Joint Cabinet Crisis
Cuban Missile Crisis
Study Guide
5th-7th February 2016
Contents
1.Chairs and Staff .........................................................................................................................2
2. Historical background ..............................................................................................................4
2.1. US-Soviet confrontation ....................................................................................................4
2.2. The Cuban Revolution and its consequences .....................................................................4
2.3. Recent events of 1962 .......................................................................................................5
3. Cabinets and character profiles ................................................................................................7
3.1. John F. Kennedy’s Cabinet ................................................................................................7
3.2. Nikita Khrushchev’s Cabinet...........................................................................................10
4. Links for further preparation ..................................................................................................13
ANNEX: CRISIS RULES OF PROCEDURE ...........................................................................14
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1.Chairs and Staff
Daniel Kastan
Crisis Director
Hi, my name is Daniel Kastan and I am going to be
your Crisis Manager. I am a 22 year old law student
from Passau University. I was born in London but
mostly raised in Munich and Washington D.C. While
going to school in D.C., I went to my first MUN
conference organized by Georgetown University.
There I partook in two JCCs. I loved it and hope you
will too – after an unforgettable weekend in Nancy.
This will be my tenth conference and I know I will
enjoy it as much as I enjoy every other MUN I went to.
Hope to see you all there!
Philipp Sander
Assistant Crisis Director
Hello everyone, I am Philipp, a 23 years old masters
student of international politics and international law at
the University of Kiel, Germany. First introduced to the
exciting world of Model United Nations during my
undergraduate studies in Mannheim, I have attended a
variety of MUNs throughout Germany and the UK,
gathering experience as a delegate in both regular
committees and crisis simulations as well as behind the
scenes as part of the crisis simulation staff. I am eagerly
looking forward to meeting all of you and having a great
time processing your directives.
Alexander Eriksrød
USSR Chair
I am Alexander, an Austro-Norwegian European
studying “European Social and Political Studies” at
Sciences Po Paris and University College London. I
bring relevant experience as delegate, chair, organizer
and journalist from many and one MUN, the Global
Young Leaders Conference (GYLC), Model NATO
Youth Summit (MoNYS) and European Youth
Parliament (EYP). I very much look forward to
chairing at MUNancy 2016 and to meeting you all!
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Georg Haustein
USSR Co-Chair
My name is Georg, I am 20 years old and I am currently
studying Political and Social Sciences at Sciences Po
Paris in Nancy. I have been attending several MUN
conferences in the past few years, but MUNancy will be
the first time chairing a committee for me. The JCC
cabinet will be completely different from normal MUN
committees and I am sure that it will be difficult but also
a great experience for you and for us as chairs. Hopefully
we will have a great time and I am, of course, looking
forward to vivid debates. See you in Nancy!
Max Moosburger
USA Chair
Originally from Salzburg, Austria, I am now an 19-yearold second year student at Sciences Po Paris, Campus
de Nancy. A thorough interest in international relations
and especially global security issues has motivated me
to participate in various policy simulations in Europe
and the United States, where I garnered some invaluable
experiences, which I am now eager to apply and pass on
as Head of Cabinet at MUNancy.
Markus Specht
USA Co-Chair
My name is Markus, I am 20 years old and an
International Baccalaureate alumnus who started
participating at MUN conferences after returning from
a year in the United States in 2012. I am a now a firstyear student at the Nancy campus of SciencesPo Paris
and an active member of UNAN. MUNancy 2016 will
be my first time organizing a conference and I look very
much forward to chairing the US cabinet of the JCC.
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2. Historical background
2.1. US-Soviet confrontation
In the early 1960s, the cold war between the United States and the USSR was at its height.
Both world powers continued their space race. After the Soviet Union had launched
Sputnik, the first man-made satellite, into orbit on October 4th, 1957, the United States
and Soviet Union competed against each other to be the first state to reach certain space
milestones (e.g. first person in space and, first person on the moon).
