PRB 08-40E
BRITISH HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Brian O’Neal
Social Affairs Division
James R. Robertson
Sebastian Spano
Legal and Legislative Affairs Division
27 February 2009
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CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS ...................................................................................... 2 A. Reforms Prior to 1997 .......................................................................................................... 2 B. Reform Developments, 1997–2003 ...................................................................................... 3 1. The January 1999 White Paper and the House of Lords Act 1999 .................................. 3 2. The Wakeham Commission and the Creation of the Appointments Commission .......... 4 3. The November 2001 White Paper.................................................................................... 5 4. The House of Commons Select Committee’s Report ...................................................... 5 5. The Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform............................................................ 6 6. The Government’s September 2003 Consultation Document, and the Reaction ............ 6 C. Reform Developments, 2003–2006 ...................................................................................... 8 1. Political Developments .................................................................................................... 8 2. Legal Developments ...................................................................................................... 11 D. Reform Developments Since 2007 ..................................................................................... 11 1. The February 2007 White Paper .................................................................................... 11 2. The July 2008 White Paper ............................................................................................ 13 3. The House of Commons Response to the July 2008 White Paper ................................ 15 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 15 CANADA
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BRITISH HOUSE OF LORDS REFORM:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The bicameral nature of the British Parliament, which consists of the House of
Lords and the House of Commons, is the model from which Canada and many other countries
derive their parliamentary systems. Tracing its genesis back to the medieval period, the British
Parliament evolved over the centuries in response to new challenges and emerging roles. This
evolution has continued, with the entry of Britain into the European Community and the
associated integration of policies and laws, and the devolution of power to subnational
assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
Institutionally, the House of Lords has generated considerable discussion and
debate in recent years. The move to reform the House of Lords was instigated by the election of
the Labour Party to government in 1997. The Party’s manifesto had contained the following
declaration:
The House of Lords must be reformed. As an initial, self-contained
reform, not dependent on further reform in the future, the right of
hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House of Lords will be ended by
statute. This will be the first stage in a process of reform to make the
House of Lords more democratic and representative. The legislative
powers of the House of Lords will remain unaltered.
The system of appointment of life peers to the House of Lords will be
reviewed. Our objective will be to ensure that over time party
appointees as life peers more accurately reflect the proportion of votes
cast at the previous general election. We are committed to
maintaining an independent cross-bench presence of life peers. No
one political party should seek a majority in the House of Lords.(1)
(1)
Labour Party manifesto, 1997, cited in Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from
Overseas, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 9.
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Originally the bastion of the landed aristocracy, hereditary lords and senior
clerics, the House of Lords underwent gradual changes throughout the 20th century. More
recently, however, the debate has focused on more fundamental reforms, including the
composition, methods of appointment, and function of the chamber. Some significant changes
have been made, but more radical options appear to have become stalled.
While most observers agree that change is due to the House of Lords, consensus
on the form that this change should take has proven elusive. Those to the left of centre argue
forcefully in favour of turning the upper chamber into a fully elected body. Others fear that this
would threaten the primacy of the House of Commons. Among the latter group, there are those
who believe that some combination of elected and appointed members represents the best
solution, increasing the legitimacy of the House of Lords while at the same time allowing the
Commons to retain its pre-eminent role. Still others push for a wholly appointed upper chamber
with an independent body responsible for nominating appointees.
Thus, the latest reform initiatives remain not only incomplete but contentious, and
an ongoing, dynamic aspect of the political debate that is taking place in Britain today. This
paper describes recent and current measures being taken to restructure the world’s oldest upper
chamber.
REFORMING THE HOUSE OF LORDS
A. Reforms Prior to 1997
Current efforts to reform the House of Lords are by no means the first; they are
merely the latest in a long series of attempts, some successful, some not.
The first major change took place with the passage of the Parliament Act 1911.
Prior to this event, the House of Lords – its membership overwhelmingly Conservative – held
unlimited power to veto legislation. This created problems for David Lloyd-George’s Liberal
government, including the blockage of its 1909 budget. In response, the government introduced
legislation (which became the Parliament Act 1911) that for the first time restricted the House of
Lords’ powers formally with respect to the House of Commons. With the new Act in place, bills
could become law after two years even without the consent of the Lords, and a category of
“money bills” was defined which the Lords could delay for only one month.
