ESSLLI 2007
19th European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information
August 6-17, 2007
http://www.cs.tcd.ie/esslli2007
Trinity College Dublin
Ireland
C OURSE R EADER
ESSLLI is the Annual Summer School of FoLLI,
The Association for Logic, Language and Information
http://www.folli.org
Figurative Language.
Reading Materials (I) for the ESSLLI-07 course
on Figurative Language Processing
Birte Lönneker-Rodman∗
July 1, 2007
1
A very short history of figures and tropes
The definition of figures in rhetoric, “the art of speaking or writing effectively”1 , is often traced back to Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of
Oratory, 95 C.E.). Book IX of Institutio Oratoria contains a chapter on Eloquence: Figures of Thought and Speech. Quintilian attempts to distinguish
figures from tropes. In tropes, “words are substituted for others”. Subtypes
of tropes are metaphor and metonymy. A figure, on the other hand, is “any
deviation, either in thought or expression, from the ordinary and simple
method of speaking”, according to Institutio Oratoria. This definition of
figure subsumes rather than excludes tropes.
Corbett (1990) explains the mechanism behind figures this way: “Both
types of figures involve a transference of some kind: a trope, a transference of
meaning; a scheme, a transference of order.” Figure, thus, is the hypernym
of schemes (deviation from the ordinary arrangement of words) and tropes
(deviation from the ordinary or principal signification of a word) (Burton,
ny). Figure 1 gives some examples of figures, arranged according to this
classification.
Rhetoric also often considers figures as “artful”, or artfulness as a prerequisite for figurative speech. Linguists, however, hold that figurative lan∗
This course was proposed for ESSLLI-2007 by Anna Feldman and Xiaofei Lu. Unfortunately, they could not teach it themselves. I am grateful to Anna Feldman for her
confidence in me as a substitute. Anna also helped me gather material, discussed ideas
for this course, and commented on drafts of this and other chapters of this course reader.
1
http://www.m-w.com [21 June, 2007]
1
Figure 1: Some Examples of Tropes and Schemes.
guage is not restricted to arts, but rather common in everyday language
use, and we will see plenty of examples supporting this view throughout
the course. The course will discuss above all three phenomena of figurative
language: metaphors, metonymies, and idioms (see Figure 1 for examples of metaphor and metonymy and Example 1 for an idiom). Humor
generation and recognition will also be briefly touched upon.
(1)
2
The thought of jumping out of an aeroplane makes my hair stand on
end.
‘The thought of jumping out of an aeroplane makes me feel very frightened.’
Literal and figurative in linguistics
The terms literal and figurative are generally thought of as antonyms, but
the distinction is far from clear cut. It might seem that judgment about the
extension of these terms relies mainly on intuition and individual preferences.
There is certainly a continuum or scale from literal to figurative, but it is
desirable to have at least some criteria that would allow us to more precisely
locate a given expression on this scale.
Referring to a distinction proposed by Dirven (2002), Dobrovol’skij and
Piirainen (2005) partition this scale into three areas: literal, non-literal,
and figurative use of lexical units. (Dirven, 2002, p. 337) illustrates the
trichotomy by the adjective sweet. The use in Example 2 is literal, the
use in Example 3 non-literal, but not figurative, and Example 4 displays a
figurative use.
(2)
sweet apple
2
Figure 2: From literalness to figurativeness.
(3)
sweet water
(4)
sweet child
As soon as a lexical unit is not used literally, there is a “tension” or
“contrast” between the mental operations (or their results) when both literal
and non-literal readings are attempted. If there is no possibility to attempt
more than one reading, and hence to achieve a contrast, the lexical unit has
either been used in its literal meaning (its literal meaning potential has been
activated), or the lexical unit does not feature any non-literal meanings, at
the current (synchronic) stage in language change.
All figurative uses of lexical items are non-literal, but not all non-literal
uses are necessarily figurative; this is why the “non-literal” category has
been introduced in the first place. The relation between the three terms can
be represented graphically as in Figure 2. The transition between the areas
can still be viewed as gradual, in terms of the “extent of the conceptual
contrast” between literal and non-literal reading: the greater the contrast,
the more figurativeness is involved.
Shortly (Subsections 2.2 to 2.4), we will have a closer look at what each
of the terms is supposed to mean; but before we move on to more details on
this terminology, we will direct our attention briefly to the question of word
senses (Subsection 2.1).
