The President and Fellows of Harvard College
The Soviet 1931-1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation Possible,
and What Would Its Consequences Be?
Author(s): ANDREA GRAZIOSI
Source: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1/4 (2004-2005), pp. 97-115
Published by: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41036863 .
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Holodomor:
The Soviet1931-1933FaminesandtheUkrainian
Is a New Interpretation
Possible,andWhatWouldIts
ConsequencesBe?*
ANDREA GRAZIOSI
SoonerorlatertheSovietpeoplewillputyouin thedockas traitor
trueenemyofthe
to bothsocialismandrevolution,
mainwrecker,
people,organizerofthefamine. . .
- F. Raskol'nikov,
SovietAmbassadorto Bulgaria,to Stalin,
17August19391
Between theend of 1932 and the summerof 1933, faminein theUSSR killed,in
half the time,approximatelyseven times as many people as the Great Terrorof
1937-1938. It was the peak of a series of faminesthathad startedin 1931, and
it constitutedthe turningpoint of the decade as well as Soviet prewarhistory's
main event. With its approximatelyfive million victims (I am not including
the hundredsof thousands,possibly more thana million,who had already died
in Kazakhstan and elsewhere since 1931), compared to the one to two million
victimsof 1921-1922 and 1946-1947, this also was the most severe faminein
Soviet historyand an event thatleftits mark fordecades. Its effectwas feltin
countriesinhabitedby immigrantcommunitiesfromtheRussian Empire and the
USSR, and itsimportance,politicalas well as historical,is stillstrongtoday.Since
of the Famine have played a key
1987-1988, the rediscoveryand interpretation
role in Ukrainein discussions betweensupportersof thedemocratizationprocess
and thosewho stilladhereto a procommunistideology.The Holodomor (theword
* Oleg Khlevniuk
andMarkKramercommented
on andmuchimproved
thistext,whose
conclusions
andmistakes
areonlymine.Ukrainian,
andRussianversions
ofthis
French,
article
haveappearedinUkrai'ns'kyi
no.3 (2005),Cahiersdumonde
zhurnal,
istorychnyi
russe46, no 3 (2005), andOtechestvennye
zapiski,no. 34 (2007), respectively.
HarvardUkrainianStudiesXXVII (1-4) 2004-2005: 97-1 15.
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98
GRAZIOSI
coined to mean hunger-related
mass extermination,
thus
implyingintentionality)
moved to the centerof the political and culturaldebate, becoming part of the
process of stateand nationbuildingin Ukraine.
Yet until 1986, when Robert Conquest published his Harvest of Sorrow,2
historianshad almostcompletelyignoredthisextraordinary
event.This is notto
say thattherewas no documentationavailable, as I realized whenreadingItalian
diplomats'reportsto Mussolini- in factsuch documentsprovethatithad always
been possible to know.Thanks to the twentieth-century
mass populationmovements migrations,forcedor otherwise,displacements,etc.- and thetracesthat
theyleft,such as diplomaticdispatches,travelaccounts, memoirsof witnesses
and victims,much was there,readyto bear witness.3
In thislightit is startlingto recall how littlewe knew beforeConquest's book
appeared.4In the best case, historianssuch as Naum Jasnyand Alec Nove did
speak of a "man-madefamine"(which was stillbeing treatedas a single event)
without,however,researchingitfullyand generallyignoringitsnationalaspect.A
few years later,Moshe Lewin analyzed themechanismsthatcaused theFamine,
but did notdeal withtheFamine as such.5In the worstcase, theFamine became
theoccasion fordepressingpolemics in which its veryexistencewas questioned
or minimized.In theUSSR, wherehistorians,even after1956, could speak only
of "food difficulties,"
theuse of theverywordgolod/holod(hunger,famine)was
forbidden.In Ukraineitwas utteredofficiallyforthefirsttimein December 1987,
in FirstSecretaryVolodymyrShcherbytslcyi'sspeech celebratingthe republic's
seventiethanniversary.
That is whyConquest's book, theoutcomeof theHarvardUkrainianResearch
Instituteproject,has been of crucialimportance:itforceda reluctantprofessionto
deal witha fundamental
question,and itdid so by stressingtheconnectionbetween
theKazakh case.
famineand thenationalquestionwhile properlydifferentiating
on thefaminesand theHolodomor
It can thusbe maintainedthathistoriography
startswith Conquest, even thoughotherauthors,such as Sergei Maksudov or
Zhores Medvedev, were by thenseriouslydealing withtheseevents.6The book's
significanceis even greaterin lightof the polemics thatit raised. Because their
level was much superiorto thatof previous polemics, theygrew into a positive
phenomenon,which may be viewed as partof the process throughwhich histohumanand intellectual
riansfinallybecame aware of theseevents' extraordinary
dimensions.This processwas, and stillis, especiallypainfulbecause ittookand is
takingplace aftera historicaljudgmenthad alreadybeen made and a "collective
memory"had set in, all withoutthe Soviet famines enteringthe picture.This
was both a consequence of the successful Soviet attemptat concealmentand a
- thelogic
of one of theEuropean twentiethcentury'skey features
manifestation
of "takingsides" thatdominatedthe discussion. Therefore,the famineshad to,
of thepast at theprice
and todaystillhave to, be broughtintoour representation
of commonlyheld beliefs.
of a completerestructuring
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
99
Then came the 1991 archivaland historiographicalrevolution.It allowed the
accumulationof new knowledge and caused a leap in the quality of polemics,
which,withfew exceptions,thengrew intoserious controversies.True scholarly
spiritand a firmmoral commitment,born of an awareness of the immensity
of the tragedytheydeal with,animate the two camps in which it is possible to
group today's existingpositions at the price of some simplificationand much
schematization.One can thus contemplatethese past few years, duringwhich
Conquest's conclusions have been integratedand in partsurpassed,witha sense
of satisfactionand findin themsome reason foroptimism.
thepositionsof thesetwo camps may be
By means of yetmoresimplification,
summedup in the followingway (I am paraphrasingfroma letterthata brilliant
youngUkrainianscholarrecentlysentme). On one side thereare whatwe could
call "A" people. They supportthegenocide thesisand see in theFamine an event
artificiallyorganizedin orderto: (a) break thepeasants and/or(b) alter(destroy)
of the
the Ukrainiannation's social fabric,which obstructedthe transformation
USSR intoa despoticempire.On theotherside we have "B" people, who, though
fullyrecognizingthe criminalnatureof Stalin's policies, deem it necessary to
studythe Famine as a "complex phenomenon"in which manyfactors,fromthe
geopolitical situationto the modernizationeffort,played a role in Moscow's
intentionsand decisions.
I believe thattodaywe have mostof theelementsneeded fora new and more
satisfactory
interpretive
hypothesis,capable of takingintoaccountboththegeneral
and complex Soviet pictureand the undeniable relevance of the national question.7This hypothesiscan be puttogetherusing theexcellentworksof Ukrainian,
Russian, and Westernscholars as building blocks, thus breakingthe wall that
stillpartiallyseparatestheirefforts.It is groundedin theresearchof outstanding
scholars such as ViktorDanilov, R. W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft,N. A.
James
Ivnitskii,D'Ann Penner and ViktorKondrashin,Stanislav KuFchytsTcyi,
Meslé
France
and
Iurii
and
Valerii
Mace, TerryMartin,
Jacques Vallin,
Shapoval
Vasyl'iev,and also Oleg Khlevniuk,whose workson Stalin and his circle,though
notfocusingdirectlyon theFamine, allowed us to situateit in itsproperpolitical
context.8
In thenextpages I will tryto sketchtheoutlineof such an interpretation.
