British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt by Khaled
Fahmy
Review by: Ehud R. Toledano
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (May, 2001), pp. 108-113
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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REVIEWS:GENERAL
ENDOWMENTS, RULERS AND COMMUNITY: WAQF AL-HARAMAYN IN OTTOMAN ALGIERS. By MIRIAMHOEXTER(Studies in Islamic Law and Society, 6)
Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1998. 188 pp.
When I read in the Acknowledgements Professor Hoexter's thanks to a foundation for
providing computing expenses, I feared that her book would prove to be a dull work of
defterology, consisting of little more than a mass of statistics. My forebodings, as it
turned out, were quite without foundation. The book does indeed rest on a basis of
statistics, drawn from the microfilmed records in Paris and Aix-en-Provence of the Waqf
al-Haralmavn in Algiers. Reconstituting these records was in itself a heroic feat, but even
more impressive is the way in which the author has been able to use the numerical
evidence which they furnish to provide a coherent and readable account of the
development over two centuries of the Waqf al-.Haramavy. Furthermore, although much
of the evidence is statistical, it is an account which is accessible even to the semi-numerate such as myself. The author's history is as good as her mathematics.
The Waqf al-Haramayn was a Hanafi foundation established in the early seventeeenth
century for the support of the poor of Mecca and Medina. Given the largesse that the
Muslim world as a whole bestowed on Holy Cities, it is unlikely that anyone in the Holy
Cities would remain poor for very long. However, Professor Hoexter shows that, apart
from fulfilling the pious aspirations of the donors, the Waqf had a legitimizing function
in that it provided a visible link between Algiers and the Holy Cities. This became
particularly important during the period between 1720 and 1830 when Algiers enjoyed
the status of an autonomous Ottoman province under the rule of the Deys. The functions
of the institution were also to become much wider than the title Waqf al-Haramayn
implies. It supported, in addition to the poor of the Holy Cities, the poor of Algiers, and
in 1688 assumed responsibility for the upkeep of the Mosque of Hasan Pasha Mezzo
Morto, and subsequently for three other mosques in the city, together with their endowed
properties. As the patrimony of the Waqf increased, especially with the accession of
Waqfs whose primary purpose was extinct and whose ultimate beneficiaries were the
poor of the Holy Cities, the .Haramavn became a major owner and manager of property
in Algiers. Inevitably, therefore, it came to play an increasingly important part in the
social and physical fabric of the city.
Professor Hoexter gives a careful account of the growth of the institution and
describes its management, showing how the board of managers was carefully balanced
between the Janissary ocak, the indigenous townspeople, especially those of Andalusian
descent and other elements in the city. She shows too how, during the two centuries
under discussion, in some areas the board introduced slight modifications to the laws of
Waqf, when it was to the financial advantage of the institution to do so. This is most
obvious in their tolerance of long leases of Waqf property, which strict Hanafi doctrine
does not allow. Her overall picture is that of a wise management which maintained the
integrity of the Waqf over two centuries, despite natural catastrophes and occasional
bombardments of the city by foreign fleets. All in all, this is an excellent book. In giving
a first-rate account of a particular institution, it serves also as a reminder of the central
importance of Waqf as an institution in Muslim urban life in general, and at the same
time makes a valuable contribution to the history of a neglected province of the Ottoman
Empire.
UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER
COLIN IMBER
ALL THE PASHA'S MEN: MEHMED ALI, HIS ARMY AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN EGYPT. By KHALEDFAHMY.(Cambridge Middle East Studies 2). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. 334 + xviii pp., 10 illustrations
The study of Egyptian history in the last phase of Ottoman rule, more specifically what
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REVIEWS: GENERAL
I have elsewhere called 'the long-nineteenthcentury',' has come a long way over the
past decade and a half. Until the mid-1980s, the discourse was dominated by the
nationalist narrative, which sought to contribute to the task of nation-building in a
Middle East that was extricatingitself from the grip of colonial powers. Egyptianwriters
such as al-Rafi'i, Rifat, Sabry, and others joined together with the rising forces of
nationalismto constitutean Egypt that did not only have legitimateclaims to sovereignty
and independence,but also a past that validated and documentedthose claims. Western
scholarshiphas generally accepted and in some cases actively promotedthe nationalist
narrative to create and foster a discourse of Egyptian history that was practically
unimpeachable.