On the planet’s surface, the competition took the form of an arms race, and on June 1 st,
1961, the US officially started to deploy Jupiter type nuclear intermediate-range ballistic
missiles targeting the Soviet Union in Turkey. During a meeting in Vienna on June 3rd,
1961, Kennedy and Khrushchev discuss international relations. Apparently, Khrushchev
developed a low opinion of Kennedy on this occasion which may have contributed to his
aggression during the Cuban Missile Crisis. From June 4th, 1961 to November 9th, 1961,
US and Soviet forces engaged in a stand-off as the Soviets began construction of the
Berlin Wall. Ultimately the tanks were withdrawn and President Kennedy accepted the
Berlin Wall lest war break out.
2.2. The Cuban Revolution and its consequences
On January 1st, 1959, President Batista of Cuba fled from Cuba to the Dominican
Republic. His departure allowed Fidel Castro’s revolutionary forces to seize power;
Castro became Prime Minister. Initially, Castro claimed that his revolution was not a
Communist revolution. Nonetheless, the USSR officially provided diplomatic
recognition of the new Cuban government the following year. When the revolutionary
government nationalized American property, the United States ended all exports to Cuba
on October 19th 1960. Exactly two month later, Cuba openly aligned itself with the Soviet
Union after the Soviet government had established trade relations and provided an
economic credit to its new ally. Consequently, the US rescinded its diplomatic recognition
of the Castro government and closed its embassy in Havana on January 3rd, 1961. Still
under the Eisenhower administration, the US initiated a plan to train and support a cadre
of 1,500 anti-Castro Cuban exiles.
In the midst of deteriorating US-Cuban relations, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard
Nixon in the 1960 election and was sworn-in as President on January 20th, 1961. On April
17th, 1961, the rebels landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in order to topple the Castro
government. The Kennedy administration decided to withdraw military support for the
invasion, dooming the rebel force. After three days, the exiles were defeated, a major
blow for the United States and John F. Kennedy. The President later authorised the CIA
to conduct Operation Mongoose, a covert operation in Cuba in order to kill Castro and
remove the Communist government from power on November 30th, 1961.
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2.3. Recent events of 1962
January 21-31, 1962 Cuba expelled from OAS
At the Organization of American States’s eighth meeting of
ministers of foreign affairs in, the United States leads the other
Western Hemispheric countries in a vote to eject Cuba from the
Organisation.
February 3, 1962
US embargo on all trade with Cuba
The United States announces Proclamation 3447, a near-complete
economic embargo of Cuba.
May 13-20, 1962
Khrushchev decides to place missiles in Cuba
Khrushchev decides to place nuclear missiles in Cuba at some point
during a May trip to Bulgaria. After the trip, he informes members
of the Politburo of his plans.
May 29, 1962
Talks between USSR and Cuba on nuclear missile deployment
After deliberations within the Soviet government, Khrushchev
dispatches a delegation to discuss the placement of nuclear missiles
in the country. Castro accepts the missile deployment the day after
meeting the delegation.
September 15, 1962 First missiles arrive in Cuba
Poltava, the first Soviet ship carrying medium-range ballistic
missiles (or MRBMs) arrived in Cuba. Construction begins.
October 14, 1962
U2 overflight takes first pictures of MRBM sites
A U2 aircraft flying over western Cuba takes pictures of the
Soviet missile sites for the first time.
October 15, 1962
Analysis of U2 pictures indicate MRBMs being assembled
Analysis from the National Photographic Interpretation Center
confirms the existence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. The
photographic analysis also reveals that the Soviets are placing
intermediate-range IL-28 bombers in Cuba, capable of carrying
nuclear bombs to the U.S.
October 16, 1962
Ex-Comm has its first meeting.
Ex-Comm, a group of American political leaders, meets for the
first time to discuss the Soviet missiles. Ex-Comm would meet
several times throughout the crisis and the members rarely agreed
on what to do.
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October 17, 1962
Photos show evidence of long-range missiles.
More photos of the missile sites are analysed and show that Cuba
also has long-range Soviet missiles. These missiles are capable of
traveling 2,200 miles.
October 18, 1962
Robert Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy keeps a previously scheduled
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, but does
not mention the missiles. Gromyko tells Kennedy that the only help
the Soviet Union is giving to Cuba is assistance growing crops and
missiles that are only for defense.
October 19, 1962
Ex-Comm suggests quarantining Cuba.
