ill t
tl
lvlodern Nclndemocratic Regimes
3
I
ModernNondemocraticRegimes
thusthe modalcategoryof regimetypein the moder'r
Authoritarian-regimes.were
in transitionto a differ^-r,{ second,autnorttarianregimeswerenot necessarily
*"-'li"lr
reeime.As Linz'sstudiesof Spainin the rgtosand earlyr96osshowed,
of an authoritarianregime-limited pluralism,
iljl1.,t* it.i"nctiue dimensions
andweakmobilization-couldcohere
leadership,
]jllrr""ft",*-ewhat constrained
systemthatwasrelativelystable'3
integrated
i.]'. r""i, o.riod asa reinforcingand
t"'fu'"i"ogi.s
In
to researchers.
"
riseor fall accordingto their analyticusefulness
become
not
only
has
^,,, i,iJnri."t, the existingtripartite regimeclassification
vv-
L
l
Illiii
Drn,o.oorlc
transition and consolidationinvolvethe movement from a
nondemocratic to a democratic regime. However, specific polities may vary immenselyin the paths availablefor transition and the unfinished rasksthe new democracy must facebefore it is consolidated.Our central endeavorin the next two
chaptersis to show how and why much-though of coursenot all-of such variation can be explained by prior regime type.
For over a quarter of a century the dominant conceptual framework amons
analystsinterested in classiffing the different political systemsin the world has
been the tripartite distinction betweendemocratic,authoritarian,and totalitarian regimes.New paradigms emergebecausethey help analystsseecommonalities and implications they had previously overlooked.When Juan Linz wrote his
1964article'An Authoritarian Regime:Spain,"he wanted to call attention to the
fact that betweenwhat then were seenasthe two major stablepolitical poles-the
democratic pole and the totalitarian pole-there existeda form of polity that had
its own internal logic and was a steadyregime type. Though this type was nondemocratic, Linz argued that it was fundamentally different from a totalitarian
regime on four key dimensions-pluralism, ideology,leadership,and mobilization. This was of coursewhat he termed an authoritarianregime.He definedthem
as: "political systemswith limited, not responsible,political pluralism, without
elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities,without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their deveiopment, and in which a leader or occasionallya small group exercisespower within
formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones."1
In the r96os,as analystsattempted to construct categorieswith which to cor.l.lpare and contrast all the systemsin the world, the authoritarian categoryproved
useful.As the new paradigm took hold among comparativists,two somewhatsurprising conclusions emerged. First, it became increasingly apParent that more
regimeswere "authoritarian" than were"totalitarian" or "democratic" combined.2
t. JuanJ. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime:The Caseof Spain,"in Erik Allardt and Yrj0 Littunen, eds'
'fransactions the WestermarckSociety,r96
of
ldeologiesand Party Systems(Helsinki:
il, z9r-342.
Clettvages,
(New York: Free
Politic,jrStudiesin PoliticalSociologT
Stein
Rokkan,
eds.,
L'fdss
in
Erik
Allardt
and
Reprinied
Press,rgTo),25181,374-81.Pagecitationswill referto the r97ovolume' The definition is found on :55
z. See,for example,the data containedin footnotes4 and 5 in this chapter'
ililil
39
theorists and practitioners than it once was' it has also
[r, ,*Af to democratic
from the im^" obstacle.Part of the casefor typology changeproceeds
;;;
if we were
roughly,
Very
to
analyze.
we
need
universe
of the empirical
;;.;;i;"r
be
conceivably
could
many
countries
how
mid-r98os,
ioo-1|;gat rhe worldof the
;aa-ocracies" of ten years' duration? And how many countries were very
auUaa
period?Answershave,of course'an in.ior" a the totalitarian pole for that entire
the evaluation of the evii.r.",ry subjectivedimension, particularly as regards
used in the typology'
d.n.. us.d to classif' countries along the different criteria
to measure
Fortunately,however,two independently organized studies attempt
liberties.a
most of the countries in the world as to their political rights and civil
degree of
very
high
is
a
there
and
explicit,
are
in
the
studies
The criteria used
tripartite
traditional
the
and
studies
these
If
we
use
agreementin the results.
nonof
modern
percent
than
that
more
90
regimetype distinction' it turns out
space-"authortypological
same
democratic regimes would have to share the
itarian."s Obviously, with so many heterogeneouscountries sharing the same
,
Party and the
3. Seeluan i. Linz, "From Falangeto Nlovimiento-Organizacion:The SpanishSingle
FrancoRegime,1936-rg68,"
in Samue'iP Huntington and ClementFI. Moore, eds.,Autfuoritarian Politicsitr
ModernSiciety:The Dynamicsol' Established
One-PartySystens(New York: BasicBooks' r97o),128-203.
Also seeLinz,lOpposition in anj under an i\uthoritarian Regime:The Caseof Spain,"in RobertA' Dahl'
ed., Regimes
and ()ppositions(New Haven: \hle University Press,t91), r7r-259.
4. One effort *as by Michael Coppedgeand WolfgangReinicke,who attenlptedto operationalizethe
eight"institutionalgua,artees"tnat ifoUeit Dahl arguedrvererequiredfor a polyarchy.Thev assignedvaluesto 137countries-ona polyarchyscale,basedon their assessment
of political conditionsas of mid-r985.
The resultsare availablein'A l.leasure of Polyarchy,"paper prepared for the Conferenceon Measuring Dein Raymocracy,Hoover Institution, StanfordUniversity,May 2Z-28,1988;and their'A Scaleof Polyarchy,"
(New York: Freemond D. Gastil,ed.. Freedomin the World:PoliticalRislttsand Civil Liberties,1987-1988
dom House,r99o),ror-28. Roberl A. Dahl'sseminaltlis ussit>nof the "institutional guarantees"
neededtirr
polyarchy is found in Dahl, Polyarchy:Participation and Oppositittn (New Haven: Yale University Press,
r9n ), r_r6.
The other major eftort to operationalizea scaleof dernocracyis the annual FreedomHouseevaluation
ofvirtually all rhe counrriesofihe world. The advisor,vpanelhas included in recentyearssuch scholarsas
SeymourMartin Lipset,Giovanni Sartori,and Lucian W. Pye.The value they assignedon their scalefor
eachyear from 1978-1987
can be ibund in Gastll,Freetlomin the World, 54-05.
D.
^ 5 .W e a r r i v ea t t h i sc o n c l u s i o ni n t h e f o l l o u , i n gf a s h i o nT. h e a n n u r l s u r v e yc ( ) o r d i n a t ebdv R a y m o n d
castil employsa
7-point scaleof the political riglts and civil libertiesdirnensionsof democracy.with the
helpof a panet
of riholnrr, Gastil,from rgZBto i982,classifiedannually167coutrtrieson this scale.For our
Purposes
ifwe call the universeof democraciesthosecountriesthat from 1978to 1982neverreceiveda score
ol lower than
:. on the Gastilscalefor political rights and 3 for civil liberty,we come up with 4z countries.
r hls is very
closeto the number of countriesthat Coppedgeand Reinickeclassifyas"full polyarchies"in
rheirindependent
rvewill
studyof the year1985.Sinceour intercstis in hou' countriesbecomedenrocracies
llli'rl
I
4o
Tlrcor et i c ttl O ver y i e',,v
typological "starting place," this typology of regime type cannot tell us much
about the extremelysignificant range of variation in possibletransition paths and
consolidation tasksthat we believe in fact exists.Our purpose in the rest of this
chapter is to reformulate the tripartite paradigm of regime type so as to make it
nrore helpful in the analysisof trnnsition paths and consolidationfasks.We proposethereforea revisedtypology, consistingof "democratic,""authoritarian," "totalitarian," "post-totalitarian," and "sultanistic" regimes.
DsN,{ocRecy
To start with the democratic type of regime, there are of course significant
variations within democracy.However,we believethat such important categories
as"consociationaldemocracy" and "majoritarian democracy" are subtypesof democracy and not different regime types.6Democracyas a regime type seemsto
us to be of sufficient value to be retained and not to need further elaboration at
this point in the book.
IOTAI-ITAR IANISM
We also believethat the concept of a totalitarian regime as an ideai type, witir
some closehistorical approximations, has enduring value. If a regime has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated,guiding, utopian ideology,has intensiveand extensivemobilization, and has a leadershipthat rules, often charismatically,with undefined limits
and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and nonelites alike, then it
seemsto us that it still makeshistoricaland conceptualsenseto call this a regime
with strong totalitarian tendencies.
If we acceptthe continued conceptual utility of the democratic and totalitarian regime types, the area in which further typological revision is needed concernsthe regimesthat are clearlyneither democraticnor totalitarian.By the earl,v
excludethose4z countriesfrom our universeof analysis.This rvould leaveus with rr5 countriesin the untversewe want to explore.
Ifwe then decideto call long-standing"totalitarian"regimesthoseregimesthat receivedthe lowestpossiblescoreon political rights and civil libertieson the Gastilscalefor eachyear in the r978-r987period.ne
Thus, ifone usedthe tratliwould havea total of nine countriesthat fall into the totalitarianclassification.
tional typology,the Gastilscalewould inpll' that rr6 of r:5 countries,or 92.8percentof the universeunder
analysis,would have to be placed in the sanretypological space.SeeGastll, Freedonrin the Wsrld, 54-65
Patternsof Ma'
6. For discussionsof variationswithin democracy,seeArendt Lijphart, Denrocracies:
joritarittttand Consensus
Governnrentit1Tweilty-oneCountries(Nerv Haven:YaleUniversityPress,19{t4)'
esp.r-36; Philippc C. Schmitterand Terrv Lynn Karl, "What f)enl(rcr.1.)'[s . . . aud Is Not," /orrrnaloJDcmocricy 2.,no. z (Summer 1991):Z5-88ianrl JuanJ. Linz, "Changeand Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies,"in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds.,ReexaminingDemocracy(Newbur)'
Park,N.J.:SagePublications,r99z),t8z-2o7.
Modern Nondemocratic Reqimes
4)
of countriesthat were clearlytotalitarianor were attempting
rogos,the number
'ri"rir^tsuch
regimeshad in fact been declining for some time' As many Sovietin 1953,they no longer con]l* ,.ni..r began to change after Stalin's death
the totalitarian model, as researchshowed. This change createdconZi*,"[r
that the totalitarian category itself was
ll"r""f confusion. Some scholarsargued
regimes authoritarian. Neither of
post-Stalinist
to
call
wanted
Others
;rt;;
seemsto us fully satisfactory'Empirically, of course,most of the
,i.r.
"pp."".hes
in the r98oswere not totalitarian. However,the "Soviet type"
i""i"-ii,p, systems
with the exception of Poland (seechap. rz), could not be understood in
,.*-*,
them in the categoryof an authoritarianregime.
it Zi, airtin.tivenessby including
to regime charThe literature on Soviet-typeregimescorrectly drew attention
and opened up promising new studies
acteristicsthat were no longer totalitarian
was "institutional pluralism."THowperspectives
of
these
One
of poliry-making.
politie s pluralistic missed some
post-stalinist
judgment,
to
call
these
eu.r,in our
hardly
be called pluralistic. Pluralist
that
could
features
extremely important
"group
explored by such writers
variant
theory"
the
democratictheory, especially
in civil societywho
individuals
with
starts
asArthur Bentley and David Truman,
autonomous
are
relatively
groups
that
enterinto numerous freely formed interest
attempt
to aggregate
and often criss-crossing.The many groups in civil society
their interestsand compete against each other in political society to influence
statepolicies.However,the "institutional pluralism" that some writers discerned
in the SovietUnion was radically different, in that almost all the pluralistic conflict occurred in regime-createdorganizationswithin the party-state itself. Conceptually,therefore, this form of competition and conflict is actually cioser to
what political theorists call bureaucraticpolitics than it is to pluralistic politics.s
Ratherthan forcing theseSoviet-typeregimesinto the existing typology of totalitarian,authoritarian, and democratic regimes,we believe we should expand
that typology by explicating a distinctive regime type that we will callpost-totalitarian.eMethodologically,we believethis categoryis justified becauseon each of
the four dimensions of regime type-pluralism, ideology,leadership,and mobi, 7'The strongestadvocateof an institutionalpluralist perspectivefor the analysisof Sovietpoliticswas
ferry F. Hough,ispeciallyin his The SovietLlnionanti Sicial'Science
Harvard
Theory(Cambridge,N1:rss.:
unrversitypress,
r977).
t'Th" pioneeringcritique of the institutional pluralist approachto Soviet politics is Archie Brown,
,,.,
Poweran"dthe ioviet PoliticalSystem:A ComparaiiuePerspective,"
in SusanGrossSolomon,
^vturalism,
eo" Pluralkm
in the SovietUriion(London: Macmillan,rq83),61-lo/. A usefulreviewof the literature,with
to authorssuchas Gordon Skilling,Archie llrown, and Jeiry Hough, is found in GabrielAlmond
il::ltt:"
Roselle),"Model-Fitting in Corimunism Srudies,"in his'A Disciptine
Divided: Schools
and Sects
)ltjn,h"*
tn Politicalscience
(Newbury park, balif.: Sagepublications,tggo),1s7-72.
luln Linz, in his "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,"in Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W
o^,-?'
rorsbY,eds.,Handbookof
(Reading,Mass.:Aidison-WesleyPublishingCo.,tgT5),3:t75-4tr,
Politicalscience
::,'1,t$ what he called"post-totalitarianauthoritarian regimes,"seei36-to. Here,with our tbcus on the
;;::i?t" pathsto demociarictransition and the tasksof democraticconsolidation,it seemsto both of us
trear post-totalitarianregimesnot asa subtypeof authoritarianism,but asan ideal
il:lil,Til."
.,:tl.to
t|i'll
rll
lri
I
lization-there can be a post-totalitarian ideal type that is different from a totalitarian, authoritarian, or democratic ideal type. Later in this chapterwe will also rearticulatethe argument for consideringsultanismasa separateideal-typeregime.ro
To stateour argument in bold terms, we first presenta schematicpresentation
of how the five ideal-type regimes we propose-democratic, totalitarian, posttotalitarian, authoritarian, and sultanistic-differ from eachother on eachone of
the four constituent characteristicsof regime type (table 3.r). In the following
chapterwe make explicit what we believeare the implications of eachregime type
for democratictransition paths and the tasksof democraticconsolidation.
