WIN), the immigrants have been required
to participate in integration programs and to have an adequate amount of knowledge of the
Dutch language and society (KIEM, 2005). According to the New Adaptation Law, passed
later in 2005, people who are to come to Holland for extended residence are required to attend
adaptation courses and take exams in their own countries (Ministry of Work and Social
1
Between 1946 and 1962, in the decolonization period, more than 300.000 immigrants from Endonesia and New
Guinea, and between 1975 and 1979, more than 300.000 immigrants from Surinam have settled in Holland.
4
Security, 2007). This condition applies to those who will come as a result of marriage.
Moreover, in order to prevent minorities from marrying people from their native countries,
the age for family reunions has been raised to 21 and the minimum monthly income to 1319
Euros. Turkish Advisory Board in Holland (IOT) argues that these prerequisites do not
conform to international treaties, and that minorities, young people and women will be subject
to discrimination as a result (Lahey, ÇSGM, 2005).
According to the Social Security Legislation2 in Holland, immigrants3, too, benefit from
social security rights. Yet the Disabled Veterans’ Retirement Law (WAO), which came into
effect as of January 1st, 2006, has been changed into Work and Income According to Working
Capacity Law (WIA). According to the criteria of this new law, it is expected that, of the
969.000 people who retired before the age of 55 due to disability, 110.000 people will
experience a reduction in their retirement salaries or that their salaries will be terminated due
to recent health controls (Turkish Republic Ministry of Work and Social Security, 2007).
Another application, which has been in effect since January 1st, 2005, requires everyone over
the age of 14 to carry an identity card for the purpose of maintaining social order and security
(Deventer ÇSGA,2005).
3.2. Turkish Immigrants Living in Holland
Unskilled Turks who arrived in the second half of the 1960s as guest workers are mostly of
rural origin and have a low educational standing (FORUM, 2003). 85% of those who arrived
in 1965 and 1966, and 50% of those who arrived in 1972 and 1973 have returned. However,
after 1975, due to family reunions of the Turks and the Moroccans, immigration rates have
continuously increased, despite the fact that workers from these countries are no longer
accepted (Lahey ÇSGM, 2006). While 5% of the Turks became citizens of Holland in 1990,
this rate increased to 57% in 2000. According to 2006 data, 98.900 Turks (258.272 with
double citizenship) live in Holland (Central Burau voor Statistiek, 2000). 35,5% of these live
in Amsterdam, Roterdam, Den Haag and Utrecht (FORUM, 2003).
According to the Dutch United Chambers of Commerce, 28.000 of the 100.000 business
administrators in the country are foreigners. With 12.500 administrators, Turks are at the top
of the list. It has been noted that minorities mostly manage cafés, hotels, restaurants, and the
like, and that the Turks who own 1/3 of all businesses in this sector are also active in finding
temporary occupation. In Holand, where 28% of the entrepreneurs is women, this rate is 15%
among Turks (Deventer ÇSGA, 2006). Of all the working Turkish population, 22% are
unskilled, 45% basic-, 25% medium-, 8% highly-skilled (FORUM, 2006). Among the Turks,
11% men and 10.1% women are unemployed (a total of 13.000 people), and these rates make
up 9% of the total rate of unemployment in the country. 61% of the Turks between 55 and 64
years of age is retired due to disability (Turkish Republic Ministry of Work and Social
Security, 2007).
Almost 70% of the first generation is married and has children. 85% of the second generation
is under the age of 20 and for this reason, the number of singles is high. 75-80% of the singles
want to marry Turks (FORUM, 2003). The Turkish youth receives formal education, although
2
For those over 65 years of age, monthly payments are made for general old age (AOW), general social benefits
(ABW), widows’ and orphans’ benefits (ANW), family benefits (AKW), and exceptional health expenses
(AWBZ). Within the framework of workers’ insurance, additional financial help is provided in line with
Incapability (WAO), Unemployment (WW), and Health Benefits (ZFW) laws. According to the Return Law
(REM), those who return to their countries permanently are offered payments.
3
In Holland, a total of 2.311.686 people (13.187 Turks) received AOW (retirement), 137.112 people (1.312
Turks) received ANW (widows’ and orphans’ monthly payment), 3.503.2738 people (2.664 Turks) received
AKW (children’s benefits) in 2004.
