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UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES
CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE DESARROLLO ECONOMICO - CEDE
RESEARCH PROPOSAL
“Discrimination in the Provision of Social Services to the Poor:
A Field Experimental Study”
Presented to:
Latin American Research Network
Discrimination and Economic Outcomes
INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Bogotá, November 22, 2005
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1. Introduction.
Discrimination and social exclusion in various domains of economic life can
create losses in terms of efficiency and equity. Particular characteristics of
individuals, many of which they did not choose during their lives but had for
different genetic or acquired reasons, make them excluded from receiving the
benefits of certain social exchange situations regarding the market, the state, or
their life in community. Such exclusion creates efficiency losses in many cases,
and equity problems in general. Credit, land and labor markets are subject to
discrimination and exclusion. The political arena can also exclude people from
expressing their preferences and affecting the outcomes on their favor.
Much of the theoretical and empirical literature can be classified in two major
approaches, ‘statistical discrimination’ (Arrow-Phelps) and the ‘taste for
discrimination’ (Becker) which have focused on imperfect markets where room
for discrimination can affect economic outcomes. The housing and labor markets
are among the most frequently studied domains in the discrimination literature.
Experiments, audit studies, surveys and other methods have been used for
exploring how workers can be discriminated against in labor contracts and job
application processes. Race and gender have been systematically tested as
characteristics where discrimination can occur and create equity and efficiency
losses. Housing and credit markets have also been subject to different inquiries
regarding discrimination. Chaudhury and Sethi (2004) offer a survey of the
Arrow-Phelps literature on stereotypes and statistical discrimination.
Less studied, however, have been issues of discrimination in the non-market
domains of social services provision, particularly to the poor. Social programs
aimed at improving access to education, health, and child care for the poor are
good examples of these settings. As in imperfect markets, the provision of public
goods and social services by the state can also be subject to discrimination, with
certain individuals treated in a less favorable way than others with equivalent
constitutional rights or under the same provider and location. Unfortunately being
poor and having some of the characteristics for which individuals are
discriminated against and excluded, coincide. Indigenous and afro-descendent
frequently appear among the poorest and excluded in the Latin American region,
and therefore are more vulnerable. Migrants (campesinos) from the rural areas
suffer various kinds of discrimination when seeking access to the same services
that others have received in the past.
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Latin America, as one of the most unequal regions but also one of the most
diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, social backgrounds, imposes special
challenges with respect to discrimination and social exclusion. Also, the region is
suffering a dramatic transformation in terms of their urban-rural dynamics that
create particular problems we are yet to understand in depth. Persistent rural
poverty and inequality, the economic changes in the agricultural sector, cultural
change, political conflicts and civil wars have created a migration to the cities that
imposes a challenge to the provision of public goods and social services by the
state, particularly to the poorest that expand the metropolitan areas of the region.
Meanwhile, decentralization and devolution of the state create also greater
challenges to local governments in providing these services to the poor, in cities
that are evolving into worlds within worlds, with wealthy neighborhoods and
slums with severe social needs to be fulfilled. Thus, political tensions in the
developing and developed world emerge when the excluded can observe within
their cities that others have access to public goods and social services.
Governments have responded with systems of focalization to target the very
poor, creating survey procedures and algorithms to rank poor households for the
distribution of such social services. Much of those programs labeled as SISBEN1
(Irarrázabal, 2004) are in place in the region, as mechanisms for the targeting of
social protection programs. In fact those programs are aimed at targeting the
most vulnerable in an attempt to positively discriminate with redistributive goals.
Yet, there is room for discrimination and exclusion. Irarrázabal (2004) does
recognize this as one of the two risks of these indices of focalization of
beneficiaries when some individuals that should be included, remain excluded,
when manipulation of the information emerges. His estimations might suggest
that at least for the cases of Chile and Colombia there might be room for
suspecting such problems. Some of these could occur because of discrimination,
but the evidence cannot be used to support. Nuñez and Espinosa (2005) also
find statistical support from the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 2004 in Colombia
that there might be errors of inclusion (households that should not and are
receiving subsidies) and errors of exclusion (households in need excluded),
discriminating against households with elderly, displaced from violence and also
households heads with low levels of education.