In that discourse, a sad Ottomanchapterof misgovernmentand abuse that lasted close
to three centuries, drew to a blissful end with the rise of Mehmet Ali at the beginning
of the nineteenth century. It was then that the Egyptian nation rose to the historical
moment and recreateditself along well-defined contours, which over the century, and
under the House of Mehmet Ali, became one, indivisible, and purposeful. With the
active participationof its Ottoman-Egyptianelite, it effectively erased from memory
most traces of its Ottomanheritage,embracingan Arab-Egyptianidentitythat ultimately
achieved full independence only after the 1952 revolution.2A key component in the
nationalistnarrativehas been the pivotal role played by Mehmet Ali and his dynasty in
providinga clean breakwith the OttomanEmpireand a fresh starttowardsa new Egypt.
Despite the revolution's recasting the narrativeto conform to the world view of its
leading elite, the formative role of Mehmet Ali, or rather Muhammad'AlI to them,
remained,by and large, unchanged.
Robert F. Hunter's Egypt under the Khedives, 1805-1879: From Household Governprovidedthe first indirectchallenge to some of the basic
meint to Modern Bureaucracvy,3
assumptions in that narrative. Although working from Arabic Egyptian sources and
excluding OttomanTurkishones, Hunterneverthelesspierced the first substantiveholes
in the edifice constructed by nationalist historians, as the picture he carefully drew
betrayed,almost inadvertantly,the stark Ottomanrealities of nineteenth-centuryEgypt.
A major setback to this nascent, and much needed, revision occurred with the publication, also in 1984, of Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot's Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad
Ali.4 Marsotreinforcedall the majorconstituentpartsof the nationalistnarrative,driving
the discourse back to its safe sites of emergence in the 1930s-1960s. Although my own
work centred on the middle decades of the nineteenthcentury,it tried to challenge some
of the most fundamentalnotions of the nationalistnarrativesby re-attachingthat century
to the preceding Ottomanperiod, as by relegitimatingthe Ottomanpast and heritage of
Egypt.5
Fortunately,with the publication of Khaled Fahmy's book on Egyptian State and
society in the period of Mehmet Ali Pasha-for this endeavour is certainly far more
comprehensiveand significantthan a mere study of the Vali's army-the revision within
the discourse has been given a majorand highly welcome boost. Fahmy's is not only an
excellent, well-researched,well-conceived and well-arguedmonograph,but also a major
1 EhudR. Toledano, 'Social and EconomicChangein the "LongNineteenthCentury"',in MartinDaly (ed.) The
CambridgeHistory of Modern Egypt (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1998, Vol. 2, pp. 252-284.
2 On that
processof re-editingthe past,see EhudR. Toledano,'ForgettingEgypt'sOttomanPast', in JayneWarner
(ed.) Talat S. Halman Festschrift (New York), forthcoming.
3 RobertF. Hunter,
HouseholdGovernmentto Modern;Bureaucracy
Egyptunderthe Khediives,1805-1879: Froma?
(Pittsburgh:University of PittsburghPress, 1984).
4 Afaf Lutfi
Ali (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).
al-Sayyid Marsot,Egypt in the Reign of Muhlammad
For a thoroughevaluationof the work, see Ehud R. Toledano. 'Muhammad'Ali Basha or MehmetAli Pasha?',
in Middle Eastern Studies, 21(4) (1985) pp. 141-159.
5Ehud R. Toledano, State and Society in Mid-Nineteenth-Century
Egypt (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
Press, 1990).