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A second change took place in 1945, when the Labour government introduced a
new Parliament Act that reduced to one year the delay that the Lords could impose on legislation
coming from the House of Commons. At the same time, a more significant change took place in
the conventions of the House of Lords: the Conservative opposition in the Lords decided not to
defeat any proposals based on explicit promises contained in Labour’s election platform. This
practice, known as the Salisbury-Addison Convention, has been followed ever since.
Until 1958, new members could be added to the House of Lords only through the
creation of new hereditary peerages; that year, the Conservative government brought in the Life
Peerages Act, giving governments the authority to appoint members, known as life peers, to the
House of Lords. The Act also opened the appointments process to women, welcoming four into
the House of Lords for the first time as life peers. Additional reform initiatives subsided until
1968, when modifications proposed by the Labour government failed because they were too
radical for conservative elements and too mild for the left. No further efforts were to take place
until 1997.
B. Reform Developments, 1997–2003
The current round of House of Lords reform proposals is part of a larger set of
constitutional changes brought about since the Labour Party won office in 1997 under then prime
minister Tony Blair. Changes such as the creation of a Scottish Parliament, Assemblies in Wales
and Northern Ireland, and the new Human Rights Act all “create a very different environment in
which the Westminster parliament must operate.”(2)
1. The January 1999 White Paper and the House of Lords Act 1999
The initiative formally began in January 1999 when then prime minister Blair
presented Parliament with a White Paper entitled Modernising Parliament: Reforming the
House of Lords. In this document, the government expressed its view that Britain needed an
upper house of Parliament, but that in its current form the Lords “suffers from a lack of
legitimacy because of its anachronistic and unrepresentative composition.”(3) The government
(2)
Russell (2000), p. 1.
(3)
Cabinet Office, United Kingdom, Modernising Parliament: Reforming the House of Lords, London,
1999, p. 1.
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listed four models that it believed provided the basis for the composition of a reformed House of
Lords: a nominated chamber; a directly elected chamber; an indirectly elected chamber; and a
mixed chamber (for which it expressed a preference).
The White Paper announced the
government’s intention to: introduce legislation removing the right of hereditary peers to sit and
vote in the Lords; create a transitional upper chamber leading to a reformed upper chamber; and
establish a royal commission to “allow an open and transparent deliberative and consultative
process involving full and wide debate of all the issues.”(4)
In the fall of 1999, Parliament adopted the House of Lords Act 1999, which
created a new, “transitional” House of Lords from which most of the 759 hereditary peers, whose
presence had been a defining feature of Britain’s second chamber, had disappeared.
The
elimination of hereditary peers had previously eluded all reform proposals since 1911 due to the
lack of agreement over what should replace the hereditary House. Even in 1999, the question of
how the replacement should be composed was far from settled, and it remains a problem today.
2. The Wakeham Commission and the Creation of
the Appointments Commission
Shortly after the release of its White Paper, the Labour government established
the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords; it was chaired by Lord Wakeham, a
former Conservative Cabinet minister, leader of the House of Commons, and leader of the House
of Lords. The Wakeham Commission was asked to consider and make recommendations on the
role and function of the House of Lords, to recommend how it should be composed, and to report
its conclusions by 31 December 1999.
In January 2000, the Wakeham Commission published its final report, A House
for the Future, in which it proposed that the House of Lords be primarily a revising and advisory
chamber that would complement the work of the House of Commons. The Commissioners
recommended that the majority of seats in the House of Lords be filled by appointment, with a
statutory appointments commission reporting to the House of Commons and responsible for
nominating all appointees, including those from the political parties.(5)
(4)
Ibid., p. 2.
(5)
For details on the work of the Royal Commission, see the Canadian Study of Parliament Group, The
Changing Nature of Second Chambers, United Kingdom: House of Lords Reform, Ottawa, 2000. The
paper is the text of a presentation given by Lord Wakeham to the Canadian Study of Parliament Group
in 2000.