5
the reason is that it is compulsory. According to data from 2005 (excluding the fugitives),
55.000 students attend primary schools, 26.000 students attend secondary schools, 4.400
students receive special education, and 6.500 students study at the university
(http://digm.meb.gov.tr/yurtdisigorev/rehber/Rehber_III_hollanda.html).
4. Turkish Immigrants in Deventer City
Located in the Overijssel Region in Holland, Deventer has a size of 135 km2 . 15%
(approximately 6457 people) of the city’s total population (approximately 96.458 people) is
composed of Turkish immigrants. Of all the heads of families, 22% has immigrated between
1970 and 1980, 63% between 1980 and 1990, and 15% after 1990 (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. The Dates of Arrival in Holland of the Family Heads of the Young Turks
Age Groups
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
All Family Heads
1970-1980
0
20
40
32
0
22
1980-1990
12
60
40
68
100
63
1990+
88
20
20
0
0
15
4.1. Living Areas; Turkish Neighborhoods
In Deventer, which is administratively made up of seven regions, Turkish immigrants live in
all regions. They have composed Turkish neighborhoods, and hence spatially segregated, in
Zandweerd/Voorstad and Rivierenwijk/Bergweide regions where they are densely populated.
1st Area - Binnenstad/de hoven is the historical city
center. With its many historical structures which are
designated as world heritage (church, municipal and
housing buildings, and the like) and its pre-industrial
seetlement fabric, it is the city’s most significant identity
area. According to data from 2006, the ratio of the Turkish
population (89 people) to the area’s population (7263
people) is 1.2%. They live mostly (2.5%) in the Singels
neighborhood (Photo 4.1). They are single young people,
workers, students, and newlyweds with one or no children.
Photo 4.1. Deventer’s historical housing fabric
This group’s educational level (as high school and university graduates) is higher than that of
Turks living in other neighborhoods. They either rent rooms in historical housing constructs
or occupy old housing, which will be demolished in 3 or 4 years’ time, in the old industrial
site bordering the canal.
2nd Area - Zandweerd/Voorstad is within 5 minutes walking distance to the train station and
within 10-15minutes walking distance to the historical commercial center. The buildings in
this area, which are mostly one or two stories, have a medium construction quality and
approximately 60-80 m2 base area. The ratio of the Turkish population (2492 people) to the
area’s population (19.040 people) is 13.2%. They mostly live in Burgemeestersbuurt (29.5%),
Rode Dorp (23.4%), Rielerweg-West (14.7%), Zwolseweg (14.6%), and Zandweerd-Zuid
(13.9%) neighborhoods, in relatively big housing alotted to them by the municipality and in
traditional family structures. In the Rielerweg-West neighborhood (Photo 4.2), referred to as
the Turkish neighborhood, there is a commercial center where most of the Turks do their
6
shopping. Here all kinds of food products (Turkish dessert baklava, Turkish pizza lahmacun,
Turkish style pastrami, and even cheese), which appeal to Anatolian people, are sold through
advertisements which advocate their compatibility with Islam.
.
Photo .4.2. Turkish Stores and Housing in Rielerweg-West
3rd Area - Rivierenwijk / Bergweide is composed of
apartment buildings which are scheduled to be
demolished in 5-6 years’ time. It is an area where
mostly families from the Black Sea region and the East
live in traditional family structures. Only children of
Turkish immigrant families attend the basic education
school (Primair onderwijs) in the region. The ratio of
the Turkish population (1693 people) to the area’s
population (37.917 people) is 21.4%. They mostly live
in Deltabuurt (Photo 4.3) (33.4%) and Rivierenbuurt
(31.1%) neighborhoods.
Photo 4.3. Turkish Housing and Shopping Sites in Deltabuurt
At the center of these neighborhoods, which Turks have named Dertalan, there is a sub-center
where Turks can shop according to their own traditions. When the ratio of the Turkish
population to the region’s population is analyzed in relation to other regions (Table 4.2), it
can be claimed that Turkish immigrants are not socially and spatially segregated.