Ex-Comm meets and discusses sending U.S. ships to Cuba to
prevent Soviet ships from reaching the island. They are careful to
call it a quarantine because a blockade is an act of war.
October 20, 1962
Robert Kennedy gives Ex-Comm's recommendation to the
president.
After meeting all day the previous day, Robert Kennedy tells the
president that Ex-Comm recommends a quarantine. President
Kennedy was in Chicago, but lies about having a cold so that he
can return to Washington to deal with the crisis.
October 21, 1962
Ted Sorenson writes one of the most important speeches
President Kennedy will ever give.
Attorney and advisor to the president, Ted Sorenson, writes the
speech that Kennedy will give to the nation. Informing Americans
that the Soviets have missiles in Cuba that are pointed at the U.S.
will be an important moment in American history and one of the
most frightening speech as president ever gives.
October 22, 1962
President Kennedy gives a televised speech to the nation.
President Kennedy gives a speech that is carried live on television
stations across the country to inform Americans that missiles have
been discovered in Cuba. He tells Americans that he has ordered a
Navy quarantine around Cuba and orders the Soviets to remove the
missiles.
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3. Cabinets and character profiles
3.1. John F. Kennedy’s Cabinet
Have you ever wondered, how it must have felt to hold the fate of the world in your hands
during those infamous thirteen days in October 1962 when the America and Russia stood
at the precipice of an all out nuclear war? As a member of the Executive Committee
(ExComm) of the U.S. National Security Council advising the President and VicePresident of the United States of America, you, being at the levers of power, will decide
how to respond to Russia stationing ballistic nuclear missiles on the communist Island of
Cuba, just over a thousand miles away from Washington and New York. Never have the
stakes been higher: not just are the United States about to loose whatever strategic
advantage they might have had over the USSR, but millions of its citizens are in
immediate danger of succumbing in a nuclear holocaust. You are the only ones in the
position to prevent all this from happening, but only with a smart strategy and through
savvy diplomacy. Are you up for the challenge?
McGeorge Bundy
Position: National Security Advisor
Having been chosen as the youngest ever dean of Harvard’s Faculty of Arts and Sciences,
McGeorge Bundy already looked back on an accomplished career as foreign policy expert
when he was appointed National Security Advisor (NSA) by President Kennedy in 1961.
One of Kennedy's "wise men," Bundy played a crucial role in all of the major foreign
policy and defense decisions of the Kennedy administration. During the crises, Bundy
encouraged the members of the Executive Committee to consider different options and
various approaches towards resolving the conflict and even played devil’s advocate to
make change his President’s mind. He himself, however, was also perfectly willing to
change his mind if another position seemed more sensible. At the beginning of the crises
(October 18) he advocated inaction, so as to avoid open hostilities, the next day, however,
he changed his mind and favoured a decisive military strike, regarding a blockade as
insufficient.
Robert Kennedy
Position: Attorney General of the United States
Nominally head of the Justice Department and America’s highest prosecutor, attorney
and legal council, Robert Kennedy was more than “just” that to his brother, John F.
Kennedy: he was one of his most trusted advisors on all policy issues, including foreign
and security policy. Inaction, to him, was unthinkable, but so was a military first strike.
He was therefore a strong proponent of a blockade policy so as to demonstrate to the
Soviets America’s seriousness about the threat it was facing whilst at the same time
leaving enough room for the Russians for a manoeuvre to pull back. He demonstrated his
political skills and intellect during an enormously tense meeting with the Soviet
ambassador, which would turn out to be turning point in the crisis.
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Dean Rusk
Position: Secretary of State
An experienced and cautious diplomat, Rusk was a major proponent of multilateral
approaches and international backing. Even though he never outrightly opposed it, he
remained cautious about a military strike and much rather advocated for diplomatic
solutions, so as to undermine Soviet-Cuban relationships and thus breaking the deadly
axis between Moscow and Havana. Advocating for a blockade, he was nonetheless
against an ultimatum and in favour of UN monitoring. Even though the relationship
between Rusk and the President was fraught from the beginning, his insight proved to be
crucial for the resolution of the crisis.
