Muslim Immigrants and Religious Identity: Western Europe
Vanessa Griffith, SUNY Oneonta
Center for Social Science Research
Winner, Undergraduate Student Essay Competition (Long)
Introduction
The majority of immigrants that make up Western Europe today are Muslims.
Prompted by post World War II guest programs in Europe and perpetuated through
technology and increased connections, this unintended mass immigration of Muslims has
brought the Muslim population in Europe to about 15 to 20 million—approximately 4 to 5
percent of the total population. Further, the National Intelligence Council estimates that
Europe’s Muslim population will double by 2025 (Leiken 2005, 121-122). With this
increase comes specific challenges, and recent events show that there are tensions between
the Muslims of Western Europe and their host societies. ,
On March 11, 2004 a series of coordinated bombings attacking the commuter train
system in Madrid, Spain killed 191 people and wounded another 1,800. It was determined
that these attacks were led by an al-Qaeda inspired terrorist cell. Demonstrations and
protests occurred after this horrendous incident. On November 2, 2004, Theo van Gogh, a
major Dutch film director, was murdered due to a film he made that was critical of the
treatment of women in the Koran. He was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri, a DutchMoroccan citizen with alleged terrorist ties to the Dutch Hofstad Network. In the aftermath
of this assassination, there were a total of 106 violent incidents in November against
Muslim targets, according to the Dutch Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. On
July 7, 2005, a series of coordinated suicide attacks occurred in the United Kingdom. These
bombings targeted civilians using London’s public underground transport system during
Center For Social Science Research
2
its morning rush. Fifty-two people were killed and over 700 people were wounded. There
were a total of four suicide bombers, two of which made videos describing their reasoning
for the attacks: they were “soldiers” fighting for Islam. On September 30, 2005, twelve
editorial cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet Muhammad were published in a Danish
newspaper. The Danish Muslim organizations that objected to these cartoons reacted by
holding public protests to raise awareness of these controversial cartoons. This led to
Islamic protests across the Muslim world, some of which escalated into violence. Together,
these events illustrate definite tensions and problems with Western Europe and its
Muslims.
In our post 9/11 world, events like these cause nation-states to fear that they are
breeding homegrown jihadists, causing policymakers to focus on their country’s security
measures. The root of these tensions, however, goes much deeper than just a failure in
security measures. One must analyze the foundation and root of these tensions and the
violence that is occurring between immigrants and their host societies. Analyzing this
origin is important because events like the ones described above have negative
consequences for Muslims and Islam around the world. This paper will argue that the root
of these tensions is due to Muslim immigrants identifying primarily with their religious
identity over their national identity. This paper will analyze the link between Muslim
migrants turning towards their religious identity and how the state and public affect this
within host countries.
Literature Review
Patti Tamara Lenard defines the term integration in her article, “What Can
Multicultural Theory Tell Us About Integrating Muslims in Europe?”, as being used to refer
Center For Social Science Research
3
to whether new immigrants have possessed legal, social and economic access, and that this
access is equal to the access non-immigrants have. If immigrants do have access equal to
that of non-immigrants, they are defined as being integrated. Lenard states that integration
is a two-way street, and not only must host societies rely on just the immigrants to try and
integrate but also that the state must be prepared to make accommodations in ways that
facilitate this integration. Both sides need to pull their weight if an integration policy is to
succeed. Lenard acknowledges that the process of integrating Muslims is slow across
Europe, and this is evident by their “low levels of skill and education and their persistent
socio-economic marginalization, even into second and third immigrant generations”
(Lenard 2010, 309). Many scholars address the integration process that has been
conducted in Western European nations for their immigrants because it has failed to work.
Amel Boubekeur in “Time to Deradicalise?” states that part of the reason why there
is an apparent failure of thirty years of European social policies aimed at integrating
Muslims is that these policies were usually designed without their input. It is important for
Muslims to be drawn in to participate, and they should not only be heard when there is a
security threat. There is a clear gap between the political elites in Europe and the
controversial reality of European Muslims. There is not a lack of wanting to integrate by the
Muslim population. Boubekeur states their reaction to certain crisis demonstrates their
desire to be an active citizen, and they are just internalizing the values of the European
political culture.