I hope
not only to push forwardthe interpretation
of the "Great Famine" (a collective
name forthe 193 1-1933 famines),butalso to stimulatea debate thatwill contribute to the breakingof the even tallerand strongerwall thatisolates its students
fromtheircolleagues studyingthe European twentiethcentury,a centurythatis
simplyimpossible to fullyunderstandwithoutconsideringthose famines.
In orderto formulatethisnew interpretation,
we need firstto definetheobject
of our investigation.As should be clear by now, we are in fact dealing with
what it would be more correctto call, on a pan-Soviet level, the 1931-1933
famines, which had of course common causes and a common background,but
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100
GRAZIOSI
included at least two very differentand special phenomena: the Kazakhstan
of 1931-1933 and the Ukrainian-Kuban(the latterarea,
famine-cwm-epidemics
to
the
Russian republic'sprovinceof NorthernCaucasus, being
thoughbelonging
inhabited
mostly
by Ukrainians)Holodomor of late 1932 to early 1933.
have been caused bytheconfusionbetweenthese
Many pastmisunderstandings
twonationaltragediesand thegeneralphenomenonthatprovidedtheirframework.
In a way,it is as if studentsof Nazism would confuseNazi repressionin general
of Soviet prisoners
withquite specificand crucialcases, such as theextermination
of war,or thatofPoles and Gypsies notto mentiontheHolocaust,an exceptional
phenomenonthatcannot be explained simply as an aspect or element of Nazi
killingsat large,and yetcertainlywas also a partof them.Both Nazi repression
in generaland such "specific" tragediesexisted,and both mustbe studied,as in
facttheyare, in and of themselvesas well as in theirconnections.
A veryclear distinctionbetweenthegeneralphenomenonand itsrepublic-level
or regional manifestationsshould thereforebe introducedin the Soviet case.
However,most"A" supportersare in factspeakingspecificallyof theHolodomor,
while manyof the"B" proponentsthinkon a pan-Soviet scale. If we analytically
distinguishwhat theyare doing, we end up discoveringthatin many,albeit not
all, ways theyare correctin theirrespectivedomains.
consistsof yetanotheranalytical
The second steptowarda new interpretation
We mustseparatethe 1931-1932 "spontaneous"famines- theytoo,of
distinction.
course,were direct,ifundesired,consequences of choices made in 1928-1929 fromthepost-September1932 Famine, whichtook on such terriblefeaturesnot
least because of humandecision. (Events in Kazakhstan followed an altogether
different
onlymake some passingreferencesto them.)9
patternand I will therefore
to
take
is to gatherand combine usefulelements
third
we
need
the
Finally,
step
fromboth "A" and "B" and drop theirunsatisfactory
parts.
"A" people are rightin drawingour attentionto thenationalquestion.Anyone
studyingthe Soviet Union should be acutely aware of its importance,as Lenin
and Stalinthemselveswere (afterall, theformerdecided notto call thenew state
Russia, and the latter,who initiallyopposed such a choice, never reversedthe
decision in lateryears). One should be equally aware of the Ukrainianprimacy
in thismatter.In late 1919 Lenin startedtheshifttowardsindigenization(korenizatsiia),10untilthattime considered to be a request of "extremenationalists,"
because of theUkrainianBolsheviks' defeatof 1919,11and Stalingave a new spin
to korenizatsiiain late 1932 because of the Ukrainiancrisis. But in Ukraine,at
least up to 1933, thenationalquestionwas thepeasantquestion.This is whatboth
Lenin and Stalin thought,and rightlyso. "A" people seem instead to be wrong
in thinkingthatthe "Famine" (meaning also the pan-Soviet one) was organized
("planned") to solve the Ukrainiannational,or ratherpeasant,problem.
of the causes and wider context
"B" people give us a detailed reconstruction
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
101
of the Famine on a pan-Soviet scale, with all its complexity,and are thus able
to criticizeconvincinglythe simplisticviews of the "A" camp. However, they
seem unable to fullyunderstandor accommodate the national factor;thatis, to
"descend" fromthepan-Sovietto therepubliclevel. "B" people also do notalways
seem capable of seeing thatStalin,even when he did notinitiatesomethingwillfully,was always veryquick to take advantage of "spontaneous" events,giving
thema completelynew turn.The obvious parallel here is withKirov's murder,
whichStalinmostprobablydid notorganize,butquitecertainly"creatively"used.
One can thus use good "B" data for the developmentof the pan-Soviet crisis,
stressinghowever thatat this level, too, Stalin at a certainmomentdecided to
use hungerto breakthepeasants' oppositionto collectivization.For a numberof
reasons, such opposition was strongerin non-Russianareas, where events soon
thiscourse we can crackthe
startedto followtheirown course. By reconstructing
secretsurroundingthe 1932-1933 events fromtheirinception- a secretwhich,
as Raskol'nikov's letterseems to suggest,was known to the Bolshevik elite.
What can thereforebe said? From 1931 to 1933 scores, perhaps hundreds,
of thousands of people died of hungerthroughoutthe USSR. In Kazakhstan,
Ukraine,NorthernCaucasus, and theVolga basin (Povolzh'e), however,the situBut forWesternSiberia, thesewere thecountry's
ation was completelydifferent.
mostimportantgrain-growing
regions,wherethepost-1927 state-village conflict
over the crop was strongest.Since 1918-1919, moreover,the war between the
regime and peasants and nomads therehad been particularlybrutalbecause of
role of national and religious factors,and in the Volga because
the intensifying
of both the Russian peasant movement's strongtraditionsand the presence of
Germancolonists.
Except in Kazakhstan, the phenomenon's causes were similar across these
areas: thedevastatinghumantoll,as well as thetollon thecapacityforproduction,
taken by dekulakization- a de facto nationwide,state-ledpogrom against the
peasant elite; forcedcollectivization,which pushed peasants to destroya large
the kolkhozes' inefficiencyand misery;the repeated
partof theirinventories;12
and extremerequisitionwaves originatedby a crisis-riddenindustrialization,
an
urbanizationout of control,and a growingforeigndebtthatcould be repaid only
by exportingraw materials;theresistanceof peasants,who would notaccept the
reimpositionof what theycalled a "second serfdom"and worked less and less
because of both theirrejectionof the new systemand hunger-relateddebilitation; and thepoor weatherconditionsin 1932. Famine, whichhad startedto take
hold sporadicallyalready in 1931 (when Kazakhs were dyingin mass), and had
grown into solid pockets by the springof 1932, thus appears to have been an
undesiredand unplannedoutcome of ideology-inspiredpolicies aimed at eliminatingmercantileand privateproduction.Based on theresultsof the 1920-1921
war communismpolicy, the Famine should not have been difficultto foresee.
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102
GRAZIOSI
Yet if one analyzes theFamine's originsand pre-autumn1932 developmentson
a pan-Sovietlevel, it seems arduous to claim thatfaminewas theconscious goal
of those policies, as it is maintainedby those who supportthe hypothesisthat
faminewas willfullyimplementedto breakthepeasant resistanceor to execute a
Moscow- (sometimesmeaningRussian-) planned Ukrainiangenocide.
