TITLE : AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN RUSSIA TODAY :
THE DEMISE OF THE MORAL IMPERATIVE
AUTHOR : DAVID A. J . MACEY, Middlebury Colleg e
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CONTENT S
Abstract
Introduction
1
The Historical Legacy
2
The Search for Alternatives
6
The Contemporary Program of Agrarian Reform
9
Alternative Programs and Prospects for the Future 12
Endnotes
15
Abstrac t
"Demise of the Moral Imperative : Agricultural Reform in Russia Today "
David A.J. Macey
Agriculture in Russia and the Soviet Union has been in a state of almost permanent crisi s
for more than two centuries . This "crisis" began with the identification of a "peasant question "
in the late 18th century, was transformed into an "agrarian" or "land" question in the secon d
half of the 19th century and by the 20th century had become a "grain problem ." At the root o f
each of these "cursed questions" was always a concern with agricultural output an d
productivity and, ultimately, the state's persistent drive to overcome its perceive d
"backwardness" vis-à-vis the more advanced countries to its west by fostering economi c
development . Each of these "problems" was moreover perceived as a significant factor in th e
country's major political crises during the same period . As a result, the language of crisis wa s
repeatedly transferred from the political to the agricultural sphere, and, often with little basi s
in fact, warnings of dire consequences to the nation's agricultural system and ultimately it s
food supply were bandied about with the goal of either encouraging or preventing both politica l
and agrarian reform . Inevitably, "solutions" to the political crisis also involved a majo r
campaign to reorganize the country's agrarian structure . However, because such reforms wer e
introduced as a by-product of partisan struggle and political change, their more rationa l
economic core was repeatedly subordinated to the existing regime's immediate political an d
social needs . Only with the passing of the political crisis was it possible for the underlyin g
economic concerns to return to the center of attention .
This link between political and agrarian change was also manifest during the collapse o f
communism and the Soviet empire between 1985 and 1991 and led in turn to the emergence o f
an "agricultural problem" as well as renewed efforts at agrarian reform . Initially, the searc h
for alternatives to the Stalinist system of collective and state farms focused on the mixe d
socialist and capitalist system, including free trade in agricultural products, that characterize d
the era of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s . However, with glasnost', the entire
socialist experiment was brought into question . Given the ensuing "moral" imperative to
destroy the last vestiges of Stalinism in agriculture, proponents of reform sought a new mode l
in the pre-revolutionary Stolypin agrarian reforms and began calling for a radica l
transformation of agricultural production and the creation of a system of individual famil y
farms based on private property ownership--though the debate over the desirability of privat e
property in agricultural land has yet to be fully resolved . "Privatization" thus came in tw o
1
forms : the creation of "Stolypin-type" farms, which in practice turned out to be no t
progressive, market-oriented fermerskie khoziaistva but a reversion to peasant-type subsistence farming ; and the juridical privatization or de-nationalization of state and collective farms ,
based largely on a formalistic understanding of western conceptions of privatization, that has
led to merely paper changes . Thus, neither program has had any significant impact either o n
the structure of agricultural production or on agricultural output, and agriculture continue s
largely within the confines of the traditional system of state orders and state subsidies, wit h
market-type relations limited to the system's periphery .
Clearly, both Stolypin and juridical models were misconceived . Worse, since the public
debate became increasingly polarized between defenders of the existing system of state an d
collective farms and the supporters of a Stolypin-style privatization, it served to confine
discussion to these two versions of "total" privatization thereby diverting attention from two
other initiatives, both of which hold greater practical promise : the Rutskoi program to privatize
the supply and marketing organizations and modernize the infrastructure, on the one hand, an d
the Nizhnii Novgorod program of breaking-up collective farms into independent functiona l
units, on the other . Unfortunately, the Rutskoi program is expensive and, given the bankruptc y
of both government and society, the time for its realization on any significant scale has lon g
since passed . Insofar as the Nizhnii Novgorod program is concerned, even though Prim e
Minister Chernomyrdin has expressed his support, it, too, is unlikely to have widespread
application, in part because such changes will have little impact without prior reforms of th e
supply and marketing networks and the modernization of the infrastructure .
Thus, the alternatives would appear to be : either a Leninist-type scenario of "the worse
the better," since only complete collapse will be able to force the changes in behavior amon g
government officials, farm managers, and farm workers that would be necessary radically t o
revamp the system ; or the "muddling through" option . It is my contention that the latter cas e
will prove the more likely, in large part because not only is there no immediate threat o f
agricultural crisis or collapse but also because the current lack of consensus at the cente r
suggests the demise of the anti-Stalinist moral imperative that inspired the movement fo r
reform in the first place . Indeed, there are already signs of the "return of the repressed "
economic core of the reform program to center stage suggesting that a moderate "consensus" i s
beginning to emerge which will permit a pluralism of economic forms (mnogoukladnost') along
the lines of the original NEP-era model .
What such an eventuality portends for the larger program of economic reform an d
development as well as the entire process of social, economic, and political transition ,
however, is unclear . In the short term, it may be a blessing since the labor that mus t
ii
eventually be released by a successful reform of agriculture currently has no place to go and
cannot be effectively used at a time when the industrial economy must also face large-scale lay offs to improve its productivity . As in the Stolypin case, a gradual reform that retains labor i n
the countryside may well be a prerequisite for the preservation of political stability during thi s
complex transition. On the other hand, a gradual process of agrarian reform, whether it result s
in agricultural crisis and a breakdown in the food supply system or simply serves as a
continuing brake on Russia's hopes for industrial development by helping preserve a reservoi r
of conservatism in the countryside, could undermine both economic and political reform an d
hence the entire transition . The dilemma facing Russia's policy makers today remains the sam e
as it has over the past two centuries : how to balance the country's need for political stability
with the demand for economic development .
iii
"DEMISE OF THE MORAL IMPERATIVE :
AGRICULTURAL REFORM IN RUSSIA TODAY "
David A .J. Macey
Middlebury College
Introductio n
By all accounts, agriculture in both Russia and the Soviet Union has been in a state o f
almost permanent crisis over the past two centuries or so . Beginning with the identification of
a "peasant question" by the first public critics of serfdom in the late 18th century, this wa s
transformed into an "agrarian" or "land question in the second half of the 19th century ." B y
the 20th century, it had become a "grain problem ." The evolution in the description an d
content of these problems reflects, of course, the differing social contexts within which they
arose and the immediate task that had to be accomplished . Thus, there was the emancipatio n
of the peasantry in 1861 which followed Russia's defeat in the Crimean War ; the Stolypin
agrarian reforms and their program of individualization and privatization which followed th e
revolutionary challenges of 1905-6 ; the compulsory expropriation and redistribution of lan d
during and following the revolutions of 1917 ; and, of course, the collectivization of agricultur e
that accompanied Stalin's 1928/29 "Revolution from Above . "2
However, at the root of each of these "cursed questions" was always a concern wit h
agricultural output and productivity and, ultimately, the state's persistent drive to overcome it s
perceived "backwardness" vis-à-vis the more advanced countries to its west by fosterin g
economic development . Meanwhile, each of these "problems" has in turn been identified a s
one of the most significant factors contributing to the country's major political crises in th e
19th and 20th centuries . So much was this the case, indeed, that the language of crisis wa s
repeatedly transferred from the political to the agricultural sphere, and, often with little basi s
in fact, warnings of dire consequences to the nation's agricultural system and ultimately it s
food supply were bandied about with the goal of either encouraging or preventing both politica l
and agrarian reform .' As a consequence, "solutions" to the political crisis have inevitably als o
involved a major campaign to reorganize the country's agrarian structure . However, becaus e
such reforms were introduced as a by-product of partisan struggle and political change, thei r
more rational economic core has repeatedly been subordinated to the existing regime' s
immediate political and social needs . Only with the passing of the political crisis was i t
possible for the underlying economic concerns to return to the center of attention .
1
In part because of this ongoing heritage and the close linkage between political an d
agrarian change, it is not therefore especially surprising to find that the collapse of bot h
communism and the Soviet empire between 1985 and 1991 have also been accompanied by th e
emergence of an "agricultural problem" as well as renewed efforts at agrarian reform .'
Moreover, like its predecessors . this reform too was preceded both by what seemed to be an
interminable period of discussion, which focused on the various economic shortcomings and
outright failures of the existing agricultural system, as well as by various limited experiment s
designed to test out possible solutions .' Yet, despite the acknowledged need to introduc e
changes, the political struggle surrounding this latest round of reform has exaggerated both th e
real nature of the crisis and the associated problems .' As a result, the program that wa s
finally adopted was motivated primarily by the moral imperative to destroy the last vestiges o f
Stalinism in the agricultural economy and hence was fundamentally misconceived . Only wit h
the demise of this imperative will it become possible to address the underlying economi c
issues .
The Historical Legac y
Historians have yet to agree precisely as to what was the precipitating cause or even t
leading to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 .7 Traditionally, however, it has been assume d
that among the reasons for serfdom's abolition was that it was in a state of economic crisis .
This, however, has been demonstrated not to be the case .' On the other hand, Russia's defeat
by England and France in the Crimean War undoubtedly played a role in challenging politica l
complacency . Even more important were the inauguration of a new tsar and the indirec t
influence of western social models and opinion .' For, ultimately, the emancipation o f
Russia's serf population and the elimination of the so-called peasant problem was conceived a s
but one phase of a larger program of "perestroika" or renovation of the tsarist system know n
as the "Great Reforms" that was designed to accelerate Russia's social and economi c
development in order to preserve its "great power" status . Given what was assumed to be th e
retardative influence of serfdom, a major component of this program was to have been th e
transformation of Russia's serfs into free peasant proprietors based on the private ownership o f
land. However, in the course of the reform's preparation, the government's overwhelmin g
fear of provoking social and political unrest and economic instability led it to strengthen the
traditional peasant commune as a unit of local administration, and with it the peasants '
traditional and communal land-use practices, and all at the expense of the original economi c
goal of increasing agricultural productivity by encouraging the development of mor e
2
individualistic and productive forms of agriculture . 10 Thus, while the "peasant problem" may
have been "solved," the very solution sowed the seeds of a new "agrarian problem . "
Discussion of this agrarian problem surfaced within a decade of the Emancipation' s
enactment . As conceived by contemporaries, and particularly the government's revolutionar y
opposition, its essence was land hunger, brought on by the inadequate provision of land at th e
time of emancipation, a rapid growth in population in subsequent decades, and the emergenc e
of a supposed "crisis of the three-field system ." However, from the government's point o f
view, the real problem was less the quantity of land cultivated by the peasantry than it was the
backwardness of Russia's economy as a whole vis à-vis the west and especially the low leve l
of agricultural productivity which acted as a break on industrial development . Increasingly ,
leading officials began to talk of the need for a "second emancipation" that would encourage
the growth of both land and labor productivity and hence permit the realization of the socia l
and economic goals behind the original emancipation . "
However, the "solution" to this agrarian problem, when it came, came in the midst of a
revolutionary crisis and was enacted as part of a larger program of social and political refor m
designed to rebuild the regime's support and bring Russia into the twentieth century . In
particular, it was designed to win back peasant support by offering an alternative to mor e
popular proposals for the "compulsory expropriation" of noble land . As a consequence, th e
long-term economic goal of increasing agricultural productivity and output by gradually an d
voluntarily breaking up the "backward" peasant commune, privatizing landholdings, an d
individualizing production was subordinated to the short-term political goal of destroying th e
"socialist bacillus" presumed to be inherent in the commune and converting peasants int o
private property owners as rapidly as possible . To this end, the government began issuin g
what were essentially worthless certificates of title to unconsolidated strips of land tha t
remained within the commune as well as encouraging small numbers of individual peasan t
"pioneers" to leave the commune and form single, compact and integral farms or "khutora "
(ideally shaped like a square) to which their cottage and other farm buildings would b e
relocated.12
Not surprisingly, the social conflict that was generated by this strategy of reform "fro m
above" seemed to many to be counterproductive and threaten the reestablishment of politica l
order . However, with the passing of the immediate crisis, the reforms' underlying economi c
goals began to reassert themselves and the government increasingly placed local interests at th e
center of attention and provided greater opportunities for compromise between supporters an d
opponents of change ." Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I and then the growin g
crisis leading to the February Revolution of 1917 not only cut short otherwise promisin g
3
possibilities for success over the long term, they effectively destroyed the only viabl e
alternative to its critic's program of compulsory expropriation .