Bernard Brown agrees with Boubekeur in “Europe’s Muslims: a Foreign Policy
Issue” by stating that the violence occurring in these Western European nations is an act of
expression by Muslims and that they truly desire to be integrated into European societies.
Center For Social Science Research
4
The various events that have been occurring around Europe should be viewed as warning
flags. Muslims are not integrating as quickly as previous waves of immigrants have. Of the
Muslim in Western countries, it is said that ten percent consider themselves fully
integrated. Approximately the same amount (ten percent) considered themselves in an
adversarial relationship with their host countries. The rest claimed to be pulled back and
forth between the two extremes. Overall it is agreed by scholars that integration in terms
acceptable to the majorities in host countries still remains difficult to achieve.
Ruud Koopmans sheds light on the notion that integration policies and
organizations made at a local level is of key importance for migrant integration. In “Migrant
Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among German Cities and a Comparison
with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,” Koopmans states that it is at the local level
where migrants and their host society interact and it is local policies that can effectively
address the problems of specific migrant groups. It is easier for migrants to identify with
their local society as opposed to the national society.
When Muslim immigrants have trouble identifying with their host societies, this can
cause them to turn to their religious identity. Jonathan Laurence argues in “Muslims and
the State in Western Europe” that second and third generations who have been expected to
assimilate into their host societies have instead discovered their religious identity in their
new societies. Laurence cites surveys that prove that many of these young people who are
part of these generations identified more with their inherited religion than with their
nationality, place of residence, or even gender. It is groups of Muslims that do not have
much else that look to Islam as a form of identity affirmation.
Center For Social Science Research
5
Daniéle Hervieu-Léger agrees with Laurence regarding young Muslims and their
religious identities, especially within France. In “Islam and the Republic: the French Case,”
she states that for the young, whom are the most vulnerable to threats of exclusion, religion
can become an area for them to construct an identity and to conquest dignity. Islam allows
young Muslims “to transform enduring exclusion into difference willingly embraced”
(Hervieu-Léger 2007, 204). Hervieu-Léger notes that these young Muslims are choosing to
have these religious identities rather than inheriting them. Young Muslims she interviews
describe their present religious identity in terms of individual, voluntary appropriation.
More importantly she discusses a study done by Farah Khosrokhavar, which confirms that
the young who are turning to this religious path of self-construction are ones who are
economically and socially excluded. These young Muslims tend to feel hated by a society
that does not make room for them. This form of Islamization is just these young Muslims
trying to reshape the meaning of their own lives, according to Hervieu-Léger. “Social
necessity becomes religious virtue” (Hervieu-Léger 2007, 215).
This social exclusion that is developing in these host societies is a clear problem. As
previously stated, integration is a two-way process. Ariane Chebel D’Apollonia discusses
how host societies can negatively affect this integration process in “Immigration, Security,
and Integration in the European Union.” Interaction between the minority and majority
groups is what overall determines the outcome of the entire integration process.
D’Apollonia uses the data from a report by the European Union Monitoring Centre on
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). The EUMC did a report on Islamophobia in the EU after
September 11th, 2001; this report confirmed that there has been a growth in xenophobic
attitudes and incidents within the EU. The EUMC reported that Islamic communities have
Center For Social Science Research
6
become the target of growing hostility. All of this proves that host societies are not
receiving these Muslim immigrants well, and that there is a negative public opinion about
Muslim immigrants.
This negative public opinion can force immigrants to feel like they need to stick
together and can lead to the creation of ethnic concentrations. Bernard Brown states that,
since the early 1980s, there has been a tendency toward immigrant populations forming in
concentrated areas, which leads to increased tendency for immigration problems. In
“Europe’s Muslims: a Foreign Policy Issue,” he states that ethnic concentrations can be
found all throughout Western Europe. For example, 48 percent of the population in
Amsterdam was of foreign origin in 2005. The average for the German cities of Stuttgart,
Frankfurt and Nuremberg was 38 percent. In Oslo, approximately one-third of the
population is of foreign origin. With France, which is known for having the largest Muslim
population in Europe, Brown went further in depth. Breaking up France into communes,
Brown noted that in Ile-de-France as many as three-fourths of young people were of
foreign origin in the year 2005. In Seine-Saint-Denis, one out of six young person was from
Sub-Saharan Africa. In Blois, it was determined that one-third of the young people were of
foreign origin in the year 2005, and of this one-third 80 percent were Muslim. This proves
that ethnic enclaves do exist within Western European countries.