However,the intensity,
course, and consequences of thephenomenon,which
new studiesand new documentsallow us to analyze,wereundeniablyand substanin different
tiallydifferent
regionsand republics.Out of the six to seven million
victims(demographersnow imputeto 1930-1931 partof the deaths previously
imputedto 1932-1933), 3.5 to 3.8 million died in Ukraine; 1.3 to 1.5 million
in Kazakhstan (where deaths reached theirpeak in relation to the population
size, exterminating33 to 38 percentof the Kazakhs and 8 to 9 percentof the
Europeans); and several hundredthousandin NorthernCaucasus and, on a lesser
scale, in the Volga, where the most harshlyhit area coincided withthe German
autonomousrepublic.13
If we considerannual mortalityratesper thousandinhabitantsin thecountryside, and make 1926 equal to 100, we see themjump in 1933 to 188. 1 in theentire
USSR, 138.2 in theRussian republic(which thenstillincludedbothKazakhstan
and NorthernCaucasus), and 367.7 - thatis, almost triple- in Ukraine. Here
life expectancyat birthdropped from42.9 years formen and 46.3 forwomen
7.3 and 10.9 in 1933 (it would be 13.6 and 36.3
registeredin 1926 to,respectively,
in 1941). Also, in Ukrainetherewere782,000 birthsin 1932 and 470,000 in 1933,
compared withan average of 1.153 millionper year in the period from1926 to
1929.14The extremefiguresforUkraine are explained by the Famine's different
course there,forwhich different
Moscow policies were largelyresponsible.
In Ukraine,as elsewhere,in thespringof 1932 local officials,village teachers,
and republicanleaders notedthespreadingof hungerand thebeginningof a mass
ruralexodus.15Stalin,urgedby theUkrainianparty,which asked fora reduction
in procurements,acknowledged in early Junethatthiswas indeed necessary,at
least in themosthard-hitareas, also out of a "sense ofjustice." Such reductions,
however,had to be moderateand local, because, despite Viacheslav Molotov's
reportthat"today we have to face, even in grain-producingareas, the specterof
famine,"the Politburoconcluded that"procurementplans mustbe respectedat
all cost."16This conclusion was dictatedby theneed to avoid therepetition,on a
largerscale, of thatspring'surbanfood riotsand strikesand to honortheGerman
bills due betweentheend of the year and thebeginningof 1933.
AlreadyinJune,however,Stalinwas developingwhatTerryMartinhas called a
of theFamine,well beforeUkrainiannationalistsoutside
"nationalinterpretation"
the USSR even startedto thinkabout it.17At the beginning,he rantedin private
against the republic leaders, whom he held responsibleforfailingto deal with
the situationwith the necessary firmness.Between Julyand August, however,
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
103
aftera Ukrainianpartyconferencehad implicitlydisagreed withMoscow and on
thebasis of OGPU reportsthataccused local communistsof being infectedwith
nationalism,Stalin produced a new analysis of the situationand its causes.18
What was perhaps the last recordeddisagreementwith Stalin in a Politburo
meetingalso possibly played a role. On 2 August 1932 someone, probablyHryhorii PetrovsTcyi
(then the UkrainianCentral Executive Committee[VUTsVK]
chairman), objected to Stalin's draftof what was to become on 7 August the
A bit later,
draconianlaw on thedefenseof statepropertyagainstpeasant theft.19
on 11 August,in spite of the recentsigningof the Polish-Soviet non-aggression
pact,20in a crucial letterto Lazaf Kaganovich, Stalin wrotethatUkrainewas now
the main issue (his emphasis), thatthe republic's party,state,and even political
police organs teemed with nationalistagents and Polish spies, and that there
into a
was a real riskof "losing Ukraine," which should instead be transformed
Bolshevik fortress.21
Such an interpretation,
developed on thebasis of theUkrainianexperience,was
laterextendedby Stalin to theCossacks (who had been singledout as enemies of
theregimealreadyin 1919 when theywere hitby decossackization),22theVolga
Germans,and, albeitin less starkterms,Belarusians.The crisisthusspurredStalin
to apply his by then well-developed model of preventive,category-based,and
thereforecollective repression(which had reached itsfirstpeak withdekulakization)to a numberof nationaland social-nationalgroupsthatin hisjudgmentposed
a threatto theregime.As eventswere to prove,however,Ukraineand Ukrainians
remainedforemostin his mind.
When,as itwas to be expected,procurements
provedunsatisfactory
throughout
thegrain-producing
lands, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Pavel Postyshevwere sent
to Ukraine,NorthernCaucasus, and theVolga to redressthesituation.The decision
to use thefamine, thus enormouslyand artificiallystrengthening
it, in orderto
was thustakenin the
imparta lesson to peasants who refusedthe new serfdom23
fallof 1932, whenthecrisiscaused by thefirstfive-yearplan peaked and Stalin's
wifecommittedsuicide. The punishmentwas tragicallysimple: he who does not
work- thatis, does not accept the kolkhoz system- will not eat. Stalin hinted
at such a policy in his famous 1933 correspondencewith Mikhail Sholokhov.
The Don's "esteemed grain-growers,"on whose behalf the writerpleaded, had
waged- Stalinwrote- a "'secret' war againstSoviet power,a war in which"- he
added, reversingroles- "theyused hungeras a weapon," and of whichtheywere
now bearingtheconsequences; thatis, implicitly,famine.24
Most of the strickenareas were not extended any help until the spring of
1933 (Don peasants got somethingonly in May). Moreover, while Commissar of ForeignAffairsMaxim Litvinov officiallydenied the Famine's existence
in his answers to foreignofficials' queries, the state "ferociously fought"(in
Kaganovich's words) to fulfilthese areas' procurementplans.
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104
GRAZIOSI
In those places where the "peasant question" was complicated- that is,
and thusmade moredangerousby thenationalone (let us remember
strengthened
thatStalin explicitlylinkedthetwo questions in his writingson nationalism,and
thatthe Soviet leadershiphad seen this hypothesisconfirmedby the Ukrainian
countryside'sgreat social and national revolts of 1919, repeated, albeit on a
lesser scale, in early 1930)25- the resortto hungerwas more ruthlessand the
lesson much harsher.Accordingto demographicdata, in Ukraine,too, mortality
meaningthatpeople
dependedon residency,urbanor rural,and noton nationality,
livingin the countrysidesufferedindependentlyof theirethnicbackground.Yet
one cannotforgetthat,as everybodyknew,in spiteof thepreviousurbanizationUkrainian,whilecitieshad
cwm-Ukrainization,
villagesremainedoverwhelmingly
In Ukraine,
largelypreservedtheir"alien" (Russian, Jewish,Polish) character.26
thecountrysidewas indeed targetedto breakthepeasants,butwiththe
therefore,
fullawareness thatthe village representedthe nation's spine.
the decision to use
The fact that,because of the "national interpretation,"
the Famine took on very specific traitsin Ukraine and Kuban is confirmedby
fromthosetakenon a pan-Soviet
measuresthatwere,at leastin part,verydifferent
lands. On 18 November1932,
of
the
Don
Cossack
with
the
scale,
partialexception
Molotov
and Kaganovich had crushed
which
theUkrainianCentralCommittee,
into submission,orderedpeasants to returnthe meager grainadvances over the
new crop thattheyhad received in recompensefortheirwork.The decision (one
may imagine whatits implementationmeant)opened the way fortherepression
of local officialswho had helped out starvingpeasant families by distributing
grainto them.Hundredsof such officialswere shotand thousandsarrested,often
on thechargeof "populism." Meanwhile,in Ukraineand Kuban thestateresorted
to finesin kindin orderto also seize meat and potatoesfrompeasants,a measure
whichwas notextendedto theVolga, where- withthepossible exceptionof the
German autonomous republic- Postyshev dealt less harshlywith local cadres
(althoughless severe punishmentdid not preventmass hunger-relateddeaths).