Gaviria and Ortiz (2005) provide statistical evidence for Colombia suggesting that
minorities may be asymmetrically attended, for instance, in the subsidized health
program. Using self-reported data for ethnicity, they find that indigenous have
higher likelihoods of being included in the state subsidized health program2 than
afro descendants or blacks, controlling for other factors such as location,
education, age, consumption and employment. The causalities, however, are still
1
2
SISTEMAS UNICOS DE INFORMACION SOBRE BENEFICIARIOS EN AMERICA LATINA
Régimen Subsidiado en Salud, based on SISBEN rankings.
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undefined. One plausible reason is that greater amounts of national government
transfers flow to areas with larger fractions of indigenous groups if compared to
those with blacks. Also, indigenous have a longer tradition of social cohesion and
organization to claim their rights with the government than afro descendants who
only during the new constitutional process have shown attempts for social
organization and collective action. But still there is the possibility that
discrimination explains a process where blacks are less likely to enter the social
protection program given the steps involved in targeting, affiliating and delivering
the services.
Further, there is documented evidence in sentences from the Constitutional
Court in Colombia3 using the mechanism of the tutela4, where individuals who
have been classified erroneously argue that their rights and the principle of
equality have been violated in their classification into the SISBEN indexing
system.
In general, there are behavioral issues that are at the core of the problem. For
instance, if there is a ‘taste for discrimination’ those who generate the
discrimination (e.g. employers) will have to show it in their other-regarding
preferences, which could be validated empirically, or experimentally. Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004) have devised a clever experiment in the field, randomly
sending constructed CVs to newspaper ads for job postings, and observing the
probability of being called for an interview to test for discrimination in the labor
markets based on prejudices emerging from the names used, and without photos
or ethnic background. The results were astonishing as not only being identified
as black decreased the probability of getting an interview, but also the marginal
gains from other characteristics like education and home location would matter
more strongly if you had a white name. However, their results would be limited
for explaining the behavioral process in the minds of those deciding to call
applicants for an interview.
As for the case of government programs that provide social protection to the
poor, rather little has been said about the behavioral aspects of local officials’
decision making. We can agree that programs and policies aimed at helping the
poor are based on pro-social preferences of the majority that vote and thus elect
and appoint officials that will run those programs. But the contract between
officials and the electorate is incomplete and subject to asymmetries of
information. Further, the individual preferences of those in government and
executing the programs are unobservable in many cases.
3
http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co, http://200.21.19.133/sentencias/
4
“writ of protection of constitutional rights”
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Particularly if we recognize that we are in a world of imperfect markets and public
goods problems, the role of the state through their representatives’ behavior and
preferences is crucial. As eloquently said by Bowles & Gintis (2000) “Many are
now convinced that John Stuart Mill's injunction that we must devise rules such
that the “duties and the interests" of government officials would coincide should
be shelved, along with the assumptions of the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics, in the museum of utopian designs.”.
2. Objectives of the research
This research proposal is aimed at studying the existence of discrimination in the
provision of social services to the poor within social programs provided by the
state, and estimating its effects in terms of efficiency and equity.
In particular, we intend to study the micro or behavioral foundations that may
exist in the processes that lead to discrimination in the provision of social
protection services to the poor, and the micro and aggregate consequences that
such discrimination could have in the efficiency and equity goals of social
protection policies. The project will explore those behavioral aspects of both the
providers and the recipients of social protection services targeted to the poor.
Also, the project intends to develop a set of field experimental tools that can be
replicated elsewhere in similar settings and programs that can efficiently be used
to detect discrimination in the delivery of government and non-government
programs attending the poor.
3. The research strategy and methodological approach.
Severe methodological problems arise for detecting the mechanisms of
discrimination, and its economic effects. The call for research proposals reviews
progress made in the improvements made in the original decomposition in the
Blinder-Oaxaca approach. The call for proposals also recognizes the recent but
thriving literature using experimental approaches to study the problem. This
research proposal moves in this second direction, using experimental methods,
in the field, where subjects are actual players of the problem being studied.