Robert McNamara
Position: Secretary of Defense
A shrewd former business man, McNamara was known for his deconstructing analysis of
policy issues. He regarded the soviet deployment as a political crisis, not an issue
affecting overall nuclear balance between the superpowers. It was McNamara who most
forcibly supported the idea of a blockade early on in the ExComm meetings. Rather than
issuing a military ultimatum, he favoured a more nuanced option which would allow for
negations, since he feared immediate soviet nuclear retaliation in response to any
American military action against Cuba.
John McCone
Position: Director of Central Intelligence
A powerful former industrialist and government advisor, John McCone took to the helm
of the worlds most powerful spy agency in late 1961 after the disastrous Bay of the Pigs
invasion. In September 1962, McCone foresaw the possibility of Soviet nuclear
deployment on the island of Cuba and ordered the surveillance flights which ultimately
discovered them. During the ExComm meeting, John McCone took a hard line stance,
arguing for an airstrike after a 24 hour ultimatum. His opposition to the blockade was
based on his conviction that it was irresponsible to allow the stationing of ballistic
missiles close to America for an extended period of time.
General Maxwell D. Taylor
Position: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Taylor, an accomplished World War II commander, severed as highest general in the
armed forces and Kennedy’s top military advisor. The President and his brother held
Taylor in highest regard and had an exceptionally good relationship with him. Joining
with other hardliners, he advocated a surprise military air strike. However, he had his
doubts about getting “our feet in that deep mud of Cuba” and believed a costly invasion
should be a last resort.
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C. Douglas Dillon
Position: Secretary of Treasury
Although he served as Secretary of Treasury, Dillon had vast foreign policy expertise due
to his experiences as ambassador to France and Undersecretary of State. During the crisis
he favoured a hard line, initially advocating a military strike but later, Dillon proposed to
begin with the blockade, refuse negotiations, demand removal of the missiles, and
threaten further military action. He was convinced that America had to demonstrate firm
intention and was the first to come up with the idea of the blockade to present the Soviets
with an ultimatum to remove the missiles or face military action.
Llewellyn Thompson
Position: Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs
Having served as a senior staffer in the America’s Moscow embassy and as ambassador
to Austria, Thompson was US Ambassador to the Soviet Union until just a few weeks
before the crisis erupted and as a result was named Ambassador at Large for Soviet
Affairs, so as to legitimise his advisory function in the ExComm. His unparalleled
knowledge of Russian and Soviet politics, culture and language made him a vital part of
the team. He supported the blockade and urged the President to accompany it with a
demand that Khrushchev dismantle the weapons in Cuba.
Adlai Stevenson
Position: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
A former Governor and presidential candidate, Stevenson was a prominent Democratic
party politician how was named UN ambassador by JFK in 1961. In the ExComm he
boldly proposed to make an exchange with the Soviets: if they would remove their
missiles from Cuba, the United States would agree to remove its obsolete Jupiter missiles
from Turkey. However, he faced strong opposition from some other EXCOMM members,
who regarded such an exchange as a sign of weakness. In the end it turned out that this
very exchange would be the Soviets’ demand for their retreat from Cuba. During a UN
Security Council session, Stevenson famously demonstrated to the world the extent of the
Soviet aggression and monumentally won the debate against his Soviet counterpart.
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3.2. Nikita Khrushchev’s Cabinet
In 1962, the world was dominated by the United States of America and the only country
capable of holding up to its power was the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis
perfectly epitomizes the aims of the US and NATO to oppress the Soviet Union and its
allied countries. Russia was aiming to execute its legitimate right of self-defence by
taking effective measures to achieve power balance in the world between the Soviet
Union and the United States. In the Soviet Cabinet you can help the Soviet Union and all
communist States at that time to finally regain control and put an end to the US strive for
world hegemony. We hope that you will enjoy participating in our cabinet and we are
looking forward to your input. Will the Cold War find a peaceful end or will the
imperialist US be erased from the landscape? The world is in your hands.
It should be noted that the Cuban missile crisis (referred to as „Caribbean crisis“ in the
Soviet Union) was perceived very differently in the Soviet Union than in the United
States. Other than the US, the Soviet Union was long accustomed to (dangers of) war,
while the US had, much due to its insulated geographical position, never experienced this
fear on its homeland. (Khrushchev had, as a child, personally experienced the invasion of
his hometown by Austrian forces during World War I).
