China in 2013: The Chinese Dream’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Shifts
Author(s): Thomas Heberer
Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 2013 (January/February 2014), pp.
113-128
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THOMAS HEBERER
China in 2013
The Chinese Dream’s Domestic and Foreign Policy Shifts
ABSTRACT
In 2013, China’s new party and state leadership specified its domestic and foreign
policies in the context of Xi Jinping’s vision of the ‘‘Chinese Dream.’’ A new reform
package modifying China’s growth and development model has been announced. In
foreign policy, a debate has commenced regarding another side of the ‘‘Chinese
Dream’’: China’s rise as a ‘‘Great Power.’’
K E Y W O R D S : Chinese Dream, mass line campaign, enhanced reform program,
Chinese-Japanese relations, Bo Xilai trial
I N 2013, C HINA ’ S NEW PARTY AND STATE LEADERSHIP specified its domestic
and foreign policies in the context of Xi Jinping’s vision of the ‘‘Chinese
Dream.’’ In particular, the 18th Central Committee brought the contours of
its ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ philosophy into sharper focus in November, when the
Third Plenary Session announced a new reform package containing the
boldest set of economic and social reforms since 1978. The aim: to modify
China’s growth and development model. With regard to social issues, the
leadership in early 2013 adopted a program for reducing social inequality in
order to reinforce social stability.
Further economic reforms are being supported by a one-year mass campaign to ensure ideological control over both the party and government
officials. This campaign, called ‘‘Mass Line Education and Practice Activities,’’ was set in motion to unite the thinking and behavior of the political
elites, from the center down to the township, to ensure the entire party will
T HOMAS H EBERER is affiliated with the School of Public Administration at Zhejiang University in
Hangzhou, China, and is Senior Professor of Chinese Politics and Society at the University of
Duisburg-Essen in Germany. He recently published (co-authored with R. Trappel) ‘‘Evaluation
Processes, Local Cadres’ Behaviour and Local Development Processes,’’ in the Journal of Contemporary China, no. 84 (November 2013). Email: <[email protected]>.
Asian Survey, Vol. 54, Number 1, pp. 113–128. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2014 by
the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2014.54.1.113.
113
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114 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
proactively implement the policies of its new leadership to help promote the
‘‘Chinese Dream.’’ In terms of foreign policy, a debate has commenced
regarding another side of this dream, China’s rise as a ‘‘Great Power.’’
Ongoing discussions of both the Mass Line Campaign and the ‘‘Great
Power’’ concept show that the content of the ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ has not yet
been fully determined. Two further critical issues, the trial against former
Political Bureau member Bo Xilai and the intensifying conflict with Japan
about disputed islands in the East China Sea, are at least indirectly related to
progress toward this ‘‘dream.’’
SESSION OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS:
GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLES
The National People’s Congress (NPC) ‘‘elected’’ a new state and government leadership in March (‘‘elected,’’ because the positions had already been
assigned previously by the party leadership). Accordingly, Xi Jinping was
appointed president of the state, and Li Keqiang, prime minister.
In his Report on the Work of the Government, outgoing Premier Wen Jiabao
stated that the new government must find solutions for the country’s major
unsolved problems: unbalanced and unsustainable development, risks in the
financial sector, a weak agricultural base, environmental and ecological
destruction, increasing income disparities between urban and rural areas and
among individual regions, and corruption. These factors are currently having
a negative impact in the public eye on the legitimacy of the Communist Party
(CCP).
Even though the living conditions of most Chinese have improved since
the beginning of the reform process, the non-material quality of life remains
precarious and is encumbered in some areas by a dearth of clean food, clean
air, or affordable housing. Beijing’s tremendous air pollution during the
NPC’s March session highlighted only one such issue. Locally, ecological
disasters have spawned protests against industrial facilities, power plants, and
river dams. Wen pointed to the urgency of dealing with the dark side of
growth: ‘‘Economic development is increasingly in conflict with resource
conservation and environmental protection,’’1 thereby highlighting the fact
that China’s growth model is currently stretched to its limit.
1. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), March 19, 2013.