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REVIEWS: GENERAL
contributionto our understandingof Egyptianhistory and of Ottomanprovincialhistory
in general. With the work of Robert Hunter,Juan Cole, KennethCuno, Selim Deringil
(from a central perspective), and others, we now have a coherent and articulate
alternativeto the nationalistnarrativeon the long nineteenthcentury;this scholarshipin
this area has now attaineda level that is perhapsunparelledin writings on other Arab
provinces of the OttomanEmpire.
Professor Fahmy's book is so dense and full of rich detail and neatly-crafted
interpretationthat it deserves and requires close and serious reading. Since it is
impossible to do justice to this work even in a somewhat more extensive review, I shall
try to at least enumeratethe main points of contributionto the debate, and simply urge
the reader to take it from here, and proceed forward to what will undoubtedlybe a
rewardingjourney, though perhaps more for the specialist than the general interested
public.
In a ratherpolemical introductorychapter(pp. 1-37), Fahmy effectively deconstructs
the three main components, as he sees them, of the nationalistnarrative.What he dubs
the 'powerful, monolithic discourse of Egyptiannationalism'(p. 17), consisted, first, of
a belief that Egypt is a pre-existing,eternal,primordialnation, an entity that had always
been out there, either embodied in certainhistoricalstates that had previously reigned in
the Nile Valley, or potentiallyhovering over that territory,waiting to be summonedand
realized. Secondly, it is assumedthat any obstacles, delays, and failings that occurredon
the road to nationalrealizationwere not due to internalforces, i.e. Mehmet Ali's army
and government, but rather were caused by external, malicious forces, namely the
British.Thirdly,the OttomanState and its agents are seen as a majornemesis, the natural
'other-a backward,stubbornand dogmatic enemy, one that had occupied Egypt for
long, dark centuries causing her to lag "behind"the humanist and scientific developments that were taking place in Europe' (p. 18).
These three constituent elements of the nationalist narrative are almost perfectly
reflected in the discourse about the history of the newly formed Egyptian army of
Mehmet Ali Pasha. In a concise and well-argued section (pp. 18-26), Fahmy debunks
each of the three, taking to task and exposing the weakensses of works by Egyptianand
Europeanwriters,but most effectively the work of Afaf Marsot.He argues that far from
resurrecting a dormant Egyptian nation, the army and other institutions under the
commandof an oppressive, tyrannicalrulercarved out, delineated,moulded, and forced
into being a new entity, the Egyptiannation, that had never existed before. This was not
a natural,pleasant, or even positive action, but rathera cruel, inhumanprocess, driven
by personal and dynastic ambition that demanded the ultimate sacrifice under false
pretence. The Egyptian nation, he concludes, was actually the product of the very
nationalist discourse which argued that it had existed for ever and ever before.
Fahmy then goes on to reject the notion that Britain was to blame for the eventual
collapse of the Pasha's enterprise, which would have otherwise met with total and
well-deserved success. The argumenthere is more sophisticated than a mere counter
claim that it was all the Pasha's fault; the authoropposes the very distinction between
internal and external factors, arguing that these were inextricably intertwined,jointly
leading, in a gradualprocess to a mountingopposition to his ambitiousimperialproject,
both from within and from without. The Vali's actions and the effect they producedon
the people who had to cope with their impactultimatelycreatedthe threatto the integrity
of the OttomanEmpire, that Britaincould not afford to ignore within the frameworkof
its own imperial designs.