2.1
Word senses
The terms literal, non-literal and figurative refer to the meaning or semantics
of lexical items, or combinations of them. A given word might have different
meanings in different contexts. Lexicographers and computational linguists
alike have drawn sense inventories of lexical items, and competitions have
been set up to recognize which of these senses is illustrated by a particular
occurrence in a particular context (cf. SENSEVAL, SemEval competitions;
most recently (Agirre et al., 2007)). Still, the idea of word senses and sense
inventories is not unproblematic in itself.
3
Without (textual and/or situational) context, (Hanks, 2000, p. 214)
prefers to say that words don’t have meanings (or word senses), but just
meaning potentials. Also (Feldman, 2006, p. 287) argues against a predefined set of word meanings; rather, he thinks, “[e]ach word can activate
alternative [neural] meaning sub-networks” when used in a given situation.
On these views, it is also difficult to say whether there is such a thing
as the literal meaning of a lexical item. But contexts can activate one or
even more meaning potentials of a lexical item, and in figurative language
use, more than one is activated, although in most cases one of the (finally
contextually determined) meanings prevails.2 Whether actual meanings or
meaning potentials, there should be a way to rank their “literalness”.
2.2
Literal
Cognitive Linguistics, somewhat bizarrely not very much in favor of the
literal-figurative dichotomy, tends to either replace or tightly connect literal
with other terms:
• terminology of a (conceptual) source domain (Kövecses, 2002, p. 6),
• concrete word (Feldman, 2006, p. 182),
• (word referring to an) embodied concept, schema, or experience; everyday experience (Feldman, 2006, p. 204),
• “original” meaning during or after a period of semantic change which
produces polysemy (cf. Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 13);
• “higher on the reference scale” (Traugott, 1985, p. 12) [cited by (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 13)].
In this course, the term literal will be used; it should in general be replaceable
by any of the previously mentioned terms, and/or have the appropriate
features.
2
More precisely: “[Scenario A] There is a clear idea, shared by all members of the
speech community, that what is literally said differs from what is meant, and that there is
a link between the two concepts; the source concept has been semantically reinterpreted
in order to denote the target concept. In such cases the impression that a given lexical
unit is idiomatic is based on semantic reinterpretation. [Scenario B] Contrary to this,
the impression of idiomaticity can arise from the fact that a given lexical unit contains
both semantic and/or formal elements which are unexplainable in a given context. So
the connection between the concept of [a constituent lexical unit], on the one hand, and
the actual meaning of [the entire expression], on the other, lacks a clearly comprehensible
motivating link.” (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 40)
4
The primary importance of literal meaning has also been studied in language acquisition, where the literal meaning (potential) of a word is learned
first. Feldman (2006) gives an account of a study by Johnson (1999) who
investigated the acquisition of different but related senses of to see. These
different uses illustrate what is called the knowing is seeing conceptual
metaphor; conceptual metaphors or mappings will be discussed later in this
course (see chapter on metaphor). The literal sense of see is illustrated by
Examples 5. This sense is learned first. In a later phase, children learn
intermediate cases, called conflations, in which the domains of seeing and
knowing are both involved (Examples 6). Finally, purely non-literal (abstract) senses are acquired, such as illustrated by Example 7. All senses are
acquired before the age of 3 years.
(5)
a. See doggie.
b. See Daddy.
(6)
a. See Daddy come in.
b. See what I spilled.
(7)
a. See what I mean.
Most linguists have no problem calling the sense illustrated by Example 7 “metaphorical”, but a rhetorician would probably hesitate to label it
“artful”. This correlates with the idea that children are not supposed to
develop consciously artful language use by the age of 3.
2.3
Figurative
To make the distinction between non-figurative and figurative easier to
grasp, Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005) argue for two criteria: the image requirement and the additional naming criterion.
By image requirement, they refer to “a specific conceptual structure
mediating between the lexical structure and the actual meaning”, where actual meaning is used in the sense of “figurative meaning” (Dobrovol’skij and
Piirainen, 2005, p. 14). The image component confers a second conceptual
level to figurative units at which they are associated with the sense denoted
by their literal form. Image components can sometimes be rendered by a
specific part of the definition of the figurative unit that starts with as if.3
Example 8 illustrates this (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 15):
3
This relates to the question of motivation–the motivating link between literal and
figurative, in idioms. Such a motivation can often be found, but not always; cf. kick the
bucket.