P o s r - T r l r e L rr A RI A N I s M
Our task here is to explore how, on eachof the four dimensions of regime type,
post-totalitarianism is different from totalitarianism, aswell as different from authoritarianism.rl Where appropriate we will also call attention to some undertheorized characteristicsof both totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes that
produce dynamic pressuresfor out-of-type change.We do not subscribeto the
view that either type is static.
a s, t a b l e3 . r i m p l i e s ,c a n e n c o m p a sas c o n t i n u u m v a r y i n g
Post-totalitarianism
from "early post-totalitarianism,"to "frozen post-totalitarianism,"to "mature posttotalitarianisml'Early post-totalitarianismis very closeto the totalitarian ideal
type but differs from it on at leastone key dimension, normally some constraints
on the leader.There can be frozenpost-totalitarianismin which, despitethe persistent tolerance of some civil society critics of the regime, almost all the other
control mechanismsof the party-state stay in place for a long period and do not
evolve (e.g., Czechoslovakia,from ry77 to rg8g). Or there can be mature posltotalitarianism in which there has been significant changein all the dimensions
of the post-totalitarian regime exceptthat politically the leading role of the official party is still sacrosanct(e.g., Hungary from r98z to 1988,which eventually
evolvedby late 1988very closeto an out-of-type change).
Concerning plurnlint, the defining characteristicof totalitarianism is that
there is no political, economic,or social pluralism in the polity and that pre-
ill
i
Modern NondemocraticRegimes
TheoreticalOverview
to. For )uan Linz'sfirst discussionof sultanism,seeibid, zlq-63. For a more completediscussio:tof strltanism, see H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, "sultanistic Regimes,"paper preparedfor a conferenceol
sultanisticregimesat Harvard Universityin Novemberr99o.ihe resultsof the ionference,which included
pup.r. on .uih .ountries asIran, the Philippines,the Dominican Republic,and Romania,will be publislrecl
in a volume editedby H. E. Chehabiand ]uan J.Linz.
n. We believethat readerscan readilyseefor themselveshow post-totalitarianregimesare not denltlWe want to makeclearthat for our analyticpurcratic regimes,so we will not discussthis point separately.
p o s e s i n t h i s b o o k t h a t t h e t e r n tp o s t - t o t a l i t a r i a n r e f e r s t o a t y p e o f n o n d e n o c r a t i c r e g i m e b e f o r e t h e t r a l l iitior to democracl'.In this chapter our main concern is with ideal types. However, in chapter 15'
"Post-Communisnt'sPrehistories,;
we provide ample empiricarlevidenceof what a totalitarian or posltotalitarian (in conrrastto an authorita;ian) legacymeansfor eachof the five arenasnecessaryfo. u a,,"solidateddemocracythat rveanalyzedin tabler.r in this book.
43
repressed.
In
:-*ino-sourc€Sof pluralism havebeen uprooted or systematically
quite
political
pluralism
often
and
regime there is some limited
llr"ii"tir"tian
social pluralism. In an authoritarian regime' many of the
economic-and.
l*."ri".
social
]-l"Lif.stations of the limited political pluralism and the more extensive
pluralism predatethe authoritarian regime.How doespluralism in
,nj..onorl.
with the near absenceof pluralism in totalitarl^*-totutiturian regimescontrast
pluralism
of authoritarian regimes?
limited
and the
L"n,.gir.t
'*
there
is a much more important and complex
In irature post-totalitarianism,
nlevof institutional pluralisn-rwithin the state than in totalitarianism. Also, in
post-totalitarianismnormally has a much more sigiolrtur, to totalitarianism,
pluralism, and in mature Post-totalitarian there is often
social
of
degree
nificant
"parallel culture'" Evidenceof this is found in
discussionof a "secondculture" or a
samizdatliteraturewith multi-issue journals
underground
robust
a
as
suchthings
This growing pluralism is simultotalitarianism.r2
under
possible
not
of the sort
for
of
vulnerability
the post-totalitarian regime and
source
taneouslya dynamic
opposition. For examfor
an
emerging
democratic
a dynamicsourceof strength
ple,this "secondculture" can be sufficiently powerful that, eventhough leadersof
the secondculture will frequently be imprisoned, in a mature post-totalitarian
regimeopposition leaderscan generatesubstantialfollowings and createenduring oppositional organizations in civil society.At moments of crisis, therefore,
a mature post-totalitarian regirne can have a cadre of a democratic opposition
basedin civil societywith much greater potential to form a democratic political
oppositionthan would be availablein a totalitarian regime.A mature post-totalitarian regime can also feature the coexistenceof a state-plannedeconomy with
extensivepartial market experiments in the state sector that can generatea "red
bourgeoisie"of statesectormanagersand a growing but subordinate private sectol especiallyin agriculture, commerce and services.
- However,in a post-totalitarian regime this social and economic pluralism is
differentin degreeand kind from that found in an authoritarian regime. It is difterentin degreebecausethere is normally more socialand economic pluralism in
an authoritarianregime (in particular
there is normally a more autonomousprivatesector,somewhat
greaterreligious fieedom, and a greater amount of aboveground cultural
prodrltion). The difference in kind is typologically even more
hportant. In a post-totalitarian
society, the historical referenceboth for the
ttota.rs oi the regime and the opposition is the previous totalitarian
f-oYtt
1qime.-nf definition, thsexistence of a pievious totalitarian regime means that
the pre-exisring sources of responsible and organizeJ pluralism have
llu
:i
ueeneliminated
or repressedand a totalitarian order has been established.There
ts therefore
an active .ffo., o, "detotalitarianization" on the pirrt of oppositional
€XlSru'O
no#:13-"*u.ple.
in maturc post-totalitarianHungary the most influential sLtntiztltrtpttblicatton,Beszlli),
fr.Jiil:ji,"a
iiJ::1""::fl1-l$::l:ff;TJ?ilT:'^'
,#H:f
ffi,""""-"i::i:il:::itJ:f
Table
3 1 MajorModern
Begime
ldealTypes
andTheirDefining
Characteristics
r
CharacteristicDemocracy
Authoritarianism
Pluralism
political
Responsible
pluralism
reinforced
by
extensive
areasof
pluralist
autonomy
in
econ0my,
soclety,
and
internal
lifeof
organizations.
Legally
protected
pluralism
consistent
with "societal
corporatism"
butnot
"statecorporatism."
Political
system
with
No significant
economic,
limited,
notresponsible social,
or political
political
pluralism.
party
Often pluralism.
Official
quiteextensive
social
has de jure and de facto
pluralism. monopoly
andeconomic
of powerParty
In authoritarian
regimes haseliminated
almostall
mostof pluralism
pretotalitarian
pluralism.
had
rootsin societybefore
No spacefor second
the establishment
of the
economy
or parallel
regime.0ftensome
society.
spacefor semiopposition
ldeology
Extensive
intellectual
Political
system
without
c0mmrtment
t0
elaborate
andguiding
citizenship
andprocedural ideology
butwith
nllesof contestation.
distinctive
mentalities.
Notteleological.
Respect
for rightsof minorities,
stateof law,andvalue
of individualism
Iotalrtananlsm
Elaborate
andguiding
ideology
thatarticulates
a reachable
utopia.
Leaders,
individuals,
and
groups
derivemostof
theirsenseof mission,
legitimation,
andoften
policies
specific
from
theircommitment
to
someholistic
conception
of humanity
andsociety
Post-totalitarianism
Sultanism
Limited,
butnotresponsible
social,
economic,
and
pluralism.
institutional
Almost
pluralism
no political
because
partystillformally
has
monopoly
of power.
Mayhave
"secondeconomy,"
but state
stillthe overwhelming
presence.
Mostmanifestations
of pluralism
in "flattened
polity"grewoutof tolerated
statestructures
or dissident
groups
consciously
formedin
opposilion
to totalilarian
postregime.
In mature
totalilarianism
oppositi0n
0ften
"second
creates
culture"
or
"parallel
society."
Economic
andsocialpluralism
doesnotdisappear
but is
subject
to unpredictable
and
despotic
intervention.
No group
or individual
in civilsociety,
polilical
soctety,
or the staters
freefromsultansexercise
of
power.No ruleof law
despotic
Lowinstitutionalization.
High
fusionof privateand public.
ideology
Guiding
stillofficially
existsand is partol the social
reality.
Butweakened
commitment
to or faithin
utopia.
Shiftof emphasis
from
ideology
to programmatic
consensus
thatpresumably
is
basedon rational
decisionmaking
andlimiteddebate
withouttoo muchreference
to
r0e0r0gy.
Highlyarbitrary
manipulation
of
giorifrcation
symbols.
Extreme
of nrler.No elaborate
or guiding
ideology
or evendislinctjve
mentalities
outsrde
of despotic
personalism.
No attempt
to
justifymajorinitiatives
on the
basisof ideology.
Pseudoideology
notbelieved
by staff,
sublects,
or outside
world.
Table3.1. /conanued/
Characteistic
qemuract
Author,tarianism
Mobilization Participationvia
Political
systemwithout
generated extensive
autonomously
or intensive
political
organization
of civii
mobilization
societyandcompeting
exceptat somepointsin
partiesof politicalsociety theirdevelopment
guaranteed
by a system
of law.Valueis on low
regime
mobilization
but
participation.
highcitizen
Diffuseetfortby regime
good
to induce
and
citizenship
patriotism.
Toleration
of
peaceful
andorderly
rtr0n.
0pp0s
ip
Leadersh
produced
Topleadership
by freeelectrons
and
mustbe exercised
within
constitutional
limitsand
stateof law.Leadership
mustbe periodrcally
crrhiprtod
1o and
nrnr|rnarl
hv
frao
electrons.
Political
system
in which
a leaderor occasionally
a
smallgroupexercises
powerwithinformally
illquite
defined
butactually
predictable
norms.Effort
at cooptation
of oldelite
groups.
Someautonomy
in statecareers
andin
military.
Totalitarianism
Post-totalitarianism
Extensive
mobilization
intoa vastarrayof
regime-created
obligatory
organizations.
Emphasis
on activismof cadresand
militants.
Effortat
of
mobilization
Private
life is
enthusiasm.
decried.
Progressive
lossof interestby
involved
leaders
andnonleaders
in organizing
mobilization.
Boutinemobilization
of
population
withinstatesponsored
organizations
to
achieve
a minimum
degree
of
conformity
andcompliance.
Many"cadres"
and"militants"
Sultanism
Lowbut occasional
manipulative
mobilization
of a
ceremonial
typeby coercive
or
clientelisticmethodswithout
permanent
organization.
Periodic
mobilization
of
parastate
groupswho use
groups
violence
against
f^r^otod
h\/ cillt:n
aremerecareerists
and
Boredom,
opportunists.
withdrawal,
andultimately
privatization
of population
s
valuesbecome
an accepted
fact
Total
itarianleadership
ruleswithundefined
limitsandgreatunprefor members
dictability
Often
andnonmembers.
charismatic.
Becruitment
highly
to top leadership
on success
dependent
in party
andcommitment
organization.
Highlypersonalistic
and
arbitrary
No rational-legal
constraints.
Strongdynastic
tendency.
No autonomy
in state
careers.
Leader
unencumbered
Topleadersare
by ideology.
Compliance
to
democracy."
fear
charismatic.
Recruitmentleaders
seldom
basedon intense
rewards.
to top leadership
restricted
to
andpersonal
Staffof
of
officialpartybut lessdependent leaderdrawnfrommembers
hisfamily,
friends,
business
uponbuilding
a career
within
partysorganization.
Topleaders associates,
or mendirectly
involved
cancomefromparty
in useof violence
to
rn stateapparatus. sustainthe regime.Staff's
lechnocrats
position
derives
fromtheir
purelypersonal
to
submission
the ruler.
emphasis
Growing
by postpolitical
totalitarian
eliteon
personal
security.
Checks
on top
leadership
vrapartystructures,
procedures,
and"internal
lllirillil
I
ir
lI
I
48
TheoreticalOverview
ity to negotiate. such a leadership structure, if it is not able to repressopponents
in a crisis, is particularly vulnerable to collapse.One of the reasonswhy midlevel
cadresin the on ce all-powerful coerciveapparatusmight, in time of crisis,let the
regime collapse rather than fire upon the democratic opposition has to do witl
the role of ideol ogy in post-totalitarianism.
The contrast between the role of ideologyin a totalitarian systemand in a posttotalitarian system is sharp, but it is more one of behavior and belief than one of
official canon. In the area of ideology, the dynamic potential for changefrom a to_
talitarian to a post-totalitarian regime, both on the part of the cadresand on the
part of the societr, is the growing empirical disjunction between official ideological claims nnd reality'. This disjunction produces lessenedideological commiiment on the part of the cadres and growing criticism of the regime by groups in
civil society.In fact, many of the new critics in civil society emerge out of the
ranks of former true believers, who argue that the regime does not-or, worse,
cannot-advance its own goals. The pressurescreated by this tension between
doctrine and reality often contributes to an out-of-type shift from a totalitarian
regime effort to mobilize enthusiasm to a post-totalitarian effort to maintain acquiescence.In th e post-totalitarian phase,the elaborateand guiding ideology created under the totalitarian regime still existsasthe official statecanon, but among
many leadersthere is a weakened commitment to and faith in utopia. Among
much of the population, the official canon is seen as an obligatory ritual, and
among groups irr the "parallel society" or "second culture," there is constant referenceto the first culture as a "living lie."t5 This is another sourceof weakness,of
the "hollowing out" of the post-totalitarian regime'sapparent strength.
The role of ideologY in a post-totalitarian regime is thus diminished from its
role under totalitarianism, but it is still quite different from the role of ideology
in an authoritarian regime. Most authoritarian regimes have diffuse nondemocratic mentalities, but they do not have highly articulated ideologies concerning
the leadingrole of the party, interestgroups,religion,and many other aspectsof
civil society, political society, the economy, and the state that still exist in a
regime we would call post-totalitarian. Therefore,a fundamental contrast between a post-totalitarian and authoritarian regime is that in a post-totalitarian
regime there is 3n important ideological legacy that cannot be ignored and that
cannot be questioned officially. The state-sanctionedideology has a socialpresenceinthe orgarrizational life of the post-totalitarian polity. Whether it expresses
itself in the extensivearray of state-sponsoredorganizations or in the domain of
incipient but still officially controlled organizations,ideology is part of the social reality of a post-totalitarian regime to a greaterdegreethan in most authoritarian regimes.
and referencesabout "parallelsociety,""second
culture,"and the "living lie" are
t5.Extensivediscrrssions
(chap.r7).
found in our chapter()n post-totalitarianism in Hungary and Czechoslovakia
Modern NondemocraticRegimes
49
de-ideologization of post-totalitarian regimesand the weakening
The relative
in utopia as a foundation of legitimacy mean that, as in many au^f ,t. U.U.f
regimes,there is a growing effort in a post-totalitarian polity to legitii"rrlrir"
regime on the basisof performance criteria' The gap between the origirr" ,n.
of the ideology and the increasinglegitimation efforts on
i"J u,opiun elements
efficacy,particularly when the latter fails, is one of the sourcesof
,irlU.ri, of
regimes.Sincedemocraciesbasetheir claim to obepost-totalitarian
*.rf.n.* in
ji.n.. on the procedural foundations of democratic citizenship, as well as peralayer of insulation againstweak performance not available
iorrun.., they have
or authoritarian regimes.The weakeningof utopian ideio mort port-totalitarian
of post-totalitarianism thus oPensup a new dynamic
oiogytl,.t is a characteristic
perspectiveof democratictransition,new
of r:.li-. vulnerabilities-or' from the
opposition. For example,
opportunities-that can be exploited by the democratic
of
the
importance of ideology
reiteration
constant
the
between
the discrepancy
worse' its transparent
or,
policymaking
to
irrelevance
growing
ideology's
and the
the commitment and
to
undermining
reality
contribute
social
with
contradiction
can help cona
Such
situation
regime.
in
the
lower
cadres
and
faith of the middle
of
the coercive
functionaries
if
midlevel
the
regime
of
tribute to the rapid collapse
who
are protestcitizens
shoot
right
to
their
apparatushave grave doubts about
eventsin
we
discuss
wheu
see
ing againstthe regime and its ideology,as we shall
1989in EastGermany and Czechoslovakia.l6
The final typoiogical difference we need to explore concerns mobilization.