Figure 3.1. The Ratios of the Foreigners living in Deventer according to Regions
European population
Non-European population
Turkish population
7
Table.4.2. The Turkish Population in Deventer, according to Deventer Statistisch Jaarboek
(dated 2006)
Area
Turkish Population
No
Name
Population
(persons)
Population
(persons)
Ratio to the area’s
population (%)
4
5
6
7
Zandweerd/ Keızerslanden
Colmschate
Dıepenveen
Bathmen*
18951
26333
11632
5319
1097
1009
57
---
5.8
3.8
0.5
----
* Turks living in this region possess double citizenship and are, therefore, regarded as Dutch in statistics.
4.2. Demographic and Social Make-Up
10.2% of the Turks is between 5 and 9 years of age, 11.7% between 10 and 14, 10.8%
between 15 and 19, 8.8% between 20 and 24, 8.6% between 25 and 29, 8% between 30 and
34, 7.8% between 35 and 39, and 7.6% between 40 and 44. The lowest percentage is 2.1 of
those who are 65 or older (Deventer Statistisch Jaarboek, 2006). Accordingly, 46.1% of the
Turkish immigrants living in Deventer is the young population (between 0 and 24 years of
age). This ratio is 30.6% among the young of Deventer (Table 4.3, 4.4). These rates confirm
the fact that the Turks make up a significant percentage of Deventer’s young population.
Table 4.3. The Young Population in Deventer
The Ratio of the Turkish Youth
to the Turkish Immigrants
The Ratio of Deventer’s Young
Population to the Population
Age Group
Age Group
(%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
Total
24+
Total
8,6
9,4
10,2
9,1
8,8
46,1
53,9
100
(%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
Total
24+
Total
6,5
6,1
5,8
5,6
6,6
30,6
69,4
100
Among Turkish immigrants, the
family model is the nuclear family
(composed of the parents and the
children) with three (17.2%), four
(17.2%), and five (37.9%) children.
The average family size is 3.9
people. In the extended families
with six or more people (10.3%),
the family heads’ relatives are also
included. Of the 17.2% people
living alone, 76% is the young, 85%
of which is single men.
Table 4.4. The Age Distribution of Deventer’s Young Population
Young Turks in Deventer
Age
Group
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
Total
Number
of
People
558
607
661
592
567
2985
(%)
18,6
20,4
22,1
19,9
19
100
Young Population of
Deventer
Age
Number
Group
of
People
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
Total
6329
5963
5657
5468
6447
29864
(%)
21,1
20
19
18,4
21,5
100
The Ratio of Young
Turks to Deventer’s
Young Population
(%)
8,8
10,2
11,7
10,8
8,8
50,3
The oldest of the
family heads was born
in 1944, and the
youngest in 1983. 6%
of the family heads
was born in Deventer
and others in different
regions in Turkey
(Table 4.5).
When the birth places, of those young people among whom questionnaires were carried out,
are analyzed, the rate of those who were born in Turkey is observed to reduce to 3%. 97%
was born either in Deventer (61%) or in other regions of Holland (36%).
8
Table 4.5. Birth Places of Young Turkish Family Heads
Age Group
Turkey
(%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
Deventer
(%)
100
100
90
89
100
84
All Family Heads
0
0
10
11
0
6
40% of those who took the questionnaire is at least
secondary school graduates. It is observed that the
first comers and their families that they brought over
are linguistically inadequate, that they do not have
the time to learn the language or to participate in
social life because of having to work, and that later
generations are more advanced in the language.
85% of the age group up to 45 (approximately 75%) can speak the language adequately.
Although the educational level is observed to increase among the young Turks who took the
questionnaire, it is interesting that higher education is not accomplished (Table 4.6).
Table 4.6. The Education Level of Young
Turks according to Age Group
Age
Goup
No
Educational
Degree
Secondary
School
(%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
100
100
68
0
49
38
0
0
32
67
51
39
All
Youth
High
School
(%)
0
0
0
33
23
Table 4.7. The Citizenship of
Young Turks’ Family Heads
Age Group
Turkish
Citizens (%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
100
100
70
44
87
73
All Family
Heads
Double
Citizenship
(%)
0
0
30
56
13
27
Of the family heads who participated in the questionnaire, 73% is Turkish citizens and 27%
possess double citizenship, while 61% of the young population has double citizenship (Table
4.7, 4.8). These rates indicate the increase in double citizenship among the second and third
generations. However, the majority of Turkish immigrants (67.9%) define their identities as
‘Turkish’ (Table 4.9). This is also true of family heads.