Lastly, Professor Fahmy takes up the core issue of Egypt's 'Ottomanness'and the
Ottomannatureof its rulerand government.It is arguablyhere that the authormakes the
most significant contributionto the discourse on Egyptian history. For he effectively
combines an historicalperspective with an historiographicalone to join the undergoing
revision within the discourseon the OttomanMiddle East. Fahmy extends backwardsthe
views that I and others have propoundedfor the past decade or so, namely that, to quote
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REVIEWS: GENERAL
his own words, '... three hundred years of Ottoman rule must have had a significant
impact on the legal, cultural and economic position of Egypt, and that only if "Egypt"
is taken to refer to a nation with a clearly defined identity could these three centuriesbe
seen as foreign and alien' (pp. 25-26). In this and other significantpoints, Fahmy rejects
Marsot's theses one by one, and restores, with the full weight of his splendid research
and control of the evidence, to Muhammad'All Basha his true identity as Mehmet Ali
Pasha.
Another importantcontributionis in evaluation and approach,which is essentially a
humanist one, ratherthan an external, merely 'evaluative'. I had for long considered a
lost cause my own attempt to draw attention to the enormous suffering inflicted by
Mehmet Ali on ordinaryEgyptians, indeed to raise the issue of the intolerablehuman
cost of his reforms and personal-dynasticambitions.6Fahmy independentlytakes up this
line of argument,bolstering his postion with convincing, indeed irrefutabledocumentation. This is social history at its best, with great emphasis being put on the plight of
the soldiers who were brutallycoerced to serve in the Pasha's army, abused, humiliated,
trodden upon, deprived of their humanity, and used in the most cynical sense of the
word. Here, ProfessorFahmy almost becomes an advocate for a cause, sparingno effort
in trying to give the down and out a voice. He shows how they resisted their exploiter
in every way possible, and by returningto them the agency to deprive the Vali-or his
son Ibrahim,for that matter-of any role as a nationalisticon, the authorrestoresto them
the basic dignity which the nationalistnarrative,inadvertantlyand in a roundaboutway,
in fact denies them.
Fahmy does not mince words. 'Service in Mehmed Ali's army was ... a dreadful
experience,' he writes. Soldiers, he goes on, 'were insulted, abused and humiliated ...
poorly fed, poorly clothed and poorly paid. It was an army that did not recognize the
sacrifice given by those who were wounded while serving in it. Above all, ... it was an
army that did not respect its dead' (p. 256). Consequently, and quite understandably,
soldiers were averse to the service, seeing the army as the very embodiment of 'the
atrocious, inhumanand dreadfulpolicies of Mehmed Ali' (p. 277). Feeling 'disgust and
hatred' towards the Pasha's brutalregime, they respondedby absconding in droves and
by mass self-maiming. But Fahmy not only condones their reaction, he actually finds it
laudatory,fully identifying with the victims, as he frankly writes: 'There is something
almost splendid about defying Mehmed Ali and his authoritiesin that way and at that
level' (p. 259).
While not denying some of the remarkableleadershipand command qualities of the
Pasha, Fahmy rightly condemns him for the oppression and inhumanitythat his blind
ambition amply produced. '... [S]ervice in the army,' he writes, 'was an ever-present
reminder to the soldiers of the injustice and misery that were reigning all over the
country during Mehmed Ali's rule' (p. 254). The soldiers, he asserts elsewhere, 'came
to see the army as the most detestable aspect of the Pasha's already hated regime' (p.
277). All these observationsare part and parcel of Fahmy's larger thesis that service in
the army had nothing to do with nation-building,nor did or could it instill in the soldiers
the sentiments of pride or belonging that are essential for developing nationalist
sentiments.He answers a flat no to a series of scathing questions intendedto dispel any
attemptto rehabilitatethe nationalistnarrativewhich he effectively demolishes (p. 253).
Even Ibrahim Pasha does not escape the just criticism that he was the most loyal
servant of his father's dynastic ambitions, not the Egyptian nationalist,that traditional
writers made him to be (pp. 242 ff., and 276). With this, Fahmy puts to rest all of
Marsot's main nationalist arguments, sharing none of the admirationshe has for the
Ottoman-EgyptianVali (pp. 252-254). But Professor Fahmy does not buy into her
economic thesis either. Marsot has depicted Mehmet Ali as a strong mercantilist,who
6 EhudR.
Toledano, 'Muhammad'Ali Pasha',Encyclopaediaof Islam, second edition (Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1991),
Vol. 7 pp. 423-431. It is there,too, thatI outline some otherviews aboutthe motives and significanceof Mehmet
Ali's reign, that are in tandem with many of the positions espoused by Fahmy in his book.