Most authoritarian regimesnever develop complex, all-inclusive networks of associationwhose purpose is the mobilization of the population. They may have
brief periods of intensivemobilization, but theseare normally lessintensivethan
in a totalitarian regime and lessextensivethan in a post-totalitarian regime.In totalitarian regimes,however,there is extensiveand intensive mobilization of society into a vast array of regime-createdorganizations and activities. Because
utopian goalsare intrinsic to the regime,there is a great effort to mobilize enthusiasmto activatecadres,and most leadersemerge out of these cadres.In the totalitarian system,"privatized" bourgeois individuals at home with their family
and friends and enjoying life in the small circle of their own choosing are decried.
In post-totalitarian regimes, the extensive array of institutions of regimecreatedmobilization vehiclesstill dominate associationallife. However,they have
lost their intensity. Membership is still generalizedand obligatory but tends to
Seneratemore boredom than enthusiasm.State-technocraticemployment is an
alternativeto cadre
activism as a successfulcareer path, as long as there is "correct" participation
in official organizations.Instead of the mobilization of enthu.^.-t6'Duni.l V. Friedheimis conducting major researchon the questionofcollapse in such frozen postThe Role
lTltli:,."" regimes.SeeFriedheim,"Reiime'Collapsein the PeacefulEastGerman Revolution:
"'-'vrto<lle-LevelOfficials," German Politics(April 1993):
97-:nz, and his forthcoming Yale University doc'"rq qlssertation
in ',,,irichhe discussesEastCermany.
'llli
II
I
siasmthat can be so functional in a totalitarian regime,the networks of ritualize4
mobilization in a post-totalitarian regime can produce a "cost" of time away frorn
technocratic tasksfor professionalsand a cost of boredom and flight into privats
life by many other people.When there is no structural crisis and especiallywhen
there is no perception of an availablealternative,such privatization is not necessarily a problem for a post-totalitarian regime. Thus, Kadar's famous saying,
"Those who are not againstus are for us," is a sayingthat is conceivableonly in 1
post-totalitarian regime, not in a totalitarian one. However,if the performanceqg
a post-totalitarian as opposed to a totalitarian regime is so poor that the personal
rewards of private life are eroded, then privatization and aPathy may contribuk
to a new dynamic-especially if alternativesare seen as possible-of crisesof
"exit," "voice," and "loyalty."I7
Let us conclude our discussionof Post-totalitarianism with a summary of its
We do this to help enrich the discussionof
political and ideological weaknesses.
why theseregimescollapsedso rapidly once they enteredinto prolonged stagnation and the USSRwithdrew its extensivecoercivesupport. Indeed in chapter t7'
"Varieties of Post-totalitarian Regimes,"we develop a theoretical and empirical
argument about why frozen post-totalitarian regimesare more vulnerable to collapsethan are authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.
Totalitarianism, democracy,and even many authoritarian regimesbegin with
"genetic" legitimacy among their core supporters' given the historical circum,L.,.., that led to the establishmentof theseregimes.By contrast' post-totalitarianism regimesdo not have such a founding geneticlegitimacy becausethey emerge
out of the routinization, decay,or elite fearsof the totalitarian regime. Post-totalitarian legimes, becauseof coerciveresourcesthey inherit and the related weaknessesof organized opposition, can give the appearanceof as much or more stability than authoritarian regimes;if externalsupPort is withdrawn, however,their
inner loss of purpose and commitment make them vulnerable to collapse.
Post-totalitarian politics was a result in part of the moving away from Stalinism, but also of social changesin Communist societies.Post-totalitarian regimes
did away with the worst aspectsof repressionbut at the same time maintained
most mechanisms of contiol. Although less bloody than under Stalinism, the
presenceof security services-like the Stasi in the GDR-sometimes became
the
more pervasive.Post-totalitarianism could have led to moderate reforms in
economy,like those discussedat the time of the PragueSpring, but the Brezhnev
restoration stopped dynamic adaptation in the USSR and in most other Soviet-
ffr'afig**s*Ntf
ru'.+$::f.il;Xffi ffiL1'Y.[lT::*
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;,Hfi
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rttul.';"4"yf
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eventt,ltltifli]ranism
1930s
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'"'fi1".',ffi1';.:'illliT?il
"*."i;:;:i:l:li:":.::1"'.'":'1,',"11i'ia
by
(detotalitarianism
betheresultofthreedistinctbutofteninterconnectedprocesses:(r)deliberatepolithe totalitariansystem
and
ciesof the rulersto ,";;;;;f*m
regimes'structures
o,rf'of tf," iotalitaiian
choice),(z) the ,"*r"uiifrii;";
systemGetotalitarianism
.*u^j.r' iieologicalbeliefin the
aninternalerosionof ;;"
;;;;;)"'dl?1,:i:.:ji"::"J*'i:.ffi,,,*il1?fi::J:ffi
::5:"ha'lre'
sistor escaPetotalltarl
"Sut-T'tNlsu
under the Duvaliers'the Dominican
A largegroup of polities,suchas Haiti
RepublicunderTiujillo,tnt'Ctttt'ulAfricanRepublicunderBokass-a'thePhilipand North
un4-erCcauqescu'
pinesunderMarcos,Iran underthe Shah'Romania
of
ttnat"ti"t io*uid i" extremeform
KoreaunderKim II s"tg, h"t" Itud
"'ong
Weber'
tftutwJtt calledsultanisn'For
tfryll
wheneverlladitional dominapatrimonialismand, in the extreme case,sultanisrntendto arise
qyd*s:i,
+.
"nil*,rt'"'r::::l*:m.,;;:,**::f
1a,'in1,,,"iro"
thern'aster...
. Wheredomination. . . operatesPrlma
nf ;:
t'o*t*r' ratio.alized-in impersonal
called,
sultanism.. . The non-traditional elementi' "oi'
.,,1.,'. discretion. It is this which
of,th.
terms,but consistsonly in the extrem€ de'elopment
distinguishesit from every form of rational authority're
for Hungary and Poland.
type systems,e.Kcept
(cambridge: Harvard Unr
r7.The reference,of course,is to Albert Hirsch man,Exit, voiceand Loyaby
collapseot
to.the
in
relation
press,
of
this
dynamic
discussion
t97o), 59.For a fascinating
versiiy
:T :'lit...
Essayon ConcePtualnrrseeHirschman,"Exit,Voiceand the Fateof the GermanDemocraticRepublic:An
chapter
detail
greater
in
the
in
quote
tory)' world Politics4t (lanuary 1993):r73-zoz..wediscussthe Kadar
(chap.
l/).
post-totalitarianism
on varietiesof
and
system
MarxistL:ninismas,alotal
of revolutionary
r8.on theideolosical
andmoralattracti'eness
Daedalus
Unrevolution"'
the
of
the.vacuum,,left
seeErn..t Cal""i,:ii.t"fand
in ihe wakeof irscollapse,
(Summer
1993):
r4r-54.
e.--:^t^-l,
o,-r
GuentherRothandclaus
ed.Grrenrher
An outlineof InteroretiveSociology,
and Society:
. 19.MaxWeber, Economy
original'
the
in
Italics
r978),
Wittich(Berkelev:
Press,
of California
Universiry
"'3"'3''
"itll
1
Weber did not intend the word sultanismto imply religious claims to obedi,
ence. In fact, under Ottoman rule, the ruler held two distinct offices and titles,
that of sultan and that of caliph. Initially, the Ottoman ruler was a sultan, and only
after the conquest of Damascusdid he assumethe title of caliph, which entaile4
religious authority. After the defeat of Turkey in World War I and the proclarnqtion of the republic, the former ruler lost his title of sultan but retained his religious title of caliph until Atatrirk eventually forced him to relinquish even thar
title. Our point is that the secularand religious dimensions of his authority were
conceptuallyand historicafy distinguished..Furthermore,the teii- illan should
not be analytically bound to the Middle East.Justas there are mandarins in New
Delhi and Paris as well as in Peking and there is a macho style of politics in the
Pentagonas well as in BuenosAires, there are sultanistic rulers in Africa and the
Caribbean as well as in the Middle East.What we do want the term sultanismto
connote is a generic style of domination and regime rulership that is, as Weber
says,an gllle4q form of patrimonialism.In sultanism, the private and the public
are fi.rsed,there is a strong tendency toward familial Power and dynastic succesSior-r,there is no distinction between a state career and personal service to the
ruler, there is a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology, economic successdepends on a personal relationship to the ruler, and, most of all, the ruler acts only
according to his own uncheckeddiscretion,with no larger,impersonal goals.
Thble3.r givessubstantial detailson what a sultanistictype is in relation to pluralism, ideology,mobilization, and leadership.In this sectionwe attemPt to highlight differences between sultanism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism because,while we believe they are distinct ideal types,in any concretecasea specific
polity could have a mix of some sultanistic and some authoritarian tendencies(a
combination that might open up a variety of transition options) or a mix of sultanistic and totalitarian tendencies(a combination that would tend to eliminate
numerous transition options).
In his long essay,"Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,"fuan Linz discussed
the special features that make sultanism a distinctive type of nondemocratic
regime.2oSincethe sultanistic regime type has not been widely acceptedin the literature,we believe it will be useful for us to highlight systematicallyits distinctive
qualities so as to make more clear the implications of this type of regime for the
patterns of democratic resistanceand the problems of democratic consolidation'
In sultanism, there is a high fusion by the ruler of the private and the public'
The sultanisticpolitv becomesthe personaldomain of the sultan.In this domain
there is no rule of lau' and there is low institutionalization. In sultanism there maf
be extensivesocial a1d economic pluralism, but almost never political pluralisttl'
becausepolitical power is so directly related to the ruler's person. However' the
essentialreality in a sultanistic regime is that all individuals, Sroups' and instituzo. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Resimes,"zsg-63.
qlrf;r.tt**
*j':;::''d' :::
*-it'#tdi
ql'1''ti
frtriffi
#'H*iffi**f',;**tx
and no sphere
moderates'
who -ighi ttg"tiitt *i11 democratic
mod..utes
of the
nim.
the despoticexercise
or clvrr'Iocietythat is not subjectto
.conomY
i6 6re
sultan,swill.Asweoemonstrateinthenextchapter,thiscriticaldifferencebetweenplurali'-"t*thoritarianandsultanisticregimeshasimmenseimplicaregimebut
t;1tti'i;l that areavailqblein an authoritarian
tionsfor the types,ot
in a sultantsttcreglme'
unavailable
of ideology
in the function and consequences
Thereis also a shar; tt"i""
only is
sultanisticregimes.In a totalitarian regimenot
behrcentotalitarianar,d
of legitimatand g;iairrg ideology,but ideologyhasthe tunction
;;;;;d"b"rate
valuesvsown
their
by
constrained
und tuf," u'"1fttt' somewhat
#;;;;;;;.,
asa point
ideology
rhat
in
believe
or both,
Theyor theirfoltowers,
;:r;;i;;;iogy.
charruler
sultanistic
a
for their actions.In contrast,
;;;;;;"-r#lustidcation
personalbe.nignb
may
guidingideology.There
hasn.oa"f
;ffi.ily
"t"i. ""aoiU.lng*urtideoiogy,oftennamed.after
the sultan,
pr.t*rion,
with
isticstatements
to exsubject
is
power,
ideologyis ejaboratedaftertheiuler hasassumed
il;it,
trememanipulation,and,mostimportantly'isnotbelievedtobeconstrainingon
Thus' therecould be questheruler and is relevantonly aslong ashe practicesit.
were consistentwith
tions raisedas to whether 6talins practicesand statements
whether
but therewould be no reasonfor anyoneto debate
Marxism-Leninism,
aubetween
contrast
The
Trujillo'sstatementswere consistentwith Trujilloism.
distincthe
however,
ideology;
thoritarianand sultanisticregimesis lessstarkover
more
tivementalitiesthat ur. u pui, of most authoritarianalliancesarenormally
ideology'
.onriiiiiins on rulersthan is the sultan'sidiosyncraticand personal
is
iru .-i.?rrL".
intensivemobilization that is a featureof totalitarianism
""a
of its low degreeof institutionalizaqsld-qm
foundin a sultanisticregimebecause
t'iifiTiia iiri"* .o.r,*tt-ent tJ an overarchingideology.The low degreeof orsporadic'
Sitir"tio" -""", ,n"t any mobilizationthat doesoccuris unevenand
irobablytt e Uigg.rtdifferencebetweensultanisticmobilizationand authoritarranmobilizationis the tendencywithin sultanism(most dramaticin the caseof
the Duvalierf To.rtonMacoutesin Haiti) to usepara-stateSroupslinked to the
sultanto .i"ialriot..rce and terror againstanyonewho opposesthe ruler'swill'
norms
Thesepara-stategroupsare not -oJ.rn bureaucracies
with generalized
andprocedur.r;,"uth"r,they aredirectextensions
of the sultan'swill. They have
nosignincant
theyarepurely"personal
i*,ir"aio"uf autonomy.AsWeberstressed'
rnstruments
of the master."
hoW€Vslt
|1il
I
lrl
Frnally,how does leadershipdiffer in sultanism, rotalitarianism, and authoritarianism? The essenceof sultanism is unrestrainedpersonal rltlership.This personal rulership is, as we have seen, unconstrained by ideology, ,utional-legal
norms, or any balanceof power. "support is basednot on a coincidenc. of intJ.estbetweenpreexistingprivileged socialgroups and the ruler but on interests
s1iated by his rule, rewards he offers for loyalty, and the fear of his vengeance.,'zr
In one key respectleadership under s_ultanismand totalitarianism,js similar.