5
(8)
a. to be between a rock and a hard place
b. ‘face a situation of choice between two possibilities that both entail difficulties and failure [. . . ]’,
(image component:) ‘[. . . ] as if the person [. . . ] was not able to
move away freely’.
Additionally or alternatively, image components can also be detected in
plays on words.
The perceived presence of such an image component is certainly gradual and might be individual; it is “more or less salient” (Dobrovol’skij and
Piirainen, 2005, p. 24). Therefore, it might be difficult to achieve high interannotator agreement rates even with this criterion, but to my knowledge,
no empirical studies have been carried out on this subject.
The additional naming requirement says that a figurative language
unit should have at least one (near-)synonym: it is one of at least two alternative ways of saying what is meant because “there is already a more
direct and cognitively simple expression denoting approximately the same
entity” (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 18). For example, the expressions in Examples 9 and 10 denote approximately the same kind of events,
respectively. As we can see, the more “direct” and “cognitively simple” expressions need not always be shorter in words. We can also call them literal
paraphrases.
(9)
a. to hit the ceiling
b. (literal paraphrase:) ‘to become angry’
(10)
a. to be at a crossroads
b. (literal paraphrase:) ‘to have to make a very important decision’
2.4
Non-literal
Remember Dirven’s (Dirven, 2002) trichotomy of sweet and Example 3 as
an instance of non-literal, but not figurative, language use.
Example 11 is another example. Here, the image requirement is fulfilled,
but the additional naming requirement is not.
(11) sea horse
A sea horse is a fish that looks ‘as if it was a horse in the sea’ (image requirement), but “within the scope of non-technical language” this
animal cannot be named differently (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p.
18). Therefore, sea horse is non-literal, but still not figurative, according
6
to Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005). For a discussion of the figurativeness
criteria, see also Lönneker-Rodman and Reining (2007).
One of the main reasons for the three-partite distinction might be the
classification of many non-literal, but non-figurative lexical items unter the
headline of metaphor, by influential cognitive linguists such as Lakoff and
Johnson (1980). Many of the lexical items that instantiate (exemplify) cognitive metaphors do not fulfil the figurativeness criteria set up by Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005). For example, it is difficult (if not impossible)
to find alternative simple expressions that would qualify as near-synonyms
of Examples 12 to 13; and also their image component has a low salience.
(12)
I lost a lot of time when I was sick. (illustrates time is money)
(13)
I’ve never won an argument with him. (illustrates argument is war)
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 5, p. 52) refer to such usages as “literal”,
because they are the “normal way for us to talk”. This definitely indicates that the additional naming requirement is not fulfilled by them. Still,
on the three-partite scale, they should be classified as non-literal, because
the embodied, higher referential and cognitively more basic (first acquired)
senses of the words win and lose refer to more concrete situations: to win
or lose a concrete object, or to win or lose a physical fight. Such metaphors
have also been called “dead”, “frozen”, or “conventional”; they have been
referred to as “commonly used parts of cognitive metaphors” (Lakoff); “peripheral meaning” (Traugott, 1985, p. 33), and finally “non-literal, but nonfigurative” (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, p. 12).
According to this definition, some of the phenomena that will be discussed in this course are actually not figurative in the strict sense, but
rather “non-literal” without being (strongly) figurative. For example, Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005) do not consider the following metonymies
to be figurative, because (in their opinion) these expressions do not exhibit
a salient image component:
(14)
Bill’s school is making a trip to the seaside.
(15)
School is one of the most important inventions of modern times.
3
Others
When introducing figurative language and related notions, we have basically
followed (Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005). Further accounts can be found
in (Coulson and Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2005), among others.
7
From a pragmatic viewpoint, Nunberg (2004) tackles “the relationship
between what is traditionally known as literal and figurative meanings. After a discussion of the opposition between conventional and pragmatically
derived meanings, Nunberg demonstrates how ubiquitous the phenomenon
of deference (of which figuration is only a subclass) is; he then proceeds to
explain the mechanism of meaning transfer, which underlies deference, and
its functioning in systematic polysemy, semantic composition and in syntax
in general.” Matic (2007)
4
Relevance of Figurative Language to Natural
Language Processing
Non-literal phenomena are generally recognized as the most difficult for
natural language processing tasks such as machine translation (MT), text
summarization, information retrieval, and question answering (QA). The
necessary potential of a metaphor-aware QA system can be gleaned from our
discussion of two rule-based metaphor processing systems in the Metaphor
chapter. For the remainder of the current chapter, we will have a look at
a different application area, MT, and discuss some of the difficulties that
might arise in translation due to non-literal language.