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 115
Social inequality is one of the hottest topics in Chinese society. In February 2013, prior to the NPC session, the State Council had already adopted
a 35-point program for reducing social inequality. The document included
the following goals: a rise in the minimum wage to 40% of the average wage
by 2015; expansion of the social system, which is funded primarily by stateowned enterprise dividends; a drop in the number of people living in absolute
poverty by 80 million within two years;2 restrictions on the income of government officials and enterprise managers; a thorough tax reform in the
interests of reducing income disparities (e.g., higher taxes for most wealthy
people); increased agricultural productivity and a promotion of larger agroenterprises to reduce China’s dependence on food imports (currently 12% of
total consumption); and the use of modern seeds and more effective plant
protection products. The government also plans to provide price supports for
agricultural producers through state purchase of cotton, rice, sugar, and
soybeans. The land rights of peasants are to be more effectively protected,
and interest rates on savings deposits (currently well below inflation) are to be
more flexible and competitive.3
Accordingly, the new premier, Li Keqiang, emphasized in a press conference during the NPC session that his core objectives will include a reduction
of social inequality and income disparities, improved social security, better
livelihood prospects, and ultimately the achievement of a more just society.4
The CCP is well aware that its legitimacy rests largely on an improved
Chinese economy. Thus, it is not ‘‘big’’ political reforms—an independent law
system or the separation of powers—that are currently on the agenda, but
a better, more transparent administrative system, stricter evaluation systems for
officials, a gradual implementation of new laws, and a greater role for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as instruments of information and a means of
monitoring local and issue-oriented developments. After taking over the post of
CCP secretary-general, Xi Jinping promised a stricter fight against corruption.
2. In 2011, about 128 million (close to 10%) of China’s people lived below the poverty line (an
annual income of 2,300 yuan [about US$380]).
3. Guowuyuan pizhuan fazhan gaigewei deng bumen guanyu shenhua shouru fenpei zhidu gaige
ruogan yijian de tongzhi [Notification of the State Council passing suggestions of the Development
and Reform Commission and other departments on the deepening of the institutional reform of the
income distribution system], <http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-02/05/content_2327531.htm>, accessed
August 20, 2013.
4. On his statements during this press conference, see <http://www.mszsx.com/news/2013-03-17/
3267.html>, accessed August 9, 2013.
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116 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
ACHIEVING ECONOMIC CONTROL: RESTRUCTURING
THE ECONOMY
In 2013, China seemed to be facing a major economic crisis: its gross domestic
product (GDP) growth had decreased from 7.7% in the first quarter of 2013
to 7.5% in the second, rose to 7.8% in the third, and decreased to 7.7% in the
fourth quarter. Full-year growth in 2013 was 7.7%, the same rate as in 2012.
Thus, the annual growth rate in 2013 was higher than the official target of
7.5%. Together with the growth rate in 2012, it was, however, still the lowest
growth rate since 1999. There were several reasons for this: weak global
demand, increased labor costs, and a strong yuan. However, 2013’s growth
rate stagnation could also be seen less as a sign of crisis than the outcome of
Premier Li Keqiang’s economic restructuring. This policy encompassed the
following elements:
Rebalancing China’s economy: shifting emphasis gradually from exports to the domestic market, restructuring the industrial structure,
supporting the upgrading of products and industries toward higherquality and knowledge-based products, and offering preferential credits
to selected industries
Developing domestic consumption
Opening the financial sector to private capital
Supporting Chinese investments in foreign countries
Strengthening the private economic sector and removing constraints on
its development
Dismantling the privileges of state-owned enterprises
Liberalizing interest rates
Clamping down on overcapacities in industrial production
Emphasizing environmental and ecological improvement.5
Improving the Chinese growth model is a long-term task. The current
structural reforms aim to reduce the economy’s dependence on exports while
fueling the domestic market and development of the service sector. With
current economic growth being primarily triggered by an investment surge in
the export sector, an effort will be made to spot and curb unhealthy growth
5. Here, China is still dependent on foreign support. In July 2013, China requested support from
the EU in tackling environmental pollution.