Inevitably, the collapse of tsarism gave the revolutionary opposition its chance t o
experiment with a full-scale program of land redistribution as a solution to Russia's agraria n
problem, though in fact, to win peasant support for the revolution, they had no choice but t o
legitimize what was at root a spontaneous seizure of noble lands "from below ." Despite thi s
revolutionary transformation of Russia's social and agrarian structures, agriculture continued t o
be based on the traditional collectivist forms of the peasant commune and the compulsor y
three-field strip system of compulsory crop rotation as well as the equally traditional famil y
centeredness of the peasant household .14 Thus, from the very beginning, the Bolshevi k
regime, whose long-term goals were also those of economic development and modernization ,
though embedded within a revolutionary program of social and political transformation, wa s
not only confronted with the retardative economic consequences of an agrarian program tha t
had been adopted under immediate political pressures to consolidate social support but also on e
that could eventually also undermine its political legitimacy . Meanwhile, before suc h
consequences could run their course, the new regime was confronted with a food supply o r
"grain problem" which it inherited from tsarism and was a direct result of the War .
Following the 1917 Revolution, the regime's paramount political concern to win the civi l
war and consolidate its own power quickly forced it to "solve" the problem of feeding th e
cities and the army by adopting a system of forcible grain requisitions (prodrazverstki) .
However, while contributing to victory in the civil war, these policies only precipitated a new
series of crises that, among other things, all but lost the Bolsheviks the support of th e
peasantry . In response, Lenin was forced to adopt his New Economic Policy, which, in th e
realm of agriculture, involved the restoration of trade and a return to the pre-revolutionary
system of voluntary marketings of grain ." Successful in the short run in reviving agricultura l
production and producing both a food surplus and raw materials for industry, the ongoing driv e
to fulfill its implicit social contract with the population also compelled the new government t o
pursue a variety of experimental policies designed to encourage agricultural modernization .
Stalin's 1929 program of total collectivization, which evolved out of the largely unsuccessfu l
experiments with various but voluntary forms of collective agricultural production as well a s
the persistence of the "grain problem" as manifest by declines in the marketing of grain and it s
delivery to the state, was the final choice . But here, too, in the last analysis, agrarian change
was largely derivative of political change--above all the attempt to build a "truly" socialis t
society and the consequent launching of the industrialization drive and the first of the five-yea r
plans . And, as with the earlier policy of prodrazverstki, the political imperative to establis h
4
once and for all the state's absolute control over agriculture and the countryside as a necessar y
prerequisite effectively sabotaged the regime's ability to achieve its ultimate goal . 16 Thus ,
collectivization, which was truly a "second serfdom," was launched at such a dizzying spee d
that, even though Stalin was forced, first, to slow the pace and, then, to compromise his pla n
by allowing peasants to retain a household plot, it ultimately led to the devastating famine o f
1932/3 and even, some would argue, the Soviet Union's eventual collapse in 1991 .17 Suc h
were the costs of subordinating long-term economic needs to short-term political imperatives .
Only by placing current efforts at agrarian reform within this context can we now begi n
to understand what precisely is happening in the Russian countryside today . Following Stalin's
death, economic concerns once again came to the fore, and for the next forty years successiv e
regimes sought to rectify the errors of Stalin's collectivization without, however, reversin g
it.18 The principal problem to be addressed was that of almost total neglect in matter s
concerning both social issues and the question of raising productivity . Thus, over the nex t
thirty years, ever greater quantities of capital were invested in the agricultural sector in orde r
to compensate for this neglect and to provide incentives to state and collective farmers t o
increase output and thereby also to raise rural and urban standards of living . This program
was also, of course, an essential component in the construction of the post-Stalinist regime' s
social contract with the population . Money and capital were not all that was required ,
however . Given Russian agriculture's eternally low productivity vis-à-vis the west, mor e
direct efforts were also undertaken to increase both land and labor productivity . Two
additional strategies were followed : on the one hand, repeated searches for a technological fix ,
whether in the form of "genetic engineering," new crops or rotations, or the use of pesticide s
and fertilizers ; on the other, a never ending series of attempts to restructure production unit s
and within them the individual work units . Finally, there were repeated attempts at the
reorganization of the state's administrative apparatus in charge of agriculture .
And, to give the reformers their due, both agricultural output as well as rural and urba n
standards of living grew from the mid-1950s through the mid-1970s--years that were not onl y
the heyday of Russian and Soviet agriculture and agrarian reform but also helped build tha t
support for the Stalinist agricultural system which today opposes any further change . Despite
these successes, agriculture never escaped the sense of being on the verge of a crisis, if onl y
one of a permanent labor shortage as rural residents migrated to the cities, and as students ,
factory workers and even the military were repeatedly mobilized to go into the countryside an d
"get in the harvest ." Nor did Russian agriculture ever raise its productivity levels high enoug h
to satisfy either Soviet or western observers let alone "catch up with the west ." Thus, sowing
and harvesting campaigns as well as "reform" became an almost chronic state . Furthermore ,
5
from the second half of the 1970s, a new concern raised its head : the increasingly low, an d
eventually even negative marginal rate of return for each new ruble that was invested i n
agriculture, which meant that the one reasonably successful path of reform during th e
Khrushchev and especially early Brezhnev years, was itself no longer producing the desire d
results . Thus, the general consensus among Russian and western observers was that thirt y
years of tinkering with the Stalinist state and collective farm system had failed to produc e
either desirable or acceptable results . And so, once again, the drive for economic growt h
compelled the state to search for new alternatives . However, as in each of the previous cases ,
not only would agricultural reform once again be derivative of political reform, immediat e
political imperatives would similarly undermine the new regime's long-term economic goals .19
The Search for Alternative s
While both the history of past reforms as well as the concern to foster general economi c
development played their role in influencing the new reforms' shape, the driving force behin d
the series of radical social, economic, and eventually political reforms begun by Mikhai l
Gorbachev under the rubric of perestroika was the moral imperative of eliminating al l
remaining vestiges of the Stalinist system from Russian society, economy, and polity . 20 In
the realm of agriculture this could mean only one thing--the abolition of the state and collectiv e
farm system which Stalin had established in 1929--in effect a "third emancipation . "21 The
more difficult question, however, was what was to be put it its place? During the Gorbache v
years, when the regime was still intent on finally achieving "socialism" in Russia, most talk a s
well as legislation involved some form of a return to what were perceived as Leninist norm s
and a "genuinely" socialist model . The first attempts to look for an alternative thus turned t o
the era immediately prior to Stalin's Revolution from Above : the era of NEP . As seen by it s
proponents, the essence of this NEP model was its mixed economy, which combine d
collective, cooperative and individualistic forms of agricultural production in conjunction wit h
state control of the "commanding heights," which in agriculture meant the procuremen t
agencies and other marketing and supply organizations, though at this stage they were not th e
monopolies they were subsequently to become. Even more important was the rapid increase i n
output that followed its adoption . At the time, however, no one seemed to recognize the basi c
irrelevance of the so-called NEP model given the radically different social and economi c
context in which it would have to be applied . 22
However, even as the Gorbachev regime moved slowly towards accepting a pluralism o f
organizational forms in agriculture, and particularly towards encouraging the formation o f
enterprises based on various types of individual management as alternatives to the state an d
6
cooperative farm system, the Soviet economy entered a period of accelerating decline that wa s
accompanied by repeated threats of agricultural crisis and even famine and starvation . The ne t
result not only undermined socialism and the post-Stalinist social contract it also discredite d
both Gorbachev and the Communist Party itself, leading the regime finally to lose its "mandat e
of heaven:" In agriculture, these social, ideological, and political developments in tur n
provoked talk about the need for more fundamental reforms in the realm of agriculture . And ,
in the spirit of the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, Russia 's anti-Stalinist, westernizing, an d
modernizing reform-minded intellectuals, in conjunction with the newly emerging group o f
Russian nationalists, pursued their search for alternatives to its logical conclusion and turne d
their attention to the last decades of tsarism and the Stolypin program of individualization an d
privatization .24 Such a development, meanwhile, had been prefigured by Gorbachev's ow n
expression of interest in the so-called Stolypin model prior to taking office as Genera l
Secretary. 25
Again, however, the imperative was essentially a moral one . For despite the rhetori c
threatening an imminent descent into the abyss, there was no crisis in agricultural output .
Whatever food shortages existed were largely a result of the breakdown in the traditiona l
distribution system that paralleled the gradual emergence of limited market relations an d
private trading .26 As this crisis of transition deepened, however, the public debate abou t
agrarian reform became increasingly polarized between defenders of the existing system o f
state and collective farms and all those who had a vested interest in it, on the one hand, an d
those who sought the destruction of that system and its replacement by peasant family farms o n
the Stolypin model, on the other.27
However, like the image of NEP held by Gorbachev and his supporters, the image of th e
Stolypin reforms projected in the course of this debate was excessively simplified . In practica l
terms, what a policy based on the Stolypin model meant, in fact, was the gradual establishmen t
of a network of individual family farms, based on either leased or privately owned property ,
and coordinated by a parallel system of private cooperatives . Moreover, ideological inspiratio n
for this program also came from the writings of Aleksandr V . Chaianov, the ideologist o f
peasant family farming and cooperatives during the NEP, though the Organization-Productio n
School with which he was associated was itself a by-product of the Stolypin experience befor e
the revolution . 28 Despite the relative moderation of their program, these proponents of th e
Stolypin and/or Chaianov models soon found themselves in a long-protracted debate over th e
merits of permitting the private ownership of agricultural land, including rights of fre e
disposability—a debate that itself had deep roots in similar discussions preceding th e
emancipation of the serfs as well as in the decades preceding and following the Stolypi n
7
reforms prior to 1917 . Moreover, and notwithstanding Yeltsin's recent October 1993 decree o n
private property, the issue remains a matter of bitter contention . 29
To be sure, the supporters of individual private farming are highly critical of th e
existing system . However, they are also quite well aware that the existing system of state an d
collective farms can not be abolished by a "stroke of the pen," overnight as it were, if onl y
because it provides such a vital portion of the food supply . Nor are they opposed to all form s
of collectivism as their opponents seem to imply since, as we have seen, they also support th e
widespread development of cooperatives to take over many of the functions now fulfilled by
the state's monopolistic systems for marketing and supply . Rather, they can perhaps best b e
described, like Gorbachev and his former supporters, as proponents of a pluralism of economi c
forms in agriculture that would permit an entire range, from state and collective farms to
individual peasants farms and even the private household plots--on condition only that eac h
independent unit prove its economic viability within an overall market system . Nor do they
necessarily support the elimination of all government subsidies, particularly those that go t o
individual
.30farmes
At the same time, opponents of the state and collective farm system, who are not
necessarily identical to the supporters of individual peasant farms, have also contributed t o
polarizing the discussion of reform alternatives by focusing on the question of state subsidies t o
agriculture and demanding their elimination and hence the elimination, presumably, of all bu t
the most profitable such farms .31 But here, too, there is a significant degree o f
misrepresentation in that much of what the state and collective farm managers are currentl y
demanding from the state is not simply subsidies but justifiable payments for crops delivere d
and/or loans to cover the expenditures necessary to permit future plantings and harvesting .
Thus, as the managers correctly argue in their defense, the elimination of such "subsidies "
would indeed be but a precursor to the collapse of the state and collective farm system an d
with it, of course, the principal source of agricultural products in Russia . Meanwhile, it i s
quite inaccurate to portray the supporters of the existing system as necessarily opposed to th e
development of a parallel private farming sector .32
Thus, at present, all sides to this debate seem to be caught up in a highly moralistic an d
hence polarized political struggle in which their cries of imminent crisis, far from reflectin g
objective economic conditions, are rather part of a political struggle to coerce the governmen t
to support their respective programs . 33 Meanwhile, over the past few years, repeate d
predictions of crisis have been buried by the reality of a series of relatively good, eve n
"bumper" harvests--which create their own problems in that the existing infrastructure lacks th e
capacity even to handle an average harvest . 34 On the other hand, the mini-crises which have
8
perpetuated traditional Soviet-style campaign tactics during the sowing and harvesting season s
remain a regular feature of rural life .35 However, the fact that there is no crisis as yet doe s
not mean that one may not develop in the near future . Meanwhile, were reform to b e
successful, it would have the paradoxical result of creating an increase in output that is no t
only unnecessary but which the system is unable to handle . Thus, in order to bring supply an d
demand into equilibrium, the government would be forced to reduce the number of agricultura l
producers—the ultimate though largely implicit goal of any successful reform . And while the
resources released by such a program could be used to foster Russia's industrial development ,
in the short-term the result would only be a further increase in unemployment . Indeed, it i s
undoubtedly this underlying threat that is responsible for mobilizing many of the often striden t
opponents of reform . 36 More important, this debate over the supposed merits of legitimizin g
private property in agricultural land and granting agricultural subsidies has effectively diverte d
the public discussion away from more fundamental questions about the proper path o f
agricultural reform .