The use of experimental methods to address development and social issues is
not new. Further, the use of experimental economics in the field, outside of the
lab with students, dates at least back to Binswanger’s (1979, 1980) early
experiments in the late 1970s in India when interested on observing risk attitudes
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in farmers, and controlling for the natural exposure to risk factors in their farming
decisions across a sample of villages. These decades have witnessed a wealth
of field studies using experimental economics, as surveyed in Cardenas and
Carpenter (2005)
At least two arguments are used to justify the approach. On the one hand, the
familiarity of experimental subjects with the question of study brings valuable
benefits to lab and field experimental approaches (Harrison and List, 2004;
Carpenter and Cardenas, 2005). Secondly, much of the sources of discrimination
emerge from the behavioral foundations of the players in the game, and using
experimental methods one can explore the causal relations causing the
discrimination.
Ferraro and Cummings (2004) offer experimental using the Ultimatum Game
where a proposer sends an allocation of a fixed amount to a responder who must
decide to accept or reject. If the latter, each player receives nothing, if accepted,
the allocation is made according to the proposer’s offer. Conducted in New
Mexico with samples from Hispanic and Navajo populations finding not only that
participants from these groups have different preferences but also that they are
influenced by the composition of the group in which they interact.
Cardenas (2004) also conducted field experiments using the Ultimatum Game,
Dictator Game, Third Party Punishment Game and common-pool resources
games in afro-Colombian communities in the Pacific coast of Colombia, as part
of a major study in 16 small scales societies around the world to study the roots
of sociality5. These experiments have also shown that there exists variation in the
other-regarding preferences of individuals and that local institutions and norms
may play important roles in understanding inequality aversion, costly punishment
and other behavioral issues of social interactions.
a. Preferences and behavior of local service providers.
Local and elected officials may have stronger or weaker pro-social preferences
towards people of certain backgrounds, ethnicity or social class. Similarly,
potential beneficiaries from different groups, including minorities, have self
formed expectations based on their status as well as conjectures about expected
behavior about local officials involved in the process of targeting, providing and
distributing social services to the poor which operate all simultaneously to create
socially undesirable outcomes. An experimental approach might offer the
mechanisms to disentangle the different causalities that operate in such
interaction between providers and recipients of social protection.
5
See http://www.hss.caltech.edu/roots-of-sociality/phase-ii
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However, the strategy will need a set of experiments as opposed to one single
experiment, to explore such behavioral mechanisms that create discrimination.
On the one hand there are experiments to explore different components of prosocial behavior such as altruism, reciprocity and trust (widely used in the lab and
the field are the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Third Party Punishment Game
and the Trust Game). Also, with respect to provision of public goods and
cooperation dilemmas there are the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism and
Common-Pool Resource games.
Newer developments of experimental methods in the field enrich the literature.
Barr et.al (2004, 2005) have been working with Ethiopian medical and nursing
students on different survey and experimental methods to explore intrinsic
motivations and room for corruption in health delivery services using games such
as the Third Party Punishment Game and The Trust Game. The dilemma of the
public servant delivering services arises from the incentives to capture rents from
unobservable actions by the community or their principal. Preferences towards
others, and responses to monitoring and sanctions are factors that can be
explored with experimental methods. For experimental literature on corruption,
see Abbink (2005) and Dusek et.al (2004).
b. Research strategy:
The core of the methodological approach lies on conducting experiments with
people that are directly involved in the processes of targeting, affiliation and
provision of social protection services to the poor. The proposed groups of
participants include:
• Potential, applicant and current beneficiaries of social protection services
for SISBEN populations
• Local officials at the municipality level, for small municipalities where the
survey and affiliation process takes place
• Surveyors usually hired by private contractors who have done the survey
process for large cities and metropolitan areas
• Controls (other government officials and citizens with equivalent
demographic characteristics as the groups above)
We will sample groups of people in a large metropolitan area, Bogotá, as well as
in smaller municipalities, including both urban and rural inhabitants. For the case
of the metropolitan area, we will recruit both local officials involved in the social
protection programs and surveyors in private companies that have contracts with
the government for the search and survey process. The total sample is expected
to be of 500 people in total.