In both regimesthe leader rules with undefined limits <jntris po-e. una tn.r.
il
' gry4,t-unp-r-edictab:lity--f9-relites and nonelite-i itit .. In this ,"rp..t, a Stalin and
4
Somoza are alike. However, there are important differences.The elaborateideology, with its senseof nonpersonal and public mission, is meant to play an important legitimating function in totalitarian regimes. The ideological pronounce_
ments of a totalitarian leader are taken seriously not only by his followers and
cadres,but also by the societyand intellectuals,including-in the casesof Leninism, Stalinism, and Marxism (and even fascism)-by intellectuals outside the
statein which the leader exercisescontrol. This placesa degreeof organizational,
social,and ideological constraint on totalitarian leadershipthat is not presentin
sultanistic leadership.Most importantly, the intense degreeto which rulership is
personalin sultanism makes the dynastic dimension of rulership normatively acceptableand empirically common, whereasthe public claims of totalitarianism
make dynastic ambition, if not unprecedented,at leastaberrant.
The leadershipdimension showsan even strongercontrastbetweenauthoritarianism and sultanism.As Linz statedin his discussionof authoritarianism,leadership is exercisedin an authoritarian regime "with formally ill-defined but actually
quite predictable"norms.22In most authoritarian regimessome bureaucraticentitiesplay an important part. Thesebureaucraticentitiesoften retain or generatetheir
own norms, which imply that there are procedural and normative limits on what
leaderscan ask them to do in their capacity as,for example,military officers,judges,
tax officials,or police officers.However,a sultanisticleader simply "demands unconditional administrative compliance, for the official's loyaltyto his office is not an
impersonal commitment to impersonaltasksthat define the extent and content of
his office,but rather a servant'sloyalty basedon a strictly personalrelationshipto
the ruler and an obligation that in principle permits no limitation."2s
we havenow spelledout the central tendenciesof five ideal-type regimesin the
modern world, four of which are nondemocratic. we are ready for the next step,
which is to explore why and how the type of prior nondemocratic regime has an
important effect on the democratic transition paths availableand the tasksto be
addressedbefore democracy can be consolidated.
l . I b i d . ,u 6 o .
zz.Ibrd., 255.
23.Ibid., z6o.
il
ii
rlli
lll
lLllil
The Implicationsof Prior
RegimeTYP.for TransitionPaths
and ConsolidationThsks
ANALyzED the necessaryconditions for a consolidateddemocH^ur*o
key differencesamong the four ideal-typical non,r.rl"J then spelledout rhe
that the characteristicsof the previous
i.ri.,"lr",i. ,"gi-.r, it should be clear
regime haveprofound implications for the transition paths avail;;;;;".r.til
when they begin their struggles to de.if. r"a the rasksdifferent countries face
ideal types,it is conceivuetop.ontotidated democracies.within the logic of our
might have a robust
stages
late
in
its
regime
authoritarian
a particular
"blr'rhu,
rule of law' a usand
constitutionalism
of
supportive
civil society,a legal culture
a reasonably
and
norms'
professional
within
ablestatebureaucracythat operates
only necand
first
polity,
the
a
For
such
well-institutionalizedeconomic society.
socipolitical
to
relate
would
essaryitem on the initial democratization agenda
of
legitimacy
and
power,
ety-that is, the creation of the autonomy, authority,
apr97os,
early
democraticinstitutions. We argue in chapter 6 that Spain, in the
proximatedthis position. However, if the starting point were from a totalitarian
regime of the communist subtype, democratic consolidation would entail the
task of simultaneouslycrafting not only political society and economic society,
but also every single arena of a democracy as well. The full implications of these
argumentsare spelledout in a more systematicand detailed manner in tables4.2
and 4.3,but here let us first depict the argument in its most stark form, table 4.t.
The analyticutility of distinguishing betweenpost-totalitarian and totalitarian
regimesshould now be clear.As table +.r demonstrates,it is conceivablethat a
post-totalitarianregime could begin a transition to democracy with a combination of low-medium or medium scoreson eachcondition necessaryfor a consolidated democracyexcept for the autonomy of political society.Hungary in early
and mid-rg8g came cloiest to approximating this position. While the tasksfacing
oemocratsstarting from a mature post-totalitarian regime are challenging,they
are substantially less than those facing democrats starting from a totalitarian
regime. However, it should also be clear that, precisely because posttotalitarian regimes
have a prior totalitarian period, there will be legaciesto over-
:--
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{
Transition
t0 Democratic
Typefor Paths
Begime
of PriorNondemocratic
Table
4.2.fhe lmplications
Authoritarianism
Totalitarianism
Post-totalitarianism
'1.
rupturaFeforma-pactada,
pactada
canbe
Giventhat civilsocietY
and
well develoPed
reasonably
political
that somemoderate
witha national
opposition
canexist,
constituency
tupturareforma-pactada,
pactada betv'reen regtme
anddemocratic
moderates
ts
moderates
opposition
possible.
regimeleaders
Either
couldwin farr
or the opposition
a
andcomplete
elections
rtron.
trans
No spacefor organized
or tor
opposition
democratic
Thus
regimemoderates
reforna-pactadaPalh is
unavailable.
In maturepost{otalitarianism, Givena lackof ruleof law an
civillibertieson the onehan
therecanbe collecttve
andpersonalistic
anda moderate
PenetratlI
leadership
the democratic the entirepolityby the sulta
wing.Likewise,
on the other,the Nvo
couldhavea wellopposition
"second
prerequisites
for a four-PlaY
culture"
developed
pactedreform,an organized
political
andincipient
democratic
nonviolent
lf leadersof a
groupings.
andregime
itarianregime opposition
maturepost-total
with sufficient
moderates
are
thatelections
believe
a Pact
to negotrate
authority
andtheYhavea
necessary
the
chanceto win, reforna-Pactada do not exist.leaving
with the leadersof the second reforn a-pactada virluallY
opposltlon i m p o s s i b l e .
or incipient
culture
ts
to freeelections
leading
possible.
in War
2. Defeat
Defeatin war or war-related
couldleadto a
collapse
with
transition
democratic
powerby
weaknegotiating
priornondemocratic
regimeif
of democratic
representatives
forcesin civrlandPolitical
and
areavailable
society
an electoral
demand
Path.
the onlypathin whlch ln earlypost-totalitarianism
Virtually
prosPects
could
democratic
in war
defeated
totalitarianism
ln
totalitarianism.
resemble
to a
couldleadrapidly
maturepost-totalitarianism,
is bY
regime
democratic
bYa
of government
assumption
by a democrattc
occupation
andthe
opposition
democratic
andexternally
regime
are
earlyholdingof elections
democratic
monitored
possible.
lation.
instal
of the ruleof
Givenabsence
law andwidespread
Para-s
pat
the democratic
violence,
is virtuallynot available
monitorin
withoutexternal
andguarantees.
----:
Iable4.2.(continued)
3. Interimgovernment
after
regime
termination
not
(coupby
initiated
by regime
nonhierarchical
military.
armedInsurgents,
or mass
uprising
andregime
collapse)
Authoritarianism
Totalitarianism
In an authoritarian
regime,
it is
possible
thatan organized
democratic
opposition
in civil
societyandevenpolitical
societyexists.lf theydemand
earlyelections,
thrstransition
pathis quiteposstble.
However,
in the absence
of
effective
demandfor elections.
the interim
government
will be
temptedto exercise
powerin policy
revolutionary
areasandto postpone
or
cancelelections,
thusdelaying
thetransition
or leading
to a
new nondemocratic
regime.
An interim
government
is
Earlyelections
areonlythe
unlikely.
However,
shoulda
mostlikelypathin mature
deepcrisisleadto a successor posltotalitarianism
where
government,
givenflattened
opposition
activists
mightform
civilsociety
andtheabsence government
andproceed
to
of organized
democratic
democratization.
In earlyor
political
society,
successful
frozenpost-totalitarianism,
the
pressure
for the holding
of
mostlrkelyregime
transition
is
freeelections
is unlikely.
massuprising
which,rf not
Thesuccessors
mightsearch
repressed,
couldleadt0 regime
for electoral
legitimation,
but
collapse
andan interim
this doesnot ensure
government
Theinterim
democratization.
government
maywell be
formedby elitesconnected
with the old regimewho are
ableto consolidate
theirpower
electorally
in the still
"flattenedsociety."
PosfTotalitarianism
Sultanism
Highchance
that"interim
government"
will claimto i
in the nameof the people
,
will postpone
elections
in c
to carryout reforms.
Given
previous
lackof autonomr
civilor politicalsociety,
the
is a highchance
thatgroup
associated
with the sultanI
claiming
legitimacy
for havi
supported
the uprising
will
achievenondemocratic
pow
Thebestchance
for democ
transitionis if revolutiona
upheaval
is ledbyinterna
tionallysupported,
democra
callyinclined
leaders
whose
a datefor elections
andallo
freecontestation
of power.
table 4.2. lcontinued/
Autltodtarianisn
Totalitarianism
Post-Totalitarianism
Pathnot availableto this tYPe
givenTddd-r
n!-Ttil6ol the partY
Extricationfron rule bY
hierarchicallyled military
If a regine is led by a
the
militarv,
hierarchical
+
"militaryas instltutlon,rl rt
ibiris rinod iirieinaior external
threat,mayplaYa rolein
as
pressuring
the "military
from
government"
to withdraw
directruleandto hold
"extrication
The
elections."
andthe
lengthof transition
domatns
extentof the "reserve
can
of power"the military
as the priceof
impose
with the
decrease
extrication
of the internalor
severity
threatio the military
external
andthestrength
as institution
forcesin civil
of democratic
socretY.
andpolitical
to this
Pathnotavailable
of
regimetype.PrimacY
par$ and
revolutionary
roleof leaders
unconstrained
makeruleby hierarchical
impossible.
military
Someregime-specific
possible
transition
Pathsand
likelyoutcomes
authoritarian
lf nondemocratic
regimeis ledbYlonhterarchicalmilitaryandthis regtme
it
oils overthrown,
collapses
will be easierto impose
and
control
democratic
civilian
thanit
trialson the military
hadbeenledbYa
the regime
militarY.
hierarchical
of totalitarian
Leadership
the
couldsPIit,oPening
regrme
mobilization,
wayfor popular
andPossiblY
liberalization,
evenan interimgovernment
Giventhe
thatholdselections.
levelof controlpriorto the
a more
of Protest,
mobilization
is thatthe
probable
outcome
leads
of mobllization
dynamic
bYforceof
to re-imposition
or to shift
controls
totalitarian
See
to post-totalitarianism.
pathsopento Posttransition
totalitarianism.
Sultanism
regime,
A post-totalitarian
with a serious
confronted
if the
crisis,couldcollaPse
ts
optionof repression
could
CollaPse
unavailable.
leadto non-democratic
elltes,
by alternatlve
takeover
or chaos.
democratization,
Pathnot availab\eto this
regimetype.SultanismimPlies
a degreeo{ fusionof Private
andpubtic,andthe sul-tan's,
interferencewith bureaucrat
with rul
normsis incomPatible
militarY.
by a hierarchical
ot
tendencies
Givendynastic
if sultandiesoJ
sultanism,
memb
familY
causes
natural
to continue
will attempt
thus,
regime;
sultanistic
no regime-led
normally
will takePlace
liberalization
Table4 2 (continued)
paths
6. 0therregime-specific
paths
regime-specific
7 Other
Post-Total
itarianism
S ul t a n i s m
Authoritarianism
itarianism
Total
lf a civilian-led
authoritarian
regimeiiiitiates
a democratic
whatever
transition,
havebeenmade
agreements
will onlytendto havethe
powerthe electorate
and
giveto them.
elected
officials
will
Theemerging
democracy
be less
therefore
normally
thanif the prior
constrained
regimehad
nondemocratic
beenledby a hierarchical
military.
regimeis
regime
is
lf post{otalitarian
lf totalitarian
by external
by an external
supported
supported
it couldcollapse
if
withdrawal
hegemon,
hegemon,
of
removes
coercrve
supportcouldalter
hegemon
hegemon's
lf it is an early
Costof guarantee
a1lpowerrelationships.
post-total
the
Increases,
itarianregime,
r-epressr0n
regimeis likelyto be
andmobilization
successor
0pposition
by
authoritarian
or controlled
increase,
andcollapse
outof the
emerging
becomes
a possible
outcome. leaders
previous
lf it is a late
regime.
lf regime
falls,chaosor
provisional
government
regime,civil
is most post-totalitarian
cneiohr loadorc n{ tho
of
likely.
Giventheabsence
provisional
government
could
democratic
organized
free
opposition,
evenif provisional callearlyandcompletely
government
begins
a transition. etecIr0ns.
control
by people
emerging
out
is most
of the old regime
likely
lf the sultanis dependent
on a
foreignpatron,
a continuation
by the
of a crisisandpressure
patronmightleadto the ruler
which
holding
snapelections
he thinkshe cancontrol.
is a
Defeatin elections
possibility,
especially
if an
the
externalpatronsupports
Butdemocratic
opposition
governance
will be greatly
aidedby continued
of the pavonin
engagement
process.
the democratization
patroncansometimes
Foreign
forcethesultanto stepdown.
Totalitarian
regime
couldshift
to post-totalitarianism.
See
for posttransition
options
totalitarianism.
Mostlikelydomestic
causefor
the defeatof the sultanis
or revolutionary
assassination
by armedgroups
or
upheaval
couldbe
civilsociety.
Upheaval
evenby business
supported
groups
of theirdislike
because
of the sultan'sextremeuseoj
powerProvisional
arbitrary
government
rs mostlikely.See
no.3 above.
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Table
4 3. Thelmplications
of Nondemocratic
Regime
TypefortheMinimal
Tasks
of Completing
Transiti0n
to andConsolidation
of a Dem0cratic
Regime
fron
Regime
Type
Necessary
Condjtions
Authoriraridnism
'1.
Buleof lawandcivilsociety ln someauthoritarian
regimes
freedom
thereis a tradition
of ruleof
law andcivilsociety
thatmight
be quitelively,
butcivilllberties will needto be extended
andprotected.
Lawsgiving
autonomy
to tradeunions,
medla,
etc.,mayneedto be
enacted
andimplemented.
Political
soclety
autonomy
All the normal
conditions
andtrustandlegalcondition ensuring
the freeelectoral
for it
competition
betweenparties
needto be created.
In some
cases,partycompetition
has
onlybeensuspended
andcan
easilybe revitaljzed.
In other
cases.
theformation
of parties
needsto be legalized
and
restrictions
on specificparties
liftedIn somecasesthe political rightsof keypolitical
actors
needto be re-established
ln
exceptronal
casesan authorilarianslatepartymayhavelo
be dismantied.
Totalitarianism
Post-totalitarianism
S u i t ai ns m
Buleof law did notexist
Muchof the legalcode,to the
extentthat it existed,
was
highlypoliticized
andinstrumentalfor the party-state
but
notfor its citizens
andthereforewasincompatible
with
democracy.