The Contemporary Program of Agrarian Refor m
What then were the principal reform strategies adopted by the Gorbachev and Yeltsi n
governments and what have been their results? Following hallowed Soviet tradition, the mai n
thrust of the government's agrarian policy since 1985 has been to create new incentives fo r
rural workers in order to stimulate the desired increase in productivity . At first, this involve d
creating alternatives to the state and collective farm system by offering up various kinds o f
individual and group leasing along lines originally proposed by Ivan Khudenko, the highl y
successful reformer of the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years who was eventuall y
rejected by the system as a threat .37 Having met with little success, first the Soviet and the n
the Russian government, under the powerful influence of the anti-Stalinist moral imperative ,
pushed ahead on the path of privatization, attempting to encourage first the creation o f
individual peasant family farms and then the de-nationalization (razgosudarstvlenie) or juridica l
privatization of the state and collective farms and their transformation into alternative an d
private forms of organization such as joint-stock companies, limited liability associations, an d
real cooperatives as well as individual peasant farms .38
Promising as these reforms seemed to be in theoretical terms, not only have they alread y
run their course, they have also come virtually to naught . To date some 269,900 individual
farms have been formed in the Russian republic and some two-thirds of the 26,000 state and
collective farms have been restructured, primarily as joint stock companies, or secondarily a s
cooperatives, while the other third have reaffirmed their status as state or collective farms .
9
Despite these essentially juridical changes, not only have neither productivity nor output
increased, they have in fact steadily declined in virtually all sectors of the agricultural econom y
with the possible exception of grain production . Meanwhile state collections for all product s
have fallen precipitously . Furthermore, there have been no significant changes in th e
structure of agricultural production . 39
Thus, the so-called Stolypin farmers, turned out in practice to be not the progressive ,
market-oriented fermerskie khoziaistva that their supporters, like the original supporters of th e
Stolypin reforms, heralded as "pioneers" in forging a new future for Russia . On the contrary ,
these so-called pioneers represent but a reversion to peasant-type subsistence-farming that i s
even less productive than the infamous "private plots ." And even though a majority of th e
state and collective farms have been transformed into non-state-owned enterprises, the whol e
process of denationalization was largely based on a formalistic understanding of wester n
conceptions of privatization and hence has produced few changes in economic behavior .40
Why is this so? Why have these developments, which seemed so promising to western eyes ,
proved so singularly unsuccessful ?
In part, as always, one might argue that not enough time has elapsed for us to trul y
determine what the real results of these reforms might be . In part, too, however, as Stephe n
K . Wegren has argued, the reforms failed largely because the changes being proposed lacke d
any basis of social support, no matter how "rational" they may seem to western or western educated Russian economists . And he has elucidated the many factors that contributed to thi s
lack of support .41 Even more significant, however, as I have argued elsewhere, thes e
reforms failed because they were fundamentally misconceived .42 However, it has bee n
difficult for us to see this until now because the propaganda war surrounding the reforms ha s
served to obscure not only the real situation in agriculture, making everyone believe that in th e
short term the problem was one of output, but also the full nature of the underlying problem s
bedeviling Russian agriculture and hence what were the most appropriate means to resolv e
them .
Thus, I would argue, that both forms of "privatization," the individualization o f
agricultural management and the denationalization of the state and collective farms, have so fa r
proved unsuccessful because those who sponsored the reforms failed to take into account th e
realities of the Russian economic system within which these different kinds of producer units
operated . As a result, despite the many changes that have occurred, such changes have bee n
purely formal, and Russian agriculture has continued to function largely within the confines o f
the larger economic system consisting of the traditional state monopolies that control th e
purchase, marketing and supply of agricultural inputs and outputs and that in turn continue t o
10
function on the basis of state orders and state subsidies as if there had been no changes .
Meanwhile, true, market-type relations, although they have begun to develop, have effectivel y
been limited to this system's periphery . Worse, the so-called privatization of both the stat e
and collective farms as well as the "wholesale" level of the marketing and suppl y
infrastructures have only reinforced their monopolistic positions vis-à-vis both individua l
farmers and the former state and collective farms . 43
In this context, it also becomes clear that it was precisely the anti-Stalinist imperative
that prevented reformers from fully understanding either the NEP or Stolypin models that they
sought to adopt . For in the ideologically polarized environment in which the reformers wer e
operating, they had virtually no choice, it seems, but to focus on the issue of state vs . private
ownership or state subsidies vs . a free market . Yet, in neither the Stolypin nor especially the
NEP cases was property ownership the central issue . In the case of NEP, the sudden surge i n
productivity and output which was so appealing to would-be reformers came as a result of th e
restoration of a market and the huge expansion of both public and private trade and not of th e
peasants' transformation into private property owners . On the contrary, not only did the lan d
remain the property of the state, as it had been since 1918, but the peasants themselve s
conducted their agriculture overwhelmingly according to traditional, pre-revolutionary, eve n
pre-Stolypin practices, based on the three-field system of compulsory crop rotation, and withi n
the traditional peasant commune with its system of periodical land redistribution . 44
Insofar as the Stolypin reforms were concerned, meanwhile, there is little evidence tha t
one can cite to support often-heard claims that the increases in productivity and/or output tha t
occurred during the ten years of their operation were due to the introduction of privat e
property ownership or other aspects of the reforms . Rather, what improvements did take plac e
have almost universally been considered to be a result of favorable weather conditions .45
More important, the Stolypin Reforms did not even intend to introduce " private " property i n
the sense that this term is used in current debates . What, in fact, was being offered was
known in the legal parlance of the time as "personal" property and was clearly distinguishe d
from "private" property by the various legal limitations the tsarist government placed on th e
right of peasants' and non-peasants to buy and sell agricultural land .46 Moreover, although i t
was intended to grant peasants the right to mortgage their allotment land, and although law s
were passed to that effect on two occasions, the ability to mortgage allotment land neve r
became a reality, in large part because of fears that such land would be taken out of peasan t
hands in the case of foreclosures .47
Despite these caveats, it must also be acknowledged that the Stolypin reforms held rea l
promise for a successful transformation of Russian agriculture, in the long term . 48 But here,
11
too, it was only in part because of the transformation from communal to individual propert y
ownership or, perhaps, more accurately, land-use . For, as was the case with the "successes "
of NEP, this promise depended even more on the fact that these changes were taking plac e
within a larger economic environment that had long been operating on the basis of a well developed capitalist-style market . As A .N . Engelgardt noted on reflecting about his own
efforts to introduce private property and individualistic forms of agricultural enterprise into th e
Russian countryside in the aftermath of the emancipation of the serfs, not only was there no
evidence that changes in the forms of ownership necessarily led to transformations i n
consciousness and hence to new forms of behavior but there was also no reason to believe tha t
the widespread adoption of such new forms was even possible in the face of a n
overwhelmingly hostile environment that actively supported the traditional system of communa l
landownership and use .49 Such observations, it seems, apply equally to the era in which the y
were written as they do to the present .50
Alternative Programs and Prospects for the Futur e
Thus, I would argue that the real or primary problem lies neither with the volume o f
agricultural output in Russia today nor with the existing system of state and collective farms ,
though they are undoubtedly in need of reform . Nor, I would argue, does the solution lie wit h
a vast program to create individual peasant farms based on private property ownership, for any
such program is clearly anachronistic in principle and ultimately absurd in conception sinc e
there have long been no real peasants in Russia anyway, while those who do live in th e
countryside are largely older citizens, a significant majority of whom are women .5 1
Paradoxically, however, the one area of success in Russian agriculture continues to be that o f
the traditional "private plots" which these rural, as well as urban, residents cultivate in thei r
own free time . Nonetheless, a country's agricultural system cannot be based on such massivel y
labor-intensive plots, which, in any event, are parasitic of the state and collective farm system ,
any more than one can expect a countryside with Russia's demographic characteristics t o
provide an alternative to the state and collective farm system .52 Rather, the real problem lie s
with the backwardness of the agricultural infrastructure and the ubiquitous waste it creates .
Indeed, were output in fact the problem, output could easily be boosted, according to some
accounts by as much as fifty per cent, simply by eliminating this waste . 53 And that could be
done without the huge and wrenching disruptions involved in remaking the entire system o f
agricultural management and production simply by improving the delivery and storage systems .
In part, too, the problem lies with monopolistic marketing and supply agencies that today ar e
milking the farmers dry . Here, the solution clearly involves the break-up of these monopolies
12
and the creation of either several competing units in a given area or perhaps by encouragin g
the development
.54 of truly producer-owned cooperativ eorganizts
And it is precisely here that the anti-Stalinist imperative and the propaganda war ove r
private property ownership and state subsidies have performed their greatest disservice b y
limiting public discussion and preventing the consideration of two other reform initiatives tha t
seem to offer alternatives to the current stalemate : on the one hand, Aleksandr Rutskoi' s
program for privatizing the supply and marketing organizations and modernizing th e
infrastructure, which was issued in the spring of 1993 ;55 on the other hand, the so-calle d
Nizhnii Novgorod program of breaking-up collective farms into small numbers of autonomou s
and functionally specialized units, including individual farms, which was developed by th e
International Finance Corporation division of the World Bank and which Prime Ministe r
Chernomyrdin recently adopted as the model for all future agrarian reform in Russia. 56
Unfortunately, while Rutskoi and his advisers focused attention in the right arena, insufficien t
attention was devoted to creating competition so that it would appear that his proposal, while
properly seeking to modernize the infrastructure, would only have created new monopolisti c
monsters.57 Moreover, the adoption of the Rutskoi program would be immensely expensive .
Thus, given the current bankruptcy of both government and society, and the difficulty o f
obtaining foreign investment, the time for its realization on any significant scale seems to hav e
passed.
Insofar as the Nizhnii Novgorod model is concerned, this latest candidate for a panacea ,
too, seems unlikely to have widespread application . To be sure, its successful adoption may
well encourage the gradual break-up of state and collective farms, but "gradual" is th e
operative word given its voluntary nature and the length of time it has taken to achieve th e
break-up of the three Nizhnii Novgorod farms . More important, such a program wil l
undoubtedly facilitate the destruction of the monopolistic roles of these farms at the local level .
As a result, such reforms will not only encourage the formation of competing units but wil l
also create a more competitive market environment for individual farmers as well . In the end ,
however, this program's impact will likely also be limited since whatever new units are create d
will still be forced to operate within the existing monopolistic and quasi-state system o f
marketing and supply networks not to mention the totally antiquated and inadequate
infrastructure . Furthermore, the cost of implementing this reform is also extremely high . 58
Thus, the real alternatives would appear to be two . The first is a Leninist-type scenario
of "the worse the better" according to which only a complete collapse of the agricultura l
system will ultimately be able to force the all-important changes in behavior amon g
government officials, farm managers, and farm workers that are ultimately presumed essentia l
13
to a successful reformation of the system .59 In fact, such a scenario may well be one of th e
calculations behind current attacks on the state and collective farm system . On the other hand .
however, this is a dangerous game since the collapse of that system could equally wel l
reinvigorate the supporters of the statist approach in at least a partial if largely political repla y
of the transformation from NEP to collectivization--even if in the end the outcome were onl y
to support Marx's dictum that the second time around the result would be not tragedy bu t
farce . The other alternative seems, therefore, to be a more moderate though less appealin g
policy of "muddling through" that will see only a very slow and gradual shift from a state dominated agricultural system to one that is made up of the full range of agricultural forms .
On the basis of existing evidence, it seems that the latter case will prove the more likely i n
large part because there does not appear to be any immediate threat of agricultural crisis o r
collapse . More important, the gradual demise of the anti-Stalinist moral imperative tha t
inspired the movement for reform in the first place seems to have produced a loss of politica l
will at the center that will doubtless encourage such a policy of "muddling-through" and ,
hence, the "return of the repressed" economic core of the reform program to center stage .60
Indeed, to some extent, just such a moderate "consensus" has already begun to emerge .61
What such an eventuality portends for the larger program of economic reform an d
development as well as the entire process of social, economic, and political transition ,
however, is unclear . In the short term, it may in fact be a blessing since the labor that mus t
eventually be released by a successful reform of agriculture currently has no place to go an d
cannot be effectively used at a time when the industrial economy must also face large-scale lay offs to improve its productivity . Thus, as was assumed in the Stolypin case, a gradual refor m
that retains a good portion of the labor in the countryside may well be a prerequisite for th e
preservation of political stability during this complex transition .62 On the other hand, such a
gradual process of agrarian reform, whether it results in a genuine agricultural crisis and a
breakdown in the food supply system or simply serves as a continuing brake on Russia's hope s
for industrial development, by helping preserve a reservoir of conservatism in the countryside ,
could ultimately undermine both economic and political reform and hence the entire transition .