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An independent Appointments Commission was created in April 2000 to take
over the nomination of non-party members of the House of Lords, and the first round of
appointments began later that month. This change represented “a significant reduction in the
Prime Minister’s powers of patronage – the first time this has been done voluntarily.”(6)
3. The November 2001 White Paper
In November 2001, the government released a second White Paper, The House of
Lords – Completing the Reform. The document set out the government’s plan for reforming the
House of Lords, to be phased in over 10 years.
The White Paper endorsed the Royal
Commission’s vision of the role of the House of Lords, and accepted its recommendation that the
House remain 80% appointed and that the Appointments Commission be given statutory status.
The government proposed to reduce the size of the upper house from over 700 members to 600,
120 of whom would be directly elected. Political parties represented in the House of Commons
would nominate a total of 332 members to the Lords, with each party assigned a number of
nominees based on its proportion of the vote in the last general election. An independent
commission would appoint 120 “People’s Peers” without political affiliation. Sixteen Church of
England bishops would sit in the House of Lords (rather than 26, as previously), and at least 12
law lords would be granted the right to sit in the House as well. At least 30% of the 600 seats
would be reserved for women, and the remaining 92 hereditary peers would lose the right to sit.
While the House of Lords would retain its ability to delay legislation (for a three-month period),
it would no longer be able to exercise a veto.
4. The House of Commons Select Committee’s Report
The House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration reviewed the
White Paper and published a report on its conclusions (The Second Chamber: Continuing the
Reform) in February 2002. The Select Committee regarded its principal task as establishing whether
there was a basis of agreement upon which reform of the Lords could proceed. In its report, it
recommended that 60% of the seats in the House of Lords be filled through elections, but called for
little change in its role and functions.
The Committee also recommended that the statutory
Appointments Commission be responsible for filling the remaining 40% of the seats (20% reserved
for members from political parties, 20% for independent members) through appointment.
(6)
Department for Constitutional Affairs (United Kingdom), Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for the
House of Lords, London, September 2003, p. 16.
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5. The Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform
The government response to the Select Committee’s report was generally positive
and proposed that the two Houses of Parliament set up a joint committee with a dual mandate.
The first part of the mandate would involve an examination of the role and functions of the
House of Lords and present a series of options for composition, on which both Houses would
vote. The second part of the mandate would involve developing a detailed reform proposal
taking those votes into account.
The Joint Committee on House of Lords Reform was appointed in July 2002 and
issued its First Report in December of that year. In that report, the Joint Committee called for
very little change in the role and functions of the House of Lords or in its relationship with the
House of Commons. The Joint Committee agreed that any new arrangement must not threaten
the supremacy of the House of Commons, and it presented seven options for composition,
ranging from 0% elected, through 20%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 80%, to 100% elected.
In January and February 2003, both the House of Lords and the House of
Commons debated the options presented by the Joint Committee.
There was no majority
backing for any of the options in the Commons, whereas the Lords overwhelmingly supported a
wholly appointed House.
In April 2003, the Joint Committee issued its Second Report. The report focused
on several areas in which the Committee believed progress was possible, including the status of
the Appointments Commission. (These areas did not, of course, include the contentious issue of
composition.) The Committee used its Second Report to request further guidance from the
government and Parliament on where it should concentrate its future work.
6. The Government’s September 2003 Consultation Document,
and the Reaction
The government responded to the Joint Committee’s Second Report in July 2003.
It welcomed the consensus that had formed around the role and functions proposed for the House
of Lords and indicated that it would produce a consultation document on the appointments process,
which it did in September 2003 (Constitutional Reform: Next Steps for the House of Lords).
Lord Falconer of Thoroton, the Lord Chancellor, announced the release of the
consultation document and some of its basic contents on 19 September 2003. Included in the
document were plans to eliminate the remaining 92 hereditary peers from the Lords and the
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creation of a new statutory Appointments Commission that would decide on the number and
timing of appointments of peers. Lord Falconer indicated that the government wanted to press
ahead with reforms to “ensure that we have a stable and sustainable House of Lords.”
The government indicated in the document that it had been hoped that the
presence of the remaining hereditary peers in the House of Lords would encourage all sides to
search for a consensus in Parliament on the way forward for the next stage of reform. Given the
lack of any such consensus, the government determined that it would consolidate the reforms
already made and that, as the retention of hereditary peers as an encouragement to find consensus
had not achieved that end, those peers would be removed from the House. The government also
indicated that its voluntary arrangements to restrict the prime minister’s rights of patronage in
relation to the Lords would be set in statute “so that a future Government is not able to resile
from them.”(7)
The proposed statutory independent Appointments Commission would be
accountable to Parliament rather than to ministers, so that people in Britain could have
confidence in the appointments process.