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had conducted an 'industrialrevolution' in Egypt, and threatenedwith his monopolies
and economic prowess the interests of Britain in the eastern Mediterranean,if not
beyond. Fahmy, rightly again, wishes to returnthe discussion to its propergeo-strategic
context, as he argues that Britain, and Palmerstonas the policy maker in this regard,
viewed Mehmet Ali as a threatto the integrity of the OttomanEmpire, whose actions
might very well lead to Russian interventionand put in jeopardy British assets in the
Levant and the sub-continent(pp. 292-304).
Although Professor Fahmy is more interested in a 'bottom-up' approach, and is
committed to giving voice and agency to the native Egyptian soldiery, he also
demonstratesan understandingof the views and mood of the Ottoman-Egyptianelite.
Here, however, there is no empathy involved; they were the loyal-sometimes even
enthusiastic-servants of an oppressive dynasty and a ruthlessruler,though Fahmy does
recognize the ambivalenceof their predicamentas well. Although the Ottoman-Egyptian
elite was larger than the Ottoman-Egyptianofficer corps in Mehmet Ali's army, that
group of senior officers was its dominantelement, especially during campaign periods,
which took up much of the Pasha's reign. The authordescribeswell the compositionand
characterof that group, putting his finger on the linguistic, cultural, and orientation
divide that separated its members from the soldiers and the junior Arabic-speaking
officers (pp. 242-252). Much of the hatred of the service on the part of soldiers, and
humiliatingconduct of the officers towards them, derived from that divide, which was
a constituent element of the entire army and lay at the very core of Mehmet Ali and
Ibrahim'sconcept of how the army should be constructedand led.
It is here that my majorcriticism of Fahmy's view comes in. Whereashe does accept
the basic views elaboratedin my own work on the Ottoman-Egyptianelite, he does not
feel comfortablewith my notion of a 'socio-culturaldivide', that existed within Egyptian
society duringmuch of the nineteenthcentury (pp. 26-29). InsteadFahmy contends that
boundaries between members of that elite and members of non-elite groups were
frequentlynegotiatedand crossed duringthe second half of the century. I am willing to
accept his view that I did not spend enough time on the groups that inhabited the
peripheriesof these two groups, i.e. 'scribes, guards,lower-rankinggovernmentbureaucrats, non-commissionedofficers, nurses and servants'. I also agree with him that these
people 'stood at the peripheriesof these two groups and facilitated the communication
and the interactionbetween their respective members' (p. 27). Finally, Fahmy believes
that I highlight the divide ratherthan the fact that it was often enough breachedat the
peripheries. However, one needs only to point to the overwhelming and impressive
evidence that Fahmy himself provides throughouthis own book, in order to reinforce,
rather than to refute, the daunting nature of the divide, certainly during the reign of
Mehmet Ali Pasha. The vivid existence of that divide in the army, and the inability of
the Egyptian officers and soldiers effectively to negotiate and cross it, serves Fahmy
himself as the most powerful causal tool in his narrative.Nonetheless, it seems to me
the differences here are of degree ratherthan of kind, and are in fact dwarfed by the
agreements shared between us within the evolving discourse on nineteenth century
OttomanEgypt.