Thus the dilemma of agrarian reform facing Russia's policy makers today remains the same a s
it has over the past two centuries or so--how to balance the country's need for political stabilit y
with the demand for economic development .°
14
ENDNOTE S
1 Some of the work preparatory to this paper was supported by a grant from the National Council for Soviet an d
East European Research. I would like to thank Don Van Atta for encouraging me to develop my ideas on this topi c
and also for contributing to their refinement, as well as Lars Lih, Ron Liebowitz and George Bellerose fo r
comments on an earlier version .
2 General overviews of Russian rural problems and agrarian history can be found in V .I . Semevskii, Krest'ianski i
vopros v Rossii v XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka . 2 vols . (St . Petersburg : Obshchestvennaia pol'za, 1888) ; Lazar
Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture : From Alexander II to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University
Press, 1970) ; Dorothy Atkinson, The End of the Russian Commune, 1905-1930 (Stanford : Stanford University Press ,
1983) ; and George Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861-1930 (Urbana : University o f
Illinois Press, 1982) . On the emancipation see W . Bruce Lincoln, In the Vanguard of Reform : Russia's Enlightened
Bureaucrats 1825-1861(DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press, 1982) ; and Danield Field, The End of Serfdom :
Nobility and Bureaucracy in Russia, 1855-1861 (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1976) ; on the Stolypi n
reforms, see David A .J . Macey, Government and Peasant in Russia, 1861-1906: The Prehistory of the Stolypi n
Reforms (DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press, 1987) ; on 1917, see Graeme J. Gill, Peasants and Governmen t
in the Russian Revolution (London : Macmillan, 1979) ; and John L .H . Keep, The Russian Revolution: A Study i n
Mass Mobilization (New York : W .W. Norton & Co . Inc., 1976), pp . pp . 383-463 ; on NEP and the collectivization ,
see Robert G . Wesson, Soviet Communes (New Brunswick, N .J . : Rutgers University Press, 1963) ; V .P . Danilov ,
Rural Russia Under the New Regime . Translated and introduced by Orlando Figes, (Bloomington : Indiana
University Press, 1988) ; R .W . Davies, The Industrialization of Soviet Russia . Vol . I . The Socialist Offensive: Th e
Collectivization of Agriculture, 1929-1930 . (Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, 1980) ; Moshe Lewin ,
Russian Peasants and Soviet Power : A Study of Collectivization (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968) ;
and appropriate volumes in E .H . Carr's A History of Soviet Russia : The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol . 2
(Baltimore : Penguin Books, 1952, rpt . 1966) ; The Interregnum, 1923-1924 (Baltimore : Penguin Books, 1954, rpt .
1969) ; Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926, Vol . I (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1958, rpt . 1970) ; and with
R .W . Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929. Vol . I . (Harmondsworth : Penguin Books, 1969, rpt .
1974) .
3 On the various "crises" : at the end of the 19th century, see the latest discussions by Steven L . Hoch, "On Goo d
Numbers and Bad : Malthus, Population Trends and Peasant Standard of Living in Late Imperial Russia," Slavi c
Review, 53 :1 (Spring 1994), 42-75 ; Stephen G . Wheatcroft, "Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Lat e
Imperial Russsia" in Esther Kingston-Mann and Timothy Mixter, eds ., Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of
European Russia, 1800-1921 (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1991), pp . 128-172 ; and Robert Bideleux ,
"Agricultural Advance Under the Russian Village Commune ." in Roger Bartlett . ed . . Land Commune and Peasant
Community in Russia: Communal Forms in Imperial and Early Soviet Society (New York : St . Martin's Press, 1990) ,
pp . 196-218 . For 1917, see Lars T . Lih, Bread and Authority in Russia, 1914-1921 (Berkeley : University o f
California Press, 1990) ; and Yaney, Urge to Mobilize, pp . 409-497 . And for collectivization, Jerzy F . Karcz ,
"From Stalin to Brezhnev : Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective" in James R . Millar, ed ., The Soviet
Rural Community : A Symposium (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1971), pp . 36-70 ; Davies, Collectivization
of Soviet Agriculture, pp. 1-108 ; Moshe Lewin, The Making of the Soviet System : Essays in the Social History of
Interwar Russia (New York : Pantheon Books, 1985) pp . 91-120 ; and Lewin, Russian Peasants, pp . 214-249 .
4 Stephen K . Wegren, "Rural Reform and Political Culture in Russia," Europe-Asia Studies, 46 :2 (1994), p . 217 .
5 On post-Stalinist agriculture and agricultural policy, see Sidney I . Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet
Russia : A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1965) ; Arcadiu s
Kahan, "Agriculture," in Allen Kassof, ed ., Prospects for Soviet Society (New York : Frederick A . Praeger, 1968) ,
pp . 263-90 ; Erich Strauss, Soviet Agriculture in Perspective (New York : Frederick A . Praeger, 1969) ; Millar, Soviet
Rural Community ; D . Gale Johnson and Karen McConnell Brooks, Prospects for Soviet Agriculture in the 1980s
(Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1983) ; Robert C . Stuart, ed ., The Soviet Rural Economy (Totowa, N .J . :
Rowman & Allanheld, 1984) ; Stefan Hedlund, Crisis in Soviet Agriculture. (New York : St . Martin's Press, 1984) ;
15
Zhores A . Medvedev, Soviet Agriculture . 1st ed . (New York : W .W . Norton & Co ., 1987) ; A .V . Rutskoi ,
Agrarnaia reforma v Rossii (Moscow : Pau-Korporatsiia, 1993), pp . 8-18, 53-63, 153-160 .
6 See recent talk of a crisis in Robert M . Birkenes, "Grain Crisis in the Soviet Union," Report on the USSR, 2 ,
No. 32 (Aug . 10, 1990), pp . 9-10 ; Tim Ash et al ., "USSR Harvest Failure Forecast," Report on the USSR . 3 :3 4
(Aug . 23, 1991), 1-3 ; Mark Rhodes, "Food Supply in the USSR," Report on the USSR, 3 :41 (Oct . 11, 1991), 11 16 ; Tim Ash et al ., "USSR Harvest : Bleak Future for Food Supplies," Report on the USSR, 3, No . 45 (Nov . 8 ,
1991), pp . 7-10 .
7 Field, End of Serfdom, pp . 1-7 .
8 Petr B . Struve, Krepostnoe khoziaistvo. Izsledovaniia po ekonomicheskoi istorii Rossii v XXIII i XIX vv. (Sankt
Peterburg : M . i S .Sabashnikovykh, 1913) ; and Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York : Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1974), pp . 163 and 326, f.n . 22.
9 Larissa Zakharova, "Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861-1874 in Russia : Chosing Paths of Development," i n
Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova, eds ., Russia's Great Reforms, 1855-1881 (Bloomington : Indian a
University Press, 1994), pp . 19-3 9
10 See Lincoln, In the Vanguard , passim ; and W . Bruce Lincoln, The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy ,
and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia (DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press, 1990), p . 89 ; Macey ,
Government and Peasant, pp . 10-11 . Cf. W .E . Mosse, Perestroika Under the Tsars (New York : I .B . Taut-is &
Co . Ltd, 1992) .
11 Macey, Government and Peasant, p . 5 . The term is used by V . Gerb'e, Vtoroe raskreposhchenie, 19 fevrali a
1861-14 iiunia 1910: obshchaia preniia po ukazu 9 noiabria 1906 g . v gosudarstvennoi dume i v gosudarstvenno m
sovete (Moscow, 1911) .
12 Macey, Government and Peasant, chapter 7 and passim, and especially p. 106 .
13 Judith Pallot, "Did the Stolypin Land Reform Destroy the Peasant Commune?" and David A .J . Macey ,
"Government Actions and Peasant Reactions During the Stolypin Reforms" in Robert B . McKean, ed ., New
Perspectives in Modern Russian History: Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and Eas t
European Studies, Harrogate, 1990 (London : Macmillan, 1992), pp . 117-173 ; also David A .J . Macey, "The Peasant
Commune and the Stolypin Reforms: Peasant Attitudes, 1906-1914," in Bartlett, Land Commune and Peasan t
Community, pp . 219-236 .
14 Atkinson, Russian Land Commune, chapters 10 and 12 ; Danilov, Rural Russia , passim .
15 See Lih . Bread and Authority, passim ; Orlando Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War: the Volga Countryside i n
Revolution (1917-1921) (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1989), pp . 246-73 .
16 See works cited in f.n . 1 and 2, above, by Karcz, Lewin, Davies, Atkinson, Danilov, as well as Rober t
Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow : Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York : Oxford Universit y
Press, 1986) ; and Hiroshi Okuda, "The Final Stage of the Russian Peasant Commune" Its Improvement and th e
Strategy of Collectivization" in Bartlett, Land Commune and Peasant Community, pp . 254-71 .
17 On concessions, Stephen K . Wegren, "From Stalin to Gorbachev : the Role of the Soviet Communist Party i n
the Implementation of Agricultural Policy," Studies in Comparative Communism, Vol . XXIII, No . 2 (Summer
1990), p . 182 commenting on Daniel Thorniley, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Rural Communist Parry, 1927-3 9
(New York : St . Martin's Press, 1988) . Also, see Teodor Shanin, "Four Models : Soviet Agriculture under
Perestroika: The Most Urgent Task and the Furthest Shore (1987-8), in Teodor Shanin . Defining Peasants : Essays
Concerning Rural Societies, Expolary Economies, and Learning From Them in the Contemporary World (Oxford :
Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp . 188-205 .
16
18 In addition to the works cited above in f .n . 4 on post-Stalinist agriculture and agricultural policy, see th e
following on the background to the current round of reforms which also throw light on these questions : Josef C .
Brada and Karl-Eugen Wãdekin, eds ., Socialist Agriculture in Transition : Organizational Response to Failing
Performance (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1988) ; Alec Nove, Soviet Agriculture : The Brezhnev Legacy and
Gorbachev's Cure (N .p . : Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1988) ; rpt . in Ferenc
Feher and Andrew Arato, eds ., Gorbachev: The Debate (Atlantic Highlands, N .J . : Humanities Press International ,
1989), pp . 169-220 ; Kenneth R . Gray, . ed ., Soviet Agriculture: Comparative Perspectives (Ames : Iowa State
University Press, 1990) ; Karl-Eugen Wãdekin, ed ., Communist Agriculture: Farming in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe (New York : Routledge, 1990) ; William Moskoff, ed ., Perestroika in the Countryside : Agricultura l
Reform in the Gorbachev Era (Armonk, New York : M .E . Sharpe Inc ., 1990) ; Michael P . Claudon and Tamar L .
Gutner, eds ., Putting Food on What Was the Soviet Table (New York : New York University Press, 1992) ; and Don
Van Atta, ed ., The "Farmer Threat": The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder ,
CO: Westview Press, 1993) .
19 See Stephen K . Wegren, "The Social Contract Reconsidered : Peasant-State Relations in the USSR," Soviet
Geography, XXXII :10 (December 1991), 653-682 on the persistent "urban bias" affecting Soviet agrarian policy .
David A .J . Macey, "Is Agrarian Privatization the Right Path? A Discussion of Historical Models" forthcoming in
The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review (1994) .
20 See especially John Gooding, "Perestroika and the Russian Revolution of 1991," Slavonic and East European
Review, 71 :2 (April 1993), 234-56 ; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Perestroika in Historical Perspective" in Tsuyosh i
Hasegawa and Alex Pravda, eds ., Perestroika: Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policies (London: Sage Publications ,
1990), pp . 25-55 ; and Robert V . Daniels, "Gorbachev's Reforms and the Reversal of History," The History
Teacher, 23 :3 (May 1990), 237-254 . See, too, the discussions by Francis Fukuyama, "The Modernizin g
Imperative," Myron Rush, "Fortune and Fate," and Vladimir Kontorovich, "The Economic Fallacy," in The
National Interest, No . 31 (Spring 1993), pp . 10-18, 19-25, and 35-45 . The role of the struggle with Stalinism i s
also the central theme of R .W . Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution (Bloomington : Indiana
University Press, 1989) ; cf. Walter Laqueur, Stalin: The Glasnost Revelations (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons ,
1990), p . 5 .
21 See the comment in Andrei Shishov, "Nizhegorodtsy deliatsia opytom," Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Mar. 13, 1994 .
