American Bar Association
SECTION OF LITIGATION
CORE KNOWLEDGE: CONDEMNATION,
ZONING AND LAND USE
In recent years, condemnation law has continued to develop in major decisions across the
country. Several of those cases are featured in this document.
C ORE K NOWLEDGE : C ONDEMNATION , Z ONING AND L AND U SE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Power to Condemn Property .............................................................................................................................................................. 2
1.
Who has the Power to Condemn Property? ................................................................................................................................. 2
2.
What Can Be Condemned? ........................................................................................................................................................... 2
1.
Necessity .................................................................................................................................................................................. 2
2.
Public Use Interpretation ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
The Proceeding to Condemn ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3
INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND REGULATORY TAKINGS ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.
FEDERAL ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
2.
NEBRASKA ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
3.
COMMITTEE WEBSITE MATERIALS ............................................................................................................................................... 4
Attorney’s Fees and Costs .......................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.
Federal .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.
Alabama ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
3.
Georgia.......................................................................................................................................................................................... 4
Zoning and Land Use .................................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Core Knowledge: Condemnation, Zoning and Land Use
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THE POWER TO CONDEMN PROPERTY
1. WHO HAS THE POWER TO CONDEMN PROPERTY?
The United States of America and each of the States, as sovereign entities, have the inherent power to condemn. See, Mississippi &
Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406, 25 L. Ed. 206 (1878); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (United States);
Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924) (states); Gober v. Stubbs, 682 So. 2d 430, 433 (Ala. 1996) (State of Alabama). In a
conflict between federal and state powers of eminent domain, the United States’ power of eminent domain shall govern. United
States v. Inlots, 26 F. Cas. 482 (1873).
The sovereigns can exercise their power to condemn by empowering others to condemn property. See Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361,
25 S. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed. 1085 (1905), aff’d 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371 (1904); City of Birmingham v. Brown, 2 So.2d 305 (Ala. 1941);
Florence v. Williams, 439 So.2d 83 (Ala. 1983); City of Huntsville v. Brown, 611 So.2d 372 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992).
Delegation of the power of eminent domain can be revoked. United States, ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
266 (1943). Such power is limited by language and restrictions contained in the statutory authority. Light v. City of Danville, 168 Va.
181, 190 S.E. 276 (1937). The power of eminent domain, including the requirement of just and adequate compensation, is “so
inherently governmental in character and so essential for the public welfare” that it cannot be susceptible of abridgement or
dispensed with by agreement. Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (XXXX).
2. WHAT CAN BE CONDEMNED?
All private property, and any interest therein, can be condemned so long as just and adequate compensation is first paid by the
condemning authority. Woodside v. City of Atlanta, 103 S.E.2d 108 (Ga. 1958). The payment of just and adequate compensation for
the taking of property includes real property, improvements thereto, and leasehold. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 470 (1972).
1. NECESSITY
The necessity of taking of private property for a public use is a matter for judicial determination; however, courts will defer to
legislative finding of necessity. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Greenup County, 175 F.2d 169 (1949).
2. PUBLIC USE INTERPRETATION
Property taken by eminent domain must be for a public use or must serve a public benefit, but a very liberal standard is used. Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
th
th
Public use requirement is binding up on states through incorporation of 5 Amendment’s eminent domain clause through 14
Amendment’s Due process Clause. Chicago, B & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). State may determine by statute what uses
are public. See Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
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"It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or participate in any
improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use." Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923). See also Parrish
v. City of Bayou La Batre, 581 So.2d 1101 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (new sewer line was a public use despite fact that private party who
primarily benefitted from it agreed to finance construction of it).
THE PROCEEDING TO CONDEMN
Under the general condemnation statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the government may elect to condemn property
by filing a declaration of taking detailing the authority for the condemnation, a description of the lands taken, and the public use for
which the lands are required. Additionally, the estimated amount of just compensation must be deposited in the court. Thereafter,
title vests in the United States. United States v. 21.54 Acres of Land, 491 F.2d 301 (1973).
INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
1. FEDERAL
Inverse condemnation should be distinguished from eminent domain. Eminent domain refers to a legal proceeding in which a
government asserts its authority to condemn property. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980).
Inverse condemnation is a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just compensation for a taking of his
property when condemnation proceedings have not been instituted. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Beginning with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 the Court has recognized that government regulation of private
property may be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster. Regulatory actions generally will be
deemed per se takings for Fifth Amendment purposes (1) where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property, or (2) where regulations completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of the property.