The work of the above scholars proves that the variables I will use in my analysis do
exist, as well as illustrate a general link between the failure of integration policies and the
recent tensions and events that have been occurring in Western Europe between host
societies and its Muslim immigrants. This paper will argue that there is more to be
analyzed in regards to these tensions, and propose that there may be an antecedent
Center For Social Science Research
7
variable between the failure of integration policies and hostile public opinion and the
resulting tensions and violence. Literature is lacking on analyzing the possible link between
Muslim immigrants choosing to identify to their religious identity over their national
identity and the tensions that this may create. It is conceivable that integration policies and
public opinion all affect Muslims choosing their religious identities, which then leads to
national tensions within Western European countries. This link is worthy of further study,
and would fit in well with the rest of the literature on the general subject of Muslim
immigrants in Western Europe.
Methodology
The question this paper will try to answer is as follows: Why are Muslim immigrants
choosing to relate primarily to their religious identity over their national identity?
Therefore, my dependent variable will be Muslim immigrants turning to their religious
identity. I will examine two independent variables: the state's reception of Muslim
immigrants and the public's reception of Muslim immigrants. The state's reception of
Muslim immigrants can be demonstrated through incorporation policies of the host
country. The public's reception of Muslim immigrants can be determined through public
opinion polls of the Muslim immigrants within the host society. Overall, I have two
hypotheses that I will be attempt to prove with this analysis. Hypothesis One (H1) is that
the failure to properly integrate Muslim immigrants via state incorporation policies will
cause Muslim immigrants to turn to their religious identity over their national identity.
Hypothesis Two (H2) is that an overall negative public opinion about Muslims immigrants
within a host society will cause Muslim immigrants to turn to their religious identity over
their national identity. This paper will analyze three different cases within Western Europe.
Center For Social Science Research
8
The countries I choose for my case studies are France, Germany and Great Britain. All three
of these countries have a significant amount of Muslim immigrants within their population.
None of these countries execute the exact same type of incorporation polices toward their
immigrant population, but all three are deeply affected by Muslim populations.
I will examine the dependent variable by looking at the percentage of Muslims
within Western European countries that consider religion to be their central identity. I will
also be looking at the percentage of Muslims that think the Islamic identity among Muslims
in their country is growing. This data can be found in a Pew Global Attitudes Project survey.
The name of the survey I will use is “Few Signs of Backlash From Western Europeans,” I
released on July 6, 2006. The Pew Global Attitudes Project is a reliable series of public
opinion surveys encompassing a wide range of subjects. The 2006 Global Attitudes Survey
was based on national samples and the survey was conducted either by telephone or
through face-to-face interviews. The margin of error for my case studies was between 4-6
percent.
I will examine my first independent variable, the state's reception of Muslim
immigrants, through the analysis of literature regarding the incorporation policies of my
chosen case studies. I will discuss the different approaches my case studies take when
integrating their immigrant into their societies. I will examine my second independent
variable, the public's reception of Muslim immigrants, through two different surveys. The
first is the same survey used for my dependent variable, “Few Signs of Backlash From
Western Europeans” by Pew Global Attitudes Project. For this part of my analysis, I will use
information on the percentage of the general public that is worried about Islamic
extremism in their country and how Muslims view their experiences with Europeans. I will
Center For Social Science Research
9
also look at data dealing with the percentage of how many Europeans are hostile towards
Muslims. The source I use is from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA). Under
their national profiles there is a “Social Regulation of Religion” section. The ARDA coded
International Religious Freedom Reports from the 2003, 2005, and 2008 reports. I will be
using two coded sections from the “Social Regulation of Religion”. The first is “societal
attitudes toward other or nontraditional religions”. The way it is coded is as follows: 0=
open and tolerant; 1= isolated discrimination; 2= negative just in certain regions or toward
certain religious brands; 3= hostile. The second question I will use from this section of the
ARDA is “are citizens intolerant of ‘nontraditional’ faiths?” Both of these questions will help
analyze the general public reception of nontraditional religions within my cases.