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 117
promptly. Moreover, the private sector will play a major role in China’s GDP
development; the aim is to double the country’s average per capita income by
2020. The rebalancing policy signifies that Premier Li, in contrast to his
predecessor, is trying to tackle problems in a practical way despite strong
resistance in parts of the state-owned economy and the bureaucracy.
INCREASED MONEY CONTROL: RESTRUCTURING THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
The government’s restructuring efforts in the industrial sector have been
accompanied by a reshuffling of the banking system in order to make it more
self-sufficient. In 2013, over-indebtedness of the Chinese banking system
because of excessive lending practices became a major concern. The government attempted to press the banks into establishing a risk control system with
greater care in lending policies and the avoidance of risky lending practices.
The ‘‘shadow’’ banking system, with its usurious interest loans, is to be kept
in check, and the financial sector is to be opened for private loans. The
government demanded that the banks restrict their offers of credit to stateowned enterprises and primarily support industries that are in line with the
government’s development planning. To underscore its policies, the central
bank refused to intervene during a liquidity problem of the Chinese banking
system in June.
Some foreign observers spoke of a serious banking crisis and an impending
‘‘crash.’’ These reports, however, were apparently exaggerated. On the one
hand, the Chinese government has the power to intervene at any time and to
inject liquidity into the banking system. On the other, China’s economy is
indeed over-indebted, but not so much as to cause serious concern. In actual
fact, the liquidity problem was merely one manifestation of a normal growth
slowdown. Unlikely as a crash may be, China’s financial system is nevertheless in urgent need of reform—a fact widely recognized by the reform package
decided upon at the Third Plenary Session of the CCP’s Central Committee
in November 2013 (see below).
ACHIEVING IDEOLOGICAL CONTROL: THE MASS LINE CAMPAIGN
The new leadership faces the task of ensuring that the entire party is following
its economic and political line. To achieve this goal, officials launched a major
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118 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
‘‘Rectification Campaign’’ to ‘‘thoroughly clean up the working style’’ of the
members of the CCP. The campaign, initiated by the CCP leadership in June
2013, was given the name ‘‘Mass Line Education and Practice Activities’’
(Qunzhong luxian jiaoyu shijian huodong) and has been designed to last
a full year.6 It is reminiscent of Maoist political campaigns to combat corruption, bureaucratic behavior, hedonism, and extravagance. The purpose is
also to ‘‘rectify’’ party members by means of self-purifying (ziwo jinghua),
self-perfection (ziwo wanshan), self-reformation (ziwo gexin), self-elevation
(ziwo tigao), self-criticism (ziwo piping), self-education (ziwo jiaoyu), and selfanalysis (ziwo pouxi).7 Senior officials are to figure as moral role models.
The campaign has been accompanied by government-ordered arrests of
dissidents, stricter control of the media and the Internet, and a battle against
ideological trends regarded by the party as threatening (such as debates on
constitutional democracy8 or universal values). Whether this can be perceived
as a return to traditional values, a reversion to Maoist rhetoric, or simply
a concession to the ideas of the New Left, remains to be traced out. Willy
Lam depicts it as a ‘‘foil for an old-style intra-party power struggle that is
aimed at boosting the authority of Xi.’’9 This could be the case, although it
does not explain why the new leadership specifically refers to the ‘‘mass line’’
concept, which is strongly reminiscent of Mao and the ‘‘New Left.’’10
In the final analysis, the new anti-corruption drive aims to bring the cadres
and armed forces under stricter control in order to enforce the political line of
the new leadership core in both the party and the PLA (People’s Liberation
Army). This seems necessary not only because of the Bo Xilai case (see below)
6. See <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-07/12/c_116513966.htm>, accessed October 1,
2013.
7. Xi Jinping zai dang de qunzhong luxian jiaoyu shijian huodong gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua
[Speech of Xi Jinping at the Working Conference on Mass Line Education and Practice Activities],
June 18, 2013, <http://qzlx.people.com.cn/n/2013/0726/c365007-22344078.html>, accessed October
1, 2013). See also Liu Yushan zai dangde qunzhong luxian jiaoyu shijian huodong gongzuo huiyi shang de
jianghua (Speech of Liu Yushan at the Conference on the Activities to Educating and Practice of
Mass Line), <http://qzlx.people.com.cn/n/2013/0726/c365007-22344080.html>, accessed October 1,
2013.