Nikita Khrushchev
Position: First Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the Soviet Union
Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) was First Secretary of the Communist Party
before becoming Chairman in 1958. He moved from supporting Stalin’s repressive
methods to rather liberal domestic reforms aimed at improving the lives of the ordinary
citizen (the effectiveness of which was, often, questionable). In foreign policy, his role
was crucial: he took the final decisions in all matters of the crisis. He had a high opinion
of Kennedy and even, rather far from reality, thought this to be mutual (especially after
the Vienna meetings in 1962). The rivalry of the Cold War, together with the surrounding
ideological, political and military competition, led Khrushchev to place ICBMs on Cuban
soil. He aimed to (1) restore the nuclear balance which he perceived as unfavorable and
(2) to protect the allied Cuban government from a feared US invasion. After the
imperialist invasion of the Bay of Pigs failed utterly and left the United States humiliated,
the Soviet Union had reason to believe a US-invasion (overt, this time) was imminent.
Hence Khrushchev was determined not to lose the only important ally so close to
American soil whose leader Castro, in addition, represented a very appealing
revolutionary spirit.
Leonid Brezhnev
Position: Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union
Brezhnev was the head of the Soviet state, although this position is seen as largely
symbolic. He was, however, close to Khrushchev and greatly influenced him. Brezhnev,
who followed Khrushchev in 1964, was one of the Hardline-Communists during all of
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the Crisis. Later on, the meetings between Brezhnev and Nixon played an important role
in breaking the ice and reducing tensions between the two superpowers. Brezhnev had
long advocated these meetings internally as, as he knew, the Soviet Union could not
sustain the enormous costs of the Cold War much longer.
Andrey Gromyko
Position: Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union
Gromyko was never particularly fond of president Kennedy, and even disliked him
personally because of his arrogance. Western pundits liked to refer to him as „Mr. No“
because of his frequent use of the Russian veto in the UN Security Council. He
nevertheless supported general détente between the Soviet Union and the United States
and, in 1963, he helped negotiate the first Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In his memoirs
he stated that „Disarmament is the ideal of socialism.”
Matvei Zakharov
Position: Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union
Zakharov gave his local commanders the authority to make their own decisions
concerning the use of the nuclear means of the Luna, Il-28, or FKR-2 as instruments of
local warfare for the „destruction of the invaders of the Cuban territory and to defend the
Republic of Cuba.” Zakharov thus raised the game considerably in what might have been
one of the most dangerous moves of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Walerian Sorin
Position: Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United Nations
Walerian Zorin was confronted on October 25, 1962, by the US ambassador to the United
Nations (Adlai Stevenson) with the photographs taken by American U-2 reconnaissance
planes over Cuba.
„Why did you deliberately, cynically deceive us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba? Do
you, Ambassador Zorin, deny, that the USSR has placed and is placing medium-range
ballistic missiles and missile sites in Cuba? Yes or No? Don’t wait for the translation!
Yes or No, I ask […] I’m prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over.“
Famously, Zorin refused to provide an answer in the United Nations General Assembly.
It is known today that he had not been informed about the stationing of nuclear weapons
in Cuba.
Anatoli Fjorodowitsch Dobrynin
Position: Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States
Dobrynin was the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States throughout the
majority of the Cold War. He helped to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis peacefully, but
also negotiated several arms treaties with the US including the Ballistic Arms Treaty in
1972 which prevented a nuclear war. Even though he was very much committed to
communist ideals, the English-speaking Dobrynin was considered to be one of a few
Soviet diplomats who understood the United States, which becomes evident in his
diplomatic friendship with Henry Kissinger. Throughout the Cold War era he was known
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for his „back-channel“ diplomacy and in the end he sustained a network of diplomats and
journalists even reaching the Oval office.
Wassili Alexandrowitsch Archipow
Position: Submarine Commander, Soviet Union
Arkhipov can be considered to be the real hero of the Cuban Missile Crisis as he refused
to launch a Nuclear Missile from a submarine, which he commanded as Senior Officer.