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c. Experimental designs:
We propose to conduct a menu of experiments that allow us to measure the
existence and degrees of pro-social preferences, including altruism, trust, and
inequality aversion as crucial for the success of social protection programs aimed
at the poor. Also we plan to design a new artefactual field experiments that
creates a setting similar to the core of the questions of the research where local
officials collect data and rank applicants in terms of their needs and applicants
once ranked receive the social services in the program. Choices by those local
officials in the game will have effects on efficiency an equity which could be
observed and controlled for.
The treatments for such experiments will focus on how discrimination based on
issues of race, ethnicity, background, household composition, being displaced,
among others may create different strategic behaviors with effects on efficiency
and equity. Also, we expect to observe how mechanisms such as reciprocity and
social sanctioning affect pro-social behavior of our subjects.
We expect to complement the data gathering strategy with secondary sources
using survey data available at the national and local levels for the programs of
social protection.
Confidentiality.
Given the characteristics of the subject pools we propose to include in the study,
we need to address the issue of external validity in experiments (Loomes, 1999a,
1999b). As we propose to conduct the experiments who face daily the issues we
are studying (generating and perceiving discrimination), we also recognize that
the subjects particularly for the groups of local officials may respond strategically
to a frame and the fact of being observed. We plan to design experiments in
which confidentiality and single or double-blind designs allow us to induce
behavior that reflect preferences as close as possible to what they would express
in their actions associated with the process of targeting, affiliating and delivering
social services to the poor.
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4. Research team (See resumes attached):
Juan Camilo Cardenas (project leader)
Rajiv Sethi (co-investigator)
Alejandro Gaviria (co-investigator)
Sandra Polania (field researcher)
Natalia Candelo (field researcher)
We have gathered an exceptional research team with very complementary skills
and experience. Our team strategy is to combine three major foundations: theory,
policy analysis, and experimental economics in the field. The co-investigators
and field researchers have all experience and offer a synergic combination of
skills for this research proposal, as can be appreciated in the CVs attached.
Juan Camilo Cardenas, project leader, has been for the last 7 years working in
the field and the lab using experimental economics to study issues of pro-social
behavior, cooperation, trust, inequality and social distance. He has published in
refereed journals and edited volumes in the areas of economic behavior, natural
resources and development, particularly on field experiments.
Rajiv Sethi (Barnard-Columbia, USA) has been working for the last year on
theoretical modeling of segregation and discrimination which are critical to
disentangle the different components on how discrimination operates and affects
economic outcomes. He has publications in top journals and has worked
extensively on game theoretical analysis of issues of behavior, institutions and
segregation in particular.
Alejandro Gaviria (U. de Los Andes, Colombia) has worked with survey data and
sound statistical methods on social policy across the region writing extensively
on equity issues in education and health areas among others. His special
combination of statistical tools and policy-relevant analysis will be crucial for the
understanding of social protection issues in the region and Colombia in
particular, as well as for the analysis of the statistical data we gather.
Sandra Polanía, a research assistant at the the CEDE and Universidad de Los
Andes, has done research on the role of social capital in generating income to
households using statistical methods, and more recently using experimental
methods. She has also experience in the field with an NGO she founded that
supports 85 poor children in a marginalized neighborhood of Bogotá.
Natalia Candelo, also a research assistant at the CEDE and Universidad de Los
Andes, recently was part of the field team in a major experimental and
longitudinal survey study involving 8,400 households (35,000 individuals) in 150
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communities across all of Mexico. Such project is part of the MEXICAN FAMILY
LIFE SURVEY (Encuesta Nacional sobre Niveles de Vida de los Hogares ENNViH)6
5. Dissemination activities.
Having the CEDE and Facultad de Economía at Los Andes a predominant role in
the discussion of the public policy arena, we expect to offer such strategic
position to disseminate the results of this research.
We will undertake as part of the project a series of workshops and focus groups
with local officials and groups of social protection beneficiaries to discuss the
experimental results. We believe that such exchange can uncover several
puzzles that can emerge from the experimental data.