8. There is still an ongoing debate on the positive effects of a constitutional state, see e.g., the
debate in the journal Caijing, October 14, 2013.
9. Willy Lam, ‘‘Rectification Campaign to Boost Cadres with ‘Red DNA’,’’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13:14, July 12, 2013, p. 4.
10. Recalling the ‘‘mass line’’ was a favorite policy of the ousted Chongqing Party Secretary Bo
Xilai.
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 119
but also because powerful interest groups such as the banks, senior military
leaders, and leading managers of state-owned enterprises might be damaged
by the new policies and attempt to undermine the planned reforms.
The ‘‘mass line’’ concept is part of the new leadership’s slogan of realizing
the ‘‘Chinese Dream,’’ which is seen as a Chinese alternative to the ‘‘American Dream.’’ While the American Dream is conceived of as an individual
project, the ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ is seen as a national and collective one, and the
‘‘mass line’’ represents an attempt to come to grips with moral decay in the
CCP’s cadre contingent and to create proper tools and institutions for dealing
with that problem. Among other things, this requires that state officials
behave in a clean, non-corrupt, and non-bureaucratic manner, and this shall
be achieved by fighting the aforementioned ‘‘four evils’’ (corruption, bureaucratic behavior, hedonism, and extravagance) comprising what in Chinese is
called fubai, i.e., corruption not as a criminal act but rather as the outcome of
a person’s ‘‘evil’’ mind and behavior. Whether these aims can be achieved
with Maoist-type techniques can only be doubted. Although they carry the
label of activity (huodong) rather than campaign (yundong) and have much
less severe consequences than during the Mao era (when people were declared
to be ‘‘counter-revolutionaries’’ or ‘‘rightists’’), the ‘‘mass line’’ activities are
reminiscent of Karl Marx’s proposition that everything in history is enacted
twice: once as tragedy and the second time as farce. Time has changed, and
most people no longer believe in the practices of the Mao era.
THE CHINESE DREAM—BECOMING A SUPERPOWER?—FOREIGN
POLICY MODIFICATIONS
In a speech at the World Peace Forum in June 2013, Foreign Minister Wang
Yi sketched out the principles of China’s foreign policies under the new
leadership. Apart from such well-known guidelines as the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence, China’s ‘‘peaceful development,’’ ‘‘building a harmonious world,’’ multi-polarity, acting as a spokesman for developing countries, and a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries, he also described some new principles: ‘‘building a new model
of major country relationships’’ and ‘‘major country diplomacy’’ as cornerstones of China’s foreign policy.
This definition of China’s new role in the world is also directly related to
one part of the ‘‘Chinese Dream,’’ namely, achieving equal footing with the
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120 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
U.S. on the international stage. The first step toward this goal is to become
a superpower. According to Wang Yi, this means that China will seek to
develop a more global perspective in the following ways:
(a) With the aim of becoming more proactive in international affairs,
China intends to offer ‘‘Chinese’’ solutions for improving global governance and dealing with international and regional hot spot issues, to
advance trade and investment liberalization, to maintain the present
international order and universally recognized norms of international
relations and concurrently to help reform the international system in
order to enhance the stability of this international order.
(b) China intends to work for a stable and prosperous environment in its
regional neighborhood as a ‘‘priority in its diplomacy’’ by upgrading
the China-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Free
Trade Agreement and advancing negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the China-Japan-ROK
(Republic of Korea) Free Trade Area; by actively engaging in bilateral
and regional maritime cooperation and helping to resolve disputes
over territorial and maritime rights issues in the region through dialogue and negotiation ‘‘on the basis of fully respecting historical facts
and international law,’’ and also by engaging in joint development.
(c) China views its own development as indispensable to finding solutions
for key global issues.