Specific areas of NorthernCaucasus and Ukraine,where the opposition to collectivizationhad been stronger,were punished even more cruelly: all goods,
were removed fromstores and all inhabitantswere
includingnon-agricultural,
deportedfromcertainlocalities.
Famine thustook on formsand dimensionsmuchbiggerthanit would have if
naturehad followed its course. It was less intense,in termsof both droughtand
thearea itaffected,thanthe 1921-1922 Famine (the 1932 crop,thoughquite low,
was stillhigherthanthe 1945 crop,whentherewere no comparablemass hungerrelated deaths), yet it caused threeto fourtimes as many victims- essentially
because of political decisions thataimed at saving the regimefromthe crisis to
whichits verypolicies had led and at assuringthevictoryof the"greatoffensive"
launched fouryearspreviously.
The awareness thatin Ukraine and Kuban the peasant question also was a
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
105
nationalquestion determinedthe need to deal withand "solve" these questions
together.In orderto make sure thatsuch a "solution" was thereto stay,it was
complementedby the decision to get rid of the nationalelites and theirpolicies,
which were suspected,as we know,of abettingpeasants.
On 14 and 15 December 1932, the Politburopassed two secretdecrees that
reversed,but onlyin the Ukrainiancase, the officialnationalitypolicies decided
upon in 1923. Accordingto thesedecreeskorenizatsiia,as ithad been implemented
in Ukraine and Kuban, had spurrednationalisticfeelingsratherthan checking
them,and produced enemies with a partymembershipticketin theirpocket.
Peasants were not the sole culpritsof the crisis, but shared responsibilitywith
the Ukrainianpolitical and culturalclasses.
On thesepremises,Ukrainizationprogramsin theRussian republicwere abolished. Several millionUkrainianswho, followingthepro-Russianborderchoices
of the mid-1920s, were living in the RSFSR thus lost those education, press,
and self-government
rightsthatothernationalitiescontinuedto enjoy. The 1937
census would reveal thatonly 3 million RSFSR citizens definedthemselvesas
Ukrainiansversusthe7.8 millionof 1926 (at least partof thisdecline was caused
by thepromotionof Kazakhstan,previouslya RSFSR autonomousrepublic,into
a Soviet one).
A fewdays later,on 19 December 1932, similarthoughless harshmeasureshit
Belarus too,where- as in Ukraine- thepeasantand thenationalquestionslargely
coincided,a factthathad also caused problemsduringthecivil war,albeit noton
theUkrainianscale. Here, too, in earlyMarch the partywas accused of abetting
nationalism,and partycadres and the national intelligentsiiawere repressedfor
such crimes. The fundamentaldifferencein Soviet nationalitypolicies, which
were much more tolerantin the east and the northof the USSR thanin the west,
was thusreaffirmed,
althoughtherewas no reversalof "Belarusization."27
On the nightof 20 December, at the urgingof Kaganovich, the Ukrainian
Politburocommitteditselfto new targetsforgrainrequisitions.Nine days laterit
declared thatthepreconditionto fulfillingtheplan was the seizure of seed stock
reserves.28On 22 January1933, soon afterPostyshev,Moscow's new plenipotentiaryin Ukraine,arrivedwithhundredsof centralcadres, Stalin and Molotov
orderedtheOGPU to stop peasants fromfleeingUkraineand Kuban in search of
food. The Central Committeeand the government,theywrote,"are convinced
thatthisexodus, like thatof theprevious year,has been organizedby enemies of
Soviet power,Socialist Revolutionariesand Polish agents,in orderto agitateby
'usingpeasants'againstkolkhozesand,moregenerally,againstSoviet powerin the
USSR's northern
territories.
Last yearparty,government,
and police organsfailed
to uncoverthiscounterrevolutionary
plot ... A repetitionof such a mistakethis
In thefollowingmonth,the decree led to the arrest
year would be intolerable."29
of 220,000 people, predominantlyhungrypeasants in search of food; 190,000 of
themwere sentback to theirvillages to starve.
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106
GRAZIOSI
Ukrainian cities too, which were far better,albeit still miserably,supplied,
were surroundedby antipeasantroadblocks,while villages were leftto starve.30
WhattheUkrainianpartysecretary,
StanislavKosior,wroteMoscow on 15 March
confirmsthatthe hungerwas used to teach peasants subservienceto the state.
"The unsatisfactory
course of sowing in manyareas," he lamented,"shows that
faminehasn't stilltaughtreason to manykolkhozniks"(emphasis mine).31These
measures were accompanied, and followed,by a wave of anti-Ukrainianterror,
which already presentedsome of the traitsthatwere later to characterizethe
1937-1938 "mass operations."Thus ended the national-communist
experiment
bornof thecivil war,withthesuicide in 1933 of important
leaderssuch as Mykola
Skrypnykand writerssuch as Mykola Khvyl'ovyias well as the repressionof
thousandsof its cadres.
The adoptionof thetermHolodomorseems therefore
legitimate,as well as necto
mark
a
distinction
between
the
essary,
pan-Sovietphenomenonof 1931-1933
and theUkrainianFamine afterthe summerof 1932. In spiteof theirundeniable
close relationship,the two are in fact profoundlydifferent.The same applies
to the famines' consequences, which also were partiallysimilaryet essentially
different.
Whereas throughoutthe USSR the use of hungerbroke peasant resistance;32guaranteedthevictoryof a dictatorwhompeople fearedin a new way and
aroundwhoma new cult,based on fear,startedto develop; opened thedoor to the
1937-1938 terror;markeda qualitativechange in the lie thathad accompanied
theSoviet regimesince itsinception;allowed, by means of thesubjugationof the
of the Soviet federalstate
most importantrepublic,the de facto transformation
intoa despoticempire;and lefta dreadfullegacy of griefin a multitudeof families
thatwerepreventedfromdealing withit(Gorbachevtoo lostthreepaternaluncles
then)because of theFamine taboo and thedogma aboutlifehavingbecome "more
joyous" - in Ukraineand in Kazakhstan faminedug even deeper.
wereseriouslyimpaired.
In Kazakhstan,thetraditionalsociety'sverystructures
In Ukraine,both the body and the top of national society were badly damaged,
slowing down and distortingnationbuilding.I think,forinstance,thatonly thus
can we accountforthemuch weakerpresence,as comparedto whathappened in
1914-1922, of theUkrainiannationalmovementin thegreatcrisisof 1941-1945
therather
(Galicia, whichin 1933 was notpartof theUSSR, was notsurprisingly
extraordinary
exception).
The numberof victims makes the Soviet 1931-1933 famines into a set of
phenomenathatin the frameworkof European historycan be compared only to
laterNazi crimes.The course of events in Ukraine and NorthernCaucasus, and
of thecrisisand thepolicies
thelinkthiscourse had to bothStalin's interpretation
thatoriginatedfromthis interpretation,
reintroduce,in a new way, the question
of its nature.Was therealso a Ukrainiangenocide?
The answerseems to be no ifone thinksof a famineconceived by theregime,
or- thisbeingeven moreuntenable- by Russia, to destroytheUkrainianpeople.
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
107
It is equally no if one adopts a restrictivedefinitionof genocide as the planned
will to exterminateall themembersof a religiousor ethnicgroup,in which case
only the Holocaust would qualify.