22 On the NEP model, see Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New
York : Harper & Row, 1987), pp . 25-6 ; Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov, The Turning Point: Revitalizing the
Soviet Economy (New York : Doubleday, 1989), pp . 8-21, and 284-93 ; Herbert J . Ellison, "Perestroika and the New
Economic Policy (1921-1928) : The Uses of History" in Mel Gurtov, ed ., The Transformation of Socialism :
Perestroika and Reform in the Soviet Union and China (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1990), pp . 21-35 ; Mark von
Hagen, "The NEP, Perestroika, and the Problem of Alternatives," in John E . Tedstrom, ed ., Socialism ,
Perestroika, & the Dilemmas of Soviet Economic Reform (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1990), pp . 40-64 ;
Alexander Dallin, "The Uses and Abuses of Russian History" in Terry L . Thompson and Richard Sheldon, eds . ,
Soviet Society and Culture : Essays in Honor of Vera Dunham (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1988), pp . 181-194 ;
R .W . Davies, "Soviet Economic Reform in Historical Perspective" in Catherine Merridale and Chris Ward, eds . ,
Perestroika: The Historical Perspective (New York : Edward Arnold, 1991), pp . 117-137 ; Davies, Soviet History
in the Gorbachev Revolution, especially pp . 27-46 and 129-63 ; Richard B . Day, "The Blackmail of the Single
Alternative : Bukharin, Trotsky and Perestrojka," Studies in Soviet Thought, No . 40 (1990), 159-88 ; Lars T . Lih ,
"NEP : An Alternative for Soviet Socialism," unpublished mss .
23 On the "social contract," see Peter Hauslohner, "Politics Before Gorbachev : De-Stalinization and the Roots o f
Reform" in Seweryn Big ler, ed., Politics, Society, and Nationality : Inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder : Westview
Press, 1989), pp . 41-90 .
24 See the discussion Stolypin's resurgence in David A .J . Macey, "Stolypin is Risen! The Ideology of Agraria n
Reform in Contemporary Russia" in Van Atta, The "Farmer Threat," pp . 97-120 .
17
25 David A.J. Macey, "Gorbachev and Stolypin : Soviet Agrarian Reform in Historical Perspective," Comparative
Economic Studies, Vol . XXXII, No . 2 (Summer, 1990), p . 13 ; Zhores A . Medvedev, Gorbachev, (New York :
W .W . Norton & Co ., 1987), pp . 203-4 .
26 On the origin, development and breakdown of the state procurement sytem, Stephen K . Wegren, "Two Step s
Forward, One Step Back : The Politics of an Emerging New Rural Social Policy in Russia," The Soviet and Post Soviet Review, 19 :1-3 (1992), 1-12 . On the absence of a crisis, see, for example, Valery Konovalov, "We Aren' t
Threatened with a Food Crisis, Although the Countryside is on the Verge of a Crisis," Izvestiia, Nov . 25, 1993 ,
p . 2 translated in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press [hereafter CDPSP], XLV:47 (1993), pp . 19-20 ; and
Andrei Shmarov, et al ., "Moderate Inflation Rate to Last Until February," Kommersant, Dec . 6, 1993, p . 23
(translated online ; Available : Lexis ; Library : Europe ; File : RusData Dialine-BizEkon News, hereafter BEN] whic h
notes that despite problems the supply of grain exceeded demand . The authors of this article also raise the question
of whether the statistics are not being manipulated by producers and local authorities who undereport to avoid taxe s
and misrepresent their situation . Also, see U .S . Department of Agriculture. Economic Research Service .
International Agriculture and Trade Reports . Situation and Outlook Series. Former USSR. (May 1993), pp . 2-14 ;
"Trouble on the Farm," Economist, 7 Aug . 1993, pp . 57-8 ; Viktor Nefedov and Andrei Sizov, "The Food Potential "
in CDPSP, XLIV, No . 49 (6 Jan . 1993), p . 30; Philip Hanson, "Soviet Food Shortages : Chaos Rather Than
Famine," Report on the USSR, 2 :51 (Dec . 21, 1990), pp . 6-7 ; Birkenes, "Grain Crisis," pp . 9-10 ; Itar-Tass report
translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report : Central Eurasia [hereafter FBIS], Mar . 26 ,
1993, p . 58 ; Michael P . Claudon, "Introduction" in Claudon and Gutner, Putting Food on What Was the Soviet
Table, pp . ix-xi ; Karl-Eugen Wãdekin, "Potentials and Deadlocks in the Soviet Food Economy" in Claudon an d
Gutner, Putting Food on What Was the Soviet Table, pp . 29-42 .
27 On calls for complete de-collectivization, see Vladimir Tikhonov, "Reforming Soviet Agriculture : The Situation
Today" in Claudon and Gutner, Putting Food on What Was the Soviet Table, pp . 25-8 ; and his Kooperatsiia: za i
protiv (Moscow : PIK, 1991) which focuses almost exclusively on cooperatives ; Iurii Chernichenko, "Confrontation
on the Ugra, Or What has Happened to Land Reform," Kuranty, May 1, 1992, p . 5 (translated online ; Available :
Lexis ; Library : Europe ; File: Russian Press Digest, 4 Apr . 1992 ; hereafter RPD) ; and Editorial Report, Moscow
TV, Nov . 26, 1993 in FBIS, Nov . 29, 1993, p . 42 reporting on Chernichenko's position as head of the "peasants '
Party" ; Don Van Atta, "Conflicts over Agrarian Reform and Privatization in Russia," The Politics of Post-Soviet
Reform : Agriculture . Newsletter, No. 1, 1 Sept . 1992, p . 2 ; Don Van Atta, "Ligachev Rallies Opposition to Lan d
Reform," Report on the USSR, 2 :47 (Nov . 23, 1990), pp . 10-12 ; McIntyre, "Phantom of the Transition," p . 82 .
Also, see Lev Timofeev (pseud .), Soviet Peasants (or: The Peasants' Art of Starving) (New York : Telos Press ,
1985) which appeared in samizdat aroubd 1980 and which is an unrestrained assault on the state and collective far m
system and defense of private farming .
For recent predictions of imminent crisis and famine or their refutation . see art . in Sel'skaia Zhizn' ; 28 Apr .
1992, p . 2 in Russian News Abstracts . Vol . 1 (1992), (Waitsfield, VT : Russian Information Services, Inc ., 1993) ,
#A55 ; Vladimir Bashmachnikov, President of AKKOR, in "Farmers Need Support," Delovoi Mir, Jan . 6, 1993 ,
p . 1 in BEN ; Iu . Voronin, "Concerns and Hopes of Russia's Countryside," Ekonomika i Zhizn', Jan . 7, 1993, pp .
1, 5 in BEN ; Interfax report, Oct . 11, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 13, 1993, p . 71 ; "Novosti" newscast, Ostankino TV ,
Moscow, Oct . 13, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 14, 1993, p . 50 ; "Help Bring in the Harvest," Rossiiskie Vesti, Oct . 13 ,
1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Oct . 15, 1993, p . 27 ; "Vesti" report, Moscow TV, Oct . 26, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 27, 1993, p .
39 ; Itar-Tass Report, "Academicians Worried About Future of Countryside," Pravda, Nov . 16, 1993, p . 2 in FBIS ,
Nov . 17, 1993, p . 57 ; "Itar-Tass Report, Moscow Radio, Feb . 9, 1994 in FBIS, Feb . 9, 1994, p . 22 ; Mikhai l
Lantsman, "The First Stage of Creating Private Farms in the Countryside is Over," Segodnia . Feb . 10, 1994, p .
2 in CDPSP, XLVI : 6 (1994), p . 22 in which he predicts the collapse of the state and collective farm system withi n
two-three years .
On the defense of the existing system and demands for subsidies : Nikolai Chernykh, "Kolkho z
Representatives Demand Subsidies," Kommersant-Daily, July 1, 1993, p . 3 in FBIS, July 2, 1993, p . 41 ; Elen a
Iakovleva, "Agrarian Party Leaders Dreaming of One-Hour All-Russia Peasant Strike," Izvestiia, Sep . 28, 1993 ,
p . 2 in FBIS, Sep . 30, 1993, p . 22; Wendy Sloane, "Russia's Agrarian Party Runs Against Land Reform, "
Christian Science Monitor, Dec . 1, 1993, p . 4 ; Irma Savvataeva and Valery Konovalov, "Agrarians Put Forwar d
18
Demands Rather Than Requests," Izvestiia, Feb . 4, 1994, p . 2 in BEN ; Don Van Atta, "Profile of Coup Leade r
Vasilii Starodubtsev," Report on the USSR, 3 :35 (August 30, 1991), 3-5 ; Don Van Atta, "The Second Congres s
of the Russian Agrarian Union," RFE/RL Research Report, 2 :31, (July 30, 1993), 42-49 ;
28 See, for example, Tikhonov, "Reforming Soviet Agriculture," pp . 25-8 ; Tikhonov, Kooperatsiia ; Don Van Atta ,
"Theorists of Agrarian Perestroika," Soviet Economy, 5 :1 (1989), 70-99 . On Chaianov, see See Gunther Schmitt ,
"The Rediscovery of Alexander Chayanov," History of Political Economy, 24 :4 (Winter 1992), pp . 925ff; and
Teodor Shanin, "Chayanov's Message : Illuminations, Miscomprehensions and the Contemporary 'Developmen t
Theory,'" in Shanin, Defining Peasants, pp .319-340 . Also, Macey Government and Peasant, pp . 284-5, f.n . 86 .
See, too, Rutskoi, Agrarnaia reforma v Rossii, pp . 13-18 . At least five volumes of Chaianov's works have been
published so far: Aleksandr V . Chaianov, Krest'ianskoe khoziaistvo : Izbrannye trudy (Moscow : Ekonomika, 1989) ;
Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow : Moskovskii rabochii, 1989) ; Osnovnye idei i formy organizatsii sel'skokhoziaistvennoi kooperatsii (Moscow : "Nauka," 1991) ; Izbrannye trudy (Moscow : Financy i statistiki, 1991) an d
Izbrannye trudy (Moscow : Kolos, 1993) .
29 A reprint of the decree is in Izvestiia, Oct . 29, 1993, pp . 1-2 translated in CDPSP, XLV :43 (1993), pp . 14-16 .
For pre-revolutionary discussion of this question, see Macey, Government and Peasant, passim . . For current
debates, see interview with Aleksandr Kh. Zaveriukha, Deputy Premier in charge of agriculture, by Aleksand r
Gavriliuk in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Sep . 10, 1993, p . 4 in FBIS, Sept . 14, 1993, pp . 36-38 ; Interfax Report, Oct . 21 ,
1993 in FBIS, Oct . 22, 1993, p . 46 ; Itar-Tass report, by Igor Galkin, Oct . 28, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 29, 1993, pp .
19-20 ; Itar-tass report by Pavel Kuznetsov, Oct . 28, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 29, 1993, p . 20 ; Andrei Lazorevskii ,
"Under the President's Draft Edict, Land Remains in the Hands of the Kolkhoz 'Feudal Lords,'" Izvestiia . Oct . 26 ,
1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Oct . 29, 1993 pp . 20-21 ; Elena Iakovleva, "Private Ownership of Land is Finally Confirmed, "
Izvestiia, Oct . 27, 1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Nov . 2, 1993, p . 43 ; Aleksandr Velchenkov, "Owners Return to the Land .
What Kind of Owner Remains to be Seen," Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Oct . 29, 1993, p . 1 in FBIS, Nov. 2, 1993, pp .
43-44 ; Veniamin Vylegzhanin, "Will It Be Possible to Speculate in Land?" Rossiiskie Vesti, Nov . 2, 1993, p . 3 i n
FBIS, Nov . 4, 1993, p . 48 ; Report on Zaveriukha's support for the decree, Rossiiskaia gazeta, Nov . 4, 1993, p .
3 in FBIS, Nov . 9, 1993, p99 . 38-9 ; Andrei Sizov, "Will the Land Market Work?" Moscow News, No . 45 (Nov .
3, 1993) ; Olga Berezhnaia, "Private Ownership of Agricultural Land has been Legalized," Moscow News, No . 4 6
(Nov . 10, 1993) ; Oleg Polukeev, "Great Land Reform?" Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Oct. 29, 1993, p . 1 in RPD ; Do n
Van Atta, "Yeltsin Decree Finally Ends 'Second Serfdom' in Russia," RFE/RL Research Report, 2 :46 (Nov . 19 .