(d) China concurrently wishes to strive for the establishment of dialogue
among national groups that find themselves at different stages along
the path of development.11
According to Foreign Minister Wang, China’s ‘‘major country diplomacy’’
(da guo waijiao) is primarily characterized by ‘‘no conflict,’’ ‘‘no confrontation,’’ ‘‘mutual respect,’’ and ‘‘win-win cooperation.’’ Purportedly, this concept
will differ from what might be called ‘‘traditional major-power’’ politics, which
as a rule characterize and/or define any country’s status as a ‘‘great power.’’
In his 1983 book, Jack Levy argues that great powers think ‘‘of their interests as continental or global rather than local or regional,’’ and seek to defend
‘‘their interests more aggressively and with a wider range of instrumentalities,
11. For Wang Yi’s speech, see the Chinese version at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_chn/wjb_
602314/wjbz_602318/zyjhs/t1053901.shtml>; English version is at <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
zxxx/t1053908.shtml>, accessed August 13, 2013.
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 121
including the frequent threat or use of military force.’’12 China, on the other
hand, wishes to portray itself (at least in the sense of da guo [major country],
which can refer either to size in terms of territory and population or to
political and military might) not as a ‘‘power’’ with specific global or regional
interests and the political and military capacities required to enforce those
interests, but simply as one ‘‘big country’’ among others and one without
a program of ‘‘power politics’’ toward third parties. All in all, China wants to
present itself as a responsible, international stakeholder, one complying with
international norms and standards. The ongoing discussions show that the
goals and contents of the ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ in terms of domestic and foreign
policy have not yet been determined. They reveal also that the political
direction of China’s development is still open to debate.
THE CHINESE-JAPANESE ISLANDS CONFLICT
The conflict between China and Japan over a group of eight uninhabited
islands about 200 kilometers north of Taiwan and 400 kilometers from the
Japanese island of Okinawa can also be considered part of China’s vision of
becoming a great power and therefore of realizing the ‘‘Chinese Dream.’’ The
waters there teem with fish, and the area around the islands, known to the
Chinese as Diaoyu and the Japanese as Senkaku, is thought to include large
oil and gas reserves. But the islands have an even broader regional and
structural significance. Michael Green, a former Asia policy aide to U.S.
President George W. Bush, argued, ‘‘Underlying all of this is a geostrategic
context for dominance of what Japan calls the ‘first island chain’ and China
calls ‘the Near Sea’.’’ The island issue is, of course, strongly related to claims
of both sides to the wider sea area. Green’s view was that ‘‘about 90 per cent
of Japanese and Chinese oil and gas is shipped through those waters’’ and
‘‘dominance above the sea helps both sides map the topography beneath the
sea for submarine warfare,’’ thus making the islands ‘‘an enduring structural
problem.’’13
After defeating the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), Japan
formally annexed the islands based on terra nullius (i.e., no prior claim).
12. Jack S. Levy, War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495–1975 (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1983), pp. 16–17.
13. Financial Times, October 1, 2012, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e0bc4358-0ba5-11e2-b8d800144feabdc0.html#axzz2bTGqitEZ>, accessed August 9, 2013.
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122 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
From the Chinese perspective, according to the Cairo Declaration of 1943
and the Potsdam Declaration of 1947, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands were not
regarded as a part of Japanese territory but should rather be returned to
China. The Japanese did not share this view. At that time, however, China
was involved in a civil war, and the islands came under the administration of
the U.S., which handed them over to the Japanese in 1972. The competing
claims therefore were not resolved, but continued to smoulder beneath the
ashes of war.
The islands are now claimed by both countries. The conflict escalated in
2012, when Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro developed a plan to use public
funds to buy the islands from a private Japanese owner. Prime Minister Noda
Yoshihiko prevented this by having the Japanese government purchase the
islands. China was annoyed by this, particularly inasmuch as Japan’s new
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo declared in early 2013 that Japan would take a
‘‘tough stance’’ regarding China’s claims. Japan’s sovereignty over the islands,
said Abe, was ‘‘non-negotiable.’’ In turn, China’s party chief Xi Jinping
declared the island issue to be a ‘‘core interest’’ of China. Beijing surveyed
the Diaoyu Islands as part of a program of mapping China’s territorial islands
and reefs.14 Chinese warships started to patrol in the area, prompting Japanese accusations that the Chinese were risking military confrontation.