The reaction to these proposals was largely negative.
The leader of the
Conservative peers, Lord Strathclyde, responded by stating that “This House values its
independence, and in the past four years it has found a voice that the country is increasingly
willing to hear. We on this side of the House will not give that up lightly.” Speaking for Liberal
Democratic peers, Lord Goodhart said: “The aim of the Government is not only to remove the
hereditary Members of your Lordships’ House, but to castrate your Lordships’ House.”(8) Lord
Goodhart called the government’s actions a “betrayal.”(9)
Editorial reaction was far from positive as well. The Independent accused the
Prime Minister of “gerrymandering” and called his move “a disgrace.” The Times called an
exclusively nominated House of Lords an “inappropriate course of action,” saying that “a serious
second chamber in Britain requires a blend of election and appointment.” An editorial in The
Daily Telegraph argued that the government’s plan was “imposed by a single party from above,
to drive out some of the hardest-working peers in the House.”
(7)
Ibid., p. 28.
(8)
Hansard (House of Lords), 18 September 2003,
office.com/pa/ld200203/ldhansrd/vo030918/text/30918-03.htm.
(9)
Michael White, “Lords reform ‘betrayal’ draws fire from all sides,” The Guardian [Manchester, UK],
19 September 2003.
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
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C. Reform Developments, 2003–2006
1. Political Developments
In the Queen’s Speech opening Parliament on 26 November 2003, it was
announced that:
Legislation will be brought forward to reform the House of Lords. This
will remove hereditary peers and establish an independent Appointments
Commission to select non-party members of the Upper House.
A bill was expected in be tabled in 2004. None was forthcoming, however, and government
plans for House of Lords reform appeared to have stalled.
On 22 April 2004, the Department for Constitutional Affairs published an analysis
of the responses to the September 2003 consultation paper on House of Lords reform
(Constitutional Reform:
(10)
Consultation).
next steps for the House of Lords – Summary of Responses to
Lord Falconer, the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, outlined the
government’s September proposals, and the reasons for not proceeding with the bill, but
indicated how the process of Lords reform would continue:
… Constitutional reform: Next steps for the House of Lords … set out
the Government’s proposals for taking forward the next incremental
stage of reform to the second chamber. The consultation paper
proposed to remove the remaining hereditary peers, establish a new
independent statutory Appointments Commission, and bring the
provisions on disqualification into line with those of the Commons.
In the face of determined refusal by the opposition to support these
reasonable reforms, the Government has subsequently decided not to
pursue this legislation at this stage.
Instead, the Government intends to reflect on the possible options for
longer-term reform of the House of Lords, and to encourage wideranging debate on the best way forward.
The Department for Constitutional Affairs received a total of 222 responses to its
consultation paper. There was widespread support for a statutory appointments commission with
accountability arrangements resembling those of the Electoral Commission (i.e., accountable to
Parliament rather than to ministers).
(10) Department for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform: next steps for the House of Lords –
Summary of Responses to Consultation, London, April 2004,
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/holref/holresp.htm.
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A working group of Labour peers published a report on the role and powers of the
House of Lords in July 2004 (Reform of the Powers, Procedures and Conventions of the House
of Lords). During the Labour Party’s annual conference in September 2004, Lord Falconer
outlined the government’s plans for reform of the House of Lords. He indicated that, if reelected, the government would bring forward a bill to reshape the Lords in the first session of the
new Parliament. In addition to removing the remaining 92 hereditary peers, the bill would
clarify the powers of the Lords and limit the Lords’ ability to delay legislation.
Most
significantly, Lord Falconer announced that it would include further changes to the composition
of the Lords.
In January 2005, the Prime Minister, in a written statement to the House of
Commons, set a limit on his power to nominate peers directly. There were reports of divisions in
the Cabinet over the direction that House of Lords reform should take. For his part, the Prime
Minister accepted the need for a debate about “the future composition of the House of Lords,”
but confirmed his opposition to a hybrid part-elected, part-appointed House of Lords. He
reiterated that debate would continue, and that he had made it clear that it should be a free-vote
issue.