Civilliberties
are
minimal
andneedto be legalized,developed,
andprolecteo
The"flattened"
natureof civil
society
requires
f undamental
changes
thatareditficult
to
generate
in a shorttime.
An extensive
reformof the
legalsystem
to assure
civil
nghtsandruleof law will be
nee0ed.
Giventhe legacyof thefL
of publicandprivate
and
personalization
extreme
ol
power,
'
the establjshmen
ruleof law andguarante
citizens
havea highpriorit
andwill be a difficult
task
Theparty's
position Thedismantling
dominant
of the priviin all areasof society
andits
legedstatus,legalandotherprivileged
statusandresources wise,of thedominant
party
mustbe djsmantled,
its preswill be neededLegalreform
encein all institutions
wrllalsobe needed
to assure
removed,
andalmostail of its
the freeformation
andcompe
property
transferred
to the
parties.
titionof political
While
stateHowever,
if citizens
want societynraynot be as "flatto recreate
the partythey
tened"as undertotalitariashouldbe allowed
to do so.
nism,the relative
lackot
and its suppo(andpower
economic
andpolitical
differen"represhoulddependon the votes
tialionmakespolitical
people
mightwantto gjveto
sentation"
of interests
difficult
it Giventheflattened
social
andcomplicates
the deveioplandscape
therep's5sn1611sn
ri
mentot a normalspectrum
ol
interests
will be particularly
democratic parties
Thesuppression
of semipr
violence
andthecreation
ol
modicum
of trustarerequin
mentsfor the developmen
r
polrticalpartres,
freeconte
tion for power,andsufficie
autonomy
for theworking
of
procedures
democratic
and
rnstituti
ons.
difficu lt
Table4.3. lcot?tindl
Post-totalitarianism
Cotfritions
/Vecessary
Authoritarianism
Totalitarianism
rulesto
3. Constitutional
allocatepowerdemocratically
In somecases,therecanbe an
that a
declaration
immediate
constlprevious
democratic
in
tutionhasbeenreinstated;
to a
othercasesamendments
ma\/
constitution
nondemocratic
beviable;in stillothersa full
constituent
democratic
andconstitutionassembly
process
areneeded.
making
mayexist Giventhe fictive characterot
A paperconstitution
thereare
the constitution,
that, whenfilled with demoseriouscoststo usingthese
craticcontent,mightleadto
andthe makingot
slncelt institutions,
pervelseconsequences,
constitution
democratic
a
demofor
a
not
designed
was
shouldbe a highprioritY.
Themakingof a
craticsociety.
constitutlon
newdemoclatic
but difficult
will be necessary
dueto an inchoate
Political
the lackof a constitu'
society,
andthe legacy
tionalculture,
createdby the verbal
of the Previous
commitments
c0nstrtutl0n.
4. Statebureaucracy
andserviceable
acceptable
government
to democratic
Tothe extentthatthe
hasnot been
bureaucracy
politicized
andhasmaintained
there
professional
standards,
needfor
maybe no immediate
ln some
reform.
bureaucratic
a moreor lesslimited
cases,
including
purgeof bureaucrats,
andthe mllitarY,
theludiciary
Butif a
mightbe desirable.
a
military
hierarchical
PlaYed
majorrolein the Prevtous
regime,such
nondemocratic
purgesmaybe quitedifficult.
Sultanism
A universa\istic\egalcu\tute
will haveto be developed.
Evenwhile theremaYbe a
giventhe
usableconstitutlon,
recentabuseo{ constitution
rules.a spiritoJtrustand
for constitutional
respec't
doesnot existat the endof
sultanistic
Period
penetratr
of Theclientelistic
Thefact that manyfunctions
of majortasks
Thedelegation
of buleauc
judiciary
andcorruption
the state,including
ol the stateto the Partyand
limittheirelfici
institutions
bt7
wereperformed
functions,
of the Party
the penetration
andPut
andlegitimacy
makes
andsocial partybureaucrats
intoall bureaucratic
reformon the
makethe creatlon purgesandreformof the state extensive
institutions
Evendemocratic
agenda.
a widesPread
bureaucracYbureaucracy
of a nonpoliticized
mayPerpe
electedleaders
and
buta complex
demand
anddifficult
an imperative
rathe
isticpractices
clientel
issueto resolve.
contentious
of the
task.Thedismantling
administra
rational
than
the
tormer
Theskillsof
partywithinthe statemrght
elrteandthe lack
the efficiencY bureaucratic
reduce
seriously
of the oPPosition
of experience
of the state
andcoordination
give
theformerelite
may
well
the
door
open
and
apparatus
position.
a privileged
bY
take-over
for a clientelistic
or bY
the newdemocrats
o{
TheexPerience
opportunists.
the partystateleavesa legacY
of populardistrustof the state
--=-
:-:=--::i:==_
Table4 3. (continued)
Necessary
Conditions
5. Sufficient
autonomy
for
economy
andeconomic
actorsto assurepluralism
of
civilsociety.
politicalsociety.
anoeconomic
society
Authoritarianism
Iotalitarianism
lf the economy
hasbeena
In communist
totalitarianism
functioning
nixedeconomy,
the almosttotal public
rneremaybe no immediate
ownership
of property
andthe
changes
necessary
to facilitate trnkages
betweenthe partyand
tne transition
andconsolidation tne economy
makethe gro\I/th
of democracy.
Whatever
further or autonomy
of civiland
reformsare desiredor needed
politicalsocietyparticularlv
will be partof normalpolitical
difficult.Fundamental
refo;mof
processes
that couldinclude
the economy
is imperative.
bur
moresoctalization
or more
the absence
of a legal
privatization
of propertyand
rnstrtutronal
framework
for a
more0r lesssocialand/or
marketeconomy
andthe
economic
regulation
of the
weakness
of legalculture
market.
makethe creationof an
"economic
society,,
difficult
andfacilitatethe emergence
of
rilegal
or alegalpractices.
Posttota,itarianism
Ultimatecontrolby tf,, ,t.t, of
att economic
activitydoesnot
seemconducive
to the minimal
degree
of civilandpolitical
socretyrobustness
necessary
ror a democratic
polity.Some
reTorms
are necessary
to
createan Institutionalized
economic
society.
A full_blown
marketeconomy
is not a
requuement
for democracy.
Dismantling
of thepi
andclientelistic
struc
the rulerandhisallie
necessary
to allowth
development
of civil,
andeconomic
societ
r
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Actorsand Contexts
I" noorrroN to our "macrovariables"of prior regime type and stateness,
we call attentionto someother important variablesthat affectdemocratictransition and consolidation and that lend themselvesto middle range propositions.
Two actor-centeredvariablesconcern the leadershipbaseof the prior nondemocratic regime and the question of who initiates and who controls the transition,
Three context variablesrelateto international influences,the political economyof
legitimacy and coercion,and constitution-making environments.
TsE INsrrrurroNAI- CouposrrroN AND LERosRsHrp
oF THE PRrcEnrNc NoNnelrocRATrc RsclnE
Our central question here concernsthe core group that is in day-by-day control of the state apparatus.What is the institutional character of this state elite?
Does its characterfavorably or unfavorably affect democratic transition and consolidation? The organizational base is necessarilyanalytically distinct from the
variable of regime type because,within some regime types (especiallyauthoritarian), there can be dramatically different types of stateelites,each with quite different implications for democratic transition and consolidation. Without being
exhaustive,four different types of state elites can be distinguished: (r) a hierarchical military, (z) a nonhierarchical military, (:) a civilian elite, and (+) the distinctive categoryof sultanistic elites.
Hierarchical Military
As shown in chapter 4 on the consequencesof prior nondemocratic regime
types,only an authoritarian regime has the possibility of being controlled by a hierarchical military organization. Control by such an organization is againstthe
logics of a totalitarian, post-totalitarian, or sultanistic regime.r All hierarchical
il
ii
r. In somecases,suchasChile and Uruguay,and especiallythe "dirty war" in Argentina,the military developeda definition of the enemyin their national securitydoctrine that gaveto the repressiona totalitarian dimension.See,for example,AlexandraBarahonade Brito, "Truth or Amnesty-Human Rightsano
Democratizationin Latin America:Uruguayand Chile" (Ph.D.diss.,Universityof Oxford, 1993),28'6r'
share one characteristicthat is potentially favorable to demo-2lit^tyregimes
*Y'ir^"inion.
The officer corps, taken as a whole, seesitself as a permanent
apparatus,with enduring interestsand permanent functions that
1"%il;,r"te
Y---^-.nAthe interestsof the govern-.nt of th. day.This means that there is alur::;;;ibility
that the hierarchicalleadersof the military-as-institution will
that the costsof direct involvement in nondemocratic rule
"uyt-'l'^ ttJaecision
of hierarchical au,nan the costsof extrication. Thus, the reassertion
#{*,
dangerfacedby
is a permanent
nameof themilitary-as-institution
ffiT;in"
elitewho
a
situational
of
members
as
Furthermore'
lirJrttn".t-us-government'
functioning stateaPparatus'
the existenceof a
l"rirre their power and statusfrom
have an interestin a stablestate,and this requiresa
ii.'rtii;.t:"s-institution
that, if a democratic regime is an available ruling
ooverrrment.zI hls ofien means
internal organizain the polity, the military may decide to solve their
il;;i"
their need for a government by devolving the exerciseof govand
,i""Jpr"Uf."ts
thus
to civilians. Paradoxicallybut predictably,democratic electionsare
;;;;,
threatened
feel
that
institutions
military
of
strategy
p." of the extrication
"'fi*
prominent role in nondemocratic regimes'
their
bv
-'
about hierarW..* make parsimonious and much lessoptimistic statements
because
Precisely
consolidatiorr'
chicalmilitary regimesin relation to democratic
is a
by
revolution)
the military (short of their elimination by foreign powers or
coerto
permanentpart of the state apparatusand as such has privileged access
.iu. ,.ro.rr."r, members of the military will be an integral part of the machinery
that the new democratic government has to manage.Theoretically and practically,therefore,the more the military hierarchy directly managesthe state and
their own organization on a day-by-day basis before the transition, the more
salientthe issueof the successfuldemocratic management of the military will be
to the task of democratic consolidation.Furthermore, the more hierarchicallyled
themilitary, the lessthey are forced to extricatethemselvesfrom a nondemocratic
regimedue toJnternal contradictions, and the weakerthe coalition that is forcing
qffice, the more the military will be in a position to negotiate their
tg*3gp
withdrawal on terms where they retain nondemocratic prerogativesor impose
vErycohfiningconditionson th; political processes
that leadto democraticconsolidation.More than any of the three other kinds of organizational basesfound
in nondemocraticregimes,a hierarchical military possesses
the greatestability to
lmpose"reservedomains" on the newly electedgovernment, and this by definition precludesdemocratic consolidation. This is a particularly acute problem if
For a more discursiveargumentabout the analyticaland historicalutility of the distinction between
*.,:.
rrltlitary-as-government
75-78,
and riilitary-as-institution,iee Stepan,"Pathstoward Redemocratization,"
V2-73.For ihe concept
of the military asa "situationalelite; with a specialrelationshipto the state,seeAlto Radicalismrvith SpecialAttention to
$-e<l
ltepan, "Inclusionary and ExclusionaryMilitary Responses
reru,"
in SewerynBialer,ed.,Rnrlirolir^ in gilr'ContemporaryAge(Boulder:WestvielvPress,rgzz),3: :zr--19,
J{4-so.
the hierarchical military have been involved in widespread human rights violntions and condition their loyalty, as a part of the stateapparatus,upon not beins
punishedby the new democraticgovernment.Such a legacyof human rights vil
olations presented severeproblems for democratic consolidation in Argentilx
and Chile.
This is not meant to imply a static situation. Power is alwaysand everywhers
relational. We simply mean that, if a relatively unified, hierarchicallyled militarv
hasjust left the direct exerciseof rule, the complex dialecticaltasksof democrati:
power creation and the reduction of the domains of nondemocratic prerogatives
of the military must becometwo of the most important tasksfor new democratic
leaders.
Nonhierarchical Military
A nonhierarchical,military-led nondemocratic regime, on the other hand,
has some characteristicsthat make it lessof a potential obstacleto democratic
transition and especiallydemocratic consolidation. Concerning democratic
transition, if a nonhierarchicallyled military-as-government(e.g.,of colonels
and majors) enters into difficulties, the incentive for the military-as-institution
to re-establishhierarchy by supporting an extrication coup is even higher than it
would be if the military-as-government were hierarchically led. The fundamen-tal political and theoretical distinction, however, concerns democratic consolidation. The chances that the military-as-institution will tolerate punishment
and trials of members of the outgoing nondemocraticgovernment are significantly grealgr if the gloup being punished is not seento be the military institution itself, but a group within the military which has violated hierarchical norms.
Likewise, if the colonels have establishedpara-stateintelligence operations that
are perceivedas threats even to the organizational military, the hierarchical military is much more likely to acquiesce(or even insist) that their reservedomains
of power be eliminated.
Civilian Leadership
In comparative terms, civilian-led regimes (even mature post-totalitarian
civilian-ledregimesin which Communist partiesare essentialcomponents)will
characteristicallyhave greater institutional, symbolic, and absorptive capacities
than either military or sultanistic leadersto initiate, direct, and manage a democratic transition. Civilian leadersare often more motivated to initiate and nror€
capableof negotiating a complicated reform pact than are the military. They often
have more links to society than do military or para-military sultanistic leaders'
Civilians also can seethemselvesas potential winners and rulers in a future denrocratic regime. This option is much lesslikely for military or sultanistic rulers.
There are, of course, potential problems for full democratic transition ano
I,L
civilian-led political change.Civilian-led.liberalizationmay
-^nsolidationin such
to'111,;fiUrut.
the systemshort of democratictransition or allow grouPSto win
tl'lllll"
access
t" skillful but nondemocratic means becauseof their privileged
it
seems
however'
consolidation,
:lt";;"f
o"wer.When we considerdemocratic
to
regime
of civilian leadersin a previouslynondemocratic
::;r;;;;i".capacity
such as constitutionally sanctioned
-.-,re obstacles,rooemocratic consolidation,.