1993), pp . 33-39 ; Stephen K . Wegren, Yel'tsin's Decree on Land Relations : Implications for Agrarian Reform, "
Post-Soviet Geography, 35 :3 (1994), 166-183 ; and a roundup of reactions on the October decree in Rossiiskie Vesti ,
Oct . 29, 1993, p . 1 in FBIS, Nov . 2, 1993, pp . 44-45 . Also, Elena lakovleva, "President Repeals Incorrec t
Decisions on Land Reform," Izvestiia, Jan. 13, 1994, p . 2 in FBIS, Jan . 13, 1994, p . 31 .
30 On subsidies to private farmers, see Don Van Atta, "Political Mobilization in the Russian Countryside : Creating
Social Movements from Above" in Judith B . Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield, eds ., Perestroika from Below : Socia l
Movements in the Soviet Union (Boulder, CO : Westview Press, 1991), pp . 53-57 ; Valerii Konovalov, "Collectiv e
Farm Chairmen Form a Party, While Private Farmers Conclude an Agreement with the Government," Izvestiia ,
Feb . 14, 1992, p . 2 in CDPSP, XLIV, No . 7 (Mar . 18, 1992), p . 25 ; interview with Minister of Agriculture Vikto r
N . Khlystun in Rossiiskie Vesti, Aug . 1, 1992, p . 2 in FBIS, Aug . 4, 1992, p . 41 ; interview with Oleg Lobov ,
adviser to Boris El'tsin, in Mikhail Lantsman, "Agrarian Reform Needs Government Props" in Nezavisimai a
Gazeta, Nov . 25, 1992, p . 1 in RPD ; Vasilii Shchurov, "Russian Goverment Extends Substantial Support t o
Farming," Trud, Feb . 26, 1994, pp . 1-2 in BEN ; Nikolai Krasnov, "Farmers Soon to be Deprived of Their Plots, "
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Nov . 23, 1993, p . 4 in BEN ; Van Atta, "Second Congress," pp . 46-47 .
31 For background on government subsidies to agriculture, see Stephen K . Wegren, "The Politics of Financin g
Agrarian Reform in Russia," forthcoming in The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review (1994) . See the debate over the
proposal for a program to revive Central Russia, itself reminiscent of the discussions on the "Crisis of the Center "
at the turn of the century . Elena Iakovleva, "A Political Demonstration in Orel : The Generosity of Chernomyrdi n
and Zaveriukha Stretches to the Sum of 2 .3 Trillion Rubles," Izvestiia, Jan . 27, 1994, p . 1 in CDPSP, XLVI : 4
(1994), p . 8 ; Vladimir Todres, "Nonmonetarist Methods : Wanted 40 Trillion Rubles," Segodnia, Jan . 26, 1994 ,
19
p . 1 in CDPSP, XLVI :4 (1994), pp . 8-9 ; Mikhail Lantsman, "Rathole : Subsidies are Retained for Agriculture--The
Agrarian Lobby is Gaining Strength," Segodnia, Jan . 25, 1994, p . 2 in CDPSP, XLVI :4 (1994), p . 23 ; Rusta m
Narzikulov, "Forty Trillion to Lower Economic Effectiveness, " Segodnia, Jan . 26, 1994, p . 1 in CDPSP, XLVI : 4
(1994), p . 9 . The issue of subsidies is also highly politicized in other countries of the world . See "Grotesque : A
Survey of Agriculture," a special report in The Economist, Dec . 12, 1992 .
32 See, for example, the interview with Ivan Rybkin by Daniel Snyder, "Russia Parliament Head Pushe s
Perestroika," Christian Science Monitor, Feb . 18, 1994, p . 7 . Rybkin is also a spokesman for the Nationa l
Agrarian Party . For favorable comments on private farming, see interview with Agrarian party leader, Mikhai l
Lapshin by Valentina Nikoforova in "The Elections : Think About Them, People—Why Peasants Need Politics, "
Pravda, Nov . 3, 1993, p . 1 in FBIS, Nov . 8, 1993, pp . 25-26 ; Valerii Konovalov, "Mikhail Lapshin : We Wan t
to be an Autonomous Force, Not a Pawn in Someone Else's Game," Izvestiia, Nov . 27, 1993, p . 4 in FBIS, Nov .
30, 1993, pp . 33-37 ; and "Aleksandr Zaveriukha : 'Peasantry is a Mainstay of the State,'" Sel'skaia Zhizn', Dec .
7, 1993, pp . 1-2 in RPD . For an extreme view of the opposition to private farms, see the report on Sergei Bystrov ,
a Stavropol' agronomist in Sloane, "Russia's Agrarian Party," p. 4 .
On the payments crisis and the ensuing threat of the existing system's collapse and the outbreak of famine :
Vesti Newscast, Moscow Television, Oct . 26, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 27, 1993, pp . 39-40 ; Vladimir Shcherbak, " A
Countryside Without Money Means a Country Without Bread . Concerning the Situation in the Agrarian Sector . "
Rossiiskie Vesti, Jan . 6, 1994, p . 3 in FBIS, Jan . 7, 1994, pp . 33-34 ; Elena Berezneva, "Not Yet Sowing, Bu t
Already Losing Crops," Trud, Mar . 18, 1994, p . 1 in BEN ; and Faina Osmanova, "For the First Time Withou t
Imports?" Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Mar . 11, 1994, p . 1 in RPD re the two trillion rubles owed farmers for th e
previous year's harvest and the potential impact on spring 1994 sowings and harvest . Also, Report by Anatoli i
Diordienko and comment by Ivan Gridasov, "Will Money be Found for the Harvest," Rossiiskie Vesti, Aug . 28 ,
1993, p . 5 in FBIS, Sep . 1, 1993, p . 28 ; Veniamin Vylegzhanin, "What is Hindering the Harvest," Rossiiskie vesti ,
Oct . 12, 1993, p . 3 in FBIS, Oct . 13, 1993, p . 71 ; Vasilii Shchurov, "Goodbye, Canadian Grain," Trud, No . 36 ,
Feb . 26, 1994 pp . 1-2 in BEN ; "Russian Agricultural Producers Are in Dire Financial Straits," Kommersant, No .
48, Dec . 6, 1993, p . 40 in BEN ; "Unfavorable Grain Crop Projections for 1994," Segodnia, Mar . 10, 1994, p . 3
in BEN ; Irma Savvataeva, "The Agrarians Aren't Just Asking Anymore, They're Demanding," Izvestiia, Feb . 4 ,
1994, p . 2 in CDPSP, XLVI :5 (1994), pp . 21-22 ; Dmitrii Volkov, "Zaveriukha Announced Strangling of Foo d
Import," Segodnia, Jan . 29, 1994, p . 2 in RPD ; Interfax report re demands from the State Duma for government
to pay its debts to the agrarian sector, see Jan 12, 1994 in FBIS, Jan . 13, 1994, p . 31 . And government promises
to pay : Ivan Rodin, "Agrarian Will Receive Money," Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Feb . 4, 1994, p . 1 in FBIS, Feb . 7 ,
1994 p . 30 . 1 trillion rubles were paid in March . FBIS Report, Apr . 1, 1994 in Russian Agriculture, Current s
Events, on line, [hereafter, RUSAG1, Apr . 24, 1994 . In May, another 5 .6 trillion rubles were promised : RFE/R L
Daily Report, May 31, 1994 in RUSAG, June 6, 1994 . Some 9 trillion rubles are said to be required to be abl e
to get in the harvest : Interfax, Food and Agriculture Report, June 17-24, 1994, p . 2 in RUSAG . July 1, 1994 .
Total demands by Zaveriukha for agriculture are said to top 34 trillion rubles . "Farm Lobbying Criticized, "
RFE/RL Daily Report, on line, Feb . 9, 1994 .
33 On "food blackmail" see Nikolai Podlipskii, "Agrarians Manage to Get Everything They Wanted ." Kommersant -Daily, Feb . 24, 1994, p . 3 in BEN ; and f.n . 31 above .
34 See interview with Mikhail Lapshin, leader of Agrarian Party, by in Konovalov, "Mikhail Lapshin : We Wan t
to be an Autonomous Force, p . 4 .
35 See the predictions of a record harvest in 1993 : "Expected Harvest--106-110 Million Tonnes of Grain . Russian
Federal Service for Hydrometrology and Environmental Monitoring Forecast," Rossiiskie Vesti, July 6, 1993, p .
1 in FBIS, July 7, 1993, p . 30 ; Radio report on Moscow Itar-Tass World Service, Aug . 2, 1993 by Aleksei Filato v
in FBIS, Aug . 3, 1993, pp . 23-24 ; Television interview with Aleksandr Zaveriukha on Moscow Russian Television
Network, Aug . 30, 1993 in FBIS, Aug . 31, 1993, pp . 28-29 ; Interview with Aleksandr Zaveriukha by Aleksand r
Gavriliuk, "Bread Will Become Dearer," in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Sep . 10, 1993, p . 4 in FBIS, Sept . 14, 1993, pp .
36-38 ; Interview with Andrei Sizov, "Russians Will Have Enough Bread, But Price Per Loaf Will Double, "
Kalingradskaia Pravda, Sep . 2, 1993, pp . 1-2 in FBIS, Sep . 15, 1993, pp . 36-38 .
20
For predictions of a poor harvest and even potential catastrophe : Valerii Konovalov, "Half the Harvest
Gathered but Grain Prices Not Sorted Out," Izvestiia, Sep . 16, 1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Sep . 17, 1993, p . 33-4 ; Natali a
Abakumova, ""Record Harvest 'May End Up Under the Snow,' Government Commission Warns," Segodnia, Oct.
2, 1993, p . 3 in FBIS, Oct . 4, 1993, p . 16 ; a warning by Aleksandr Zaveriukha of catastrophe, Interfax Report ,
Oct . 11, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 13, 1993, p . 71 ; Vylegzhanin, "What is Hindering the Harvest" ; the "Novosti "
newscast on Moscow Ostankino Television Report, Oct . 13, 1993, in which the chairman of Roskhlebproduk t
refutes rumors of famine in FBIS, Oct . 14, 1993, pp . 49-50 ; Elena lakovleva, "Almost Half the Flax, Potatoes ,
Beetroot in Russia Has Not Been Harvested," Izvestiia, Oct . 13, 1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Oct . 14, 1993, p . 50 ; a report ,
"Help Bring in the Harvest," in which Aleksandr Zaveriukha is quoted as describing the harvest situation a s
"catastrophic" in Rossiiskie Vesti, Oct. 13, 1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Oct. 15, 1993, p . 27 ; Aleksandr Goliaev ,
"Aleksandr Zaveriukha : Not Only the Heavens Are to Blame," Rossiiskaia Gazeta, Oct . 14, 1993, p . 3 in FBIS ,
Oct . 19, 1993, p . 39 ; Valerii Konovalov, "Peasants Get Opportunity to Sell Grain Abroad," Izvestiia, Nov . 16 ,
1993, p . 2 in FBIS, Nov . 17, 1993, pp . 56-57 ; Interfax Report, Dec . 22, 1993 in FBIS, Dec . 23, 1993, pp . 48-49 .
The latest reports are predicting even great crises, if possible, for 1994 : Elena Berezneva, "Not Yet Sowing ,
But Already Losing Crops," Trud, No . 48 (Mar. 18, 1994), p . 1 in BEN ; "Unfavorable Grain Crop Projections
for 1994," Segodnia, No . 44 (Mar. 10, 1994), p . 3 in BEN ; an article in Pravda, Apr . 8, 1994, predicts "disaster "
with a harvest estimated for 1994 at 88 .7 million tons . RUSAG, Apr . 15, 1994 . "Experts," however, ar e
apparently forecasting an even lower 75 million tons . RFE/RL Daily Report, Apr . 8, 1994 . Also see Interfax Foo d
and Agriculture report, May 27-June 3, 1994, pp . 2 and 8 in RUSAG, June 20, 1994 ; and Report of SovEkon
Center in FBIS, May 25, 1994 in RUSAG, June 20, 1994 . Vasilii Starodubtsev, Chairman of the Agrarian Union ,
predicts a harvest as low as 60-70 million tons . Interfax, Food and Agriculture report, May 6-13, 1994 in RUSAG ,
May 27, 1994 .