There are limitations to this methodology. The problem with looking at integration
policies is that there is a lack of any comparative or systematic data. As with all surveys,
one should always bear in mind that the question wording and practical difficulties in
conducting surveys could bring about errors and a bias with the outcomes of opinion polls.
Ideally, I would go out and create my own survey that would be exclusive to my research
topic. Since this is not a viable option, I must depend on other surveys that deal with
different aspects of my variables and apply them to my research variables as best I can.
Analysis
Germany
Germany has a population of of 82 million people, of which 68.2 percent is Christian
and 8.5 percent is Muslim (thearda.com). Germany is considered to be a relatively reluctant
land of immigration. This reluctance is evident by its lack of formal policies regarding the
benefits immigration may have for Germany’s economy. Because of its reluctance to
Center For Social Science Research
10
embrace immigration as a means to boost the economy there was no clear integration path.
In general, Germany has a medium level of cultural integration policies, meaning religious
and cultural group rights (Minkenberg 2008, 53). It is also important to note that because
Germany is a federal state there are important differences between regions. The
incorporation approaches within Germany are very different between liberal cities and
conservative cities (Koopmans 2004, 450). Germany is viewed as having substantial
regional variation when it comes to cultural group rights for migrants.
Graph 1 Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006
Graph 2 Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006
The data for my second independent variable, public reception of Muslim
immigrants show that there is a general negative opinion about Muslims in Germany.
According to Graph 1, 51 percent of Muslims in Germany view Europeans to be hostile
towards them. This is the highest percentage out of all the case studies. What is most
interesting about this data is that despite a perceived hostile environment, Germany has
the lowest percentage (19 percent) of Muslims that actually had a bad personal experience.
Center For Social Science Research
11
This data also coincides with the ARDA data. According to the Social Regulation of Religion
data, Germany received an overall 3 for “societal attitudes toward other or nontraditional
religions. This coding of a 3 means that Germany is an overall hostile environment. For the
question of whether citizens are intolerant of “nontraditional” faiths within Germany the
general answer was “yes and more than one case”. In 2006, 40 percent of the general
German public was very concerned about Islamic Extremism within Germany. This is a 5
percent increase from the previous year’s survey. Overall, the data leads to the conclusion
that, in general, there is a negative public perception of Muslims within German society.
Germany has an overall medium level of cultural integration policies and is considered to
be restrictive when it comes to immigration. Germany is, in general, considered to have
hostile societal attitudes towards Muslims. Graph 3 demonstrates that 66 percent of
Muslims in Germany consider their central identity to be Muslim, as oppose to being a
German citizen. Compared to Christians in Germany (33 percent viewed Christianity as
their central identity) there is a significant difference. Graph 4 shows that 84 percent of
German’s general public feel there is a very or fairly strong Islamic identity among Muslims
in their country. This data strongly suggests that a majority of Muslims within Germany are
choosing to identify with their Islamic identity over their national identity.
France
France has a total population of 63.7 million. Of this total population, an estimated 5
to 6 million Muslims live in France- approximately 8 to 10 percent of the total population
(thearda.com). Unlike Germany, France has a long history of immigration due to its
republican tradition. France has low-level of cultural integration policies (Minkenberg
2008, 53).
Center For Social Science Research
Graph 3 Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006
12
Graph 4 Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006
The position France usually takes on the cultural group rights of its migrants is a
monist or assimilationist position (Koopmans 2004, 452). France shows that this
assimilationist approach can be combined with a very open citizenship regime on the
individual level. Naturalization in France acts as a tool for assimilation (Koopmans 2004,
452). France is viewed to be a moderate state when it comes to dealing with immigration
policy (Minkenberg 2008, 53).
Graph 1 shows the data for public reception of Muslims within France. France has
the lowest percentage (39 percent) for all three countries of its Muslims that view
Europeans to be hostile. However, France has the highest percentage (37 percent) of
Muslims who said they had a bad experience with Europeans. The ARDA data concludes
that France is an overall hostile environment when it comes to societal attitudes toward
other or nontraditional religions (received a 3 in the coding process). In response to the
question regarding whether citizens are intolerant of “nontraditional” faiths, France
received an overall “yes and more than one case”. France’s general public’s concern over
Center For Social Science Research
13
Islamic extremism within its country actually decreased from 2005 to 2006, as shown in
Graph 2. Overall, France is the least concerned with Islamic extremism when compared to
Germany and Great Britain.