'ffiii^uins
that of a miiitary organization.
lessihan
is
significantly
of power,
-tuff;;;.o,ion
to be the caseof a civilian-led,
seem
might
to ihe aboveassertion
a ruling Commuparty-especially
re-gimebasedon a monopoiy
noni..o.iu,ic
'_i..
an obstacleto
be
considered
p".tv. Should this kind of organizational base
'ffi;irrcconsolidation
that
organization
comparableto a hierarchicalmilitary
a
dethat
feared
,"0 power? some political activists in Eastern Europe
il.r;*
Party and a defeatedruling hierarchical military were
ia.tJJ r"fi"g Communist
of their ability to impede the consolidation of determs
in
?"".ti"*f eiuivalents
in those caseswhere the Communist Party has
that,
^'""r^ry Howe.rer,we believe
elections(as in Hungary in r99o), this analU..n a.i.u,.a in free and competitive
(i) organizational relationships
gn
ogf ir frr"au-entally misleading two grounds:
military, unless it has
tJthe state-apparatusand (z) incentives.The hierarchical
and dissolvedby the new democratic incumbents, will, as
ffi-ltituiiiydefeated
it still has
an organization, withdraw as a unit into the state apparatus where
missions and state-allocatedre.sources(as in Chile in lqSg)' A deextens-iV-e--state
E.t.d Co-*unist Party,in contrast,while it may well retain control of many resourcesand loyaltiesthat help it compete in later elections'has no comparableinstitutional base in the state apparatus, has no continuing claim on new state
resources,
and has no continuing statemission. Organizationally,it is a defeated
partyout of office and, though it may win open electionsin the future (asin Hungaryin 1994),it has lesscollectiveresourcesto impose "reservedomains" than do
the military out of office. Our argument here is restricted only to those cases
wherethe democratic opposition wins open and contestedelectionsand then asSumescontrol of the government. However, in some societies'normally closeto
the totalitarian pole, with no legacies of liberal or democratic politics, top
nomenklaturafigures are able to put on nationalist garb and engagenot in democracybuilding but ethnocracy building. In such contexts civil society is too
weak to generatea competitive political society and members of the nomenklaturaar"eable to approp.iate power and "legitimate" themselvesvia elections.
In relation to behavioral incentives,Communists (or ex-Communists) from
the former nomenklatura after defeatin free and contestedelectionswill still occupynumerous important positions within the stateapparatus,especiallyin state
enterPrises.
The members of the former nomenklatura through their networks
extendingover management,administration, and even security servicescan assurethemselves
a privileged position in the emerging capitalisteconomy and with
It substantial
political influence. However, they normally act for their own indi-
7o
ll
I
Actors and Contexts
TheoreticalOverview
vidual self-interest.In most post-Communist countries the former nomenklatura
do not attempt to overthrow or directly challengethe new regime but to profit by
ii. In some cases,particularly in the former SovietUnion, this leadsto a confusioi
betweenthe public and the private and with it considerableroom for corruption.
The more the members of the former nomenklatura act as individuals or democratic statemanagers,the better their chancesof survival as officials. This is particularly so for managersof state production, trading, and banking enterprises,
who can use their organizational resourcesprofitably to restructure new for65
of recombined public-private property.3 The incentive system for the former
nomenklatura thus has strong individualist or network components, which involve working for advantagesby manipulating the new political context more
than opposing it per se. The incentive system for the military is fundamentally
different. With few exceptions,incentivesto the military are collectiveand derive
lrom the strugglesto retain group prerogativesto avoid collectivenegativeactions, such astrials. Therefore,unlike the nomenklatura out of office, for the military out of office there may be significant incentivesfor acting together in open
contestationagainstthe new democratic government.
Sultanistic Leadership
Last, we should briefly consider what the institutional composition of sultanistic rule implies for democratic transitions and consolidation. A sultanistic
regime is one in which the ruler personalizesthe government and the regime and,
in an uninstitutionalized but erratically pervasiveway,penetratesthe state,political society,and civil society.Fused are not only the private and the public, but
also the civilian and the military. Theoretically,it is hard to classif, sultanshipas
either a military- or a civilian-led regime. Sultanistic regimes present an opportunity for democratic transition because,should the ruler (and his or her family)
be overthrown or assassinated,
the sultanisticregime collapses.However,the very
nature of a sultanistic regime means that there is very little spacefor the organlzation of a democratic opposition. Therefore, short of death by natural causes,
sultanistic dictators are characteristicallyoverthrown by quick, massive movements of civil society,by assassination,or by armed revolt (seetable 4.2). This
mahner of regime termination often leads to the dynamics of a provisional government which, unlessthere is a decision to hold rapid elections,normally presents dangers for democratic consolidation.aAlso, the very personalization oI
power around the dictator may allow close associatesqf the regime to assune
power. Or, evenwhen the group or armed movement leadingthe revolt eliminates
phenomenonof"recombinant prop3. Pioneeringwork on new network formation and the associated
erty;'that is notleally privateand no longer public is being done by bavid Stark,"RecombinantPropert'Y
in EastEuropeanCapitalism,"WorkingPaper,Collegium Budapest.r994.
e. We will discussinterim sovernmentsin our analvsisof the next variable.
a1
as
with the sultanisticregime,theymayappointthemselves
. ,^. mostassociated
of the peopleand rule in the nameof democracy
representatives
ffi;A
the freecontestationand freeelectionphasesthat are
lrffiqpu_rrilg.tl.o"gh
for full democratictransitionand consolidation.
i;;;r*;;i
TRANSTTION
INTTTETION: WHO
STER-fS AND WHO
CONTNOT'S?
by an uprising of civil society,by the sudden collapseof
Transitionsinitiated
nonhierarchicallyled
,1" nondemocraticregime,by an 1lm9d revolution, or by a
of rule will be
the
instruments
-iti .rU coup all tend toward situations in which
or provisional government.sTransitions initiated by hier;'.-rr-#a by an interim
or regime-led forcesdo not'
archicalstate-led
are highly fluid situations and can lead to diametrically
WfrifCbvernments
especially
opffiifontiomefdepending on which groupsare most powerful,and
first prito
be
the
are
considered
reforms
decree
or
sweeping
on whetherelections
rules
as a reland
for
elections
a
date
quickly
sets
ority.If the interim government
and
efficarapid
a
very
can
be
ativelyneutral caretakerfor these elections,this
government
ciousroute toward a democratic transition. However, if the interim
claimsthat its actions in overthrowing the government give it a legitimate mandateto make fundamental changesthat if definesas preconditions to democratic
elections,the interim government can set into motion a dangerous dynamic in
whichthe democratic transition is put at peril, even including the postponement
ofelectionssinedie.
Electionsare crucial becausewithout them there is no easyway to evaluate
whetherthe interim government is or is not actually representingthe majority.
!{!1hout elections,actors who did not play a central role in eliminating the old
regiilETiilInd ir very difficult to emergeand assertthat they have a.democratic
And without electionsthe full arrayof institutionsthat constitutea new
Inandate.
oemocraticpolitical society-such as legislatures,constituent assemblies,and
competitivepolitical parties-simply cannot develop sufficient autonomy, legaltty,and legitimacy.
Electionsare most likelv to be held auickly in casesof collapsewhere democraticparty leaders(as
in Greece,n rgzi) almost immediately .-.rg. as the core
of the interim government
or where leadersof civil societywho are committed to
creatinga political
democracy as the first order of business(as in Czechoslovakia
tsts) arethe core of the interim government.Frequently,however,especiallyin
ln
armed force has brought them into power,interim governmentsdeS.*[:t.
YErQp
a dynamic that moves them away from fully free contestation.Claiming
u more detaileddiscussionof interim governments,seeYossiShainand Juanl. Linz, eds.,IJetweett
-Sr,,5--fo,t
4tes:
InterimGovernnentsondDenrocraticTrarosltions(NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,rgg5).
V
revolutronary legitimacy, the provisional government may substitute occasional
plebiscitesor referendafor multiparty elections.A provisional government 11,ui
begins with a nonhierarchical coup may open up an explosivesituation b.car,r^
it may involve part of the state apparatus attacking another part of the statea;:
paratus,in which outcomes canvary from massivestaterepressionto revolution
The leastlikely outcome in such a conflict is procedural democracy.
What can we say about state-led or regime-initiated and regime-controlled
transitions?For one thing the potential for the emergenceof an interim govern_
ment is virtually absent when the regime controls the transfer of governmenl
until electionsdecidewho should govern.This fundamental point made, we nsg4
to be aware that regime-controlled transfers can be placed along a continuum
ranging from democratica-llydisloyal to loyal. A democratically disloyal transfer
the outgoing regimeattemptsto put strons
is one in which, for whateverreasons)
constraints on the incoming, democratically electedgovernment by placing supi
porters of the nondemocratic regime in key statepositions and by successfullyinsisting on the retention of many nondemocratic featuresin the new political system. A disloyaltransfer is most likely to happen when the leadersof the outgoing
nondemocratic regime are reluctant to transfer power to democratic institutions
and the correlation of forcesbetween the nondemocratic regime and the democratic opposition is one where the nondemocratic leadersretain substantialcoercive and political resources.For reasonswe have already discussed,this is most
likely to happen if the prior nondemocratic government was a hierarchicallycontrolled military regime-with strong allies in civil and political soiiety, as we shall
seein the caseof Chile.
INrpRNetroNAL INFLUENCE
The most influential and widely read publication on democratic transitionsis
the four-volume work edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter,and
LaurenceWhitehead, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule.The casesin this study
all concerned Southern Europe and Latin America and, with the exception of
Italy, the decadeof the mid-r97os to the mid-r98os. Generalizingfrom the experienceswithin these spatial and temporal confines, O'Donnell and Schmitter tn
the concluding volume argue that "domestic factors play a predominant role in
the transition. More precisely,we assertthat there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence-direct or indirect-of important divisions within
the authoritarian regime itself."6LaurenceWhitehead, in his valuable chapter on
TentativeConchrsions
about (JncertainDenot'rttdcs
6. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schn.ritter,
(Baltimore:JohnsHopkins UniversityPress,r986),19.
:Tif#il*::'"',rur*tt*:*'x
ffi11'j;t"':J#:ffT:T'Jfi
aiolrrb "'--
'
;1,i.]i"i"1:i':'il;ii::*ri;:ffi
::':l
r;11;lf;:l,Tl'ffi'jil:i:i':f
Jl'ii'l#Ji'l
f;*:;*ru#:'::ffi
;,[1,H;1*::il^'"'ffi
*,i:,'":*'f
seCondary role]'7
ForeignPolicies
a
,. )^*
ln
havean influenceon domesticcontexts
foreignpolicies-can
Conceptually'
outcomesthat reverydifferent*;Tt-;%inwith'ther'eareinfactthreecategoriesofsituations
in foreignpolicy actuallydetermines
use;;;"
in whichthe
or inlatetodemocracy.First,anondemocraticcountrycanuseforcetooverthrowa
g$5ither annexor occupythe countrv
rs:8)'
tessmilitarilyp";;il;;-;ttuty
in
puppetregime(e'g''G:tTllt in !11n3stovakia
stalla nondemocratic
or a
country
hegemon(which canbe a single
6€:6nq," nota"-lttutlt "glo""ut
military
.trm/unity or.o,-rrriri., acti"ngcollectively)canin its "outer empire"use
revolutionary effort to overthrow a
forceto Jeyerr. o ,.r..*rru i.mocratiring
liberalizing
Process
(e'g"Hungaryin r956)or to reverse'a
nondemoclgt,to;;"
a war
in
victor
is
a
that
countrv
,s;'s).rhiia, a democratic
i:ffii;*[i;1"
a
initiate
and
country
defeated
a nondemocraticregimecan occupythe
against
However'
tnot)'
transitionby insiallation(e'g''Getmanyand.|apanln
democratic
--a-7.--";"
forcein the democratictransiatthougn,or"rgrr'fo1i.i",.un havedeteiminative
in an independentcountryis ultimatelydedemocraticconsolidation
tionphase,
terminedby domesticforces.
.
1.1
Anotherinfluenceofforeignpolicyondemocratictransitionandconsoltdaeforts'Formalor intionconcerns
whatwe mightialiga te openingto democratic
needs'
formalempires,iu.g"iy."ipondini to tt.i. J*n internaland geopolitical
rein
subordinate
efforts
mayopenu pr"uiorirfi closedgateto democratization
will
this
whether
and
not
or
gimes.
whethertherewill be a democratictransition
tad to democraticconsolidationor not is predominantlydomesticallydetermined(e.g.,mostof theBritishEmpireafterworld war II, the Sovietbloc in EasternEuropein rg8g).
,l'xh,:i'l':x$
li,i'ii;,"'iliiii;;::::i1;:';"f,:;il1:';::;':,i:,:7","
$tff:i:T:Jl
a stronglysupporttve
Wt it.tt..a'gi"..'i.tuit"ainfo.*"tion abouthowtheE'urop.un
Communitypla-ved
rolein a.m8.."til
O'Donnel''t:9 t:fll^
in sourhernnu-f".1" laierworks,Whitehe'rd'
consolidation
H":"'J,'*lT:l;::i,i:;"il;lj;:T'i:i*:'li;:'i"Jl;fl;Jill:;;;:::;:iij'
Democ'
4""*,
Pridham,ed''Securing
press,
r99r)landGeoffrey
tr"rii."i*-l"rr.. hdntrs university
r99o)'
'^'yt rni t"i|"iiinnl
in iiuthern Europe(London:Routledge'
Transittott
contrrt of Resime
illillilii
llt'l
I
Subversionis another kind of policy effect.Regionalhegemons(democratic
6,
nondemocratic)can play an important contributing,though seldom a.t.rrnini'
tive, role in helping to subvert a nondemocratic regin-re(e.g.,U.S.forergn polic;^^
toward the Philippines in r987) or in helping to subvert democracythut i, oppor'
ing the hegemo.'s policy preferences(e.g,, u.S foreign policy toward chifu
tgz3).A democratic hegemon may also use its geopolitical and economi. po*,,;
to thwart nondemocratic forcestrying to impede a democratic transition p.o..r,
(e.g., President carter's role in reversing electoral fraud in the Dominican qs.
public in 1978).
Finally,a regionalhegemonmay,by a consistentpolicy packageof meaningful
incentivesand disincentives,play a major supportive (but not determinative)iqli
in helping a fledgling democracy in the region complete a democratic transition
and consolidatedemocracy(e.g.,the coiiectiveforeign policy of the Eu.opean
Economic community IEEC] and especiallyof west Germany toward portugal
in ry71.
Zeitgekt
The concept of zeitgeistis taken from the German tradition of intellectualhistory and refersto the "spirit of the times."we do not believein any variant of the
"end of history" thesis-the thesis,namely,that one ideology,such as the democratic ideology, can or will stop human efforts to respond to problems by creating alternativepolitical visions and ideologies.8But we do maintain that, whena
country is part of an international ideological community where democracyis
only one of many strongly contestedideologies,the chancesof transiting to and
consolidating democracyare substantiallylessthan if the spirit of the tirnesis one
where democratic ideologieshaveno powerful contenders.The effect of a democratically hostile or a democratically supportive zeitgeistcanreadily be seenwhen
we contrastinterwar Europewith the Europe of the mid-r9zosand the r98os.In
interwar Europe, in the aftermath of the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Ern'
pire, boundary changesemerging out of the Treaty of Versailles,and various political experiments,elevenstateswith little or no prior experienceof an independent democratic regime made some effort to establishdemocracies.eHowever'
the spirit of the times was one in which the democraticideal competedwith four
8. See,tbr exarrple,FrancisFukuyama,"The End of History," NationalIntercstr 6 (Sumnrcrr qsq): r- I E
The return to power in Lithuania,Poland,and Hungary of reform communistsas socialdemocratsis Dut
ln
one exampleof how history can evolvein new and unexpectedways.Another exampleis the resurg.'ncc'
the name of "democraticmajoritarianism,"of ethnic nationalistdictatorshipsin prrts of the fi)r'rller5()r'r('
U n i o n a n d Y u g o : l a ira .