When the Soviet submarine was attacked by United States Navy destroyers on 27 October
1962 the crew, including the three officers in charge, did not know whether the Soviet
Union and the United States were at war. Contrary to the other two officers in charge
Arkhipov thought it would be wiser to wait for further instruction from Moscow and
denied the launch of a nuclear missile, which prevented the outbreak of a nuclear war.
Fidel Castro
Position: Prime Minister of Cuba
The president of the Republic of Cuba from 1959 to 1976 survived many attempts of
removal (partly through economic blockades) and even assassinations by the American
government before 1962. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion he reached a secret
agreement with Nikita Khrushchev which aimed to protect the Republic of Cuba with
Soviet nuclear missiles. Due to the fact that Castro was left out of any negotiations
concerning the aftermath of this agreement, he felt betrayed by Khrushchev, but the
relations between the two countries were good throughout the 1960s. Even though he did
not play an important role in the development of this particular crisis, at MUNancy his
position and demeanor may lead to a completely different outcome than in 1962.
Raúl Roa García
Position: Foreign Minister of Cuba
Roa's role as the Foreign minister at the time can be considered as essential for the actual
execution of diplomatic agreements between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union
within the borders of Cuba. Anything concerning the integrity of the country needed to
be discussed with the Foreign Minister. Therefore, everything pertaining to solutions in
Cuba and the maritime territory of Cuba needs to be approved by Roa throughout the
conference.
Andrej Grechko
Position: Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization
Grechko is the man to turn to when it comes to any unfriendly tasks. As the Commander
in Chief of the Forces of the Warsaw Pact, he was responsible for the defense of all
Member States of the Soviet Union and on October 26 1962 he wrote to Hungarian
Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege demanding combat readiness as a response to
„Kennedy’s provocative announcement on 23 October 1962 and the increased danger of
the outbreak of war caused by the Western aggressors.“
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Therefore, when it comes to ultimately defending communism, Grechko is the man who
has the power to command military actions from the Warsaw Pact Member States and
increase the military capabilities of the Soviet Union.
4. Links for further preparation
http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/
http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/
You might also want to check out the 2000 movie Thirteen Days starring Kevin Costner
which provides an accurate account of the Cuban missile crisis.
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ANNEX: CRISIS RULES OF PROCEDURE
I. GENERAL
Joint Cabinet Crisis simulations (hereafter JCC) are not subject to the same rules
of procedure governing other MUN bodies. Therefore, the present document
regulates every dynamic of the work within the JCC.
II. CRISIS STAFF
a. The Crisis Director and, in his place, all members of the crisis staff are the
maximum authority within the JCC. They decide upon the development of the
Crisis and their decisions are not subject to appeal. In the case of a specific conflict
between two participants, the Crisis Director, or a representative from the Crisis
Staff, will rule on the issue.
b. Only the Crisis Staff has the authority to issue decisions on the development of
the crisis. Any communications between Cabinets, not approved by the Crisis
Staff will be considered null, and the participants will be sanctioned within the
crisis.
c. The Crisis Staff is only subject to the Secretary General on disciplinary matters.
III. COMMITTEE DIRECTORS
a. Committee Directors are the main authority within each cabinet, and are only
subject to decisions made by the Crisis Staff, on crisis-relevant matters, and by
the Secretary General, on disciplinary issues.
b. Within each committee, chairs represent the Head of State of the country in
question. For this reason, they are the main decision making authority on official
actions.
c. Committee Directors also regulate debate within the Cabinet by giving the floor
to delegates at their discretion. It is up to the Committee Director to set particular
debating procedures within the Cabinet, if he or she so wishes, and these decisions
are not subject to appeal by the delegates.
IV. PARTICIPANTS
a. Participants, also referred to as delegates, are the backbone of the JCC
simulation. They are subject to executive actions and debating procedures
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introduced by the Chair, decisions on the development of the Crisis Staff and to
the Secretary General on disciplinary matters.
b. They play the role of a minister, a military general or any other sort of political
or religious authority within the cabinet. Participants must therefore fulfil this role
to the best of their abilities, and avoid privileging other personal circumstances
when making crisis-related decisions and actions.