Meanwhile, the government is apparently proposing to eliminate imports for 1994 relying on leftovers fro m
the 1993 harvest to make up the difference . Faina Osmanova, "For the First Time Without Imports?" Nezavisimai a
Gazeta, No . 46 (Mar. 11, 1994), p . 1 in BEN . See also, Andrei Shmarov et al ., "Moderate Inflation Rate to Last
Until February," Kommersant, No . 48 (Dec. 6, 1993), p . 23 in BEN which charges falsification of statistics and
an excess in the supply of grain over the demand . An open conflict also broke out between Zaveriukha, who keeps
talking of ending imports, and Khlystun who disagrees : Konovalov, We Aren't Threatened," p . 2; and Aleksand r
Gavriliuk, "Having Cut Down on Imports, We'll Be Eating Our Own," Rossiiskaia Gazeta, No . 221, Dec . 3, 1993 ,
p . 1 in BEN . This position was reiterated several times this spring and summer, see "Self-Sufficiency in Grain? "
RFE/RL Daily Report, May 9, 1994 ; Interfax Food and Agriculture Report, June 3-10, p . 6 in RUSAG, June 20 ,
1994 . Apparently, Russia's consumption of grain is declining considerably : Interfax Food and Agriculture report ,
June 17-24, p . 3 in RUSAG, July 1, 1994 .
36 On the problems of overproduction, see Valerii Konovalov, "Private Farmers are Concerned About the Prospec t
of Overproduction," Izvestiia . 17 Mar. 1992, p . 2 in CDPSP, XLV :11 (Apr . 14, 1993), pp . 22-3 . Cf. the current
threat of new bumper harvest, Irina Demchenko, "Government Has No Intention To Abandon Reform Course, "
Izvestiia, Aug . 7, 1993, pp . 1-2 in RPD . On declining area under grain crops, Economic News Agency, "Russia' s
Economic Projections for 1994," Business fact, No . 235 (Dec . 8, 1993), in BEN ; "Facts Only," Krest'ianskie
Vedomosti, No . 4 (Jan . 31, 1994), p . 7 ; "Unfavorable Grain Crop Projections," p . 3 ; Interfax News Agency, "Foo d
and Agriculture report," July 22-29, 1994, p . 4 in RUSAG, Aug . 8, 1994 .
37 See Alexander Yanov, The Drama of the Soviet 1960s : A Lost Reform (Berkeley : Institute of Internationa l
Studies, University of California, 1984) . Gorbachev himself is associated with another experimental and successfu l
form of work unit for harvesting, known as the Ipatovskii method, in Stavropol' that was also abandoned :
Medvedev, Gorbachev, especially, pp . 81-7, 100-1 .
38 On the recent history of agrarian reform, see Stephen K . Wegren, "Private Agriculture in the Soviet Union
Under Gorbachev," Soviet Union/Union Sovietique, 16 :2-3 (1989), pp . 105-44 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Private
Farming and Agrarian Reform in Russia," Problems of Communism, (May-June, 1992), pp . 107-121 ; Wegren ,
"Two Steps Forward," pp . 1-51 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Dilemmas of Agrarian Reform in the Soviet Union," Sovie t
Studies, 44 :1 (1992), pp . 3-36 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Rural Reform in Russia," RFE/RL Research Report, 2 :4 3
2 3.
(Oct . 29 . 1993), pp . 43-53 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Political Institutions and Agrarian Reform in Russia" in Van Atta .
The "Farmer Threat," pp . 122-7 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Trends in Russian Agrarian Reform," RFE/RL Research
Report, 2 :13 (Mar . 26 . 1993), 46-57 ; Wegren, "Rural Reform and Political Culture, pp . 215-41 ; Ihor Stebelsky ,
"Restructuring Soviet Agriculture : Towards a Spatial Dimension ." Soviet Geography, 31 :7 (September 1990), 500508 ; Karen M . Brooks and Odin Knudsen, "The Agricultural Transition in the U .S .S .R ." in Lisa Garbus et al . ,
eds ., Agricultural Issues in the 1990s : Proceedings of the Eleventh Agriculture Sector Symposium (Washington, DC :
The World Bank, 1991), pp . 179-205 ; Timothy N . Ash et al ., "Russia Sets the Pace of Agricultural Reform . "
RFE/RL Research Report, 1 :25 (June 19, 1992), 55-63 ; Don Van Atta, "The Return of Individual Farming i n
Russia" in Van Atta, The "Farmer Threat," pp . 71-96 ; Van Atta, "Comments at 5th Annual Theodore Shabad
Memorial Round Table," Atlanta, GA, 7 Apr . 1993, forthcoming in Post-Soviet Geography ; Former USSR ; Do n
Van Atta, "First Results of the 'Stolypin' Land Reform in the RSFSR," Report on the USSR, 3 :29 (July 19, 1991) ,
pp . 20-23 . For a broad overview and further citations, see Macey, "Is Agrarian Privatization the Right Path? "
39 RF State Statistics Committee, "How Many Private Farmers Are There In Russia?" Krest'ianskie Vedemosti .
Feb . 13, 1994, pp. 1-6 in BEN; Valery Konovalov, "Private Farming Has Stopped Growing," Izvestiia, Jan. 12 ,
1994, p . 2 ; and on the question of withdrawals, ITL Company, "546 Farms in Maritime Territory Cease to Exist, "
Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn' Russkogo Dal'nego Vostoka, Dec . 25, 1993 in BEN . Bashmachnikov has projecte d
300,000 private farms by the end of 1994 : Mikhail Lantsman, "First Stage" ; another prediction anticipates as many
as 400,000 : Economic News Agency, "Russia's Economic Projections for 1994," Business Fact, No . 235 (Dec . 8 .
1994), in BEN . In fact, there has been a decline to 255,000 : Interfax Food and Agriculture Report . June 24-Jul y
1, 1994, p . 3 in RUSAG, July 16, 1994 . Cf . Valerii Konovalov . "Farmers Think the State Does Not Need Them .
but Deputy Prime Minister Gaidar Dispels Their Doubts," Izvestiia . Nov . 6, 1993 . p . 2 in FBIS, Nov . 9, 1993 .
p . 38 .
Re output, see "Trouble on the Farm," pp . 57-8 ; Viktor Nefedov and Andrei Sizov, "The Food Potential "
in CDPSP, XLIV, No . 49 (Jan . 6, 1993), p . 30 ; Former USSR, pp. 2-14 ; State Committee of Statistics, " A
Statistical Picture of Russia's Agriculture," Ekonomika i Zhizn', Dec . 4, 1993, p . 24 in BEN ; "Transformation of
Collective Farms," Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Aug . 26, 1993, p . 4 in FBIS, Aug . 27, 1993, p . 24 ; Stephen K . Wegren,
"Farm Privatization in Nizhnii Novgorod : A Model for Russia?" RFE/RL Research Report . 3 :21 (May 27, 1994) ,
pp . 18-20 ; Shcherbak, "A Countryside Without Money" ; AgroFact News Agency, "There Will Be Abundance o f
Potatoes and Chips in Russia by 2000," Krest'ianskie Vedomosti, No . 2 (Jan . 23, 1994), p . 3 ; V . Stepenev ,
"Potatoes in Russia," Gudok, No . 20 (Feb . 4, 1994), p . 3 in BEN . As a result, there has been talk of abolishin g
the system of state deliveries : Gavriliuk, "Bread Will Become Dearer ." However, two-thirds of marketable grai n
is still sold to the state and only 12 .4 percent on the free market . Interfax Food and Agriculture report, June 10-17 ,
1994, pp . 5-6 in RUSAG, July 1, 1994 .
40 Vladimir Grishchenko, "Spring '92 : The Autumn Reckoning," Moskovskie Novosti . 3 May 1992 . pp . 14-15 i n
CDPSP, XLIV :18 (June 3, 1992) . pp . 1-3 ; Itar-Tass report . July 20, 1992 in FBIS . July 21 . 1992 . p . 16 ; Va n
Atta, "First Results," pp . 20-3 ; Wegren, "Trends," pp . 46-57 ; Former USSR, pp . 13-14; Van Atta, "Comments" ;
Ash, "Russia Sets the Pace," pp . 62-3 ; Wegren, "Political Institutions and Agrarian Reform," pp . 121-147 ; Viktor
Nefedov, "Number of Private Farms in CIS Grows to 540 .000," Izvestiia . May 22, 1993, p . 4 in CDPSP. XLV :2 1
(June 23, 1993), p . 20 ; "With the Start of Spring Planting, Efforts to Dispossess Private Farmers are Expanded . "
Izvestiia, Apr . 6, 1993, p . 2 in CDPSP, XLV :14 (May 5, 1993), pp . 34-5 ; Stepan Avdeev, "Another Assistance
Plan for Agriculture," Kommersant—Daily, Mar. 25, 1993, p . 9 in BEN ; Valerii Konovalov, "Agricultural Ministry
Mapped Out Agrarian Reforms Development Program," Izvestiia . May 13, 1993 . p . 4 in BEN ; Television interview
with Viktor N . Khlystun in FBIS, Mar. 22, 1993, p . 74 ; Itar-Tass report in FBIS, Mar . 26 . 1993, p . 58 ; Itar-Tass
report in FBIS, Apr. 14, 1993, p . 42 . See "Bashmachnikov Disagrees With Statistics Committee," Krest'ianskaia
Vedomosti, Mar. 13, 1994, p . 3 in BEN ; Alexei Filatov, "Private Owner Provides 80 Percent," Krest'ianin, Feb .
28, 1994, p . 2 ; for background on private plots, see Wegren, "Private Agriculture," pp . 105-144 ; Nikolai Radugin ,
"Transition to Market : Blind Theory and Depressing Practice," Sel'skaia Zhizn', Dec . 23, 1994, p . 2 in BEN ;
22
41 Wegren; "Dilemmas of Agrarian Reform," pp . 3-36 ; Stephen K . Wegren, "Agricultural Reform in th e
Nonchernozem Zone : The Case of Kostroma Oblast" Post-Soviet Geography, 33 :10 (1992), 645-685 ; Wegren ,
"Rural Reform and Political Culture," pp . 215-41 ; Wegren, "Private Farming," pp . 114-121 ; Lynn D . Nelson an d
Irma Y . Kuzes, Property to t; e People : The Struggle for Radical Economic Reform in Russia (Armonk, NY : M .E .
Sharpe, 1994), pp . 139-44 . On similar results with private farms in Estonia : Ray Abrahams, "The Emergence o f
New Family Farmers : The Countryside of Estonia in Transition" in David Lane, ed ., Russia in Flux : The Politica l
and Social Consequences of Reform (Brookfield, VT : Edward Elgar, 1992, pp . 133-48 . For a more positive spin ,
see Karen Brooks and Zvi Lerman, Land Reform and Farm Restructuring in Russia . (Washington, DC : The Worl d
Bank, 1994), though the evidentiary base for this study ends in 1992 . See, too, V .B . Mikhailov, ed ., Sotsial'nye
problemy razvitiia fermerstva v nechernozemnoi zone Rossiiskoi federatsii . Sbornik nauchnykh trudov (Sankt Peterburg : NIESKh NZ RF, 1993) ; and V .F . Mashenkov et al ., eds ., Sotsial'nye problemy razvitiia sela v
usloviiakh mnogoukladnoi ekonomiki . (Tezisy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii) (Sankt-Peterburg—Pushkin :
NIESKh NZ RF, 1993) .
42 Macey, "Is Agrarian Privatization the Right Path? "
43 Wegren, "Rural Reform in Russia," pp . 46-53 . On the role of Roskhlebprodukt see Elena lakovleva, "State
Withdraws From Russia's Grain Market," Izvestiia, Dec . 28, 1993, p . 1 in CDPSP, XLV :52 (1993), p . 24 ; Serge i
Kliuchenkov, "Federal Corporation Spoke for Formation of Grain Association," Kommersant--Daily, Nov . 9, 1993 ,
p . 9 in BEN ; and "Russian Agricultural Producers are in Dire Financial Straits ." Also, Iurii Afanas'ev ,
"Revanche," Novoe Vremia, No . 5 (February 1994), pp . 18-20 in CDPSP, XLVI:6 (1994), pp . 10-12 . Also see ,
Sergei Veselovskii, "What is Preventing the Establishment of a Grain Market in Russia," Izvestiia, Dec . 22, 1993 ,
p . 4 in FBIS, Dec . 23, 1993, pp . 49-50 ; Shcherbak, "A Countryside Without Money" ; Olga K . Yastrebova, "The
Russian Transition from State Monopoly to Market Economy in Agribusiness : A View from the Inside 1, "
Occasional Paper # 122 (April 1933) (Madison : University of Wisconsin) . Meanwhile, there is evidence tha t
privatized wholesale depots avoid perishable products because they are inconvenient, Vladimir Shcherbak,
"Agriculture is to get Funds for Grain to be Produced," Delo, Jan . 6, 1994 in BEN . On the privatization of the
processing industry : Gavriliuk, "Bread Will Become Dearer . "
44 Ellison, "Perestroika and the New Economic Policy," p . 29 . See, too, Wegren, "Yel'tsin's Decree," p . 174 ;
45 See Peter Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy, 1850-1917(London : B .T . Batsford Ltd ., 1986), pp . 98-140, especially
140 ; and S .G . Wheatcroft and R .W. Davies, "Agriculture" in R .W . Davies et al ., The Economic Transformatio n
of the Soviet Union, 1913-1945 (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1994), p . 108 . But see a major revisionist
challenge by Paul G . Klebnikov, "Agricultural Development in Russia, 1906-1917 : Land Reform, Social Agronomy
and Cooperation," (unpub . Ph .D . dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1991) .
