(Doha Institute)
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The popular revolution in Egypt:
The forces shaping the change and their role in the transitional period
Omayma Abdel-Latif
Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies
Doha, February - 2011
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Contents
THE POPULAR REVOLUTION IN EGYPT:
THE FORCES SHAPING THE CHANGE AND THEIR ROLE IN THE
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD ......................................................................................
HISTORIC PRECEDENTS ........................................................................................................................... 3
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY ................................................................................................................. 4
WHO ARE THE FORCES WHICH WILL SHAPE THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD? ......................................... 5
Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies
The popular revolution in Egypt
The popular uprising-turned-revolution which broke out in Egypt on January 25th has finally brought
about regime change in Egypt through the most unexpected venue, the street. It has, nonetheless, given a
remarkable boost to Egypt‟s ambitions for establishing a democratic system. It has also marked a number
of historic precedents, the most important of which is achieving regime change using the dynamics of
street politics.
Initially, the revolutionary state of affairs seemed rather unique compared to all other previous
manifestations of protest which Egypt has experienced in the past five years – and there were many.
Although many observers invoked the Tunisian popular uprising, which ousted Zein al-Abedeen Bin Ali
from a 23 year iron fist rule, as the main catalyst for the Egyptian revolution, one could cite a number of
factors which predated the Tunisian uprising, and together helped trigger what came to be known as the
25th January revolution.
First, the revolution was the outcome of a long list of protest actions, including sit-ins,
demonstrations, and strikes that took place in both governmental and private sectors for the past decade.
In 2007 alone, protest actions reached 1,000 while, in 2009, a record of at least 700 protest actions was
reported. Such manifestations did not disappear with the revolution. On day 15 there were more than 20
protest actions in nine governorates.
Second, the revolution has also been an outcome of a legacy of bringing the street back into the
political scene as the place of action and protest against the regime and its oppressive policies. Political
protest movements, such as Kifaya (the Egyptian Movement for Change) which came into the scene in
2005 with slogans that raised the ceiling of political demands for the first time during Mubarak‟s then 25
years in office. It decided to focus on the president as the target of its protest and slogans. The two famous
„NOs‟ were no to succession, and no to a new term in office for Mubarak.
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The popular revolution in Egypt
Against this background and out of this momentum was born six protest movements which called
for and mobilized the demonstrations on January 25th. Some of those movements have, in fact, been in
solidarity with the workers‟ strikes (the 6 April movement which called for a strike in solidarity with
textile workers in al- Mahla al-Kubara) while others were protesting against torture and police oppressive
manners (We are all Khaled Said; kuluna Khaled Said); a third group was pressing for political demands
(the National Front for Change, Democratic Front, and Alghad party).
One very important factor in all of this is the collective consciousness which found manifestations
among protesters that this was a revolution against the existing order. A collective awareness grew that it
was the president who was most responsible for their misery, humiliation, and oppression. It‟s within this
context that the protesters‟ persisted on what one analyst described as „the maximum demands,‟ that was
Mubarak should step down, refusing to make any compromises on such a demand.
This awareness also marked a turning point in the struggle of the Egyptian national movement
against the Mubarak regime. For a very long time, the protest movements in Egypt failed to mobilize
larger numbers of Egyptians in their anti-Mubarak demonstrations. Kifaya, as well as others, almost
always ended up with a few protesters. In almost all street activity, the number of the police forces
cordoning the demonstration outnumbered that of the protesters. For years, such movements suffered
from popular isolation. At the same time, different segments of Egypt‟s work force decided to stage its
own demonstrations and sit-ins against the status quo in an apolitical manner. Their demands focused
mainly on improving work conditions and increasing salaries, but did not extend to any political demands.
While Mubarak‟s regime responded to some of those demands, it blatantly ignored many others.
It was, therefore, surprising to see the change brought about by the revolution when huge
segments of the Egyptian society decided to make the hardest shift to politics, and wholeheartedly
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The popular revolution in Egypt
embraced the political demands of regime change. And contrary to what many experts have been warning
about „a rebellion of the deprived and the impoverished,‟ the 25th January revolution proved them wrong.
For this was not just another bread riot; rather, it was an uprising for “change, freedom and social justice,”
as the revolution‟s most noted slogan went. However, one common feature this revolution shares with
previous uprisings in Egyptian history is the focus on one basic demand. We have seen this during the
students‟ movement in 1968, protesting against the light sentences against the army generals responsible
for the 1967 defeat. This was also highlighted in 1972 marches, urging Sadat to declare war on Israel,
and, of course, in the 1977 bread riots.
Historic Precedents
The revolution marked a number of historic precedents:

Reclaiming the street as a place for political activism. In fact, the street movement was moving at
a much faster pace than the political elite, both ruling and opposition, even in the absence of a
unified leadership and platform.

Bringing down the authoritarian regime which had ruled the country since 1952, replacing it with
a democratic state (changing the ruler in the street).

We witnessed, for the first time, how the ruling elite (in this case the armed forces, which is now
charged with running the state affairs during the transitional period) is engaging civilian figures,
opposition parties, and protest forces in a dialogue over what political system Egypt should have
post-Mubarak.
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
The popular revolution in Egypt
The end of the strong state myth since the crisis revealed how some of the state institutions were
turned into „interest groups,‟ as had been the case with the security institution and its collapse on
Friday 28th in the face of protesters.
The security institution has been one of the regime‟s tools in a trilogy of the ruling party, along with a
class of businessmen and pro-regime media to tighten Mubarak‟s grip on power. According to IMF
statistics, Mubarak‟s regime spent 11 billion LE (nearly 2 billion US dollars) on security institutions
which employs 1,200,000 employees (800,000 in the police force, 450,000 for central security forces,
400,000 secret police), according to 2009 figures.
Added to this is the unofficial security force, commonly known as the militia of thugs, operating
under the eyes of security forces, and, at their order, participated in what came to be known as statesponsored thuggary. They were used by security institutions as a way to intimidate and terrorize regime
opponents, which has also been the role of the state security police, another organ of the security
institution. Under the emergency law imposed on the country since Mubarak took office in 1981, the
security institution was given an immense mandate. The collapse of the interior ministry on Friday 28th is
now being investigated, but according to press reports, there were two apparent causes; either it was a plot
by Mubarak regime to terrorize a whole population, leaving them with only two options, Mubarak or
chaos, or this conspicuous absence is the result of power struggle at the upper echelons.
The Role of the Military
Egyptians hold a utopian view of their national army, and believe that it is „the army of the people and
will not be a tool of oppression‟. The Egyptian Armed Forces, nonetheless, was, and remains, „a black
hole‟ during Mubarak‟s years, so it is difficult to evaluate the changes that have taken place during those
years. One should, therefore, be cautious when making any assessment of army role in any future setting.
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The popular revolution in Egypt
Who are the forces which will shape the transitional period?

The popular force which constituted the bulk of Tahrir square revolutionaries. They achieved a
popular revolution which should result in a new social contract that includes the revolution‟s key
slogans (equality, freedom, and social justice). They believe that those who made the revolution
should be allowed to set the new rules for the political system, select a transitional government, as
well as the members of the committee which will write a new constitution. One obstacle,
however, remains the fact that the revolution did not result in new leadership, although some find
this a plus.

The Armed Forces; the military takeover of state affairs brought to the fore many questions
regarding the role of the army in the transition period. Many count on the army to secure a
smooth transition to a democratic rule, one which will decrease the role of the army in any future
arrangement, and, instead, will be in favor of a more civilian take on power.

A number of civilian figures, as well as the official opposition parties.
While the January 25th uprising achieved its first goal (i.e., bringing down the president), but there
remains other important, and perhaps more crucial steps, on the road to transition from dictatorship to
democracy, including creating a new social contract, restructuring security institutions to transform Egypt
from a police state to one of law and order, and balancing the military civilian relationship in favor of
civilian rule.
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