Outside of these two categories (and the special contest of land-use exactions), regulatory takings challenges are governed by Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, wherein several factors are identified that are particularly significant in
determining whether a regulation effects a taking, including the regulation’s economic impact on the claimant, the extent to which
it interferes with distinct investment –backed expectations, and the character of the government action. Whether the government
action “substantially advances” a legitimate government interest is not a valid method of identifying compensable regulatory
takings. Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
2. NEBRASKA
If a condemner takes or damages property without instituting condemnation proceedings, the condemnee may file a condemnation
petition in county court pursuant to statute, but the statutory condemnation procedure is not exclusive. The owner may elect to
file suit in district court. Kula v. Prososki, 365 N.W. 441 (Neb. 1985). A claim for inverse condemnation damages may be joined
with a regulatory taking claim or a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Whitehead v. City of Lincoln, 515 N.W.2d 401 (Neb.
1994).
The date of taking in an inverse proceeding is the date of actual appropriation for public use.
522(Neb. 1989).
Rose v. City of Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d
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3. COMMITTEE WEBSITE MATERIALS
ARTICLE: Casey Pipes and John R. Hamilton, “Claims for Right-of –Way Changes without a physical Taking”.
ARTICLE: Jennifer Franks, “Inverse Condemnation: An update from Around the United States”.
CASE NOTE: Reagan v. County of St. Louis. inverse Condemnation/Rezoning.
CASE NOTE: Limestone Development Corp. v. Village of Lemont. Inverse Condemnation/Rico.
CASE NOTE: State ex rel. Gilbert v. City of Cincinnati. Mandamus to compel commencement of condemnation/repeated temporary
invasions.
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS
1. FEDERAL
United States v Bodcaw Co., 440 US 202 (1979); Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 368, 369, 50 S. Ct. 299, 74 L. Ed. 904 (1930) - court
costs which a condemnee incurs, such as appraisal fees, are not part of the just compensation which the Federal Government must
pay under the Fifth Amendment when it takes property for public use, such costs being indirect costs for which compensation is not
constitutionally required
th
A condemnee's recovery of litigation costs or attorney’s fees may be authorized by statute even though not required by the 5
Amendment. See, e.g., Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 USCS § 4654 (dismissal or
abandonment of takings by federal agencies or by other agencies when using federal money); Tucker Act, 28 USCS § 1491 (inverse
condemnation); Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (prevailing party in litigation).
th
A condemning agency cannot tax its court costs against a condemnee, however, without violating the 5 Amendment even if it is the
prevailing party. Grand River Dam Auth. v. Jarvis, 124 F.2d 914, 916 (10th Cir. 1942); Fed. R. Civ. P., 71.
2. ALABAMA
Attorney’s fees are not recoverable in a direct condemnation action unless the condemning agency either fails to acquire the
property it sought or abandons its condemnation action after it has commenced. White v. State, 319 So.2d 247 (Ala. 1975),
certiorari denied, 424 U.S. 954; CODE OF ALABAMA, §§ 18-1A-3(12), 18-1A-95, 18-1A-290.
Attorney’s fees are recoverable in a successful inverse condemnation action. CODE OF ALABAMA, § 18-1A-32.
3. GEORGIA
In general, attorneys fees and expenses are not recoverable in a direct condemnation case. Dekalb County v. Trustees, B.P.O. Elks,
251 S.E.2 243 (Ga. 1978). O.C.G.A. § 22-1-12 provides for an award of fees and expenses to a property owner if a final judgment is
issued finding that the taking was improper or the condemnor abandoned the taking.
Core Knowledge: Condemnation, Zoning and Land Use
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ZONING AND LAND USE
Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) – zoning ordinances are not unconstitutional; there is a valid
government interest in maintaining the character of a neighborhood and in regulating where certain land uses should occur.
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (Court overturned a zoning ordinance for violating an
owner’s 14th Amendment due process rights when his property was zoned residential instead of commercial
when there was no advancement of the health, safety, or welfare of the community by the residential zoning
classification).
Land use regulations that denied the most beneficial use of the property are allowable and are not compensatory regulatory takings.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition of brickyard operations within certain neighborhoods); Village of Euclid,
Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (prohibition of industrial use); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (requirement
that portions of parcels be left unbuilt); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909) (height restriction).
Land use regulations that deny the property owner any economically viable use are deemed a taking of the affected property. See,
e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1982), First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (the application of land use regulations to a particular piece of property
is a taking if it denies an owner economically viable use of his land); Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.
See, Employment Div. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883–85 (1990)
The RLUIPA does not apply to decisions to condemn property because it is not a “zoning or landmarking law.” See St. John's United
Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007); Faith Temple Church v. Town of Brighton, 405 F. Supp. 2d 250
(W.D.N.Y. 2005); City and County of Honolulu v. Sherman, 129 P.3d 542 (Haw. 2006). If the basis for the condemnation action,
however, is the zoning power of the agency, then there is an argument that the RLUIPA may apply. See Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v.
Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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