Maintaining the confidentiality and privacy of the data, we will discuss with
government officials at the different relevant agencies the results in order to
propose mechanisms to decrease the potential effects of discrimination, if
existing in the social protection services delivery.
The principal actors in this project are the academia, the civil society and the
target groups. Thus, the research results will be mainly disseminated to
academics and the public. First, the results will be presented to the academia
and policy makers in a conference at Universidad de los Andes, leaded by the
Economics Department to contribute to government policies performance, the
results will be informed to the civil society and the target groups in several
meetings. Finally, a working paper will be published in the Economic
Development Research Center (Economics Department) at Universidad de los
Andes, and later submitted to academic journals.
6
Ver http://www.ennvih.cide.edu/ Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. (CIDE),
Universidad Iberoamericana, Ciudad de México (UIA), Departments of Sociology and Economics,
(UCLA), California Center for Population Research (CCPR).
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6. T imetable of activities (2005 – 2006)
Activity
Reviewing literature and
experimental design
Applying the
experiments*
Applying a household
socio economic survey
Data processing
Analyzing and reporting
results
First partial report
First draft of the paper
Second draft of the paper
Final research paper and
Dissemination
De
c
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Se
p
Oct Nov
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Appendices
The Research Center: A Description
The Center for Economic Development Studies (CEDE) was founded in 1958 as
a research center affiliated to the Department of Economics at Universidad de los
Andes. The Center’s purpose is to produce top-quality research in economics
with focus on the economic and social development of Colombia. CEDE has a
staff of thirty researchers, half of them with a doctoral degree.
CEDE was the first private economic research center in Colombia. Research
produced at CEDE has historically been a central reference to those in charge of
the design and implementation of the national economic and social policies.
Among the institutions that fund research at CEDE have been the Central Bank
of Colombia, the Ministries of Finance, Development, Education and Health, the
National Planning Department, and COLCIENCIAS, the Colombian institution in
charge of the promotion of scientific research. Other sources of funding have
been multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter American
Development Bank (IADB), foreign governments and the private sector.
Throughout the years CEDE has participated in numerous projects with other
local and foreign universities and economic research centers. At the present
CEDE has a joint academic and research program in the area of Environmental
Economics with the University of Maryland (College Park) and it is a member of
the Latin American University Regulation and Infrastructure Network (LAURIN)
sponsored by the IADB, through which it is affiliated to the University of Sao
Pablo (Brasil), the Universidad del Pacífico (Perú), the Center for Applied
Economics (CEA) of the Universidad de Chile, the Universidad de la Plata and
the Foundation for Latin American Economic Research – FIEL (Argentina), and
to the J.F. Kennedy Harvard School of Government. Also sponsored by the
IADB, CEDE has a project directed towards strengthening the area of social
evaluation of projects in Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally, researchers at
CEDE often work in association with researchers from other Departments of
Economics and other research centers around the world.
There is a strong interest at CEDE to disseminate the results of the projects
undertaken by its researchers. For this reason CEDE has a series of Working
Papers (Documentos CEDE) that is widely consulted, and a journal (“Desarrollo y
Sociedad”) in which selected final papers are published. CEDE also has an
incentive scheme to encourage the publication of research papers in foreign
indexed journals. In addition, CEDE plays an active role in international seminars
and research networks, by contributing papers and some times at the
organizational level. Researchers at CEDE are usually present with their work at
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the Latin American and the Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) meetings,
at the Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, and at other
international research seminars. CEDE is also an active member of the Network
of Research Centers of the Inter American Development Bank.
Finally, CEDE regularly organizes seminars open to the public and the local
press to promote the debate around current issues of economic policy.
Researchers, both local and foreign, as well as actors from the public and private
sector participate in these seminars.
7. Cited and complementary references.
ABBINK, KLAUS (2005) “Laboratory experiments on corruption”. University of
Nottingham. Survey article to appear in The Handbook of Corruption, ed. by
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, UK, and
Northampton, US
ANDREONI, J. and VESTERLUND, L. (2001) "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender
Differences In Altruism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol.