5
5.1
Translation and Figurative Language
Translation is difficult
Translation is difficult because of inherent differences in languages, which
have been called mismatches or divergences in the context of Machine Translation (cf. e.g. Barnett et al. (1991); Dorr (1994); Kameyama et al. (1991)).
Languages differ at all linguistic levels (expressivity of morphology and syntax, for example), but the lexical-semantic level might have received the
most attention. Differences at one of the levels also have repercussions on
the other levels, making it difficult to deal with a specific problem in isolation. For example, a point-of-view related mismatch at the lexical level
might go along with a thematic divergence at sentence level, resulting in
different distribution of subject and object position, cf. Example 16 taken
over from (Dorr, 1994, p. 598).
(16)
a. [E] I like Mary
b. [S] Maria me gusta a mi
’Mary pleases me’
8
5.2
Figurative language in rule-based Machine Translation
We cannot go into the details of Machine Translation (MT). Rather, we
will have a look at a few non-representative examples from rule-base MT
systems and their handling of figurative language units.
In some rule-based MT systems, specific rules have been implemented
for idioms. Each idiom receives its own representation and translation, for
example via transfer rules. An example is (17), where Japanese sinu ‘die’
is defined as translation equivalent of the English idiom to kick the bucket
(Kinoshita et al., 1992, p. 681):
(17) kick(K) & obj(K, B) & the − bucket(B) ←→ sinu(K)
The rule comprises a set of two terms and the object relation between
them. Due to the treatment of determiner and noun as a fixed phrase, a
modified version of the idiom (e.g. kick the proverbial bucket) would not be
recognized and translated correctly.
A different question is whether Jap. sinu is an appropriate translation
of the English idiom. Obviously, it is a literal lexical unit (no contrast).
However, if one adopts the strong synonym approach to contrastive idiom
analysis as proposed by Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen (2005), a literal translation might be preferred over a target language idiom that differs in its
semantics (image component) or pragmatics (function, application area); cf.
(Dobrovol’skij and Piirainen, 2005, 55-58).
Also metaphors should be explicitly represented in rule-based systems
as additional word senses, or further processing must be applied to the
literal senses in order to derive the metaphorical extensions from them.
If metaphors are not dealt with in either way, mistranslations such as in
Example (18) are likely to occur (cf. Dorr (1993); Radzinski (1994)). The
MT system failed to produce an adequate translation because the ‘terminate’
sense of kill was not represented in the lexicon.
(18)
a. [E] kill a process
b. [*S: MT] matar un proceso
‘[literally] kill a process’
c. [S: reference] acabar con un proceso
‘terminate a process’
9
Figure 3: Image component in Example 19.
5.3
Figurative language in word alignment and statistical
MT
To study translation equivalents in an aligned corpus which is often used
for training statistical MT systems, I investigated 200 sentences of a wordaligned version of EuroParl.4 Insert EuroParl reference. These sentences
contain several metaphors and idioms as well as many fixed (multi-word)
expressions without image component. Subsections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 discuss
different types of examples.
5.3.1
Idiom - idiom
Sometimes, linguistically and culturally close languages have similar idioms.
This is the case with Example 19.
(19)
a. [G] es war in einzelnen gemeinden in meinem land wirklich die
hölle los .5
‘In fact, the hell was loose in some municipalities in my Land
[province].’
b. [E] in fact , all hell broke loose in some municipalities in my
province .
The image component, based on a cultural symbol, is the same in both
idioms and can be exemplified by Figure 3 representing hell. The idiom
exploits the associated idea of noise, violence, and disorder. The lexical
structure of the idiom is not exactly identical (cf. the hell vs. all hell; was
loose vs. broke loose). Word alignment is shown in Figure 4.
4
http://www.statmt.org/europarl/ [1 July, 2007]. Thanks to Behrang Mohit for
creating the word alignment using GIZA++ and for importing the data into the AVENUE
Elicitation Tool (Erik Peterson, CMU).