Estonia,Latvia,Lithu.rnia,RLrlg'rrld;
9. ThesestateswereSpain,ltaly, Poland,Hungary,Czechoslovakia,
\ugoslavia,and Romania.F'ora discussionoftheir demise,seeJuanl. Linz, "La crisisde las .lctttocrrct'''
in MercedesCabrera,SantosJuliii,and PabloMartin Aceria,eds.,Europi en lisis, t9t9-l9t9 (MrclriJ: LLttt o r i a l P a b l ol g l e s i a sr ,9 9 z ) , : 3 r 8 o .
noneof them democratic' Communism tn
, ^- ront€stillg ideologiesin Europe,
promise.
*as u nouel experiment that many ,:n .1"1*:reat
:it'- *|;;;iJn
-,-..
both
comto
contestant
in Italy was seenby many others as a powerful
Novarum,
Rerwn
ft::#and
democracy.Catholicism, after the papal encyclical,
Finally, in
tn"".il,,h;
of nou.l forms of corporatist and integralist movements'
rffi $fi[***i*-***$iDurvr_,_-'-fluencedby theseEuropean intellectualand ideological
strongly lrr
ica too was
Brazil and of Perthe experienceof the EstadoNovo under Vargasin
.*,."", as
in Argenttna snows'
onism
""iiough J"-o.ru.y is never"overdetermined,"even in the context of the most
by the late r97osthe zeitgeistin southern Europe-indeed in
zeitgeist,
,u-ai#.
,r,. *oild (*itn the important exceptionof a reinvigoratedfundamental.|ii"f
such that there were no major idei* i, tfr. Islamic cultural community)-was
system.To be sure, Communism
political
a
as
democracy
ologicalcontestantsto
in the subordinateregimes
extension
by
and
Union
w.s"rnt.en.hedin the Soviet
Polish philosopher that
an
eminent
by
of ErU..r, Europe,but the pronouncement
the "clinical death" of
represented
ihe rgOASoviei invasion of Czechoslovakia
prophetic'ro By tg77'
proved
Marxist revisionism in Central and EasternEurope
theissueof human rights had acquiredsuch pan-EuropeansupPortthat most of
l
the EastEuropeanregimesbecamesignatoriesto the Helsinki Accords.l Fascism
andNazismwere thoroughly discreditedafter World War II, and no longer representeda pole of attraction. After Vatican II (rq6r-6:) Catholicism developedan
ideologicaland institutional position more amenableto democracy (if not to caPitalism)than ever before.12In the modern era most of the secureand successful
monarchsare now constitutional headsof statein parliamentary democracies.The
Egyptianand Peruvian military option so iltriguing in the l96os had few adherentsin the world by the mid-r97os.On the other hand, the I-atin American left's
experiencewith a new type of modern military-led bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimehad contributed to a deeprevalorizationof democracy'not merely asa tacticalinstrumentbut as a value in itsel[.r3Thc hopesthat some democratshad in
Yugoslavworker self-managementas a school for democracy have been thor-
ro. LeszekKolakowski,&fnin Curretttsof Marxisrn(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress,1978)'3: 465.
. u. For the effectson the domesticpoliticsof EastEuropeancountriesantl the SovietUnion of having
stgnedthe Helsinki
Accords,.eeSa-uel P.Huntington, Th'eThird Vitve: Demotratizttion tn the Twcntieth
Lentury(Norman:
Oklahoma UniversityPress,r99r),esp.85-roo.
(ieorgc
, , , . r z .F o r V a t i c a nI I a n d h o w i r e n h a n e c dl h e : t a t u . o f d e m o r r a c yi n l { o m a nC a t h o l i ct h c o l o g v , : e e
The
(New
York:
Oxford
Final
Collapse
oJ
Conmunism
and
the
Revolution:
The
Clrurch
Resistance
,wetgel,
universitypress.
r9g2),esp.67-/ 4.
t3.The revalorizationtf democrac,v
by the lefi producecla rich nervgenreof rvritings.For one suchex.*
Francisco\\teffort,"\rvh,vf)enrocracv?"in Alfred Stepan,ed., DemocratizingBrazil:ProblensoJ'
flpt..:."
transition
(NewYork: OxforclUniversitvPress,1989),327-50.
and Consoli(lation
oughly disappointed.In Africa, "one-party" statesby the early r99os had lost
almost all their original credibility as "mobilizing regimes" and were increasingly
disdainedas "rent-seeking"formulas exploited by nondemocratic elites.
Diffusion
Zeitgeistin the world of politics refersto historical eras.But the diffusion effecs
in an international political community, especiallyina edinmunity tightly coupled
by culture, coercivesystems,and/or communication, can refer to weeks or evel
days.Law-like statementsabout human creationssuch as democraciesare inherently different from law-like statementsin the physical sciencesbecauseno two
moments in history can be exactly alike. Human beings reflect upon previous
eventsand, where the eventsseem directly relevant to them, often consciouslyor
unconsciously attempt to adjust their behavior so as to achieveor avoid a comparable outcome. Political learning is possible.For example,after the Portuguese
revolution had exploded,a Spanishconservativeleader,Manuel Fraga,expressed
some interest in playing a role in leading democratic changebecausehe "did not
want to become the Caetano of Spain."r+Likewise Prince fuan Carlos in Spain
was undoubtedly influenced by the Greek case,where his brother-in-law, King
Constantine,lost his throne due to his ambivalenceabout democracy.
More generally,we posit that the more tightly coupled a group of countries
are, the more a successfultransition in a31c_-oug-!I)a_in
the group will tend to
transform the range of perceivedpolitical alternativesfor the rest of the group.
Indeed, as we shall seewhen we examine Central and EasternEurope in t989,international diffusion effects can change elite political expectations,crowd behavior, and relations of power within the regime almost overnight. For practitioners and theorists alike, diffusion effectshave obviously gained in saliencein
the modern world owing to the revolution in communications. Today,the dramatic collapseof a nondemocratic regime is immediately experiencedby virtually the entire population of the neighboring countries through radio and television. This experiencein turn instantly becomes a powerful new component of
domesticpolitics.ls
THr Portrrcer
EcoNoMy oF LscrrriMecy AND oF CoERCToN
What is the relationship between citizens' perception of the socioeconomic
efficacy of a regime and their perception of the legitimacy of the regime itselfl
t4. Fragawas referringto the overthrow of the post-Salazar
leaderof Portugal,Marcello Caetano,\''h,0
failed to initiate a transition.The diffusion effecthere is that Spanishconservatives
rapidly beganto rc'carc u l a t el h e c o s t sa n d b e n e f i t so f i n i t i a t i n ga d e m o c r a t i ct r a n s i t i o n .
r5. All countriesdiscussedin this volume experiencedsome diffusion effects,but none more drrnattcally than the countriesof Central and EasternEurope.
affectthe prosPects
of a transitionawayfrom a nondem,r^w
doesthe economy
b?l,iraffect the
,"*i^e? lf a transition has begun,how does the economy
regimes
nondemocratic
Aredemocraticand
T^:;rof-democratic consolidation?
renondemocratic
growth?Are democraticand
helpedby .sustained
:;n;
',lil"
hurt by economicdecline?
,t"'ii, "ouullythe well-documented
at
correlationthat therearefew democracies
^lr"O,
high
polities
at
a
most
that
and
development
socioeconomic
of
.,,* L* levels
Most of the major modaredemo,cragies.J-9
_{evelopaglt
ilujf o1ro.io_"co-nomic
j,r7.-rnto; aitemptsthustakeplacein countriesat mediumlevelsof develop9r"
-
gor.uer, this relationship betweendevelopment and the probability of deil.nt.
how, and fa transition will take place
-o.r..y ao.t not tell us much about when,
completed. Indeed, within this critical context of intermedi,ia U. iu...tsfully
we contend that it is often difficult or impossible to
,ie l.u.tr of development
about the effect of economics on democratization
statements
makesystematic
uses
an analytical framework that combines politics
if
one
However,
Drocesses.lT
one can make much more meaningful
on
legitimacy,
focuses
and
andeconomics
theory,
economic trends in themselvesare less
for
transition
Certainly
statements.
alternatives,
systemblame, and the legitimacy
perception
of
is
the
importantthan
population
or major institutional actors.
the
;ignificant segmentsof
}![i[ffif
M-
For theoreticiansand practitioners who posit a tightly coupled relationship
betweenthe economy and regime stability, robust economic conditions would
appearsupportive of any type of regime. We would argue, however, that the
propositionis theoretically and empirically indefensible.We seegood theoretical
reasonswhy sustained economic growth could erode a nondemocratic regime.
Weseeno theoreticalreasonwhy sustainedeconomic growth would erode a democraticregime.Regimetype can make a great difference.From the perspectiveof
political economy, we absolutely cannot formulate any valid propositions that
takethe form, "under conditions of great economic prosperity there will be no incentivesfor a transition from a nondemocratic to democratic regime."This is so
preciselybecausemany nondemocratic regimes,especiallythose of the statistical
t6'fh. classicinitial formulation of this argumentwas SeymourMartin Lipset,"Some SocialRequi.,^
$tcs
of Democracy: Economic Development aid political Legitimacy," Americin Political Science
Review
trsn), us-io5. Larry Diamond reviewedthreedecades6f lite.aiu.e r"l"uant to the development/deSltd
mocracydebate
and concluded that the evidencebroadly supports the Lipset theory. SeeDiamond, "EconW D"u.1oO.ent
and DemocracyReconsidered,"
in bary Marks and iarry Diamond, eds.,Reexaminuenocrary
"6'
lNewbury park: Sage,199.2
), 93_rjo.
specificrelationsnipbelween
growth or economiccrisisand the initiation of a tran".ono.ni.
",r,.!'Th. of a nondemocraticregimehas
been the"objectof considerabledebate.JosdMaria Maravall,in
i'j1l."u,
q{utstanding
and well-research'edwork, has analyzei this problem in great detail, with particular referi"tt-ro,southe.n and Eastern Europe.We find that iris analysiscotrt"rg"r *ith our brief anilysis, which we
independently.We o."i"ppy to refer the reader to his boo-kfor the relevant evidence.Seelos6
iill-Iitl""
os resulltatlos
tie Ia tiimocracia: (Jn estutliotiel sur y el estede Europa (Madrid: Alianza
ilffi,X,.,ffll,i
rliiul
il
t
tLcw'c.tLqL
vvYt
,,Iew
mode, authoritarian regimes,are originally defended by the state elite and their
core socioeconomic allies as necessarygiven the exceptionaldifficuities (e11.n
e c o n o m i c )t h e p o l i t y f a c e sT. h u s ,p r o l o n g e de c o n o m i cp r o s p e r i t ye s p e c i a l liyn 3 1
authoritarian regime, may erode the basis of the regime'sjustification basedon
exceptional circumstances.Prolonged economic successcan contribute to th;
perception that the exceptionalcoercivemeasuresof the nondemocratic regirnq
are no longer necessaryand may possibly erode the soundnessof the nelv economic prosperity.
Prolonged economic growth may also contribute to social changesthat raise
the cost of repressionand thus indirectly facilitatea transition to democracy.prolonged economic expansionnormally contributes to the growth of a middle class;
a more important and needed skilled labor force; an expansionof education;
greater contactswith other societiesvia television, radio, and travel; and a more
diverserange of possibleprotests.There is even strong evidenceto indicate that,
within a territory, increasesin regional wealth irrcreasecitizens'expectationsthat
they should be well treatedby the police.t8
Empirically, there are a number of caseswhere sustainedprosperity alteredrelations of power in favor of democratic forces.In fact, three casesin our study,
Pinochet's C\llq, Bryz1lin the early t97os,and Franco'sSpain in its last twenty
years (aswell as South Korea),had some of the world's highest ratesof economic
growth. Spain'sgrowth contributed to the belief of some of the core constituents
of the authoritarian regimeand among the industrial elite that they could manage equally well in the future in a more democratic environment. The times had
changedand so did the regime.reIn Brazil, the soft-line military wing announced
its liberalization program in September 1973,after five years of unprecedented
growth and beforethe oil crisis, soaring interest rates,and its attendant debt crr
sis. In September 1971themilitary felt that the economy was in excellentcondition and no significantpolitical threat existed.In the absenceofthe "exceptional
circumstances"that had legitimated their coup ir-ttheir own eyes,they came to believe that continued authoritarian rule not only was not necessarybut might con'Argentinization ot
tribute to the autonomy of the security forces and the
Brazlll'2oIn Chile manv of the kev industrialists who had believed that Pinochet
18.For example,sevenoccupationalgroups in Franco'sSpain,ranging from nrirnuallaborersto thosc
"equal,""b"it"r," o. "iroise" treatmentby the policethan
in liberal professions,
we." u.k"i ifth"y
"*peited
accordingto the levelof economicdevelopmentof thc re\po'r'
other citizens.The datawerebroken down
greaterthe regionaleconomi! dcvcldents'placeof residence.In r9 of zr of the possiblecomparisons,the -See
^'Ecological
AnllysL:
opnl"nt, the greaterthc expeitation of equal treatmentby the police.
Iuan l. Liirz,
il r/rr'50in Mattei Dogan an.l Stein Rokkan, eds.,Quttntitartive
Ecotogit,tlAnalit:;is
un,l Suru"y Rlesearch,"
(Caurbridge:MI'I Press,t969), 9r-r3r, esp.table r, p. rr3.
ciol Sciences
r9. As Adolfo Suiirezsaidbeforehe becameprime minister of Spain,"Our peol.lewho at the begrnrrinB
of his (Franco's)governmenthad askedsimply for bread,today ask for quality corlsumpti()n'rrrd.ttr"'samefashion,whereasat the beginningthey wanted order,today they ask for freedom-freedom ,tt Itt""
Speechin the Corteson June9, 1926.
ical association."
zo. Stepan,Rethi*ing Military Politics,3t j3.