116(1), pages 293-312.
Barr, Abigail, Magnus Lindelöw, and Pieter Serneels (2004), “To Serve the
Community or Oneself: The Public Servant'
s Dilemma”. World Bank, Working
Paper No 3187, 2004
Barr, Abigail, Magnus Lindelöw, Jose García-Montalvo and Pieter Serneels
(2005) “Intrinsic motivations on the development frontline: Do they exist? Do they
endure?”
BÉNABOU R. and J. TIROLE (2005) Incentives and Prosocial Behavior.
Discussion paper series. IZA DP No. 1695 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der
Arbeit. Institute for the Study of Labor. July.
BEN-NER, A, B. MCCALL, M. STEPHANE, and H. WANGL (2005) Identity and
Self-Other Differentiation in Work and Giving Behaviors: Experimental Evidence.
June.
BERTRAND, M. S. MULLAINATHAN and E. SHAFIR (2002) A BehavioralEconomics View of Poverty. Memos to the council of behavioral-economics
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Bertrand, Marianne and Sendhil Mullainathan (2004). “Are Emily and Greg more
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination.” American Economic Review, 94(4), pp. 991-1013(23).
Binswanger, H., 1980. Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measurement in rural
India. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 62, 395-407
BOLTON, G. and E. KATOK (1995) An experimental test for gender differences
in beneficent behavior. Economics Letters 48 (1995) 287-292.
BOWLES, S. and R. SETHI (2005) Social Segregation and the Dynamics of Group
Inequality. July. Santa Fe Institute and University of Siena. Department of Economics,
Barnard College, Columbia University.
Bowles, Samuel & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Walrasian Economics In Retrospect,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1411-1439.
Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis (2004) “Persistent parochialism: trust and
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CÁRDENAS, J.C. (2004) Social preferences among the Santianga (Colombia)
people. Roots of human society Project. Universidad de los Andes. Santa fe
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Cardenas, Juan Camilo and Jeffrey Carpenter (2005) “Experiments and
Economic Development: Lessons from field labs in the developing world”.
Mimeo. Available at:
CÁRDENAS, M., JUNGUITO, R., and PACHÓN, M. (2004) Political Institutions
and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The effects of the 1991 Constitution.
Fedesarrollo. August.
Carpenter, Jeffrey and Juan Camilo Cardenas (2005) “Three Themes on Field
Experiments and Economic Development”. In J. Carpenter, G.W. Harrison and
J.A. List (eds.), "Field Experiments in Economics" (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,
Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 10, 2005).
Chaudhury, Shubham and Rajiv Sethi “Discrimination with Neighborhood Effects:
Can Integration Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?”. Mimeo. Department of
Economics, Barnard College, Columbia University.
DERCON, S. ,T. BOLD and C. CALVO (2004) Insurance for the Poor? QEH
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DNP (2001) CONPES: Reforma del Sistema de Focalización Individual del Gasto
Social. Documento Conpes Social 055. República de Colombia. DNP: Dirección
de Desarrollo Social. Bogotá.
Dusek, Libor, Andreas Ortmann, and Lubomir Lizal (2004) “Understanding
Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments: A Primer”. Center for
Economic Research and Graduate Education, Charles University and Economics
Institute, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
Ferraro, P.J. (with R. Cummings). “Cultural Diversity, Discrimination and
Economic Outcomes: an experimental analysis. Under review.
http://epp.gsu.edu/pferraro/docs/FerraroCummingsEJFinalSubmit.pdf
Fershtman Chaim, and Uri Gneezy (2001), '
Discrimination in a Segmented
Society: An Experimental Approach'
, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 351377.
Gaviria, Alejandro y Roberto Ortiz (2005) “Inequidad racial en la afiliación al
régimen subsidiado en salud”. Mimeo.
HARRISON G. and J. LIST (2004) Field Experiments. Journal of Economic
Literature, 42(4), December 2004.
IRARRÁZAVAL, I. (2005) Sistemas Únicos de Información sobre Beneficiarios
en América Latina. November.
Irrazabal, Ignacio (2004) “Sole Information Systems on Beneficiaries in Latin
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