In 1948, however,even theratherstrictUN definitionof genocide listedamong
possible genocidal acts, side by side with "killing membersof the group, and
causing serious bodily or mentalharmto membersof the group," "deliberately
inflictingon membersof the group conditionsof life calculated to bring about
itsphysical destructionin whole or in part" (emphasis mine). Not long before,
Raphael Lemkin, the inventorof the term,had noted that"generallyspeaking,
genocide does not necessarilymean the immediatedestructionof a nation... It
actions aiming at the
is intendedratherto signifya coordinatedplan of different
destructionof essential foundationsof the life of nationalgroups."33
- if one thinksof the substantialdifferencein
Based on Lemkin's definition
mortalityrates in different
republics; adds to the millions of Ukrainianvictims,
the
ones
from
Kuban, themillionsof UkrainiansforciblyRussifiedafter
including
December 1932, as well as thescores of thousandsof peasants who meta similar
fateafterevadingthepolice roadblocksand takingrefugein theRussian republic;
keeps in mindthatone is thereforedealing withthe loss of approximately20 to
30 percentof the Ukrainianethnicpopulation; remembersthatsuch a loss was
caused by the decision, unquestionablya subjective act, to use the Famine in an
anti-Ukrainiansense on thebasis of the"nationalinterpretation"
Stalindeveloped
in the second half of 1932; reckonsthatwithoutsuch a decision the death count
would have been at the most in the hundredsof thousands(thatis, less than in
1921-1922); and finally,if one adds to all of theabove thedestructionof a large
partof therepublic'sUkrainianpoliticaland culturalelite,fromvillage teachersto
nationalleaders- I believe thattheanswerto our question,"Was theHolodomor
a genocide?" cannotbut be positive.
Between the end of 1932 and the summerof 1933:
1. Stalin and the regimehe controlledand coerced (but certainlynot Russia
or the Russians, who sufferedfromfamine too, even thoughon a lesser
scale) consciously executed, as part of a drive directed at breaking the
an anti-Ukrainian
and causing
peasantry,
policyaimed at mass extermination
a genocide in the above-mentionedinterpretation
of the term,a genocide
whose physical and psychological scars are stillvisible today.34
2. This genocide was the productof a faminethatwas not willfullycaused
withsuch aim in mind,butwas willfullymaneuveredtowardsthisend once
it came about as the unanticipatedresultof the regime policies (it seems
thatthe even more terribleKazakh tragedywas "only" the undesired,if
towards
foreseeable,outcomeof denomadizationand colonial indifference
the natives' fate).35
3. It took place withina contextthatsaw Stalin punishingwithhunger,and
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108
GRAZIOSI
applyingterrorto, a numberof national and ethnosocial groups he feltto
As all thequantitativedata indicate,
be actuallyor potentiallydangerous.36
however,the scale of bothpunishmentand terrorreached extremedimensions in Ukraine forthe reasons I listed,thusgrowinginto a qualitatively
different
phenomenon.
4. From this perspective,the relationshipbetween the Holodomor and the
othertragicpunishmentsby repressionof 1932-1933 do in a way recall the
betweenNazi repressionsand theHolocaust.
relationship
already-mentioned
fromthe Holocaust. It did
The Holodomor, however,was much different
the whole nation,it did not kill people directly,
not aim at exterminating
and it was motivatedand constructedtheoreticallyand politically- might
one say "rationally"?- ratherthan ethnicallyor racially. This different
motivationat least partiallyaccounts forthefirsttwo differences.37
5. Fromthisperspective,theHolocaust is exceptionalbecause itrepresentsthe
genocide imaginable. It thus
purest,and thereforequalitativelydifferent,
time
it representsthe apex of
same
Yet
at
the
belongs in anothercategory.
a multilayeredpyramid,whose steps are representedby othertragedies,
and to whose top the Holodomor is close.
answer has greatmoral and
Were it true,as I believe it to be, thisaffirmative
of the European
intellectualconsequences upon our image and interpretation
twentiethcentury.In an essay published in this veryjournal, afterdiscussing
theproblemsrelatedto the "Great Famine's" medium-and long-termimpacton
Soviet history,I triedto address some of theseconsequences and would now like
to recall threeof them.38
and responsibilities
How does theawarenessof theFamines' modalities,entity,
as
human
to
called
affectthejudgmentwe are
beings firstbut also as
upon pass,
historians,on the Soviet systemand its firstgenerationof leaders, a group that
who executedtheirdecisions,without
mustbe extendedto cover thefunctionaries
themanywho bravelyrefusedto participatein or boycotted
of course forgetting
the state's policies and were punishedforit? In the lightof 1932-1933, doesn't
that systemmuch more resemble, for at least a stage in its history,a violent
and primitivestateheaded by a wicked despot thana modernizing"totalitarianism," ideologically aimed at conqueringand recastingthe consciousness of its
subjects?
Is it possible to maintainthatif at the rootof the Soviet system,as recastby
Stalin,therewas such a crime,thenitscollapse is somehowrelatedto thisoriginal
sin,a sin coveredfordecades by lies because itcould notbe acknowledged?From
this angle, the "Great Famine" assumes the featuresof a formidableobstacle
to the survivalby renewal of a systemthatcould not speak the truthabout its
past and was thus swept away by the surfacingof this truth,oftenby virtueof
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
109
people who wanted to reformit and make it more humane,and startedto do so
by settlingaccounts withthe past, only to discover thatsuch accounts could not
be settled.39
We thus enterthe extremelyinterestingquestion of the evolution of "totalitarianism,"a categoryI do notlike in partbecause it makes itdifficultto account
for such evolution, which in the Soviet case is nonethelessundeniable. Jacob
Burckhardtwrote,"even a statefoundedat the beginningonly upon the curses
of the oppressed is forcedwith time to evolve some kind of law and civil life,
because rightfuland civil people slowly gain controlover it."40Can it be that
if peace prevails fora long enough period, at least the progress,if not the final
triumph,of such evolution is indeed possible, even when thatstate's historyis
markedby genocide? Were it so, Soviet historywould be notjust the astonishing moral parable thatindeed it is, but also the harbingerof hope in much more
generalterms.
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110
GRAZIOSI
Notes
1.
servedin Sofiafrom1934to 1938.
a famouscivilwarcommander,
Raskol'nikov,
His "openletter"to Stalinwas publishedin Novaia Rossiia (Paris)on 1 October
withmuchnewmaterial,
1939,threeweeksafterhisdeathin Nice. Fortheletter,
- kaketobylo:Dokumenty
TsK
seeA. Artizovetal.,eds.,Reabilitatsiia
Prezidiuma
vol.2,FevraV1956-nachalo80-khgodov(Moscow,2003),
KPSS i drugiematerialy,
aremyown.
420-53. Emphasismine.Unlessotherwise
noted,all translations
2.
and theTerrorRobertConquest,TheHarvestofSorrow:SovietCollectivization
Famine(New York,1986).
3.
AndreaGraziosi,"'Lettresde Kharkov':La famineen Ukraineetdansle Caucase
des diplomatesitaliens,1932-1934,"Cahiersdu
du Nordà traversles rapports
monderusseet soviétique30, no. 1-2 (1989): 2-106; Graziosi,ed., Lettereda
deidiplomatici
La carestiainUcrainae nelCaucasodelNordneirapporti
Kharkov:
ontheUkraine
italiani,1932-33(Turin,1991);UnitedStatesCongressCommission
Famine,Investigation
oftheUkrainianFamine,1932-1933: Reportto Congress
D.C., 1988), see esp. appendixes;Marco Carynnyk,
LubomyrY.