In July, Abe proposed a meeting of the heads of government of both
countries without any preconditions, in order to improve their relationship.
Tokyo dispatched Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Saiki Akitaka to Beijing to
prepare for the summit. However, China rejected Abe’s proposal to talk
‘‘without preconditions,’’ demanding that prior to high-level talks Japan must
acknowledge that sovereignty over the islands is at least in dispute. Tokyo
fanned the flames in July with its Annual Japan Defense White Paper, in which
it accused China of attempting to change the status quo by force, violating
international law, and spurring great concern on the part of Japan about the
future direction of Chinese politics. In the context of Japan’s election campaign, Abe attacked China’s ‘‘urge of territorial expansion.’’
Unsurprisingly, Abe’s denial that the island issue is under dispute, his verbal
attacks on China, and Japan’s launching in August of its largest warship since
the end of World War Two (a helicopter carrier that could be used to launch
military jets) have been met by China with silence about the possibility of
14. Renmin Ribao, January 15, 2013.
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 123
a summit. An especially sensitive issue is the fact that the ship was christened
Izumo, the name of the Japanese flagship that attacked Shanghai in World War
Two. Shortly thereafter, Abe dropped his plans for a visit on August 15, the
anniversary of Japan’s surrender, to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where
war criminals are also buried, probably to avoid further tension with China.
(He did, however, permit his deputy to attend.) In December 2013, however,
Abe visited the shrine, thus infuriating China and South Korea and hardening
further the China-Japan conflict.
Although there are those in China who loudly advocate a tough stand visà-vis Japan, the Chinese leadership is not interested in further fueling the
conflict. One reason might be that China suffered defeat in both previous
wars with Japan (1894–95 and 1937–45), resulting in major setbacks to China’s
modernizing efforts. Moreover, international observers argue that China’s
PLA is still too weak to go to war, and the risk of defeat is still too great.
This might also explain why some senior members of the Chinese military are
warning of the danger of an ‘‘accidental war.’’15
China’s unilateral announcement in November that it was establishing an
East China Sea ‘‘Air Defense Identification Zone’’ (ADIZ) marked a new
dimension in the Chinese-Japanese conflict over the disputed islands. The
Chinese Ministry of Defense now demands that aircraft entering the zone
identify themselves and follow its instructions. The Chinese ADIZ overlaps
with that of Japan, that is, it extends also to the disputed islands. It constitutes
a reaction to Japan’s warning that it will shoot down foreign military drones
entering Japanese airspace. Japan strongly opposed the Chinese ADIZ, arguing
that it might trigger unpredictable consequences. The zone indicates a new,
more assertive pattern of behavior in China’s foreign policy aimed at pressing
Tokyo to admit the islands are disputed and to get it to the negotiation table.
The ADIZ announcement seems to prove that China’s invocations of
peace and harmony in the region are merely platitudes. Differing statements
by its Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense might also signify contrasting views and divergent interests within the Chinese leadership. In the end,
however, it might be more accurate to interpret this Chinese step as a signal
to the U.S., the major guarantor of peace and stability in the region, that it
15. Choi Chi-yuk, ‘‘PLA General Warns Against ‘Accidental Warfare’,’’ South China Morning Post,
February 5, 2013, <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1143481/pla-general-warns-againstaccidental-warfare>, accessed August 12, 2013.
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124 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
should press Japan to acknowledge and negotiate over a territorial conflict
with China. As Peter Mattis has convincingly argued, the actual target of
China’s action is not Japan, but Washington.16 In addition, by establishing
the ADIZ, China is telling the world that the territorial dispute with Japan
exists despite Tokyo’s denial. China’s action is thus ultimately in line with its
‘‘building . . . a new model of major country relationships’’ and its pursuit of
‘‘major country diplomacy’’ as fresh cornerstones of foreign policy.