Graph 3 shows that more Muslims within France relate to their Islamic identity (46
percent) over their national identity (42 percent). These percentages have only a 4 percent
difference, which is the lowest out of all three countries. It should be noted that among the
Christians in France, 83 percent of them claimed their national identity to be their central
identity- this is the highest among all three nations by 24 percent. Among the general
population in France and French Muslims, there is a general agreement that French
Muslims have a very or fairly strong Islamic sense of identity (76 and 75 percent). This data
is shown in Graph 4. This data strongly suggest that more French Muslims are relating to
their religious identity over their national identity.
Great Britain
Great Britain has a total population of about 62, 348,447. Of this total population
approximately 3 percent are Muslim. Great Britain has been a net immigration country
since 1983 (Layton-Henry 2004 318). After Germany and France, the United Kingdom has
the third largest foreign population in Western Europe. Regardless of their large foreign
population, the British governments have always lacked in having a clear philosophy for
the integration of these foreign populations (Layton-Henry 2004, 328). This is partly
because Great Britain only recently- since World War II, has viewed itself as an
immigration country. The British government takes the stance that people migrate because
it is in their own interest to do so; therefore it is up to them to bear the costs and to adapt
into the British society (Layton-Henry 2004, 318). British policymakers assume that
Center For Social Science Research
14
immigrants will assimilate on their own. Great Britain has a reactive integration policy as
opposed to a proactive and planned one. Overall, Great Britain is considered to have
moderate cultural integration policies (Minkenberg 2008, 53). Great Britain is a centralized
state and therefore has a narrower range of local variation for its integration policies
(Koopmans 2008, 451).
Graph 1 shows that 42 percent of Muslims in Great Britain believe Europeans are
hostile towards Muslims. According to Graph 1, 28 percent have actually had a personal
bad experience with Europeans. The ARDA data concludes that Great Britain has hostile
(coding of a 3) societal attitudes towards other or nontraditional religions. Great Britain
was also considered to have intolerant attitudes toward ‘nontraditional’ faiths on more
than one case. Graph 2 shows that 42 percent of Great Britain’s general public is very
concerned with Islamic extremism. This percentage is the highest out of all three countries.
This percentage has increased by 8 percent from the previous year. Thus, there is a
generally negative public reception of Muslims within Great Britain.
Graph 3 shows that 81 percent of Muslims in Great Britain identify his or herself as
being Muslim first instead of identifying his or herself as a citizen of Great Britain first. This
is the highest percentage out of all three countries. To compare, the majority of Christians
(59 percent) within Great Britain consider their national identity to be their primary
identity. According to Graph 4 approximately 79 percent of Great Britain’s general public
feel there is a very or fairly strong sense of Islamic identity among Muslims in Great Britain.
This shows that not only do well over the majority of Muslims relate primarily to their
Islamic identity but that the public recognizes and witnesses a strong presence of Islamic
identities within their country. All of this data strongly suggests that a great deal of
Center For Social Science Research
15
Muslims within Great Britain are relating primarily to their religious identity over their
national identity.
These three cases show that, in general, Muslims are identifying with their religious
identity over their national identity. France is the one country has did not have a majority;
only 46 percent of their Muslims claimed their central identity to be their Islamic one. I still
consider this to be a significant number especially since 83 percent of its Christians relate
to their national identity over their religious identity. In general each state does some sort
of incorporation policy proving that there is some sort of reception of Muslim immigrants
within host societies. These integration policies, which differ from country to country, are
seen as generally failing by scholars in the field. This supports H1, the failure to properly
integrate Muslim immigrants via state incorporation policies will cause Muslim immigrants
to turn to their religious identity over their national identity. In general, all three cases
were considered to have hostile public environments for people of other or nontraditional
religions. The public reception in Germany, Great Britain and France are generally negative.