The House of Lords debated the report of the Labour peers’ working group in
January 2005. Subsequently, a cross-party group of MPs put forward proposals for reform of the
House of Lords, with the aim of reinvigorating the reform process and developing a consensus.
Reforming the House of Lords: Breaking the Deadlock set out the case for a majority of
members to be elected. A draft bill to achieve this result was included in the report.
In the 2005 general election, all the major parties included statements on House of
Lords reform in their manifestos. The Labour Party pledged: “In our next term we will
complete the reform of the House of Lords so that it is a modern and effective revising
Chamber.” The Party was re-elected, and, in the Queen’s Speech for the 2005–2006 session, the
government announced that it would “bring forward proposals to continue the reform of the
House of Lords.” Although discussion on the subject continued, no concrete proposals or
initiatives were announced. In February 2006, the Constitution Unit, part of University College
London’s School of Public Policy, published a report suggesting that the House of Lords was
becoming increasingly confident and assertive in its behaviour: The House of Lords in 2005: A
More Representative and Assertive Chamber?(11)
(11) Meg Russell and Maria Sciara, The House of Lords in 2005: A More Representative and Assertive
Chamber?, The Constitution Unit, London, February 2006, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitutionunit/publications/unit-publications/132.html.
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In March 2005, it was announced that the Metropolitan Police Service was to
conduct an inquiry into allegations that offences had been committed under the Honours
(Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925. This development followed allegations that honours had been
awarded improperly – the so-called “cash for peerages” controversy.
Following a Cabinet shuffle on 5 May 2006, the Leader of the House of
Commons, Jack Straw, assumed the lead responsibility for House of Lords reform.
On
25 April 2006, a motion proposing the creation of a joint committee to consider codification of
the key conventions on the relationship between the two Houses of Parliament had been agreed
to by the Lords. The motion was agreed to by the Commons on 10 May 2006.
Concurrently with the creation of the Joint Committee on Conventions, Mr. Straw
announced that he was consulting with the political parties, as well as with the cross-benchers
(members of the Lords who are not aligned with any particular party) and the bishops, on reform.
Mr. Straw tabled draft plans for reform of the Lords on 22 October 2006, proposing a 50%
elected chamber. He proposed that the current 741-member Lords be cut back to 450 and that all
members, whether appointed or elected, should hold office for a non-renewable fixed term of 12
years, the equivalent of three parliamentary terms.
Elections would be by proportional
representation. Life peerages would be abolished, and members would be paid a salary (unlike
the present receipt of a per diem) and would be expected to work full-time. Mr. Straw did not
deal explicitly with transitional arrangements, but his proposals would take as long as 15 years to
come fully into effect. Mr. Straw said that he would publish a White Paper shortly. It was
reported that a likely next step would be to ask MPs soon after Christmas 2006 to vote in
principle on what proportion of the upper chamber should be elected. Initial reaction seemed to
be cautiously optimistic.
Just over a week later, the Joint Committee on Conventions published its report,
which stated that peers should not be able to propose “wrecking amendments” to government
bills if those amendments would change manifesto intentions. Furthermore, line-by-line scrutiny
of manifesto legislation should be carried out in “reasonable time” so that MPs have the
opportunity to look at the bill and any changes the Lords might wish to make. The Committee
said that the traditions could be codified in resolutions of the two Houses; but it also made clear
that, should the Lords become an elected chamber, the entire issue of codification would need to
be re-examined.
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At about the same time, the Liberal Democrat Party unveiled plans for the House
of Lords to be replaced by a modern senate.
The new chamber would be composed of
450 members, of which all except 90 would be elected; and it would be renamed “the Senate” in
2011, with all hereditary peers leaving by that date. Elections would take place by thirds every
four years, by single transferable vote. There would be an end to the automatic places for
Church of England bishops, and the Appointments Commission would be responsible for
ensuring suitable faith representation.
2. Legal Developments
In June 2003, the government issued a series of consultation papers setting out its
proposals to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor and to create a Supreme Court and a statutory
Judicial Appointments Commission. The perceived need to provide greater separation of powers
between the legislature and the judiciary was a major factor in the proposals.