E L I M I N A T I N G T H E K E Y P E R S O N O F T H E ‘‘ N E W L E F T ’’ :
THE TRIAL OF BO XILAI
In August 2013, the charismatic Bo Xilai, former party chief of Chongqing
Municipality in Sichuan Province and a member of the CCP’s Political
Bureau, went on trial. Early in 2012 his police chief had sought asylum in
the U.S. consulate in Chengdu. Bo was dismissed, and his wife Gu Kailai was
arrested for the murder of a British businessman. In July, Gu received a suspended death sentence. Charges against Bo piled up: he was accused of being
responsible for forced confessions under torture and blackmailing persons
during the ‘‘strike hard’’ campaign in Chongqing in 2009–10.
For its part, the Chinese leadership attempted to emphasize its impartiality
by arguing that the Bo case was a ‘‘legal’’ issue rather than a ‘‘political’’ one.
However, the conviction of Bo was a heavy blow to the ‘‘New Left’’ and its
populist-tending policies. Bo still has many supporters and sympathizers
within both the party and the military. Although the political leadership
strove for a certain transparency in the trial by posting (censored) partial
transcripts to the Internet, the process was clearly political in content and
direction. Public discussion of the ‘‘Chongqing model’’ was clearly unwanted.
This model was denoted by a set of populist policies that included among
others a campaign directed against organized crime, the promotion of a Maoist-like ‘‘red culture,’’ and a huge social welfare program including subsidized
housing for the poor. A discussion of Bo’s policies in Chongqing, his violation
of existing laws, and his ‘‘reign of terror’’ there were avoided, and attention was
16. Peter Mattis, ‘‘China’s East China Sea ADIZ: Framing Japan to Help Washington Understand China,’’ Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13:24 (December 5, 2013), <http://www.jamestown.
org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D¼41719&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid
%5D¼25&cHash¼bc62eef7405484e553573b1d002184b1#.UqhMNPR5MW8>, accessed December
11, 2013).
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 125
focused rather on cases of bribery in his former domain of Dalian in China’s
northeast.
For his part, Bo rejected all allegations, and ultimately the charges proved
to be weak. At the end of the trial, it was announced that no leniency would
be given because Bo did not confess and cooperate. In September 2013, he
was sentenced to life imprisonment and confiscation of all his personal assets,
an outcome many Chinese considered far too severe.
MODIFICATION OF CHINA’S GROWTH MODEL: THE THIRD
PLENARY SESSION OF THE 18TH CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The long-awaited Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee met
from November 9 to 12 in Beijing. A generalized communiqué was followed
by a 60-point program specifying far-reaching reforms in 15 policy fields.17
These targets are to be implemented by the year 2020. Among the highlights
were the following:
The economic system: In future, the market shall play an even more
decisive role; prices (e.g., for fuels, electricity, and other key resources)
will be decided by the market; the private sector will be further promoted, and competitiveness and innovative capacity will be encouraged.
The judicial system: ‘‘Reeducation through labor,’’ which allowed
detention without a court proceeding, will be abolished (thus allowing
China to ratify the International Covenant on Civic and Political
Rights); the number of grounds for imposing the death penalty will
be reduced; confessions obtained through torture or physical or mental
violence will no longer be allowed as evidence in trials; the principle of
presumed innocence will be implemented, i.e., court decisions will not
rely on the confessions of culprits alone but rather on further evidence;
a court for patent infringement will be set up; and although the legal
system will not become independent, at least the courts will be protected from intervention by local governments.
Social policies: The one-child policy will be relaxed, allowing couples in
which one partner is an only child to have two children; the household
17. The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reforms (abridged version), <http://www.china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30620736_4.
htm>; Chinese version, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-11/15/c_118164235.htm>, both accessed December 1, 2013.
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126 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
registration (hukou) system will also be relaxed, allowing rural residents
to move to smaller cities; new forms of social conflict management will
be developed.
The financial and fiscal system: Local governments will be permitted to
sell bonds as a new channel for funding local projects and reducing local
debts; 30% of the proceeds of state-owned enterprises (instead of the
current 15%) must be handed over to the state by 2020 in order to
finance the social security system; exchange rates will be allowed to
fluctuate freely and interest rates will be liberalized; bank deposits will
be better protected, and banking supervision will be reinforced.
Land rights of farmers: Property rights and land use rights will be
strengthened in rural areas. Land use rights will be open to sale, lease,
or mortgage at market prices.