This leads me to conclude that Muslims are feeling excluded due to societal attitudes
towards them. If Muslims are having a difficult time being accepted by their society, it is
only natural that he or she find another social medium that will accept them and help his or
herself to create an identity. The social medium that these Muslims are finding to be most
accepting is a religious one, thus, leading them to view themselves as Muslims over
German, French or British. This data and conclusion supports my H2, an overall negative
public opinion about Muslims immigrants within a host society will cause Muslim
immigrants to turn to their religious identity over their national identity. Though the
correlations I have found are not necessarily causal, I believe the correlations are
Center For Social Science Research
16
significant enough to suggest that Muslim immigrants relating primarily to their religious
identity is an important factor to consider as the root of current tensions.
Conclusion
I took great care to find data that was as consistent as possible across all three of my
case studies so that I could come up with the most accurate conclusions possible. The link
between Muslim immigrants choosing to identify with their religious identity over their
national identity and the affects state reception and public reception of Muslim immigrants
has on this dependent variable has in general proved to be existent. This supports my
argument that there is an antecedent variable to be analyzed between the incorporation
policies and tensions in Western European countries. Due to my limitations within my
research I believe it to be beneficial for more scholarly work to be done on this religious
identity variable. Though incorporation policies vary among these three Western European
countries there does not appear to be an over all successful incorporation policy.
Integrating immigrants should be considered as a higher priority among policymakers. The
failure of integration causes immigrants to feel as though they are not culturally and
socially part of their new host country pushing Muslim immigrants to rely on their religious
identity. This increase in Muslims relating primary to their Islamic identity is likely a root
cause of the tensions with Western European countries. However, due to recent violence,
the issue is not exclusive to the root of the tensions, but also to how these tensions can be
eased. This is a difficult question to address because there is no uniform solution. Each
country needs to recognize the problem and work with immigrants to create a solution that
best fits with its background history, its outlook on policies and its current problems with
Muslim immigrants.
Center For Social Science Research
17
Work Cited
Bourbekeur, Amel. 2008. “Time to Deradicalise? The European Roots of Muslim
Radicalism.” International Spectator 43 (September): 85-99.
Brouard, Sylvain., and Vincent Tiberj. 2008.“The Challenge to Integration in France.” In
Immigration, Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon
Reich. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 283-299.
Brown, Bernard E. 2010.“Europe’s Muslims: A Foreign Policy Issue.” American Foreign
Policy Interests 33 (September/ October): 297-312.
Casanova, José. “Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism: A European Union/ United
States Comparison.” 59-83.
D’Appollonia, Ariane Chebel. 2008.“Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European
Union.” In Immigration, Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia
and Simon Reich.Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 203-228.
Giry, Stéphanie. 2006.“France and Its Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 85 (September- October):
87- 104.
Hervieu-Léger, Daniéle.“Islam and the Republic: The French Case.” In Democratic
Responses to the New Religious Pluralism. 203-221.
Hollifield, James F. 2004.“France: Republicanism and the Limits of Immigration Control.” In
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius and Takeyuki
Tsuda and Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 182-214.
Kastoryano, Riva. 2004.“Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany.”
International Migration Review 38 (Fall): 1234-1255.
Koopmans, Ruud. 2004.“Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among
German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.”
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (May): 449-470.
Laurence, Jonathan. 2008.“Muslims and the State in Western Europe.” In Immigration,
Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon Reich.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 229-253.
Layton-Henry, Zig. 2004.”Britain: From Immigration Control to Migration Management.” In
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius and Takeyuki
Tsuda and Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 296-333.
Center For Social Science Research
18
Leiken, Robert S. 2005.“Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Foreign Affairs 84 (July- August): 120135.
Lenard, Patti Tamara. 2010.“What Can Multicultural Theory Tell Us About Integrating
Muslims in Europe?” Political Science Review 8 (September): 308-321.
Martin, Philip L. 2004.“Germany: Managing Migration in the Twenty-First Century.” In
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, eds. Wayne A. Cornelius and Takeyuki
Tsuda and Philip L. Martin and James F. Hollifield. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 221-253.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2008.“Religious Legacies and the Politics of Multiculturalism.” In
Immigration, Integration, and Security, eds. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia and Simon
Reich. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 44-66.
Yukleyen, Ahmet. 2010.“State Policies and Islam in Europe: Milli Gorus in Germany and the
Netherlands.” Journal of Ethnic Migration Studies 36 (March): 445-463.