In February 2004, the Constitutional Reform Bill was introduced in the House of
Lords; it received Royal Assent on 24 March 2005. The office of the Lord Chancellor continues
in existence, following a government defeat on this matter in the House of Lords. The office is
no longer the official head of the judiciary, however, and the creation of the Judicial
Appointments Commission removes its responsibility in this regard. In addition, the holder of
the office does not need to be a peer, a judge or a lawyer.
Among numerous consequential changes, the Lord Chancellor is no longer
required to act as Speaker of the House of Lords. The Lords had appointed a committee to
consider the role of Speaker in 2003. Its report – The Speakership of the House of Lords – was
published on 18 November 2003. An election for Lord Speaker was held on 28 June 2006, and
on 4 July 2006 it was announced that Baroness Hayman had been elected the first Lord Speaker.
D. Reform Developments Since 2007
1.
The February 2007 White Paper
In February 2007, the government released a White Paper entitled The House of
Lords: Reform. Several options for a reformed House were presented in the paper:
•
an all-appointed House;
•
an all-elected House; and
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•
a hybrid, consisting of: 50% of members elected by a form of proportional representation;
30% appointed by political parties; and 20% appointed by a non-partisan appointments
commission.
The government’s preference was the hybrid option. The government suggested
that the size of a reformed House should be 540 members. Elections would be held at the same
time as elections to the European Parliament, and would use the same electoral boundaries.
Members would be elected by means of the partially open party-list method of proportional
representation. The 20% of members appointed by a non-partisan appointments commission
would be considered non-political appointees, with no party affiliation.
A statutory
appointments commission would be created to make these appointments.
The paper maintains that longer, non-renewable terms of office would ensure a
more independent-thinking House with a longer-term focus, and would preserve the distinctive
role for which the current House is noted. Longer terms are also considered important in
maintaining a sufficient degree of independence from the executive. To further these ends, the
paper argues for longer, non-renewable terms for both elected and appointed members. It
proposes that elections for the elected component of a reformed House would be staggered, with
one-third of members being introduced at each European Parliament election. At the same time,
one-third of appointed members would be replaced at each election. On this basis, the term for
both elected and appointed members would be 15 years. Members who finished their term in the
House of Lords would be prohibited from contesting a seat in the House of Commons for a
minimum period of time. In addition, members who had been elected to a reformed House could
not subsequently be appointed, while former appointees could not stand for election.
The paper proposes a reduced representation for the Church of England in a
reformed House. It also proposes breaking the link between a life peerage and membership in a
reformed House, as such a link would be inconsistent with the notion of fixed terms. The
government presents options for the removal of the remaining hereditary peers:
either by
removing their right to sit and vote (by cancelling the relevant provisions of the House of Lords
Act 1999), or by placing hereditary peers in the same position as life peers. There are currently
92 sitting hereditary peers as a result of the passage of the House of Lords Act 1999.
The government emphasizes in its report that the aim of reforming the House of
Lords is to ensure a complementary role for the House alongside the House of Commons, by
preserving its traditional role of careful scrutiny and revision of legislation and not merely
rubber-stamping the work of the House of Commons. A key principle to be preserved, however,
is the primacy of the House of Commons.
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In accordance with the government’s commitment in its 2005 general election
manifesto, Parliament held a free vote on the reform proposals in the White Paper.
On
7 March 2007, the House of Commons voted 337 to 224 in favour of a 100% elected House of
Lords. On 14 March 2007, the House of Lords voted 361 to 121 in favour of a 100% appointed
House. These free votes were non-binding on the government.
2. The July 2008 White Paper
Following the free votes on the February 2007 White Paper, the cross-party group
that had been formed following the 2005 general election to address reform of the House of
Lords was reconvened. The cross-party group consultations were followed by another White
Paper released by the government in July 2008: An Elected Second Chamber: Further reform of
the House of Lords.
As with the earlier White Paper, the primacy of the House of Commons was
asserted as a first principle in any reform of the House of Lords. Nonetheless, a reformed House
should continue to play a complementary role with the House of Commons and maintain its
traditional role in scrutinizing legislation, conducting investigations and holding government to
account.