5
All characters have been downcased for word alignment.
10
Figure 4: Word alignment of Example 19.
Figure 5: Image component in German version of Example 20.
5.3.2
(20)
Idiom - non-figurative paraphrase
a. [G] frau präsidentin , ich möchte herrn poettering für das rühren
der werbetrommel zugunsten dieser aussprache danken .
b. [E] madam president , i would like to thank mr poettering for
advertising this debate .
The German idiom in Example (20) contains an image component of
somebody who plays the drum (cf. Figure 5), especially in order to draw
attention to something. The specific purpose of this drumming is explicitly
stated. A compound including the name of the instrument (. . . trommel) is
internally modified by a stem indicating the purpose of the drum, namely
Werbe- ‘advertising’. The English paraphrase preserves only this purpose
but no image component.
Idiom (21) contains the same image as the German idiom. If the idioms
are pragmatically similar, a (closer) translation preserving the image would
have been possible.
(21) bang/beat the drum [for something]
‘to speak eagerly about something that you support’
The word alignment in Figure 6 shows that the main semantic components of the idiom have indeed been aligned to its paraphrase; only a
11
Figure 6: Word alignment of Example 20.
function word has been missed.
5.3.3
Metaphors from the same domains
Example 22 contains two conventionalized metaphors.
(22)
a. [G] [die regelung ist] ein weiteres instrument im kampf um die
maximale erhöhung der verkehrssicherheit
b. [E] [the legislation is] yet another tool in our fight to make transport in the european union as safe as possible
The legislation is not a concrete tool, and the action of the politicians
is not a concrete, physical fight. Nevertheless, neither word alignment nor
translation of these metaphors pose major problems, as both German and
English make use of the same conceptual mappings and can instantiate them
by similar lexical material.
Consequently, statistical MT systems tend to produce correct translations of metaphors involving the same image component and the same lexical material, as long as there is enough training data. This is illustrated by
Example 23 and its shared image component (Figure 7), showing the result
of the EuroMatrix6 demo system.
(23)
5.3.4
a. [G: source] Die CSU-Europagruppe begrüßt , dass [. . . ]
b. [E: MT] the csu-europagruppe welcomes the fact that [. . . ]
c. [E: reference] The CSU ’s Europe group welcomes the [tabling]
[. . . ]
Metaphor from different domains
Example 24 shows that working towards a goal can be metaphorically conceptualized as creation, instantiated by the German sentence, or motion,
illustrated by the English sentence.
6
http://www.statmt.org/matrix/ [25 June, 2007].
pointing out this web site.
12
Thanks to Philipp Koehn for
Figure 7: Image component of Example 23.
Figure 8: Word alignment of Example 24.
(24)
a. [G] mit dem vorliegenden richtlinienentwurf schaffen wir eine wichtige
grundlage dafür , daß gut ausgebildete sicherheitsbeauftragte zur
verfügung stehen, [. . . ]
‘with the present draft directive, we are creating an important
basis for the availability of well-trained safety advisers’
b. [E] this draft directive is an important step towards well-trained
safety advisers being available , [. . . ]
Partly due to the different choice in metaphor, the sentence structure also
differs fundamentally, and word alignment does not succeed (cf. Figure 8).
5.3.5
Other Phenomena in Translation
A metaphor can be dropped altogether, or it can be translated into a
metaphor from the same domain, but using slightly different lexical material instantiating the mapping. The latter case is illustrated by Examples 25 to 27, which show the selection of a more specific instrument (an
impact weapon) in German (cf. Figure 9) or the related force or energy in
French, whereas in English just weapon is used. Still, all metaphors are from
the fight source domain; conceptual domains will be discussed further in
the Metaphor chapter.
(25)
a. [F: source] mais il faut veiller à ce que ce système ne puisse pas
servir de force de frappe politique .
13
Figure 9: Image component of Example 26.
‘[. . . ] striking force [. . . ]’
b. [*E: MT] but we must ensure that this system cannot be striking
force policy .
(26)
a. [G: source] aber es muss dafür Sorge getragen werden , dass das
System nicht als politische Schlagwaffe benutzt werden kann .
b. [*E: MT] but it must ensure that the system is not as a political
schlagwaffe can be used .
(27)
[E: reference] An agreement on procedures in itself is a good thing ,
but we must make sure that the system cannot be used as a political
weapon .
14
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