(Washington,
Luciuk,andBohdanS. Kordan,eds.,TheForeignOfficeand theFamine:British
on UkraineandtheGreatFamineof1932-1933(Kingston,
Documents
Ont.,1988);
D. Zlepko,Der ukrainische
(Sonnenbühl,
1988)[a pooredition];
Hunger-Holocaust
/ ChoseFreedom:ThePersonaland PoliticalLifeofa Soviet
VictorKravchenko,
A
ed., TheBlackDeeds oftheKremlin:
Official(NewYork,1946); S. O. Pidhainy,
WhiteBook,vol. 2, TheGreatFaminein Ukrainein 1932-1933 (Detroit,1955);
MironDolot,ExecutionbyHunger:TheHiddenHolocaust(NewYork,1985),and
others.In themid-1960sDana G. Dairymplereviewedtheavailablesourcesin
"TheSovietFamineof 1932-1934,"SovietStudies15,no.3 (1964): 250-84; Soviet
on
Studies16,no. 4 (1965): 471-74. Therearenowseveralonlinebibliographies
of
onArchives
siteoftheStateCommittee
theofficial
theFamine.See, forinstance,
ukramsicoho
narodu:Holodomor1932-1933rr.,"http://www.
Ukraine:"Genotsyd
archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine.
4.
was still
This attitude
was notlimitedto the 1932-1933Famine.The profession
of E. H. Carr,who in his
dominated,and notwithoutreason,by theauthority
the
multivolume
opuson 1917-1929devotedonlya fewpages- in whichneither
of thedisasterwere
and fate,northenationalimplications
behaviors
peasants'
- tothe1921-1922Famine,whichwas centraltotheearlySovietexperianalyzed
Wealsoknewverylittleaboutthe1946-1947Famine,
enceandlaterdevelopments.
in spiteof thecentralrole Khrushchev
assignedit in his 1970 memoirs(see his
liudi,vlast'4 vols.[Moscow,1999]).See also V. F. Zima,
Vospominaniia-vremia,
i posledstviia(Moscow,1996);
GolodvSSSR 1946-1947godov:Proiskhozhdenie
O. M. Veselova,V. I. Marochko,and O. M. Movchan,Holodomoryv Ukraini
1921-1923,1932-1933,1946-1947:Zlochyny
protynarodu(Kyiv,2000).Recently
ofKyivin
starvation
theGerman-organized
hasalso investigated
KarelC. Berkhoff
1941-1942inhisHarvestofDespair: Lifeand Death in UkraineunderNazi Rule
Mass.,2004).
(Cambridge,
5.
TheSocializedAgriculture
NaumJasny,
1949);Alec Nove,
oftheUSSR (Stanford,
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
111
An EconomicHistoryof theUSSR (London,1969; 3rded., London,1992). See
also MosheLewin's 1974 article"Taking Grain':SovietPoliciesofAgricultural
inLewin,TheMakingoftheSovietSystem:
beforetheWar,"reprinted
Procurements
Russia,142-77 (New York,1985).
Essaysin theSocial Historyoflnterwar
6.
and theDilemmasofNationalLiberation:National
JamesE. Mace, Communism
in Ukraine,1918-1933(Cambridge,
Communism
Mass., 1983); SergeiMaksudov
PoterinaseleniiaSSSR (Benson,Vt.,1989).ZhoresA.
[Alexander
Babyonyshev],
Medvedev,inhisbookSovietAgriculture
(New York,1987),devotedan excellent
where
he
addresseditspan-Sovietfeaturesbut
to
the
Famine,
correctly
chapter
Social Changeand
overlookeditsnationalaspects.See also BohdanKrawchenko,
Ukraine(New York,1985).
NationalConsciousnessin Twentieth-Century
7.
In 1996,in TheGreatSovietPeasant War:Bolsheviksand Peasants,1918-1933
Mass., 1996),I triedto look forsucha solution,butdid it in a way
(Cambridge,
incorrect.
thatI nowdeeminadequateandpartially
8.
V. Danilov, R. Manning,and L. Viola, eds., Tragediia sovetskoiderevni:
i raskulachivanie,
vol. 3, Konets1930-1933 (Moscow,2001);
Kollektivizatsiia
R. W. Davies, Oleg V. Khlevniuk,and E. A. Rees, eds., The Stalin-Kaganovich
1931-36 (New Haven,2003; Russianed., Moscow,2001); R.
Correspondence,
W. Davies and StephenG. Wheatcroft,
The YearsofHunger:SovietAgriculture,
i raskulachivanie
1931-1933 (New York,2004); N. A. Ivnitskii,
Kollektivizatsiia
vlastivderevne(1928(Moscow,1996);Ivnitskii,
Repressivnaia
politikasovetskoi
1933 gg.) (Moscow,2000); V. V. Kondrashin
and Diana [D'Ann] Penner,Golod:
1932-1933 godyv sovetskoiderevne(na materialePovolzh'ia,Dona i Kubani)
ed., Holodomor1932-1933 rr.v Ukraïni:
(Samara,2002); S. V. Kul'chytsTcyi,
i
i holodna
ed., Kolektyvizatsiia
1995);
Prychynynaslidky(Kyiv,
Kul'chytsTcyi,
Ukrdinamizhdvomaviinamy
Ukraïni,1929-1933 (Kyiv, 1992); Kul'chytsicyi,
(1921-1939 rr.)(Kyiv,1999);RuslanPyrihetal.,comps.,Holod 1932-1933rokiv
na Ukraïni:Ochymaistorykiv,
movoiudokumentiv
(Kyiv,1990); V. M. Lytvyn,
ta naslidky(Kyiv,2003); Terry
ed., Holod 1932-1933 rokivv Ukraïni:Prychyny
TheAffirmative
ActionEmpire:NationsandNationalism
intheSovietUnion,
Martin,
1923-1939 (Ithaca,N.Y, 2001); FranceMeslé and JacquesVallin,Mortalitéet
causesde décèsen Ukraineau XXesiècle(Paris,2003); IuriiShapovalandValerii
holodu:PoïzdkyV Molotovai L Kahanovychav
Vasyl'iev,
Komandyry
velykoho
Ukraïnuta na Pivnichnyi
Kavkaz,1932-1933 rr.(Kyiv,2001). Timothy
Snyder's
workin progresson Polish-Ukrainian-Soviet
relationsis also veryuseful.See,
forexample,"A NationalQuestionCrossesa SystemicBorder:The Polish-Soviet
ContextforUkraine,1926-1935"(paperpresented
at thecongressof theSocietà
Italianaper lo Studiodella StoriaContemporanea,
Bolzano-Bozen,September,
2004).
9.
See M. K. Kozybaevetal.,NasiVstvennaia
i golodv Kazakhstane
v
kollektivizatsiia
1931-33gg.:Sbornik
i materialov
dokumentov
1998);IsabelleOhayon,La
(Almaty,
sédentarisation
desKazakhsdansl'URSS de Staline:Collectivisation
etchangement
social (1928-1945) (Paris,2006); NiccoloPianciola,"Faminein theSteppe:The
Collectivization
ofAgriculture
andtheKazak Herdsmen,
1928-1934,"Cahiersdu
monderusse45, no. 1-2 (2004): 137-92.
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112
GRAZIOSI
10.