Cadre performance: In order to reduce the pervasive obsession with
GDP, evaluations of the performance of local governments will focus
more on growth quality. When cadre performance is evaluated, new
criteria such as local debt, environmental costs, resource consumption,
work safety, employment, personal income, social security, and health
issues will be included.
The reform package aims to open a new chapter of growth and development. It is undoubtedly the boldest set of economic and social reforms in
China since 1978, and contains most of the major changes demanded for
years by Chinese and foreign experts. Such an ambitious program can be
implemented only incrementally. A central management team for ‘‘comprehensive deepening of the reform program’’ will be established to oversee the
program, which is expected to be fully implemented by 2020. However, some
provinces have already taken steps to implement individual items of the
program on an experimental basis. Anhui Province, for example, announced
that it will commence immediately with the sale of rural land rights by
peasants in 20 counties.
A major point of the reform package is the establishment of a State Security Committee (Guojia Anquan Weiyuanhui) to coordinate the work of the
military, police, state security, and intelligence services and to bring these
bodies under stricter party control. Since details have not yet been released, it
remains to be seen whether the aim is to create a kind of super KGB to
monitor all social and political activities, or simply to better control China’s
multiple mechanisms of external and internal security—or both. Such a
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HEBERER / CHINA IN 2013 127
committee will also help bolster Xi’s intention to have the final word on
security issues in domestic and foreign policy.
Implementing this program will not be easy; it must be translated into
concrete policies to implement. China’s central leadership is facing various
challenges posed by vested interests: state-owned enterprises, security authorities, local governments, banks, and other groups. On the other hand, the
new reform program demonstrates that Xi Jinping and his leadership group
are not pure Maoists, but rather are following Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic
reform philosophy. The reform elucidates anew that the party conceives of
itself as crucial for achieving modernization. Finally, these outcomes of the
Third Plenary Session illuminate the principal philosophy of the new Chinese leadership and the contents of the ‘‘Chinese Dream.’’
CONCLUSION
The extraordinary reach of the Third Plenary Session’s decisions underscores
the reform intentions proclaimed by the new leadership under Xi Jinping.
Concurrently, however, the forces of tension within China are tremendous.
The direction China will take in the years to come depends primarily on its
domestic development. As long as the economy booms, the living standard
for most people keeps rising, and social and political stability may well be
preserved. China may increasingly become a trustworthy and accountable
partner in world politics. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine the negative
consequences that a failure of the Chinese state and its reform programs
could bring about.
We argue that despite all its internal differences, the Chinese party-state
still has the function of an activator; it acts as a political entrepreneur,
purposefully pursuing the modernization of the country. In the interest of
social and political development, gradual political reforms designed to reinforce the rule of law and citizens’ rights, to foster a new societal consensus,
and to establish new patterns of efficient social management are indispensable. It is crucial for further progress that China avoid the pitfall of societal
disintegration by finding solutions for the country’s burning issues. Pursuing
a nebulous ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ will not solve the most pressing problems.
Both party members and the people of China are waiting for much-needed
structural (‘‘political’’) reforms. Whether the new leadership will be capable of
providing fresh responses that go beyond the decisions of the Third Plenum
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128 ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
will be a crucial issue that determines whether the power of the CCP will
erode. Will this lead to an increasingly predatory state controlled by vested
interests and an interplay of economic and political entrepreneurs? Or is the
Party capable of further institutional adaptation and political-structural reforms? The new reform program points in the latter direction.
As yet, however, the concept of a ‘‘Chinese Dream’’ is still too abstract
for outsiders to identify China’s ultimate internal and external directions.
Beijing’s support of a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s third
nuclear test in February 2013 can be seen as a sign that China is increasingly
adapting to international norms. But implanting the ADIZ could be interpreted as going in the opposite direction. Different factions pursue different
aims, and nationalist sentiment within the Chinese population is strong.
Accordingly, China in 2013 offers an ambiguous picture. However, Beijing’s
relative silence in the Snowden secrets case and the relatively undisturbed
flight of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft flying through the zone without identifying themselves or reporting to the Chinese authorities both show that
China is also not interested in a confrontation with the U.S. government.
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