46 Macey, Government and Peasant, passim .
47 Macey, Government and Peasant, pp . 226-27 . On the current regime's reluctance to create land banks and a n
effective mortgage system, Andrei Sizov, "Will the Land Market Work?" Moscow News, No . 45 (Nov . 3, 1993) ;
Krasnov, "Farmers Soon to be Deprived of Their Plots ." For an example of private initiative . "AKKOR launches
A Bank," Krest'ianskie Vedomosti, No . 2 (Jan . 23, 1994), p . 3 in BEN .
48 See Macey, "Government Actions," and "Bureaucratic Solutions to the Peasant Problem : Before and After
Stolypin" in R . C . Elwood, ed ., Russian and Eastern European History: Selected Papers from the Second World
Congress for Soviet and East European Studies (Berkeley : Berkeley Slavic Specialties, 1984), pp . 73-95 ; and
"Agricultural Reform and Political Change : The Case of Stolypin" in Theodore Taranovski and Blair Ruble, eds . ,
Reform in Modern Russian History (New York : Cambridge U .P ., 1994) .
49 Aleksandr Nikolaevich Engelgardt, Aleksandr Nikolaevich Engelgardt's Letters from the Country, 1872-1887,
translated and edited by Cathy A . Frierson, (New York : Oxford University Press, 1993), pp . 232-233 . Cf. Wegren ,
"Farm Privatization," p . 19 .
50 See, for example, Brooks and Lerman, pp . 59ff.
23
51 On the current demographic and social condition of the countryside, see V . Timofeev, "Rural Comforts of Life :
A National problem," APK: Ekonomika, Upravlenie . Dec . 15, 1993, pp . 14-16 in BEN . See, too, the report o n
a seminar discussion in the Institute of History in Moscow discussiing Henri Mendras' Le Fin des paysans. Suivi
d'une reflexion sur la fin des paysans : vingt ans apres (Le Mijan, Arles : Actes Sud . 1991) in "Sovremennye
kontseptsii agrarnogo razvitiia (Teoreticheskii seminar), Otechestvennaia istoriia, 1994 :2, pp . 31-59 .
52 Filatov, "Private Owner Provides 80 Percent" ; Wegren, "Private Agriculture," pp . 105-44 ; Timofeev, Soviet
Peasants, pp . 17-21 . For background, see Basile Kerblay, Modern Soviet Society . Translated by Rupert Swyer .
(New York : Pantheon Books, 1983), pp . 74-109 ; Caroline Humphrey, "Rural Society in the Soviet Union" in
Michael Paul Sacks and Jerry G . Pankhurst, eds ., Understanding Soviet Society (Boston : Unwin Hyman, 1988) ,
pp . 53-70 ; and Norton D . Dodge and Murray Feshbach, "The Role of Women in Soviet Agriculture," and Susan
Bridger, "Soviet Rural Women : Employment and Family Life," and "Rural Women and Glasnost," in Beatric e
Farnsworth and Lynne Viola, eds ., Russian Peasant Women (New York : Oxford University Press, 1992), pp . 236 70, 271-93, 294-304 .
53 Former USSR, p . 10 ; art . in Delovoi Mir, Sept . 12, 1992, p . 9 in RNA, #A139 ; Television interview with
Viktor N . Khlystun in FBIS, Sept. 1, 1992, pp . 23-4 ; John Cavanaugh, "Looking Beyond Production : What
Prevents Soviet Crops from Reaching the People?" in Claudon and Gutner, Putting Food on What Was the Soviet
Table, pp . 1-5 ; Rutskoi, Agrarnaia reforma v Rossii, pp. 40-41 . For potatoes the losses are estimated at 75 % . V .
Stepanov, "Potatoes in Russia," Gudok, No . 20 (Feb . 4, 1994), p . 3 in BEN . The figures for gram are 20-30% ,
"Less Grain Harvested This Year Versus Last Year Figure," Izvestiia, No . 217 (Nov . 12, 1993), p . 2 in BEN ;
Interfax report, Dec . 22, 1993 in FBIS, Dec . 23, 1993, pp . 48-9 ; Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets in FBIS, June 21 ,
1994, pp . 27-8 in RUSAG July 16, 1994 .
54 See Sizov, "Will the Land Market Work?" ; Veselovskii, "What is Preventing the Establishment of a Grain
Market" ; Sergei Kliuchenkov, "Federal Corporation Spoke for Formation of Grain Association," Kommersant—
Daily, No . 215 (Nov . 9, 1993), p . 9 in BEN . Wegren, "Farm Privatization," pp . 16-17 . See the initiative by Land
O'Lakes: Andrei Bagrov, "Humanitarian Aid To Help Modernize Russian Agro-Industrial Complex, " Kommersant —
Daily, No . 225 (Nov . 23, 1993), p . 4 in BEN .
55 Rutskoi, Agrarnaia Reforma v Rossii ; and interview with Minister of Agriculture, Viktor Khlystun in
Konovalov, "We Aren't Threatened with a Food Crisis," where he calls for precisely such infrastructural reforms ;
also "Alexander Zaveriukha : 'Peasantry is a Mainstay of the State .'" Cf. Wegren, "Yel'tsin's Decree ." p . 178 .
Also see Shchurov, "Goodbye Canadian Grain" ; Radugin, "Transition to Market" ; Wegren, "Rural Reform in
Russia," p . 43 .
56 Vesti Newscast, Moscow Television, Oct . 26, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 27, 1993, p . 39 ; "Russian Farm Land ;
Europe's Once and Future Granary," Economist, Oct. 30, 1993, p . 50 (U .K . ed .) ; Elena Berezneva . "Those Wh o
Sow and Those Who Divide," Trud, No . 42 (Mar . 10, 1994), p . 1 in BEN ; "Chernomyrdin Backs Land Reform, "
RFE/RL Daily Report, Mar . 14, 1994 . This was confirmed by a government decree of March 31st . "Land
Redistribution Decree," RFE/RL Daily Report, Apr . 5, 1994 ; and "Nemtsov Resigns as Yeltsin's Representative
in Nizhni Novgorod," RFE/RL Daily Report, Apr . 20, 1994 . The decree appears in Rossiiskie Vesti, Apr. 21 ,
1994 . Predictably, members of parliament called this decree, which they rejected, "anti-peasant ." Tass Report, Apr .
4, 1994 in RUSAG, Apr. 20, 1994 . AKKOR, meanwhile, sees the parliament as anti-peasant and as wanting to
reestablish state control over agriculture . RFE/RL Daily Report, Feb . 8, 1994 . For details, see: Elisabeth
Rubinfein, "Russia Moves to Dismantle Collective-Farming System," Wall Street Journal, Oct . 27, 1994, p . Al2 ;
John LLoyd, "Russia Speeds Up Private Ownership of Farms," Financial Times, Mar . 11, 1994, p . 1 ;Vladimi r
Stepanov, "Nizhegorodskaia model' zemel'noi reformy," Krest'ianskie Vedomosti, Mar . 14-20, 1994, p . 2 ; and
Wegren, "Farm Privatization," pp . 16-27 .
57 Don Van Atta, "Rutskoi Loses Responsibility for Agriculture," RFE/RL Research Report, 2, No . 18 (Apr. 30 ,
1993), 11-16 .
24
58 Wegren, "Farm Privatization," pp . 25-27 . See, too, Shishov, "Nizhegorodtsy deliatsia opytom," where
infrastructural reforms are seen as a necessary prerequisite .
59 See Robert V . Daniels . "The Riddle of Russian Reform," Dissent (Fall 1993), p . 492 . For another version o f
the hidden political agenda behind the policies of the "shock therapists" see Lynn D . Nelson and Irina Y . Kuzes ,
"One Step Forward and Two Steps Toward the West," Moscow News, No . 22 (May 26, 1993) . Cf. also wit h
respect to the industrial sector, "Russia Reborn : A Survey of Russia," a special report by The Economist, Dec . 5 ,
1992, p . 10-17 .
60 A symbolic manifestation of this was Zaveriukha's stunt of walking out of a meeting of the Council of Minister s
in October of last year : Vesti Newscast, Moscow Television, Oct . 21, 1993 in FBIS, Oct. 22, 1993, p . 46 ; and
Valerii Konovalov, "Politicians Gathering Harvest From peasants' Fields . Vice Premier's Demarche Was a Bluff, "
Izvestiia, Oct . 26, 1993, p . 1 in FBIS, Oct . 27, 1993, p . 40 .
61 For those in favor of a compromise approach to agrarian reform or mnogoukladnost', see Egor Gaidar in L .
Malash, "Yeltsin Asked to Ignore That," Kuranty, Jan . 22, 1992, p . 1 in RPD ; Aleksandr Rutskoi in Ilya Brushtein ,
"People Were Choosing Their Future Not Us," Moskovskaia Pravda, June 11, 1992, p . 2 in RPD ; Aleksandr
Vasilev, "Taking a Proper Line," Sel'skaia Zhizn', Apr . 13, 1993, p .1 in BEN ; Elena Iakovleva and Valerii
Konovalov, "Chernomyrdin Promises Support for Private Farmers," Izvestiia, Feb . 12, 1993, pp . 1-2 in CDPSP ,
XLV :6 (Mar . 10, 1993), p . 24 ; Gennadii Burbulis in Interfax report Feb . 12, 1992 in FBIS, Feb . 13, 1992, p . 59 ;
radio interview with Igor Gavrilov, advisor to Aleksandr Rutskoi, Interfax report, June 15, 1992 in FBIS, June 16 ,
1992, pp . 34-5 ; Viktor N . Khlystun in Sankov, "Optimist Despite the Slump," Rossiiskie Vesti, Aug . 1, 1992, p .
2 in FBIS, Aug . 4, 1992, pp . 40-1 ; Interfax reports on AKKOR Congress, Feb . 9, 1993 in FBIS, Feb . 10, 1993 ,
p . 27 and Feb. 10, 1993 in FBIS, Feb . 11, 1993, p . 18 ; Zaveriukha in Itar-Tass report, May 14, 1993 in FBIS ,
May 17, 1993, p . 42 and Interfax Report, Oct . 21, 1993 in FBIS, Oct . 22, 1993, p . 46 ; ; El'tsin in Itar-Tass report ,
June . 29, 1993 in FBIS, June 29, 1993, p . 38 ; and Chernykh, "Kolkhoz Producers call for State Support" in FBIS ,
July 2, 1993, pp . 41-2 ; Viktor Gerashchenko, Governor of the State Bank, in Itar-Tass Report by Aleksand r
Dzyublo and Aleksei Filatov, Feb . 10, 1994 in FBIS, Feb . 10, 1994, p . 29 ; and Nikolai Travkin, chairman an d
founder of the Democratic Party of Russia, Reuters Report, Apr . 12, 1994 in RUSAG, Apr . 24, 1994 . Cf. Van
Atta, "First Results," p . 21 ; Barbara Severin, "The Soviet Food Problem and Land Reform" in Claudon and Gutner ,
Putting Food on What Was the Soviet Table, pp . 92-4 ; Elmira N . Krylatykh, "Agrarian Reform in the USSR" in
Claudon and Gutner, Putting Food on What Was the Soviet Table, pp . 43-8 ;
62 See Macey, Government and Peasant, p . 247 ; Report by Vienna Institute for Comparative Studies in Mosco w
Times, May 15, 1994, p . 53 in RUSAG, June 6, 1994 .
63 . "Russia Reborn," p . 17 ; and N .I . Ivanova, "Reformy Stolypina : Vzaimosviaz' istoricheskikh i sovremennyk h
aspecktov," and M .D . Karpachev, "Voronezhskaia derevnia v gody Stolypinskoi agrarnoi reformy : Itogi i uroki . "
in A .A . Nikonov et al ., eds, Derevnia tsentral'noi Rossii : Istoriia i sovremennost'. Tezisy dokladov i soobshcheni i
nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii . Kaluga, dekabr' 1993 g . (Moscow : Tip . Rossiiskoi akademii
sel'skokhoziaistvennykh nauk, 1993), pp . 192-4 and 194-7 .
25