Table 4.8. Citizenship of the Young
Turks according to Age Group
Age Group
Double
Citizenship
(%)
Turkish
Citizenship
(%)
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
95
80
49
58
62
61
5
20
51
42
38
39
All
Youth
Table 4.9. Identities with which
the Turks Define Themselves
The answer to the question
“where are you from”
(%)
Only Turkish
Only Dutch
Turkish + Dutch
A City in Turkey
Turkish + A City in Turkey
From Deventer
Turkish + Muslim
Total
67,9
3,6
3,6
7,1
7,1
3,6
3,6
100,0
Furthermore, some have articulated local and/or religious identities along with their Turkish
identity, while others have indicated that they have local and/or national Dutch identities
together. It is observed that the Turks do not group according to their being from the same
city, or belonging to the same income or social status group, but that they are grouped
9
according to religious and political points of view, thereby separating into congregations such
as Alevis, Sunnis, and Nationalists and establishing their own mosques. When the detailed
identity definitions are grouped under three main categories, excluding those who advocate
solely their Turkish identity, 18% states a local and/or religious identity along with their
Turkish identity and 14% states only Dutch identity or some other identity in addition to the
Dutch identity. Not tolerating marriage with foreigners and still preferring spouses from their
own countries become an overt indication of rejecting integration and defending identity. 72%
of family heads is against their daughters’ marrying Dutch people, and 67% against their sons
marrying Dutch people. Religious and cultural differences are given as reasons to this. This
stated and/or felt identity argument is especially analyzed as it will define the problems and
adaptation difficulties of living in Holland, as well as shaping solidarity/concentration in the
urban space.
4.3. Working Life
Of the Turkish immigrant family heads, who participated in the questionnaire, 42% is
employees and 10% is employers, while 48% is unemployed (Table 4.10). Of the young
population, 52% is students and 9% has not started their education yet. Additionally, 6% is
employed and 33% is unemployed (Table 4.11). It is noteworthy that the rate of
unemployment among the young population is still high, despite the fact that it has decreased.
An important factor in this formation is the fact Holland offers one of the highest minimum
wages throughout Europe (1301 Euros). The unemployed are paid 1319 Euros through social
security. When a person is fired by the employer, he/she is paid the same amount of salary for
a certain amount of time, which is later decreased. This high rate of minimum wage is the
reason why a lot of Turkish immigrants prefer unemploymet. In other words, unemployment
is regarded among the immigrants not as a result of desperation, but as a part of the easy life.
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
All Family
Heads
0
0
10
21
0
10
12
40
30
44
62
42
88
60
60
35
38
48
0-4
5-9
10-14
15-19
20-24
All
Youth
12
13
6
60
100
45
0
52
43
87
33
Not Started
Education
(%)
Unemployed
Student %
(%)
Working
Table 4.11. Working Status of Young
Turks according to Age Groups
Age
Groups
(%)
Unemployed
(%)
Employee
(%)
Employer
Age
Groups
Table 4.10. Professions of Young
Turkish Family Heads
100
40
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In addition, Turks in Holland occupy the political arena in working life. In the November
2004 elections carried throughout 25 cities and towns in the East Gelderland and Overijsel
Regions, a total of 5 candidates with Turkish origins made it into the Municipality Board in
Deventer, 2 from the Labor Party, 2 from the Green Party, one of which was a woman, and 1
from among the Christian Democrats.
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As a Conclusion
In line with the neighborhood-effect approach, poverty-stricken neighborhoods inject negative
norms, values, and behaviors into the residents of the area, thereby creating a socially infected
environment from which only very few people can escape. Neighborhoods are regarded as
solely responsible for people’s social and economic standing (Hughes, 1989; Sibley, qtd. in
Bauder, Sharpe, 2002, 86).
In theoretical discussions, 3 mechanisms are observed to create this effect (Bauder, Sharpe,
2002). These are;
young groups,
the poverty that has settled in the region and the examples set by role models,
physical infrastructure and institutional networks.