In 1923,aftertheUSSR hadbeenorganizedas a Federation
ofRepublicsbasedon
titular
thepartyformally
nationalities,
adopteda setof measuresto promotethe
ofprivileges
of"backward"nationalities
thema number
development
bygranting
andrights.Korenizatsiia
was thecollectivenameof thesemeasures.See Martin,
ActionEmpire.
Affirmative
11.
In RichardPipes,ed., TheUnknown
Lenin:FromtheSecretArchive(New Haven,
1996), 76-77, one can readthepreviouslysecretdraftthesesthatLenin wrote
in November1919,"Policyin theUkraine."Amongotherthings,he demanded
cautionregarding
nationalist
strictest
observance
ofequalityof
traditions,
"greatest
theUkrainian
as wellas to"treatJewsandurbaninhabitants
languageandculture,"
in theUkrainewithan ironrod."
[thatis, largelynon-Ukrainians]
12.
on grainprocurements
ofMay 1929 already
Interestingly
enough,an OGPU report
mentions
the
authorities'
withdrawal
ofbreadandother
ignitedby
peasantprotests
theplan.As in thecivil war,hunnecessitiesfromvillagesthathad notfulfilled
gerwas thusused by theregimein orderto punishand tamepeasantsfromthe
drive.See NicolasWerthandGael Moullec,
ofthecollectivization
verybeginning
secrets
Rapports
soviétiques(Paris,1994), 112.
13.
The uncertainty
inboththeUkrainian
andespeciallytheKazakhfiguresis caused
forthenetresultoftheexodustheFaminecaused.
ofaccounting
bythedifficulty
diedaroundrailroadstationsoralongtheway;otherswereable to
Manyrefugees
orChina.
takerefugeintheRussianrepublic,
Transcaucasia,
14.
Holodomor1932-1933 rr.v
Maksudov,PoterinaseleniiaSSSR; Kul'chytsTcyi,
YearsofHunger;Meslé andVallin,Mortalitéet
Ukraini;Davies andWheatcroft,
causes de décès en Ukraine;E. M. Andreev,L. E. Darskii,and T. L. KharTcova,
istoriiaRossii,1927-1959(Moscow,1998);lu.A. Poliakov,
ed.,
Demograficheskaia
vol. 1, 1900-1939gg.(Moscow,
NaselenieRossiivXXveke:Istoricheskie
ocherki,
2000).
15.
inthespringof 1920.See A.
withlocalfamines
also started
The 1920-1922tragedy
ofthePoliticalPolice,1918-1922,"inA
Graziosi,"StateandPeasantsintheReports
inSovietHistory,
1917-1937,95-107 (Westport,
New,PeculiarState:Explorations
I
however,
which,
Conn.,2000) (in
mistakenly
quotetheold,excessiveestimates
Bertrand
M. Patenaude,TheBig Showin Bololand:
on thatFamine'smortality);
toSovietRussiain theFamineof1921 (Stanford,
TheAmericanReliefExpedition
2002).
16.
Quoted in N. A. Ivnitskii,"Golod 1932-1933 godov: Kto vinovat,"in Golod
1932-1933godov,éd. lu. N. Afanas'evandN. A. Ivnitskii
(Moscow,1995),59.
17.
is in
of theoriginof Stalin's"nationalinterpretation"
The bestreconstruction
cametotheconclusionthat
ActionEmpire.Mace too,however,
Martin,
Affirmative
crucialforsubsequent
happenedinJuly1932.
developments
something
18.
withinUkrainian
On 5 August,forinstance,theOGPU reportedthatfractions
withinUkraine"carryouttheordersofthe
communism
andnationalcommunists
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
113
andViola,
ofthePolishGeneralStaff."See Danilov,Manning,
SecondDepartment
443.
sovetskoi
derevni,
3:420-22,
Tragediia
19.
in
without
PetrovsTcyi,
directly
mentioning
Kaganovichspeaksofsuchopposition,
a letterto Stalin thathe perhaps didn't mail: "TojibKOhto coõpajmcb cneipiajibHo
fljia6ecejn>ino Bonpocyo npoeicre«eicpeTa. B npoeicrejjeicpeTaoöteflHHeHbiTpH
pa3flejiab flyxeBaiimx VKa3aHHH.IlpOTHBTpeTberopa3flejiaBHepa BO3paxcaji...,
no 2-My i 3-My
cerojnraero He 6buio, oh yexaji. Comhchhhh aaace BO3paxceHH5i
HMejiHCbTaiüKe h y..., ho b KOHU,e
kohijob MbiocTaHOBHjmcbHa stom TeKCTeb
thoseresponsible
forstealing
ochobhom."
Thesecondpointofthedecreesentenced
forced
laborif
to
or
to
five
to
ten
of
kolkhozproperty
death,
years
(meaninggrain)
werepresent.
The thirdpunishedthoseinciting
circumstances
peasants
mitigating
to leave thekolkhozywithfiveto tenyearsof forcedlabor.See O. V. Khlevniuk
et al., eds.,Stalini Kaganovich:Perepiska1931-1936gg. (Moscow,2001), 134,
256.
20.
Thepactwassignedon25 July1932. Inhis"A NationalQuestionCrossesa Systemic
maintains
thateven if Moscow,after
Border"(see note8), Snyderconvincingly
Piisudski's1926coup,perceiveditselfas opento attack,after1930Warsawgrew
thestatusquo. And it is indeed
moreand morewillingto officiallyreconfirm
- Stalin,havingresolvedthePolishthreat
- as Snydersuggests
tohis
probablethat
inorderto
ownsatisfaction
of 1932,feltfreetoexploititsremnants
bythesummer
internal
foesandsolidifyhisownposition.
removepotential
2 1.
Khlevniuk
et al., Stalini Kaganovich,213-74.
22.
PeterHolquist,"'ConductMercilessMass Terror':Decossackizationin theDon,
1919,"Cahiersdu monderusse38, no. 1-2 (1997): 127-62.
23.
Sheila Fitzpatrick,
Stalin's Peasants: Resistanceand Survivalin theRussian
(New York,1994); M. A. BezninandT. M. Dimoni,
VillageafterCollectivization
v 1930-1960-egody,"Otechestvennaia
isto"Povinnosti
rossiiskikh
kolkhoznikov
riiamo.2 (2002): 96-111.
24.
in 1963,see IuriiMurin,comp.,
Forthecorrespondence,
revealedbyKhrushchev
PisateVi vozhd':PerepiskaM. A. Sholokhova
s I.V. Stalinym:
Sbornikdokumentov
iz lichnogoarkhivaI. V Stalina(Moscow,1997),59-69.
25.
AndreaGraziosi,Bol'shevikii krest'iane
na Ukraine,1918-1919gody(Moscow,
révoltespaysannesetpolitiquesgouvernemen1997); Graziosi,"Collectivisation,
tales à traversles rapportsdu GPU d'Ukrainede février-mars
1930," Cahiers
du monderusse35, no. 3 (1994): 437-632; LynneViola, PeasantRebels under
Stalin:Collectivization
and theCultureofPeasantResistance(New York,1996);
A. Berelowitch
andV. Danilov,eds.,SovetskaiaderevniaglazamiVChK-OGPUNKVD,vol. 3, 1930-1934,bk. 1, 1930-1931(Moscow,2003).
26.