Actors and Contexts
in lg8o, by 1988had come to believethat the risk of fair elec*65
.. indispensable model was lessthan the risk of supportingPinochetin un_-. to the economlc
In all three cases,the political economy of prosperity contributed
lgl:.;"t.21
about alternativefutures and to lesseningresistanceto demof.t..ltions
lii!*
u'-rn
craicalternattlll^", ,^,""- -^,o
democratizingreglmesor cc)nsolidated
we .^..idcr
considerdcmn
,nurp contrast,when
there are no theoreticalreasonsor empirical evidenceto suPport an
arr"arrai.r,
growth contributes to regime erosion.Of course,a "revl'rrun'ant that economic
on democraticgovernof rising expectations"may createnew demands
:ffi;
if
a regime is based on
Indeed,
d'6tre.
raison
their
Ir]n,r, Uo, it cannot attack
efficacy,the
socioeconomic
and
procedures
of democratic
,'ii'j""Ur. legitimacy
"stateness"
a
(given
of
the
absence
of a }undamental regime alternative
;;;
negligible.
is
empirically
group in society
pr"ilr.nll being raisedby a significant
and nondemocratic regimes,esdemocratic
affect
problems
economtc
Severe
There are good theoretical reasons
oeciallyauthoritarian ones, very differently.
(say
continuous negative growth) will
years
of
five
decline
economic
liy,nurp
nondemocratic regimes,but it
and
democratic
in
both
stability
alversellaffect
nondemocratic (especiallyauModern
more.
will affett the latter substantially
their performance claimsbul
on
dependent
heavily
thoritarian) regimes are often
their democratic status'
from
deriving
are Fot bolstelg.dby procedural claims
has two valuable
regime
to porit therefore that a democratic
fheilleadi"i
to a nonnot
available
sourcesof insulation from sustainedeconomic downturn
fact that
the
democraticregime: its claim to legitimacy based on its origin and
electionsare alwayson the horizon and hold the prospect of producing an alternativesocioeconomicprogram and an alternative government without a regime
change.This means that most new democracieshave about eight yearsof breathing space-four yearsor so for the initial government and four yearsor so for an
alternativegovernment.
This theory-basedassumption gains strong empirical support from data compiled by Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworqki. In their study of South Americabetween1945and 1988,they found that the probability that a nondemocratic
regimewould survive three consecutiveyearsof negativegrowth was 33 percent,
whereasthe probability that a democraticregime would survivethree yearsof negativegrowth was percent.More dramatically,their data show that no nondemZ3
ocratic regime survived more than three years of consecutivenegative growth,
whereasthe probability that a democratic regime would survive four or five years
ot consecutivenegativegrowth was percentand
5o percentrespectively.22
5/
Let us return to our argument concerning economicsand the politics ol alter21.Seethe interview with one of the leadersof a major businessinterest group in Chile, in Alfred
o^
Itepan,"The
LastDaysofPinochet?" NewYorkReviewofBooks(Junez, 1988):13.
z z . F e r n a n d oL i m o n g i l 1 d A d a m P r z e w o r . k i ". f ) e m o c r a c ya n r l D e v e l o p m c n ti n S o u t h A m e r i c a .
,1945-1988"
(Universityo['Chicaqo,C)ctoberzZ,r99-t,unpublishedm:rnuscript).
8o
TheoreticalOvervietu
nativesand systemblame in nondemocraciesand in democracies.If the political
situation is such that there is no strong perception of a possiblealternative,a nqr_
democratic regime can often continue to rule by coercion.However,when the be_
lief grows that other alternativesare possible (as well as preferable),the political
economy of legitimacy and coercion changessharply. If the coercivecapacity of
the nondemocratic regime decreases(due say to internal dissent or the withdrawal of vital external guarantees),then the political economy of prolonged
stagnation can contribute to the erosion of the regime. It is not changesin the
economy,but changesin politics, that trigger regime erosion-that is, the e/ecrs
of a poor economy often have to be mediated by political change.
The question of systemblame is also crucial for the fate of democracies.As we
have discussedelsewhere,the economic crisis of interwar Europe was as intense
in countries such as the Netherlands and Norway (which did not break dorvn)
as in Germanyand Austria (which did break down). Indeed,3o,oooDutch workers in 1936went to work in Germany becausethe Dutch economy was in worse
condition than the German economy.What made the crisis of the economy a crisis of the political systemin Germany and Austria was that strong groups on the
right and the left had regime alternativesin mind and thus attacked the regime.
Politically motivated systemblame, more than the economic crisis per se, caused
the German and Austrian breakdowns.23
The key question for the democraciesis whether their citizens believethat, in
the circumstances,the democratic government is a doing a credible job in trying
to overcome economic problems. It is important to stressthat the political economy of legitimacy will produce severeand perhaps insoluble challengesto democratic consolidation in those caseswhere the democratic system itselfis judged
to be incapableof producing a program to overcome the economic crisis.
To summarize,what can and cannot we say about transition theory and the
political economy of legitimacy?Theory and the Limongi-Przeworski data indicate that consecutiveyears of negativegrowth lessenthe chanceof either a nondemocratic or a democratic regime's surviving. Thus, a country that is experiencing positive growth, other things being equal, has a better chance to
consolidatedemocracythan a country that is experiencingnegativegrowth. This
said,the theory and the data also indicate that a democratic regime has more insulation from economic difficulty than does a nondemocratic regine. The ques13.For a more detaileddevelopmentof this argumentwith supportingdata,secJuanJ.Linz arrd,\lired
Stepan,"Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidationor Destruction:Europeanar.rdSouth Amertcan
Comparisons,"in Robert A. Pastor,ed.,Denocracy in the Atnericas:Stoppingthe Pmdulum (New York:
Holmes and N{eyer,1989),4r-6r.We are indebtedto Eklart Zimmerman fbr his pioneeringstudiesol tnterwar Europe.SeeZimmerman,"GovernmentStabilityin Six EuropeanCountriesduring the \!brld Ecot5, ttt:
nomic Crisisof the r93os:SomePreliminaryCor.rsiderationsl'
Europeanlountal of Political Researclt
t (t987):4*52 and Zimmerman, "Economic and PoliticalReactionsto the World Economic Criseso[ the
r93os:Six EuropeanCountries,"paper presentedfor the Mid-West PoliticalScienceAssociation(lonrerrtion, Chicago,April ro-rz, r986.
F
Actors and Contexts
8r
,Tlt';::J:?
tionorwS,tSttiili:lT3*i"T::','.#il:Tj"#:ix
Germat'IfI svstemblameand mass-elite
perceptionsaboutthe desirabilityof
It is theoquestionis thusone of relationships.
ryi:#iiri:;ilalternatives. The
o##-i;rrrible, and indeedhasoccurred,that a newlydemocratizing
regime
efficacy
ar
socioeconomic
of
democracy's
perceptions
i..6ne in cirizen
lll#t
ti,J"**;r;tthat their.beliefthat"democracy
is thebestpossiblepoliticalsystem
likeours"i ncreases'24
for, aoontty
wherethe citizenscometo believethat the democratic
nowever,
In thosecases,
compoundingthe economicproblemor is incapableof defining
*rr'"i'rut| rs
a crediblestrategyof economicreform' systemblame will
l'"ii*of.*.nting
ih. politicaleffectof economichard times'More importantly,
:::";;;;;^rut.
to democraticbreakdownin thosecaseswhere
li""lrff.rtses will tendto lead
increasingly
r-gt.ups outsideor-more fatally-insidethe government
to the ecosolution
only
the
are
of rule
""*.-rn
alternatives
ffiifru,"nondemocratic
nomic
'--i; crisis.
alsituationwherethe crisisis permanent,afterat leastone democratic
the
that
" of government,
made
argumentcanbe
andwherea reasonable
ternation
to searchfor solutionsand
unwilling
or
incapable
are
actors
p."otitlcat
d.*o.ruti.
key
.u.n.o-po,.rnd the problemsby suchactionsasinfightingand corruption,
Keyacmight not be available'
But alternatives
actorswili searchfor alternatives.
unmore
or
equally
been
have
might
with alternatives
experience
tors'previous
to
themselves
resign
might
actors
of
these
many
attractive.
In suchcircumstances,
upcrises'
prevent
not
may
a poorlyperformingdemocracy.Suchresignation
heavats,
ana attempiedlocalcoupsbut is not conduciveto regimechange.But it
a democracy'
certainly
makesconsolidationdifficult and canevendeconsolidate
CoNsrtrurtoN-MertNG
ENVIRoNT'lENTS
A neglectedaspect of democratic transition and consolidation concerns the
comparitive anufysi. of the contexts in which constitutional formulas are
adoptedo. retained.Without attempting to review all possiblevariations, let us
contexts and/or
limpty mention six very different possible constitution-making
formulasand indicate what problems they presentfor democratic transition and
democraticconsolidation. We move from those contexts and formulas that pre-
Destruction,"44, we note
.. .4: In Linz and Stepan,"political Crafting of DemocraticConsolidationor
d:rling a p;;il (-i;-r;rj'.i.i.i"g
and terrorism the Spanish
inflation, recession,
::l
citit.nt U"ii"fin
tlectiied'by25percentagepoints in national polls while the betfr. .f6.".r.fa...,-,.
craiy"."""rployment,
rreftttat
5 percentagepoints
democralv-** i["i.r, politicrl .yrt"n for a countr,vlike Spainincreased.by
n the same
probis that the citizenry did roi b"li"u.' despitethe economic
o.;;;.
i;"
k;;
imoiication
'ems'that
any alternativcpolitical svstemwa\ preferahle.
ALLUIS
sent the most confining conditions for democraticconsolidationin an existing
stateto those that presentthe least.2s
r. The retention of a constitution createdby an nondemocratic regime will
reservedomains and difficult amendment procedures.These confining condi_
tions may be the price the outgoing nondemocratic regime is able to extract for
yielding formal control of the stateapparatus.However,if this constitulion de.iure
enshrinesnondemocratic "reservedomains" insisted upon by the outgoing nondemocratic power-holders,then the transition by our definition cannot be completed until these powers are removed. If the constitution has very difficult
amendment procedures this will further complicate the processof democratic
transition and consolidation. In this book Chile is the clearestcase.
z. The retention of a "paper" constitution which has unexpecteddestabilizing
when used under more electorallycompetitive conand paralyzingconsequences
ditions. Some nondemocratic constitutions may enshrine a very elaboratesetof
decision-rules,procedures,and rights that had no effect on the operation of the
nondemocratic regime becausethe constitution was a fiction. However, in more
electorallycompetitive circumstances,this constitution can take on a life of its own
that may make it almost impossibleto arrive at democraticallybinding decisions.
In such cases,the constitution can help destroythe stateand should be changedextremely quickly before its perverseconsequenceshave this paralyzingeffect.The
most important instancesof this type of constitution are found in the Soviet-type,
federalconstitutions in the former U-SSR,
Yugoslavia,and Czechoslovakia.
ilI
3. The creation by a provisional government of a constitution with some de
jure nondemocratic powers. Even when the old nondemocratic regime is destroyed and many new policies are passed,a democratic transition itself cannot
be completed unlessthe nondemocratic components of the constitution crafted
by the provisional government are eliminated, as we shall seein the caseof Portugal. Even when these nondemocratic clausesare eliminated, the origin of the
constitution in a provisional government may hurt democratic consolidation becauseof its inappropriatenessor weak societalacceptance.
I
4. The use of constitution created under highly constraining circumstances
reflecting the de facto power of nondemocratic institutions and forces' Such a
constitution may be formally democratic and thus consistent with a transition
Rune Sleg'tr'l',cdr"
25.Someindispensable
sourceson constitutionsand clemocracyareJon Elsteran<1
Constitutionalismantl Democracy(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1988);Dougl.rsGrsglr[rcr$;
StanleyN. Katz, Melanie Beth Oliveira, and StevenC. Wheatly, eds.,Constitutionalismanrl l)ctttrt'-rttc''
r"'
Transitionsin the Contemporlry \lorld (NewYork: Oxford UniversityPress,r993);BruceAckernr'ttl'
Futureof LiberalRevolution(New Haven:YaleUniversityPress,r99z);A. E. Dick Howard, ed.,Constittt.t.i)tl
('',Muking in EasternEurope(washington:Woodrow Wilson C"nt.i ir".., r993);and the EastEan'f"rrl
t 15'stitutiinalReviewpublishedquartirly sincer99z by the Centerfor the Studyof Constitutionalismin
ern Europeat the UniversityofChi.ogo Law Schoolin partnershiprvith the Central EuropeanUniversitf'
dITLl
\-UIIL€XLs
democratic consolidation may be hampered becausea conping cornpleted,but
D""i"ia
constituent assembly,while believing that other institutional arrangetjt#;;r.
more appropriate for the creation and consolidation of democratic
To some extent Brazil is
,n., be di facto prevented from selecting them.
liili,
y"._^-r^
,--L
^ e.l{AILLPLe'
pre. The restoration of a previous democratic constitution. This formula
is
often
divisive debate about constitutional alternativesand
.rJ., u po,.ntiatly
and
by ,"d"-o.r atizingpolities for reasonsof speed,conflict avoidance,
ffff
pointed
be
It
should
legitimacy.
historic
of
legacies
some
upon
,r,. a.rir. to call
that simple restoration presentstwo potential problems for demooui,L*.u""
First, when the polity has undergone Sreat changesduring
Iirii. .onrotidation.
it is possiblethat a new constitutional arrangement
ii. uutnoriturian interlude,
for democratic consolidation.Second'restorawould in fact be more appropriate
proceduresand institutions of the old constition alsoassumesthat the political
When the
iution hau. played no role whatsoeverin the democratic breakdown.
breakdown,
to
democratic
in
fact
contributed
have
arrangements
old democratic
restorationprecludes an historic opportunity to construct new and improved
with different proceduresand symbols.Uruguay and Argentina are
arrangements
casesworth analyzing from this perspective.
6. -Free-arrdconsensualconstitution-making. This occurs when democraticallyeleiib?iepresentativescome togethert"o deliberate freely and to forge the
new constitutional arrangementsthey consider most appropriate for the consolidation of democracy in their polity. The c-onstituentassembly ideally should
avoida partisan constitution approved only by a "temporary majority" that leads
a largeminority to put constitutional revisions on the agenda,thereby making
consolidationof democratic institutions more difficult. The optimal formula is
onein which decisionsabout issuesof potentially great divisivenessand intensity
arearrivedat in a consensualrather than a majoritarian manner and in which the
work of the constiiuent assemblygains further legitimacy by being approved in a
popularqeferendumthat setsthe democratic context in which further changes,
){, ut devolution (if theseare to be considered),take place.26In this book only
Gipain$tsthis patrern.
\-/
the restof this book we examinehow the interplay of our arenas,such aspo,. .In
Itttcalsociety,rule
of law and economic society,and our variables,such as regime
\rpe, stateness,
and those discussedin this chapter,affectedthe processesoftransltlon to democracy
and the consolidation of democracy in three different sociopolitical(and
geographic)regionsof the world-southern Europe, the Southern Core
of t-atirlarierica, and post-Communist L,urope.
t6' Fo. un argument
in favor of consensualconstitutionsproducedand ratified by nationwidedebates,
*^
xeAckerman,
fh, Furup of I il,eratRcvoltttiott,466g.