V. DISCIPLINE
Participants, Committee Directors and Crisis Staff members are all bound to the
MUNany 2016 general rules of conduct, and any breach thereof will be
immediately reported to the Secretary General for consideration.
VI. LANGUAGE
Delegates are not bound to utilize parliamentary language at any time, in contrast
with other MUN bodies. Participants may also refer to themselves and their peers
in first and second person, respectively, both during speeches and informal
negotiations. However, participants must, at all times, refer to the assigned
characters of their fellow participants and keep a respectful attitude towards the
committee director and the Crisis Staff.
VII. WORK WITHIN THE JCC
a. The JCC is composed of three cabinets, each of them representing a specific
State. The crisis develops through the interactions both between and within
individual cabinets. The Crisis Staff will manage additional international actors.
b. Each cabinet is composed of one Committee Director and ten delegates, each
of them representing a particular minister or authority of the respective country.
VIII. DIRECTIVES
a. Directives are the only method to develop the Crisis. They consist of a text,
submitted by participants to the Crisis Staff, through a platform that will be made
available at the beginning of the simulation. Directives elaborate on a decision or
command by the respective authority, which is to be implemented by the Crisis
Staff.
b. Directives must be specific. If they are not, they may not produce the expected
results, or the Crisis Staff may even consider them inadmissible.
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c. Participants are encouraged to be creative during the submission of directives.
Participants should, however, also consider economic, institutional and military
restrictions. Said restrictions may end up weakening a directive or even declaring
it completely inadmissible.
d. There are two main types of directives: individual and collective action
directives.
IX. COLLECTIVE ACTION DIRECTIVES
a. Collective Action Directives are decisions made by the Cabinet as a whole.
Collective action directives may be automatically submitted if no Cabinet member
introduces an objection. If an objection is introduced, the directive will be voted
upon through a show of placards. In order for it to pass, it requires a simple
majority of all participants and the approval and signature of the ommittee
Director.
b. Due to their consensual nature, collective actions are more effective than
individual actions, and are not restricted to any specific field of competence.
However, the Crisis Staff will process them slower.
c. There are four kinds of Collective Action Directives
i. Press Release: Used to convey a public message in the name of the
respective government. This message will reach all cabinets and all actors
managed by the Crisis Staff.
ii. Official Executive Action: Used to make coordinated military
campaigns or establish particular nationwide policies.
iii. Legislative Action: Used to present the draft of a law to the competent
legislative authority for consideration and approval. This is still subject to
consideration by parliamentarians, i.e. the Crisis Staff, and it may not pass
even if the directive is correct.
iv. Diplomatic Action: Used to communicate with other cabinets or with
Crisis Staff‐run actors, or to arrange private meetings with their
representatives.
X. INDIVIDUALACTION DIRECTIVES
a. Individual Action Directives elaborate on decisions made by one single
participant. They do not require any voting procedure, and may be submitted
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directly without consulting the whole. However, the content of said directives
needs to be in line with the competences and authority of the submitting
participant’s character.
b. Individual Actions may prove less effective than Collective Actions, but the
Crisis Staff will process them faster.
c. There are four kinds of Individual Action Directives:
i. Press Statement: Used to convey a public message in the name of the
respective character. This message will reach all cabinets and all actors
managed by the Crisis Staff.
ii. Individual Official Action: Used to carry out specific campaigns or
actions within the competence scope of the submitting character.
Individual Official Actions will be announced to the whole cabinet and, if
relevant, to any other Cabinets involved.
iii. Individual Undercover Communication: Used to communicate or to
request a secret private meeting with members of opposing Cabinets or
with representatives of Crisis Staff--‐run actors.
iv. Individual UndercoverAction: Used to carry out a secret operation of
any kind. This is subject to further specification by the Crisis Staff during
the first day of the simulation.
XI. RESOURCES
Countries possess a limited yearly amount of resources at the beginning of the crisis. This
amount may shrink or grow during the crisis, depending on the actions undertaken by
each cabinet. Participants should take aid resources into consideration, since they may
lead to unwanted effects, if not taken seriously. A specific list of available resources will
be made available to the cabinet at the beginning and at several stages of the crisis.
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