A corrolary of this discussion is the attempt made by Fahmy to understand the serious
identity issue that evolved within the Ottoman-Egyptianofficers corps, which also
affected othercomponentsof the elite. The militaryconflict between MehmetAli's army
and Sultan Mahmut II's imperial forces only brought this inherentconflict into relief,
exacerbatingan already present, if dormantdilemma. As I have argued elsewhere, the
Ottoman-Egyptianelite, like other Ottoman-Localelites within the Middle East and
North Africa, was forged out of the Ottoman imperial elite through a dual process of
Localization and Ottomanizationfrom the seventeenthcentury on.7 Under Mehmet Ali
7 Ehud R.
Toledano, 'The Emergenceof Ottoman-LocalElites (1700-1800): A Frameworkfor Research',in I.
Pappe and M. Ma'oz (eds) MiddleEasternPolitics and Ideas: A Histornfrom Within,(Londonand New York:
Tauris Academic Studies, 1997), pp. 145-162; and idem, 'Social and Economic Change' pp. 252-284.
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in Egypt, the process moved from household hegemony-first achieved under the
Kazda6ly household in the eighteenth century, then under Mehmet Ali-into the
dynastic phase, which was accomplished by the Pasha in the early 1840s, then
consolidated under his descendants. The essence of the process involved not only the
rallying of an elite corps around a leading figure and his household, but also the
formationof Ottoman-Localidentity. Such a process inevitably consists of constructing
a core local, here Egyptian, identity vis-i-vis an Ottoman 'Other'.
Without resortingto this type of explanation,Fahmy neverthelessgrasps the natureof
the process that took place within the Ottoman-Egyptianofficers corps during the
campaigns of Mehmet Ali.
TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY
EHUD R. TOLEDANO
ISRAEL: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, VOLUME 1: ISRAEL'S TRANSITION
FROM COMMUNITY TO STATE. Edited by EFRAIMKARSH.London, Frank Cass
Publishers, 2000. 244 pp.
HOW ISRAEL WAS WON: A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT. By BAYLIS
THOMAS.
London, Lexington Books, 1999. xviii + 288 pp.,
maps
Recently, the US and Israelhave declassified governmentdocuments,enablinghistorians
and scholars to impartmore accurateaccounts of the Arab-Israeliconflict. Yet, opening
up archival doors has not ended the polemics of interpretingMiddle Eastern history.
Israel: The First Hundred Years and How Israel Was Won both tackle the contro-
versial history of the birth of Israel. Efraim Karsh's book, which is a compilationof 12
essays written by various authors,takes a more nationalisticapproachto describingthe
evolution of Israel. The book includes abstractsof each of the essays as well as an index
at the end, but it does not provide a bibliographyor profiles of the contributors.Baylis
Thomas's book, with 19 chapters, two appendices, a bibliography, and ample maps,
appears to capture a more balanced approachin interpretingthe events leading to the
creation of Israel and the origins of the Arab-Israeliconflict.
The titles of these books also deserve attention.The First Hundred Yearspresumably
refer to the preliminarystages leading up to the establishmentof the State of Israel in
1948, and its subsequentsurvival to the present. The subtitle, 'Israel's Transitionfrom
Community to State', presupposes that Israel had existed in communal form prior to
statehood, which is the underlyingpremise of Karsh's book, upon which each chapter
is supposed to build. The selected essays pertain to various aspects of state-building,
entailing the establishment of institutions, infrastructure,security forces, intelligence
networks,settlements,transportationsystems, the political structuresfor self-rule,Zionist
leadership,education systems, and media services, while facing nearly insurmountable
obstacles. The perspective of this book describes Israel's evolution as an outcome of a
collective action for survival, driven by the determinationand sagacity of a severely
persecuted people.
How Israel Was Won, however, connotes 'how the West was won', invoking an
analogy between, on the one hand, America's deliberate, violent campaign against the
indigenous Native American population in confiscating land, establishing settlements,
terrorizing the perceived enemy, and declaring statehood based on sovereignty and
self-determination,and, on the other hand, similar tactics carried out by the Zionist
movement against the indigenous population in Palestine. This analogy is not actually
mentioned until the last page of the last chapter in the book. However, the preceding
chapterseffectively build up to this analogy, using well-researcheddocumentsto support
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