At the outset, the paper states that a new name for a reformed House should be
created to reflect the fact that a reformed House would no longer be composed of Lords alone,
but primarily or entirely of elected and appointed members. No specific name for a reformed
House is recommended, but the term “reformed second chamber” is used throughout the
document to refer to a reformed House.
The 2008 White Paper recommends a wholly or mainly elected reformed second
chamber. Unlike the government’s 2007 paper, no specific breakdown is proposed between
appointed and elected members. The 2008 document states that elected and appointed members
would serve three non-renewable terms totalling 12 to 15 years. Elections of members would be
held at the same time as elections to the House of Commons – not, as recommended in the earlier
White Paper, at the time of elections to the European Parliament. Elections would take place in
three “tranches,” with one-third being elected at each election. Some fine-tuning in the form of a
“rider” is proposed to deal with shortened Parliaments of less than four or five years. If a general
election were to be held less than three years after the first general election in which a member is
elected, the second general election would not count towards the three electoral terms to be served.
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No recommendation as to the type of voting process is proposed.
The
government indicates that further consideration will be given to the options of using a first-pastthe-post system or a form of proportional representation.
The paper proposes no specific size for a reformed second chamber, apart from
indicating that its size should be reduced gradually over time to make it smaller than the House
of Commons. The Conservative Party proposes a second chamber of 250–300 members. The
government has indicated that it would welcome other views on the size of a reformed second
chamber.
A transitional phase of three electoral cycles would be put in place during which
each “tranche” of new members would join the reformed second chamber. Existing peers would
continue in their traditional roles during this period. Three options are presented in the paper on
the timing of the removal of peers:
•
Option one: all life peers would continue to be members of the second chamber for life,
while sitting and voting rights for hereditary peers would be removed at the point at which
the third group of new members is elected or appointed.
•
Option two: all existing peers would be removed by the time of the arrival of the third group
of new members.
•
Option three: existing peers would depart in three groups coinciding with the arrival of each
new group of elected or appointed members.
The government does not indicate a preference for any particular option and indicates it would
welcome comments on the choice of options.
Eligibility requirements would be imposed for membership in a reformed second
chamber. There would be a minimum age of 18 and no maximum age. Members would have to
be British, qualifying Commonwealth or Republic of Ireland citizens. Individuals with certain
criminal convictions or electoral fraud convictions, those subject to a bankruptcy restriction
order, those holding full-time judicial offices, mental health detainees, and non-UK taxpayers
would be ineligible for membership in a reformed second chamber. In addition, previously
elected members would not be eligible for appointment, and vice versa.
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3. The House of Commons Response to the July 2008 White Paper
In a short report dated 21 January 2009, the House of Commons Public
Administration Select Committee responded to the July 2008 White Paper. The report, entitled
Response to White Paper:
appointments process.
“An Elected Second Chamber”, however, addresses only the
The principal concern in the report is the integrity of the process,
particularly in light of the “cash for peerages” controversy. The report calls for a House of Lords
Appointments Commission that is independent of the prime minister. The July 2008 White
Paper proposed an appointments commission with a statutory basis (unlike the current
commission, which is a creature of Cabinet), but which would be accountable to the prime
minister. The Select Committee considers this unacceptable, recommending instead that an
appointments commission be accountable to Parliament. The Committee acknowledges that a
fully or largely elected second chamber would render its proposal largely obsolete, but notes that
during the transition period, which could be lengthy, a fully independent appointments
commission is essential.
The Committee also proposes that the government should take immediate steps to
change the process by which members of the House of Lords are currently appointed by the
House of Lords Appointments Commission. The Committee proposes that parties supply a long
list of nominees to the Commission and that the Commission base its selections on standards of
probity and public interest.
It also recommends that the Commission be empowered to
determine the balance of the parties in the House.
CONCLUSION
The current attempt to reform the House of Lords has managed to achieve what
previous efforts had tried to do and failed – namely, to dramatically reduce the number of
hereditary peers who may sit and vote in Parliament’s upper house. Since the initial flurry of
activity, however, the initiative has become bogged down and steeped in acrimony. There has
been no shortage of proposals, and some observers have argued that the 2005 “cash for peerages”
scandal further fuelled the mood for reform; but there appears to be little likelihood of consensus
developing.