Stalinneverworriedabout"splinters
flyingwhenwood is cut"(a favorite
expresof the"statistical"school
sion). And he was perhapstheforemost
practitioner
of repression,
whichdestroyed
entirecategoriesto makesurespecific,and even
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114
GRAZIOSI
andT. Martin,
were"solved."See A. Graziosi,O. Khlevniuk,
foreseeable,
problems
"II grandeterrore,"
Storica6, no.18 (2000): 7-62.
27.
vBelorussii(Russian
decreesO sel'sko-khoziaistvennykh
See Politburo
zagotovkakh
StateArchiveofSociopoliticalHistory[hereafter
RGASPI],fond17,opis'3, delo
of 16December1932,protocolno. 126,
912,listy8,42^3, Pb [politburo
meeting]
natsional'noi
politilaVKP(b) v Belorussii(RGASPI,
p. 1); and Ob izvrashchenii
to Oleg Khlevniukforreminding
fond17,opis'3, delo 917, list7). I am grateful
meofthem.
28.
Danilov,Manning,andViola,Tragediiasovetskoi
derevni,
3:603,611.
29.
TsK VKP(b) i SNK SSSR o predotvrashchenii
See "Direktiva
massovogovyezda
in ibid.,3:635.
kresttan,"
golodaiushchikh
30.
onthestreets
ItalianandPolishconsulsinKyivwroteofcasesofdeathbystarvation
countednotin tens,butin hundreds
and in thecourtyards
daily.Most,however,
werepeasantswho had somehowbeen able to reachthecity.Theirbodieswere
quicklyremoved.
3 1.
HeHaynmio
Thesearetheoriginalwords:"To, hto rojiojjaHHe
emeoneHbMHorax
KOJIXO3HHKOB
vMy-pa3VMy, noKa3bmaeT HeyflOBjieTBopirrejibHaHnoflroroBKa k ceBy
KaK pa3 B HaHÕojiee HeõJiaronojiyHHbix paôoHax," from a report note [dopovidna
zapyska]fromKosiorto Stalinand theVKP(b) CentralCommittee,15 March
i
1933.See RuslanPyrih,
ed.,Holodomor1932-1933rokivv Ukraini:Dokumenty
materialy
(Kyiv,2007),771.
32.
Alreadyon 17 May 1933,aftervisitingtheDon region,a VTsIK (All-Russian
a slightincreasein thenumber
instructor
CentralExecutiveCommittee)
reported
forwork,a facthe explainedby theirdesireto receive
of kolkhozniks
reporting
on thebasisofdaysactuallyworked.In
distributed
thefoodthatlocal authorities
mostvillages,he added,the"conspiracyof silence"had been broken:peasants
had started
who up to a fewweeksbeforerefusedevento talkto theauthorities
to speakat meetings,
mainlyto ask forbreadin exchangeforthepromiseto work
theFamine
In thesamewayandevenmorethanin 1921-1922,therefore,
properly.
Werth
and
backs
the
servedgovernment
Moullec,
(see
policybybreaking peasants'
155).On 11 Julyan Italiandiplomatarguedprecisely
Rapportssecretssoviétiques,
thesamepointonthebasisoftheopinionsofsomeGermanagricultural
specialists
fromUkraineandKuban(see Graziosi,Lettereda Kharkov,152ff.).
returning
33.
UnitedNations
(NewYork,1948-1949),959; RaphaelLemkin,i4*w
Yearbookofthe
RuleinOccupiedEurope(Washington,
D.C., 1944),82. See J.OttoPohl,"Stalin's
Genocideagainstthe'RepressedPeoples,'"JournalofGenocideResearch2, no.
2 (2000): 267-93.
34.
N. Valentinov[Vol'skii],"Toutest permis,"Le contratsocial 10 (1966): 19-28
and77-84. As theauthornotedinthisshortbutinsightful
article,StalinandHitler
kind
oftwentieth-century
and
terrible
of
a
small
to
the
very
group peculiar
belonged
is permitted."
thoseforwhom"everything
Europeanrevolutionary,
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THE SOVIET FAMINES AND THE UKRAINIAN HOLODOMOR
115
35.
from
Thecase forgenocidehasbeenargued,forinstance
byStanislavKul'chytslcyi,
and
the
both
at
the
Famine
that
of
another
is,
view,
pan-Soviet
by
presenting
point
yet
motivated
levelas an ideologically
theUkrainian
genocide,inviewofitsbeingthe
of
in 1929bywhatwas thethencurrent
outcomeofchoicesinspired
understanding
were
that
there
The
fact
the
Soviet
tenets
and
communist
leadership.
among
ideology
from
communist
conceived,behindStalin'srevolution
ideals,howeverprimitively
to
the1931-1932crisisis difficult
aboveandthusbehindthepoliciesthatprovoked
ofwhatsuch
thatStalinwas ignorant
tomaintain
difficult
Butitis certainly
contest.
of 1921-1922hadalreadyshownthis,and
policiescouldprovoke.The experience
morethanoncethattoabandonNEP in
hadtoldTrotsky
before1927 Stalinhimself
wouldcausea crisisinthe
andcollectivization
industrialization
favorofaccelerated
such
withpeasantsandresultinfamine(a wordhe diduse).A hypothesis
relations
butI believethatStalin,
thuscontainsat leasta kernelof truth,
as KuFchytsTcyi's
its
wouldcause a crisis,didnotanticipate
thoughknowingthatthe1929offensive
andin factat theendof 1930believedhe hadwonthebattlewiththe
seriousness,
thisargument,
Therefore,
pointing
thoughin partcorrectandrightly
countryside.
economicbeliefs,endsup in my
to theroleofcommunist
ideologyanderroneous
weak.
opinionrather
36.
In a letterto theauthor,Oleg Khlevniukrightly
pointsto thefactthatmanyof
Stalin'spolicieshad whatcould be called "genocidal"features.He writes,"No
of
theapplication
itwas solvedthrough
whatproblemarosein thecountry,
matter
or nationalgroupsof
sociocultural
violencedirectedat specificand well-defined
on them,frompreventive
inflicted
Thesegroupsandthetreatment
thepopulation."
andinternational
totheinternal
variedovertimeaccording
measurestoliquidation,
theoldand
andthedespot'sownbeliefs.TheyincludedCossacks,peasants,
situation
- from
nations"
and
thevariousnationalintelligentsiias,
religiousfigures, "enemy
PolesandGermanstoJewsandChechens,etc.TheHolodomormustbe understood
againstthisbackground.
37.
motivated
thata raciallyorplot-theory
Somemaymaintain
genocide,basedon the
ofanother
the
extermination
thata nation'sora "race's"future
convinction
requires
from
originates
peopleis just as "rational."Afterall, thedecisionto exterminate
lies
difference
YetI believethatan important
whatmight
passforlogicalreasoning.
as it
involved.Stalin'swas fairlysophisticated,
in thekindofrationality
implying
oftheprocessofnationand statebuilding,
didtheuse ofa refined
peasant
theory
ofinfluencing
thepossibility
them,andso on.
behavior,
38.
A. Graziosi,"The GreatFamineof 1932-1933:ConsequencesandImplications,"
HarvardUkrainianStudies25, no. 3-4 (2001): 157-65.
39.
Needlessto say,I am notclaimingthiswas thereasonfortheSovietcollapse.
natureof its past certainlycomplicatedthelifeof
However,theunredeemable
and national
a systemthatwas slowlystrangled
by itseconomic,demographic,
to reform
it.
andthatwas finallykilledbytheattempts
contradictions
40.
JacobBurckhardt,
Meditazionisulla storiauniversale,2nd ed. (Florence,1985),
35ff.
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