In the first of these mechanisms, the networks among the young in the neighborhood are
influencial in leading to negative behaviors and characteristics. These are dropping out of
school and teenage pregnancy, as well as those related to participation in the work force
(Evans, et al, qtd. in Bauder, 2002, 86). Acoording to the second mechanism, the unhealthy
attitudes of the adults in the neighborhood (such as not having permanent employment,
having children outside of marrigae, and the like) negatively affect the young people of the
same neighborhood (Wilson, qtd. in Bauder, 2002, 86). An effect like this is also known as
the collective socialization effect. If there exists successful examples and rich social networks
in a neighborhood, the young are highly likely to yield towards high positions in the labor
force market. Yet if the jobs in the secondary labor force market are in the majority in a
neighborhood or if unemployment is widespread, the young yield towards similar positions or
unemployment. For this reason, the occupational characteristics, unemployment rates, and
income levels of neighbors are determinative in defining the occupational characteristics of
the young. The third mechanism, on the other hand, focuses on the physical infrastruture and
institutional networks of the neighborhood which are appropriate to the young. Local
institutions, such as schools, in poverty-stricken neighborhoods do not provide service at an
adequate level. It is argued that inadequate physical infrastructure hamper the healthy
operation of the society, thereby strengthening the first two mechanisms (Nenno, qtd. in
Bauder, Sharpe, 2002, 86). Despite the fact that the electronic age has led to the loss of
distance, the neighborhood effect, based on age, social class, and income, is expected to
increase in time.
In Deventer, life in neighborhoods where Turks are concentrated continue just like it would in
Turkey, but in the 1970s. In the completely-Turkicized neighborhoods, home gatherings
among women and café gatherings among men have become the norm. Under these living
conditions, the young face a totally different Holland and are, thus, squeezed in between. In
addition to this formation, heightened through the neighborhood effect, the inability to reach
the adequate level of education and economic deficiencies affect the young the most and
ethnic identity provides the escape. In the meantime, religious identities come to the fore, and
pull the young into contradictory identity characteritics, which are not only distant from the
Dutch society but also internally contradictory. While there are no young people who define
themselves as totally Dutch or Turkish, they complain about being in a state of emptiness.
They can adapt neither to Holland nor to today’s Turkey. Viewed as such, integration acquires
a multidimensional nature and requires each group to be evaluated by itself through its own
realities.
The integration policies which are applied result not in assimilation, as is expected, but in
identity conflicts, and while the young resist integration, they embrace even more fervently
the ethnic (religious) identities in which they are situated. Among the troubles experienced in
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Holland, discrimination, prejudices, and hostility towards foreigners are at the top of the list
(Table 5.1). At this point, it is believed that polarization will increase and the existing ethnic
conflicts will continue increasingly.
Table 5.1. Problems of Living in Holland
Problems Caused by Living in Holland (multiple
answers)
Discrimination / prejudices / hostility towards
foreigners
Not being able to like Holland / weariness
Low income
The belief that Holland’s economy is getting
worse
The belief that finding jobs has / working
conditions have become tougher in Holland
The problem of military service duty
Health / social security
Cultural differences / the language problem
No problems
(%)
46,4
7,1
3,6
21,4
21,4
3,6
7,1
14,3
10,7
At the other end of the spectrum, the
desire to return to Turkey is shaped
in relation to the integration policies
which are applied or are planned to
be applied, and to a certain extent,
fulfill the goals. 84.6% of those who
participated in the questionnaire
states that they want to return.
Nevertheless,
through
in-depth
interviews, it has become evident
that this tendency is on the decrease
among the young.
Table 5.2. Reasons for the Desire to Return to Turkey
Why does he/she want to return?
Hostility towards foreigners
Not being able to like Holland / weariness
Longing for Turkey / homeland / family
Planning to return after having saved money
The belief that finding jobs has / working
conditions have become tougher in Holland
If Turkey’s economy recovers and I can find a job
In retirement (at the age of 45 ) / old age
Total
Those who want to return are mostly
from the adult population. The elder
do not want to return as their families
are here, and the younger believe
they will not be able to adapt to the
Turkish society. One of the reasons
for the desire to return is the rights
15,8 given in Holland to those who return
31,6
after retiring.
(%)
5,3
15,8
10,5
10,5
10,5
100,0
Hostility towards foreigners make up only a small percentage (5.3%), which does not
constitute a valid reason to return (Table 5.2).
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